

United States & Co-Plaintiff States v. Google LLC

Plaintiffs' Closing Statement

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Redacted









Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan SVP, Knowledge &

Information Products



- Q. ...[A]nd that proposal, had it been enacted, would have offered users an option for searching where Google would anonymize the user's data and never log it, right?
- A. Correct.
- **Q.** And Google never adopted that proposal, correct?
- A. Correct.
- **Q.** And one of the concerns was if Google adopted that proposal, users would pick it and Google would lose billions of dollars in revenue, correct?
- A. That was only one of the concerns, yes.

Tr. Testimony



Decisions Without Competitive Pressure

- Prabhakar Raghavan Contacto Spoogle.com From
- 6/21/2019 12:53:52 AM Benedict Gomes (Resarced Depocele.com) Sent: To:
- Cory Ondrejka | Redacted @google.com]: Jen Fitzpatrick | @google.com] CC-
- Re: consumer council follow up ahead of notes

(dropping Nick)

Ben - I don't think that simply repackaging the content and telling us to not talk past each other is a good use of time, or will materially change the outcome. Let me try again.

- I agree that there's something worth exploring in this space of private search. But the working teams have to do MUCH more careful work before wasting our valuable time.

2019

- I want to see evidence that there's a real impact on Google users, attributable to this factor.

C

- I disagree that this is "has to be gut". I even gave a clear example of a closely related question that we didn't resolve with "just gut". I'd have at least expected some curiosity of the form "Oh really, how?" A company at our scale and with our resources can't he run on out when we have data available

- I disagree with a methodology that consists of conflating "people care increasingly about privacy, DDG is making a lot noise about it, Sundar mentioned it in I/O* (all true statements) then concluding that this needs a product change.

- If the data supported it, I'd have expected the team to consult with Policy, Comms, Privacy and Revenue, before arriving at any product proposal. I recognize they're trying to move fast, but surely not at the expense of quality work?

- I was dismayed that we conducted 58 minutes of yesterday's meeting on "gut" then - the one place we had a real model (revenue) the reaction was "I don't believe it" (without seeing the analysis) and "I instead happen to think it's \$X" (i.e., the people who do incredibly precise revenue analysis week after week are surely wrong).

Net - I do want us to consider this topic again, but we have to go through the diligence suggested in Cory's and my emails.

On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 4:45 PM Benedict Gomes <Redated @google.com> wrote:

In thinking about yesterday's conversation, I think we ended up talking past each other. I think there were two points of confusion:

- Ithink the original goal of the meeting was to look at DDG's privacy and what we could do in that context. So the framing was very DDG focussed (that was actually the explicit topic, 1 believe). I don't think anyone feels like we should strongly frame our external positioning w.r.t. DDG, but the meeting and our conversation. ended up skewing in that direction.

- I also think that there were many things explored and we were talking about different things in terms of product and money. What I personally had in mind was fairly modest and I think we need to come back with a more focussed version that has the right ad numbers for that proposal

Overall, I think we mostly agree the privacy sensitive search spot is an important positioning point that is a potential threat (whether it is DDG, Owant or something else) that we need to think about in the context of our environment and what we should do from both a product and marketing perspective.

Could we redo a part of that meeting with the more modest proposal and then see if we have the same Als?



Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan SVP, Knowledge & Information Products

"I disagree with a methodology that consists of conflating 'people' care increasingly about privacy'... then concluding that this needs a product change."



"Google Does Not Respect Your Privacy"



Apple's Take

"[T]he implication of recommending DuckDuckGo when customers choose private browsing is that **Google does not respect your privacy**, which while true would certainly be a public slap in the face."

Monopoly Maintenance

What Google Did...

Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market

A. Google Has Monopoly Power In General Search

B. General Search Is A Relevant Market

Monopoly Power: Direct Evidence



"[T]he company set the price of Windows without considering rivals' prices, . . . something a firm without a monopoly would have been unable to do."

> United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 57–58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

"In analyzing potential changes to its Search product, Google considers the needs of users. Google recognizes that it exists in a competitive landscape and if it does not satisfy users' information needs, users will access information from myriad other search providers (general or otherwise). Google does not, however, consider whether users will go to other specific search providers (general or otherwise) if it introduces a change to its Search product."

> UPX6019 at -365–66 (written 30(b)(6) response).





Prof. Kevin Murphy

Google Expert Prof. of Economics, Univ. of Chicago A. ... So the idea that we can infer they had a precise estimate, I think is incorrect, because the deals they were doing weren't conditional on that number being exactly right or even close to right, right? In other words, there's a lot of headroom between those numbers and what the deal they were doing....

Tr. Testimony



Users Lack Alternatives



"In other wo	ords, 1 IS
point =	Redacted
	revenue ex- c Acquisition



Users Preferences Ignored



"How long do you want Google to store this data?"

Never: 17% 1 day to 1 month: 32% 2 months to 1 year: 25%



Jennifer Fitzpatrick SVP, Core System & Experiences

A. ... And 18 months was greater than one year and kind of a round number. We played with 13 months, but it just felt like a really weird number. 18 months just felt a little -- you know, it felt a little better. And, so, that became the default
Tr. Testimony

Monopoly Power: Indirect Evidence





Monopoly Market Share





Monopoly Power Durable





Even Greater Mobile Dominance

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US CA GB DE	Avg VS Score LY/L Q Redacted	Desktop Search Query Share 84% 88% 84% 87%	vs LY 1% 0% 0%	Mobile Search Query Share 98% 98% 99% 99%	vs LY 0% 0% 0%	"Searchnin ess" vs LY (Android)	GApp queries in % of iOS	vs LY	Mobile Query Share	
FR JP AU BR IN MX PL TR RU		87% 54% 90% 95% 93% 93% 93% 94% 23%	-1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%	99% 60% 99% 100% 99% 100% 100% 100% 48%	-1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%				84%	
		th Greative Excellen		reased from Reda		e quarter UPX0 1:26-cr-03	476		Desktop Query Share	

Monopoly Power: Barriers to Entry





Entry Not Fundable

	EX. No. UPX0240 1/20-04320104PM
GHLY CONFIDENTIAL	APLGOCGDOJ-0057850

2018

Redacted

"[T]he reason a better search engine has not appeared is that **it's not a VC fundable proposition even though it's a lucrative business**."



John Giannandrea Apple Chief, Machine Learning & AI Strategy; Former Google Head of Search & AI

- **A.** ... [A] startup could not raise enough money, in my opinion, to build a very good, large-scale search engine.
- Q. You believed that in 2018?
- A. I did.
- **Q.** And you still believe that?
- A. I do.

Tr. Testimony



Market Participants Agree



John Giannandrea Apple Chief, Machine Learning & Al Strategy; Former Google Head of Search & Al

- **Q.** And the "so few contenders" -- "serious contenders" is because of the cost and complexity of the general search engine problem?
- A. In my opinion, to build a competitive project is very expensive.

Tr. Testimony

Presentation re: "Seven Deadly Sins of Tech" by Hal Varian

General purpose search is a tough business.

UPX0334 (2019)



Sridhar Ramaswamy Former Neeva CEO & Founder; Former Google SVP, Ads & Commerce

A. ... We did our own crawl, we did our own search index. These are things that most even - like I would say most good engineers would basically give up on before they start, because it is a Herculean problem.

Tr. Testimony



Dr. Mark Israel

Google Expert, Compass Lexecon

- Q. Okay. And so -- and Google invests billions of dollars in building its index and crawling the web, right?
- **A.** Right, and makes substantial revenue doing so on the queries that it monetizes.

Tr. Testimony



- Complexity and cost (crawling, indexing, ranking, serving)
- Acquiring necessary scale
- Brand recognition and consumer loyalty
- Google's control of search access points through exclusive distribution contracts
- Google's control of the default on Chrome

Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market

A. Google Has Monopoly Power In General Search

B. General Search Is A Relevant Market



Search The Web



John Giannandrea Apple Chief, Machine Learning & AI Strategy; Former Google Head of Search & AI



- **Q.** Let's start with what a -- briefly what a general search engine is.
- A. A general search engine is a tool that you use to search the worldwide web using queries.

* * *

- **Q.** Okay. And general search engines help users find content on the web?
- A. Yes, that's their main function.

Tr. Testimony

Google's Ordinary-Course Analyses Show That SVPs Are Not In The Market



SVPs Are Complements

C 2019

Executive Summary

- We have found no evidence of short-term negative per-user revenue impact (or a negative query volume impact or a meaningful shift in query volume of "shoppy" queries away from Google) resulting from a user becoming an online retail loyalty program member or being active on large online retailers.
- In fact, engagement on large online retailers and querying on G.com are positively correlated we have
 observed that loyalty program members and regular shoppers at large online retailers have higher query
 volume on G.com, including higher query volume in "shoppy" verticals (including those verticals that large
 online retailers are known to be very strong in like Computers & Consumer Electronics).
- Naturally these users are subsequently more active on large online retailers' sites, but our analysis
 indicates that is *likely incremental to rather than cannibalizing* their activity on G.com- we see no
 evidence of a change in G.com query volume when users sign up for loyalty membership, and even see
 some evidence of an increase in expected G.com revenue and engagement when users are active on the
 retailer's sites.

long-term impact, seasonality, and trend of impac limitations section on Slide 7	2 months and impact estimate is measured over a 12 week window. Therefore, it are not tested in this analysis. More detailed scope/saveats are induded in Notest exceptions.
oogle	Diffusion - Propriets
	Ex. No. UPX0344
	1:20-cv-03010-APM

"We have found <u>no evidence of short-</u> <u>term negative per-user revenue</u> <u>impact</u> (or a negative query volume impact or a meaningful shift in query volume of 'shoppy' queries away from Google) resulting from a user becoming an online retail loyalty program member or being active on large online retailers."



SVPs Are Complements

G 2019

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ogle		Definition - Propriet
		Ex. No.



Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan SVP, Knowledge & Information Products

- Q. And so loyalty members, Amazon Prime members tend to do more searches, not fewer searches on Google.com, right?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. And that doesn't just apply to Amazon Prime or loyalty members, the same positive correlation exists for regular shoppers of large online marketplaces, right?
- A. That's what it says here . . .

Tr. Testimony

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UPX0344 at -057-58; Tr. 7434:7-15 (Raghavan (Google)); see also Des Tr. 140:21-141:17 (Miller (Google) Dep.).



Project Charlotte

|--|

Executive Summary

- We have found no evidence of short-term negative per-user revenue impact (or a negative query volume impact or a meaningful shift in query volume of "shoppy" queries away from Google) resulting from a user becoming an online retail loyalty program member or being active on large online retailers.
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	Due to data limitations, analysis o long-term impact, seasonality, an limitations section on Slide 7	by covers last 12 months and impect estimate is measured over a 12 week window. Therefore, d trend of impact are not tested in this analysis. More detailed scope/parcests are industed in
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oogle		Definition - Programmer
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		Ex. No.
		Ex. No. UPX0344



Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert, Compass Lexecon

- Q. Were you aware [] of that, sir, that Google had actually done research and concluded that people who spent a lot of time on Amazon did not harm them?
- A. I don't recall the full study, if I've studied it. I would have to look at the full study to see what's being compared to what. So I can't agree from what you're showing me on the "does not harm them," but I see the statement.

Tr. Testimony



Project Charlotte

	PLEASE NOTE: This data soo Aphilastic Party Ast	s is strictly confident of and n net broken. Tealmy as well as t	eed to know, and may be d hose 100-, fer additional inf	ermed to be material nonpublic bimation on material nonpublic is	internation. Please	
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EXHIBIT PSX00562

GOOG-DOJ-30669

"App adopters are correlated with increased revenue and queries on mobile."

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SVPs Are Complements

PLCASC NOTE: Tais data is endedy. State of plants for the Social Plants	confident di anti need de Anjou, and may too desemble be material incrupuible information. Present transferent a Roser - too, for ad Biblioni information and material normation instruction
	requent Google Users
As expected, Amazon users are also more likely to be regular and frequent Google users.	Nor Africaum Users Redacted
There is a slight correlation of higher Amazon App use to higher G.com frequency. But in general all Amazon App users see high G.com usage.	0% 25% 50% 75% Amazon and Goodle Use Frequency 0 to 10 days Redacted
	IN I
CONFIDENTIAL	EXHIBIT PSX00562



Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert, Compass Lexecon

A. So I think I would say at that sort of broad level, of everything Amazon and Google do, there are elements of complementarity between them, and the existence of the app[] might help Google. They like that shopping apps[] are there.

Tr. Testimony

"[I]t would be improper to group complementary goods into the same relevant market just because they occasionally substitute for one another. Substitution must be effective to hold the primary good to a price near its costs[.]"

FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2015) (cleaned up)

"[A] product market is made up of substitute goods, not complements, even going so far as to say that [g]rouping complementary goods into the same market is 'economic nonsense."

Intel Corp. v. Seven Networks, LLC, 562 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (cleaned up)





Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert Compass Lexecon

- Q. Okay. There's no documents from Google that validate this analysis; right? You don't have any example where Google themselves have actually looked at this analysis or considered this analysis; right?
- A. This is not based on a Google document. It's based on my analysis of the data.

Tr. Testimony

"[W]hile providers of all tax preparation methods may compete at some level, this does not necessarily require that [they] be included in the relevant product market for antitrust purposes."

United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 54 (D.D.C. 2011)

Market Definition: Brown Shoe Factors

"These 'practical indicia' of market boundaries may be viewed as evidentiary proxies for proof of substitutability and cross-elasticities of supply and demand."

United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 51 (D.D.C. 2011)



- Industry or public recognition of the market
- The product's peculiar characteristics and uses
- Unique production facilities
- Sensitivity to price or quality changes
- Specialized vendors
- Distinct customers
- Distinct prices




Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert Compass Lexecon

- Q. Google said to the OEMs and to the carriers in the agreements it's okay for you to put – we're not going to prohibit you from putting TikTok and Amazon and Facebook, we're not going to prohibit you from putting those on the devices; right?
- A. That's what they say.
- **Q.** Right. But they do prohibit and cite exclusivity regarding general search engines?
- **A.** Yes. I mean, I have views on the why, but those aren't opinions I'm offering.

Tr. Testimony



Google Recognizes General Search



DEC 2013 INTERNAL US SEARCH SHARE METRICS (pct pts delta from NOV 2013)

US Online Panel Search Session Share (home-only, desktops, incl Mac OS)* Google 76.3% (+0.3 pct pt) Bing 13.3% (+0.2 pct pt) Yahoo 6.7% (no change) *Prior to 10K expansion sample size. Observed -0.4 pct pt for AOL and -0.1 pct pt for Ask

Adsense U.S. Click Share Google 78.6% (-0.5 pct pt) Bing 11.9% (+0.7 pct pt) Yahoo 7.1% (no change)

Analytics US. Click Share [NEW in Dec!] Google 80.6% Bing 10.6% Yahoo 6.6%

84% 98% Desktop Query Mobile Query Share in U.S. Share in U.S.



Industry And Public Recognition

G2020

WHY DOES SEARCH BEHAVIOR DIFFER?

MARKET SHARE FOR SEARCH ENGINES IN THE USA... IT ISN'T EVEN CLOSE



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Ex. No.

UPX0450



- Industry or public recognition of the market
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Peculiar Characteristics And Uses

"We see no barrier to combining in a single "The fact that a customer might buy a stick of market a number of different products or gum at a supermarket or at a convenience store services where that combination reflects does not mean there is no definable groceries commercial realities." market." United States v. Grinnell Corp., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966) 548 F.3d 1028, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2008) "The most distinguishing feature of broadline "Based on the Court's observations, the Court distribution is its product breadth and finds that the unique combination of size, diversity. . . . The other distribution channels selection, depth and breadth of inventory pale in comparison in terms of product breadth offered by the superstores distinguishes them and diversity." from other retailers." FTC v. Sysco Corp., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27–28 (D.D.C. 2015) 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1079 (D.D.C. 1997)





A. ... [A] general search engine is a place that you go to for the vast majority of your information needs.... It's a little bit of a **one-stop shop** for all information needs....

Tr. Testimony



- Q. Google answers noncommercial queries because it hopes, at some point, the user will also type in a commercial query and Google can make money off of it?
- A. Something of that sort, yes.
- Q. Well, exactly, right?



Chief Economist

A. Yeah. Okay.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Tr. 3670:6-18 (Ramaswamy (Neeva)); Tr. 188:14-19 (Varian (Google))



Peculiar Characteristics And Uses

	People also ask 1 How far can an Apple Air		ĎE	DACTED FOR PU		That's fair.	Tr. Testimo
	Add an AirTag in F Add an AirTag · Go to the AirTag and Acces	Home Screen on your iPhone sories Rems and easily keep track of them		Developer: Apple Manufacturer: Foxconn Mass: 11 g (0.39 oz) Power: CR2032 button cell Feedback	Q.	There's a variety of information a variety of places on a Goog Bing SERP; is that right?	
	AirTag is designed to discou your stuff, your iPhone will n Buy AirTag Attach AirTag to everyday	rage unwanted tracking. If someone otice it's traveling with you and I tems and easily keep track of them		designed to act as a key finder, which helps people find personal objects. Wikipedia Battery type: CR2032 battery betterytation.co.uk Connectivity: Bluetooth LE, UWB, NFC Current firmware; 2.0.36 (2A36)		Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert, Compass Lexecon	
	Apple https://www.apple.com - i AirTag - Apple	ainteg 1		AliTag is a tracking device developed by Apple. AliTag is			
	AirTag - Apple \$29.00 Apple Free gift	Apple - Airtag \$29.00 Best Buy	Apple - AirTag \$28.99 Amazon.com 30-day returns (most)				
		Pick up today					
	About 387.000,000 results (Sponsored i	(0.34 seconds)		AirTag			
	Shopping images !	Setup Tracker Videos	Review Price 4 pack Battery life	Ali filters 🖌 Tools		SafeSearch	
Google	apple airtag		x 🕹 😨 Q			🕸 III Sign in	

Tr. Testimony





Dr. Pandu Nayak VP, Search



- Q. Do you know if there's been a latency test against Google and TikTok?
- A. No, there wouldn't be a latency test because they're very different experiences. So there can't be a latency test --
- **Q.** Do you do IS scores with TikTok?
- A. We can't do IS because it's a different experience....

Tr. Testimony



- Industry or public recognition of the market
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- Distinct customers
- Distinct prices



All the critical elements of a GSE are unique:

- sophisticated crawler designed to build and maintain an index
- a constantly updated index of the entire web
- algorithms to receive unstructured queries and return the best results from the index
- search engine result page with the results from the entire web



- Industry or public recognition of the market
- The product's peculiar characteristics and uses
- Unique production facilities
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- Specialized vendors
- Distinct customers
- Distinct prices



Users Insensitive To Quality Changes

Message		-	
From: Guy Ben-Ishai Sent: 3/2/2021 1:20:45 To: Hal Varian Re	Redacted AM dacted act Reports and Willingness to Accept measures		
F	Redact	ted	
		Ex. No. UPX0340	
CONFIDENTIAL		1:20-cv-43010-APM GOOG-DDJ-30272058	

WRT the value of our product, specifically search, if Google were to disappear, people would just switch to Bing. If all search engines were to disappear we look like Borge's universal library, but with no card catalog.

Dr. Hal Varian Chief Economist



Q. This author considered a universal library that had all knowledge but no card catalog --

A. Yes.

Q. -- so there was no way to find anything?

A. Right.

Q. And so the comparison you're making here is if all generalpurpose search engines were to disappear, the world would look like Borges' Universal Library, but with no card catalog, right?

A. Right.

Tr. Testimony



- Industry or public recognition of the market
- The product's peculiar characteristics and uses
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Browsers Distribute General Search



- Industry or public recognition of the market
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Market Definition: **Brown Shoe Factors**

Market Definition: Hypothetical Monopolist Test





Prof. Michael Whinston Plaintiff Expert Prof. of Economics & Management, M.I.T. "And so, you know, for me, I looked at many, many alternatives, both when I was looking at the search services side and when I was looking at the ads side and came to the conclusion that those things would not prevent a hypothetical monopolist from exercising considerable market power."

Tr. Testimony



Dr. Mark Israel Google Expert Compass Lexecon "[It is] more normal than not that [an expert] doesn't do a full quantitative hypothetical monopolist test."

Tr. Testimony

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Tr. 10463:17-10464:21 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)); Tr. 8386:23-8387:20 (Israel (Def. Expert)).





1-	Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market
2-	Google's Search Distribution Contracts Have Anticompetitive Effects
3-	Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Benefits Outweighing The Anticompetitive Effects
4-	Summation

APPENDIX



Distinct Customers And Prices

	FOR THE DISTR	ATES DISTRICT COURT ICT OF COLUMBIA
United States of America	et al	
	Plaintiffs,	Case No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM
V.		HON. AMIT P. MEHTA
Google LLC,		
	Defendant.	
v. Google LLC, <u>DEFENDANT</u> :	Plaintiffs, Defendant S RESPONSIVE P	Case No 120-cv-03715-APM HON AMIT P MEHTA

- Google argues that distinct customers and distinct prices undermine a general search services market
- These factors have no use in this action:
 - Essentially everyone online uses a GSE
 - Search is a zero-price market
- Not every *Brown Shoe* factor will suggest the right result in every case, and a relevant market can exist even if only *some* of the factors are present

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Def. RPCOL ¶ 4(e) at 5, ECF No. 911; United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA, 646 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2022); FTC v. IQVIA Holdings Inc., 2024 WL 81232, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2024).; FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997).



Durable Monopoly Share Tracked

Message	Description (Instant)
From: Sent:	Penny Chu Redaced 1/30/2014 7:40.24 AM
To:	Note: Rediacted Den Genesi Research JAin fustanei Rediacted JCos Nicolaou/ Rediacted JEsar Upikovitz/ Rediacted Jean Smith Rediacted Scott Hiffman Rediacted Jean Smith Rediacted Jean Smith Rediacted YWIIIa to Rediacted Jain Fighal Rediacted Jean Rediacted Jean Image YWIIIa Rediacted Joundar Fichai Rediacted Jean Rediacted Patrick Ritery Rediacted Jean Rediacted
	Redacted ; Karen Dubas Redacted ; Brian Bershad Redacted ; Jiangleng Ai Redacted ; Tara Kousha Redacted ; Sergio Civetta Redacted ; Maketo Uchida
	Redacted ; Jeff Whipps Redacted ; Jim Koehler Redacted Michael
	Redacted ; Jeff Whipps Redacted ; Jim Koehler Redacted Michael Murakami Redactes : Aiyou Chen Redacted ; Remo Storni
	Redacted ; Deepak Ramanathan Redacted ; Cliff Hopkins Redacted ; Yo
CC:	Chen Redacted ; Jonathan Bullick Redacted ; Ruwin Perera Redacted
Subject:	Finalized Dec and Q4 2013 US internal search share metrics
Hi evervon	
	re, ase find our finalized internal US search share metrics for Dec and Q4 2013. All our internal data-
	d Conscore show an increase for Bing in both Dec 2013 as well as in Q4 2013. We see a bit of a
	for Google share. Our internal data-sources show Yahoo share being flat in Dec 2013, but continue
to lose share	re in Q4 2013 (vs Q3 2013). Conscore is even reporting that Yahoo is at an all-time low with 10.8%
search shat	e in Dec.
use for sea HTTPS, w sources (U	to report that as of Dec 2013, we are able to re-introduce Analytics as an internal data-source we can rch share reporting. Flowever, my team also recently discovered that Yahoo Search has gone hich significantly impacts our ability to track Yahoo share across all three of our internal data- S online panel. Adsense and Analytics J going forward. My team is actively working to see what ds we have, but please note that search share reporting may be impacted in the short-term.
	obile tracking to our US online panel should begin in the next few weeks, and I hope we will have minary #s to share with you by end of quarter.
	ry much to Remo Storni and Makoto Uchida for continuing to provide this data. Please let us know if ny questions.
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-Penny	n statist
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DEC 2013 INTERNAL US SEARCH SHARE METRICS (pct pts delta from NOV 2013)

US Online Panel Search Session Share (home-only, desktops, incl Mac OS)* Google 76.3% (+0.3 pct pt) Bing 13.3% (+0.2 pct pt) Yahoo 6.7% (no change) *Prior to 10K expansion sample size. Observed -0.4 pct pt for AOL and -0.1 pct pt for Ask

Adsense U.S. Click Share Google 78.6% (-0.5 pct pt) Bing 11.9% (+0.7 pct pt) Yahoo 7.1% (no change)

Analytics US. Click Share [NEW in Dec!] Google 80.6% Bing 10.6% Yahoo 6.6%



Past Monopolists Instructive



Long-Distance Calls for US Common Carriers (millions of calls per year), 1935 to 1982



Global PC Shipments



UPXD106 at 3; Tr. 10456:17-10460:19 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)).



- Industry or public recognition of the market
- The product's peculiar characteristics and uses
- Unique production facilities
- Sensitivity to price or quality changes
- Specialized vendors
- Distinct customers
- Distinct prices



"[E]vidence of industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic unit matters because we assume that economic actors usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities."

FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J., concurring) (cleaned up)

Jon Tinter

Corporate VP, Business Development

Q. And thinking about the market today, who

competition, it's one company, it's Google.

are Bing's search competitors?

A. ... Candidly, when we talk about



Gabriel Weinberg

- **Q.** And who does DuckDuckGo consider to be its search engine competitors?
- A. Really most of our users switch from Google. So like far and away, we consider Google just our competitor. Other search engines that compete with us are Bing, Yahoo!, Ecosia, and Brave are probably the main ones in the U.S.
- **Q.** Does DuckDuckGo consider vertical search engines such as Amazon to be competitors that users are likely to switch to or from?
- A. No, not really.

Tr. Testimony REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Tr. Testimony



Peculiar Characteristics And Uses

G 2019

7/01/23.6 54 PM Android Choice Societ The Wayback, Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20190802094658/https://www.android.com/choicescreerv

About the choice screen

Following the European Commission's July 2018 Android decision, Google is implementing a choice screen for general search providers on all Android phones and tablets shipped into the European Economic Area (EEA) where the Google Search app is pre-installed.

The choice screen will appear during initial device setup and will feature multiple search providers, including Google.

An illustrative version of the choice screen follows. Providers will vary by country

Q		
Choose your se		
The choice you make be default in a search box on	your home screet and in	
Google Chrome. If you do app, it will be download		
Qwant	0	
	0	
Ecosia	0	
Google	0	
Yahoo	0	
	3008	Ex. No.
*		UPX8091
		1:20-cv-03010-APM

EU Android Choice Screen Criteria

"To **ensure a good user experience**, search providers that wish to participate in the choice screen must satisfy the following requirements: ... The search provider must operate a 'general search service.'"

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https://web.archi





Ramesh Ramalingam Former Senior Director, Product Management

yahoo!

Q. Okay. How do general search engines differ from vertical search providers?

* * *

A. So [a] general search engine would provide answers without any specific restriction to a domain. So it can be anywhere in the Worldwide Web the data is available, it'll show. The vertical one is going to be either focused on a particular domain or particular aspect of vertical, whether it's a travel or restaurants related, yeah.

Des. Testimony



Specialized Vendors

John Giannandrea

Apple Chief, Machine Learning & AI Strategy; Former Google Head of Search & AI

Q. And users, when they put something in the URL bar of Safari, they have an expectation that it's going to go to a general search engine?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony

verizon^V ^B

Brian Higgins Chief Customer Experience Officer

- **Q.** During your time in device marketing, has Verizon ever set a vertical search provider as the default search engine on a device?
- A. ... I am not aware of that happening.

Tr. Testimony



Mitchell Baker Founder & Chairwoman

- **Q.** For the Firefox default search engine, is Mozilla looking for a general search engine that responds to all different types of user queries?
- A. That is -- yes, that is what we have done.

Des. Testimony



Project Charlotte

	re frequent Google Users		
As expected, Amazon users are also more likely to be regular an frequent Google users.	Non Amazon Ukers Reda	acted	
There is a slight correlation of higher Amazon App use to high G.com frequency. But in genera Amazon App users see high G.com usage.		nd Goodle Use Frequency	
	20+ days = NACTIVE = ONE_DAY = CASUAL =		

"There is a slight correlation of higher Amazon App use to higher G.com frequency. But in general all Amazon App users see high G.com usage."



Dr. Israel: No Documents



 44 slides in his demonstrative that address the user-side market definition

Only 1 slide references any documents at all

 The 1 document cited is a Bank of America Report that says nothing about search queries