



the opportunity to comment on its intent to seek termination of the judgments; it received no comments. For these and other reasons explained below, the United States requests that these judgments be terminated.

## **I. BACKGROUND**

From 1890, when the antitrust laws were first enacted, until the late 1970s, the United States frequently sought entry of antitrust judgments whose terms never expired.<sup>1</sup> Such perpetual judgments were the norm until 1979, when the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division”) adopted the practice of including a term limit of ten years in nearly all of its antitrust judgments. Perpetual judgments entered before the policy change, however, remain in effect indefinitely unless a court terminates them. Although a defendant may move a court to terminate a perpetual judgment, few defendants have done so. There are many possible reasons for this, including that defendants may not have been willing to bear the costs and time resources to seek termination, defendants may have lost track of decades-old judgments, individual defendants may have passed away, or company defendants may have gone out of business. As a result, hundreds of these legacy judgments remain open on the dockets of courts around the country. Originally intended to protect the loss of competition arising from violations of the antitrust laws, none of these judgments likely continues to do so because of changed circumstances.

The Antitrust Division has implemented a program to review and, when appropriate, seek termination of legacy judgments. The Antitrust Division’s Judgment Termination Initiative encompasses review of all of its outstanding perpetual antitrust judgments. The Antitrust

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<sup>1</sup> The primary antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. The judgments the United States seeks to terminate with this motion concern violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.

Division described the initiative in a statement published in the Federal Register.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the Antitrust Division established a website to keep the public apprised of its efforts to terminate perpetual judgments that no longer serve to protect competition.<sup>3</sup> The United States believes that its outstanding perpetual antitrust judgments presumptively should be terminated; nevertheless, the Antitrust Division is examining each judgment to ensure that it is suitable for termination. The Antitrust Division is giving the public notice of—and the opportunity to comment on—its intention to seek termination of these judgments.

In brief, the process by which the United States is following to determine whether to move to terminate a perpetual antitrust judgment is as follows:

- The Antitrust Division reviews each perpetual judgment to determine whether it no longer serves to protect competition such that termination would be appropriate.
- If the Antitrust Division determines a judgment is suitable for termination, it posts the name of the case and the judgment on its public Judgment Termination Initiative website, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>.
- The public has the opportunity to comment on each proposed termination within thirty days of the date the case name and judgment are posted to the public website.
- Following review of public comments, the Antitrust Division determines whether the judgment still warrants termination; if so, the United States moves to terminate it.

The United States followed this process for each judgment it seeks to terminate by this motion.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Department of Justice's Initiative to Seek Termination of Legacy Antitrust Judgments, 83 Fed. Reg. 19,837 (May 4, 2018), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2018-05-04/2018-09461>.

<sup>3</sup> *Judgment Termination Initiative*, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>.

<sup>4</sup> The United States followed this process to move other district courts to terminate legacy antitrust judgments. See, e.g., *United States v. Am. Amusement Ticket Mfrs. Ass'n*, Case 1:18-mc-00091 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2018) (terminating nineteen judgments); *In re: Termination of Legacy Antitrust Judgments*, No. 2:18-mc-00033 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) (terminating five judgments); *United States v. The Wachovia Corp. and Am. Credit Corp.*, Case No. 3:75CV2656-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 2018) (terminating one judgment); *United States v. Capital Glass & Trim Co., et al.*, Case No. 3679N (M.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2019) (terminating one judgment); *United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., et al.*, Case 1:19-mc-00069-RDB (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2019) (terminating nine judgments).

The remainder of this motion is organized as follows: Section II describes the Court's jurisdiction to terminate the judgments in the above-captioned cases and the applicable legal standards for terminating the judgments. Section III explains that perpetual judgments rarely serve to protect competition and that those that are more than ten years old presumptively should be terminated. Section III also presents factual support for termination of each judgment. Section IV concludes. Appendix A attaches a copy of each final judgment that the United States seeks to terminate. Finally, Appendix B is a proposed order terminating the final judgments.

## **II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR TERMINATING THE JUDGMENTS**

This Court has jurisdiction and authority to terminate the judgments in the above-captioned cases. Each judgment, a copy of which is included in Appendix A, provides that the Court retains jurisdiction. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant the Court authority to terminate each judgment. Rule 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) provides that, "[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . (5) [when] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)-(6); *see also Klapprott v. United States*, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949) (In simple English, the language of the 'other reason' clause, . . . vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."); *Pantoja v. Texas Gas & Transmission Corp.*, 890 F.2d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Clearly, a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for 'any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.'"); *United States v. City of Chicago*, 663 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The standard also incorporates consideration of whether there remains any need to continue the injunction, that is, whether 'the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree' have been achieved."). Thus, the Court may terminate each judgment for any reason that justifies

relief, including that the judgment no longer serves its original purpose of protecting competition.<sup>5</sup> Termination of these judgments is warranted.

### **III. ARGUMENT**

It is appropriate to terminate the perpetual judgments in each the above-captioned cases because they no longer serve their original purpose of protecting competition. The United States believes that the judgments presumptively should be terminated because their age alone suggests they no longer protect competition. Other reasons, however, also weigh in favor of terminating them. Under such circumstances, the Court may terminate the judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) or (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

#### **A. The Judgments Presumptively Should Be Terminated Because of Their Age**

Permanent antitrust injunctions rarely serve to protect competition. The experience of the United States in enforcing the antitrust laws has shown that markets almost always evolve over time in response to competitive and technological changes. These changes may make the prohibitions of decades-old judgments either irrelevant to, or inconsistent with, competition. These considerations, among others, led the Antitrust Division in 1979 to establish its policy of generally including in each judgment a term automatically terminating the judgment after no more than ten years.<sup>6</sup> The judgments in the above-captioned matters—all of which are decades old—presumptively should be terminated for the reasons that led the Antitrust Division to adopt its 1979 policy of generally limiting judgments to a term of ten years.

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<sup>5</sup> In light of the circumstances surrounding the judgments for which it seeks termination, the United States does not believe it is necessary for the Court to make an extensive inquiry into the facts of each judgment to terminate them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or (b)(6). All of these judgments would have terminated long ago if the Antitrust Division had the foresight to limit them to ten years in duration as under its policy adopted in 1979. Moreover, the passage of decades and changed circumstance since their entry, as described in this memorandum, means that it is likely that the judgments no longer serve their original purpose of protecting competition.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL at III-147 (5th ed. 2008), <https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-manual>.

**B. The Judgments Should Be Terminated Because They Are Unnecessary**

In addition to age, other reasons weigh heavily in favor of termination of each judgment.

Based on its examination of the judgments, the Antitrust Division has determined that each should be terminated for one or more of the following reasons:

- Most defendants likely no longer exist. With the passage of time, many of the company defendants in these actions likely have gone out of existence, and many individual defendants likely have passed away. To the extent that defendants no longer exist, the related judgment serves no purpose and should be terminated.
- The judgment prohibits acts that the antitrust laws already prohibit, such as fixing prices, allocating markets, rigging bids, or engaging in group boycotts. These prohibitions amount to little more than an admonition that defendants must not violate the law. Absent such terms, defendants still are deterred from violating the law by the possibility of imprisonment, significant criminal fines, and treble damages in private follow-on litigation; a mere admonition to not violate the law adds little additional deterrence. To the extent a judgment includes terms that do little to deter anticompetitive acts, it should be terminated.
- Market conditions likely have changed such that the judgment no longer protects competition or may even be anticompetitive. For example, the subsequent development of new products may render a market more competitive than it was at the time the judgment was entered or may even eliminate a market altogether, making the judgment irrelevant. In some circumstances, a judgment may impede the kind of adaptation to change that is the hallmark of competition, rendering it anticompetitive. Such judgments clearly should be terminated.

Additional reasons specific to each judgment are set forth below:

1. United States v. Milk Haulers and Dairy Workers Union, Local 916, et. al., Civil No. 653, 1950-1951 Trade Cases ¶ 62,887 (June 29, 1951)

This judgment was entered in 1951. Jurisdiction was explicitly retained in Section VII of the judgment. Defendants were perpetually enjoined and restrained from, among other things, fixing milk transportation charges; excluding, restricting, limiting or interfering with anyone engaged in the business of transporting milk; and restricting or limiting competition in the market for transporting milk. The judgment should be terminated because: (a) it is more than ten years old; (b) its terms largely prohibit acts the antitrust laws already prohibit (price fixing,

bid rigging, market allocation); and (c) most defendants appear to no longer be in the milk transportation business.

2. United States v. Tri-County Beer Distributors Assoc., et. al., Civil Action No. 2385, 1958 Trade Cases ¶ 69,021 (April 25, 1958)

The judgment was entered in 1958. Jurisdiction was explicitly retained in Section VIII of the judgment. Defendants were perpetually enjoined and restrained from, among other things, fixing prices of beer; adopting minimum retail prices; boycotting or refusing to supply beer to certain retailers; boycotting or refusing to buy beer from certain wholesalers; and boycotting or otherwise refusing to deal with any person engaged in the purchase, sale or distribution of beer. The Judgment applied to activities in Sangamon County, Illinois.<sup>7</sup> The judgment should be terminated because: (a) it is more than ten years old; (b) its terms largely prohibit acts the antitrust laws already prohibit (price fixing, bid rigging, market allocation); and (c) all defendants appear to no longer be in business.

### **C. There Has Been No Public Opposition to Termination**

The United States has provided adequate notice to the public regarding its intent to seek termination of the judgments. On April 25, 2018, the Antitrust Division issued a press release announcing its efforts to review and terminate legacy antitrust judgments.<sup>8</sup> On August 15, 2018, the Antitrust Division listed the judgments in the above-captioned cases on its public website,

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<sup>7</sup> In 1958, when this judgment was entered by the Court in the Southern District of Illinois, Sangamon County was in the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Illinois. In 1978, the Central District of Illinois was created and Sangamon County is now in the jurisdiction of the Central District of Illinois. This motion has been filed in both the Southern and Central Districts of Illinois to ensure that the judgment is properly terminated.

<sup>8</sup> Press Release, *Department of Justice Announces Initiative to Terminate "Legacy" Antitrust Judgments*, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (April 25, 2018), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-announces-initiative-terminate-legacy-antitrust-judgments>.

describing its intent to move to terminate the judgments.<sup>9</sup> The notice identified each case, linked to the judgment, and invited public comment. No comments were received.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States believes termination of the judgments in each of the above-captioned cases is appropriate, and respectfully requests that the Court enter an order terminating them. A proposed order terminating the judgments in the above-captioned cases is attached as Appendix B.

Respectfully submitted,

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<sup>9</sup> *Judgment Termination Initiative*, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>; *Judgment Termination Initiative: Southern District of Illinois*, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/judgment-termination-initiative-illinois-southern-district> (last updated October 2, 2018).