



DVAA P&L 101

Aug 2018

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outside of Ads Finance**

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Agenda

- Evolution of the P&L
- DVAA revenue ... a crash course in ~5 to 7 minutes
- P&L mechanics
- DVAA P&L trends, highlights and 2019+ priorities


The Evolution of the P&L at Google

Google


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Pre-2015: Revenue solves all problems!

Ads Revenue



Shift to Mobile going well in Search



Google

2015: What's a P&L?

	Search			Display			YouTube			Platform			TOTAL ADS			
	\$	% P&L	YoY	\$	% P&L	YoY	\$	% P&L	YoY	\$	% P&L	YoY	\$	% P&L	YoY	
Revenue	11,527	100%	100%	11,527	100%	100%	11,527	100%	100%	11,527	100%	100%	11,527	100%	100%	
AdSense	12,054	94%	9.9%	12,054	94%	9.9%	12,054	94%	9.9%	12,054	94%	9.9%	12,054	94%	9.9%	
AdSense	4,200	35%	10%	4,200	35%	10%	4,200	35%	10%	4,200	35%	10%	4,200	35%	10%	
Served Revenue (Fixed)	\$53,382	89%	15.1%	\$10,823	94%	17.8%	\$5,100	8%	21.8%	\$621	4%	9.8%	\$69,805	21%	32	17.2%
15B Interim	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0%
FX/Adjustments	(1,181)	-1.0%	-1.0%	(1,181)	-1.0%	-1.0%	(1,181)	-1.0%	-1.0%	(1,181)	-1.0%	-1.0%	(1,181)	-1.0%	-1.0%	-1.0%
Variable Spend	(120)	-1%	-1%	(120)	-1%	-1%	(120)	-1%	-1%	(120)	-1%	-1%	(120)	-1%	-1%	-1%
TAC/CAC	8,872	8%	8%	7,310	6%	6%	2,523	2%	2%	8	0%	0%	11,614	10%	10%	10%
Transactional COG	375	0%	0%	175	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	385	0%	0%	0%
Gross Margin* (Booked)	\$43,621	9%	73.2%	\$3,016	3%	8.8%	\$2,098	2%	26.8%	\$620	4%	8.2%	\$49,355	17.6%	1.3%	13.8%
Machine / Platform																
Opex & COGS																
Payroll																
Expense																
Contribution Margin																
Contribution % of Gross Booked																
Contribution % of Net Booked																

Google

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2016-2017: Oh S***, we spend how much on REWS???



Google

© 2016 Google LLC. All rights reserved.

2018+: YOU get a P&L! And YOU get a P&L!



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DV ... A? ... A?

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Display & Video (ads), Apps and Analytics



Google

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


DVAA Mission


“Strengthen Google’s Mission by
efficiently connecting advertisers to users
through great, accessible content.”

go/dory-dvaa-all-hands-q2






DVAA P&L: What's included




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DVAA addresses spectrum of marketer/publisher use cases (simple to sophisticated) and optimizes for access



How are P&Ls defined?



- PAs are defined by **sellside** product (i.e., where did the ad land/was viewed by the user?)
- This is why YouTube isn't part of the DVAA P&L, even though our teams do work that benefit them! (i.e. DBM)

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P&L Mechanics

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
P&L Definitions

		Served Revenue (Fixed FX)	RevForce revenue + Fees (in fixed Annual Plan rate FX)
		Contra Revenues	Spam/Credits, Sales Allowance (bad debt), DVIP
		Booked Revenue (Floating FX)	Accounting revenue (in floating FX)
Cost of Sales	TAC		Applies to media revenue only (except PG/PD, Exchange Bidding)
	Net Revenue		Booked Revenue - TAC
	<i>Net Revenue Margin %</i>		<i>Net Revenue / Booked Revenue</i>
	Other COS		Credit Card Fees, transactional gTech, data licenses (e.g. White Ops)
	Machine/Network		Resource Economy charges, incl. share of Ads-PA Reserve, Logs, Payments
		Gross Margin	Booked Revenue - Cost of Sales
		<i>Gross Margin %</i>	<i>Gross Margin / Booked Revenue</i>
OpEx	Total Opex		All the FTE HC (Payroll, SBC) + non-Payroll OpEx (e.g. TVCs, licenses) supporting DVAA Business
	EngPM		DVAA FTEs, non-Payroll OpEx and Other SR Teams supporting DVAA (EngProd, DIA, Payments Infra)
	GBO		GBO FTEs selling/supporting Core DVAA + GA products (gTech, LCS, Platforms Sales, Partnerships, etc.)
	Marketing		
	G&A		REWS, Legal, Finance, PeopleOps
	TI		SRE, Privacy/Security, Machines/Network "Overhead," Corp Equipment (e.g. laptops, Tech Stops)
		Operating Profit	Gross Margin - OpEx
		<i>Operating Profit %</i>	<i>Operating Profit / Booked Revenue</i>

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Source: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lmyHRpxs_fosbkRGbwenaOE2hKaWQAvUTTzcIsrw6BQ/edit#gid=1479443361

2017 DVAA Revenue Matrix



Key takeaways:

Google "owns" majority of these transactions on both sides -- AdX and nonGoogle relatively small parts of DVAA business

2017 Actual		AdWords	DBM					AdX Buyers			Exchange Bidding
			DA	PD	PA	PG	Tag	DA	PD	PA	
Network	AFC/AdMob	0% 32%	11% 32%					0% 32%			
		32% \$5.4B	43% \$0.4B					32% \$0.5B			
	AdX Pubs	15% 18%	10% 20%	10% 8%	10% 16%	4% 7%		0% 20%	0% 8%	0% 16%	0% 5%
		30% \$3.1B	30% \$1.0B	18% \$0.2B	26% \$0.3B	10% \$0.2B		20% \$0.6B	8% \$0.1B	16% \$0.2B	5% \$0.2B
Non-Google	Reservation										
	IPE	15% 0%	10% 0%	9% 0%	10% 0%		3% 0%				
		15% \$0.3B	10% \$1.3B	9% \$0.1B	10% \$0.4B		3% \$0.0B				

- Legend:
- | | | | |
|--------------|-----|--------|------------------|
| Buy-side Fee | 6% | 27% | Google Rev Share |
| Net Revenue | 31% | \$2.4B | Media Spend |
| Margin | | | |

*AW/Bid (AdWords on 3PE) target margin is 15% as per Product
Net Revenue Margin = (BuySide Platform Fee + Google's Revenue Share) / Media Spend
Programmatic Guaranteed and Preferred Deals recognized as net revenue in external/financial reporting
Increased TAC due to Open Auction tiered deals (and minimum guarantees for AdX Pubs and AFCA/Admob not included; overall impact is ~28pps to Google Total Net Revenue Margin in 2017)

OpEx Allocations: EngPM

Process: 1X annually, Ads Finance analysts solicit feedback from EngPM allocations by product based on estimated time spent a

- Allocations are uploaded into [go/tuboallocates](#) b
- Allocation rates are applied to all Payroll, SBC, T&E, and designated PG

Example: Bahman Rabii manages EngPM Cost Center, which houses ~400 Engineers or ~\$200M of OpEx. He provides the following allocation rates to his trusty financial analyst, Piper:

P&L	Product	Allocation Rate	Allocated OpEx \$
YouTube P&L	YouTube	5%	\$10
	AFC	12%	\$24
DVAA P&L	AdMob	20%	\$40
	AdExchange	42%	\$84
	3PE/NonGoogle	18%	\$36
Play P&L	Play Ads	2%	\$4
Gmail P&L	Gmail Ads	1%	\$2
	Total	100%	\$200

Based on Bahman's inputs, Piper uploads these new allocation rates into [go/tuboallocates](#)

Hyperion then takes the \$400M total OpEx forecast/spend in Bahman's cost center and applies the relevant allocation rates to ensure OpEx hits each P&L accordingly

Dear YT, my boy Bahman says we spend ~5% of our time building out YT-specific formats. So pleeez enjoy this \$10M OpEx allocation 4 our good work



Source: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lmyHRpxs_fosbkRgBwenaOE2hKaWQAvUTTzcIsrw6BQ/edit#gid=1479443361

OpEx Allocations: GBO & Marketing

Process: 1X annually, every GBO Googler completes the GBO time study survey

- One question is spearheaded by the Central Ads Finance team, where the GBO Googler is asked to manually enter how long he/she spends on each product listed (out of 100%). The product options presented are relevant to the team of the Googler taking the survey (ie GMS, LCS, etc.)
- Central Ads Finance scales up the results and applies them to the entire Sales, Marketing, Partnerships, and Google for Work rollups by cost center. The products are mapped to the appropriate Product Areas and Product Groups using Corp's latest Product Taxonomy
- For Buyside Teams working on GDN (AdWords) or DBM, costs are allocated to Sellside product (AdX, AdMob, AFC, YouTube, Play Ads, etc.) on the basis of Revenue

Section 1: Overview and background information
 Question 1: What is the purpose of this document?
 Answer: This document is a report on the results of the survey conducted in 2018.

Section 2: Methodology
 Question 2: How was the data collected?
 Answer: The data was collected through a series of interviews and focus groups with participants from various departments.

Section 3: Results
 Question 3: What are the key findings of the survey?
 Answer: The key findings are that there is a need for more training and development opportunities for employees, and that the current communication channels are not effective.

Section 4: Recommendations
 Question 4: What actions should be taken based on the findings?
 Answer: The recommendations are to implement a new training program, and to improve the communication channels by using a more modern system.

Section 5: Conclusion
 Question 5: What is the overall conclusion of the report?
 Answer: The overall conclusion is that the survey has identified several areas for improvement, and that the recommendations provided are a good starting point for addressing these issues.

Source: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lmyHRpxs_fosbkRGbwenaOE2hKaWQAvUTTzcIsrw6BQ/edit#gid=1479443361

OpEx Allocations: G&A and TI

Process: G&A (REWS, POps, Finance) and TI allocated to P&Ls using a series of drivers

- REWS - **\$3.7B**: Volume of seated Headcount
- TI - **\$3.9B**: PA-specific applications/infrastructure
- POps - **\$1.1B**: count of net hires
- Finance - **\$0.8B**: volume of activities that drive work (invoices, manual journal entries)
- Legal - **\$7.0B**: product launches, PA specific policy issues



Source: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lmyHRpxs_fosbkRGbwenaOE2hKaWQAvUTTzcIsrw6BQ/edit#gid=1479443361

REWS budget is highly fixed in the short-term with the exception of workplace services

- 1 ~60% of the REWS budget is fixed in the short-run but represent the greatest long-term opportunity. Key levers:
 - Location
 - Build/Buy v Lease
 - Fitout specifications
 - Density
- 2 Facilities and Safety & Security (~15% of REWS) may have room on the margins, but are difficult to find structural changes given the requisite nature of maintaining and securing our portfolio
 - NorCal and EMEA facilities contracts out to bid
 - Security is standardizing contractors
- 3 Food spend is highly variable but also highly visible. Key levers:
 - How often you feed people (e.g., # of meals)
 - How many people you feed (e.g., TVCs, visitors)
 - How much you subsidize (e.g., currently 100%)
 - What you feed people (e.g., hot breakfast, MK snacks)
- 4 Transportation is specific to the Bay Area and necessary for future development; possible to overhaul routes and scheduling but would impact Googlers flexibility and commute times



Google Note: Based on 2017 V6 Forecast; excludes write-offs and one-time gains

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Food: Current Global CPPPD¹ of \$20 has seen a mix benefit from the increase in GOVOs but faces pressures in labor costs

Breakdown by Meal



- All sites provide MK services but meal offerings vary by site type and size
 - GOGOs also provide lunch while # of breakfast and dinner offerings vary by site
 - GOVOs are MK services only and make up 5% of program spend (but 22% of the population)

Breakdown by Account



- Labor costs increases pose the largest risk to food unit costs while the program continues to push for operational efficiencies through continued consolidation of vendor partners
- Food & Beverage inflation (1% CAGR in the US²) is actively offset through a focus on waste reduction and economies of scale through procurement

Google ¹ CPPPD = Cost per person per day
² US locations account for 65% of program costs and 55% of the population


DVAA P&L and trends

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DVAA Margin structure heavily dependent upon TAC

DVAA 2018E Margin Structure (Exhibit 1)




Google

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DVAA profitability and value creation in 2019+

- 1. **Increase net revenues:** pricing, inventory mix, product launches
- 1. **Control Operating Expense Growth:** DBM GBO serviceability, EngPM growth
- 1. **Control Capital Expenditures:** consider dropping low value queries

Inventory mix: 3PE declining, but still 40% of total



Google


*Net Revenue Margin here factors: Spam, DVIP, FX

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AFC: 28% in go/projectslice + 3ppt if DVIP had same % of rev as AFC on AW

DBM platform fees have been in decline

DBM Platform Fees as % of Media



Google

Note that recent uptick in DTA is mainly due to mix shift, as Agencies with lower rates have decelerating growth and Direct clients with higher rates are maintaining stable growth trajectory

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Supporting DasNav: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1hGlqawxIKCXwOvLGD1FAJU3u_0pWNU-2Nnz2gZ_t5lQ/edit?ts=5af26e64&pli=1#slide=id.p

Proposal: Drive profitable DVAA growth through new investment framework

ESTABLISHED

Established, at scale businesses with relatively low growth potential

Web

EMERGING

High revenue growth potential, already at minimum scale

Apps

NEW

Early stage businesses with little or no revenue

Video, CGM, etc.

SUPPORTING

Infrastructure and businesses that support other businesses or create optionality

GA Suite

Goals

Drive significant operating profit, FCF improvement

Drive revenue growth and variable margin improvement

Hit technical and adoption milestones; establish demand and unit economics

Drive measurable impact on other businesses

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Appendix/Extras

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Data Sources/References

[go/adsonl](#) - Total Ads P&L (DVAA, Search Ads, YT) updated each forecast cycle *(Central Ads Finance)*

[go/adsonl/mapping](#) - Product/product groups (PG) hierarchies for DVAA vs. Search vs. YT, etc *(Central Ads Finance)*

[go/displayperformance](#) - Display/Video gross revenue forecasts by buying door, sellside product, format, environment, etc. *(Display Rev Team)*

[go/projectslice](#) - Splits total DVAA P&L by various cuts: buying door, sellside product, format, environment, channel, etc. *(DVAA Finance)*

[go/dvaatraining](#) - Series of trainings on DVAA products, revenue, etc. *(DVAA PM)*

[go/corpstats/ga-turbo](#) - Overview of all Turbo G&A allocated costs: REWs, POPs, Finance, TI, etc. *(G&A Finance)*

[Most recent Q2'18 DVAA All Hands recording](#)

Finance Glossary

Variable Costs: Costs that increase with incremental revenue. Our TAC is a variable cost, because it increases with our revenues.

Variable margin: Ratio of incremental profits to incremental revenues, e.g., If we add \$1 incremental gross revenue with 80% TAC, we add \$0.20 to our profits (negating incremental TAC costs). The variable margin is 20%. A business that has high variable margins and can grow revenues is highly likely to turn profitable and be valuable over time, unless its engineering and sales are not well managed, or it requires massive infrastructure to run (Amazon, 2011 model build).

Fixed Cost: Costs that do not increase directly with revenue growth, like EngPM, S&A or R&D.

Invested Capital: Value of the assets (e.g., office buildings, data centers, machines, inventory) needed to support the business.

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC): Whether or not generating \$20 operating profit on \$100 of revenue creates value depends on how much capital is invested in the business. If the capital invested (e.g. IT infrastructure) is \$80, then the return is 25% (\$20 operating profit / \$80 invested). 25% return is generally excellent for a well understood, established business. However, if the business generates \$20 operating profit but had to invest \$1,000 of capital, then the return is 2% and it'd be better off investing in US bonds (~3% return, with no risk). Prospectively, if a business is very risky, then the potential return that would make it an attractive investment has to be higher, as higher risk investments should have higher potential returns. A key reason why Google is so valuable is because its overall return on invested capital, which is driven primarily by Search, is significantly higher than 25%.

For a business to be valuable, it is not sufficient to have high ROIC. If you walked to Gene Kranz in the office and gave him \$5 in exchange for \$10 (worth the try!), your return would be 100%, but you would not be rich. For you to become wealthy, you would have to do this many, many times, i.e. invest quite a few \$5s. That is why when smart businesses find opportunities with high returns they invest a lot in them, e.g., R&D, sales and marketing, and infrastructure, often making profitability and returns temporarily negative to generate more value later.

A business can be very valuable and have low or negative ROIC in the present or near future, e.g., if it is in an investment cycle. A business will not be very valuable if its ROIC is low or negative and has no prospects of increasing (or if ROIC is high but expected to decline quickly).

Capital Intensity: Ratio of cash outlays for capital expenditures to revenue (e.g. machines). Higher capital intensity businesses have higher invested capital and require higher margins to create value.

1/10/2012 11:00 AM

Note: These are principal definitions and omit several technical considerations (e.g., taxes).

Fall 2015 GBO Sales Activity Survey

For this presentation, the CDC and I have assembled a team of individuals who are working on this in real time and I will introduce you to the right people, from a technical and policy level that will help.

Thank you for participating!

- Agency (Google, Twitter, etc.)
- Cloud, Scaled, Performance & Platforms (all in one)
- CMA Platform Sales (Google, Twitter, etc.)
- CMA (Google, Twitter, etc.)
- gTech Auto USA
- gTech Auto Global Support, Dedicated & Specialist Teams (Google, Twitter, etc.)
- FMS (Google, Twitter, etc.)
- LES
- O2 Pub. & Performance Pool
- SaaS (Google, Twitter, etc.)

Teams that do NOT need to take the survey:

- Global: find up to two more good things about your job (3 items)
- Group: 10 items
- 2/3rd salary and 2/3rd benefits from group (anonymous)
- 1/3rd salary, 1/3rd benefits, 1/3rd from group (1/3rd)
- 1/3rd salary, 1/3rd benefits, 1/3rd from group (1/3rd)
- 1/3rd salary, 1/3rd benefits, 1/3rd from group (1/3rd)

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How is this different from hypothesis?

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How will the survey data be used?

The firm will be paid 10% up front and 90% on completion of the project. The firm's cost is \$100,000. The firm's expected profit is \$10,000. The firm's expected profit is \$10,000. The firm's expected profit is \$10,000.

Figure 10: *Plot of the function ϕ for $\alpha = 0.5$ and $\beta = 0.5$*

Figure 10: *Plot of the function ϕ for $\alpha = 0.5$ and $\beta = 0.5$*

Downloaded At: 11:53 11 September 2009

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Computer Turned Search

QOMA (University of Ottawa and the BMRB)

10

1999-2000

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6.2. Performance

1997-1998

Statistical Software – EViews

Fig. 1. *Staphylococcus aureus* (strain 104) and *Staphylococcus aureus* (strain 105) on agar plates. The plates are labeled "104" and "105" and show the characteristic golden-yellow color of *S. aureus*.

Statistik CMM - Performance

Melinda Szwed

University of Alabama

Received: 1999.8.11

Available

2017 DVAA "Waffle" - Buyside Fee, Rev Share, Net Rev % & Media Spend

		AdWords	DBM					AdX Buyers			Exchange Bidding
			OA	PD	PA	PG	Tag	OA	PD	PA	
O&O	YouTube	0% 45%	4% 45%								
		45% \$5.6B	49% \$1.0B								
	Gmail	0% 100%									
		100% \$0.4B									
Network	AFCAdMob	0% 32%	11% 32%					0% 32%			
		32% \$5.4B	43% \$0.4B					32% \$0.5B			
	AdX Pubs	15% 18%	10% 20%	10% 8%	10% 16%	4% 7%		0% 20%	0% 8%	0% 18%	0% 5%
		30% \$3.1B	30% \$1.0B	16% \$0.2B	26% \$0.3B	10% \$0.2B		20% \$0.6B	6% \$0.1B	16% \$0.2B	6% \$0.2B
Non-Google	Reservation						3% 0%				
	3PE	15% 0%	10% 0%	9% 0%	10% 0%		3% \$0.0B				
		15% \$0.3B	10% \$1.3B	9% \$0.1B	10% \$0.4B						

- 1 Significant variance in DBM net margins across inventory sources
- 2 Significant variance in buy and sell side contributions across deal types
- 3 DBM on 3PE net revenue margin depends solely on buyside fees

*O&O not included in DVAA PSL

**AWBid (AdWords on 3PE) target margin is 15% as per Product

Net Revenue Margin = (Buyside Platform Fee + Google's Revenue Share) / Media Spend

Programmatic Guaranteed and Preferred Deals recognized as net revenue in external financial reporting

Increased TAC due to Open Action tiered deals (and minimum guarantees) for AdX Pubs and AFC/Admob not included; overall impact is -25bps to Google Total Net Revenue Margin in 2017

Legend:

Buyside Fee	→	6% 27%	←	Google Rev Share
Net Revenue Margin	→	31% \$2.4B	←	Media Spend

AdWords has higher net rev margin than DBM mainly due to larger YT share of spend, but DBM is higher margin when limiting to Network and Auction

All Trans Types			Auction Only		
	AdWords	DBM		AdWords	DBM
O&O	0% -49% 49% \$6.0B	4% -45% 49% \$1.0B	O&O	0% -49% 49% \$6.0B	4% -45% 49% \$1.0B
Network	6% 27% 31% \$8.5B	9% 20% 20% \$2.1B	Network	6% 27% 31% \$8.5B	10% 23% 34% \$1.5B
Non-Google	15% 0% 15% \$0.3B	10% 0% 10% \$1.8B	Non-Google	15% 0% 15% \$0.3B	10% 0% 10% \$1.3B
Total	4% 35% 38% \$14.8	8% 19% 27% \$5.1B	Total	4% 35% 38% \$14.8	9% 21% 30% \$3.7B
Total ex-O&O	6% 26% 31% \$8.9B	10% 11% 20% \$3.9B	Total ex-O&O	6% 26% 31% \$8.9B	10% 13% 23% \$2.7B

1 Total net rev margin of 38% for AdW vs 27% in DBM, but YT was ~2x share of Adwords spend (40%) vs DBM (21%)

2 Removing YT, AdW net rev margin still significantly higher because DBM has direct deals (lower buy-side fees and Google rev share) and also falls on 3PE (0% Google rev share)

3 Removing YT and limiting to Auction only, DBM has slightly higher net rev for Network, but AdW remains 8pp higher than DBM in total net rev margin due to DBM spend on 3PE

Legend:

Buy-side Fee → 6% 27% ← Google Rev Share

Net Revenue → 31% \$2.4B ← Media Spend

Margin

*O&O not included in DVWA P&L
 **AWBid (AdWords on 3PE) target margin is 15% as per Product
 Net Revenue Margin = (Buy-side Platform Fee + Google's Revenue Share) / Media Spend
 Programmatic Guaranteed and Preferred Deals recognized as net revenue in external/financial reporting
 Increased TAC due to Open Auction tiered deals (and minimum guarantees) for AdX Pubs and AFC/Admob not included; overall impact is ~35bps to Google Total Net Revenue Margin in 2017

Glossary of basic Google display terms: display products

GDN (Google Display Network): Advertiser product to place display ad on collection of websites via Google. Sometimes referred to as AdWords because advertisers use the same front-end system as for search ads/traditional AdWords.

DBM (DoubleClick Bid Manager): Google's DSP (Demand Side Platform), where advertisers can go to advertise both on Google publisher product websites (AFC and AdExchange) as well as non-Google exchanges. Formerly known as Invite Media.

AFC (AdSense for Content): Google's traditional display publisher product. Other AdSense publisher products that fall under display include AFD (AdSense for Domain), AFE (AdSense for Error), AFG (AdSense for Games), AFV (AdSense for Video).

Display Buyside: Includes all Google display advertiser products except GDN/AdMob. Display Buyside includes AdX Buyers, DBM, DS/DoubleClick Search, DFA/DoubleClick for Advertisers, DRM/DoubleClick Rich Media.