



United States & Co-Plaintiff States v. Google LLC

Plaintiffs' Closing Statement
Search Advertising

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Revenue

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

“Mandatory”

“Always On”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

“No Real Market Pressure”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

**“Rank ads sub-optimally in
exchange for more revenue”**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

“Code Yellow”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Agenda

- 1 Google Has Monopoly Power In Search Ads & Text Ads
- 2 Search Ads Is A Relevant Product Market
- 3 Text Ads Is A Relevant Product Market
- 4 Google's Price Increases Harmed Advertisers
- 5 Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Justifications

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Agenda

- 1 Google Has Monopoly Power In Search Ads & Text Ads**
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- 5 Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Justifications

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Monopoly Power

“Monopoly power is the **power to control prices** or exclude competition.”

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (emphasis added)

“[T]he material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is...[if] **power exists to raise prices** or to exclude competition **when it is desired to do so.**”

Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (emphasis added)

Direct evidence shows a firm's “**power to control prices** or exclude competition.”

United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)

Monopoly power exists where “something a firm without a monopoly **would have been unable to do**” or behavior “**difficult to explain** unless [the defendant has] a monopoly product.”

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 57–58 (emphasis added)

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Monopoly Power: Direct Evidence

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A Monopolist Controls Prices

“Monopoly power is the **power to control prices** or exclude competition.”

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (emphasis added)

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A Monopolist Raises Prices When It Desires



Dr. Hal Varian
Chief Economist



Q. A monopolist who sells things through an auction could control the auction's outcome by **changing the design of the auction** itself?

A. There could be ways to do that, yes.

* * *

Q. A monopolist who sells things through an auction could influence the auction's outcome by **changing the algorithm** that runs the action; is that right?

A. Well, yes. If he changes the algorithm, you get a different answer.

Q. Finally, sir, a monopolist that wanted to influence the result of an auction would have **a number of levers** that it could use, correct.

A. Correct, yeah.

Tr. Testimony

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Google Uses Knobs And Tunings To Raise Prices



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



Q. And Google has **pricing knobs or tunings** that it can use to impact search ad pricing; correct?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product Management



Q. And you defined a **tuning as a mechanism by which the weights in the auction function are adjusted**. Would you agree on that?

A. That sounds reasonable to me.

Q. **Tunings can impact pricing**, correct?

A. They can.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Defines “Fair” Prices As Higher Prices



Dr. Adam Juda

VP, Product
Management



Q. So, yes, ads quality sometimes does try and **raise prices**.

A. I would describe it less as raising prices and more coming up with better prices or **more fair prices, where those new prices are higher** than the previous ones.

Tr. Testimony



“Code Yellow”: A Call For More Revenue

 2019

Message

From: Darin Fisher [redacted@google.com]
Sent: 2/5/2019 6:13:51 PM
To: Benedict Gomes [redacted@google.com]
CC: Anil Sabharwal [redacted@google.com]
Subject: Fwd: CONFIDENTIAL: Search revenue code yellow

Hey Ben,

Would love to get your thoughts on this. I imagine Edge and the rise of Win10 is a significant factor here (especially with the recent holiday device sales). I will dig into what we are seeing on the Chrome-side. I would love to get insight into what you see from your side and any thoughts you have on how we should approach this together.

Thanks,
-Darin

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Jerry Dischler** <[redacted@google.com]>
Date: Tue, Feb 5, 2019 at 9:53 AM
Subject: CONFIDENTIAL: Search revenue code yellow
To: Prabhakar Raghavan <[redacted@google.com]>, Philipp Schindler <[redacted@google.com]>, Ross Monro <[redacted@google.com]>, cersei-2019 <[redacted@google.com]>, Surojit Chatterjee <[redacted@google.com]>, Ben Gomes <[redacted@google.com]>, Anil Sabharwal <[redacted@google.com]>, Darin Fisher <[redacted@google.com]>, Nick Fox <[redacted@google.com]>

All,

Shiv and I are **calling a code yellow for Search revenue** starting today. We've seen steady weakness in the daily numbers and are likely to end the quarter significantly behind if we don't turn things around.

This is material non-public information, so please do not share this message broadly. We also pride ourselves in not asking our teams to worry about revenue, so please keep this message within this core team.

If we divide up the weakness, there are three contributing factors:

1. **Search query growth is significantly behind forecast**, particularly on desktop. There is a chance that Chrome is a contributor to this weakness.
=> **Ben and Darin**: We would like a **single owner from the Search and Chrome teams** to conduct urgent analysis to understand the nature of the weakness.
2. **The timing of our revenue launches is slightly behind** where it was last year. +Darshan Kantak and +Sunita Verma will lead this workstream and the Code Yellow effort overall. Our top priority in this stream is to deliver Q1 revenue launches during February. +Surojit Chatterjee, we'll need a **lead from your team** as well in the core team.
3. There are **several advertiser-specific and sector weaknesses**, including [redacted] US Financial Services, and Autos. +Andy Miller will lead efforts on this workstream, working on advertiser/sector analysis and sales program acceleration.

Ex. No.
UPX2043
1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-03836063

“[C]alling a **code yellow** for **Search revenue** starting today. We’ve seen **steady weakness in the daily numbers** and are **likely to end the quarter significantly behind** if we don’t turn things around.”

“The **timing of our revenue launches is slightly behind** where it was last year.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Profitably Raised Prices By 5% Or More



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



Q. And in some of the launches you recall have **increased prices 5 percent**; is that correct?

A. Yes; for the typical advertiser, yes. With every advertiser, every advertiser behaves differently. So I'm not going to say across the board.

* * *

Q. And when Google launched price increases of 5 percent on search ads, it resulted in an increase in revenue to Google; correct?

A. Typically, it would result in an increase in revenue.

Tr. Testimony

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Google Can Profitably Raise Prices By 10% Or 15%



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



Q. Sir, would you agree that Google has **raised search ad prices by 10 percent** for some queries? Correct?

A. By 10 percent for some queries? **It's possible, yes.**

* * *

Q. Would [Google] keep enough advertisers so that [its] **revenue would go up if [Google] implemented a 15 percent increase?**

A. I imagine that's what the author would say, yes.

Q. Do you have any reason to think that that's not true?

A. No.

Q. Yes or no, did you give that answer?

A. That is the answer I gave on September 28, 2020, yes.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Has Increased Search Ad Prices



Dr. Mark Israel

*Google Expert
Compass Lexecon*

Q. Now, **prices for Google's ads have risen over the past decade**; is that right?

A. Overall -- nominal prices on average, **I think it's fair that they have gone up**. It depends a lot on what you look at and what index you use, but I think it's fair that on average, they've gone up.


Tr. Testimony

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Search Ads Price Increase: CPCs More Than Doubled

Google's Search Ads Price Index, PCs and Mobile Phones (US)



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Search Advertising Is Incredibly Profitable



Adrian Perica

VP, Corporate Development

“[T]here aren’t so many businesses on the planet that have **such high marginal profit[] on incremental revenues.**”

UPX0635 (2018)



Dr. Sridhar Ramaswamy

Former CEO & Founder at Neeva; Former SVP, Ads/Commerce at Google

“[S]earch is one of the **most profitable businesses ever.**”

Tr. Testimony



Nick Fox

VP, Product Management

“**What are our superpowers? Resources: our core business (Search) is incredibly lucrative** ... providing **endless capital....**”

UPX0275 (2021)

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Google Can Ignore “Fundamental Laws Of Economics”

G 2020

Background

- Search advertising is one of the world's greatest business models ever created - maybe Windows is on that same level as Christian and I discussed at dinner & there are certainly illicit businesses (cigarettes or drugs) that could rival these economics, but we are fortunate to have an amazing business
- Part of what has been so amazing about that is that we've essentially been able to ignore one of the fundamental laws of economics - businesses need to worry about supply and demand
- When talking about revenue, we could mostly ignore the demand side of the equation (users and queries) and only focus on supply side of advertisers, ad formats, and sales
- Sure, we had to build the best product, made smart marketing/distribution investments to get our product everywhere, but we could essentially tear the economics textbook in half
- We had a few jolts across time, such as
 - iOS 7 when Apple moved the search access point in Safari
 - Mozilla moving search default to Yahoo where we lost some users
- But these were mostly exceptions that reminded us how lucky we were
- Nothing can defy the economics foundations forever and the law large numbers catches up with everyone - even Google - such that user and queries are becoming an important input into revenue

Situation

- So we're entering a new world - with a lot of uncertainty around how to adjust our incentives and targets to care about both sides of the equation
- I think we need to acknowledge that there's a lot of emotion and fear wrapped up in where we go next - how do we keep evolving without destroying the secret sauce that has made Search so wonderful
- **Ads/Revenue:** When I talk to folks in ads and revenue, I hear fear and frustration that they are held to revenue targets where they only control half of the picture - the old model of things getting thrown over the wall to them has outlived its usefulness
 - There's talk of suggesting that the Search team consider new goals around query quotas, focusing on monetizable queries, returning towards focusing Search experience on high revenue countries
- **Search:** When I talk to my search friends, I hear similar fear around not focusing on the next generation of search users (even if lower monetizing today), avoiding any metrics or targets that could lead to unnatural search experiences to chase revenue, and DAU (not queries) is the one metric that matters

Ex. No.
UPX0038
1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-16071619

“Search Advertising is **one of the world's greatest business models ever created . . .**”

“Part of what has been so amazing about that is that we've essentially been able to **ignore one of the fundamental laws of economics** – businesses need to worry about supply and demand[.]”

“Sure, we had to build the best product, made smart marketing/distribution investments to get our product everywhere, **but we could essentially tear the economics textbook in half[.]**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



20%+ Year-Over-Year Revenue Growth

2018

Message
From: Jerry Dischler [Redacted@google.com]
Sent: 10/22/2018 3:44:10 AM
To: Prabhakar Raghavan [Redacted@google.com]
CC: Vivek Raghunathan [Redacted@google.com]; Vishal Sharma [Redacted@google.com]
Subject: Re: Really basic video ads questions

Inline

On Sun, Oct 21, 2018 at 8:19 PM Prabhakar Raghavan <[Redacted@google.com]> wrote:
Gents - I'm looking

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golinsidertrading
golcompliance



Overview of Search and YouTube Ads Revenue

October 12, 2018

GOOGLE CONFIDENTIAL

1

Yes! Although no advertiser really says zero tolerance and we're still trying to seek out what an acceptable level is for many of the top brand advertisers.

Thanks.


--
p.r.

Ex. No.
UPX0342
1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-04183957

Google.com revenue growth:
within ~1ppt of 21% Y/Y for 8 of last 9 years



~2/3rds of company's revenue and \$ growth for 10+ years



Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan

SVP, Knowledge & Information Products



Q. And this chart shows that between the years 2010 and 2018, the . . . Search Ads team consistently met the OKR for revenue growth in the neighborhood of 20 percent; correct?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Moving From Query Growth To RPM Growth

 2018

Message
From: Jerry Dischler [Redacted@google.com]
Sent: 10/22/2018 3:44:10 AM
To: Prabhakar Raghavan [Redacted@google.com]
CC: Vivek Raghunathan [Redacted@google.com]; Vishal Sharma [Redacted@google.com]
Subject: Re: Really basic video ads questions

Inline

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Overview of Search and YouTube Ads Revenue

October 12, 2018

GOOGLE CONFIDENTIAL

1

Yes! Although no advertiser really says zero tolerance and we're still trying to seek out what an acceptable level is for many of the top brand advertisers.

Thanks.

--
p.r.

Ex. No.
UPX0342
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-04183957

RPM has become the dominant growth driver
Redacted

Maintained ~20% Y/Y growth over several years
RPM gains making up for diminishing query volume contribution

[TOTAL] Query & RPM contribution to total G.com Y/Y revenue growth



1 Monetisation gains now driving majority of revenue growth

- In 2018: Red. of growth driven by RMP, however that gets to Red. when we adjust for country mix

>> What's the source of the RPM strength?

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Used Levers To Meet Wall Street Revenue Targets

 2019

From: Jerry Dischler <Redacted@google.com>
To: Anil Sabharwal <Redacted@google.com>
Sent: Fri, 3 May 2019 09:05:53 -0700
Subject: Re: Important SQV Update
Cc: Prabhakar Raghavan <Redacted@google.com>, Nick Fox <Redacted@google.com>, Benedict Gomes <Redacted@google.com>, John Maleis <Redacted@google.com>, Hiroshi Lockheimer <Redacted@google.com>

Thanks Anil for pushing your team and for being open to this whole line of thinking. Is there any chance we can converge on this more quickly? To elaborate:

Just looking at this very tactically, and sorry to go into this level of detail, but based on where we are I'm afraid it's warranted. We are short % queries and are ahead on ads launches so are short % revenue vs. plan. If we don't hit plan, our sales team doesn't get its quota for the second quarter in a row and we miss the street's expectations again, which is not what Ruth signaled to the street so we get punished pretty badly in the market. We are shaking the cushions on launches and have some candidates in May that will help, but if these break in mid-late May we only get half a quarter of impact or less, which means we need % excess to where we are today and can't do it alone. The Search team is working together with us to accelerate a launch out of a new mobile layout by the end of May that will be very revenue positive (exact numbers still moving), but that still won't be enough. Our best shot at making the quarter is if we get an injection of at least %, ideally % queries ASAP from Chrome. Some folks on our side are running a more detailed, Finance-blessed, what-if analysis on this and should be done with that in a couple of days, but I expect that these will be the rough numbers.

The question we are all faced with is how badly do we want to hit our numbers this quarter? We need to make this choice ASAP. I care more about revenue than the average person but think we can all agree that for all of our teams trying to live in high cost areas another % in stock price loss will not be great for morale, not to mention the huge impact on our sales team.

I'm super proud of our pure approach at Google and don't want to poison the culture of any team, and this is why I haven't pushed harder. I also don't want the message to be "we're doing this thing because the Ads team needs revenue." That's a very negative message. But my question to all of you is - based on above - what do we think is the best decision for Google overall?

In that spirit, do we think it's worth reconsidering a rollback? Or are there very scrappy tactical tweaks we can launch with holdback that we know will increase queries? (For example, can we increase vertical space between the search box/icons/feed on new tab to make search more prominent? Are there other ranking tweaks we can push out very quickly? Are there other entry points we haven't focused on that we could push on soon?) Just to be clear, the reason I haven't pushed harder on a rollback so far is because I don't want the message to be

Would love your thoughts and sorry for the long email.

Best,
-Jerry.

On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 8:20 PM Anil Sabharwal <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

Ex. No.
UPX0522
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-13030193

“If we don’t hit plan . . . we miss the street’s expectations again . . . so we get punished pretty badly in the market. We are shaking the cushions on launches”



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager, Google Ads



- Q.** Part of your goal of shaking the cushions was to find more revenue for Google; correct?
- A.** **My goal was to get creative so that we could try to make our quarter, yes.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



GOOG-DOJ-22529383.001

Search Ads and O&O Revenue



First off we wanted to remind you that we are all part of a most amazing business. Search Ads + O&O has **grown at an incredible rate over the past decade** - typically in the high teens - reaching \$98B last year, and despite covid - **we'll exceed \$100B this year**. You can see that the vast majority of our growth has come from Mobile search - especially in the last 5 years. Desktop has largely plateau-ed, while AFS has declined. And just in the last couple years - you can see O&O like discovery and gmail starting to really contribute.

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Google Search+ High Margins And Profits Are Durable

Google Search+ Margins

Ex. No.
UPX7002.A
1:20-cv-03010-APM

USD Millions	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Booked Revenue	46,827	52,552	60,515	71,791	86,158	98,330	102,883	146,438
TAC	(7,101)	(7,175)	(8,226)	(11,198)	(14,482)	(16,976)	(18,576)	(26,344)
CAC								
Other COS								
Machine/Network								
Gross Margin								
Gross Margin %								
EngPM								
GBO								
Marketing								
G&A								
TI								
Operating Profit								
Operating Profit %								

Redacted

- Search Ads revenue exceeds \$150 billion today
- Gross margin exceeds Red %
- Operating profit exceeds Red %

Sources: UPX0490 (Total Ads Annual tab, Column J), UPX0491 (Total Ads Annual tab, Columns H, I, J), UPX0492 (Total Ads (Mgt) tab, Columns I, J, K), UPX0493 (Total Ads (Mgmt) tab, Column J)

USDOJ-GOOG-00189774.001

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Monopoly Power: **No Consideration** **Of Competitor Pricing**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Monopolists Do Not Consider Rivals' Prices

Monopoly power exists where a firm sets prices “**without considering rivals' prices**, something a firm without a monopoly would [be] unable to do.”

United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 57–58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)



Google Does Not Consider Competitor Pricing

 2022

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

United States of America, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM

v.

HON. AMIT P. MEHTA

Google LLC,

Defendant.

State of Colorado, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:20-cv-03715-APM

v.

HON. AMIT P. MEHTA

Google LLC,

Defendant.

**DEFENDANT'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFFS' NOVEMBER 1, 2021 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF GOOGLE LLC**

Defendant Google LLC hereby supplements its responses and objections to Plaintiffs'

November 1, 2021 Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Google LLC ("Notice"), as follows.

Ex. No.
UPX6021
1:20-cv-03010-APM

USDOJ-GOOG-00187388

“As a general matter, Google **does not regularly or systematically compare ‘the relative pricing’ of different Google digital advertising products**, nor does Google regularly or systematically compare ‘the relative pricing’ of ‘Google search advertising’ to advertising provided by different sellers.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Does Not Consider Competitor Pricing



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product
Management



- Q.** Sir, you're not aware of anyone at Google doing any analysis of Bing's auction model; correct?
- A.** No one immediately comes to mind.
- Q.** You're also **not aware of anyone at Google ever doing any analysis of pricing of search ads at Bing**; correct?
- A.** **Nothing immediately comes to mind.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google: No Market Pressure To Clean Up Advertising

 2016

Message
From: Jerry Dischler <Redacted@google.com>
Sent: 4/21/2016 8:29:33 PM
To: Sridhar Ramaswamy <Redacted@google.com>
Subject: Re: Internet - Takeaways From Large NA Search Agency Check

SG; will bring up at next 1:1

On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 12:15 PM Sridhar Ramaswamy <Redacted@google.com> wrote:
Lets brainstorm this. If they are being consistent naysayers, we have a problem.

--Sridhar

On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Jerry Dischler <Redacted@google.com> wrote:
Partially this and partially that he wants to distribute the generation of sacred cow slaying ideas so he is not a single point of failure so the rest of the team can be comfortable with these kinds of explorations.

I am going to push part of this back on Sundee. But do think we as a leadership team could do more to encourage here. I just talked about this a bit in my team meeting. Mike and Vinod could be more accepting and encouraging though it is good to have their perspectives as defenders of quality.

On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 11:21 AM Sridhar Ramaswamy <Redacted@google.com> wrote:
Let me make sure I understand though: Is the saying that they are other sacred cows we need to slay?

On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:21 AM, Jerry Dischler <Redacted@google.com> wrote:
FYI/please do not forward

Sundee brings up a deep issue and am thinking through this seriously. Would love to get any feedback you have on this important topic.

----- Forwarded message -----
From: Jerry Dischler <Redacted@google.com>
Date: Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:20 AM
Subject: Re: Internet - Takeaways From Large NA Search Agency Check
To: Sundee Jain <Redacted@google.com>

Let's discuss this.

I take your feedback seriously, as does Sridhar. We want to create a road for this kind of innovation to occur. At the same time these kinds of changes are "boil the frog" in nature. We never really had market pressure to clean up advertising - just look at the state of ads and in particular search ads when AdWords was announced. It was taken on as a moral imperative for that team and has served Google (and us personally) incredibly well. Unfortunately this approach comes with constraints, some of which are no longer valid. Sridhar is acutely aware of this which is why at every opportunity you are asked to present the holy grail findings. He wants to change the mindset of the group and this takes time and repetition.

The market argument is somewhat dangerous. The market is a trailing indicator and it's too easy to "boil the frog." When we arrive at a point that's too far the market will be all over us and we'll be in a spot where it'll be difficult to turn back. That is the reason we need a deep set of principles that guide our actions. But that set of principles needs to evolve over time and should not stifle innovation.

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GOOG-DOJ-03424732



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager, Google Ads



"We never really had market pressure to clean up advertising"

Ex. No.
UPX0461

1:20-cv-03010-APM

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Does Not Consider Competitor Pricing



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product
Management



- Q. THE COURT: So is there any variable in the algorithm that takes into consideration the cost of advertising on other digital platforms?**
- A. THE WITNESS: No.** I don't think we would know with enough confidence what that would be at the auction level even if we wanted to do so, but no, **I can't think of anything like that.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Did Not Consider Facebook



Sundeep Jain

Former VP, Product
Management (Mar.
2013-Oct. 2018)



Q. Was competition with Facebook for advertisements something you would consider when deciding whether to enact a particular user interface launch at Google?

A. [T]here are so many factors that go into a user interface launch. . . . **I don't think we looked at Facebook's ads** as -- so broadly, not really.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Competition Lowers Prices

 2017

From: Evan Sidarto <Redacted@google.com>
To: Ben Friedenson <Redacted@google.com>
Subject: Re: Japan RPM
Cc: Mike Roszak <Redacted@google.com>, Tomonori Sakai <Redacted@google.com>, Patrick Orr <Redacted@google.com>

Glad it was helpful. I think the message you should take away are:

- 1) Japan is unique, we have a big competitor unlike US and UK
- 2) Japan advertisers are still behind the curve on online adoption, but this represents a big opportunity for Google (JP can be #2 market for Google after US if we have market metrics like US/UK)
- 3) From a sales perspective, we are doing everything we can to help extract the most from search

On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 9:53 AM, Ben Friedenson <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

+1 thanks!

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:03 PM Mike Roszak <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

Great, thanks to you both!

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 5:57 PM, Tomonori Sakai <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

Hi Mike,
To add to Evan's comment which I echo (thank you very much Evan!), I'd highlight the competitive situation in JP.

- JP is unique among our major countries in a sense that we have a player who competes against us head-to-head, Y!J (even though we surpassed Y!J in search revenue ~2 years ago). Advertisers split their search budget to Y!J and Google, which makes the auction pressure on Google less.
- So I don't think it's much apple-to-apple to compare RPM in JP against RPM in US/UK where we don't have competitors like Y!J, and I've rather compared our RPM against Y!J's (even though we need to make lots of assumptions to estimate it). And I believe our RPM surpassed Y!J's a few years ago on smartphones.

Another possible factor behind why the absolute mobile RPMs are lower than in other countries is that JP advertisers may value online less compared with those in US/UK. Online share of wallet in the ads market is Redacted in JP while it's Redacted in US and Redacted in UK (2016).

Tomo

On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Mike Roszak <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

Thanks Evan - very helpful. We were looking at both desktop and mobile RPMs where Japan was lower than other markets on both those dimensions. So if the underlying advertiser metrics are very healthy, do we have a theory for why the absolute mobile RPMs are lower?

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 4:39 PM, Evan Sidarto <Redacted@google.com> wrote:

@Tomo feel free to share more thoughts

Hi Mike,
Are we talking about mobile or desktop RPMs? We are less concerned with the latter given query declines. I don't think either of them are a fair comparison for US/UK/AU given language differences. I've inserted a table below from search ads BFM.

- On mSearch JP is already the most mature in the world (i.e. % of msearch of total is highest).
- Google is already the #1 search in the market, so it's not a market issue. It would be worth asking if Japan has a separate tuning cluster from UK/US/AU. Perhaps they already are.
- mBids in Japan are a cut above the rest, so from a sales perspective, advertisers are already valuing mobile much higher than desktop.
- Creative excellence in Japan is one of the highest in the world - so we are using the best ad formats to derive

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GOOG-DOJ-16070844

“Japan is unique, we have a big competitor unlike US and UK.”

* * *

“JP [Japan] is unique among our major countries in the sense that we have a player who competes against us head-to-head, Y!J . . . Advertisers split their search budget to Y!J and Google, which makes auction pressure on Google less.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Monopoly Power: Market Shares

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Monopoly Power: Market Shares


Market share of 60-65% meets “the levels that courts ordinarily find sufficient to establish monopoly power.”

FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34, 47–48 (D.D.C. 2022) (citations omitted)



Monopoly Power: Market Shares

Shares Of Search Ads Revenue (US)



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Agenda

- 1 Google Has Monopoly Power In Search Advertising
- 2 Search Ads Is A Relevant Product Market**
- 3 Text Ads Is A Relevant Product Market
- 4 Google's Price Increases Harmed Advertisers
- 5 Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Justifications

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Market Definition: Search Advertising

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Relevant Market Based On Market Realities

“Congress prescribed **a pragmatic, factual approach** to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one.”

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962) (emphasis added)

Expert conclusions on relevant market must be
“**consistent with the business realities**” of a
company.

FTC v. Sysco Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis added)

“[T]he relevant market must include all
products **reasonably interchangeable** by
consumers for the same purposes.”

United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 51–52 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added) (cleaned up)


“[C]ourts look at whether two products can be
used for the same purpose, and, if so, **whether
and to what extent purchasers are willing to
substitute one for the other.**”

United States v. H & R Block, Inc.,
833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 51 (D.D.C. 2011)
(emphasis added) (cleaned up)

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Not Reasonably Interchangeable



REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Not All “Competitors” Are Included In A Market

“[A]lthough it is literally true that, in a general sense, cash and checks compete with general purpose cards as an option for payment by consumers . . . cash and checks do not drive many of the means of competition in the general purpose card market.”

United States v. Visa,
163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

“[T]he mere fact that a firm may be termed a competitor in the overall marketplace does not necessarily require that it be included in the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.”

FTC v. Sysco Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (cleaned up)

“[W]hile providers of all tax preparation methods may compete at some level, this does not necessarily require that [they] be included in the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.”

United States v. H & R Block,
833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 54 (D.D.C. 2011) (cleaned up)

“At a high enough price, even poor substitutes look good to the consumer.”

United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
63 F.3d 95, 105 (2d Cir. 1995)
(emphasis added) (cleaned up)

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



All Digital Advertising Is Not Substitutable

“In other words, **the existence of a larger market within which two products compete does not necessarily mean that they are reasonably interchangeable substitutes for one another.** In this case, there is undeniably a broader market for digital healthcare advertising in which programmatic, social media, and endemic websites all participate. **But the viability of such additional markets does not render the one identified by the government unusable.”**

FTC v. IQVIA Holdings Inc.,
2024 WL 81232, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2024) (emphasis added) (cleaned up)

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Market Definition: Search Ads

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Brown Shoe Factors

- **Peculiar characteristics and uses**
- **Distinct prices**
- **Industry or public recognition of the market**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Search Ads Defined: Response To A User Query



Joshua Lowcock
Global Chief Media Officer



- Q.** Could we focus on search advertising for a moment? How do you define “search advertising”?
- A.** Search advertising can be defined as advertising that you buy in **response to people conducting a search** on a search engine or platform.

Tr. Testimony



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



- Q.** . . . A search ad is an advertisement that’s displayed on a search engines result page **in response to a user query**; correct?
- A.** Yes.

Tr. Testimony

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Search Ads Are A Market “Of Course”

2020

From: Hal Varian
To: David Stille
Cc: John Edwards, Tobias Cook, Bill
Subject: Re: Google, 9/9/2020
Date: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 12:42:28 PM

My concern is with “market” which I usually think involves financial transactions of some sort. There’s no such “market” for search, though there is a market for search advertising of course. If you look at radio station mergers in the US, all of them defined “the market” as the advertising market, not the “content” market.

This chart is interesting, as it shows that most people arrive at shopping sites via direct navigation. Overall search ads are only 8% of the total. (Source:) There are other related numbers: 94% of clicks are organic, 6% are ad. Google advertisers get 5 times as many organic clicks as ad clicks on average.

2

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:56 AM Hal Varian <hal@cs.stanford.edu> wrote:

“The EU find that specialist search is a complement, not substitute, for general search. They support this by noting that most specialist searches are preceded by general searches.”

By that logic, kissing is a substitute for intercourse.

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 1:00 AM David Stille <david.stille@europa.eu> wrote:
On market power:

What the CMA says:

The CMA never formally defines a market (3.25 of their main report).

They refer to the EU Shopping Case, which finds a market for General Search due to limited demand-side substitution (5.2.1.2 of their infringement decision). The EU find that specialist search is a complement, not substitute, for general search. They support this by noting that most specialist searches are preceded by general searches.

The CMA found similar results for MoneySuperMarket and UK CSS services who also receive significant traffic from general search.

The CMA also looked at Amazon (3.50), but were misled by Amazon’s argument that they can’t be horizontal competitors given how much money Amazon spends on Google ads. The CMA also noted that retail search ads are ~20% of total search revenue.

They concluded that “specialist search providers provide only a limited competitive constraint to Google Search on the consumer side of the platform.”

In essence, they define market power by exclusion: Google wins auctions to be the default General Search provider, Google wins consumers from other General Search providers, and Google makes a lot of money.

What I think:

I have sympathy with not wanting to define a market. It’s drawing a bright binary line which doesn’t really exist.

Having said that, there are a number of places where “General Search” is a clear product, such as default search bars. Google wins most (all?) auctions to be initial default. Google also wins in the market where defaults are changed by the user (either in app or through replacing Edge with Chrome etc.).

The user may have a range of intents when they interact with the product, but I think it is reasonable to consider General Search as a well-defined focal product in these instances.

Once you’ve defined “General Search” as a focal product, it’s relatively easy to conclude that Google has market power in it.

GOOG-DOJ-29851895.001



Dr. Hal Varian
Chief Economist



“[T]here is a market for search advertising of course.”

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Search Ads Are “Evergreen”



Tracy-Ann Lim

*Managing Director,
Chief Media Officer*



A. [P]aid search is . . . an **always-on channel** so we call it like an **evergreen media channel**, where we capture demand year-round, whereas other[] channels, like paid social, operate on a campaign timetable so a campaign has a beginning, a middle, and an end.

* * *

Q. And when you say always on, what does that mean?

A. **Every day of every week of every month year-round.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Search Ads Are Constant


KOHL'S 2018

Kohl's – Spring Media Strategy & Investment
SVP Review

October 3, 2018

DX0412

HOULY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEY EYES ONLY | BROWSE | BUY | 1000010000



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Search Ads Are Not Substitutable



**Joshua
Lowcock**

Global Chief Media
Officer



- Q.** Mr. Lowcock, could you explain the **differences in your mind between “search” and “display”** and whether or not they are substitutable from your perspective in your business?
- A.** Display advertising is primarily to drive awareness, what we would call brand advertising. Search advertising is lower funnel, primarily intended to capture intent. **I would not consider them substitutable.**

* * *

- Q.** Mr. Lowcock, could you please explain whether you consider any particular ad inventories or platforms to be **must haves** for an online ad campaign?
- A.** I would go so far as **search would be mandatory** in any advertising campaign.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Search Ads Are “Unique”



Ryan Booth
Senior Manager,
Paid Search



A. . . . Back to earlier part of the testimony, **search ads are unique** in the sense that somebody is going and initiating the action, going to Google, going to Bing, asking for solutions to -- asking for a solution.


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Search Ads Are A Unique Channel

G 2020



Ex. No.
UPX0033
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-16933114

Discovery ads provides a familiar pitch to social buyers

~\$150BN spend from Search and Display buyers

\$80BN Incremental Social budgets



- Beyond Search and Display buyers, Google can now access social budgets and creatives
- Discovery's lift and shift strategy brings social campaigns for feed surfaces and drives higher marginal ROI for social buyers using Search Intent

Google

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Market Definition: **Search Ads Pricing**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Profitably Raised Prices By 5% Or More



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



Q. And in some of the launches you recall have **increased prices 5 percent**; is that correct?

A. Yes; for the typical advertiser, yes. With every advertiser, every advertiser behaves differently. So I'm not going to say across the board.

* * *

Q. And when Google launched price increases of 5 percent on search ads, it resulted in an increase in revenue to Google; correct?

A. Typically, it would result in an increase in revenue.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Search Ad Price Increases Were Profitable



Prof. Michael Whinston

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Economics &
Management, M.I.T.*

A. What they did is they **artificially lowered or raised prices to advertisers**, and they looked to see what happened to ad revenue.

* * *

A. And the bottom line on this that they came to was, if we -- basically there's what they called a **stickage of 50 percent. So if they raised prices 10 percent, revenue would go up 5.**

* * *

A. So, yes, there was some reduction in advertising, but it was low enough that **raising prices was profitable**, and that's what convinced them that they could do this.

Tr. Testimony

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Gamma Yellow: 20% Price Increase Was Profitable

G 2017

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Momiji Review 1 (6/6/2017)
Momiji Review 2 (6/8/2017)
Momiji Review 3 (6/9/2017)
Momiji Review 4 (6/14/2017)

Momiji Review 1 (6/6/2017)



Slides

Action items

- AI: Send plot of lift vs. CPC increase to Gaurav
- AI: We can get the shape of the CPC increase distribution
- AI: What do these graphs look like in absolute dollar changes instead of relative?
- AI: Please do the tail impact graph for the near-exact launch as a comparison
- AI: Need another 30 minutes this week on this before we talk to sales

Notes

- First format pricing launch
- Headroom = 1 - CPC/bid
 - If our auctions were very competitive, and advertisers were on equal footing, headroom as defined here would be smaller.

Ex. No.
UPX0036
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-06207060

• “Agenda:

- **Do we want to raise prices?**
- Is it ok to raise prices?
- How we would roll-out?”

• “**10% is believed to be safe**

- WoW noise is high (50% by spend seeing more than 10%).
- We’ve launched things at 15% and heard nothing.
- **GY was 20% on mobile on average.”**

- “^{Redacted}@: one way to phrase this is that under perfect prices, **1 penny less than the breaking point is the right amount.** The advertiser is currently paying at least 20% less than their willingness to pay.”

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“Reassuring Piece of Evidence” Price Increases Stick

G 2019

Redacted

Redacted

Ex. No.
UPX0509
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-04451958

“The AION long term AE was in that regards **a key reassuring piece of evidence showing that** Redacted **spend stickage to a detectable price increase** matched shorter 6 week responses, while the CX Lab ROI study confirmed that advertisers do indeed detect and react to changes within these time frames.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Agenda

- 1 Google Has Monopoly Power In Search Advertising
- 2 Search Ads Is A Relevant Product Market
- 3 Text Ads Is A Relevant Product Market**
- 4 Google's Price Increases Harmed Advertisers
- 5 Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Justifications

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Market Definition: **Brown Shoe Factors**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Brown Shoe Factors

- **Peculiar characteristics and uses**
- **Distinct customers**
- **Distinct prices**
- **Industry or public recognition of the market**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Text Ads Are A Different Species



Dr. Hal Varian
Chief Economist



Q. . . . PLAs are a **different species** than text ads; is that right?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony

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Text Ads Defined



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



Q. Sir, UPX12.005, is this an example of a text ad?

A. It is.

Q. **And a text ad contains the ad content and the text including possibly one, the URL, two, one to three headlines, and three, a one to two description line; is that correct?**

A. That's correct.

Tr. Testimony



Joshua Lowcock
Global Chief
Media Officer



Q. What is a text ad?

A. ...**So a text ad is just simply text, there's no image, there's no video, it is text only.**

Tr. Testimony

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Text Ads Give Advertisers More Control



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



- Q. Would you agree that a text ad gives an advertiser **more control** when their ad appears on a search engine results page?
- A. It does.
- Q. For a text ad, an advertiser can **select a set of keywords** to direct the text ad to appear in response to specific user queries?
- A. A specific set of user queries, yes.
- Q. But for a shopping ad, the advertiser does not select keywords that will respond to a query; correct?
- A. That's correct.

Tr. Testimony



Dr. Hal Varian
Chief Economist



- Q. With text ads, the **advertiser gets to choose the creative element** in the ad?
- A. Yes.
- Q. With text ads, the advertiser can identify the distinctions in their product versus other companies?
- A. Yes.
- Q. With **shopping or -- shopping ads, or PLAs, advertisers do not get to choose the creative in the ad?**
- A. Okay.
- Q. True?
- A. I believe so.

Tr. Testimony

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Text Ads Have Distinct Customers



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



- Q.** And the majority of advertisers on Google cannot buy shopping ads or PLAs because **they're not actually selling physical products**; correct?
- A.** That's correct.

Tr. Testimony



Tracy-Ann Lim
Managing Director, Chief
Media Officer



- Q.** And why does JPMorgan Chase not buy product listing ads or shopping ads?
- A.** We, for the most part, **represent intangible products and services.**
- Q.** So is it the case that the only search-related ads that JPMorgan buys are search text ads?
- A.** Yes.

Tr. Testimony


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Majority Of Advertisers Buy Only Text Ads

A majority of Google's search ad revenue comes from advertisers who buy only text ads

2021 Share of Google Search Ad Revenue From Advertisers Who:



Jerry Dischler

VP & General Manager, Google Ads



- Q. The majority of advertisers on Google purchase text ads, correct?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. The majority of revenue that Google earns is from text ads, correct?
- A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony

Google Customer Spend Data (DOJ RFP 2.76). (Whinston Report, Fig. 59, at 155)

37

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Distinct Prices: Separate Auctions



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product Management



- Q. Google runs an ad auction for text ads, correct?
- A. We do.
- Q. And Google runs a **separate ad auction for shopping ads, or PLAs** correct?
- A. That is correct.

Tr. Testimony



Joshua Lowcock
Global Chief Media Officer



- Q. And when shopping ads are sold in an auction, is that the same auction or a different auction than the auction for text ads?
- A. It's a different auction.
- Q. How does the auction for shopping ads differ from the auction for text ads?
- A. They're **two separate auctions**.

Tr. Testimony



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager, Google Ads



- Q. And I believe you stated that the **auction for text ads is different than the auction for shopping ads or PLAs**; correct?
- A. It is.
- Q. They're **completely separate auctions**; correct?
- A. They are.

* * *

- Q. And since text ad auctions and shopping auctions are separate, any changes to **the pricing in one auction does not impact the pricing of another auction; correct?**
- A. That's correct.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Text Ads Are More Expensive

Average Annual Cost Per Click (CPC) for US Queries, 2016–2021

Google (Text) Bing (Text) Bing (PLA) Google (PLA)



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Text Ads: “Siloed In Their Own World”

G 2017

Redacted

EXHIBIT
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GOOG-DOJ-03773720

“[T]he hypothesis is that PLA’s are good experience on shopping queries, however, the cpc’s on PLAs arent [sic] comparable to text ads. Today these two formats are **siloed in their own world and don’t compete**, it will be worth looking at pricing from that point of view.”

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Advertisers Bought Text Ads Even When Prices Increased



**Joshua
Lowcock**

Global Chief Media
Officer



Q. And, Mr. Lowcock, if the price of Google's text ads **increased by 5 percent**, would you recommend to your clients to move their ad spend elsewhere?

A. No.

* * *

Q. Have you seen a trend with respect to the CPCs of Google's text ads?

A. **There has been an increase in price of CPC on text ads.**

Q. And have your clients moved their ad spend away from Google Search?

A. No.

Tr. Testimony

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Text Ads “Exist For A Different Reason”



Tracy-Ann Lim

*Managing Director,
Chief Media Officer*



Q. And just to drive down on this point, what is it that makes paid search text ads versus digital display ads not fungible?

A. They exist for a different reason. . . .

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Text Ads Are “Distinctly Different”

2018

Google Search & Automotive - Summary

10/25/2018, 5:10 PM
Type: document

Google Search & Automotive - Summary

The purpose of this doc is to provide initial research and a POV on how to evolve our Automotive Ads offerings to be more competitive to Google. The desired outcome is to provide an initial set of conclusions and recommendations that allow us to drive deeper discussion and rebound into specific initiatives.

For questions, please feel free to reach out to Julia Mail or Kevin Chao

Executive summary

- For Automotive, search has built up a highly defensible offering by positioning itself as a measurable high intent platform where clients MUST have presence regardless of their objective
 - o OEMs - I must be present if someone searches otherwise I risk losing the spot to a competitor who might capitalize on my absence.
 - o Dealers - the most important thing is getting the car which is most easily accomplished by focusing on one funnel audiences.
- Last click attribution prevents given difficulty in measuring the offline transaction amplified by the long purchase cycle. In light of this, measurement centers around efficiently driving more immediate outcomes often defined as the traffic and engagements.
- Clicks all perceive Facebook as a reach and awareness social platform as opposed to a one funnel intent capture channel; this means we are placed in separate critical budgets in order to meaningfully win dollars, a shift in perception by budget decision makers must happen.
- In order for us to shift search dollars we can not only focus on performance - rather we should think about addressing how we build confidence with advertisers on using our platform.
 - o 1) Change perception of Facebook from a discovery and reach platform to one of intent capture.
 - o 2) Provide visibility on expected performance so clients able to better plan their campaigns by understanding how they can achieve their metrics on Facebook.
 - o 3) Increase predictability of performance so clients can with a degree of confidence, understand how budget changes will impact their campaign metrics.
- While perception, visibility, and predictability will take time to shift there are steps that we can take in the short term to move budgets by driving to the current perception of Facebook and extending existing solutions like DAA into Reach and Click based objectives.
 - o Furthermore, in the short term, rather than redefine perception of the Facebook feed with Marketplace and Search teams as placements of intent and ensure DAA is supported and drive adoption by positioning as alternative to Google Shopping Ads.

Why is search important to us

Across digital channels, Automotive search is expected to be a \$10.2B industry by 2022 with the largest share spend with Google still capturing the majority of the budgets. For the purposes of this research, we will focus on Google when referring to search given they are still the dominant player in the space.

As advertisers move budgets away from mass media driven by desire to personalized, changing consumer behaviors, and importance of digital in the customer journey, clients will be looking towards digital channels that allow them to accomplish their marketing objectives. The majority of these dollars are used to accomplish DRI objectives driving qualified site engagements such as website configurations, dealer lookup, or dealer contact. As such these budgets tend to be centered at Tier 3 and the agencies and people who support them (ing, Edwards, CarGurus, Autotrader).

The majority of this spend is allocated towards the direct response objective of selling vehicles and concentrated at the Tier 3 audience and supporting agencies.

Sell Cars Objective Breakdown - 2022 (Source: IDC FS DAMM 2018)

Ex. No.
UPX0915
1:20-cv-00010-ATM

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FBDQJGOOG_00361061

“Using Google as our frame of reference, ‘search’ refers to two distinct products: **Shopping Ads** (f.k.a. Product Listing Ads) and **Google Ads** (f.k.a. AdWords). **These two units are distinctly different in both how they are bought and consumer experience.**”

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Advertiser Harm: Google Manipulates Auction Pricing

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A Monopolist Raises Prices When It Desires To Do So

“[T]he material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is . . . [if] power exists to **raise prices** or to exclude competition **when it is desired to do so.**”

Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (emphasis added)



Pricing Knobs “Extract Value More Directly”

G 2018



Ex. No.
UPX0889
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-29296769

When Vanilla pricing may no be sufficient

Second Pricing works great most of the time, but there are failure scenarios

- **Weak or lack of Auction Pressure**
 - When no competition is present, or when competition is of inferior quality
- **Reserve pricing**
 - Reserve prices are generally lower than their second price counterparts

We need a way to extract value more directly

→ We need *pricing mechanisms with pricing knobs*

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Manipulates Search Ad Pricing

Redacted



Tuning for Smarties

(ads quality: we're no dummies)

“What are we tuning again? Prices!”

Redacted

Ex. No.
UPX0043
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-12619436

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Google Raises Prices Through “Intentional Pricing”

 2018

Redacted

How should AQ think about Pricing?

Jan 2018 - 18

Note: This was reviewed and brought to resolution (preferred path) in AQER on 2/1 and 2/8. The outcome of these investigations, 6 months later, were then summarized in August [here](#).

I - Strategic considerations

Pricing today

If we think of pricing as the action of defining the cost our advertisers' pay per unit of value (e.g. cost per click or cost per conversion), then pricing on google.com happens today in small touches all throughout the year.

Most AQ launches, in addition to trying to improve the value for users and advertisers (e.g. quality improvements driving better conversions, new formats driving higher CTRs, etc) have some CPC or CPA component. We'll call this 'incidental' pricing. We also directly affect pricing through tunings of our auction mechanisms, in general through the three levers that are format pricing, squashing or reserves. We'll call this 'intentional' pricing.

As a result pricing on google.com is happening in a semi-controlled, semi-organic way that might not be ideal. We worry about how these changes stack up over time for individual advertisers. We worry that this might eventually - and unwillingly - lead us to a state where advertisers are unhappy with their performance. And we worry this might lead them at some point to modify their spend on google.com, possibly reallocating budget to other channels on timeframes we can't track (e.g. quarterly, annually). How can we assess the cumulative effects of our launches?

A side effect of these worries is a recent discomfort among leadership with the idea of intentional pricing launches. Historically we've aimed at maximizing long term value for both advertisers and google through intentional exploration.

Redacted

Types of risks at hand

When it comes to pricing there are two broad categories of risk we should consider:

Ex. No.
UPX0509
1.25-cv-03018-APM

GOOG-DOJ-04451958

“We also **directly affect pricing** through tunings of our auction mechanisms, in general through the **three levers that are format pricing, squashing or reserves**. We'll call this ***'intentional'* pricing.**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google's "Intentional" Pricing Levers And Knobs

- 1. Format Pricing**
- 2. Squashing**
- 3. rGSP**

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Advertiser Harm: Format Pricing

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Pricing Knob #1: Format Pricing



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



Q. And do you agree that format pricing is just one of the pricing knobs that Google has to adjust the search ads auction?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony

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Momiji: Format Pricing Opportunity To Make “Billions”

 2016

Expensive Formats AE

...
AQER - December 5 2016



A Momiji Project

Ex. No.
UPX0727

1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-03437041

A) Momiji Opportunity

Likely billions in format pricing + squashing

- ~10% RPM from Format Pricing
- ~5% RPM from Squashing
- Work well together (i.e. ~15% total)
- More opportunity on Mobile than Desktop

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Momiji: “Best Knob To Engender Large Price Increases”

 2017

Produced in Native

ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED

Momiji V1 (Review #23)
2017 Format Pricing Launch
...

AQER - June 89 2017



Ex. No.
UPX0507

1.2017-06-08-14:00

0000-0000-0000

GOOG-DOJ-04167998.001

“Prices should go up . . .

GammaYellow: Prices could be higher,
and we think we would keep the
money[.]”

* * *

“Most gains in Top-1, where we have no
way to say what formats should cost . . .

**Format pricing is our best knob to
engender large price increases[.]”**

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Momiji Increased Prices



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



- Q.** For the typical or average advertiser, there was a price increase as a result of the momiji launch; correct?
- A.** For the typical advertiser, I believe the answer is yes, but as advertisers are fond of telling us, none of them are typical.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google's Search Ad Auction Is A Black Box

G 2017

Launch: Momiji V1

[Launch call](#)

[Team](#)

[Summary](#)

[Background and Motivation](#)

[Product Summary and Tuning Philosophy](#)

[Launch Timeline and Comms](#)

[Metrics and Analyses](#)

[Rasta](#)

[MH-CPC](#)

[Tail Impact](#)

[Top Division Impact](#)

[Format Opt Out Incentives](#)

[Lift Breakdowns and Position Cost Comparison](#)

[Format Impact](#)

[Sundar Email](#)

[Appendix](#)



Team

Momiji Tuning Team

Tech Lead:	Ankur Jain
SWEs:	Igor Slasny, Pavel Morar
Consultation:	Patrick Hummel
AR-SIM team:	Saeed Alaei, Susan Chiang, Sugato Basu
Technical Management:	JF Crespo, Omkar Muralidharan
Product Manager:	Chris Monkman

Gamma Yellow

The Momiji launch was only able to proceed after the Gamma Yellow advertiser experiment validated that expensive formats was long term revenue positive.

Tech Lead:	Kay Brodersen
QA:	Cathy Lee, Tom Ferriss
SWEs:	Moritz Fransosch, Sophie Schmieg
Product Manager:	Thomas Iijc

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ex. No.
UPX0456
1:20-cv-03010-APM

GOOG-DOJ-27876273


“There will be no proactive communication of this change, and no comm doc or impact list will be shared with sales.”

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Google's Search Ad Auction Is A Black Box

 2008



Ex. No.
UPX0925
1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-16763745



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Advertiser Harm: Squashing

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Pricing Knob #2: Squashing

 2017

So you want to work on the Auction

An introductory guide for Research collaborators and Thresholds newbies

Redacted

NB: All of the content and documents linked in this document are very confidential. Please do not share any of this material outside of Search Ad Auction and Prediction Stack SWEs/PMs without consulting Redacted

[Introduction](#)

[Background](#)

[Value Reserve Pricing](#)

[Format Pricing](#)

[Squashing](#)

[Whole Page Auction](#)

[MIA](#)

[Quality Based Pre-Auction Disabling](#)

[Quality Tuning and Ads Blindness](#)

[How advertisers really use our product](#)

[Advertiser Response](#)

[The Budget Effect](#)

[Problems we are thinking about these days](#)

[Requirements for Auction design](#)

Introduction

The Thresholds team develops and maintains the Search Ad Auction. Our main concern is text ads on Google.com, but the auction also decides whether or not to show PLAs in the top slot based on expected revenue and utility. A version of our auction is also running on some Google owned and operated search properties (e.g. Play Store Search, YouTube viral) and AFS, but there are teams which manage a tweaked version of our auction for those properties.

The auction determines the following three key aspects for text ads on Google.com:

- Allocation: Whether ads get to show or not for the query, and what kind of UI (e.g. extensions) we show along with the ad
- Ranking: The order of ads on the page.
- Pricing: The price that advertisers have to pay for the ad (currently, always a cost per click, or CPC)

Ex. No.
UPX0430

1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-10776576

“It is a pricing knob which increases an advertiser’s LTV based on how far their pCTR is from the highest pCTR on query.”

“[W]orking on **using it to engender a more broad price increase.**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Squashing: Raises Price Against The Highest Bidder



Prof. Michael Whinston

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Economics &
Management, M.I.T.*

A. [W]hat they would do is they would take . . . the bidder who had the second highest predicted clickthrough rate, and, in essence, in the formula for the auction, boost that ranking of that. And why? To basically **raise the price against the highest bidder.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Squashing: Recover Lost Revenue

G 2017

Launch: Butternut Squash

ads-heterodox@



Launch call entry

[Executive Summary](#)
[Why we are doing this](#)
[What we are doing](#)
[Butternut Limitations](#)
[How to Butternut a Launch](#)
[Reserve vs. Second Pricing](#)
[Launch Timeline](#)
[Ads Layer Metrics](#)
[Launch Layer Metrics](#)
[Reranking analysis](#)
[pCTR Ratio Analysis](#)
[MH-CPC Analyses](#)
[Impact on Advertisers](#)
[Reranking Examples](#)
[Examples with Big CPC Changes](#)
[Headroom Analysis](#)
[Does the Max pCTR Candidate Show?](#)
[Communication Plan](#)
[Larry Email](#)

Ex. No.

UPX0442

1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-27838867

“recover lost revenue from launches which create value for our users and advertisers, but reduce revenue for Google”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Squashing: Winner Pays More



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



Q. And Google has implemented squashing in its text ad auction dynamics; correct?

A. It has.

Q. And one of the effects of squashing text ads is that the top winner of the auction pays more; correct?

A. In some cases, yes.

Q. **On average, the winner pays more; correct?**

A. On average, yes.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Trades Efficiency For More Revenue



**Prof. Michael
Whinston**

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Economics &
Management, M.I.T.*

A. [Google is] **introducing inefficiency into the auction**. . . . [T]hey're willing to do that because it helped them extract more out of the highest – the advertiser most likely to win – the top advertiser. . . .

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



“Negative User Experience” And “Negative Impact” On Quality

 2017

This document contains sensitive and confidential Google information. Please do not share the contents of this doc without consulting @.

PRD: Kumamon

A holistic approach to fine-grain tuning and employing unlimited ML signals in the auction
go/Kumamon

@, with lots of ideas and input from @ and @
August 2017

[Introduction and Product Summary](#)

[Further Background and Motivation](#)

[New Auction Algorithm](#)

[Optimization System](#)

[Shared Constraints and Requirements](#)

[Quality Constraints and Requirements](#)

[Pricing Constraints and Requirements](#)

[But what about...](#)



Introduction and Product Summary

The current function we use to select, rank and price search ads on Google.com (LTV) is a relatively simple algorithm consisting of bid, three quality signals, and some (mostly) hand tuned parameters. While we derive a lot of comfort from this simplicity, and our almost certainly mistaken belief that we fully understand how the system works, it may be that we can better achieve our various use cases and the fundamental product goal of improving long term revenue by embracing an automatically tuned system with more inputs. At the risk of being trite, how can we make the auction AI first?

Kumamon aims to create a world where, not only are we using many more ML signals (e.g. more quality and taste models and UBS classifiers) in the auction and tuning more parameters at finer granularity, but we are also doing so much more often and with better results. The core idea:

1. Run many blindness and advertiser experiments
2. Update macro models based on the experiments

EXHIBIT
PSX00167

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GOOG-DOJ-03034207

“negative user experience
consequences”

“negative impact on the long
term incentives for advertisers to
improve quality”

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Reduces Quality For More Revenue

G 2018

Redacted

Redacted

- Another way of doing revenue-efficiency tradeoff: Rank ads sub-optimally in exchange for more revenue

Redacted

Ex. No.

UPX0051

1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-11178224

“Another way of doing revenue-efficiency tradeoff:
Rank ads sub-optimally in exchange for more revenue.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Advertiser Harm: “Randomized” GSP

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



RGSP Replaced Format Pricing

 2019

"Polyjuice" rGSP + εFP launch

ads-thresholds@, market-algorithms-team@, ads-metrics@



Links

[Ariane](#) | [Rasta](#) | [AQER Part I](#) | [Part II](#) | [Q&A](#) | [rGSP Mechanism Design doc](#)
Holistic tracking: Rasta, ExcessCPC

Timeline

- 9/3/19 start ^{Reserve} AE experiment
- 10/16/19 AE ends, ramp down to ^{Reserve} traffic
- 10/24/19 start ^{Reserve} QB and region tuning
- 11/12/19 launch with ^{Reserve} holdback

Contributors

Ads Thresholds: ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted
Market Algorithms Research: ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted
Ads Metrics: ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted
+ building on broader frameworks from holistic-pricing@, advertiser-understanding@
(^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted) and ongoing advice and guidance from ^{Reserve} Redacted, ^{Reserve} Redacted and ^{Reserve} Redacted

Comment (1): ^{Reserve} Redacted @google.com

Omkar, any suggestion on how big the holdback should be? I'm thinking of either ^{Reserve} Redacted since we need it to be sufficiently large to get good QB measurements. Any preferences?

Comment (2): ^{Reserve} Redacted@google.com

Hi Omkar, I'm thinking of either ^{Reserve} Redacted since we need it to be sufficiently large to get good QB measurements. Any preferences?

Comment (3): I defer to Sujay for QB power analysis. How long will the holdback run - I'm sure that makes a difference for Sujay's analysis

Comment (4): I think we can run the holdback through ^{Reserve} Redacted and bring down in early

Comment (5): ^{Reserve} Redacted holdback SOTA. Could we ensure that no other experiments are run in that layer so that I can use all ^{Reserve} Redacted remaining traffic as the control arm?

Comment (6): I think it depends on whether we need to run different variants to understand blindness contribution of each launch component

Omkar, I think there are a few flag combinations that you have in mind?

Comment (7): Yes, I think Tom and Sujay had a design to isolate the various blindness effects of different treatment components

Comment (8): We had some recommendations at the bottom of this doc: <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a3b4CDEZDEpEXebMmGcOGF7H66d4YXELjg/edit#heading=h.3k4u4a4a4a>. Main idea is to have a version that swaps but doesn't drop and/or vice versa to separate out those effects

Comment (9): Thanks Tom, I think a swap-only experiment wouldn't require rGSP holdback, so it wouldn't be constrained by the holdback traffic

Sounds like everyone is okay with ^{Reserve} Redacted holdback through ^{Reserve} Redacted. I'll resolve this comment

Comment (10): Marked as resolved

Comment (11): Re-opened. ^{Reserve} Redacted@google.com Could you explain this a bit more? I was thinking that exploring the impact of reranking would require non-rGSP traffic, so we need holdback traffic for a swap-only experiment

Comment (12): I think a swap-only experiment can be done by setting the reserve price alpha to 1.2 in rGSP. It is different from an rGSP holdback, which reverts to the FP

Ex. No.

UPX0457

1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-27877257

"Polyjuice" rGSP + εFP launch

ads-thresholds@, market-algorithms-team@, ads-metrics@



"[It] introduces a **probability of swapping ads** as their scores get closer . . ."


"It **avoids the creation of feature opt-out incentives** common with mechanisms that are tied to ad features (e.g. format pricing), **better embedding pricing into our auction.**"

"It provides the high efficiency and **large tuning range** we need to accommodate Ads Quality tuning needs going forward."

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RGSP Is “A Better Pricing Knob”



“A better pricing knob than format pricing”

“Would likely replace format pricing”

“Initial impact of 10+% RPM with the current tuning knob”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Misleads Advertisers On RGSP

 2018

Randomization we can explain to advertisers

Redacted

Background

There are a few important metrics to advertisers we need to be cognizant of if we want to launch randomization (and especially if we aim to use these as a way to replace format pricing):

Average Position - The average auction position (not page position) for the keyword over the auctions it has participated in. For example, if it was the top ad on the page in the bottom slot, and the second ad on the page in the top slot on another query, Avg Pos = $(1 + 2) / 2 = 1.5$.

Impression Share - Impressions (in any slot) / Queries the advertiser could have shown on. Our logic for determining where the advertiser could have shown is not exactly great - basically based on a rough simulation and a limited slicing of rejected ads that sort of ask the question "where could the advertiser have shown if the multiplied their bid by X?", where I think X is 10. Budgets are accounted for, but XBT is not.

Click Share (Not launched yet) - $\text{SUM}(\text{prpCTR of shown impressions}) / \text{SUM}(\text{Max possible expected clicks})$. The denominator of the metric is computed by simulating the maximum clicks the advertiser could get at the maximum bid (using a methodology similar to bid landscapes) and if they had full and relevant extension coverage.

What are some relevant things we communicate?

- The ad with the highest Ad Rank gets the highest position (auction position)
- NB: We used to say "you pay the minimum to beat the runner up", but now we just say that "your CPC is based on your competition and the Ad Rank thresholds." This gives us freedom to do things like config pricing.

Requirements

We need a mechanism advertisers can grok, and that advertisers perceive as fair and logical. I am willing to make some changes to our external documentation, but bonus points go to a mechanism which fits within the Help Center rewrite we just did ([summary of rewrite](#)).

What will advertisers expect?

- Impression share is non-decreasing in bid
- Click share is non-decreasing in bid
- If Impression share is maxed out, Average Position is non-decreasing in bid

Commented [1]: Really? Advertisers care about this metric? How can that possibly be useful if not conditioned on slot?

Commented [2]: -1

Commented [3]: I agree this is not a great metric, but there are lots of folks that care.

It is sliceable by slot, but even if we restrict to slot, issues remain when triggering on new queries.

Commented [4]: Is this not something like $\text{current_impressions} / \text{max_possible_impressions}$?

Commented [5]: basically yes

Commented [6]: So jacking up the bid to an arbitrarily large value?

Commented [7]: yes

Commented [8]: Doesn't format pricing violate (7)? Or was it really "you pay the minimum required to sweep the current allocation". But that seems equivalent to saying we don't first price.

Commented [9]: format pricing doesn't violate this - format lowers your LTV - we also say "you pay the minimum necessary to maintain your position and extensions"

Ex. No.

UPX0059

1:20-cv-03010-APM

“Randomization we can explain to advertisers”

* * *

- “Easy to tune, with the ability to raise prices (shift the curve upwards or make it steeper at the higher end) in small increments over time (AKA ‘inflation’)[.]”
- We don’t want to have to say ‘we randomize’ – that will have perception problems[.]”

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GOOG-DOJ-23848619

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Advertisers Cannot Opt-Out Of RGSP



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product
Management



Q. rGSP was a launch that was incorporated into the Google ad auction in around 2019; is that correct?

A. Seems right.

* * *

Q. **But if they enter the ad auction in any way, they're subject to rGSP; agreed?**

A. rGSP is how the auction works today, yes.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



RGSP Manipulates The Ad Auction



Prof. Kinshuk Jerath

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Marketing,
Columbia Univ.*

Google Influences the Outcomes of Its “Black Box” Auctions

Pricing Knob:
rGSP

Google artificially inflates Ad Rank of Runner-Up

*e.g., Winner's Ad Rank is 32;
Runner-Up's Ad Rank was
originally 20; Google inflates
Runner-Up's rank to be above 20*

Winning Ad may lose

*Depending on difference in
Ad Ranks of the Winner and
Runner-Up, Google may switch
their ad positions, e.g.:
Runner-Up ad in 1st position
and Winning Ad in 2nd position*

Winning Ad's price increases

- ▶ *When Winning Ad is not swapped,
inflated Ad Rank of Runner-Up ad
results in higher price of Winning Ad*
- ▶ *Winning ad's price*
 - *is not based on Runner-Up ad's
actual bid or Ad Rank*
 - *is now set at amount needed to
equal inflated Ad Rank*

43

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RGSP Incentivizes Advertisers To Bid Higher



Dr. Mark Israel

*Google Expert
Compass Lexecon*

Q. Okay. So one of the things that rGSP does is, it says if you are bidding high enough, you don't have to worry about the swap, correct?

A. I think -- I mean, I think **it incentivizes advertisers who have a high value on the spot to bid higher** if they put a high value on the slot.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



RGSP Does Not Improve Quality

 2019

Message

From: Chalmers Wang [Redacted@google.com]
Sent: 10/23/2019 4:20:59 PM
To: Ads-quality-notes [Redacted@google.com]; Saeed Alaei [Redacted@google.com]; Michael ZwiBelman [Redacted@google.com]; Igor Stassiy [Redacted@google.com]; Mohammad Mahdian [Redacted@google.com]; Thomas Ilic [Redacted@google.com]; Jean-François Crespo [Redacted@google.com]; Xi Chen [Redacted@google.com]; Tom Ferriss [Redacted@google.com]; Guru Guruganesh [Redacted@google.com]; Uri Nadav [Redacted@google.com]; Kay Brodersen [Redacted@google.com]; Aranyak Mehta [Redacted@google.com]; Omkar Muralidharan [Redacted@google.com]; Ying Wang [Redacted@google.com]; Daniel Sabanes Bove [Redacted@google.com]; Sunita Verma [Redacted@google.com]; Ankur Jain [Redacted@google.com]
CC: Ads Quality Eng Review [Redacted@google.com]
Subject: [Ads-quality-notes] AQER Notes: rGSP (10/17/2019)

AQER Notes: rGSP Launch (slides)

Date: Oct 17, 2019
Presenters: Ilic
Attendees: shivav, juda, srikant, sunitav, srikant

Feedback summary:

- Proceed with candidate exploration
- Come back to decide between option 1 vs option 2 (option 3 set aside for now).
- Additional analysis results to support choice

Notes:

- What is rGSP?
- Introduces a probability of swapping when two LTV ad scores are close
- As advertisers raise/lower bids, there are additional points along the curve ("virtual positions" analogy)
- Good properties
 - Not attached to specific ads features (like, e.g. format pricing)
 - Avoids winner takes all problem

Ex. No.
UPX1045
1:20-cv-03010-APM

“[I]s there any component of quality?”

“Does not directly touch quality.”

“Does exploration lead to better quality?”

“[H]aven’t seen that it does[.]”

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Agenda

- 1 Google Has Monopoly Power in Search Ads & Text Ads
- 2 Search Ads is a Relevant Product Market
- 3 Text Ads is a Relevant Product Market
- 4 Google's Price Increases Harmed Advertisers
- 5 Google Failed To Prove Procompetitive Justifications**

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Google Has The Burden

Defendant's burden to "show" a sufficient justification for its conduct, "specif[y] and substantiate . . . [its] claims."

United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

"The Government, having demonstrated harm to competition, the burden shifts to Dentsply to show that [its exclusionary contractual provision] promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective."

United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.,
399 F.3d 181, 196–97 (3rd Cir. 2005)

"This burden-shifting has evolved based on which party has access to the various categories of evidence and information, with any evidence of pro-competitive justifications likely to be under the defendant's control."

Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,
951 F.3d 429, 464 (7th Cir. 2020)

[T]he "procompetitive benefits" argument is the centerpiece of Meta's affirmative defense to the FTC's claims. . . . [B]ecause it is an affirmative defense, Meta will bear the burden of proof on the issue.

FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
2023 WL 3092651, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2023)

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Quality Adjusted Price

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Prices Are Not Based On Competition

 2016

Redacted

We don't yet have "value" reserves

- We still don't know value distributions
 - We need external data (not bids!)
 - Revenue optimal reserve and other advertiser's bids not correlated enough
- We still can't set a price per advertiser
 - Generalization problem not solved (e.g. pBid failed)
 - Robustness problem not solved

But maybe we can set an "optimal" query reserve...

"After years of reserve work, we still aren't able to say what an advertiser's value is."

We aren't really detecting value, we are finding ideal reserve for click loss trade-off. So, it's another revenue efficiency knob[.]"

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Google Does Not Know Advertiser “Value”

 2019

So you want to work on the Auction

An introductory guide for Research collaborators and Thresholds newbies

Redacted@

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[Squashing](#)

[Whole Page Auction](#)

[MIA](#)

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- Allocation: Whether ads get to show or not for the query, and what kind of UI (e.g. extensions) we show along with the ad
- Ranking: The order of ads on the page.
- Pricing: The price that advertisers have to pay for the ad (currently, always a cost per click, or CPC)

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GOOG-DOJ-30173105

Message

From: Emily Mosley [mailto:emilym@google.com]
Sent: 4/12/2019 9:25:55 PM
To: Hyung Min [mailto:hmin@google.com]
Subject: Re: quality PM

I had him send me some artifacts, posting below. (some I couldn't copy and aren't shared - but I can't request access if you want to look more closely at one that is locked down).

In addition to sundae's stuff, I could actually imagine him helping out with tetriz. how would annot feel about having a PM partner? obviously from below it's clear that he can do heavy analysis.

- I wrote [this doc](#) to introduce newcomers to the auction, so it might be a helpful overview.
- This is the last PDD I wrote in an IC capacity. It is a major removal of the auction system. The first version of the product is complete and we are running long term experiments to validate it now.
- Here's an [example](#) of proposing an algorithm change (this particular one is under development).
- Here is a [strategy doc](#) for the auction and quality systems (our ML models to predict user needs and ad quality, such as SmartASS and landing page quality). I've lead the strategy planning for these teams the past three years.

I did a major quality tuning. A report of mine drove the launch, but I was involved in free change components and helping get executive approval.

I wrote to help the teams think through a new human eval and ML approach for dealing

eriment. When I have free

key metrics for Targeting. I've
as we created a new
to Quality.

targeting product, as well as act

a small team.

sc?

E:

Ex. No.
UPX0042

GOOG-DOJ-24224234

“If we had good estimates of the following two values for each ad, then we could simplify the system and pretty much call it a day:

- Blindness cost (or sightedness value) of the ad
- **Advertiser value per click**

We’ve tried to get good estimates on both of these values **but have been unsuccessful.**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Chooses Revenue Over Quality

 2018

Why Leaning on AQ to deliver +20% LongTerm-Rasta RPM for All of SearchAds is a Fragile Strategy (TLDR: It's likely not possible)

Redacted

Summary

Historically, the overwhelming majority of SearchAds 20% RPM OKR has rested on the shoulders of the SearchAdsQuality team. This document articulates why that strategy is structurally becoming more fragile over time, and likely is not one on which to rely in 2020+.

Issue 1: External structural headwinds

PLAs appear like they will be touching ^{Redacted} of spend in 2019 (QueryNav). So at most ^{Redacted} of Google.com spend comes from SearchAds (and perhaps much less if Travel is included in QueryNav - I can't tell!). Therefore, ^{Redacted} more is being asked of AdsQuality relative to a long time ago if they alone need to get to 20%.

Automated bidding is also seemingly resulting in advertisers ever more setting TargetCPAs or Max* strategies, which in turn inhibits AdsQuality from raising prices and/or increasing clicks to increase revenue¹. While such bidding strategies may be proper from a long-term advertiser health perspective, it creates a headwind for RPM launches, likely manifested most strongly in the discounts taken by the team when mapping Rasta RPM to LongTerm RPM factoring in advertiser response (often a 50% haircut).

Issue 2: Internal structural headwinds

Relative to the past (when the OKR was still 20%), we are now dramatically more conservative in how we translate Rasta RPM to bookable RPM. Budget-adjusting is a 20% haircut², we seemingly take a 50% haircut on at least ^{Redacted} of Rasta RPM from pricing oriented launches (book at least ^{Redacted} fewer than we would have in the past on such launches). Long-term user quality may be a bit more of a wash (as we both don't book negatives and positives from quality launches, so for now I will assume these cancel). However, just accounting for Budget and Advertiser adjusting, ^{Redacted} more is being asked of AdsQuality relative to a long time ago given how much more conservatively we book things these days relative to the past.

Issue 3: Things less broken than ever despite bar never higher

Issues (1) and (2) combined imply that roughly ^{Redacted} is needed of AdsQuality now relative to yesterday in order to achieve the 20% RPM OKR. In other words, in order for AdsQuality alone in 2019 to achieve the 20% RPM OKR, they would need to launch things

¹ For Target ROI products, as CPAs increase the bidding will automatically lower. For Max* strategies which look NoBC but are actually BC, as clicks increase the bidding will automatically lower.

² Budget adjusting been happening for a while, but not always. Therefore, while the team has already been having to work harder, emerging circumstances are resulting in AQ being asked to work harder still.

Commented [1]: I agree that we are pretty conservative with pure pricing launches. Then again, they are a new phenomenon. Do you think we should be more liberal in counting these?

Ex. No.

UPX0467

1:20-cv-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-23054331



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product Management



“Within ClickQuality, I think the general belief is that **we’re likely showing more low quality ads that we ought not be showing** relative to high quality ads that are not making their way through to the auction.”

* * *

“Auction / Pricing . . . The general belief here is there is **more juice in getting prices right (higher) than in improving the allocation of ads.**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



No Analysis Of Quality-Adjusted Pricing



Dr. Mark Israel
Google Expert
Compass Lexecon

Q. Right. You don't try to determine what portion of nominal price changes is due to changes in quality; is that correct?

A. I mean, I report what Google has done in measuring that. **I don't do a separate econometric study.**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Terminated Attempt To Measure Excess CPC

 2022

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

United States of America, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM

v.

HON. AMIT P. MEHTA

Google LLC,

Defendant.

State of Colorado, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:20-cv-03715-APM

v.

HON. AMIT P. MEHTA

Google LLC,

Defendant.

**DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES AND
OBJECTIONS TO DOJ PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES**

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, defendant Google LLC ("Google"), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby supplements its responses and objections to Plaintiffs United States of America and the States of Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin's Fourth Set of Interrogatories as follows:

Ex. No.
UPX6015
1:20-cv-03010-APM

USDOJ-GOOG-00187313

"In early 2018, members of Google's ad auction team began what they called a 'holistic pricing project.' During this effort, the ads team tried to measure and track something they called 'Excess CPC.' . . . **Google paused the holistic pricing project and the associated adjustments in late 2019.**"



Dr. Mark Israel

Google Expert, Compass Lexecon

A. [Excess CPC] is Google's metric that they reported over time. I think they last reported a value in 2020. . . . [I]t was their attempt to . . . measure something like a quality adjusted price.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Expanded Keyword Matching

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Expanded Matching Reduces Advertiser Control

IPG 2020


SOURCE Guide : Paid Search – Setup

Ex. No.
UPX0926
1:20-cv-03010-APM

REPRISE

CONFIDENTIAL

IPG-00002681



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Advertisers Cannot Opt Out



**Prof. Kinshuk
Jerath**
*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Marketing,
Columbia Univ.*

A. [T]his makes it **easier for advertisers to enter auctions, but much more difficult for them to not enter these auctions**. So on average, that would lead to thicker auctions, exactly as [the Court] said, and thicker auctions means more -- higher prices.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Thicker Auctions Increase Price



Jerry Dischler
VP & General Manager,
Google Ads



Q. An outcome of semantic matching is **thicker auctions**, correct?

A. Yes.

Tr. Testimony



Joshua Lowcock
Global Chief Media Officer



Q. [W]hat effect on CPC would you expect an increase in bidders in an auction to have?

A. It would increase the -- it should **increase the price**.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Thicker Auctions Increase Price



Dr. Mark Israel

*Google Expert
Compass Lexecon*

Q. And all else equal, **more advertisers in an auction tend to lead to a higher price?**

A. . . . I think it's probably **true on average.** . . .

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Match-Type Expansions Increase Prices

 2018

Google

Semantic Exact and Close Match

Current targeting analyses

Redacted@, Redacted@, advertiser-understanding@, ads-expmatch-team@

Advertiser Response Summit
Zürich, 2018-10-02

Confidential - Proprietary

Ex. No.

UPX1117

1:20-cv-03010-APM

GOOG-DOJ-22425101

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Examples: increased auction pressure

Query	Baseline	Experiment
Redacted	KW: Redacted \$0.23 Redacted Redacted	KW: Redacted \$5.81 Redacted
		KW: Redacted Redacted

SAVE KW+AD

Google

Confidential - Proprietary

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Match-Type Expansions Increase Prices

G 2019

Redacted

“[C]overage increase also leads to denser auctions and higher CPCs . . .”

DX0161

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

DX0161.001


GOOG-DOJ-06280541

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Match-Type Expansions Increase RPM

 2020




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EXHIBIT
PSX00548

GOOG-DOJ-29857446

RPM contributions per year



- Keyword targeting has delivered steady gains
- Semantification of match types started in 2012 with close variants & full semantic exact in 2018
- We will continue to harness gains from expansion and semantification using ML

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Advertisers Cannot Opt Out Of Match-Type Expansions



Jerry Dischler
VP & General
Manager, Google Ads



- Q.** Advertisers do not have the ability to opt out of semantic matching, correct?
- A.** That's correct.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Advertisers Cannot Opt Out Of Match-Type Expansions

A 2019

Redacted

“[I]t is like being in the ring with a sumo wrestler, with the lights turned off. We just have to keep our heads down and work hard to innovate our way to the next level.”

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ANGI-00240964



REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Search Query Reports

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



“Massive Decrease In Query Visibility”



“Google moved to **reduce the queries** included in Google Ads search terms reports, thereby **limiting advertiser visibility into the specific queries driving ad traffic.**”

“This is a **massive decrease** in query visibility, making it more **difficult for paid search marketers to effectively identify poor-matching queries** to weed out via keyword negatives.”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Privacy Explanation Is Pretextual

2020

From: Paskalis, Louis
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 12:04 PM
To: Stephen Arthur Redacted@google.com
Subject: FW: Google Limiting SQRs

WOW!

From: Martin, Kenny
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 11:55 AM
To: Paskalis, Louis Redacted@bofa.com
Subject: RE: Google Limiting SQRs

We'll the article just gives the context. We learned about it from GC, I believe, who discovered it via a real-world issue we discovered in our accounts. So I'm pretty sure Google did not notify them or us, no.

Kenny Martin
SVP, Digital Marketing / Search CoE lead

Redacted
Redacted@bofa.com

BANK OF AMERICA

Search Center of Excellence



From: Paskalis, Louis
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 10:36 AM
To: Martin, Kenny Redacted@bofa.com
Subject: RE: Google Limiting SQRs

Ex. No.
UPX0983

1:20-cv-03010-APM

Are you telling me that our team learned about this from a 45 day old article and not directly from Google?

From: Martin, Kenny
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 11:31 AM
To: Paskalis, Louis Redacted@bofa.com
Subject: FW: Google Limiting SQRs

See below - one of the more egregious examples of Google removing transparency from advertisers under the banner of 'privacy', IMO. Search Query Report data has always inherently anonymized and aggregated.

1

Confidential

BACGOOG-00003162

“See below – one of the more egregious examples of Google removing transparency from advertisers under the banner of ‘privacy’, IMO. **Search Query data has always [been] anonymized and aggregated.**”

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Privacy Explanation Is Pretextual



Mike James
Director, Software
Development



- Q.** . . . [D]o you recall any conversations with Google about whether there are privacy issues with regard to the data that you referred to as obfuscated in Exhibit 4?
- A.** I have **no recollection of conversations regarding privacy concerns in the search query report data prior to this change.**

Des. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Privacy Explanation Is Pretextual

 2020

Redacted



Dr. Adam Juda
VP, Product Management



“While a query can contain sensitive information . . . queries are not PII . . .”

Ex. No.
UPX0526

1:20-cv-03010-APM

GOOG-DOJ-29814524

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Advertisers Do Not Know What They Are Buying



**Prof. Kinshuk
Jerath**

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Marketing,
Columbia Univ.*

- A. [F]or 20 percent of their spend on Google, the **advertisers were not even told which queries they're buying** [T]his is like if you buy a product in a supermarket but they don't tell you what you actually bought. . . . **You should be entitled to know that at least this is where I spent my money.**

Tr. Testimony

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ROI

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

ROI \neq Substitutability

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING




ROI “Within” Not “Across” Channels

“[W]e should be more concerned about the **perception of price / ROI changing within a channel rather than actual cross channel ROI comparisons.**”

* * *

“**[C]ross channel ROI comparisons** appear to still be **extremely difficult** today, even for major players[.]”



REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



ROI Does Not Equal Same Relevant Market



Dr. Mark Israel

*Google Expert
Compass Lexecon*

Q. Right, but the simple fact that different things have the same ROI, that **doesn't tell us whether they're in the same antitrust model?**

A. **I agree with that entirely. . . .**

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Complements Not Substitutes



**Prof. Kinshuk
Jerath**

*Plaintiff Expert
Prof. of Marketing,
Columbia Univ.*

A. [M]oney is moved from one channel to the other, [but] that **does not mean the channels were substitutes**. . . .

* * *

A. [M]oney has been moved from search to display, but not because the channels are substitutes or interchangeable, rather, **because the channels are complementary and mutually reinforcing**. . . .


Tr. Testimony

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Different Channels Are Complements, Not Substitutes

G 2019



Ex. No.
UPX0427
1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-08612029

What's a commercial journey, and why do we care?

Conceptual definition: A commercial journey is any journey that eventually results in a real-world transaction

Examples:

- Shopping for a new suit for an upcoming wedding
- Buying a used car and transferring the title
- Taking piano lessons to pick up a new hobby
- Diagnosing an MCL sprain and finding an orthopedic doctor
- Relocating to a new city and looking for apartments



Commercial journeys have traditionally been **underserved** in organic Search, but they're some of the most important and **friction-filled** user needs

Google

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Advertisers Do Not Shift Search Spend



Ryan Booth
Senior Manager,
Paid Media



Q. Does your team **shift ad spending that frequently between display and Google?**

A. Sorry, you're talking about shifting money from display buying over to Google.

Q. Or Google to display on a daily basis?

A. **No.**

Q. What about any social platforms?

A. No. I would say our Google and Bing investments are pretty much interchangeable but **distinct and separate** from social or display.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Advertisers Do Not Shift Search Spend



Tracy-Ann Lim

*Managing Director,
Chief Media Officer*



Q. And do you typically **shift the spend between search text ads and digital display ads** based on the – if the relative cost of those ads would change?

A. **No.**

Q. And why is that?

A. Paid search budgets are for paid search only. . . . **They are distinct and different and separate.**

Q. And distinct in what way?

A. **They are not fungible.**

* * *

Q. Do you typically **shift ad spend between search text ads and social ads** based on changes in relative cost of those ads?

A. No.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Advertisers Optimize “In-Channel”



Joshua Lowcock
Global Chief Media Officer
IPG

Q. The engine will recommend moving spend from one ad format to another in order to improve ROI; fair?

A. Yes. It also talks about -- I mean, **all in-channel optimization**.

Tr. Testimony



Tracy-Ann Lim
Managing Director, Chief
Media Officer
JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO.

Q. If you learned that the ROI on Bing search text ads was greater than the ROI on Google Search text ads, could you switch all of your search text ads spending to Bing?

A. No. Our spend with Bing maxes out where their volume ends...[s]o once we max out there...**there's no where else to go**.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Search Ads Are Constant


KOHL'S 2018

Kohl's - Spring Media Strategy & Investment
SVP Review

October 3, 2018

DX0412

NOT FOR PUBLIC FILING - ATTORNEY EYES ONLY



REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Google Discovery Ads

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Discovery Ads Are Social Ads

 2020

Google

Discovery ads strategy (ACM)

June 5, 2020

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ex. No.

UPX0033

1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-16933114

Discovery ads launched, allowing advertisers to extend the reach of their social ads to 2.9B+ Google users

Positioning

Discovery ads reach 2.9B people across Discover, YouTube and Gmail worldwide*. Simply reuse your social assets to drive performance.



*except Discover users in FR/DE/AU

Trajectory

Open beta announced at GML in May 2019

- Current: \$836M 7-day ARR, Goal: \$1.4B ARR
- Q1 Booked revenue \$165 M surpassing target (\$160M) despite COVID-19
- Active Advertisers: 20K
- Early signs demonstrating some proof that "lift and shift" strategy is working. [Case Studies](#)
- 4/28 GA: Silently launched to 100% of Google ads advertisers
- 5/27: Publish blog posts and UI alerts to drive adoption


Google

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Google Discovery Ads Are Social Ads

 2020



HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ex. No.
UPX0033
1:20-cv-03010-APM

GOOG-DOJ-16933114

Discovery ads provides a familiar pitch to social buyers

~\$150BN spend from Search and Display buyers

\$80BN Incremental Social budgets



- Beyond Search and Display buyers, Google can now access social budgets and creatives
- Discovery's lift and shift strategy brings social campaigns for feed surfaces and drives higher marginal ROI for social buyers using Search Intent

Google

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Discovery Ads Are Not Substitutes For Search Ads



**Dr. Prabhakar
Raghavan**

*SVP, Knowledge &
Information Products*



Q. . . . Demand Gen ad campaigns, like **Discovery ad campaigns, are aimed at social buyers; right?**

A. At buying -- are aimed at the **latent intent that Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and others are capturing, yes.**

* * *

Q. Do you see. . . the headline is 'no evidence of cannibalization with existing campaigns'?

A. I do.

Q. And that's saying that the **Discovery ads campaigns aren't cannibalizing what you're getting from Search ad campaigns; right?**

A. Correct.

Tr. Testimony

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Nike Facebook Boycott


REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Nike Facebook Boycott: Search Ads Are Constant

 2019

CONVERSION BEFORE AND AFTER FACEBOOK PAUSE



- When we paused **FB/IG** we reallocated most of our Social investment in **DBM (Display)** and **Search**, which both drive higher MTA demand at the cost of decreased creative elevation and less storytelling
- During the pause, Social investment shrunk by more than half to just 8% of overall PM budget allocation due to limitations on scale opportunities within Snapchat, Pinterest, and Twitter
- After relaunch, budget allocation shifted back to similar allocations to pre-pause with slightly more investment staying within **DBM**, **Snapchat**, and **Twitter**

Highly Confidential

NIKE - 00000152

Ex. No.
UPX2076
1:20-cv-03010-APM

- Search Ad spend was effectively constant.
- Facebook Ad spend was primarily reallocated to Display Ads during pause period.
- Additional investment in Search Ads remained post pause period.

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Ad Clicks Is A Flawed Proxy For Quality

Ad Side

Increases in the Google Search Ads Price Index Cited by Prof. Whinston Are No Faster than Quality Improvements

Search Ads Price Indices and Ratio of Ad Clicks to Queries Returning Ads, 2013-2021



UPXD102 at 065; DX1108 (Google QueryNav Data); DX1141 (Google Search Ads Price Data)

Google
DXD-29.129

- Trend line of ad clicks is not a proxy for quality.
- Decreasing organic clicks does not imply quality improvements.
- No evidence clicks alone equal quality.

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING



Google Rejects Clicks As A Quality Proxy

 2018

Message
From: Jerry Dischler [Redacted@google.com]
Sent: 10/22/2018 3:44:10 AM
To: Prabhakar Raghavan [Redacted@google.com]
CC: Vivek Raghunathan [Redacted@google.com]; Vishal Sharma [Redacted@google.com]
Subject: Re: Really basic video ads questions

Inline

On Sun, Oct 21, 2018 at 8:19 PM Prabhakar Raghavan <[Redacted@google.com]> wrote:
Gents - I'm looking

PRIVILEGED &
CONFIDENTIAL
golinsidertrading
golcompliance



Overview of Search and YouTube Ads Revenue

October 12, 2018

GOOGLE CONFIDENTIAL

1

Yes! Although no advertiser really says zero tolerance and we're still trying to seek out what an acceptable level is for many of the top brand advertisers.

Thanks.

--
p.r.

Ex. No.
UPX0342
1:20-cv-03010-APM

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

GOOG-DOJ-04183957

“[A]dvertisers care, in the end, about conversions/purchases, not clicks.”



Sundeep Jain

Former VP, Product Management (Mar. 2013-Oct. 2018)



A.

Redacted

..... **[W]e can't draw the correlation on the click.** We have to draw the correlation to the quality of the post-click experience.

Tr. Testimony

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING