

CONFIDENTIAL

Core RiGoR Review

Q1'25 Cybersecurity Update

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REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION


Top Cybersecurity Risks | Overview

Insider Risks


Intellectual Property (IP)

Very High Risk.  On Track
Insider access to Intellectual Property including AI Models.

User Data Protection


Very High Risk.  On Track
Insider access to user data in storage repositories.

Access Controls in First-Party Tools (1P)


High Risk.  On Track
Insider access to user data via 1P Enterprise Tools.

Third-Party Risks


Third-Party SaaS (3P)

High Risk.  On Track
Use of third-party Software as a Service solutions.

Contract Manufacturing (CM)


High Risk.  On Track
Third-party Contract Manufacturing facilities that make Google's servers and consumer devices.

Software Supply Chain

High Risk.  On Track
Software creation, maintenance, and deployment.


Trusted Identity Risk

Identity Verification & Deepfakes (IdV)

Very High Risk.  On Track
Threat actors impersonating employees and members of the extended workforce.

Infrastructure Risks

Physical Infrastructure Controls Systems

Very High Risk.  On Track
Physical Infrastructure Controls Systems that manage water, power, cooling, etc., in data centers.


Developer Endpoints

High Risk.  On Track
Highly-privileged engineering workflows.

Alphabet's Use of Cloud

High Risk.  Off Track
Use of next-gen Cloud platforms.

Data Center Regionalization

High Risk.  On Track
Expanded data center locations and services.

Third-Party Risk: Software Supply Chain			
Current Risk Level		High Risk	Trend ● On track
<p>Google relies on thousands of third-party produced software, both open source and commercial. Use of third-party software increases developer velocity but also introduces risk by incorporating unverifiable components. In recent years, threat actors have leveraged the unverified trust in the ecosystem by placing malicious code into components used by companies all over the world (e.g., SolarWinds), and vulnerabilities in popular components have made attacks-at-scale possible.</p>			
Headlines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployed planned automated security checks ("enforcement gates") in the SDLC to measure supply chain risk. Pilot in place to auto-update open-source software dependencies in Cloud. 		
Risk Reduction Update	% software with controls that prevent unilateral tampering.	% of 3P open source consumed by Google that meets the vulnerability remediation requirements.	
	Milestone(s) Q4'24: Q4'25: 2027+:		Milestone(s) Q4'24: 2025+:

Google has historically mandated code tampering controls, such as requiring two-person review on all code. Our work on additional controls will continue to drive down risk.

Medium Risk

Our focus is on updated automation, control development, and increased control adoption, with broad take-up in 2026.

Ad Hoc

We have not yet developed all the solutions we need to scale control enforcement. We may not have a complete inventory of assets to be protected.



Third-Party Risk | Software Supply Chain

Overview

Third-party dependency management is fundamental to Google's software supply chain. We have obligations to Google and our Customers to protect and be transparent about our software supply chain.

Challenge(s)

- *Shared fate*: The Core-administered third-party google3 directory is shared across Google.
- Federated ownership of shared third-party dependencies in google3 does not scale. Central remediation continues to have the largest ROI on safety and security.

Path forward

Pursuant to the Core Pillar Request and Internal Audit findings.

1. **Automation**: Build infrastructure to automate maintenance of dependencies.
2. **Pay down accumulated risk debt**: Remediation of select dependencies and moving them onto well-lit paths with automated maintenance. Prioritize Trusted Core Access (TCA) C++ dependencies going forward.



Core Pillar Request

Support for Beyond Security funding to relevant Core teams (Core Dev, PSS) and TRR (in progress).