

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

STANDARD SANITARY MFG. CO., ET
AL., Defendants;

In Equity No. G-17

v.

WARD FOOD PRODUCTS CORP., ET AL.,
Defendants;

In Equity No. 1073

v.

CONFECTIONERS CLUB OF
BALTIMORE, ET AL., Defendants;

In Equity No. 1424

v.

MARYLAND STATE LICENSED
BEVERAGE ASSN., INC., ET AL.,
Defendants;

Civil Action No. 9122

v.

CHARG-IT OF BALTIMORE, INC.,
Defendant;

Civil Action No. 12330

v.

THE H.E. KOONTZ CREAMERY, INC., ET
AL., Defendants;

Civil Action No. 14308

v.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY BOARD OF
REALTORS, INC., Defendant;

Civil Action No. 21545

v.

SWEETHEART BAKERS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants;

Civil Action No. 71-821 HM

v.

THE E.H. KOESTER BAKERY CO., ET
AL., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 71-822 HM

**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION OF
THE UNITED STATES TO TERMINATE LEGACY ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS**

The United States respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion to terminate nine legacy antitrust judgments. The Court entered these judgments in cases brought by the United States between 1911 and 1972; thus, they are between forty-seven and one hundred eight years old. After examining each judgment—and after soliciting public comments on each proposed termination—the United States has concluded that termination of these judgments is appropriate. Termination will permit the Court to clear its docket, the Department to clear its records, and businesses to clear their books, allowing each to utilize its resources more effectively.

I. BACKGROUND

From 1890, when the antitrust laws were first enacted, until the late 1970s, the United States frequently sought entry of antitrust judgments whose terms never expired.¹ Such perpetual judgments were the norm until 1979, when the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division”) adopted the practice of including a term limit of ten

¹ The primary antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. The judgments the United States seeks to terminate with the accompanying motion concern violations of these two laws.

years in nearly all of its antitrust judgments. Perpetual judgments entered before the policy change, however, remain in effect indefinitely unless a court terminates them. Although a defendant may move a court to terminate a perpetual judgment, few defendants have done so. There are many possible reasons for this, including that defendants may not have been willing to bear the costs and time resources to seek termination, defendants may have lost track of decades-old judgments, individual defendants may have passed away, or firm defendants may have gone out of business. As a result, hundreds of these legacy judgments remain open on the dockets of courts around the country. These judgments likely no longer are necessary to protect competition and may even have become anticompetitive because of changed circumstances since their entry.

The Antitrust Division recently implemented a program to review and, when appropriate, seek termination of legacy judgments. The Antitrust Division's Judgment Termination Initiative encompasses review of all of its outstanding perpetual antitrust judgments. The Antitrust Division described the initiative in a statement published in the Federal Register.² In addition, the Antitrust Division established a website to keep the public apprised of its efforts to terminate perpetual judgments that no longer serve to protect competition.³ The United States believes that its outstanding perpetual antitrust judgments presumptively should be terminated; nevertheless, the Antitrust Division examined each judgment covered by this motion to ensure that it is suitable for termination. The Antitrust Division also gave the public notice of—and the opportunity to comment on—its intention to seek termination of these judgments.

² Department of Justice's Initiative to Seek Termination of Legacy Antitrust Judgments, 83 Fed. Reg. 19,837 (May 4, 2018), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2018-05-04/2018-09461>.

³ <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>.

In brief, the process by which the United States has identified judgments it believes should be terminated is as follows:⁴

- The Antitrust Division reviewed its perpetual judgments entered by this Court to identify those that no longer serve to protect competition such that termination would be appropriate.
- When the Antitrust Division identified a judgment it believed suitable for termination, it posted the name of the case and a link to the judgment on its public Judgment Termination Initiative website, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>.
- The public had the opportunity to submit comments regarding each proposed termination to the Antitrust Division within thirty days of the date the case name and judgment link was posted to the public website.
- Having received no comments regarding the above-captioned judgments, the United States moved this Court to terminate them.

The remainder of this memorandum is organized as follows: Section II describes the Court's jurisdiction to terminate the judgments in the above-captioned cases. Section III explains that perpetual judgments rarely serve to protect competition and those that are more than ten years old should be terminated absent compelling circumstances. This section also describes the additional reasons that the United States believes each of the judgments should be terminated. Section IV concludes. Appendix A attaches a copy of each final judgment that the United States seeks to terminate. Appendix B summarizes the terms of each judgment and the United States' reasons for seeking termination. Finally, Appendix C is a Proposed Order Terminating Final Judgments.

⁴ The process is identical to that followed by the United States when it recently and successfully moved the District Court for the District of Columbia to terminate nineteen legacy antitrust judgments and the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to terminate five legacy antitrust judgments. See Order Granting Motion to Terminate Legacy Antitrust Judgments, *United States v. American Amusement Ticket Mfrs. Ass'n, et al.*, Case No. 1:18-MC-00091-BAH (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2018) and Order Granting Motion to Terminate Legacy Antitrust Judgments, *United States of America v. The Noland Company, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 2:18-MC-00033-HCM-LRS (E.D.VA. Nov. 21, 2018).

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR TERMINATING THE JUDGMENTS

This Court has jurisdiction to terminate the judgments in the above-captioned cases. A copy of each of the judgments is attached in Appendix A. Eight of the nine judgments expressly provide that the Court retains jurisdiction. Although one of the judgments does not explicitly state the Court retains jurisdiction, it has long been recognized that courts are vested with inherent power to modify judgments they have issued which regulate future conduct. *See United States v. Swift & Company*, 286 US. 106, 114-15 (1932).

Moreover, the Court's inherent authority to terminate a judgment it has issued is now encompassed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) provides that, "[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . (5) [when] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)-(6). *See also Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev.*, 404 F.3d 821, 826 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The court's inherent authority to modify a consent decree or other injunction is now encompassed in Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, et al.*, 859 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Rule 60(b) also contains a catchall section, which gives a court authority to relieve a party from a judgment for 'any other reason' not articulated in sections (1) through (5), Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), but only when the movant demonstrates 'extraordinary circumstances.'" (citation omitted)).

Given its jurisdiction and its authority, the Court may terminate each judgment for any reason that justifies relief, including that the judgments no longer serve their original purpose of protecting competition.⁵ Termination of these judgments is warranted.

⁵ In light of the circumstances surrounding the judgments for which it seeks termination, the United States does not believe it is necessary for the Court to make an extensive inquiry into the facts of each judgment to

III. ARGUMENT

It is appropriate to terminate the perpetual judgments in each the above-captioned cases because they no longer continue to serve their original purpose of protecting competition. The United States believes that the judgments presumptively should be terminated because their age alone suggests they no longer protect competition. Other reasons, however, also weigh in favor of terminating these judgments, including that defendants likely no longer exist, terms of the judgment merely prohibit that which the antitrust laws already prohibit, or changed market conditions likely have rendered the judgment ineffectual. Under such circumstances, the Court may terminate the judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) or (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. The Judgments Presumptively Should Be Terminated Because of Their Age

Permanent antitrust injunctions rarely serve to protect competition. The experience of the United States in enforcing the antitrust laws has shown that markets almost always evolve over time in response to competitive and technological changes. These changes may make the prohibitions of decades-old judgments either irrelevant to, or inconsistent with, competition. The development of new products that compete with existing products, for example, may render a market more competitive than it was at the time of entry of the judgment or may even eliminate a market altogether, making the judgment irrelevant. In some circumstances, a judgment may be an impediment to the kind of adaptation to change that is the hallmark of competition, undermining the purposes of the antitrust laws. These considerations, among others, led the

terminate them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or (b)(6). All of these judgments would have terminated long ago if the Antitrust Division had the foresight to limit them to ten years in duration as under its policy adopted in 1979. Moreover, the passage of decades and changed circumstance since their entry, as described in this memorandum, means that it is likely that the judgments no longer serve their original purpose of protecting competition.

Antitrust Division in 1979 to establish its policy of generally including in each judgment a term automatically terminating the judgment after no more than ten years.⁶

The judgments in the above-captioned matters—all of which are decades old—presumptively should be terminated for the reasons that led the Antitrust Division to adopt its 1979 policy of generally limiting judgments to a term of ten years. There are no affirmative reasons for the judgments to remain in effect; indeed, there are additional reasons for terminating them.

B. The Judgments Should Be Terminated Because They Are Unnecessary

In addition to age, other reasons weigh heavily in favor of termination of each judgment. These reasons include: (1) most defendants likely no longer exist, (2) the judgment largely prohibits that which the antitrust laws already prohibit, and (3) market conditions likely have changed. Each of these reasons suggests the judgments no longer serve to protect competition. In this section, we describe these additional reasons, and we identify those judgments that are worthy of termination for each reason. Appendix B summarizes the key terms of each judgment and the reasons to terminate it.

1. Most Defendants Likely No Longer Exist

The Antitrust Division believes that most of the defendants in the following cases brought by the United States likely no longer exist:

- *Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., et al.*, In Equity No. G-17 (judgment entered 1911),
- *Ward Food Products Corp., et al.*, In Equity No. 1073 (judgment entered 1926),
- *Confectioners Club of Baltimore, et al.*, In Equity No. 1424 (judgment entered 1930),
- *Charg-It of Baltimore, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 12330 (judgment entered 1960),
- *Sweetheart Bakers, Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 71-821 HM (judgment entered 1972), and

⁶ U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL at III-147 (5th ed. 2008), <https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-manual>.

- *E.H. Koester Bakery Co., et al.*, Civil Action No. 71-822 HM (judgment entered 1972).

These judgments relate to very old cases brought against groups of individuals or firms. Each of these cases range between forty-seven and one hundred eight years old. With the passage of time, the individual defendants in these cases likely have passed away and some firm defendants likely have gone out of existence. To the extent that defendants no longer exist, the related judgment serves no purpose, which is a reason to terminate these judgments.

2. Terms of Judgment Prohibit Acts Already Prohibited by Law

The Antitrust Division has determined that the core provisions of the judgments in the following cases merely prohibit acts that are illegal under the antitrust laws, such as price fixing, customer or territorial allocations, group boycotts, and attempted monopolization:

- *Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., et al.*, In Equity No. G-17 (prohibiting price fixing, attempted monopolization),
- *Confectioners Club of Baltimore, et al.*, In Equity No. 1424 (prohibiting group boycotts and price fixing),
- *Maryland State Licensed Beverage Assn., Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 9122 (prohibiting price fixing),
- *The H.E. Koontz Creamery, Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 14308 (prohibiting price fixing),
- *Prince George's County Board of Realtors, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 21545 (prohibiting price fixing),
- *Sweetheart Bakers, Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 71-821 HM (prohibiting price fixing), and
- *E.H. Koester Bakery Co., et al.*, Civil Action No. 71-822 HM (prohibiting price fixing).

These terms amount to little more than an admonition that defendants shall not violate the law. Absent such terms, defendants who engage in the type of behavior prohibited by these judgments still face the possibility of imprisonment, significant criminal fines, and treble damages in private follow-on litigation, thereby making such violations of the antitrust laws

unlikely to occur. To the extent these judgments include terms that do little to deter anticompetitive acts, they serve no purpose and there is reason to terminate them.

3. Market Conditions Likely Have Changed

The Department has determined that the following judgment concerns markets that likely now face different competitive forces such that the behavior at issue likely no longer is of competitive concern:

- *Charg-It of Baltimore, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 12330 (concerning charge service plans)

The judgment in *Charg-It of Baltimore*, which was entered in 1960, concerned credit charge plans that largely have been replaced by the use of credit cards. Market dynamics in this industry appear to have changed so substantially since 1960 that the factual conditions that underlay the decisions to enter the judgment no longer exist.

C. There Has Been No Public Opposition to Termination

The United States has provided adequate notice to the public regarding its intent to seek termination of the judgments. On April 25, 2018, the Antitrust Division issued a press release announcing its efforts to review and terminate legacy antitrust judgments, and noting that it would begin its efforts by proposing to terminate judgments entered by the federal district courts in Washington, D.C., and Alexandria, Virginia.⁷ On May 4, 2018, the Antitrust Division described its Judgment Termination Initiative in a statement published in the Federal Register.⁸ On August 15, 2018, the Antitrust Division listed the judgments in the above-captioned cases on its public website, describing its intent to move to terminate the judgments.⁹ The notice

⁷ Press Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Initiative to Terminate “Legacy” Antitrust Judgments, (April 25, 2018), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-announces-initiative-terminate-legacy-antitrust-judgments>.

⁸ Department of Justice’s Initiative to Seek Termination of Legacy Antitrust Judgments, 83 Fed. Reg. 19,837 (May 4, 2018), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2018-05-04/2018-09461>.

⁹ <https://www.justice.gov/atr/JudgmentTermination>, link titled “View Judgments Proposed for Termination in Maryland.”

identified each case, linked to the judgment, and invited public comment. The Division received no comments concerning the judgments in any of the above-captioned cases.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States believes termination of the judgments in each of the above-captioned cases is appropriate, and respectfully requests that the Court enter an order terminating them. *See* Appendix C, which is a proposed order terminating the judgments in the above-captioned cases.

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