


Three Economic Objectives for Restoring Competition



Plaintiffs'
Demonstrative C
1:23-cv-00108

Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedies

AdX
Divestiture

Phased DFP
Divestiture

Behavioral
Restrictions

Data and
Transparency
Requirements


Escrow and
Technical
Assistance

AdX Divestiture


- Separation and sale of AdX (Pl. PFJ §§ VI, XI(A))
- Interim Measures:
 - AdX-header bidding interoperability (Pl. PFJ § IX(A))
 - AdX bidding into other publisher ad servers in same manner as DFP (Pl. PFJ § IX(B))

AdWords Is Likely to Bid More Widely


AdWords



DV360



Non-Google Bidding Tools



Phased DFP Divestiture

DFP-Prebid interoperability
and API for publishers to
move data to other publisher
ad servers (“Phase 1”)

(Pl. PFJ §§ IX(C)-(D))

Make DFP final auction logic
available under open-source
license (“Phase 2”)

(Pl. PFJ §§ VII, XI(B)-(C))

If necessary: Remainder of DFP structurally separated
from Google and sold (“Phase 3”) (Pl. PFJ §§ VIII, XI(D))

Behavioral Restrictions

- No specific conduct found anticompetitive.
(Pl. PFJ § X(J))
- No using Google bidding tools to foreclose rivals in sell-side markets. (Pl. PFJ §§ X(A)-(D))
- No conditioning sale or use of one ad tech tool on sale or use of another. (Pl. PFJ §§ X(F)-(G), (I))

Data and Transparency Requirements

- Share auction-improving DFP data with open-source auction administrator. (Pl. PFJ § IX(G))
- Provide customers access to their own DFP and AdX data. (Pl. PFJ § IX(E))
- Prohibit Google from using DFP data or Google first-party data to foreclose rivals. (Pl. PFJ §§ X(E), X(H))

Escrow and Technical Assistance

- Fund account to help administer the open-source auction and defray publisher switching costs.
(Pl. PFJ § XII)
- Provide technical assistance to the open-source auction administrator. (Pl. PFJ § VII(G))

Google's Proposals Are Insufficient to Restore Competition

- Do not address AdWords behavior
- Do not sufficiently protect against other forms of monopolization
- Do not meaningfully address harm to rivals' competitiveness or exit/forgone entry of rivals
- Three-year monitoring duration likely too short