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UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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and
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 JOINT HEARING
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UNDERSTANDING SINGLE-FIRM BEHAVIOR:
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LOYALTY DISCOUNTS SESSION
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2006
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HELD AT:
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UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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601 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, N.W.
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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9:30 A.M. TO 4:00 P.M.
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Reported and transcribed by:
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Brenda Smonskey |
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MODERATORS:
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PATRICK DEGRABA
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Economist
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Federal Trade Commission
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and
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DAVID MEYER
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General
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U.S. Department of Justice
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PANELISTS:
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Morning Session:
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Joseph Kattan
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Thomas Lambert
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Barry Nalebuff
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David Sibley
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Afternoon Session:
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Daniel A. Crane
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Timothy J. Muris
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Janusz Ordover
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Willard K. Tom
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P R O C E E D I N G S
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- - - - -
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MR. DEGRABA: Good morning, and welcome to our
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first panel of the day on loyalty discounts which is
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part of an ongoing series of public hearings on
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single-firm conduct jointly sponsored by the Department
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of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
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Commission.
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This series is designed to help advance the
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development of the law concerning treatment of
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unilateral conduct under the antitrust laws.
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My name is Patrick DeGraba. I'm an economist
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here at the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of
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Economics, and I'm one of the moderators for this
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morning's session.
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My co-moderator is David Meyer, Deputy Assistant
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Attorney General of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Before we start, I need to do a few housekeeping
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matters.
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As a courtesy to the speakers, please turn off
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your cell phones, Blackberries and all other devices
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that will beep during the proceedings. Mine's off.
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Second, the restrooms are across the hall to the
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left of the guard desk where you came in. So ask a
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guard because that description won't help you get there. |
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The third is in the unlikely event that the
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building's alarm goes off, please proceed calmly and
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quickly as instructed. If we must leave the building,
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exit through the main entrance. After leaving the
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building, please follow the stream of FTC people that
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are going to the staging area. They have practiced a
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number of times and some of them know where they are
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going.
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Also, we request that you not make comments or
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ask questions during the session. It is a moderated
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hearing. For the speakers, I'm going to ask you to
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please speak into the microphones. The sessions are
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being transcribed and videotaped and the microphones are
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the means by which the sound is captured.
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The transcripts and other materials from the
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session will be available on the DOJ and the FTC Web
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sites. And finally, our next hearing will be next
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Wednesday, December 6th, on misleading and deceptive
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conduct.
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Today's session, loyalty discounts include a
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host of related contracting practices. The simplest,
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often referred to as single-product loyalty discounts,
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involve the seller providing a discount on all units of
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a good sold to a buyer once that buyer has reached some
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purchasing threshold. |
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More complicated practices, often called
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bundling loyalty discounts, involve the seller offering
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discounts or rebates when a buyer has reached a
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purchasing threshold on several possibly unrelated
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goods.
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Such practices have raised antitrust concerns
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recently, and the appropriate antitrust treatment of
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such practices is clearly in a state of flux. We are
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honored to have this morning a distinguished panel of
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academists, economists, and private practitioners who
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will discuss the current thinking regarding the
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treatment of these loyalty discounts.
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Our panelists this morning will include Barry
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Nalebuff, a professor of economics and management at the
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Yale University; Tom Lambert, an associate professor at
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the University of Missouri Columbia School of Law; David
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Sibley, a professor of economics at the University of
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Texas at Austin; and Joe Kattan, a partner in Gibson,
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Dunn & Crutcher, LLP in Washington, D.C.
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The organization of the panel is as follows.
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The four panelists will give presentations of
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approximately 15 to 20 minutes. It will be timed by our
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staff here in the front row.
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We will then take a short break. And after we
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reconvene, the panelists will have a couple minutes to |
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respond to each other's presentations, and then there
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will be a moderated discussion. We will end about noon.
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David, do you have any comments?
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MR. MEYER: Not at this point.
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MR. DEGRABA: All right. Let's get on with it.
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Our first speaker today is Barry Nalebuff, who
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is the Milton Steinbach professor of economics and
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management at the Yale School of Management.
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Professor Nalebuff has written extensively on
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applications of game theory to business strategy and has
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coauthored the first popular book on game theory, which
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is used in colleges and business schools throughout the
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world.
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His current academic research focuses on
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bundling and tying. He has provided expert testimony
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and seminars on antitrust matters to federal
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administrative agencies and courts in Australia and
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Europe and has extensive experience consulting with
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multinational firms.
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Barry.
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PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: Thanks. I'm going to be up
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there and control it?
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Greetings, good morning. What I'm going to try
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and do is give you my overall perspective in terms of
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the way I think about loyalty discounts and bundling. |
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And I'm of the view to start with that unlike
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physics, where one is searching for a brand unification
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theory, you won't find that here.
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I still believe there is nothing so practical as
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a good theory. In this case it will be multiple
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theories. The reason is that it is different horses for
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different courses.
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What matters is the nature of the competition.
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You care about whether the products in the bundle are
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substitutes with each other, as would be the case of
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branded and generic tape; where they are complements,
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such as aircraft engines and avionics; where they are
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used in some fixed proportions, like in a nail cartridge
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and a nail; whether or not one is essential to the
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other, such as Windows and a media player.
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Sometimes the goods are neither complements nor
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substitutes, in the sense of Aspen skiing. Before you
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go to Aspen, the different mountains are complements.
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Once you are there, they are substitutes.
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Sometimes there is no connection, substitutes or
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complements between them. For example, different blood
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tests are all essential but it is not that you use them
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together.
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The goods that are in the bundle might be
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positively correlated, negatively correlated or not |
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correlated at all.
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All of these factors end up changing the
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motivations and the effects of bundling and you have to
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consider that when you are trying to understand the
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effects and what to do about it.
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The good news is that we are not in the desert
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here lost, that in fact in each case where when you
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understand where you are, we have the tools to analyze
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it.
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In my speed attempt to do 10 propositions in 10
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minutes, here we will go. I want you to know these are
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not bundled. You are free to accept any one of these
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individually. But there is a discount if you take more
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than three.
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The first point is that often bundled discounts
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or loyalty discounts lead to negative prices. The
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reason for that is the discount often goes back to the
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first unit that you buy. The end result of that is very
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peculiar prices, things that are hard to justify.
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This issue arises both with single and
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multiproduct rebates. Below, this is an example that is
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an amalgam of actual prices that I have seen from
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different cases where things have been normalized and
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discussed.
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But the way it works is your price for the first |
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31 units was 100. Your price for the 32nd unit was
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minus 6000. Your price for the next couple units is 100
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again. When you get to the 95th unit, your price is
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about minus 800. And then for units 96 through 100, it
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is 97.
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Now, if you thought about that as sort of a
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rational way of doing it, you would say what is going on
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here, does that really make any sense?
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Of course the customer should never be in a
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position of buying fewer than 31 items because in fact
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the first 32 are free. But then having bought 32, now
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they are okay until they get to 85 because once you get
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to 85, 85 through 95 is free.
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What that means is if a rival wants to come in
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and displace the firm entirely, it will not happen
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because 31 units are free. Moreover, a rival will never
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be able to sell between 85 and 95 or, in that case,
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between 5 and 15.
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The solution, in my view, to that is to still
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give out discounts but to give out discounts on
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incremental volume rather than go back to square 1.
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And note, if that's your objective to give
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people low prices, we have ways of doing that. I'm not
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preventing the discounts, just trying to make them a way
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that actually makes some sense. |
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The second point is that loyalty discounts can
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actually create no cost predation. And I'm going to
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give you a quick example of this in terms of numbers.
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The reason is that what we do is we inflate the
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price of A rather than really give a discount. Imagine
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the normal monopoly price of A is 100 and you can get it
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at the normal monopoly price if you also buy B at 20.
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But if you don't buy the B, then I will raise
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the price of A to 120. Hence, the effective price of B
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is zero or certainly below cost in this case.
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Now, the key observation is that nobody actually
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pays the 120 because nobody is foolish enough to only
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buy A on an a la carte basis. Therefore, since the
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threat is credible, it doesn't have to be used and it is
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not costly.
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The difference between predation and this type
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of loyalty discount is that under predation, the firm
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actually charges below cost, and so customers benefit
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from those low prices.
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Here all that is happening is the firm is
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threatening to charge a high price if you don't go
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along. It is like the mugger who says "your money or
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your life," and when you give him your wallet, he wants
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credit for actually saving your life. Actually, I don't
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think that gets to count. |
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Because there is no need for recoupment, it is
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easier to implement this. Hence, there is a greater
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danger of it. Because customers aren't necessarily
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winning along the way, there is also more reason to be
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suspicious.
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To give you another disguised example of this,
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the following is a case where an incumbent firm had a
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market power in three goods, 1, 2 and 3, and they
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offered prices like you see in column 1.
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However, if you were to buy all four of their
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products, including their competitive fourth product,
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then you would get the discount, 16, 26, 51, so on
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percent.
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If you added up those discounts, what you
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discover is that the cost of buying all of the three
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products on an a la carte basis, which essentially you
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had to do anyway because they were the only supplier of
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those three products, ended up being sufficiently high
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that you were going to save $1-1/2 million by buying the
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bundle.
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The end result of that was it was actually a
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negative incremental price to go and take the
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competitive product.
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Once again, that is something that is very hard
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to compete with. That leads to the following proposed |
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test, which is if you have a firm which has market power
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in A and you are worried about whether or not it is
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going to extend that to another good, B, look at the
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price of the A-B bundle versus the price of A alone and
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ask how much more is the firm charging for A and ask
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could that firm itself make money selling A at that
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incremental price or B at that incremental price.
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So instead of asking whether or not the rival
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can make money selling B at that price, is the firm
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itself apparently making incremental profits or not. If
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it isn't, then what we have is a case of exclusion, and
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that exclusion can be achieved without cost.
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One of the things that is nice about this test
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is that we actually don't have to look at actual rivals
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or hypothetical rivals, we can look at the incumbent
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firm's own cost structure. The incumbent firm which
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knows its own cost structure.
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Therefore, it is well equipped to discover
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whether it is passing this test or not. It knows
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whether it is in the safe harbor or it isn't.
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There is an extra element to this test that
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David Sibley and his co-authors have emphasized, which
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is did the price of A go up or did the price of A-B, the
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bundle, go down.
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We should be more worried about the case when A |
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alone goes up than when the A-B bundle goes down
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because, of course, when it is a threat, there is no
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benefit. Whereas, if the bundle has been discounted, at
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least customers are getting some value along the way.
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One point that I think the courts have really
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missed about loyalty discounts is that some of the ways
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that these rebates are paid end up being significantly
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less competitive than a straight price cut.
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So, again, think of a case where the incumbent
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has market power in A, and B is a substitute. And the
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two examples I will take you through are Scotch tape and
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generic tape or Keflin and Kefzol, two cephalosporins,
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where Keflin was the big money maker and Kefzol was the
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new product which is the competitive one.
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In the cephalosporin market, we had Lily with
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its monopoly and Keflin, Keflex, Loradine, Kaphacen and
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facing competition with SmithKline Ancef, which was the
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exact same compound as Kefzol.
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The first thing they tried doing was just
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discounting Kefzol to match the prices on Ancef. The
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problem with that was that Kefzol ended up being a
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substitute for Keflin.
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So not only did they have trouble capturing the
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market against Ancef, as prices starting getting lower,
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it started eating in on the demand to Keflin. |
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Then they got wise and said okay, we will give
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you a rebate on Keflin and the other products if you buy
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enough of our goods.
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Now, note what happens here. The price of
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Kefzol ends up being high. I'm getting a million
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dollars back or some fixed amount of money back, but I
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don't end up discounting Kefzol.
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In essence, I'm bribing you to say if you buy
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all of my goods, I will give you this fixed amount of
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money. But because Kefzol keeps its price high, that
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reduces the competition between Kefzol and Keflin, and,
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hence, customers don't get that benefit.
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We also see that by its equivalent it is almost
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as if Lily says to the customer we will give you 100
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units of Kefzol for free on the condition that that's
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all you use, which of course is something again that
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rivals would have a hard time matching.
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We have the same issue in LePage's. If you are
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3M, you don't want to get into a price war with LePage's
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over generic tape, because the cheaper generic tape
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gets, the more that will eat into Scotch tape prices.
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What you want to do is how can I beat LePage's
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without discounting my generic tape. Well, if I give
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them a bribe, a million dollars just to take my goods,
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even if they are high priced and you can spread out that |
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million dollars over their expected sales, then you can
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say the overall deal is better for me, Staples, than it
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is for taking LePage's.
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But note the incremental cost of another roll of
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tape is high. What that means is the price to consumers
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for that tape is going to be high and there will be less
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substitution of generic for branded product.
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So in that sense, these rebates don't get passed
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on to consumers and don't threaten the incumbent
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monopoly.
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That's an aspect of these loyalty rebates that I
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don't think has been appreciated and I think is
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problematic.
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Another area is that loyalty rebates make
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pricing incredibly hard to understand. If somebody
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offers 2.93, I know that is cheaper than 2.97. But if
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somebody says you get 3 percent off A and B if you buy
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B, is that a good deal or not? Well, it depends on how
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much A I'm going to buy. And sometimes I know the
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answer to that and sometimes I don't.
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Moreover, if rivals are trying to compete and
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think about how much they have to undercut to get the
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business, that means the B rival has to forecast my
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demand for A, and, generally speaking, they are not very
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well equipped to do that. |
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So we have seen cases where people misforecast
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these demands, end up buying the wrong product or don't
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get discounts as large as they think.
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I have also found that actually analyzing these
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price things can often take an MBA. And it is not an
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understatement to say it costs $10,000 to actually
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figure out what price is the cheapest, and many times
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that is not worth it for the individual customer to do.
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An issue that bothers me about loyalty discounts
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is that the price a firm charges to a customer shouldn't
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depend on who else the customer buys from. I have less
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a problem if the price says if you buy many units,
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here's the charges. If you buy this many more units
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this year compared to last year, here's the charge.
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I think it is very funny to say to the customer,
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"oh, and if you buy 10 units from Fred, I'm going to
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charge you more money" or "if you buy 3 percent of your
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products from Fred, I'm going to charge you more money."
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The price that I charge you should ultimately
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depend only on what it is that you buy from me, not what
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it is that you buy from other people.
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Now, I realize that the effect may be the same
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through some volume discounts. But that still leaves
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many more options in an uncertain environment for a
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rival to come in than when you literally price based on |
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what you are doing with your rivals.
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You will hear many what I will flat out call
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bogus justifications for bundled discounts. For
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example, it is often said that customers like bundles
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and, hence, that's a justification for doing bundling.
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Yes, that's true, but it is not a justification
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for a bundle discount. Because a customer likes it, in
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theory you could charge more for it. You don't have to
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offer it as a discount if you are providing something
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customers like better.
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We do the discount for price discrimination.
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Well, there is no room for price discrimination if A and
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B are consumed in fixed proportions.
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Moreover, the arguments for price discrimination
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generally rely on having a negative correlation between
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the two products or no correlation in valuation between
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the two products.
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For example, opera tickets and wrestling tickets
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you think of as having negative correlation. However,
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if you look at what's bundled out there, I think you
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will find that they generally have a positive
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correlation in value and, hence, don't fit the normal
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framework that we would expect price discrimination to
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fall under.
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Yes, Virginia, bundling can leverage and protect |
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market power. Here is an example of how that works.
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If we have a monopolist whose demand is
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represented by 10 minus P and the cost is zero, the
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monopoly price would be 5. Profits would be 5 times 5.
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Price is 5, quantity is 5.
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I'm having the B product be competitive with a
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cost of one. So the price is one. Demand I'm making
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just to be one unit.
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Chicago School says don't sell A and B together
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at 6. I do better just to sell A alone at 5, because
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there are some people who may not want B, even at the
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competitive price.
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What I say is consider the following contract.
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If you buy my B, I will lower the price of A to 4. But
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if you don't buy my B, I will raise the price of A to 6.
|
16 |
Well, if you think about the cost of that threat
|
17 |
and promise, the customer is going to save at least $2
|
18 |
on A by buying the B product since they are going to be
|
19 |
buying at least four units of A.
|
20 |
That means that it is a net savings to them of
|
21 |
at least 8, which means they are willing to pay up to 9
|
22 |
in order to get that discount. They will pay 9 on B to
|
23 |
get that discount.
|
24 |
Well, the discount doesn't cost the firm very
|
25 |
much. And the reason is that discounts my price from 5 |
20
1 |
to 4 only lowers my profits from 25 to 24. Raising my
|
2 |
price from 5 to 6 also only lowers my profits from 25 to
|
3 |
24.
|
4 |
So at a cost to me of only a dollar here, I can
|
5 |
do something that will either reward or punish the
|
6 |
customer to the tune of 8. And the reason for this is
|
7 |
the monopoly is inefficient.
|
8 |
So in essence, what I'm saying to the customer
|
9 |
is I'm willing to be a less inefficient monopolist if
|
10 |
you play ball with me and do what I'm asking on good B.
|
11 |
It doesn't make sense to take out all of your monopoly
|
12 |
rents on the monopoly product because that's what leads
|
13 |
to dead weight losses.
|
14 |
What I would like to do is some type of lump sum
|
15 |
payment and incremental pricing and charge the customer
|
16 |
for the right to buy my goods at a reasonable price.
|
17 |
Oftentimes the way we see that happen is the way
|
18 |
I charge them for being less of a monopolist is I say
|
19 |
you have to buy my other goods at B at inflated prices.
|
20 |
It is also the case that the bundle allows firms
|
21 |
with multiple market powers to protect themselves. So
|
22 |
if I have market power in A and B and charge 10 for A
|
23 |
and 10 for B but only 16 for the two together, there is
|
24 |
a $4 discount that any single-firm rival would have to
|
25 |
meet in order to undercut me. |
21
1 |
Note that my average price is 8. In essence, I
|
2 |
get to use that same $4 discount on multiple fronts. So
|
3 |
the customer isn't benefitting $4. The customer is only
|
4 |
benefitting 2 on each.
|
5 |
Rivals would actually have to go 4 below. That
|
6 |
is a special sauce in multigood bundling that makes the
|
7 |
incumbent have an advantage over rivals. It is sort of
|
8 |
why it works.
|
9 |
It also explains to me why the right test should
|
10 |
not be whether or not the overall bundle is above or
|
11 |
below cost but whether or not the individual components
|
12 |
at the appropriate incremental price is above or below
|
13 |
cost.
|
14 |
So the Chicago School story is correct in its
|
15 |
limited environment, but it misses most of the
|
16 |
interesting cases that we look at when it comes to
|
17 |
bundling.
|
18 |
Even where there is one monopoly profit, that
|
19 |
monopoly profit can be of different sizes. In
|
20 |
particular, bundling can allow price discrimination,
|
21 |
such as through metering and some of the examples you
|
22 |
have seen, which, therefore, leads to greater profits to
|
23 |
the monopolist but less surplus to the consumer.
|
24 |
It is also the case that many of the motivations
|
25 |
for bundling are dynamic, that by preventing somebody |
22
1 |
from getting into the B market, that may be their
|
2 |
subsequent entry into the A market which is where I
|
3 |
still have market power.
|
4 |
It is also the case that bundling and tying
|
5 |
provide potential for no cost for closure, which has the
|
6 |
same effect as predatory pricing but at no cost.
|
7 |
I recognize that bundles versus bundles is
|
8 |
generally more competitive than individual items versus
|
9 |
each other. So what I would like to be able to do is
|
10 |
take the advantage of that competition without the harm.
|
11 |
And the way that I do that is the following. I
|
12 |
actually take the example from Johnson & Johnson who
|
13 |
said, look, U.S. Surgical, you have a full line, we have
|
14 |
a full line, Coke and Pepsi, you each have full lines,
|
15 |
you can compete against me bundle for bundle.
|
16 |
But if I don't have a full line, I will not
|
17 |
count your sales in my 80 percent number or 90 percent
|
18 |
number. Whatever target I make, it is only a target for
|
19 |
other full-line competitors.
|
20 |
We have come our way through the deserts often
|
21 |
through intuition. There are now some tests that I hope
|
22 |
you will believe offer more formal approaches.
|
23 |
And I believe -- maybe this is a temptation here
|
24 |
-- that the theories of bundling loyalty discounts are
|
25 |
now ready for prime time. So I hope you will be able to |
23
1 |
use them.
|
2 |
Thank you.
|
3 |
(Applause.)
|
4 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you.
|
5 |
Our next speaker is Tom Lambert, who is an
|
6 |
associate professor at the University of Missouri
|
7 |
Columbia School of Law, where he has achieved the
|
8 |
university's Gold Chalk Award for excellence in graduate
|
9 |
teaching.
|
10 |
Professor Lambert's scholarship focuses on
|
11 |
regulatory theory, including antitrust policy and
|
12 |
business law. His 2005 Minnesota Law Review article
|
13 |
provided one of the first scholarly treatments of the
|
14 |
law of bundling discounts.
|
15 |
Tom is a member of the eSapience Center for
|
16 |
Competition Policy and is a regular contributor to Truth
|
17 |
on the Market, a Weblog devoted to academic commentary
|
18 |
on law, business, economics and more.
|
19 |
Tom.
|
20 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: Thank you.
|
21 |
It is an honor to be here on such a
|
22 |
distinguished panel. I will talk today about bundled
|
23 |
discounts entirely. I will not focus on single product
|
24 |
loyalty discounts.
|
25 |
A word about the scope of my remarks. I'm a |
24
1 |
lawyer, not an economist. I'm very concerned with
|
2 |
structuring rules in a way that they can be administered
|
3 |
by judges and juries and used by antitrust counselors to
|
4 |
advice their clients.
|
5 |
My focus is on the law, how we would structure
|
6 |
the rules.
|
7 |
I have a three-pronged agenda that's very
|
8 |
ambitious for 20 minutes.
|
9 |
Why are bundled discounts troubling, and I will
|
10 |
give you the straightforward view the courts have
|
11 |
adopted and most of you are familiar with this.
|
12 |
Summarizing and critiquing of the leading
|
13 |
evaluative approaches offers an alternative proposal
|
14 |
that I think is very administrable.
|
15 |
The problem with bundled discounts the courts
|
16 |
have recognized is they may lead to the exclusion of an
|
17 |
equally efficient but less diversified rival even if
|
18 |
they are above cost.
|
19 |
The classic example of this came in the Ortho
|
20 |
Diagnostic case. It is I think a little bit
|
21 |
unrealistic, but this is what the court wrote in its
|
22 |
opinion and it illustrates the problem, I think.
|
23 |
You can have two manufacturers who sell the same
|
24 |
product, manufacturer A and manufacturer B. They both
|
25 |
make shampoo. Manufacturer B is the more efficient |
25
1 |
producer. It can produce shampoo at $1.25 a bottle.
|
2 |
Manufacturer A, it costs $1.50 to produce the shampoo.
|
3 |
Manufacturer A, though, is a more diversified
|
4 |
rival. It sells conditioner as well as shampoo.
|
5 |
So by bundling its shampoo and conditioner and
|
6 |
by offering an above-cost bundled discount -- and what I
|
7 |
mean there is that the price, the discounted price of
|
8 |
the bundle is in excess of manufacturer A's cost of
|
9 |
producing the bundle -- manufacturer A can effectively
|
10 |
exclude manufacturer B from the market.
|
11 |
If the separate price of shampoo and conditioner
|
12 |
for A is $2 and $4, so that buying them separately you
|
13 |
would have to pay $6, and manufacturer A charges a
|
14 |
package price of $5, that is still a dollar in excess of
|
15 |
its average variable cost of four dollars. Manufacturer
|
16 |
B can't compete with that.
|
17 |
In order to sell its shampoo -- and any buyer
|
18 |
that buys both shampoo and conditioner will have to pay
|
19 |
$4 for the conditioner and will not be willing to pay
|
20 |
any more than $1 for the shampoo. Manufacturer B is
|
21 |
excluded despite the fact that it is the more efficient
|
22 |
producer.
|
23 |
So the fundamental problem the courts have
|
24 |
identified is that bundled discounts can lead to the
|
25 |
sort of exclusion of equally efficient but less |
26
1 |
diversified rivals, and that's the case even if the
|
2 |
discount is above cost.
|
3 |
All right. I have identified six approaches in
|
4 |
the case law and commentary for evaluating the legality
|
5 |
of bundled discounts. I want to march through them
|
6 |
quickly and explain why I think each is a little bit
|
7 |
troubling.
|
8 |
The first and the most sort of laissez-faire is
|
9 |
a rule of per se legality. This is the rule that's been
|
10 |
advocated most recently by Professor Hovenkamp in his
|
11 |
new book, "The Antitrust Enterprise," and also the rule
|
12 |
advocated by Demicci in the LePage's case.
|
13 |
It basically says a bundled discount should be
|
14 |
per se legal if the discounted price of the bundle
|
15 |
exceeds the aggregate cost of the products within the
|
16 |
bundle.
|
17 |
The reason for this rule is not that we don't
|
18 |
believe that above-cost bundled discounts can ever be
|
19 |
anticompetitive. The Ortho Diagnostic example showed
|
20 |
how they could lead to the exclusion of a more efficient
|
21 |
rival.
|
22 |
Administrability concerns motivate this rule.
|
23 |
The idea is that it is simply too difficult to separate
|
24 |
the pro-competitive wheat from the anticompetitive chaff
|
25 |
and will end up chilling pro-competitive bundled |
27
1 |
discounting if we don't have the sort of safe harbor,
|
2 |
and so the best approach is to have a per se legality
|
3 |
rule for above-cost bundled discounts, very much along
|
4 |
the lines of the Brook Group rule.
|
5 |
My criticism is -- well, I'm not all that
|
6 |
critical. In the long run, this may be the best
|
7 |
approach to take. However, I'm not willing to concede
|
8 |
that at this point.
|
9 |
I think the search for anticompetitive bundled
|
10 |
discounts may be worth the cost, including the cost of
|
11 |
deterring some pro-competitive bundled discounts.
|
12 |
It is very easy to imagine instances of
|
13 |
anticompetitive exclusion. Professor Nalebuff and
|
14 |
Professor Sibley have modeled cases where this could
|
15 |
occur. The Ortho Diagnostic example is a good example.
|
16 |
I think there is a fairly easily administrable
|
17 |
weeding device that can help us separate pro-competitive
|
18 |
from anticompetitive bundled discounts. I will get to
|
19 |
that in just a minute.
|
20 |
The second approach is at the other end of the
|
21 |
spectrum -- and this is an approach from the raising
|
22 |
rivals costs literature. I'm thinking in particular of
|
23 |
Will Tom, who will speak this afternoon, and Einer
|
24 |
Elhauge, who has discussed this in testimony on hospital
|
25 |
group purchasing organizations and also in his Stanford |
28
1 |
Law Review article defining better monopolization
|
2 |
standards.
|
3 |
This approach says that bundled discounts are
|
4 |
discounts are illegal if they unjustifiably usurp so
|
5 |
much business from their rivals that their rival's costs
|
6 |
are erased.
|
7 |
Now, the $64,000 question here is how do you
|
8 |
determine what is unjustifiable. Every discount tends
|
9 |
to usurp some business from rivals. And obviously we
|
10 |
don't want to ban discounts.
|
11 |
The concern here is that so much business will
|
12 |
be usurped from rivals that it will deny rivals
|
13 |
economies of scale, make it harder for them to raise
|
14 |
capital.
|
15 |
A couple of approaches have been advocated for
|
16 |
identifying what are unjustifiable instances of raising
|
17 |
rival's cost.
|
18 |
Will Tom suggests in his article on the
|
19 |
Antitrust Law Journal that we adopt a case-by-case test
|
20 |
where the courts look to see is this an exclusionary
|
21 |
usurpation of the business or a pro-competitive
|
22 |
usurpation of the business.
|
23 |
That is difficult because that leaves a lot open
|
24 |
to the whims of juries and judges and will likely have a
|
25 |
chilling effect on pro-competitive bundled discounts. |
29
1 |
Professor Elhauge has suggested an approach
|
2 |
where a business-usurping discount is justified only if
|
3 |
the discounter's business stealing, business usurpation
|
4 |
occurs because the bundling has made the discounter more
|
5 |
efficient.
|
6 |
If you are stealing business because your
|
7 |
bundling is making you more efficient, then that's okay.
|
8 |
But if you are stealing business for any other reason,
|
9 |
then that's illegal.
|
10 |
I think this is a troubling approach for several
|
11 |
reasons. First, it would prevent price cutting by a
|
12 |
monopolist who has reached minimum efficient scale and
|
13 |
can't achieve any additional distribution efficiencies
|
14 |
by bundling.
|
15 |
That person is not getting any efficiency
|
16 |
benefits from the bundling and then would be precluded
|
17 |
from cutting prices, which seems bad for consumers.
|
18 |
Secondly, this approach is very difficult to
|
19 |
administer. A court would have to figure out what is
|
20 |
minimum efficient scale, very difficult for judges and
|
21 |
juries to do.
|
22 |
In addition, it has to figure out what discount,
|
23 |
what amount of discount is necessary to get the
|
24 |
discounter to the point of minimum efficient scale. Any
|
25 |
discount beyond that would be excessive discount and |
30
1 |
under Professor Elhauge's test would be exclusionary.
|
2 |
That is extremely difficult for judges and
|
3 |
juries to administer. For that reason, this approach is
|
4 |
likely to have a major chilling effect. Discounters
|
5 |
discount at their own peril.
|
6 |
The third approach is the approach we sort of
|
7 |
see in LePage's. Everyone in this room knows it is very
|
8 |
difficult to articulate a rule of law from the LePage's
|
9 |
case.
|
10 |
There were some key facts that were very
|
11 |
important in the court's analysis there. LePage's was
|
12 |
not required to prove that it couldn't match the 3M
|
13 |
discount. It was not required to prove it was as
|
14 |
efficient a manufacturer as 3M was.
|
15 |
Instead, it just had to show that it was being
|
16 |
excluded. And once it showed that, the burden shifted
|
17 |
to 3M to justify its behavior.
|
18 |
So if you want to take away a rule from that --
|
19 |
and lots of smart antitrust counselors are trying to do
|
20 |
so and advise their clients accordingly -- it would seem
|
21 |
to be the following. A bundled discount is
|
22 |
presumptively exclusionary if the discounter is bundling
|
23 |
products not sold by rivals and is winning business from
|
24 |
those rivals.
|
25 |
Now, the discounter may rebut that presumption |
31
1 |
if it proves a business reasons justification. There is
|
2 |
a suggestion in the LePage's case that that
|
3 |
justification must show that the bundling saves costs
|
4 |
approaching the amount of the discount, very similar to
|
5 |
Professor Elhauge's suggestion in the Stanford Law
|
6 |
Review.
|
7 |
This I believe is a very troubling rule. First
|
8 |
of all, since the plaintiff need not establish its
|
9 |
equivalent efficiency, this approach essentially creates
|
10 |
a price umbrella for less efficient rivals.
|
11 |
And there is a suggestion in LePage's that's
|
12 |
exactly what happened. LePage's expert economist
|
13 |
conceded that LePage's was a less efficient manufacturer
|
14 |
of tape than 3M and yet LePage's won.
|
15 |
Moreover, since the focus is on product line
|
16 |
breadth and not whether an efficient rival is being
|
17 |
excluded, this approach will tend to chill bundling,
|
18 |
which has a number of pro-competitive benefits which we
|
19 |
will talk about in the roundtable discussion. I assume
|
20 |
that some of my co-panelists will discuss that issue.
|
21 |
The third approach here -- fourth approach, I
|
22 |
guess -- the approach we see in the Ortho Diagnostic
|
23 |
decision, in that case, the court reasoned that a
|
24 |
bundled discount is illegal if the plaintiff shows
|
25 |
either that the bundle is priced below average variable |
32
1 |
cost, straightforward predatory pricing, or that the
|
2 |
plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the
|
3 |
competitive product but cannot match the discount
|
4 |
without pricing below cost on that product.
|
5 |
In other words, you have to show you are an
|
6 |
equally efficient rival, and after you show you are an
|
7 |
equally efficient rival, you show if you attribute the
|
8 |
full amount of the discount to the competitive product,
|
9 |
that will result in below-cost pricing by the
|
10 |
discounter. You couldn't match that discount.
|
11 |
My criticism of this rule, it is a great rule in
|
12 |
theory, but this is a very difficult rule to administer.
|
13 |
The plaintiff, in order to prevail, has to show
|
14 |
that it is an equally efficient rival. To do that, it
|
15 |
has to establish its own cost and the discounter's cost.
|
16 |
In addition, there are going to be joint costs
|
17 |
in here because this is a bundling case. In figuring
|
18 |
out the discounter's cost on its competitive product, it
|
19 |
has to figure out what percentage of the joint cost it
|
20 |
should attribute to that competitive product.
|
21 |
That is an incredibly difficult rule to
|
22 |
administer. For that reason, I believe this rule, the
|
23 |
rule of law in Ortho Diagnostic, may be underdeterrent,
|
24 |
because plaintiffs are going to have a hard time winning
|
25 |
these cases. |
33
1 |
The next approach is what I'm calling the
|
2 |
original antitrust law approach. This is the approach
|
3 |
that was advocated in the Areta/Hovenkamp treatise. It
|
4 |
was updated this summer. I had to update my
|
5 |
presentation.
|
6 |
The original approach advocated by the treatise
|
7 |
was focused on trying to fix the administrability
|
8 |
problems with the Ortho Diagnostic test.
|
9 |
Rather than asking if the plaintiff itself was
|
10 |
an equally efficient rival, the original antitrust law
|
11 |
approach said let's ask if a hypothetical equally
|
12 |
efficient single-product rival would be excluded by this
|
13 |
discount and without adequate business justification.
|
14 |
So essentially we take the Ortho Diagnostic
|
15 |
test, we lop off the part where the plaintiff has to
|
16 |
show that it is actually an equally efficient rival, and
|
17 |
we say if you attributed the entire amount of the
|
18 |
bundled discount to the competitive product, would a
|
19 |
hypothetical single product be excluded by this
|
20 |
discount.
|
21 |
This is definitely an easier to administer test
|
22 |
because plaintiffs don't have to prove the defendant's
|
23 |
costs where there are joint costs. It is troubling,
|
24 |
though, for a couple reasons.
|
25 |
First, it prevents discount cross-subsidization. |
34
1 |
Consider a situation where you have a seller that sells
|
2 |
products A, B and C. Its cost is $4 each. It sells
|
3 |
them separately for $5 each. But it would sell the
|
4 |
bundle for $13.50.
|
5 |
Under the antitrust law approach, this would be
|
6 |
a presumptively exclusionary discount because a single
|
7 |
product seller of A that was equally efficient at a cost
|
8 |
of $4 couldn't match this discount because it would have
|
9 |
to charge a price of $3.50, a price below its cost.
|
10 |
Now, if you think about an oligopolistic
|
11 |
market -- it is not cartelized, but there is a lot of
|
12 |
what looks to be tacit collusion -- if you assume the
|
13 |
seller that sells A, B and C is selling in that market,
|
14 |
it is great that the seller can engage in the sort of
|
15 |
complicated pricing.
|
16 |
Professor Nalebuff says it is very difficult to
|
17 |
figure out exactly what price is being charged.
|
18 |
That's a fantastic thing in an oligopolistic
|
19 |
market. This sort of pricing can disrupt, this sort of
|
20 |
bundling can disrupt oligopolistic pricing. In
|
21 |
addition, it is a discount for customers. That would
|
22 |
seem to be good in itself.
|
23 |
A second problem with the antitrust law approach
|
24 |
is there was no requirement that the foreclosed market
|
25 |
be capable of monopolization, there was no requirement |
35
1 |
that there be entry barriers in the foreclosed market
|
2 |
that the plaintiff was being excluded from.
|
3 |
The revised antitrust law approach is definitely
|
4 |
superior to the original. But I still think it is a
|
5 |
little bit troubling.
|
6 |
What Professor Hovenkamp is now saying -- which,
|
7 |
by the way, seems to conflict with his book, "The
|
8 |
Antitrust Enterprise" -- is that we should analogize
|
9 |
bundled discounts to tying and say there is a tie-in if
|
10 |
the price is below cost when the entire discount is
|
11 |
attributed to the competitive product.
|
12 |
Very importantly, the treatise points out there
|
13 |
will not be this tie-in if there is another significant
|
14 |
rival that sells all products. In the Johnson & Johnson
|
15 |
versus Tyco case or U.S. Surgical case,
|
16 |
Johnson & Johnson engaged in this bundling, but there
|
17 |
was another significant rival that had the same bundle
|
18 |
in place.
|
19 |
Professor Hovenkamp would say that does not
|
20 |
constitute a tie. But absent such a significant rival,
|
21 |
there would be a tie-in if there was a below-cost price
|
22 |
after the discount was attributed to the competitive
|
23 |
product.
|
24 |
The treatise then says that after you find time,
|
25 |
you should apply a basic rule of reasoned approach, ask |
36
1 |
whether the foreclosed market is capable of
|
2 |
monopolization, ask if a collaborative bundle is
|
3 |
probable, ask if there are pro-competitive
|
4 |
justifications for the bundling.
|
5 |
This is a definite improvement on the original
|
6 |
version. My criticism is why involve tying at all. It
|
7 |
seems to me that the reason that we are concerned about
|
8 |
tying in cases like this is that it leads to
|
9 |
foreclosure.
|
10 |
Why should we focus on the tie rather than
|
11 |
focusing directly on the foreclosure issue?
|
12 |
Here is my alternative proposal. The goals of
|
13 |
the proposal is we want to condemn bundled discounts
|
14 |
that could eliminate competitive rivals and result in
|
15 |
price increases. We don't want to condemn other bundled
|
16 |
discounts. And we want the rule to be easy to
|
17 |
administer.
|
18 |
What I want to structure my rule to show is that
|
19 |
the complaining rival has exhausted its competitive
|
20 |
options. You are not a competitive rival unless you
|
21 |
have done everything you can to stay in business.
|
22 |
The complaining rival must have the ability to
|
23 |
match the bundled discounter's efficiency. You are not
|
24 |
a competitive rival if you are not as good as the
|
25 |
bundler. |
37
1 |
We have to show the foreclosed market is capable
|
2 |
of monopolization. We don't want to ban discounts in
|
3 |
markets that can't be monopolized because there are very
|
4 |
low barriers to entry.
|
5 |
Here is a proposed rule. I would have a rule
|
6 |
that says that the above-cost discount, and that means
|
7 |
that if you add up the cost of all the items in the
|
8 |
bundle, they are exceeded by the price of the bundle.
|
9 |
So the above-cost discount is per se legal
|
10 |
unless the plaintiff could not match without pricing
|
11 |
below cost and, number one, barriers to entry exist in,
|
12 |
A, the product market in which the plaintiff doesn't
|
13 |
participate, and, B, the market for the competitive
|
14 |
product, a collaborative bundle is impracticable, a
|
15 |
good-faith supply offer was rejected. That means that
|
16 |
the foreclosed firm goes to the bundled discounter and
|
17 |
says, hey, let me supply my products to you, you buy my
|
18 |
product and bundle it.
|
19 |
And if those are established, then the bundle is
|
20 |
considered presumptively exclusionary, but the defendant
|
21 |
gets a rebuttal opportunity to show that it rejected
|
22 |
this good-faith supply offer because it wasn't
|
23 |
attractive, either the price being offered was too high
|
24 |
or the quality was insufficient.
|
25 |
Let me explain how this meets all of my goals of |
38
1 |
protecting competitive rivals. We want to protect
|
2 |
competitive rivals and only competitive rivals, and we
|
3 |
want to ensure that the market that is being foreclosed
|
4 |
is capable of monopolization.
|
5 |
The above-cost discount is per se legal unless
|
6 |
the plaintiff could not match without pricing below
|
7 |
cost. That requires a complaining plaintiff to lower
|
8 |
its price to the level of its marginal cost.
|
9 |
That's what we expect will happen in perfect
|
10 |
competition. We should demand that of a complaining
|
11 |
rival.
|
12 |
Next, it has to show that barriers to entry
|
13 |
exist in a product market in which the plaintiff doesn't
|
14 |
participate. An option for a plaintiff that's
|
15 |
confronting a bundled discount is to enter the other
|
16 |
markets in which it doesn't participate. It needs to
|
17 |
show there are some entry barriers that prevent it from
|
18 |
being able to do so.
|
19 |
In addition, it has to show barriers to entry
|
20 |
into the market for the competitive product. That's
|
21 |
required to show the market is in fact capable of
|
22 |
monopolization.
|
23 |
Supercompetitive prices could be charged in that
|
24 |
market without inviting so much entry that it is
|
25 |
impossible to charge those prices. |
39
1 |
Next, the plaintiff would have to show that a
|
2 |
collaborative bundle is impracticable. It cannot
|
3 |
compete with the bundle by entering into agreements with
|
4 |
sellers of other products to craft a competing bundle.
|
5 |
These sort of cross-seller bundles are
|
6 |
incredibly common. I sent my research assistant to
|
7 |
Target, and he found an Olympus digital voice recorded
|
8 |
bundled with batteries, Suave body wash bundled with a
|
9 |
Schick razor, Colgate White-Plus teeth whitening cream
|
10 |
bundled with a camera. Americans are vain.
|
11 |
The prima facie case here is intended to show
|
12 |
that the plaintiff has exhausted its competitive options
|
13 |
and that the market being foreclosed is capable of
|
14 |
monopolization.
|
15 |
Then we have a rebuttal opportunity. The
|
16 |
defendant may rebut by showing that the supply offer was
|
17 |
not attractive.
|
18 |
The defendant has to show that when the
|
19 |
plaintiff came and made the supply offer to me, I didn't
|
20 |
accept it because the price it was charging me was
|
21 |
higher than my cost. That shows that the plaintiff is
|
22 |
in fact a less efficient rival.
|
23 |
If the plaintiff can show its prima facie case
|
24 |
and the defendant can't rebut, then we have an exclusion
|
25 |
of a competitive rival in a market that is capable of |
40
1 |
foreclosure or capable of monopolization, and it would
|
2 |
seem to me that liability is appropriate.
|
3 |
Otherwise, I would have a rule that these sorts
|
4 |
of discounts which are discounts, good to customers, are
|
5 |
legal.
|
6 |
Thanks.
|
7 |
(Applause.)
|
8 |
MR. DEGRABA: Our next speaker is David Sibley,
|
9 |
who is the John Michael Stuart Centennial professor of
|
10 |
economics at the University of Texas at Austin.
|
11 |
Professor Sibley was previously the head of the
|
12 |
economics research group at Bell Communications Research
|
13 |
and served as a member of the technical staff in
|
14 |
economics at Bell Labs.
|
15 |
In 2003 and 2004, David served as a Deputy
|
16 |
Assistant Attorney General for economic analysis in the
|
17 |
Antitrust Division.
|
18 |
Professor Sibley has carried out extensive
|
19 |
research in the area of industrial organization,
|
20 |
microeconomic theory and regulation, and his
|
21 |
publications have appeared in numerous leading economics
|
22 |
journals. He has consulted extensively for various
|
23 |
firms and agencies, both in the United States and
|
24 |
abroad, on antitrust and regulatory matters.
|
25 |
David. |
41
1 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Thank you.
|
2 |
The title of my talk, what have we learned since
|
3 |
LePage's about bundled discounts, I guess is sort of
|
4 |
inspired by the feeling of knowing not what to say at
|
5 |
the Antitrust Division when the parties representing
|
6 |
both sides of LePage's came to convince us either to
|
7 |
support a take cert brief or not.
|
8 |
There was not a whole lot the economists had to
|
9 |
say. Greg Warden was on the right track when he said
|
10 |
"what do the prices do?"
|
11 |
It turned out you couldn't tell from the
|
12 |
evidence in the record. I take LePage's as kind of a
|
13 |
baseline as sort of very useful knowledge.
|
14 |
What have we done since then? Well, there has
|
15 |
been some progress. We understand now I think better
|
16 |
the effects of bundled discounts on both foreclosure and
|
17 |
customer welfare.
|
18 |
I mentioned foreclosure and customer welfare
|
19 |
separately here because, as we will see, it is possible
|
20 |
to have a bundled discount which increases customer
|
21 |
welfare and yet excludes equally efficient rivals.
|
22 |
I expect that to be the case from the way
|
23 |
bundled discounts can be structured. I will also talk
|
24 |
about tests to determine if a bundled discount is
|
25 |
anticompetitive. |
42
1 |
This would be in the spirit of the Ortho test
|
2 |
with its explication of extension by Barry Nalebuff or
|
3 |
tests whether customer welfare rises or falls. The
|
4 |
reference here would be what I was aware of without
|
5 |
having to go to any trouble to look up more, Wrightman,
|
6 |
Sibley and Roy Nalebuff.
|
7 |
The tests here I guess were designed originally,
|
8 |
both to try to see whether we could figure out whether
|
9 |
bundled discounts are good or bad but also with a view
|
10 |
toward the same type of goal that Tom Lambert had,
|
11 |
administrability here.
|
12 |
We wanted simple tests that didn't require you
|
13 |
to calculate complicated things or use data that you are
|
14 |
not likely to be able to get in practice. The result is
|
15 |
we have tests that will work sometimes but not all the
|
16 |
time.
|
17 |
To start, I will take a very simple set-up which
|
18 |
is actually I think probably the set-up behind some of
|
19 |
the slides here.
|
20 |
A is a monopoly market served by a firm we will
|
21 |
call Firm 1. B is a competitive market. It might not
|
22 |
be perfectly competitive. I think for the next five
|
23 |
minutes or so I will assume it is perfectly competitive.
|
24 |
But it doesn't have to be.
|
25 |
Firm 1 is a seller in the B market too. I think |
43
1 |
for the purpose of the rest of the slide, I want to
|
2 |
assume a couple things, one, that the B market is
|
3 |
perfectly competitive and some B customers will buy B
|
4 |
only and some will buy A only.
|
5 |
A couple of preliminary observations. Starting
|
6 |
from independent pricing, a bundled discount or a BD can
|
7 |
raise both profits and customer welfare. That doesn't
|
8 |
mean that it will actually happen by a profit-maximizing
|
9 |
profit discounter, but it is capable of happening.
|
10 |
We should keep that in mind. The logic is
|
11 |
really as follows. Let's suppose we have a preexisting
|
12 |
time that we can observe where Firm 1 is engaged in
|
13 |
independent pricing and it is a monopolist in market A.
|
14 |
We will assume that if it hasn't anticipated the
|
15 |
onset of the regulatory rule I will be talking about,
|
16 |
that the price it charged to the A market was probably a
|
17 |
monopoly price.
|
18 |
As Barry was saying, if the monopoly price is --
|
19 |
if the price charged by firm one in the A market really
|
20 |
was the profit-maximizing monopoly price, then it is
|
21 |
always possible to have a slight discount on the price
|
22 |
of A, which will have an insignificant effect on profits
|
23 |
that Firm 1 generates in market A.
|
24 |
In Barry's example, it was a $1 increase in
|
25 |
profits. From a customer welfare standpoint, that is |
44
1 |
not an insignificant increase in customer welfare.
|
2 |
That allows the firm, Firm 1, to bundle that
|
3 |
slightly lower price of A with a price of B that's above
|
4 |
marginal costs and still get A and B consumers to select
|
5 |
the bundle in preference to buying any A at all or
|
6 |
paying a bundled price for it and getting B at a
|
7 |
marginal cost.
|
8 |
In that situation, the A/B consumers are better
|
9 |
off. They can all select the bundle that will make them
|
10 |
better off.
|
11 |
B-only consumers are nowhere better and no worse
|
12 |
off than before. They are getting B at marginal cost
|
13 |
from all the other perfect competitors out there.
|
14 |
If the bundled discount in doing this has an
|
15 |
out-of-bundled price no higher than the previous
|
16 |
monopoly price under independent pricing, then we know
|
17 |
that consumers' options within the bundle are no worse
|
18 |
than before.
|
19 |
In fact, we have designed the bundle to attract
|
20 |
them away from independent pricing of A and marginal
|
21 |
cost of B. So they are better too.
|
22 |
So starting from independent pricing, which
|
23 |
would be the marginal cost of B for everyone, including
|
24 |
Firm 1, and the profit-maximizing monopoly price of A by
|
25 |
Firm 1, we can always construct a bundled discount which |
45
1 |
raises customer welfare and also raises profits for Firm
|
2 |
1.
|
3 |
Now, this has an interesting effect here. There
|
4 |
is implicit in this the foreclosure result.
|
5 |
Since the A and B customers are better off
|
6 |
taking the bundle, even at a price of B that is slightly
|
7 |
above marginal cost, this means that a B-only seller,
|
8 |
one of those perfect competitors, can't appeal to these
|
9 |
folks without charging below-market costs. Equally
|
10 |
efficient providers are foreclosed and, yet, consumer
|
11 |
welfare has gone up.
|
12 |
Clearly I have contrived this example to make a
|
13 |
point. But it is a point that I suspect in practice
|
14 |
comes up often enough to make it interesting.
|
15 |
It at least points out when we are talking about
|
16 |
bundled discounts, we should not equate foreclosing
|
17 |
equally efficient firms with lowering consumer welfare.
|
18 |
In my example, consumer welfare is higher. The
|
19 |
single-line producers of B would just sell to B-only
|
20 |
consumers.
|
21 |
Okay. Another point that is implicit to what
|
22 |
Barry said which I should have mentioned a moment ago,
|
23 |
we are going to assume here that under independent
|
24 |
pricing, the Firm 1, the monopolist in the market for A,
|
25 |
has not been able to extract all consumer surplus in the |
46
1 |
market for A.
|
2 |
In principle, the firm might do this by a
|
3 |
perfect two-part tariff, for example. In practice, I
|
4 |
think neither Barry nor I think this is a big deal. If
|
5 |
it were, we would see lots more two-part tariffs with a
|
6 |
lot fewer loyalty discounts than we do.
|
7 |
If consumers' demands have some uncertainty and
|
8 |
consumers know more about what their demands are, then
|
9 |
you will not have a two-part tariff anyway, and you
|
10 |
would find that would still be of some use.
|
11 |
So far we are talking again about a monopolist
|
12 |
in the market for A and everyone inside is a perfect
|
13 |
competitor in B.
|
14 |
Had I taken more time on this particular slide,
|
15 |
I would have had a third bullet point which contrasts
|
16 |
what you might expect Firm 1 to actually do with the
|
17 |
possibility of raising both consumer welfare and
|
18 |
profits.
|
19 |
In practice, you wouldn't expect the firm to be
|
20 |
interested in raising consumer welfare. So profit
|
21 |
maximizing in a very simple setting where B is perfectly
|
22 |
competitive and products are not differentiated and the
|
23 |
only thing consumers care about is price, in that
|
24 |
setting profit-maximizing behavior by Firm 1 is to raise
|
25 |
the out-of-bundled price of A a great deal. |
47
1 |
The only point of the out-of-bundled price is to
|
2 |
essentially stampede consumers into buying product. In
|
3 |
fact, you would give them very bad out-of-bundle
|
4 |
alternatives, $10 trillion an ounce or whatever it might
|
5 |
be.
|
6 |
Of course, they could buy B at marginal cost
|
7 |
from competitors. This puts consumers of A and B in a
|
8 |
much worse position.
|
9 |
So in that setting, the effect of
|
10 |
profit-maximizing bundling would not be to raise
|
11 |
consumer welfare. It would be to increase profits and
|
12 |
lower consumer welfare.
|
13 |
Let's not lose sight of the fact that if the
|
14 |
out-of-bundled price of A is no higher than the
|
15 |
preexisting monopoly price of A under independent
|
16 |
pricing, we have the result which has the interesting
|
17 |
effect, as I said a moment ago, of excluding sellers in
|
18 |
B market from selling to consumers that buy A and B.
|
19 |
What I will do next is to change the story and
|
20 |
the market for B a little bit. What I talked about so
|
21 |
far I suspect people in the audience have heard before
|
22 |
from me, from what I have heard. It is on the paper on
|
23 |
SSRN for a while. My coauthors and I have labored to
|
24 |
extend the results and have had some progress.
|
25 |
The story I will tell next, suppose that the |
48
1 |
market for B is not perfectly competitive. It has two
|
2 |
firms, one of which is Firm 1. They produce
|
3 |
differentiated products.
|
4 |
So yes, there are substitutes but not perfect
|
5 |
substitutes. Consumers have tastes which are some will
|
6 |
prefirm firm 2's version of B and some prefer Firm 1's
|
7 |
version. You have a distribution of tastes in the
|
8 |
market for B.
|
9 |
Some consumers want only B, but there is also a
|
10 |
population of A and B consumers. If you look at those
|
11 |
folks, the ones who want A, we will assume the same
|
12 |
distribution of taste as regard to B. So there are some
|
13 |
A/B consumers who really like Firm 1's flavor of B but
|
14 |
some who really like Firm 2's.
|
15 |
In this setting, the world changes a fair
|
16 |
amount. Let me talk you through things before I go to
|
17 |
the bullet point here.
|
18 |
Firm 1 now has a much more interesting role for
|
19 |
the out-of-bundled price of A than it had a moment ago
|
20 |
when I assumed that the B market was perfectly
|
21 |
competitive and all sellers in B produced a homogeneous
|
22 |
product.
|
23 |
In this case, Firm 1 realizes there are folks
|
24 |
out there wanting to buy my monopoly product which
|
25 |
really want to buy B from the other guy. |
49
1 |
The tools at my disposal if I'm Firm 1 are I
|
2 |
will have out-of-bundled prices for A and B and bundled
|
3 |
prices for A and B.
|
4 |
I also know there are some A consumers who also
|
5 |
prefer my version of B. How hard do I want to try to
|
6 |
retain consumers that want to buy A but really want to
|
7 |
buy firm 2's version of B?
|
8 |
If I am going to keep those folks, I might have
|
9 |
to really discount the price of the bundle a lot. If I
|
10 |
do that, then I'm passing up profits that I could make
|
11 |
on A and B consumers that like my version of B.
|
12 |
So maybe I won't do it. Maybe it is better not
|
13 |
to try so hard. I will simply concede A/B consumers
|
14 |
that prefer firm 2's version of B to Firm 2.
|
15 |
Now, I still would like to make some money off
|
16 |
them. I would like them to continue to buy A from me.
|
17 |
So my out-of-bundled price for A in this
|
18 |
setting, although it is a high price, is no longer set
|
19 |
at some infinite level that is designed solely to
|
20 |
stampede people into buying the bundle. It is low
|
21 |
enough so that A/B consumers that like Firm 2's version
|
22 |
of B are still going to buy some A product.
|
23 |
So the stand-alone price of A, the out-of-bundle
|
24 |
price of A in this setting has a price discrimination
|
25 |
goal as well as incentive to buy the bundle. It is a |
50
1 |
more complicated world.
|
2 |
Now, look at the first bundle here. Compared to
|
3 |
independent pricing, consumer welfare can go up or down
|
4 |
assuming that Firm 2 does not exit the B market. In
|
5 |
this bullet, when I say consumer welfare can go up or
|
6 |
down, I mean in the aggregate. I don't necessarily mean
|
7 |
every single consumer.
|
8 |
Now, Firm 1 -- why would that work? Firm 1 --
|
9 |
there's sort of an interesting effect here. Firm 2 has
|
10 |
a tougher job with bundling than under independent
|
11 |
pricing because it has to convince consumers to buy B
|
12 |
from it at the expense of them having to pay a higher
|
13 |
price for A.
|
14 |
Under independent pricing, it didn't have this
|
15 |
problem. In this set-up here, Firm 2 lowers its price
|
16 |
of B because it is now competing, trying to pull people
|
17 |
out of the bundle from Firm 1, which it didn't have to
|
18 |
do under independent pricing.
|
19 |
Firm 1's best response to that is to set an a la
|
20 |
carte price for B which is lower as well so B-only
|
21 |
consumers are better off in this setting here.
|
22 |
If you look at the people buying the bundle, it
|
23 |
is not clear whether they are individually better off or
|
24 |
not. Usually some are worse off.
|
25 |
In that setting, B-only consumers are always |
51
1 |
better off. A and B consumers may be, may not be.
|
2 |
Aggregate consumer welfare can go up or down.
|
3 |
There is an interesting permutation of this for
|
4 |
either entry deterrents, if that's how you want to think
|
5 |
about this, or driving firms to another market.
|
6 |
Since Firm 2 always sets a lower price of B
|
7 |
because it has to work harder to capture consumers
|
8 |
because they will be tempted to buy B to get a lower
|
9 |
price of A, it always charges a lower price, its cash
|
10 |
flow is lower. Depending on the costs it may have, it
|
11 |
may in fact exit the market.
|
12 |
Look at this from another way. Imagine that
|
13 |
Firm 2 has not yet entered the market but it is thinking
|
14 |
about doing that and asking itself what would happen if
|
15 |
I did enter the market.
|
16 |
Well, the story I have gone through here depends
|
17 |
on a result which is in the paper that Firm 1's best
|
18 |
response to entry by Firm 2 is always to bundle.
|
19 |
Firm 2, if it hasn't entered yet, knows if it
|
20 |
does, Firm 1 will respond by bundling. Therefore, if
|
21 |
there is some cost of entry specific to the active entry
|
22 |
that Firm 2 had to incur, they may be deterred from
|
23 |
entering, somewhat like the one in the tying literature,
|
24 |
the paper by Mike Winston.
|
25 |
But there is a difference. You recall that |
52
1 |
Mike's entry deterrence result depends on the equivalent
|
2 |
of Firm 1 giving a precommitment to a time, meaning if
|
3 |
an entry were to occur, it has to precommit to the tie.
|
4 |
There is no precommitment requirement because
|
5 |
bundling is what Firm 1 will want to do anyway, the best
|
6 |
response. So it is possible to induce Firm 2 to exit
|
7 |
even without the precommitment assumption of Winston and
|
8 |
others in the tying literature.
|
9 |
For a long time in this more complicated set-up,
|
10 |
I didn't think we were going to get any sort of fact
|
11 |
pattern that would tell us we had a safe harbor here the
|
12 |
way we did in the previous story that I just told.
|
13 |
My coauthor, David Wrightman, actually came up
|
14 |
with one. A sufficient condition in this set-up for
|
15 |
consumer welfare to be higher under bundling than under
|
16 |
independent pricing, assuming Firm 2 does not exit, is
|
17 |
the following.
|
18 |
If the a la carte price of A or the
|
19 |
out-of-bundled price of A is no higher than it would be
|
20 |
under independent pricing and if Firm 2's price for B
|
21 |
falls, then whatever happens with the bundle, we can
|
22 |
infer consumer welfare has to have gone up, even though
|
23 |
the price of B in the bundle may be a little higher.
|
24 |
So if we have this fact pattern, we can conclude
|
25 |
not only that overall consumer welfare is higher but in |
53
1 |
fact every single consumer is better off.
|
2 |
A couple of remarks here. I talked about two
|
3 |
kinds of safe harbor tests here. The previous result or
|
4 |
model were the B markets perfectly competitive, and we
|
5 |
compare the a la carte price of A under bundling to the
|
6 |
monopoly price of A and we have a result.
|
7 |
And in this case we do the same thing. We can
|
8 |
only do that if there is a preexisting independent
|
9 |
pricing regime followed by an onset of bundling.
|
10 |
And in practice you may not find such a clean
|
11 |
set-up. Perhaps bundling began in 1932 or something
|
12 |
like that. However, in a litigation setting, the
|
13 |
chances are reasonably good that you will run up against
|
14 |
this set-up.
|
15 |
Typically what happens is firms compete, and one
|
16 |
of them will start bundling, and then there is an
|
17 |
antitrust complaint. Typically there is a before and
|
18 |
after if things make it to the litigation stage.
|
19 |
Let me contrast this with the doability of
|
20 |
Barry's test. Barry's test does not have the problem of
|
21 |
needing to find a before and after situation.
|
22 |
It basically lists as attributes the discounts
|
23 |
to the competitive line and asks if an equally efficient
|
24 |
competitor could undercut that. We could use that in
|
25 |
principal using data from the firms if we didn't have |
54
1 |
any reason to think that was a strange point in time to
|
2 |
consider.
|
3 |
The advantage of -- Barry has a safe harbor, and
|
4 |
it's really oriented towards saying when do we exclude
|
5 |
competitors. That doesn't necessarily mean consumer
|
6 |
welfare is lower if in fact this test has failed.
|
7 |
Okay. To sum up, then, in the right
|
8 |
circumstances, at least, it seems possible that simply
|
9 |
by looking at pricing patterns in order to prepare
|
10 |
out-of-bundled prices so the monopoly must carry them to
|
11 |
the preexisting prices or by allocating discounts to the
|
12 |
competitive line, we do have some safe harbor tests at
|
13 |
this point, most of which weren't around or at least
|
14 |
weren't understood by us at the time of LePage's.
|
15 |
Okay, thank you.
|
16 |
(Applause.)
|
17 |
MR. DEGRABA: Our last presenter for the morning
|
18 |
is Joe Kattan.
|
19 |
He has asked that I waive the reading of his bio
|
20 |
and simply say he is a partner at Gibson, Dunn &
|
21 |
Crutcher in Washington, D.C.
|
22 |
MR. KATTAN: Thank you. I will also waive the
|
23 |
use of PowerPoint, the pervasiveness of which may be
|
24 |
testament to the bundling of the Microsoft Office Suite.
|
25 |
I'm a lawyer, too, and I'm going to look at |
55
1 |
things from the perspective of the lawyer. And I want
|
2 |
to start out with a fairly obvious proposition which is
|
3 |
that both bundling and loyalty discounts involve price
|
4 |
cutting.
|
5 |
This is an area which U.S. law has tread very
|
6 |
carefully, and for a good reason. The cost of error in
|
7 |
this area, as we all know, is deterring firms from
|
8 |
engaging in aggressive price cutting, which the courts
|
9 |
have been loathe to do, viewing such deterrents as
|
10 |
antithetical to the goals of antitrust.
|
11 |
Justice Breyer back when he was in the First
|
12 |
Circuit captured this idea in the Barry Wright case,
|
13 |
where he said, "The consequence of a mistake here is not
|
14 |
to force a firm to undergo a legitimate business
|
15 |
activity that it wishes to pursue. Rather, it is to
|
16 |
penalize appropriate competitive price cuts, perhaps the
|
17 |
most desirable activity from an antitrust perspective
|
18 |
that can take place in a concentrated industry where
|
19 |
prices typically exceed costs."
|
20 |
This has been the foundation of U.S. antitrust
|
21 |
policy in the price arena. We have obviously seen that
|
22 |
in a number of Supreme Court cases in the predatory
|
23 |
pricing area, where the Supreme Court said that cutting
|
24 |
prices to increase business is the very essence of
|
25 |
competition. |
56
1 |
Although this policy has its underpinnings in
|
2 |
the predatory pricing area, at least from a narrow legal
|
3 |
perspective, it is important to note that the Supreme
|
4 |
Court has made it clear that this policy has a broader
|
5 |
applicability.
|
6 |
This point was made in the Arco versus USA
|
7 |
Petroleum case which involved, as you all know, maximum
|
8 |
RPM, where the court said in the context of pricing
|
9 |
practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite
|
10 |
anticompetitive effect.
|
11 |
The reason for that it said was that low prices
|
12 |
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are
|
13 |
set, and so long as they are above predatory levels,
|
14 |
they do not threaten competition.
|
15 |
We have adhered to this principle regardless of
|
16 |
the type of antitrust claim involved.
|
17 |
So at least from the legal perspective, we have
|
18 |
to start from the standpoint that discounting practices,
|
19 |
regardless of their form, can only violate the law when
|
20 |
they result in some form of predatory pricing.
|
21 |
Obviously there are economic models that attempt
|
22 |
to show how various discounting practices can harm
|
23 |
consumers, sometimes even when price exceeds cost.
|
24 |
But the courts have stubbornly clung to this
|
25 |
bright-line standard. And the reason for that is that |
57
1 |
courts have been loathe to sacrifice the immediate
|
2 |
benefits of a price cut for the much more speculative
|
3 |
possibility that some future harm to competition might
|
4 |
be avoided if we curb the ability of firms to discount,
|
5 |
at least in the absence of more tractable and, more
|
6 |
importantly, more general economic models that can
|
7 |
predict harm.
|
8 |
Essentially what the courts have said, we like
|
9 |
the bird in the hand, the immediate price cut, much more
|
10 |
than the birds in the bush, which is the possibility
|
11 |
that at some point down the line we may have a more
|
12 |
competitive market and lower prices.
|
13 |
This obviously embodies assumptions about the
|
14 |
efficiency of progressive price cutting and about the
|
15 |
cost of false positives.
|
16 |
Regarding efficiencies, the courts are assuming
|
17 |
that price cuts that remain above cost enhanced both
|
18 |
consumer and total welfare. And with regard to the cost
|
19 |
of false positives, what the courts are saying is we are
|
20 |
worried very much about inhibiting price cutting that we
|
21 |
view is the essence of competition.
|
22 |
There are clearly several worries that the
|
23 |
court's fixation with false positives has made them
|
24 |
insensitive to the possibility of false negatives.
|
25 |
The basic critique is that anticompetitive |
58
1 |
pricing conduct involving mixed bundling, involving
|
2 |
loyalty, is likely to be more pervasive and more
|
3 |
permanent than predatory pricing, so that the risk of
|
4 |
underdeterrents is greater than in the predatory pricing
|
5 |
area where this policy has its roots.
|
6 |
The reason for this, and I think we have heard
|
7 |
some of it today, is that while predatory pricing often
|
8 |
requires a large profit sacrifice, uncertain possibility
|
9 |
of recoupment, which leads to the predation approach not
|
10 |
being tried very often, anticompetitive bundling or
|
11 |
loyalty rebates could -- and I want to underscore
|
12 |
"could" -- entail in profit sacrifice or alternatively
|
13 |
enable instant recoupment.
|
14 |
For that reason they are more likely to occur.
|
15 |
For that reason, they are also more likely to be
|
16 |
durable, which is to say it can go on for a long time.
|
17 |
To me, the absence of a profit sacrifice would
|
18 |
also suggest, at least in the realm of pricing and what
|
19 |
we are talking about here is pricing -- not talking
|
20 |
about blowing up a competitor's factory or lying to a
|
21 |
standard-setting body -- is that an equally efficient
|
22 |
competitor would be able to match the discounts as a
|
23 |
general proposition.
|
24 |
We have heard about some exceptions and that to
|
25 |
the extent that the rivals are excluded, they are being |
59
1 |
excluded on the basis of superior efficiency.
|
2 |
In addition, I think we have to take into
|
3 |
account the pervasiveness of bundling, the pervasiveness
|
4 |
of discounts that have a retroactive feature, which is
|
5 |
to say you hit a threshold and the discount applies to
|
6 |
it for marginal units.
|
7 |
Volume discounts are fundamentally structured
|
8 |
that way. Buy a hundred units and you get 10 percent
|
9 |
off is a fairly common form of doing business.
|
10 |
The pervasiveness of these types of practices
|
11 |
throughout the economy, the prevalence of their use by
|
12 |
firms that don't have market power and have no hope of
|
13 |
excluding competitors would suggest or at least caution
|
14 |
that there is a good possibility that the efficiency
|
15 |
explanation for these practices is the dominant one.
|
16 |
Now, there are models that show that equally
|
17 |
efficient competitors can be excluded even without a
|
18 |
sacrifice of profits.
|
19 |
But I think the issue with these models is that
|
20 |
they don't necessarily show consumer welfare being
|
21 |
reduced by the discount. In fact, I think some of the
|
22 |
models depend on consumer welfare being enhanced. I
|
23 |
guess we are really in the dark about this area of the
|
24 |
law.
|
25 |
Some of these models depend on consumers |
60
1 |
actually being better off with the bundled price
|
2 |
offered. What we see is that both producer surplus and
|
3 |
consumer welfare is better off.
|
4 |
So what this shows is that there are
|
5 |
circumstances in which bundled pricing can harm
|
6 |
competitors, even efficient competitors, but they don't
|
7 |
necessarily harm consumer welfare.
|
8 |
Another question is whether these models at this
|
9 |
point are sufficiently general to support changing the
|
10 |
current legal regime.
|
11 |
Professor Hovenkamp argues that they are not,
|
12 |
that they cannot support a legal standard. What he says
|
13 |
is that the economic modeling showing that certain
|
14 |
discounts can be anticompetitive tend to be highly
|
15 |
complex, often making unrealistic assumptions.
|
16 |
The result is proposed legal standards that make
|
17 |
impossible informational demands on the courts.
|
18 |
A more benign way of looking at this is the
|
19 |
early models that have questioned the conventional
|
20 |
thinking and basically challenged the Chicago view have
|
21 |
worked with stylized assumptions to knock down at least
|
22 |
the universality of the received wisdom and more work
|
23 |
needs to be done before we know whether the results can
|
24 |
be generalized enough to support a rule of law, whether
|
25 |
basically what we have are some interesting footnotes |
61
1 |
that show that the current legal regime can lead to
|
2 |
false negatives under some severe assumptions.
|
3 |
To base a rule of law on the economic models, we
|
4 |
have to have general models on which we can base clear,
|
5 |
predictable and administrable rules. Models that show
|
6 |
that anticompetitive results could happen are not good
|
7 |
enough to prescribe rules of law.
|
8 |
What we need are models that identify the
|
9 |
particular circumstances in which aggressive pricing is
|
10 |
likely to be anticompetitive and do so in a way that can
|
11 |
be reliably administered within the constraints of legal
|
12 |
factfinding.
|
13 |
The challenge is to have rules that capture the
|
14 |
circumstances in which discounts harm competition, rules
|
15 |
that do not discourage price cutting and do not serve as
|
16 |
an instrument for strategic behavior by rivals to attack
|
17 |
discounting by more efficient competitors, rules that
|
18 |
offer sufficient guidance to business executives to
|
19 |
enable them to respond and can be administered within
|
20 |
the constraints of legality.
|
21 |
We need rules that are general, sufficiently
|
22 |
general to have application beyond a narrow range of
|
23 |
stylized assumptions, do not lead to incidents of false
|
24 |
positives, are capable of application by business
|
25 |
executives, capable of implementation with the types of |
62
1 |
evidence that are available to us in the litigation
|
2 |
setting rather than some idealized laboratory setting.
|
3 |
The virtue of the cost-based test as a starting
|
4 |
point or as an initial screen for analyzing pricing
|
5 |
practices -- and that would include bundling and include
|
6 |
loyalty discounts -- is that it does all of the above.
|
7 |
It is highly general in distinguishing between
|
8 |
discounting to reflect a seller's superior efficiency in
|
9 |
price cutting that has the potential to drive out an
|
10 |
equally efficient competitor.
|
11 |
It avoids false positives by limiting liability
|
12 |
to cases in which it is economically rational to incur a
|
13 |
profit sacrifice in the hope of subsequent recoupment,
|
14 |
following exclusion of a rival from a market.
|
15 |
It also sets a very understandable guideline for
|
16 |
business executives, what they need to understand is
|
17 |
their own cost, the cost of producing the goods that
|
18 |
they make. They don't need to understand what the cost
|
19 |
of their rivals are. They don't need to have a more
|
20 |
detailed understanding regarding the consequences of
|
21 |
their business conduct on market performance.
|
22 |
The test is administrable, because determining
|
23 |
average variable cost, which has been the measure of
|
24 |
costs used by the courts in most cases, which almost
|
25 |
always is going to be a good proxy for avoidable cost, |
63
1 |
presents a relatively tractable problem, even though it
|
2 |
is a fairly complicated one, as anyone who has been
|
3 |
involved in any kind of cost analysis will tell you. It
|
4 |
leads to predictable results.
|
5 |
One cannot overemphasize the importance of
|
6 |
generality, predictability and consistency. Unclear or
|
7 |
open-ended rules can have some serious negative effects
|
8 |
because in and of themselves they can deter firms from
|
9 |
engaging in discounting.
|
10 |
In fact, predictability is the reason why the
|
11 |
predatory pricing test is a test that's grounded in a
|
12 |
price-cost comparison rather than being a true profit
|
13 |
sacrifice test.
|
14 |
A true profit sacrifice test would condemn
|
15 |
failing to maximize short-term profits. It would
|
16 |
condemn failing to recover the opportunity cost
|
17 |
associated with particular pricing behavior. And the
|
18 |
reason we don't do that is that a rule like that would
|
19 |
make pricing decisions by firms with large market shares
|
20 |
basically a roll of the dice.
|
21 |
So we have a clear rule that omits, I think,
|
22 |
false negatives but one that is administrable and
|
23 |
enables firms to base pricing decisions on an objective
|
24 |
measure that is easy to follow.
|
25 |
Now, what does all this mean in the context of |
64
1 |
the practices that we are talking about here? What
|
2 |
would a plaintiff have to show in challenging a
|
3 |
multiproduct discounting?
|
4 |
The first thing a plaintiff has to show is it
|
5 |
cannot offer the multiproduct bundle either on its own
|
6 |
or in cooperation with other firms. If the plaintiff
|
7 |
can match the entire bundle alone or cooperatively, the
|
8 |
bundle is incapable of excluding, at least by virtue of
|
9 |
being a bundle, other than on the basis of superior
|
10 |
efficiency.
|
11 |
It can obviously ask whether the price of the
|
12 |
entire bundle exceeds the cost of the entire bundle.
|
13 |
But the bundling doesn't give the bundling firm a lever
|
14 |
over its rival because we don't have the asymmetry of
|
15 |
the ability of the rival to match a component of the
|
16 |
bundle.
|
17 |
To the extent that an equally efficient
|
18 |
competitor cannot match an offer because consumers are
|
19 |
better off with a bundle than from a la carte purchases,
|
20 |
any exclusion that might occur, and we have heard that
|
21 |
it might occur based on perhaps differentiated demand
|
22 |
for the products included in the bundle, may show harm
|
23 |
to a competitor, but they would not show harm to
|
24 |
consumers.
|
25 |
The same principle I think would apply, as |
65
1 |
Professor Hovenkamp has argued, to single-product
|
2 |
discounts if the price charged by the defendant is above
|
3 |
cost.
|
4 |
That should be the end of the story. If the
|
5 |
plaintiffs can show that it can't match the bundle
|
6 |
either alone or cooperatively, then I think the Ortho
|
7 |
test is probably today the best means that we have for
|
8 |
identifying whether harm to competition may occur, if
|
9 |
allocating the discount to the competitive product
|
10 |
yields an above-cost price that is no more exclusionary
|
11 |
than having the bundling firm price the competitive
|
12 |
product on that stand-alone basis.
|
13 |
If the bundling firm flunks that test, then we
|
14 |
need to look at a couple of other things. One is has
|
15 |
the price been extended to a sufficient share of the
|
16 |
market to result in exclusion, because unlike the
|
17 |
classic predatory pricing situation, where the predatory
|
18 |
price is extended across the entire market and every
|
19 |
unit is sold below cost, mixed bundling discounts may be
|
20 |
extended on a selective basis.
|
21 |
Critics of bundling cite this as evidence that
|
22 |
the strategy is less costly than predatory pricing. By
|
23 |
the same token, it also tells us the strategy is less
|
24 |
likely to exclude.
|
25 |
It is also tempting for plaintiffs to focus on |
66
1 |
what happens at the margin, at some point which is near
|
2 |
the threshold that triggers the discount.
|
3 |
To use an example from the Concord Boat case, in
|
4 |
that case a defendant offered a graduated discount. The
|
5 |
first level was 1 percent if a consumer bought 60
|
6 |
percent of its requirements from Brunswick.
|
7 |
Now, obviously, if you look at this from the
|
8 |
standpoint of a hypothetical consumer who otherwise
|
9 |
would buy 59 percent of its requirements from Brunswick,
|
10 |
then you could say the last 1 percent is being given
|
11 |
away for free and that is surely below cost. And that
|
12 |
observation is as irrelevant as it is true.
|
13 |
To compete for just 10 percent of a buyer's
|
14 |
requirement, an equally efficient competitor would have
|
15 |
only had to extend a 6 percent discount to match the
|
16 |
Brunswick offer in that case. And obviously an equally
|
17 |
efficient competitor can match the offer to compete for
|
18 |
the entire amount of the business, in which case its
|
19 |
discount doesn't need to be any larger than the
|
20 |
Brunswick discount.
|
21 |
It has to match the discount dollar for dollar,
|
22 |
which is a 1 percent discount.
|
23 |
I think it is also important to take the
|
24 |
duration of arrangements into account. Supporters of an
|
25 |
interventionist approach assume that bundling loyalty |
67
1 |
discounts can go on forever because of the absence of a
|
2 |
profit sacrifice.
|
3 |
In a litigation setting, this is an empirical
|
4 |
question. We know in the exclusive dealing arena, the
|
5 |
law presumes that arrangements of a year or less are
|
6 |
presumptively legal.
|
7 |
Where we are talking about an arrangement that
|
8 |
does not require exclusivity but simply offers an
|
9 |
economic incentive to buy more from the seller, the same
|
10 |
presumption should be applicable here.
|
11 |
Finally, I would say the plaintiff has to show
|
12 |
real rather than conjectured harm. This means exclusion
|
13 |
of the plaintiff that results in harm to consumers. We
|
14 |
have seen in too many cases -- Ortho being one of them,
|
15 |
but there are many others -- the spectacle of a
|
16 |
plaintiff that is actually doing well in the
|
17 |
marketplace, claiming that a rival's pricing practices
|
18 |
are making it hard for it to compete, that it would have
|
19 |
done better.
|
20 |
"I would have done better" shouldn't be the
|
21 |
basis for a monopolization. The basis for a
|
22 |
monopolization case ought to be exclusion.
|
23 |
Again, there are models that attempt to rebut
|
24 |
the Chicago thesis. Maybe down the road they would call
|
25 |
for a reevaluation of the law, but I think at this point |
68
1 |
they are too ambiguous in terms of impact on consumer
|
2 |
welfare and too limited in their assumptions to support
|
3 |
a change in the legal regime.
|
4 |
Thank you.
|
5 |
(Applause.)
|
6 |
MR. DEGRABA: We are at the break portion of our
|
7 |
morning festivities. It looks like we should get back
|
8 |
here in about 10 minutes.
|
9 |
We will reconvene. It is 11:00 now. So 11:10.
|
10 |
(Recess.)
|
11 |
MR. DEGRABA: Welcome back. We will continue
|
12 |
for about 50 more minutes.
|
13 |
This is the sort of the moderated discussion
|
14 |
part of our day, where we will present a number of
|
15 |
propositions up here on the slides.
|
16 |
These propositions are not meant to represent
|
17 |
necessarily the views of the Commission. They are
|
18 |
simply statements made to generate some discussion.
|
19 |
But before we move to the propositions, I want
|
20 |
to go through each of the presenters and ask if any of
|
21 |
the presenters want to respond to anything any of the
|
22 |
other presenters said.
|
23 |
So we will start in the same order that we did.
|
24 |
So we will ask Barry. Is there anything you
|
25 |
want to say in response to something someone else said? |
69
1 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I guess I was a little
|
2 |
disappointed in the lack of response in terms of the
|
3 |
presentation we had from Mr. Kattan in the sense of I
|
4 |
think it is manifestly the case that bundled discounts
|
5 |
do not mean lower prices, and that's actually a
|
6 |
distinguishing feature of them.
|
7 |
The example I gave you, historical prices that
|
8 |
had always been charged for these goods that you saw
|
9 |
sort of 1, 2 and 3, suddenly the firm says if you don't
|
10 |
buy all of my goods, now this competitor, I will raise
|
11 |
them substantially.
|
12 |
In fact, the evidence would suggest that I'm
|
13 |
going to raise them above what would be the monopoly
|
14 |
level.
|
15 |
It is really a case of if you don't give me your
|
16 |
wallet, I'm going to shoot you. To say that is now good
|
17 |
for the consumers because they have the absence of being
|
18 |
shot and calling that a discount strikes me as just a
|
19 |
perversion of what's really going on here.
|
20 |
The fact is that when you do predatory pricing,
|
21 |
you actually buy the stuff cheaply. But when you see a
|
22 |
bundle, quote, "discount," it is not required that the
|
23 |
customer actually was ever paying that high price. It
|
24 |
is only that they weren't being threatened to be charged
|
25 |
that high price. |
70
1 |
That is a fundamental distinction which has to
|
2 |
be recognized, and it is one of the reasons why we want
|
3 |
to treat these things differently.
|
4 |
It is also, of course, central to David Sibley's
|
5 |
perspective of when we see the price being raised for
|
6 |
the single product by the absence of the bundle, that
|
7 |
really should set off alarm bells.
|
8 |
In terms of Tom's presentation, just one thing
|
9 |
to observe is there are times when the purpose of the
|
10 |
exclusion is not to raise the price in the B market.
|
11 |
And in particular, there are cases I have seen
|
12 |
where firms would never be able to raise the price of B,
|
13 |
would always be competitive, but nonetheless, equally or
|
14 |
more efficient B firms were excluded because that was
|
15 |
going to be the platform for them to come into the A
|
16 |
market and, therefore, attack monopoly, because it would
|
17 |
be establishing sales force, establishing manufacturing
|
18 |
in that territory.
|
19 |
So one has to look not just at the potential of
|
20 |
the B market to be monopolized but what is the purpose
|
21 |
of the exclusion here.
|
22 |
MR. DEGRABA: I will give Joe a chance to
|
23 |
respond to the statement that bundled discounts don't
|
24 |
always mean lower prices.
|
25 |
Joe, do you want to respond to that at all? |
71
1 |
MR. KATTAN: It is certainly an empirical
|
2 |
proposition that can be tested, whether bundled prices
|
3 |
or unbundled prices represent an increase in the price
|
4 |
vis-a-vis the price levels that prevail in the absence
|
5 |
of the bundle.
|
6 |
I have not seen evidence suggesting that that's
|
7 |
the pervasive way in which we encounter bundled
|
8 |
discounts.
|
9 |
Now, is it theoretically possible to set up a
|
10 |
construct that says here is what a seller can do, it can
|
11 |
jack up the prices on an unbundled basis and offer a
|
12 |
discount that simply takes you back to where you would
|
13 |
have been in the absence of the bundle.
|
14 |
Yes, that is obviously arithmetically plausible.
|
15 |
But the question is how common is that empirically and
|
16 |
whether that is something that in the context of
|
17 |
litigation also lends itself to the kind of proof that
|
18 |
we have in the litigation setting, particularly when you
|
19 |
have changes in quality, performance, product attributes
|
20 |
that may take place over the same period of time.
|
21 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you.
|
22 |
And Tom Lambert, do you want to respond to the
|
23 |
exclusion doesn't always mean an increase in the price
|
24 |
in the B market?
|
25 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: Sure. May I bundle my |
72
1 |
response?
|
2 |
MR. DEGRABA: Is somebody controlling the volume
|
3 |
on this thing? Let's continue.
|
4 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: I will bundle my response to
|
5 |
Barry, along with my comments.
|
6 |
Joe began by quoting the Barry Wright case, and
|
7 |
I believe that that is absolutely spot on in this
|
8 |
context. So I will quote a bit from that.
|
9 |
Then Judge Breyer writes, "Unlike economics
|
10 |
laws, an administrative system, the effects of which
|
11 |
depend on the content of rules and precedents only as
|
12 |
they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by
|
13 |
lawyers advising their clients."
|
14 |
And here is the key part. "Rules that seek to
|
15 |
embody every economic complexity and qualification may
|
16 |
well, through the vagaries of administration, prove
|
17 |
counterproductive, undercutting the very economic ends
|
18 |
they seek to serve."
|
19 |
So my response to Barry's two points, one is the
|
20 |
point that he makes in response to Joe, that you could
|
21 |
have these phony discounts where you have jacked up the
|
22 |
price and then said "hey, we are giving you a discount,"
|
23 |
and he seems to think those are very pervasive, it seems
|
24 |
to me that most of the bundled discounts I see are not
|
25 |
like that at all. |
73
1 |
McDonald's, go to McDonald's.
|
2 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: They are not the ones the
|
3 |
antitrust cases are about.
|
4 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: Correct, but they are the
|
5 |
ones that are affected if we adopt a rule of law that is
|
6 |
designed to deal with .0001 percent of bundling cases.
|
7 |
That to me is troubling and it's exactly what Judge
|
8 |
Breyer is talking about in Barry White.
|
9 |
Sometimes we have to sacrifice the last 1
|
10 |
percent to protect the 99 percent.
|
11 |
It also seems to me that we could deal with
|
12 |
those cases by -- the legal rule I propose presumes the
|
13 |
legality of above-cost bundled discounts.
|
14 |
It seems to me that it would be possible -- and
|
15 |
I think Joe mentioned this in his talk -- to identify a
|
16 |
phony discount. If you see a price jack and then a
|
17 |
discount, well, that's not really a discount.
|
18 |
So we could withhold the presumption of legality
|
19 |
for that type of bundled discount.
|
20 |
And then I guess I would make the same point
|
21 |
with respect to Barry's argument that sometimes bundling
|
22 |
is done not to charge supercompetitive prices in the B
|
23 |
market, foreclose competitors and get monopoly power in
|
24 |
that market but instead to monopolize the A market.
|
25 |
That very well may be the case, and this is |
74
1 |
incredibly casual empiricism, but my guess is that
|
2 |
doesn't happen enough to justify writing a law, a rule
|
3 |
that is so complex that it chills the procompetitive
|
4 |
bundled discounting.
|
5 |
I am very much motivated by this idea that we
|
6 |
have to make these theories workable as laws,
|
7 |
understandable, administrable by juries and judges and
|
8 |
useful to counselors who are advising their clients.
|
9 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you.
|
10 |
David, do you have any comments on anybody's
|
11 |
presentations?
|
12 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Yes. This is more in the
|
13 |
nature of something I meant to say but forgot rather
|
14 |
than a comment.
|
15 |
One thing that motivated some of the original
|
16 |
work that Greenlee and Wrightman and I did on bundled
|
17 |
discounts was try to figure out as nonlawyers what
|
18 |
branch of antitrust law was it appropriate to use in
|
19 |
analyzing these.
|
20 |
We concluded predatory pricing wasn't the right
|
21 |
branch. For a while we thought that tying was. The
|
22 |
reason for that is if the B market is perfectly
|
23 |
competitive and the A market is a monopoly, the only
|
24 |
function of the bundle discounts is to set an
|
25 |
out-of-bundled price of the monopoly product so high |
75
1 |
that consumers are faced with a choice of buying at high
|
2 |
bundled prices or buying the competitive product and
|
3 |
buying none of the monopoly product at all.
|
4 |
That is really equivalent to a tie.
|
5 |
The version of the model which involved two
|
6 |
firms offering differentiated products tells us that no,
|
7 |
there is lots more going on with bundled discounts than
|
8 |
simply being equivalent to a tie.
|
9 |
The out-of-bundled price on my third slide
|
10 |
wasn't in place simply to force people to face the
|
11 |
option of buying the B market at a competitive price but
|
12 |
no A or buy the bundle at outrageous prices.
|
13 |
It actually played a price discrimination role
|
14 |
and people buy at that price. That suggests to me that
|
15 |
if there is a general legal theory of bundled discounts
|
16 |
to be had, it is not predatory pricing and it is not
|
17 |
always going to be the same as tying either.
|
18 |
It is going to be something else, and I don't
|
19 |
know what it is.
|
20 |
I would like to comment on something that both
|
21 |
Joe and Tom said about sort of requirements that the
|
22 |
plaintiff would have to meet in a bundled discount case
|
23 |
in order to prevail.
|
24 |
One of them was that the plaintiff would need to
|
25 |
show that it is impossible, either alone or with someone |
76
1 |
else, to assemble a bundle that would match the bundle
|
2 |
being offered by the defendant in such a case. I think
|
3 |
that rule has a lot of appeal to it.
|
4 |
There is one big caveat. Of the many things we
|
5 |
have learned about bundled pricing from Barry, one of
|
6 |
them is that the more symmetrical firms are, the more
|
7 |
you would expect head-to-head competition to be very
|
8 |
severe.
|
9 |
If in fact a firm were able to match the items
|
10 |
in another firm's bundle, the result of that might
|
11 |
simply be low-profit dog-eat-dog competition bundle
|
12 |
versus bundle.
|
13 |
Knowing that to be the likely result, the firm
|
14 |
might not incur the cost of assembling that bundle in
|
15 |
the first place.
|
16 |
So it could well be that you could ask a
|
17 |
plaintiff why haven't you assembled a counterpart to the
|
18 |
defendant's bundle, and it seems perfectly possible, and
|
19 |
the plaintiff would say yes, it is perfectly possible,
|
20 |
it is just it would be unprofitable for me to do it
|
21 |
because all I'm doing then is bundling myself into a
|
22 |
price war and it is not worth the cost of doing it.
|
23 |
So I have a choice, either get into a price war
|
24 |
which isn't going to make any money or stay where I am
|
25 |
now and be excluded. |
77
1 |
Although I think it is an appealing rule, you
|
2 |
could probably anticipate a come-back like that.
|
3 |
I do want to quibble some with the notion that
|
4 |
the existing models are simply too complicated or too
|
5 |
data intensive to say anything useful. Before I do, let
|
6 |
me make it clear I'm sure there are fact situations in
|
7 |
which that charge would be true.
|
8 |
But the test that Barry has advocated which is
|
9 |
sort of the refinement of the Ortho test, I don't think
|
10 |
it is any more complicated to implement that test to do
|
11 |
a lot of things that we do in antitrust cases.
|
12 |
I don't view that as having any incremental
|
13 |
complication or data requirements over and above things
|
14 |
we engage in any way.
|
15 |
Secondly, if you have a situation that is
|
16 |
analogous to what Greenlee and Wrightman and I looked
|
17 |
at, where there is a before and an after independent
|
18 |
pricing of model discount, really a test for consumer
|
19 |
welfare would simply be to say are the out-of-bundle
|
20 |
options that consumers face after the bundle discounts
|
21 |
are put into effect better or worse or the same as prior
|
22 |
to the bundling.
|
23 |
If the out-of-bundled price for A is no higher
|
24 |
than the previous price of A and if prices in the B
|
25 |
market are either the same are have gone down, then we |
78
1 |
can infer that whether people take the bundle or not,
|
2 |
they can't be worse off and they are probably better off
|
3 |
than they were before.
|
4 |
That is not a complicated test. It does involve
|
5 |
some work, sure. It is a lot less complicated than a
|
6 |
number of things I have had to do in antitrust cases.
|
7 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you, Dave.
|
8 |
Joe, do you have any comments on anything that
|
9 |
was said here?
|
10 |
MR. KATTAN: Certainly.
|
11 |
I am wondering whether the second model that
|
12 |
David talked about is one that has antitrust
|
13 |
significance.
|
14 |
It certainly shows that a firm that's facing
|
15 |
differentiated demand in the second product market can
|
16 |
raise its profits by bundling not necessarily for the
|
17 |
purpose of excluding the second firm but simply in order
|
18 |
to extract more surplus.
|
19 |
But that usually does not fit within the
|
20 |
paradigm of antitrust cases. It is simply charging a
|
21 |
higher price of its consumers.
|
22 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: I would agree that if there
|
23 |
is no foreclosure effect, I probably wouldn't worry
|
24 |
about it.
|
25 |
Some of the -- the model does suggest there can |
79
1 |
very well be, that the institution of bundling by Firm 1
|
2 |
puts the other firm in a situation where it has to
|
3 |
charge lower prices than it has before, and this can
|
4 |
make it viable.
|
5 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you.
|
6 |
We now move on to the propositions. Can I have
|
7 |
slide 2 up there, please.
|
8 |
We have assembled a set of propositions that we
|
9 |
will read and ask anyone who would like to comment on
|
10 |
them to comment. Some of them have actually been
|
11 |
covered at least in some part in some of the talks, but
|
12 |
we will go through these anyway.
|
13 |
The first proposition is single-product
|
14 |
discounts should be per se lawful if the overall price
|
15 |
for all units exceeds cost.
|
16 |
Is there anyone that disagrees with that
|
17 |
proposition?
|
18 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: And, again, if it turns out
|
19 |
that somebody could replace another firm 100 percent,
|
20 |
sure, no problem.
|
21 |
But the Concord Boat case is a great one where
|
22 |
in fact there is evidence that they had a monopoly for
|
23 |
some share of the market based on installed base.
|
24 |
So it wasn't realistic. Maybe you could get 20
|
25 |
percent or maybe 50 percent of the market, but you |
80
1 |
weren't going to get 100.
|
2 |
The chart that I showed you was also from other
|
3 |
cases like that. Do we think that rivals should always
|
4 |
have to do 100 percent replacement? That's a pretty
|
5 |
strong test for a firm that's not yet proven itself.
|
6 |
It may well be that incumbent buyers want to
|
7 |
only take 10 percent chance, 10 percent of their supply
|
8 |
before they decide to go whole hog in this.
|
9 |
So you have to ask do these discounts that go
|
10 |
back to volume 1 really provide an opportunity for
|
11 |
somebody to come in at a reasonable scale or not. If
|
12 |
the answer is no, then I think we have a problem.
|
13 |
MR. DEGRABA: Anyone else?
|
14 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Let me comment on what Barry
|
15 |
said.
|
16 |
Barry, if the proposition were rephrased in the
|
17 |
following way, would you have a problem with it?
|
18 |
Single-product discounts are lawful if sellers, each
|
19 |
seller in the market can serve 100 percent of each
|
20 |
buyer's needs. In other words, each seller can bid for
|
21 |
all of each consumer's business. Then there shouldn't
|
22 |
be a problem, should there?
|
23 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: They may have the capacity
|
24 |
to do it. It turns out it may well be the buyers are
|
25 |
unwilling to have a sole source, or they may be |
81
1 |
unwilling -- the incumbent supplier might have a
|
2 |
monopoly over 40 percent, in which case the fact that I
|
3 |
could supply 100 percent and undercut them isn't really
|
4 |
relevant.
|
5 |
MR. DEGRABA: David, would your proposition be a
|
6 |
problem if there was a significant amount of product
|
7 |
differentiation amongst the competitors so that a
|
8 |
particular consumer may not be willing to switch 100
|
9 |
percent out of supplier A into supplier B?
|
10 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Yes, I might have a problem
|
11 |
then because the buyer then is faced with competition
|
12 |
really only for all his business and the buyer might not
|
13 |
want that. Knowing that, one firm might end up with a
|
14 |
lot of that buyer's business, charging a higher price.
|
15 |
Really I guess it is only if everything inside
|
16 |
is as homogeneous as you would like and sellers are all
|
17 |
perfectly positioned to serve each buyer and there is
|
18 |
none of the stuff Barry was talking about, then it
|
19 |
should be okay without further ado.
|
20 |
MR. MEYER: Is there some increment of the
|
21 |
volume where it would be relevant to you that the price
|
22 |
is above cost?
|
23 |
In other words, if there is an installed base,
|
24 |
if you leave that out of it and ask about the
|
25 |
contestable units, would it be relevant if as to those |
82
1 |
units the price is above cost overall?
|
2 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: You have to ask is there
|
3 |
some normal, sensible way that a firm could come into
|
4 |
this.
|
5 |
If you can say the picture I first showed you, a
|
6 |
firm could only come in for below 5 percent of the
|
7 |
market in some sensible way, in some area between 30
|
8 |
percent and 50 percent.
|
9 |
That didn't strike me as a normal thing. The
|
10 |
other point is what's wrong with having significant
|
11 |
discounts on incremental units rather than going back to
|
12 |
01? You could achieve very similar objectives. We are
|
13 |
not stopping firms from cutting prices.
|
14 |
So I think in general, firms aren't going to
|
15 |
offer negative prices under that scheme, but they may
|
16 |
offer low prices over longer ranges. That strikes me as
|
17 |
pro consumer. Since I have another way of achieving
|
18 |
price discounting that doesn't have that exclusionary
|
19 |
effect, why not use it?
|
20 |
MR. KATTAN: I think the same logic would apply
|
21 |
to simple volume discounts, say if you buy 100 units, I
|
22 |
will give you 5 percent off. That has exactly the same
|
23 |
effect as something that may be more individually
|
24 |
tailored.
|
25 |
If you look at Concord Boat, you can see that |
83
1 |
the rivals there didn't have to compete for very much
|
2 |
business in order to -- unless you assume that 6 percent
|
3 |
discount would have forced them to be below cost. They
|
4 |
wouldn't have to compete for very much business to be
|
5 |
able to recover their cost and compete against the
|
6 |
discount.
|
7 |
I think the other issue is how do you determine
|
8 |
which is the inframarginal business that you are going
|
9 |
to say this is not contestable, it is sacrosanct, it
|
10 |
belongs to the monopolist and they are really competing
|
11 |
only the following units which are incremental units to
|
12 |
which we would allocate the costs. I think that gets to
|
13 |
be incredibly complicated because in most cases it is
|
14 |
not going to be clear what is inframarginal and what's
|
15 |
marginal.
|
16 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: The solution is to ask for
|
17 |
an equally efficient firm, the monopolist itself, what
|
18 |
units could it compete for. You can see what range it
|
19 |
is.
|
20 |
If it turns out the discount is small enough, as
|
21 |
it may have been in Concord Boat, so that a large range
|
22 |
of entry is possible, I'm not worried about it. It is
|
23 |
an empirical question.
|
24 |
You can say 1 percent doesn't work, 5 percent
|
25 |
does, up to 30 percent does, but you can't go beyond |
84
1 |
that. Okay. So show what the range is based on what
|
2 |
these discounts create.
|
3 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Let me point out, really
|
4 |
supportive of Barry's feeling, that this really isn't
|
5 |
all that undoable. There has been a fairly recent -- I
|
6 |
know that antitrust or patent was used, but in a case I
|
7 |
was involved in in which we had discounts like this.
|
8 |
You can calculate which units have negative
|
9 |
prices associated with them and what level of entry you
|
10 |
would need to achieve if you were a new entrant and
|
11 |
wanted to cover costs. The prices do look bizarre, just
|
12 |
like Barry's picture, but it is really not that hard.
|
13 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: Can you do it ex ante if you
|
14 |
are the business planning to give a loyalty discount?
|
15 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Ex ante, the picture is
|
16 |
actually somewhat easier. Right? It is one thing to
|
17 |
think about an incumbent being there and there are a lot
|
18 |
of reasons why incumbents are hard to unseat. Perhaps
|
19 |
you are dealing with a loyalty discount scheme, which
|
20 |
makes it tougher.
|
21 |
Ex ante, we could all be competing with loyalty
|
22 |
discount schemes.
|
23 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: If you can't do it ex ante,
|
24 |
because it is so damn hard. If you as a seller can't
|
25 |
figure out what it is, the buyer will probably have |
85
1 |
trouble, the rival would have trouble.
|
2 |
I would hope that a firm who is setting a price
|
3 |
could actually figure out what its profits are at
|
4 |
different levels.
|
5 |
MR. KATTAN: I think the reason the firm
|
6 |
offering the discount can't do it ex ante is it doesn't
|
7 |
know the scale at which the entrant is able to enter,
|
8 |
which is something known to the entrant, the firm
|
9 |
offering the discount.
|
10 |
I think part of what we need to do here is to
|
11 |
make sure that the test that we apply is one that is
|
12 |
based on information which is available to the firm
|
13 |
that's offering the discount and doesn't depend on
|
14 |
things that are outside of ability to know or control.
|
15 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you. We will move on to the
|
16 |
next slide, slide number 3.
|
17 |
We have heard about this a little bit. The
|
18 |
LePage's decision's vagueness is likely to chill pricing
|
19 |
behavior that enhances consumer welfare.
|
20 |
I will ask sort of a two-part question, one to
|
21 |
the lawyers and one to the economists.
|
22 |
The one I want to ask the lawyers is so what
|
23 |
counsel are you giving to your clients, if at all, if
|
24 |
you have run into this problem or what other counsel
|
25 |
have you heard other attorneys giving to their clients? |
86
1 |
For the economists, have there been any other
|
2 |
empirical studies or any other data in the market that
|
3 |
might suggest there's a problem? Anyone?
|
4 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: I'll start.
|
5 |
I think the answer -- the proposition is
|
6 |
correct. And if you want empirical evidence, it is not
|
7 |
very rigorous, but go to Google and enter "client alert
|
8 |
LePage's," and you will end up with pages of client
|
9 |
alerts from law firms saying "warning, this practice is
|
10 |
potentially troubling, be very, very careful," blah,
|
11 |
blah, blah.
|
12 |
It is likely, I believe, that that means there
|
13 |
is a chilling effect.
|
14 |
In terms of counsel to clients, I would say give
|
15 |
bundled discounts at your own risk, be very, very
|
16 |
careful before you do it, and you might want to think
|
17 |
about whether your rivals could compete with those
|
18 |
discounts, even if your discounted price is above your
|
19 |
cost.
|
20 |
Another piece of advice that I would give is
|
21 |
something that Barry mentioned, I think -- maybe not --
|
22 |
and this is based on the Johnson & Johnson versus
|
23 |
Applied Medical case.
|
24 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I mentioned it.
|
25 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: I knew you did but I wasn't |
87
1 |
sure if it was in private conversation.
|
2 |
In the Johnson & Johnson versus Applied Medical
|
3 |
case, Johnson & Johnson was giving bundled discounts
|
4 |
primarily to compete against an equally diversified
|
5 |
rival, U.S. Surgical, a small, less diversified rival,
|
6 |
Applied Medical, and several others who couldn't compete
|
7 |
because they didn't sell the full product line.
|
8 |
And after receiving complaints, Johnson &
|
9 |
Johnson responded by carving out the purchases of those
|
10 |
smaller rivals. And nonetheless, Johnson & Johnson got
|
11 |
sued by Applied Medical even after this act of
|
12 |
generosity.
|
13 |
The judge granted summary judgment in favor of
|
14 |
Johnson & Johnson on the basis of those carve-out
|
15 |
purchases. So this does seem to be a way that a company
|
16 |
can protect itself.
|
17 |
MR. KATTAN: I certainly agree that the
|
18 |
vagueness of LePage's is problematic.
|
19 |
I think one of the things that is not clear from
|
20 |
LePage's -- and when I have talked to people who have
|
21 |
been associated with the case, I have gotten different
|
22 |
answers on this -- is whether 3M simply showed that the
|
23 |
price of the total bundle exceeded cost or whether it
|
24 |
actually passed the Ortho test.
|
25 |
People who have studied the record tell me that |
88
1 |
they don't think that 3M passed the Ortho test. That
|
2 |
still creates a problem for us because the burden of
|
3 |
proof normally would be allocated to the plaintiff to
|
4 |
show that the Ortho test wasn't met.
|
5 |
But to the extent that this is a case where the
|
6 |
discounts allocated to the competitive products resulted
|
7 |
in a below-cost price, it may be less exceptional than
|
8 |
we think it is and we just need to wait and see how the
|
9 |
law develops in this area.
|
10 |
MR. DEGRABA: Joe, could you articulate what the
|
11 |
Ortho test is for anybody in the audience who doesn't
|
12 |
know.
|
13 |
MR. KATTAN: It says that we will allocate the
|
14 |
discount in a multiproduct bundle discount to the
|
15 |
competitive product.
|
16 |
So the example would have been the shampoo and
|
17 |
conditioner example that I think Tom used in his
|
18 |
presentation.
|
19 |
In this case, the question was whether
|
20 |
allocating the discount to the generic transparent tape
|
21 |
would have resulted in an above-cost or below-cost
|
22 |
price. I gather that the record is silent on that
|
23 |
issue.
|
24 |
So it may be simply -- what the case may come
|
25 |
down to, then, is really who bears the burden of proof |
89
1 |
in showing whether the Ortho test has been satisfied as
|
2 |
opposed to some of the broader readings that have been
|
3 |
given to the case as basically setting a formless and
|
4 |
vacuous test for exclusion and a Section 29 test.
|
5 |
MR. DEGRABA: Thank you.
|
6 |
You want to say something, David?
|
7 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: I don't know whether LePage's
|
8 |
has had a chilling effect or not because to answer that
|
9 |
question, I would have to know all the firms that have
|
10 |
thought about doing loyalty or bundled discounts but
|
11 |
have chosen not to.
|
12 |
I will simply observe that there are antitrust
|
13 |
cases going on now or recently concluded which, if you
|
14 |
believe the plaintiffs in those cases, involve firms
|
15 |
that have been engaging in bundled discounts in time
|
16 |
periods subsequent to LePage's.
|
17 |
It may have chilled such activities in some
|
18 |
senses, but it certainly hasn't stopped them.
|
19 |
MR. DEGRABA: We will move on to the next slide,
|
20 |
please.
|
21 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: One more comment.
|
22 |
One should also take the perspective that the
|
23 |
vast majority of bundled discounts that we see out
|
24 |
there, whether it be the Happy Meal at McDonald's and
|
25 |
the like, wouldn't come close to the test we are |
90
1 |
describing here in terms of leading to incremental
|
2 |
products being below cost.
|
3 |
Those in my view are just red herrings in terms
|
4 |
of thinking about the type of bundled prices that you
|
5 |
would see. They are not affected by LePage's and they
|
6 |
are just not relevant for any discussions we have here.
|
7 |
MR. DEGRABA: Okay. Our next proposition is a
|
8 |
bundled rebate or discount can exclude an equally
|
9 |
efficient single-product competitor, even if the
|
10 |
postdiscount price of the bundle as a whole is above
|
11 |
cost.
|
12 |
We have talked about that at some length here.
|
13 |
There is actually kind of two off-shoot questions I want
|
14 |
to talk about.
|
15 |
The first is what happens if we instead of
|
16 |
looking at existing competitors in the market, what if
|
17 |
we were to also consider entry deterrents. How would
|
18 |
entry deterrents be considered in this proposition?
|
19 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I have written on that. In
|
20 |
the paper in the quarterly Journal of Economics, the
|
21 |
challenge is that same rebate gets to be used in
|
22 |
multiple dimensions, and, therefore, it makes it less
|
23 |
profitable for somebody to come in.
|
24 |
It is also rational that a firm would want to do
|
25 |
that rebate and do that bundling in the face of |
91
1 |
competition.
|
2 |
It is also the case that it limits the potential
|
3 |
market of a rival to consumers who like that entrant's
|
4 |
product and don't like the A product and therefore can
|
5 |
shrink the potential market available to an entrant.
|
6 |
Bundling is one of the most effective tools to
|
7 |
prevent entry that we know, I think.
|
8 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: Let me follow along with what
|
9 |
Barry is saying.
|
10 |
In the last line of my talk, when I had the two
|
11 |
firms offering differentiated product, it is not only
|
12 |
the case that it is possible to exclude an equally
|
13 |
efficient B competitor in that set-up where the overall
|
14 |
price of the bundle exceeds the cost of the bundle.
|
15 |
In fact, the individual prices would all be
|
16 |
higher than costs as well. In no sense are you pricing
|
17 |
below cost, and, yet, you can exclude an equally
|
18 |
efficient competitor.
|
19 |
MR. KATTAN: I think the question is whether in
|
20 |
these models that show that an equally efficient
|
21 |
competitor can be excluded, consumers are better off or
|
22 |
worse off.
|
23 |
At least as I read the exclusionary bundling
|
24 |
paper by Professor Nalebuff, in one of the examples he
|
25 |
gave with the A and B products with one of his |
92
1 |
propositions today actually showed that both consumer
|
2 |
welfare and producer surplus go up.
|
3 |
So total welfare goes up, consumer welfare goes
|
4 |
up, and yet an equally efficient competitor gets
|
5 |
excluded.
|
6 |
And the question is do we want an antitrust
|
7 |
policy that says that we are going to punish firms for
|
8 |
conduct that actually raises consumer welfare.
|
9 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: I think we are not to
|
10 |
punish firms for conduct that raises consumer welfare.
|
11 |
The sort of policies at least the economists at
|
12 |
the table have been talking about are not policies which
|
13 |
are finely designed enough so they attempt to root out
|
14 |
consumer welfare reducing activities, consumer welfare
|
15 |
increasing activities, but simply to construct safe
|
16 |
harbors. That is, if the following is true, then
|
17 |
consumers are not harmed.
|
18 |
It does not mean that if the following is not
|
19 |
true, they are benefitted necessarily or are harmed.
|
20 |
But at least the safe harbor test we have been
|
21 |
talking about I think are on sound ground there.
|
22 |
By the way, you asked earlier about examples of
|
23 |
what Barry was talking about in terms of bundled
|
24 |
discounts just involving sort of fictitious discounts.
|
25 |
Barry went through a pharmaceutical example. |
93
1 |
Who are the firms in that one, the Keflin and the rest
|
2 |
of it?
|
3 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: That was SmithKline and
|
4 |
Lily.
|
5 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: That's a case where the
|
6 |
discount was in some sense fictitious.
|
7 |
What the defendant did there was to raise the
|
8 |
out of bundled price 3 percent and give them a 3 percent
|
9 |
discount on the bundle. That was pretty close to what
|
10 |
you have heard us talking about.
|
11 |
MR. KATTAN: My recollection is that that case
|
12 |
could be addressed by application of the Ortho test.
|
13 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: It was addressed by the
|
14 |
application of the Ortho test. The point is simply it
|
15 |
isn't just a figment of economists' imagination that
|
16 |
these things could happen. They did in that case.
|
17 |
MR. KATTAN: What you are citing is a 25-year
|
18 |
old case. If that's the only example we can come up
|
19 |
with in 25 years, I'm not persuaded that it is
|
20 |
pervasive.
|
21 |
The question is, do we need a test that is more
|
22 |
stringent than the Ortho test, or is the Ortho test
|
23 |
adequate to address the kind of concerns that have been
|
24 |
articulated through these models?
|
25 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: It depends on what your |
94
1 |
concerns are. The Ortho test is a test designed to see
|
2 |
whether a single-line firm can undercut a bundle.
|
3 |
You can say if you want to call that a test of
|
4 |
anticompetitiveness, that's what it does. It gives a
|
5 |
sort of safe harbor.
|
6 |
The sorts of things that Greenlee Wrightman and
|
7 |
I talk about were not tests for that, does consumer
|
8 |
surplus go up or down, when can we be assured it only
|
9 |
goes up. There are circumstances under which it is an
|
10 |
easy test to do.
|
11 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: The one place where Joe and
|
12 |
I do agree is what I proposed is really a modification
|
13 |
of the Ortho test.
|
14 |
There are some parts of the test that are
|
15 |
missing. For example, it turns out the right time to
|
16 |
apply the test is not ex post. It is ex ante. It is
|
17 |
when the consumer is trying to decide who to buy from.
|
18 |
Therefore, you have to use the anticipated
|
19 |
volumes, not the ex post volumes, which can often be a
|
20 |
challenge here. You also have to use the incremental
|
21 |
cost as opposed to thinking about what I'm selling, the
|
22 |
bundles or just selling things individually.
|
23 |
Subject to correcting for what expectation
|
24 |
should be and how you measure costs, actually I think it
|
25 |
is the way to go. |
95
1 |
MR. DEGRABA: Let me skip ahead here to slide
|
2 |
number 7 because it is a related question.
|
3 |
The proposition here is loyalty discounts,
|
4 |
either single product or bundles, should never be
|
5 |
condemned without applying some kind of price-cost test.
|
6 |
Do you agree or disagree? Or kind of agree?
|
7 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: It kind of depends. If what
|
8 |
Barry and I call the B market is perfectly competitive
|
9 |
and the demand for A and B are independent and all that
|
10 |
sort of thing, then in that case you can say whether
|
11 |
consumer welfare has gone up or down or stayed the same.
|
12 |
Simply by comparing the out of bundled price to
|
13 |
the prebundled price, to the independent pricing level
|
14 |
of the monopoly good, you don't need to know anything
|
15 |
about costs.
|
16 |
MR. DEGRABA: Outside of the nice, clean test on
|
17 |
prices, is there any other conditions under which you
|
18 |
would condemn a bundled discount without a price-cost
|
19 |
test? Is this essentially a price-cost issue?
|
20 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I have this general matter
|
21 |
and issue where my price depends on what it is that you
|
22 |
buy from other people as a general statement, as opposed
|
23 |
to the price I charge you depends on what you buy from
|
24 |
me.
|
25 |
So that to me -- it is of the form I will charge |
96
1 |
you one price if you buy from David and another price if
|
2 |
you buy from Joe.
|
3 |
I think that is problematic, as opposed to my
|
4 |
pricing depends on what you buy from me.
|
5 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: If I was going to use that as
|
6 |
a test, if I'm a bad guy and I want to charge you more
|
7 |
if you buy from Fred as opposed to me, can't I always
|
8 |
mimic an anonymous-looking thing just by appropriate
|
9 |
choice of quantity discount with grade points which
|
10 |
happen to exclude Fred?
|
11 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: You can try and do that.
|
12 |
It is much more difficult to do it. I didn't claim
|
13 |
excluding that is going to be perfect. When you do it
|
14 |
directly, it is problematic and I shouldn't -- we should
|
15 |
know how.
|
16 |
MR. MEYER: If we grant you an exception for the
|
17 |
moment for discounts specifically or rebates
|
18 |
specifically keyed to purchases from identified
|
19 |
competitors, leave that off the table, is there some
|
20 |
kind of price-cost test safe harbor that you would
|
21 |
acknowledge is appropriate here?
|
22 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: That first one is basically
|
23 |
a statement of my price to you depends on the market
|
24 |
share I get. My market share test is ultimately a test
|
25 |
that you don't buy from somebody else. |
97
1 |
Those things are very common. They are not
|
2 |
exceptional out there.
|
3 |
MR. MEYER: You wouldn't limit your exception to
|
4 |
specifically identified purchasers? You would say if
|
5 |
there is anything that is keyed to how much the consumer
|
6 |
is buying?
|
7 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: Not volume. Percent.
|
8 |
Ultimately --
|
9 |
MR. MEYER: If you have an estimate of the
|
10 |
customers' total needs, don't you also have an estimate
|
11 |
of their share?
|
12 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I have an estimate. The
|
13 |
price will depend on what they buy, an absolute amount,
|
14 |
not punishing them for buying something from another
|
15 |
firm.
|
16 |
MR. KATTAN: If you buy 800 units from me, you
|
17 |
get a 5 percent discount, that's okay, even if I say to
|
18 |
him if you buy 600 units from me, you get a 5 percent
|
19 |
discount?
|
20 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I'm much happier with that
|
21 |
than saying i will take away your discount if you buy
|
22 |
anything from David.
|
23 |
MR. MEYER: Defining this exception to mean
|
24 |
market share discounts, where do you end up after that?
|
25 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I think if you pass the |
98
1 |
modified Ortho test, if you would like, so that the
|
2 |
incremental price, based on expected volumes and such,
|
3 |
is above the incremental average variable cost, you are
|
4 |
fine. And you are using your own cost in doing that
|
5 |
test. Because you could offer a competing B product by
|
6 |
itself without any difficulty.
|
7 |
MR. MEYER: Is there congruence, David, between
|
8 |
that statement and the situation you were describing of
|
9 |
the conditions where an increase in the out of bundled
|
10 |
price for A goes up or doesn't go up?
|
11 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: I guess in some sense. I
|
12 |
would want to think about that more. Simply saying buy
|
13 |
from Fred, pay a lot for A.
|
14 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I thought the question was
|
15 |
something else. I thought we all agreed on that safe
|
16 |
harbor, by the way, in terms of if the incremental price
|
17 |
for B compared in the A/B bundle story is sufficiently
|
18 |
high, then it actually isn't below the actual variable
|
19 |
cost to B, for the firm selling it, I think we all
|
20 |
believe you are in no danger.
|
21 |
The question is what about if that test isn't
|
22 |
passed.
|
23 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: If it isn't passed, then it
|
24 |
is hard to tell. It is not a simple test. At least I
|
25 |
personally don't have anything ready for primetime on |
99
1 |
that.
|
2 |
MR. DEGRABA: Let's go back to slide number 5.
|
3 |
It says a loyalty discount that allows a competitor to
|
4 |
operate profitably at some scale can never be harmful to
|
5 |
consumers.
|
6 |
Basically what we want to know here is is the
|
7 |
sort of antitrust objections to loyalty discounts
|
8 |
strictly one of driving competitors out of the market or
|
9 |
can there be serious harm to consumers simply by
|
10 |
shrinking, if you will, some competitors' output.
|
11 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: I would say, just as a
|
12 |
factual matter, sure, there can be harm to competitors
|
13 |
and to consumers by shrinking the rivals' output through
|
14 |
a discount.
|
15 |
The problem is, beating a dead horse here, we
|
16 |
have to come up with a way to write a rule that
|
17 |
implements that notion, and that requires us to know
|
18 |
something about minimum efficient scale, which is almost
|
19 |
impossible to know.
|
20 |
So while I would concede that it is possible to
|
21 |
harm rivals and harm consumers by reducing the rival's
|
22 |
scale by usurping so much business from them with your
|
23 |
loyalty discount, nonetheless we should have this
|
24 |
Hovenkamp legality rule if the discounted price is above
|
25 |
cost. |
100
1 |
It could be met by equally efficient rivals.
|
2 |
The discounting practice might actually affect rivals'
|
3 |
efficiency by diminishing their scale.
|
4 |
But I can't think as a lawyer of a way to design
|
5 |
a rule that doesn't have a chilling effect if we are
|
6 |
having to focus on what is minimum efficient scale and
|
7 |
what amount of a discount is permissible before you
|
8 |
usurp so much business that you prevent someone from
|
9 |
achieving minimum efficient scale. I think that is too
|
10 |
hard to administer.
|
11 |
MR. MEYER: What if you instead define the
|
12 |
defense, which is if the plaintiff is continuing to
|
13 |
operate profitably in the market for B, even if it is at
|
14 |
much lower volume than it had or market share than it
|
15 |
had, then the plaintiff's claim fails?
|
16 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: I would certainly have that
|
17 |
defense. I would say that if a plaintiff can match the
|
18 |
discount --
|
19 |
MR. MEYER: He may not have been able to match
|
20 |
the discount for all the customers to which it was
|
21 |
operating but still operating in the market for B is my
|
22 |
question.
|
23 |
PROFESSOR LAMBERT: Yes, I would give that
|
24 |
defense.
|
25 |
MR. KATTAN: That is exactly what happened in |
101
1 |
the Ortho case.
|
2 |
PROFESSOR SIBLEY: I think people who know the
|
3 |
facts of LePage's better than I may tell me I'm all
|
4 |
wrong here.
|
5 |
As I recall, LePage's didn't claim it was going
|
6 |
out of business. It just had a lower market share and
|
7 |
it wasn't making as much money as it was before.
|
8 |
If this rule were applied to LePage's, I guess
|
9 |
it would have been over in favor of 3M. Let me
|
10 |
speculate as well. I don't know if this is true, and I
|
11 |
haven't thought about it before this second.
|
12 |
Even if we accept that a rival can only compete
|
13 |
profitably for a subset of consumers, maybe based on
|
14 |
some peculiar behavior scale of economies, something
|
15 |
like that, nonetheless, if the other firm, the one that
|
16 |
is not the rival in this case is pricing some other set
|
17 |
of consumers very high, it may be possible for the
|
18 |
rival, even though it can't serve the entire set of
|
19 |
consumers, to sort of skip around between subsets that
|
20 |
it does in fact serve and keep prices down that way.
|
21 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: It seems to me that this
|
22 |
can still be a problem. And actually we saw a recent
|
23 |
case against Briggs and Stratton here in the lawn mower
|
24 |
industry, where some of the rivals were making some
|
25 |
money and others were actually losing so much that they |
102
1 |
were exiting the business.
|
2 |
The view was that if the type of loyalty
|
3 |
payments had been different, those rivals would have
|
4 |
been at 20 percent of the market, they would have been
|
5 |
at 50 percent and the competition would have been much
|
6 |
more vigorous in that industry, that the customers would
|
7 |
have been able to have a whole collection of different
|
8 |
companies to buy from, that there would have been a lot
|
9 |
more innovation going on here.
|
10 |
So, if you are able to keep your rivals at 10
|
11 |
and 15 percent, they may choose not to invest in this
|
12 |
business, not to try and expand it. And I think there
|
13 |
can be tremendous harm in the long run here.
|
14 |
MR. DEGRABA: Anyone else?
|
15 |
Okay. Thank you.
|
16 |
I have time for one more before we break for
|
17 |
lunch. We will move to slide 8, which reads "In a
|
18 |
loyalty discount case, intent is relevant to proving
|
19 |
monopolization."
|
20 |
Do you agree or disagree? That comes from
|
21 |
LePage's, by the way.
|
22 |
MR. KATTAN: The question is intent to do what?
|
23 |
Every firm intends to take business away from its
|
24 |
rivals. When I discount, I'm hoping that by offering
|
25 |
the discount, I'm going to get more business for myself |
103
1 |
and that my rivals are going to get less business.
|
2 |
That intent certainly shouldn't have any bearing
|
3 |
on the outcome of the case. You can assume that it did
|
4 |
in every case.
|
5 |
MR. MEYER: What if the intent were the converse
|
6 |
or the flip side of that, which is intent to achieve
|
7 |
some business justification, if you will -- I'm not
|
8 |
interested in what those might be -- evidence that there
|
9 |
wasn't a desire to exclude rivals or that that wasn't
|
10 |
the dominant driving factor in the business's behavior?
|
11 |
MR. KATTAN: I think that presents a more
|
12 |
complicated question. I think if you have a test that
|
13 |
focuses on objective factors, did I price below or above
|
14 |
cost, if I priced below cost, did that exclude
|
15 |
competitors, that you probably would not need to go
|
16 |
through things like that.
|
17 |
PROFESSOR NALEBUFF: I think this actually gets
|
18 |
to some of what Tom was asking about, which is is this
|
19 |
market ultimately monopolizeable, and I would extend
|
20 |
that to is there something else that you could achieve,
|
21 |
maybe not monopolize B but A.
|
22 |
It is harder to understand why firms would be
|
23 |
engaged in this type of exclusion if there was no
|
24 |
ultimate benefit for them. I also share the view that
|
25 |
trying to either look for evidence of intent one way or |
104
1 |
the other is sufficiently manipulable or hideable that
|
2 |
I'm worried about playing that game.
|
3 |
You would have the advantage the first time it
|
4 |
is being done in that people aren't aware of it. So you
|
5 |
can have a lot of bad evidence.
|
6 |
And, of course, people say things that they
|
7 |
don't really mean in ways when they get into court that
|
8 |
can often not sound as good as sometimes they really did
|
9 |
mean it to.
|
10 |
MR. DEGRABA: Okay. Given that it is 12:00, I
|
11 |
will thank the panelists for all of their insight.
|
12 |
(Applause.)
|
13 |
MR. DEGRABA: We will reconvene at 1:30 after a
|
14 |
tasty lunch.
|
15 |
(Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was
|
16 |
recessed, to be reconvened at 1:30 p.m. this same day.)
|
17 |
|
18 |
|
19 |
|
20 |
|
21 |
|
22 |
|
23 |
|
24 |
|
25 |
|
105
1 |
AFTERNOON SESSION (1:30 p.m.)
|
2 |
MR. MEYER: Let's get started.
|
3 |
Welcome to the second of today's sessions on
|
4 |
loyalty discounts. My name is David Meyer. I'm the
|
5 |
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust
|
6 |
Division. I will be monitoring this afternoon's session
|
7 |
with the help of Patrick DeGraba, who is at the Bureau
|
8 |
of Economics at the FTC.
|
9 |
The Department and the FTC are sponsoring
|
10 |
jointly this series of public hearings on single-firm
|
11 |
contracting to help advance the development of the law
|
12 |
concerning the treatment of unilateral conduct under the
|
13 |
antitrust laws.
|
14 |
Transcripts and other materials from prior
|
15 |
sessions are available on the DOJ and FTC Web sites, and
|
16 |
in due course, hopefully soon, the transcripts of
|
17 |
presentations from today's sessions will also be posted.
|
18 |
Our next hearing will be December 6th -- that's
|
19 |
next Wednesday -- addressing misleading and deceptive
|
20 |
conduct.
|
21 |
Today's session concerns the law and economics
|
22 |
of loyalty discounts.
|
23 |
Bundled discounts or rebates involving two or
|
24 |
more products have been a hot topic in antitrust forums
|
25 |
for some time, particularly since the LePage's decision |
106
1 |
of several years ago.
|
2 |
In addition to bundled discounts, today's
|
3 |
panelists are also addressing single-product loyalty
|
4 |
discounts, sometimes referred to as first-unit
|
5 |
discounts, by which a seller provides a discount on all
|
6 |
units sold once certain targets are reached, not just
|
7 |
the discount on the incremental units sold above or
|
8 |
beyond the set targets.
|
9 |
Our morning panel offered many interesting
|
10 |
comments and observations about loyalty discounts of
|
11 |
both sorts, and we look forward to learning more from
|
12 |
this afternoon's panelists.
|
13 |
This afternoon's speakers are, starting with Tim
|
14 |
Muris, a George Mason University Foundation professor of
|
15 |
law. He is of counsel at O'Melveny & Myers and, as
|
16 |
perhaps all of you know, a former chairman of the FTC.
|
17 |
He also has the distinction of having headed
|
18 |
both the FTC's Bureau of Competition and the FTC's
|
19 |
Bureau of Consumer Protection.
|
20 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Not at the same time.
|
21 |
MR. MEYER: That may be debatable.
|
22 |
Our second panelist is Daniel Crane, who is an
|
23 |
associate professor at law at the Yeshiva University
|
24 |
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
|
25 |
Our third panelist will be Janusz Ordover, who |
107
1 |
is professor of economics at NYU and a former Deputy
|
2 |
Attorney General in the Antitrust Division.
|
3 |
And, finally, Will Tom, who is a partner at
|
4 |
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and a former deputy director of
|
5 |
the FTC's Bureau of Competition.
|
6 |
More detailed bios are available out front. So
|
7 |
I will not bore you with all of the accomplishments of
|
8 |
all of these esteemed panelists.
|
9 |
The organization of the panel will be as
|
10 |
follows. Each of the four panelists will deliver a
|
11 |
presentation, approximately 15 to 20 minutes. We will
|
12 |
then take a short break.
|
13 |
When we return, we will start with each panelist
|
14 |
having an opportunity to take a few minutes to respond
|
15 |
or comment on the presentations made by the other
|
16 |
panelists, at which point after hopefully only 10 or 12
|
17 |
minutes, we will turn to a moderated discussion among
|
18 |
the panelists and with the panelists.
|
19 |
Unfortunately, I will not be able to take
|
20 |
comments or questions from the audience. We plan to end
|
21 |
around 4:00, but if the discussion is lively and
|
22 |
entertaining, we don't have any necessary hard and fast
|
23 |
end time.
|
24 |
The doors will be locked. So don't worry about
|
25 |
that. Before we start, I need to cover a few |
108
1 |
housekeeping matters.
|
2 |
First, as a courtesy to everyone and given the
|
3 |
way the electronic system works here, I would ask you
|
4 |
all to turn off your cell phones and Blackberries or at
|
5 |
least turn them off of transmit so they don't cause a
|
6 |
problem with interference.
|
7 |
Second, as you may know, restrooms are all the
|
8 |
way across the hall past the elevators where you came in
|
9 |
this morning.
|
10 |
Third, and this is a required safety
|
11 |
announcement here at the FTC, if the building's alarms
|
12 |
go off, move calmly and quickly but act in the manner in
|
13 |
which you are instructed to. You will be exiting
|
14 |
through the main entrance if necessary. Presumably
|
15 |
there will be a lot of FTC folks who know what they are
|
16 |
doing. Just follow them.
|
17 |
With that, I would like to introduce and welcome
|
18 |
Tim Muris.
|
19 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Thank you very much for the
|
20 |
very kind introduction.
|
21 |
In the long time since I left law school -- and
|
22 |
I think I look younger than my actual age -- I have had
|
23 |
a lot of jobs and six of them in the federal government.
|
24 |
With apologies to my many friends at the Antitrust
|
25 |
Division, four of them were at the FTC Commission, which |
109
1 |
I guess makes me an FTC guy. But I have had a deep
|
2 |
fondness and respect for both agencies.
|
3 |
I'm going to talk today a lot about some
|
4 |
experimental economic work. Let me put it in an overall
|
5 |
framework.
|
6 |
I do want to disclose that I was retained by the
|
7 |
United States Telecom Association, the views in the
|
8 |
paper, and I will express views that are my own as well.
|
9 |
And this slide presents a framework that we all
|
10 |
know, I believe, which is the basic economic framework
|
11 |
about not just economics but about what a legal system
|
12 |
needs to do.
|
13 |
A legal system needs to be efficient, needs to
|
14 |
minimize some of the error costs and indirect costs, and
|
15 |
I believe we all know a lot about both of those. We all
|
16 |
know about type I, type II, and the direct costs makes
|
17 |
livings for lots of us.
|
18 |
The history of Section 2 is one that ought to
|
19 |
give us -- which I have written and many people have
|
20 |
written on -- one that ought to give us great pause. It
|
21 |
has largely been a history of mistakes, not exclusively.
|
22 |
As someone who launched the most aggressive use
|
23 |
of Section 2 of any enforcement head since the '70s, I
|
24 |
hope the pattern and history of mistakes doesn't
|
25 |
continue. |
110
1 |
There obviously have been some good cases, I
|
2 |
believe, along the way. But as Hovenkamp says in the
|
3 |
second bullet, the scope and meaning of exclusionary
|
4 |
behavior remains, indeed, very poorly defined.
|
5 |
There's a few key cases in the bundling world
|
6 |
and in the broader world. Brooke Group clearly wanted
|
7 |
to minimize the type I error, recognized the high type I
|
8 |
costs, rejected the theoretical possibility of harm as a
|
9 |
sufficient basis for liability and focused on market
|
10 |
realities.
|
11 |
Probably the most important thing about Brooke
|
12 |
Group is Brooke Group is about having a bright-line test
|
13 |
that is administrable for judges, juries and parties.
|
14 |
I think my good friend Greg Warden phrased it
|
15 |
best, that it is a recognition that we don't want to
|
16 |
contemplate making mistakes in this area. I don't know
|
17 |
if I quoted Greg exactly, but I think I paraphrased in
|
18 |
the spirit.
|
19 |
Concord Boat is another important decision. It
|
20 |
doesn't address bundling but single-product market share
|
21 |
discounts in a manner that is consistent with the varied
|
22 |
cost approach of Brooke Group.
|
23 |
The discounts were above cost. They are
|
24 |
ordinary business practices often used in competitive
|
25 |
markets. They are not unlawful exclusive dealing. |
111
1 |
The bottom line, it was not a Section 2
|
2 |
violation.
|
3 |
Then we come to LePage's. And whatever one
|
4 |
thinks of potential problems with bundled discounts, I
|
5 |
think it is hard to find supporters of the standardless
|
6 |
LePage's opinion.
|
7 |
It is an opinion that did not exercise caution,
|
8 |
a very poorly articulated theory of harm and an
|
9 |
incomplete record.
|
10 |
If you believe, which is usually a good thing to
|
11 |
do, to take the opinion at face value, the jury could
|
12 |
find a dominant firm liable under Section 2 based on the
|
13 |
possibility that bundled rebates, regardless of their
|
14 |
effect on consumer welfare, could exclude an equally
|
15 |
efficient competitor.
|
16 |
The point is that when you apply the
|
17 |
standard-free approach of LePage's to Section 2
|
18 |
liability, you are going to likely have high error costs
|
19 |
from false positives.
|
20 |
We know, and particularly because we live in a
|
21 |
world where bundles are everywhere, bundles can reduce
|
22 |
transaction costs in both the purchasing and selling
|
23 |
side of the market, they can serve as an alternative
|
24 |
traditional advertising, and they can be used, and a
|
25 |
very important part of the literature, they can be used |
112
1 |
by companies to give retailers strong incentives to
|
2 |
promote and sell their products and services, which is
|
3 |
an efficient and important vertical control function.
|
4 |
As an example, one can think of bundling. The
|
5 |
consumers of telecom products and services demand
|
6 |
bundles. And we live in a world increasingly where the
|
7 |
competition of the future is between the traditional
|
8 |
so-called wireline companies and the cable companies
|
9 |
selling consumers bundled products, video, data, voice,
|
10 |
and now the cable companies are even offering wireless.
|
11 |
That's just one of -- we could go forever on
|
12 |
examples of bundling.
|
13 |
Now, the economic literature on exclusionary
|
14 |
bundling indeed shows that bundling can exclude
|
15 |
competitors. And from that it is possible that
|
16 |
anticompetitive harm could exist. They certainly don't
|
17 |
show that such harm is likely.
|
18 |
These models contain many restrictive
|
19 |
assumptions. They don't consider efficiencies from
|
20 |
bundling, and they have not been tested for robustness
|
21 |
or empirical application to the real world.
|
22 |
They simply don't show whether the potential for
|
23 |
anticompetitive harm outweighs the benefits from
|
24 |
bundling.
|
25 |
Now, there have been lots of suggested theories, |
113
1 |
and one of the ones that would be a vast improvement
|
2 |
over LePage's but I still think has problems is the idea
|
3 |
of excluding a hypothetically equally efficient
|
4 |
competitor.
|
5 |
This in itself focuses by itself -- I believe
|
6 |
Professor Hovenkamp has supported this but now in a much
|
7 |
narrower version than he originally did.
|
8 |
By itself this focuses on harm to competitors,
|
9 |
not competition, and the bundled discount would exclude
|
10 |
-- using this test, would exclude a bundled discount
|
11 |
that could help consumers.
|
12 |
My basic problem with the test can be summarized
|
13 |
in one simple sentence, which is all else equal, how can
|
14 |
a firm that offers you less of what you want be equally
|
15 |
efficient with a firm that offers you more?
|
16 |
And I think the government in its 3M brief had a
|
17 |
sentence alluding to the fact that, indeed, the whole
|
18 |
concept of equally efficient might be a difficult
|
19 |
proposition here.
|
20 |
This is an example. I won't go through the
|
21 |
arithmetic because I do want to get to the experimental
|
22 |
economics. This is an example that Professor Hovenkamp
|
23 |
uses, and it's an example clearly where bundling
|
24 |
increases consumer welfare.
|
25 |
Yet, you can see that the alleged equally |
114
1 |
efficient competitor is excluded.
|
2 |
Let me move to what I in my ways believe is a
|
3 |
significant contribution to moving the ball forward on
|
4 |
the issue of bundled discounts, and that is work that
|
5 |
was done by Vernon Smith and his colleagues at the
|
6 |
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Sciences at George
|
7 |
Mason, where I teach, so-called ICES.
|
8 |
Vernon is one of the fathers of experimental
|
9 |
economics, and for that work he received the 2002 Nobel
|
10 |
Prize in economics.
|
11 |
Experimental economics uses laboratory subjects
|
12 |
to test the validity of economic theories.
|
13 |
One of the many good things about experimental
|
14 |
economics is in numerous settings, experimental
|
15 |
economics has been shown to be consistent with the way
|
16 |
the real world works.
|
17 |
One of the most interesting things --
|
18 |
experimental economics is sometimes criticized because
|
19 |
they use college students. I have watched the
|
20 |
economists compete with the students. And the college
|
21 |
students have nothing in mind but making money in these
|
22 |
experiments, and the economists are often trying to
|
23 |
think of some theory. And the college students
|
24 |
invariably kill them.
|
25 |
And I participated in these experiments myself. |
115
1 |
My colleague at George Mason, Bruce Kobiashi, can
|
2 |
remember going down many a time for beer money, to pick
|
3 |
up a little money. But you had to be good at the
|
4 |
experiments.
|
5 |
What ICES did was they conducted an experimental
|
6 |
evaluation of various theories of anticompetitive
|
7 |
bundling using a baseline case and then variations on
|
8 |
the case.
|
9 |
The variations included changes in the
|
10 |
correlation of reservation values. I don't know if
|
11 |
Professor Nalebuff and Sidley talked about that this
|
12 |
morning, but the relationship of the reservation values
|
13 |
is extremely important in this literature, the existence
|
14 |
of efficiencies from bundling and the introduction of a
|
15 |
fringe competitor to the monopolist.
|
16 |
What you have is an A market with a monopolist.
|
17 |
100 percent of the literature assumes 100 percent that
|
18 |
also sells in the B market. And in the experiments, the
|
19 |
B market was served by up to three sellers of only B.
|
20 |
The baseline experiment tested cases in which
|
21 |
bundling by the monopolist was first prohibited and then
|
22 |
permitted. There are lots of details about this that
|
23 |
are available in the paper.
|
24 |
The baseline results showed that despite no
|
25 |
efficiencies and despite a setting under which you would |
116
1 |
think that bundling could be problematic, consumer
|
2 |
welfare still increased, although it wasn't
|
3 |
statistically significant.
|
4 |
And then when you added efficiencies, that is,
|
5 |
transaction costs, savings or the assumption of perfect
|
6 |
correlation and demand, the welfare-increasing effects
|
7 |
of bundling rose.
|
8 |
Here are again the details that are in the
|
9 |
paper, and the slides are available, and obviously we
|
10 |
have given you a set of the slides.
|
11 |
What was measured was consumer surplus, total
|
12 |
surplus and the number of competitors. And then the
|
13 |
variations were the transaction cost savings, the
|
14 |
negative correlation.
|
15 |
The Stigler paper on black booking, which was
|
16 |
one of the first papers here, had as opposed to perfect
|
17 |
positive correlation, perfect negative correlation,
|
18 |
which was a situation that allowed price
|
19 |
discriminations.
|
20 |
Under each of these, sometimes it was
|
21 |
statistically significant and sometimes it wasn't, but
|
22 |
there were not welfare losses. And only when bundling
|
23 |
was efficient did statistically significant exclusion
|
24 |
occur, which is interesting.
|
25 |
Now, what happened is after these -- I consulted |
117
1 |
throughout this experimental process. We were hoping
|
2 |
that what we would find is under these very simple
|
3 |
conditions here, you have anticompetitive effects of
|
4 |
bundling which these models had predicted, and then we
|
5 |
would tweak them some and see what happened.
|
6 |
Since we couldn't find anticompetitive bundling
|
7 |
effects, what we decided to do was modify the demand
|
8 |
conditions to make exclusionary bundling more
|
9 |
profitable.
|
10 |
The reservation value for the B good was raised
|
11 |
to greatly exceed the reservation value for the A good
|
12 |
for a lot of consumers, which meant there was more to
|
13 |
get out there.
|
14 |
Under the modified demand conditions, the
|
15 |
bundled discounts can exclude competitors in the B
|
16 |
market. And, indeed, welfare did fall, but it was very
|
17 |
little and it wasn't statistically significant.
|
18 |
Look at the conditions that had to occur. There
|
19 |
were extreme assumptions regarding the demand in the B
|
20 |
market. There was perfect positive correlation between
|
21 |
the A and B market demand.
|
22 |
There was no fringe seller in the market, and
|
23 |
there were entry and exit frictions in the sense that if
|
24 |
you entered, you had to stay for some periods, and if
|
25 |
you exited, you had to stay out for some periods. |
118
1 |
And here are the results. You can see there was
|
2 |
a big drop in the number of competitors. And there was
|
3 |
actually a drop in surplus, both consumer and total, but
|
4 |
very small and not statistically significant.
|
5 |
Now, then the results of the experiments were
|
6 |
changed to add -- one of the nice things about
|
7 |
experiments, you can hold a lot equal and make a lot of
|
8 |
variations, to add a fringe seller, with the fringe
|
9 |
seller having a small fraction of the capacity of the
|
10 |
market.
|
11 |
With the fringe seller, the total surplus
|
12 |
increased, and also they tested the effects of removing
|
13 |
those entry and exit frictions that I talked about.
|
14 |
Those alone reversed the negative welfare results that
|
15 |
were shown in table 2.
|
16 |
And here in table 3 are the results, showing the
|
17 |
various effects of what I just described.
|
18 |
Let me briefly say what a lot of this means, and
|
19 |
I do hope to do this under my 20 minutes.
|
20 |
We have the various tests. The hypothetically
|
21 |
equally efficient competitor test, for reasons I stated
|
22 |
before, it is overinclusive, and it would condemn
|
23 |
bundled discounts that increased welfare.
|
24 |
The de facto tying test requires knowledge of
|
25 |
the hypothetical monopoly price in the absence of |
119
1 |
bundling, which is a price generally not easily
|
2 |
ascertained, to say the least.
|
3 |
If deviations from perfect competition in the B
|
4 |
market or other alternatives are considered, this
|
5 |
further complicates the test.
|
6 |
I don't know what Professor Sidley talked about
|
7 |
this morning, but in the second paper he did, he showed
|
8 |
that his results of anticompetitiveness depended on
|
9 |
perfect competition in the B market.
|
10 |
And, of course, perfect competition in the B
|
11 |
market is not -- perfect competition anywhere is not
|
12 |
something we find much of in the real world.
|
13 |
Based on the experiments, the conditions under
|
14 |
which this de facto tying will emerge are very limited.
|
15 |
And, of course, we already have rules about tying.
|
16 |
I think that the most appropriate test would be
|
17 |
a modified Brooke Group test, which would be based on
|
18 |
the bundled price exceeding the bundled cost. It would
|
19 |
minimize the cost of false positives, and it would be
|
20 |
administrable.
|
21 |
And in that sense, in the absence of evidence
|
22 |
that the cost of false negatives from anticompetitive
|
23 |
exclusionary bundling is large, I submit that we should
|
24 |
use the modified Brooke test.
|
25 |
So just a few points in conclusion. |
120
1 |
I believe and I think that Barry Wright's case,
|
2 |
as Professor Crane and others have stated, Professor
|
3 |
Lambert, who was here this morning -- clearly the
|
4 |
federal courts have ruled on single-product pricing
|
5 |
behavior.
|
6 |
But that is not true for bundled discounts.
|
7 |
LePage's is standard free and it has spread beyond the
|
8 |
Third Circuit. Read Pease Health, a Ninth Circuit
|
9 |
District Court case which is discussed in the paper.
|
10 |
Given the history of Section 2 and given that we
|
11 |
are dealing with price application of Section 2 to any
|
12 |
exclusionary conduct, particularly this one, we should
|
13 |
follow a cautious approach that is consistent with that
|
14 |
applied to the single-product pricing in order to
|
15 |
minimize the sum of error and direct costs.
|
16 |
And the courts and those subject to potential
|
17 |
liability would benefit from guidance that reduces the
|
18 |
uncertainty that LePage's has created and stems the
|
19 |
general application of the Third Circuit's flawed
|
20 |
approach.
|
21 |
I'm hoping that these hearings, among many other
|
22 |
good things they will do, will accomplish that result.
|
23 |
Thank you very much.
|
24 |
(Applause.)
|
25 |
MR. MEYER: Our next speaker is Daniel Crane, |
121
1 |
who, as I said, is an associate professor of law at the
|
2 |
Cordozo School of Law. He is also counsel at Paul,
|
3 |
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.
|
4 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: It is my pleasure to be here
|
5 |
today. I'm going to speak primarily about bundled
|
6 |
discounts, the LePage's issue, and I'm afraid I will
|
7 |
repeat some of what was said this morning, but hopefully
|
8 |
to good effect.
|
9 |
I should disclose I am been involved and
|
10 |
continue to be involved in some cases as a lawyer in
|
11 |
which bundled discounts are at issue, though, of course,
|
12 |
the views I present today are my own.
|
13 |
I will not use any slides. We can just listen,
|
14 |
I hope.
|
15 |
At the outset, let me stress that the rule that
|
16 |
I'm going to defend as a safe harbor, the Ortho test, or
|
17 |
perhaps the Ortho test with some modification, is not a
|
18 |
rule that is perfect.
|
19 |
It is not a rule that will achieve a state of
|
20 |
affairs where all discounts that are harmful to
|
21 |
consumers will be said to be illegal and all that are
|
22 |
pro-competitive will be lawful.
|
23 |
But what I think is important as a lawyer, of
|
24 |
course, now as an economist, is to articulate
|
25 |
practicable, workable rules for the courts. This is |
122
1 |
particularly important for private litigation.
|
2 |
At the end of my remarks, I will talk about how
|
3 |
I would welcome a perhaps different approach in
|
4 |
injunctive cases brought by the government than in
|
5 |
private litigation. Because of some features of private
|
6 |
litigation, I am quite confident that the LePage's test
|
7 |
is doing far more harm than good.
|
8 |
Let me sort of set forth four background
|
9 |
conditions against which I will defend the Ortho test as
|
10 |
a safe harbor in litigation.
|
11 |
The first background condition which has been
|
12 |
addressed already today is that bundled discounting is
|
13 |
pervasive and has many pro-competitive or competitively
|
14 |
neutral reasons.
|
15 |
When a practice is widespread and usually
|
16 |
competitively neutral or pro-competitive, courts should
|
17 |
be particularly concerned about condemning instances of
|
18 |
that conduct without very strong proof of
|
19 |
anticompetitive consequences because of the dangers of
|
20 |
false positives.
|
21 |
Just to give an example about how widespread and
|
22 |
pervasive bundled discounting is, when I was working on
|
23 |
my article for the Emory Law Journal about bundled
|
24 |
discounting, I looked at my e-mail, and lo and behold, I
|
25 |
got an e-mail from the ABA antitrust section advertising |
123
1 |
"Market Power Handbook" and "Econometrics," two separate
|
2 |
books, for a package price which is a 12 percent bundled
|
3 |
discount off of the retail price of the two
|
4 |
individually.
|
5 |
I ran into Dan Rubinfeld a short while later,
|
6 |
who is the editor of one of the books, and I promptly
|
7 |
served on him a complaint for monopolizing the economics
|
8 |
and antitrust literature market.
|
9 |
Of course, bundled discounting happens in all
|
10 |
sorts of places where there can be no suspicion of
|
11 |
anticompetitive conduct.
|
12 |
That doesn't mean that cases like that will be
|
13 |
litigated, but what it shows you is when you have a
|
14 |
pervasive practice, there are often likely to be good
|
15 |
explanations for it, which should make us particularly
|
16 |
reluctant to condemn instances where there might be
|
17 |
anticompetitive consequences without very strong reasons
|
18 |
to do so.
|
19 |
A second background condition is that bundled
|
20 |
discounts in commercial contexts are often driven by
|
21 |
buyers rather than sellers. Significantly, many of the
|
22 |
recent bundled discount cases to be litigated did not
|
23 |
involve sales to end consumers but to retailers or
|
24 |
manufacturers acquiring components or other large
|
25 |
oligopsony or monopsony buyers. |
124
1 |
Large diversified buyers often leverage their
|
2 |
buying power across multiple product lines to exact a
|
3 |
bundled discount from the manufacturer. And, of course,
|
4 |
these buyers have a strong incentive not to demand
|
5 |
discounts when doing so would weaken competition in the
|
6 |
markets that supply them.
|
7 |
So my own view is that bundled discounting,
|
8 |
often driven by buyers in these cases, the incentives of
|
9 |
the buyers themselves are much better at controlling
|
10 |
competition than litigation is.
|
11 |
This morning Barry Nalebuff said that oftentimes
|
12 |
in bundled discounting cases, one of the problems with
|
13 |
bundled discounts is that they sort of conceal what the
|
14 |
real price is, it is hard to know what the real price
|
15 |
is, it can cost up to $10,000 for a buyer to really
|
16 |
compare apples to apples unbundled versus bundled.
|
17 |
When we are talking about buyers like Wal-Mart
|
18 |
or GPOs and the medical devices cases, AMD, Intel,
|
19 |
Broadcomm, Qualcomm, Information Resources versus A.C.
|
20 |
Nielsen, many of these litigated cases involve very,
|
21 |
very large sophisticated buyers.
|
22 |
So even if it is true that sometimes comparing
|
23 |
apples to apples is difficult, if you look at the cases
|
24 |
litigated today, it seems to me that is simply not an
|
25 |
objection. |
125
1 |
A third background condition is that I believe
|
2 |
that courts need rules and not merely open-ended
|
3 |
standards, particularly in sensitive areas of price
|
4 |
competition and Section 2.
|
5 |
I have a forthcoming article in the Washington
|
6 |
and Lee Law Review about the rules and standards debate
|
7 |
as applied to antitrust law where I argue in favor of
|
8 |
bright-line rules to immunize defendants from lawsuits
|
9 |
in cases involving particularly private litigation and
|
10 |
unilateral practices.
|
11 |
Committing economic policy to juries in cases
|
12 |
like LePage's is a really miserable way to run a legal
|
13 |
system.
|
14 |
A fourth and related background condition is
|
15 |
that a growing literature -- including my co-panelist,
|
16 |
Janusz Ordover, has written in this area -- shows that
|
17 |
firms can strategically misuse antitrust law to prevent
|
18 |
pro-competitive behavior by their rivals.
|
19 |
As I will discuss in a few minutes, I believe
|
20 |
that many of the recent bundled discounting cases
|
21 |
involve frustrated competitors seeking to deny
|
22 |
commercial advantage to a more diversified rival, not
|
23 |
firms that are in any real danger of being excluded from
|
24 |
the market.
|
25 |
Well, with these background conditions as |
126
1 |
considerations, let me say a word about why it is not
|
2 |
sufficient to analogize bundled discounting to tying or
|
3 |
exclusive dealing, as some cases like LePage's have
|
4 |
suggested.
|
5 |
In a tying case the consumer is required to take
|
6 |
the tied product if he wants the tying product as well.
|
7 |
In a bundled discount case, the consumer always has the
|
8 |
choice to buy simply the tying product.
|
9 |
Of course, it is possible that the discount is
|
10 |
so large that it would be economically irrational for
|
11 |
the consumer who wants both products to buy just the
|
12 |
tying product and then purchase the tied product
|
13 |
separately from the plaintiff or a smaller, less
|
14 |
diversified firm.
|
15 |
But that would only be the case if the plaintiff
|
16 |
was unable to offer a discount that would make the
|
17 |
consumer indifferent on whether it accepted the
|
18 |
defendant's package discount or bought the two items a
|
19 |
la carte. Of course, that's a question that tying
|
20 |
analysis lacks the tools to answer.
|
21 |
Similarly, an exclusive dealing analysis focuses
|
22 |
on whether the defendant's contractual practices
|
23 |
foreclose a substantial share of the relevant market to
|
24 |
rivals.
|
25 |
But foreclosure is, again, an empty concept |
127
1 |
unless it means that rivals cannot compete for the
|
2 |
business.
|
3 |
To put it another way, if a rival would be able
|
4 |
to profitably match the defendant's bundled discount,
|
5 |
what we have is ordinary price competition and not
|
6 |
foreclosure.
|
7 |
The problem with using exclusive dealing
|
8 |
analysis to assess bundled discounts is that exclusive
|
9 |
dealing analysis begins with the assumption that
|
10 |
whatever contracts are covered by the relevant contracts
|
11 |
are foreclosed to rivals, a fact which is not even in
|
12 |
evidence yet in bundled discounting cases.
|
13 |
So either a tying analogy or a bundled discount
|
14 |
analysis, without first looking at sort of economics of
|
15 |
the discount, is really putting the cart before the
|
16 |
horse.
|
17 |
Let me now turn to the rule for bundled
|
18 |
discounts that I will defend as a safe harbor. Janusz
|
19 |
tells me he created this on the back of a napkin. So we
|
20 |
will leave it to him to give you a history of this.
|
21 |
The rule traces back at least to the Ortho
|
22 |
decision. It was adopted in some litigated cases,
|
23 |
including Information Resources versus Dun & Bradstreet,
|
24 |
a Southern District of New York case, and I believe is
|
25 |
reflected in Professor Hovenkamp's 2006 supplement to |
128
1 |
the antitrust treatise.
|
2 |
A plaintiff challenging a seller's bundled
|
3 |
discounts as predatory must show as a minimum
|
4 |
requirement that the bundled discounts resulted in at
|
5 |
least one product in the package being sold at less than
|
6 |
cost after reallocation of the discounts on other
|
7 |
products in the package to the predatory product.
|
8 |
Another way of saying this is that the bundled
|
9 |
discount is not unlawful unless the effective price of
|
10 |
the product in the competitive market is below cost,
|
11 |
taking into account the discounts on noncompetitive
|
12 |
products that the consumer would forego by buying the
|
13 |
two products individually instead of in the package.
|
14 |
In my Emory Law Journal article, I propose a
|
15 |
number of additional showings the plaintiff would have
|
16 |
to make. I won't discuss those here, in the interest of
|
17 |
time.
|
18 |
I want to defend the sort of core concept
|
19 |
underlying this analysis which is an analogy of two
|
20 |
predatory pricing, although with some modifications for
|
21 |
bundled discounts, which is what I think the LePage's
|
22 |
court says should not be done, we should not analogize
|
23 |
to predatory pricing. I argue we should, although it
|
24 |
may take some qualification of the rules.
|
25 |
The basic argument is based on the Brooke Group |
129
1 |
standard itself. Under Brooke Group, a single-product
|
2 |
discount is per se lawful unless it results in pricing
|
3 |
below an appropriate measure of cost.
|
4 |
I will put aside what the appropriate measure of
|
5 |
cost should be and assume we know what it is in a
|
6 |
particular circuit. Let's call it X.
|
7 |
What that means is that a defendant would have
|
8 |
an unqualified right to offer a discount on the good Y
|
9 |
so long as the price continued to exceed X.
|
10 |
Now, suppose the defendant offers a bundled
|
11 |
discount on goods Y and Z and that the plaintiff sells
|
12 |
only Y. The plaintiff cannot offer a discount on Z.
|
13 |
But by reducing the price of Y, it can make up for the
|
14 |
discounts that consumers would forego by continuing to
|
15 |
buy the goods unbundled.
|
16 |
So long as the effective price for the
|
17 |
single-product firm is not below X, it is no more
|
18 |
disadvantaged than if the defendant had offered the same
|
19 |
above-cost prices through a single-product discount on
|
20 |
Y.
|
21 |
Since a single-product discount resulting in a
|
22 |
price above X would be per se lawful, a multiproduct
|
23 |
discount resulting in effective price above X should
|
24 |
also be lawful per se.
|
25 |
Let me sort of answer some arguments against |
130
1 |
this logic that I have seen discussed in economics
|
2 |
literature, actually moreover in litigation briefs,
|
3 |
which are probably not a good source of economic
|
4 |
reasoning, but nonetheless, let me discuss a few things.
|
5 |
One sort of very common argument is that where a
|
6 |
single-product predation is expensive and risky because
|
7 |
it involves sustaining losses for an indefinite period
|
8 |
of time to drive out or discipline rivals, the
|
9 |
multiproduct predator sustains no losses from the
|
10 |
bundled discount because it can cross-subsidize the
|
11 |
discount in the competitive market with discounts off
|
12 |
the prices in the monopoly product.
|
13 |
Of course, the diversified firm that uses a
|
14 |
multiproduct discount to exclude rivals is also
|
15 |
sacrificing profits with the hopes of long-term
|
16 |
recoupment.
|
17 |
A discount of one dollar off the monopoly
|
18 |
product for the purpose of subsidizing the campaign of
|
19 |
exclusion in the competitive product is economically
|
20 |
identical to a single-product firm taking a dollar out
|
21 |
of a bank and subsidizing single-product predation.
|
22 |
Unless there is rate regulation over the
|
23 |
products and the bundled discount is somehow being used
|
24 |
to fool rate regulators, this cross-subsidization story
|
25 |
doesn't really hold up. |
131
1 |
This morning Professor Nalebuff argued that
|
2 |
loyalty discounts can create noncost predation by
|
3 |
threatening to inflate the monopoly price. In his
|
4 |
model, the monopolist says I'm going to jack up the
|
5 |
monopoly price of the monopoly product unless you take
|
6 |
my bundled discount.
|
7 |
Of course, as Professor Nalebuff recognized,
|
8 |
this only works if the threat to jack up the monopoly
|
9 |
price is credible.
|
10 |
Of course, the reason that the defendant has not
|
11 |
charged a price higher than the current price, the
|
12 |
current monopoly price is that any further price
|
13 |
increase would by definition be unprofitable because
|
14 |
there would be substitution to other products.
|
15 |
So the buyer has its own very credible threat,
|
16 |
which is if you jack up the price even further, I will
|
17 |
substitute to other products. By definition, the
|
18 |
profit-maximizing price being charged already is one
|
19 |
which will become less profitable to the seller if he
|
20 |
jacks up his price even further.
|
21 |
Although I'm not saying it could not happen, it
|
22 |
is certainly the case that the threat I will raise my
|
23 |
price where the defendant is already charging the
|
24 |
profit-maximizing price gives rise to another threat by
|
25 |
the buyer, which is in that case I will substitute to |
132
1 |
something else.
|
2 |
A second argument that is sometimes made is that
|
3 |
bundled discounts, unlike single-product below-cost
|
4 |
pricing, can go on indefinitely. If that is true, it is
|
5 |
because there is no sacrifice in profits and no need of
|
6 |
future recoupment.
|
7 |
That suggests to me that the reason that the
|
8 |
diversified firm is able to offer the bundled discount
|
9 |
indefinitely is that there are legitimate business
|
10 |
reasons for doing so that do not depend on the exclusion
|
11 |
of competitors.
|
12 |
Of course, competitors can be excluded from the
|
13 |
market by any number of strategies, but those should
|
14 |
typically not be of concern under the antitrust laws if
|
15 |
they reflect reasons that have legitimate business
|
16 |
justifications. That is to say, business justifications
|
17 |
that make the practice profitable, even assuming
|
18 |
continued competition.
|
19 |
A third and final criticism I will just touch on
|
20 |
briefly is sort of really a criticism of the equally
|
21 |
efficient competitor hypothesis in the Ortho case.
|
22 |
Under the Ortho formulation, the plaintiff would
|
23 |
have to show that it is as efficient a producer as the
|
24 |
defendant in at least the competitive product.
|
25 |
This has been criticized on the grounds that |
133
1 |
what if the plaintiff is a new entrant, it is trying to
|
2 |
achieve economies of scale, it is the defendant's very
|
3 |
practices that prevent it from reaching economies of
|
4 |
scale, so how can a defendant say that he should have
|
5 |
been equally efficient in order to sue.
|
6 |
For present purposes, I don't want to take a
|
7 |
position on this, although I do think the equally
|
8 |
efficient competitor hypothesis is probably correct. I
|
9 |
would be happy with a test that simply required some
|
10 |
price-revenue comparison, because that would at least,
|
11 |
different than LePage's, force the focus back on to
|
12 |
whether the plaintiff really had options or simply
|
13 |
whether the defendant's discounts were exclusionary in
|
14 |
the market.
|
15 |
I think even that would be a substantial
|
16 |
improvement on sort of the open-ended standardless
|
17 |
approach of the LePage's case.
|
18 |
Let me conclude my remarks, then, by arguing for
|
19 |
the need for bright-line rules in unilateral
|
20 |
exclusionary practices cases, particularly in private
|
21 |
actions for damages.
|
22 |
As I noted at the outset, it is not difficult
|
23 |
for law professors and lawyers and economists to create
|
24 |
sort of armchair assumptions about markets that show
|
25 |
exclusionary practices in various forms. |
134
1 |
Nonetheless, adoption of bright-line rules is
|
2 |
necessary to prevent strategic misuse of antitrust law
|
3 |
by rivals.
|
4 |
Many of the cases brought in recent years are
|
5 |
not cases brought by very small firms that are on the
|
6 |
margins of the market. These are cases brought by very
|
7 |
dominant, large firms with very substantial market
|
8 |
shares, with a good bit of profitability and a recent
|
9 |
history of success in the market.
|
10 |
One has to ask if the exclusion story doesn't
|
11 |
seem to be strong on its face, what's really going on
|
12 |
here.
|
13 |
The answer may very well be, although I can't
|
14 |
prove what any individual plaintiff intends, that there
|
15 |
is simply an effort being made to prevent more
|
16 |
diversified firms from using their diversification as a
|
17 |
competitive tool.
|
18 |
Now, it is one thing to say that we will commit
|
19 |
these issues to juries, as LePage's did, but of course
|
20 |
jury trial is extremely rare.
|
21 |
The statistics from the U.S. courts
|
22 |
administrative offices show that there are approximately
|
23 |
nine civil antitrust cases a year out of about 860 that
|
24 |
are terminated. So less than 1 percent of all private
|
25 |
antitrust cases will end up before a jury. |
135
1 |
LePage's is the exceedingly rare case. What
|
2 |
happens is that all the cases either are dismissed on
|
3 |
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss or they have to
|
4 |
settle, they have to settle because defendants simply
|
5 |
cannot take the risk of going to trial.
|
6 |
So what happens, then, is unless the courts are
|
7 |
given good, solid, antitrust rules that can serve as
|
8 |
screening devices on a motion for summary judgment or a
|
9 |
motion to dismiss, the only question becomes how big is
|
10 |
the price tag, the settlement that the defendant has to
|
11 |
pay to avoid the trial.
|
12 |
I think this is sort of a culture that LePage's
|
13 |
has encouraged. Courts often interpret the LePage's
|
14 |
standard as really a commitment of these issues to
|
15 |
juries, although we haven't had lots of jury trials. In
|
16 |
some cases it is because defendants have had to pay to
|
17 |
get out of them.
|
18 |
Let me conclude by saying though I think rules
|
19 |
are necessary as screening devices for private
|
20 |
litigation, I'm actually more sympathetic to
|
21 |
experimentation by the government with different
|
22 |
theories of exclusionary conduct.
|
23 |
I think one of the unfortunate things that has
|
24 |
happened in unilateral cases is that these same rules
|
25 |
that have been designed to protect against abusive |
136
1 |
litigation by private plaintiffs have been applied
|
2 |
wholesale to government cases, and I think a good
|
3 |
example of this is the U.S. versus American Airlines
|
4 |
predatory pricing case, where the court simply used sort
|
5 |
of off-the-rack rules that were really not sort of
|
6 |
designed to prevent against abusive private litigation
|
7 |
but didn't take into account the differences that occur
|
8 |
when a government sues.
|
9 |
So while most of my comments have been very
|
10 |
skeptical about bundled discounting cases and supportive
|
11 |
of strong rules to weed out these cases early on in the
|
12 |
litigation, except the most meritorious cases, I do
|
13 |
think the government, whether FTC or DOJ, as plaintiff
|
14 |
should be given more latitude.
|
15 |
Thank you.
|
16 |
(Applause.)
|
17 |
MR. MEYER: Our next speaker is Janusz Ordover,
|
18 |
who needs no introduction. He is professor of economics
|
19 |
at NYU, as I mentioned, former deputy Assistant Attorney
|
20 |
General of the Antitrust Division and a frequent
|
21 |
participant in antitrust debates of all sorts.
|
22 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Thank you very much, David,
|
23 |
for the kind words. As I say, I always need an
|
24 |
introduction just to keep my name in front of the
|
25 |
public, like Coca-Cola and Pepsi or Marlboros, maybe. |
137
1 |
My topic today is loyalty rebates. I frequently
|
2 |
do something which is inappropriate which is create way
|
3 |
too many slides. I have not deviated from my strategy
|
4 |
here either.
|
5 |
What I do have is way too many slides. Plus, I
|
6 |
have also asked the organizers to post two of my papers
|
7 |
which deal with the issue of loyalty rebates and which
|
8 |
are in order to show the economists' schizophrenia are
|
9 |
quite adversarial to each other.
|
10 |
I mean that one tries to demonstrate
|
11 |
circumstances in which loyalty rebates, back to first
|
12 |
unit type discounts, are potentially anticompetitive,
|
13 |
and we actually demonstrate how they can be so. And the
|
14 |
other paper in which the same kind of loyalty rebates
|
15 |
turn out to be powerfully procompetitive.
|
16 |
I have spanned the universe of possible
|
17 |
outcomes. The big challenge is to try to figure out how
|
18 |
to marry these two approaches. It is at this marriage
|
19 |
level that the huge challenges to economic modeling are
|
20 |
likely to come about. I will come back to these papers,
|
21 |
of course, in a very short minute.
|
22 |
There is no point to running you through the
|
23 |
usual introductions, as you have been here this morning,
|
24 |
many of you.
|
25 |
We also already talked about what the loyalty |
138
1 |
rebates entail.
|
2 |
The main point that I wanted to make, other than
|
3 |
the fact that we don't know yet enough about their
|
4 |
economic effects in the wide variety of settings, the
|
5 |
point that I really think is worthwhile keeping in mind
|
6 |
is we both need more empirics, more technical research,
|
7 |
and also I think a lot of bright-line rules, because I
|
8 |
believe strongly that absent bright-line rules, we are
|
9 |
going to create mischief on both sides.
|
10 |
Remember, there are two types of errors. We
|
11 |
always forget that.
|
12 |
The point that is I think worthwhile is the
|
13 |
interesting aspect of these loyalty rebates that really
|
14 |
comes to play as the driver behind the variety of
|
15 |
outcomes from models of these settings. And really the
|
16 |
loyalty rebates create complex links in the product
|
17 |
space between the supplier and the consumer.
|
18 |
These links could be across volume, across time
|
19 |
or across products. Because of these links, because of
|
20 |
these externalities that come about as a result of the
|
21 |
loyalty rebates or bundled rebates, different
|
22 |
manifestations, the typical analyses that we have are
|
23 |
difficult to carry out.
|
24 |
Normally we do not think very easily in terms of
|
25 |
mathematical modeling or empirics in which there are |
139
1 |
these kind of versions of almost network-like effects.
|
2 |
In this case, the network-like effects are much
|
3 |
more concentrated as between the pair of transactors and
|
4 |
spilling into the outside world in which the third
|
5 |
parties are being affected one way or the other by the
|
6 |
internal contractual arrangement between the seller and
|
7 |
the buyer.
|
8 |
It is quite true, as I have seen in litigation
|
9 |
myself, that often it is the actual buyer that is
|
10 |
requiring or asking for or demanding the creation of
|
11 |
those kinds of links.
|
12 |
Of course, I missed here Professor Einer
|
13 |
Elhauge, who would have talked about these kinds of
|
14 |
links extensively in the context of GPO purchasing
|
15 |
practices, which are being litigated as we speak.
|
16 |
I also have to fess up that I have an interest
|
17 |
in the outcome of these litigations.
|
18 |
In any case, it is the nature of these links
|
19 |
that creates complexity for economic modeling of the
|
20 |
sort that I think is illustrated in some kind of
|
21 |
examples that have been put forth.
|
22 |
This is the Hovenkamp example that Tim Muris
|
23 |
already took apart. So I don't want to waste my time on
|
24 |
that because this example actually proves nothing. It
|
25 |
proves nothing because it is not embedded in any known |
140
1 |
economic model of anything.
|
2 |
I second Professor Muris's point that learning
|
3 |
from stripped down examples is a dangerous thing to do,
|
4 |
that we really have to rely on the complete and deep
|
5 |
understanding of the circumstances in which the practice
|
6 |
takes place and understand fully and well all the
|
7 |
economic forces that act upon the practice, the
|
8 |
transacting parties as well as on the third parties and,
|
9 |
in particular, on consumers ultimately, ultimately
|
10 |
consumers.
|
11 |
A simple example that people have often used
|
12 |
showing that it excludes an equally efficient competitor
|
13 |
is, okay, so what, is there any problem with exclusion
|
14 |
of this equally efficient competitor, assuming -- again,
|
15 |
I agree here with the previous speaker -- that what it
|
16 |
means to be an equally efficient competitor is subject
|
17 |
to debate.
|
18 |
Indeed, some of you may be as old as I am.
|
19 |
Although -- do I look younger or older than you? We
|
20 |
will debate that later.
|
21 |
What I'm trying to say is that when the issue of
|
22 |
that kind of an equally efficient competitor came out
|
23 |
way back in the Turner treatise days, in the context of
|
24 |
multiproduct firms predating against single-product
|
25 |
firms, Professor Areta said -- I think it in a letter to |
141
1 |
Will Dommel commenting on the Ordover paper efforts --
|
2 |
saying there is absolutely no reason to give a
|
3 |
multiproduct firm a leg up in competition against the
|
4 |
single-product firms because there is no reason why
|
5 |
should we take into account these deep potential links
|
6 |
on the demand side or on the supply side or the cost
|
7 |
side and the cross-elastic side in terms of lowering the
|
8 |
benchmark price against which the rival ought to
|
9 |
compete.
|
10 |
Now, that was Professor Areta probably now 20 --
|
11 |
maybe 18, 19 years ago. I think our thinking has deeply
|
12 |
changed.
|
13 |
We do understand a lot of complex relationships
|
14 |
in terms of the efficiencies that are involved, whether
|
15 |
it is on the cost side, gains from a multiproduct
|
16 |
production, whether it is on the savings side, the
|
17 |
bundling effects from offering a wide variety of
|
18 |
products in order to minimize efficiency, inefficiency
|
19 |
of transacting and so on, coupled again with the Barry
|
20 |
Nalebuff point, which is now very fashionable at MIT and
|
21 |
at Harvard, when economists talk about so-called
|
22 |
shrouding. You know what the hell it means, is it some
|
23 |
kind of religious ceremony? No.
|
24 |
It involves marketing practices precisely of the
|
25 |
sort that make it very hard for a consumer to figure out |
142
1 |
what the price is. Is shrouding good or is it bad? We
|
2 |
don't know. It depends on the model and the facts.
|
3 |
The facts are the driver of our analysis when
|
4 |
properly slotted into some well-understood economic
|
5 |
theory.
|
6 |
So what I want to do is to give you a quick run
|
7 |
through the two papers with Greg, who threatened to be
|
8 |
here but I don't see him, thank God. Otherwise, he
|
9 |
would take me to task for misrepresenting our research.
|
10 |
The research in fact can be misrepresented or
|
11 |
represented in a variety of ways. It goes back to
|
12 |
something that happened to me and Steve Salaw in
|
13 |
connection with our paper on vertical issues where Steve
|
14 |
viewed that as a theorem, proof that vertical
|
15 |
relationships could be anticompetitive. I viewed it as
|
16 |
a proof that circumstances under which vertical
|
17 |
relationships could be anticompetitive is actually
|
18 |
difficult to implement.
|
19 |
We had the same paper, and the two authors
|
20 |
agreed to stay neutral on the subject. The same paper
|
21 |
can been seen from a variety of perspectives.
|
22 |
What it is that Greg Schaefer and I have tried
|
23 |
to do, and we are hard at work at probably a few more
|
24 |
versions of these kind of analyses, is to construct
|
25 |
economic scenarios which I think are plausible as |
143
1 |
opposed to two-by-two examples that do not reside in any
|
2 |
well known market setting -- other than Ortho -- in
|
3 |
which these types of loyalty rebates which is what I
|
4 |
want to talk about or back to first-unit discounts do
|
5 |
emerge as equilibrium offers.
|
6 |
Remember that much of the problems we had with
|
7 |
examples is it is never tested whether or not what is
|
8 |
happening in the example is an equilibrium or not. If
|
9 |
it is, what is the gain that underlies the example.
|
10 |
Greg and I have specified two sets of cases in
|
11 |
which these kind of loyalty rebates as equilibrium
|
12 |
offers. One is the one in which -- the first one is the
|
13 |
one in which exclusionary loyalty rebate does come
|
14 |
about.
|
15 |
This is a model, a very stripped down model.
|
16 |
Let me take you quickly through it. The papers are
|
17 |
posted. Probably incomprehensible for the lawyers in
|
18 |
the audience, but maybe not.
|
19 |
The setting is straightforward. It is stripped
|
20 |
down. We have two competitors, one of which is, quote,
|
21 |
unquote, "dominant" in the following simple sense, that
|
22 |
is, it is capable of producing output for the whole
|
23 |
market. Whereas, the other, the rival, the smaller
|
24 |
competitor, the entrant can only produce one unit of
|
25 |
output. |
144
1 |
From a social welfare standpoint, ideally we
|
2 |
would like one unit to be sold by each. And the reason
|
3 |
for that is there a heterogeneity of preferences. The
|
4 |
consumers who would like to buy in the marketplace, they
|
5 |
like the incumbent's product and some other people like
|
6 |
the challenger's product.
|
7 |
In an equilibrium, we would like to see people
|
8 |
being optimally served, which takes me back to the
|
9 |
question of what do I mean by an equally efficient
|
10 |
competitor.
|
11 |
In the model that we have constructed, each firm
|
12 |
has the same marginal cost of production, but their
|
13 |
products are not equal. So they are equally efficient
|
14 |
on the cost side, but they have heterogeneous offerings,
|
15 |
which is an environment where economics is not entirely
|
16 |
clear, what do we mean by an equally efficient
|
17 |
competitor.
|
18 |
When I am selling A and you are selling B, and
|
19 |
they are not perfect substitutes for each other, it is a
|
20 |
bit of a challenge to give a crisp and clear definition.
|
21 |
In that model, there are some assumptions that
|
22 |
actually have to be made in order to create a
|
23 |
circumstance whereby an equilibrium exclusionary offer
|
24 |
arises, i.e., an offer that denies consumers the ability
|
25 |
to purchase the product they would like to get. |
145
1 |
Again, this goes back to my misspent youth with
|
2 |
Shaffer and Salaw. You can argue amongst yourselves --
|
3 |
I will be happy to chip in later on -- whether the
|
4 |
conditions that we have specified are necessary, are
|
5 |
they sufficient and more or less are they realistic,
|
6 |
because the usefulness of the model stems, at least in
|
7 |
my view, from modeling circumstances that are not so off
|
8 |
the wall as to give no guidance to anything. But the
|
9 |
conditions we have specified I think are of interest.
|
10 |
For example, in the paper we have the assumption
|
11 |
that the incumbent can supply all of the market but the
|
12 |
entrant can supply only at most one unit. Whether it is
|
13 |
one unit versus two or two versus five is not
|
14 |
necessarily an issue. But it is the foundation of the
|
15 |
differential that exists.
|
16 |
The second assumption that I think is important
|
17 |
is that the model has two periods involved. Remember I
|
18 |
told you about the links that are being created through
|
19 |
these exclusionary, potentially exclusionary offers.
|
20 |
Here the link is intertemporal. That is,
|
21 |
through time. And it is that fact in the model that
|
22 |
actually is another of the key drivers.
|
23 |
In period two, the buyer becomes locked in to
|
24 |
the seller or the sellers from whom it purchased in
|
25 |
period one. |
146
1 |
What does that mean? In a normal economic
|
2 |
model, it would mean people would beat their brains out
|
3 |
to get the second period profits and would give them all
|
4 |
up in the first period.
|
5 |
Remember the Supreme Court profound economic
|
6 |
analysis in ITS v. Kodak on that subject.
|
7 |
So, no restriction on feasible sale of
|
8 |
contracting. However, the entrant faces a financing
|
9 |
constraint, a cap on how much it can borrow against its
|
10 |
potential period two lock-in gains in period one.
|
11 |
Now the question comes in whether you are the
|
12 |
believer in the old fashioned finance literature or more
|
13 |
inclined to the new old fashioned financial literature
|
14 |
in which the financing constraints are in fact a fact of
|
15 |
life for a variety of reasons. And I refer you to
|
16 |
Turro's new brilliant finance textbook.
|
17 |
The second aspect of this whole thing is that
|
18 |
the entrant cannot commit to its second period price in
|
19 |
period one. How realistic is it? I don't know. It
|
20 |
depends on the setting.
|
21 |
So there are two key assumptions or three that
|
22 |
limit the capacity of the entrant. The inability to pay
|
23 |
for all of the first period battle, either with borrowed
|
24 |
money or with the second period money, whether these are
|
25 |
realistic, that depends on the particular circumstance. |
147
1 |
And I believe that there are settings like that in which
|
2 |
these conditions are likely to be satisfied.
|
3 |
In such an equilibrium, such as we do have
|
4 |
equilibria in which the entrant gets no sales, the
|
5 |
incumbent makes the sales despite the fact that he is
|
6 |
going after or she is going after or it is going after
|
7 |
the marginal unit which is less valued to consumers
|
8 |
being supplied by the incumbent firm versus the
|
9 |
challenger.
|
10 |
Now, again, this goes against the grain of the
|
11 |
Chicago -- perfectly on time -- against the Chicago view
|
12 |
of life, which is why would anybody pay to gain sales
|
13 |
against somebody who can offer those same sales more
|
14 |
efficiently?
|
15 |
And the answer is well, there are these
|
16 |
intertemporal links. These kind of relationships do
|
17 |
change the analytics. Moreover, and here is why these
|
18 |
constraints that we have talked about are key.
|
19 |
Moreover, how much you have to pay in order to
|
20 |
steal or to grab or to sell that second unit is clearly
|
21 |
tied to how much the rival, the entrant can pay to keep
|
22 |
it for itself.
|
23 |
If the price is low because the rival can only
|
24 |
offer the buyer a penny but you would be happy to offer
|
25 |
two pennies to something that would lead you to three |
148
1 |
cents gain tomorrow, you are going to do that.
|
2 |
The Chicago view is again somewhat too
|
3 |
simplistic in terms of the underlying economics. I'm
|
4 |
not saying as a matter of empirics it is flawed, but as
|
5 |
a matter of underlying economics, we all know we are not
|
6 |
Chicagoans anymore. I believe that's the right place to
|
7 |
be, out of Chicago, leaving Chicago yet again.
|
8 |
It is a slide. To switch direction completely,
|
9 |
Shaffer and I with his graduate students have come up
|
10 |
with another model in which in fact the efficiency of
|
11 |
the first-unit discount rebate comes out in a very
|
12 |
stripped down equilibrium as well.
|
13 |
In that model, there is no competition. There
|
14 |
is only a supplier that has a monopoly, and he is facing
|
15 |
two states of the world of which one is the high demand
|
16 |
and the other one is the low demand.
|
17 |
As you all know, obviously, from your
|
18 |
microeconomics textbooks, in such a world the seller
|
19 |
would like to create incentive to sell as much as
|
20 |
possible in the high-demand state.
|
21 |
But the buyer may not want to reveal whether it
|
22 |
is a high-demand state or not. You have this asymmetry
|
23 |
of information.
|
24 |
If there is an asymmetry of information, you
|
25 |
have to implement some kind of sophisticated pricing, |
149
1 |
which we see everywhere. It is that sophisticated
|
2 |
pricing that in fact is the explanation why we see these
|
3 |
kind of schedules in real life.
|
4 |
Now, in our model, we have a typical
|
5 |
self-selection equilibrium that comes about. The
|
6 |
benefit from the loyalty rebate is clearly going to
|
7 |
accrue to the seller, not to the buyer, because the
|
8 |
loyalty rebate gives greater power to price
|
9 |
discrimination.
|
10 |
We don't know whether price discrimination is a
|
11 |
good thing or a bad thing as a general economic
|
12 |
proposition. In our model, we would say, look, if the
|
13 |
driver behind the loyalty rebate is to incentivize the
|
14 |
downstream, these buyers or a buyer could be either in
|
15 |
the high state or the low state, and that should be
|
16 |
enough to stop somebody trying to condemn the particular
|
17 |
loyalty rebate as being potentially anticompetitive.
|
18 |
So you can see that is the theorem right here.
|
19 |
If you compared this diagram relative to the prior
|
20 |
diagrams, you can see where the difference comes from.
|
21 |
As I said, the basic insight of that paper is
|
22 |
that loyalty rebates permit more efficient price
|
23 |
discrimination than simple two-part tariffs because of
|
24 |
the nondifferentiability of the outlay schedule of the
|
25 |
self-selection point chosen by the high-demand buyer. |
150
1 |
Price discrimination is not always welfare
|
2 |
enhancing, but we don't believe there should be public
|
3 |
policy prohibitions for reasons to discourage the use of
|
4 |
loyalty rebates for such purposes.
|
5 |
Here I will stop, given that you have my slides.
|
6 |
Here are the references for those of you who are
|
7 |
interested. Greg will be happy to send you our papers
|
8 |
if you ask for them.
|
9 |
Thank you very much. And I hope I was not way
|
10 |
too confusing.
|
11 |
(Applause.)
|
12 |
MR. MEYER: Thank you very much.
|
13 |
Our final panelist is Will Tom, a partner at
|
14 |
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius here in Washington.
|
15 |
As I mentioned earlier, Will has also been the
|
16 |
deputy director at the FTC's Bureau of Competition.
|
17 |
MR. TOM: Thank you very much, David.
|
18 |
I will make up for Janusz's too many slides by
|
19 |
having none at all.
|
20 |
I am also going to free ride on all the previous
|
21 |
panelists, both this morning's and this afternoon's, by
|
22 |
assuming that you have heard all their presentations,
|
23 |
you are now up to speed on all that they have said.
|
24 |
So I will not rehash any of the previous
|
25 |
discussions or points that were made, which may lead |
151
1 |
some of you to wonder whether there is anything more
|
2 |
left to be said after all of the education that you have
|
3 |
gotten.
|
4 |
I do think that one of the things that comes out
|
5 |
pretty clearly in hearing the lawyers and the economists
|
6 |
and listening for some of the differences between what
|
7 |
they are doing here is that the lawyers are looking for
|
8 |
rules that you can apply in real litigation situations
|
9 |
and a state of imperfect information.
|
10 |
We have had a lot of talk about the precise
|
11 |
contours of those rules and what models can guide us in
|
12 |
formulating what those rules are.
|
13 |
At least for us simple-minded lawyers, the
|
14 |
attraction of the incremental revenue versus incremental
|
15 |
cost or Ortho standard or whatever you want to call it
|
16 |
is that it is simple enough for us to understand, and it
|
17 |
can actually provide some guidance. It provides
|
18 |
guidance on which most lawyers for a fairly wide
|
19 |
spectrum of so-called Chicago School or post-Chicago
|
20 |
School adherents can agree on.
|
21 |
But it obviously provides that guidance only
|
22 |
when the incremental costs and the incremental revenues
|
23 |
are known.
|
24 |
And it seems to me that the interesting problems
|
25 |
in actually deciding the cases is how the case should be |
152
1 |
decided in the large number of cases where it is not
|
2 |
known or where that is the very subject of the
|
3 |
litigation, with the two sides arguing for different
|
4 |
factual inferences.
|
5 |
One of the things that struck me in hearing the
|
6 |
lawyers talk, particularly this morning, is that there
|
7 |
wasn't a lot of mention of the legal framework and the
|
8 |
legal doctrines by which these kinds of rules were
|
9 |
introduced in the first place, particularly in the
|
10 |
predatory pricing scenario.
|
11 |
The question for the factfinder in these rule-of
|
12 |
-reason kinds of cases is simply in a Section 1 kind of
|
13 |
case, a vertical case where you have a contract and
|
14 |
therefore you can bring it under Section 1, does the
|
15 |
anticompetitive harm exceed the procompetitive benefit.
|
16 |
In the Section 2 case, it is, "was the defendant
|
17 |
able to apply or maintain monopoly power as a result of
|
18 |
the conduct or did it dangerously threaten to do so?"
|
19 |
And the way the rules and the economics come
|
20 |
into play is in helping the court decide what kinds of
|
21 |
inferences are permissible from the evidence, or in the
|
22 |
words of a famous case from way back in the '60s or
|
23 |
'70s -- I guess I'm showing my age -- if a frog be found
|
24 |
in the party punch bowl, one can infer the presence of a
|
25 |
mischievous guest, but not the presence of spontaneous |
153
1 |
generation.
|
2 |
That is the role of economics or that has been
|
3 |
the role of economics. That's how it has guided us in
|
4 |
the question of what inferences are possible, what
|
5 |
inferences are reasonable, from the facts that are
|
6 |
given.
|
7 |
So suppose, to take a hypothetical or a
|
8 |
paraphrase of a hypothetical that was used within the
|
9 |
Supreme Court in the last couple days, suppose you had
|
10 |
board of directors' minutes that said we are adopting
|
11 |
this practice even though it will be costly, even though
|
12 |
it is not going to earn us any profits because it will
|
13 |
cut off our rivals' air supply and ensure we will not
|
14 |
have serious competition for a generation.
|
15 |
In the absence of proof by the plaintiff that
|
16 |
the Ortho test is failed, can defendant get summary
|
17 |
judgment, or does plaintiff get to a jury, having
|
18 |
presented that evidence?
|
19 |
Well, I guess those of us who still remember the
|
20 |
law school side of the house -- and I realize that all
|
21 |
of us antitrust lawyers have slowly gravitated over the
|
22 |
years to being economists that simply haven't studied
|
23 |
enough to get a degree have to ask, what is the legal
|
24 |
framework, what is the legal system, how does the law
|
25 |
control what the role of the district judge is or what |
154
1 |
the role of the jury is, what the role of the Court of
|
2 |
Appeals is?
|
3 |
You would think that that case goes to the jury,
|
4 |
at least unless defendant can prove that this could not
|
5 |
possibly have caused the acquisition or maintenance of
|
6 |
monopoly power.
|
7 |
Now, it may be that people write documents all
|
8 |
the time, as someone earlier said, that they don't mean
|
9 |
or they are just deluded, and there may be a defendant
|
10 |
who can prove that. A lot of the real questions in
|
11 |
these areas devolve into questions of burden of proof.
|
12 |
When you get to the question of when is the
|
13 |
legal system confident enough to take those kinds of
|
14 |
questions away from the factfinder and to impose rules
|
15 |
that say this case cannot go to the jury, we will decide
|
16 |
it as a matter of law that such an outcome is right, you
|
17 |
are really looking for the kind of confidence that we
|
18 |
have in the predatory pricing area.
|
19 |
I think Tim started out his presentation with a
|
20 |
little bit of a refresher course on decision theory,
|
21 |
which I think is very apt, that we are all trying to
|
22 |
minimize the administrative costs plus the costs of
|
23 |
error, and having sensible administrable rules to do
|
24 |
that is a very valuable thing to do.
|
25 |
But at the end of the day, the question is in |
155
1 |
order to have a basis for applying that kind of rule, do
|
2 |
we have the kind of confidence that the cost of the
|
3 |
false positives in this kind of setting is going to so
|
4 |
swamp the cost of the false negatives that we should
|
5 |
simply say no, this kind of inference is not
|
6 |
permissible.
|
7 |
And I think, to borrow again from things that
|
8 |
I'm sure Tim Muris and others have said, one of the
|
9 |
virtues of the market is that it tends to be
|
10 |
self-correcting; whereas, misguided government
|
11 |
intervention tends not to be self-correcting, but,
|
12 |
rather, is persistent for a long time.
|
13 |
I think we should be cautious in this area as
|
14 |
well in applying per se rules that essentially cut off
|
15 |
the debate and end up not being self-correcting,
|
16 |
because, of course, if these instances of loyalty
|
17 |
rebates are per se lawful, unless plaintiff meets the
|
18 |
burden of proving something that is very difficult for
|
19 |
plaintiffs to prove, then those cases will never be
|
20 |
brought and you will not have the opportunity for the
|
21 |
development and refinement of those legal rules.
|
22 |
So I think I am much more comfortable with
|
23 |
presumptions and with rules of thumb that can be
|
24 |
overcome in the particular case. And in this
|
25 |
connection, I am somewhat taken by Dan Crane's |
156
1 |
suggestion that the legal standards might be different
|
2 |
purely in injunctive cases from the treble damage
|
3 |
situation.
|
4 |
I do think that to a large extent in antitrust
|
5 |
laws, our view of the substantive legal rules are shaped
|
6 |
by the institutional setting in which those rules are
|
7 |
developed, and properly so, because that tells you what
|
8 |
the cost of the false positives are, at least to some
|
9 |
extent.
|
10 |
In a setting where you don't have treble
|
11 |
damages, where the relief is purely prospective, you can
|
12 |
perhaps afford to experiment a little bit more or to be
|
13 |
somewhat more precise in the way you apply complex legal
|
14 |
rules or complex economic theories.
|
15 |
Here I am not going to please the Department of
|
16 |
Justice representatives or any of my former colleagues
|
17 |
at the Department of Justice. Because of the different
|
18 |
institutional settings that apply to those two agencies,
|
19 |
it is much easier for the Federal Trade Commission to do
|
20 |
that sort of thing than for the Department of Justice.
|
21 |
I have long found the portion of the Areeda-
|
22 |
Turner treatise that talks about applying a lower
|
23 |
substantive standard in Department of Justice injunctive
|
24 |
proceedings somewhat problematic because they are
|
25 |
applying the same statute that is applied in private |
157
1 |
cases, and to some extent the court doesn't have the
|
2 |
freedom to write different rules for the two different
|
3 |
sides, unlike Section 5, which is entirely different.
|
4 |
Indeed, if you go back and look at the
|
5 |
legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
|
6 |
it seems to be one of the very purposes for which the
|
7 |
Commission is created is to explore some of the cutting
|
8 |
edges, if you will, of the law and allow this expert
|
9 |
body to define prospective rules of the game in a way
|
10 |
that doesn't punish companies for past conduct that they
|
11 |
did not have reason to believe was unlawful.
|
12 |
I think given how much there is to talk about
|
13 |
among the panelists and how late it is in the day, I
|
14 |
think I will stop there and leave as much time as
|
15 |
possible for any discussion.
|
16 |
Thank you.
|
17 |
(Applause.)
|
18 |
MR. MEYER: Thanks very much. I think we will
|
19 |
take about 10 minutes as our break. It looks like it is
|
20 |
about quarter to three.
|
21 |
If we could all be back here in five minutes to
|
22 |
the hour, that would be great.
|
23 |
(Recess.)
|
24 |
MR. MEYER: We are ready.
|
25 |
We will start, as I said, with an opportunity |
158
1 |
for each of the panelists to comment on or reply to or
|
2 |
question the others about their remarks.
|
3 |
Just to shake things up a bit, I'm going to
|
4 |
suggest that we alter the order and start with Dan.
|
5 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: Sure. I guess I would like to
|
6 |
respond to one thing that Will said, which was the
|
7 |
hypothetical memo to the board of directors about the
|
8 |
reasons for a discount and how it could be exclusionary
|
9 |
of rivals.
|
10 |
The problem I would have with a legal standard
|
11 |
that focused on the intent of the defendant is that
|
12 |
usually it will not be a memo to the board of directors
|
13 |
but an e-mail to some third-tier manager that has some
|
14 |
inflammatory war metaphors for its metaphor about
|
15 |
crushing a competitor. And it won't be just one, it
|
16 |
will be three or four or five or six of these strung
|
17 |
together from millions of documents. You will always
|
18 |
find these in someone's files.
|
19 |
Although the memo to the board of directors
|
20 |
might be better evidence, in private litigation, if we
|
21 |
even raise intent as a consideration, it is those third
|
22 |
and fourth-tier manager e-mails that will become the
|
23 |
evidence that get to the people in the jury, even though
|
24 |
those e-mails really tell us very little about the true
|
25 |
efficiency consequences of the bundled discount program. |
159
1 |
I agree with Richard Posner that intent evidence
|
2 |
is evidence of anticompetitive conduct only two people
|
3 |
who sort of are foolishly taken by sort of aggressive
|
4 |
language. And juries certainly can be influenced by
|
5 |
that.
|
6 |
I think in the Brooke Group case, the post-jury
|
7 |
or post-trial interview showed the jurors had no
|
8 |
understanding about oligopoly, the average variable cost
|
9 |
test, but they were highly influenced by Brown and
|
10 |
Williamson's war documents. To me, that is not a good
|
11 |
standard.
|
12 |
MR. MEYER: Thanks very much.
|
13 |
Janusz, any thoughts?
|
14 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think that we are all
|
15 |
pretty much in agreement on a lot of aspects of how to
|
16 |
approach these kind of business practices.
|
17 |
My only question would be actually to Tim Muris,
|
18 |
whether or not we really have that much faith in
|
19 |
experimental economics to create the edifice of a big
|
20 |
chunk of antitrust laws, what it is that
|
21 |
well-incentivized graduates, undergraduates or even
|
22 |
faculty of the law school can do in these games.
|
23 |
I historically have been rather skeptical of
|
24 |
experimental economics. In this case, I think my
|
25 |
skepticism is probably heightened by virtue of the fact |
160
1 |
that the kind of environments in which litigation
|
2 |
actually takes place, the market settings in which the
|
3 |
actual litigations take place are very hard, I think, to
|
4 |
reproduce in the pure experimental setting.
|
5 |
I'm not saying there is no insight to be gained.
|
6 |
I'm trying to figure out whether or not this is enough
|
7 |
to say that we should allow X or that we should disallow
|
8 |
Z. I would say it is not.
|
9 |
It may be an interesting angle to look at
|
10 |
matters through the prism of these experiments. But I
|
11 |
would hate to have someone go to court and say that
|
12 |
Professor Vernon Smith, how much I admire his work over
|
13 |
the years, has shown that the experimental setting with
|
14 |
three firms, a bunch of graduates, X, Y, and Z cannot
|
15 |
happen, therefore the case should be dismissed.
|
16 |
I don't know whether you would go there. But I
|
17 |
would say that one shouldn't even try to go there.
|
18 |
That's my strongest reaction.
|
19 |
As to the Ortho test, of course I find it rather
|
20 |
attractive. The problem in that setting again, the test
|
21 |
was somewhat limited as to the broad application,
|
22 |
because it did involve again a very specific set of
|
23 |
relationships.
|
24 |
There was only one buyer, Red Cross, which
|
25 |
needed a whole panoply and did specify a whole panoply |
161
1 |
of red blood tests that it needed, and it commanded the
|
2 |
two offerors to give them bundled and unbundled pricing.
|
3 |
Where the issue arose, where I really fell down
|
4 |
flat on my face, was because we had no cost data for
|
5 |
anybody to be able to apply any of these scratchings on
|
6 |
the napkin that I have generated as a foundation for
|
7 |
this whole analysis.
|
8 |
But again -- so now the question does arise
|
9 |
whether what the court did there and how they looked at
|
10 |
the allocation of margins and so on would be directly
|
11 |
translatable into other circumstances.
|
12 |
So from an intellectual standpoint, the source
|
13 |
of that test is of course the so-called compensatory
|
14 |
pricing test that Bobby and I have invented since 1980.
|
15 |
I'm sort of asking myself those questions
|
16 |
because I see the possibility for the application. But
|
17 |
I also understand the limited setting in which the test
|
18 |
actually had its traction may not have the kind of
|
19 |
traction that we would need in other contexts.
|
20 |
MR. MEYER: Thanks, Janusz.
|
21 |
When DOJ develops and opens its museum on
|
22 |
loyalty discounts, it will ask you to donate that
|
23 |
napkin.
|
24 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think it is part of the
|
25 |
record. Mr. Weinstein, whoever was the lawyer for the |
162
1 |
other side, actually he attached it to my deposition.
|
2 |
It should be someplace. I think I have it.
|
3 |
MR. MEYER: We will leave no stone unturned.
|
4 |
Since you have now posed two questions for Tim,
|
5 |
one that you just asked him about, experimental
|
6 |
economics, and the earlier one about age and looks, Tim,
|
7 |
you can respond now.
|
8 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: We will leave the second one
|
9 |
to a market test.
|
10 |
Let me make four points. You will probably hear
|
11 |
me either way. The first is just a point I repeatedly
|
12 |
make to the world, which is that when people say
|
13 |
Chicago, they are talking Posner and Bork, who don't
|
14 |
even -- Posner and Bork are the most extremely
|
15 |
differentiated on mergers. But Posner and Bork had
|
16 |
certain views that were not the views of a so-called
|
17 |
Chicago economist.
|
18 |
I don't consider myself a Chicago economist. I
|
19 |
like what is called the new institutional economics.
|
20 |
As a matter of fact, what is called Chicago
|
21 |
economics before 1960 invented and dismissed as
|
22 |
empirically irrelevant raising rivals' costs, variable
|
23 |
proportions as an explanation for why tying is
|
24 |
anticompetitive and why, RPM could be anticompetitive in
|
25 |
certain circumstances, all this by 1960. |
163
1 |
Posner and Bork came along, particularly in the
|
2 |
vertical practices, with what I think was a restrictive
|
3 |
and extreme view.
|
4 |
On experimental economics, there are some
|
5 |
economists who are concerned about experimental
|
6 |
economics. I think there is enormous validity to
|
7 |
experimental economics in the sense that basic
|
8 |
theoretical propositions of economics are verified in
|
9 |
the lab.
|
10 |
The beauty of the experiments is that one can
|
11 |
take Janusz's paper, which I obviously haven't studied
|
12 |
and deals with a different problem than was modeled in
|
13 |
the bundling, you could take that paper and you could
|
14 |
run it in the lab and run various differences and see
|
15 |
what happened.
|
16 |
In this world, for better or worse, experimental
|
17 |
economics is the one-eyed man in the kingdom of the
|
18 |
blind.
|
19 |
We are dealing with almost complete ignorance
|
20 |
about the empirical effects of bundling. We are taking
|
21 |
a ubiquitous practice in nonmarket power settings and
|
22 |
saying in market power settings there are problems here
|
23 |
based on an extreme set of assumptions.
|
24 |
My third comment is about bright-line rules,
|
25 |
which Will was talking about. Even -- I guess this will |
164
1 |
turn out to be a point that Janusz may want to talk
|
2 |
about as well.
|
3 |
Even in Brooke Group, which appears to be a very
|
4 |
bright-line rule, courts are pushing it. Janusz
|
5 |
testified for Northwest in the Spirit -- is that --
|
6 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Yes, I did successfully the
|
7 |
first time around.
|
8 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Right, right.
|
9 |
The point is that the Sixth Circuit, Brooke
|
10 |
Group or no Brooke Group, was pushing the envelope
|
11 |
there.
|
12 |
And I think what we ought to do is look at the
|
13 |
world as we know it, and the world as we know it is a
|
14 |
world in which LePage's has caused lots of damage. We
|
15 |
have highly theoretical evidence of problems without
|
16 |
real world evidence.
|
17 |
Of course, the experiments were designed to push
|
18 |
and test and find exclusionary bundling and didn't. But
|
19 |
someone can go run modifications if they want, which
|
20 |
leads me to my fourth point, which is the Ortho test.
|
21 |
The Ortho test, as they say, Parker, is
|
22 |
obviously much better than the standard LePage's world.
|
23 |
The problem is that it is so easy for -- one of many
|
24 |
problems with Ortho besides the fact that it would
|
25 |
condemn efficient practices is that it is so easy to |
165
1 |
turn the safe harbor into the test.
|
2 |
I assume Professor Crane would reject that.
|
3 |
Professor Hovenkamp rejects that. But it would be very
|
4 |
easy to cross over that line.
|
5 |
When you are shifting presumptions makes a
|
6 |
difference. One of the interesting things on the
|
7 |
Twombley argument Monday was Justice Stephens through
|
8 |
the course of the argument, it appeared -- who knows
|
9 |
exactly, obviously -- it occurred to him that if he
|
10 |
allowed the complaint, from his questioning, if you
|
11 |
allowed the complaint, there was going to be some fact
|
12 |
that was going to survive a motion for summary judgment.
|
13 |
As a practical matter, maybe you did want to
|
14 |
scream at the complaint level. I wrote an amicus brief,
|
15 |
along with some other people at O'Melveny, supporting
|
16 |
the petitioners in Twombley. So I obviously have a dog
|
17 |
in that hunt.
|
18 |
Recognizing these real world practical
|
19 |
considerations, as Will and others have said, is
|
20 |
absolutely essential.
|
21 |
MR. MEYER: Thanks.
|
22 |
Will, your final opportunity.
|
23 |
MR. TOM: Let me just respond to Dan Crane's
|
24 |
last remark by repeating something that Joe Kattan said
|
25 |
this morning, and that is "intent to do what?" |
166
1 |
I think there is a danger in a lot of these
|
2 |
areas in using broad classifications to stand for a
|
3 |
whole bunch of disparate things, and that applies to
|
4 |
evidence as well as it does to some of the economic
|
5 |
issues we have been discussing here today.
|
6 |
I think most courts nowadays confronted only
|
7 |
with the intent evidence that says "let's crush our
|
8 |
competitors" would say that that is insufficient
|
9 |
evidence to go to the factfinder.
|
10 |
Whether you should then sweep into that every
|
11 |
other piece of evidence that you find in an internal
|
12 |
company document I'm highly dubious about.
|
13 |
MR. MEYER: Okay. With those comments, I think
|
14 |
we will turn now to the propositions.
|
15 |
In these hearings, we have been using
|
16 |
propositions merely as a starting point for discussion
|
17 |
and not necessarily as a set of propositions that
|
18 |
reflect the agencies' views either for enforcement or
|
19 |
otherwise.
|
20 |
If we go to slide 3, we will start with this. I
|
21 |
think perhaps we might have something like agreement,
|
22 |
but I will ask.
|
23 |
The proposition is the LePage's decision's
|
24 |
vagueness is likely to chill pricing behavior that
|
25 |
enhances consumer welfare. Agree or disagree? |
167
1 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I agree.
|
2 |
MR. MEYER: We all agree?
|
3 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: I do agree. And from a
|
4 |
client-counseling perspective, I have been on a number
|
5 |
of calls in cases where someone is not a defendant but
|
6 |
simply trying to figure out what they can do and what
|
7 |
they can't do.
|
8 |
Without being too specific, for attorney-client
|
9 |
privilege reasons, if you have any moderate degree of
|
10 |
risk aversion, you can guess what the answer is.
|
11 |
It is oftentimes the case that you probably
|
12 |
wouldn't get sued, but you don't want to be the person
|
13 |
who gives the advice that we could bring in the smart
|
14 |
economist and convince the court to dismiss the case on
|
15 |
summary judgment.
|
16 |
You tell them you don't want to invite
|
17 |
litigation at all and it is always better to try to
|
18 |
unbundle a discount than to face the prospect of
|
19 |
litigation.
|
20 |
MR. MEYER: I certainly understand the need to
|
21 |
mask the specific facts. But are the situations that
|
22 |
you are describing ones where, at least in the mind of
|
23 |
the company involved, there is a clear pro-competitive
|
24 |
motivation or rationale for wanting to structure a
|
25 |
discount program and they are asking can we do this |
168
1 |
without fear of litigation or is it where they have the
|
2 |
structure and they are being asked is this going to pose
|
3 |
problems?
|
4 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: It really varies. Even what a
|
5 |
pro-competitive justification is I'm not always clear
|
6 |
on.
|
7 |
There are certainly cases where clients are
|
8 |
asking. Sometimes these bundled discounts are customer
|
9 |
driven, and large diversified buyers are putting
|
10 |
pressure on sellers to give them a concession for
|
11 |
buying, and that is simply responding to pressure from
|
12 |
the client.
|
13 |
Sometimes there is a question simply about using
|
14 |
as a competitive advantage, not to necessarily exclude a
|
15 |
rival, but because you think you can increase your
|
16 |
market share through a discount that takes advantage of
|
17 |
your diversification.
|
18 |
I think certainly I tell the client if the
|
19 |
discount is one that looks like it is going to really
|
20 |
harm the competitor to the point of extinction,
|
21 |
obviously you shouldn't do it. Even far short of that,
|
22 |
clients often think about this as a competitive
|
23 |
strategy.
|
24 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Would the answer differ in
|
25 |
the following two settings? |
169
1 |
One, there are bundled discounts but we have
|
2 |
something called mixed bundling. In other words, you
|
3 |
offer a bundle, there is a good price, like the one that
|
4 |
ABA offered for two volumes of writings, but there is
|
5 |
also a stand-alone price.
|
6 |
Because of the not total disattractiveness of
|
7 |
the stand-alone prices, people can avail themselves of
|
8 |
buying one of the volumes and then buying a substitute
|
9 |
product somewhere else. But there are recognizable
|
10 |
efficiencies from bundling.
|
11 |
Does one get protected under any of these
|
12 |
LePage's standards or their progeny from the challenge
|
13 |
if you do indeed offer mixed bundling and you also
|
14 |
demonstrate that people are buying at the stand-alone
|
15 |
price?
|
16 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: That's an important point. I
|
17 |
think the hypothesis of the attack with LePage's is you
|
18 |
don't have a de facto time. It is calling it mixed
|
19 |
bundling.
|
20 |
MR. MEYER: Is the problem with LePage's from
|
21 |
the perspective of its vagueness and potential to chill
|
22 |
behavior, which I think we all agree to, is the problem
|
23 |
the lack of a safe harbor, the lack of a concrete cast
|
24 |
or the focus on the impact on rivals or something else
|
25 |
or all of the above? |
170
1 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: I think it is the lack of a
|
2 |
concrete test. Even though we had the Ortho standard,
|
3 |
it would be sometimes hard in a client-counseling
|
4 |
situation to anticipate how that would come out in
|
5 |
practice.
|
6 |
I think most bundled discounts would clearly
|
7 |
meet the Ortho safe harbor. And it is not even a
|
8 |
question of most cases.
|
9 |
What I think that would do is change the culture
|
10 |
of this issue in the courts, where you could tell a
|
11 |
client that only in really sort of egregious cases of
|
12 |
bundled discounting that has a clearly exclusionary
|
13 |
effect on single-product rivals will a court condemn it.
|
14 |
That will certainly change your willingness to
|
15 |
say go ahead and do it.
|
16 |
MR. MEYER: Let's turn to proposition 6.
|
17 |
This problem situation is as follows: Because
|
18 |
lower prices immediately benefit consumers, we should be
|
19 |
extremely careful not to adopt legal rules that can
|
20 |
result in false positives, that is, condemn legitimate
|
21 |
price cutting.
|
22 |
Do we agree or disagree with that proposition?
|
23 |
MR. TOM: I think the disagreement here will be
|
24 |
more on whether this proposition is one that is relevant
|
25 |
to the loyalty discount kind of setting rather than |
171
1 |
agreement or disagreement with the proposition itself.
|
2 |
I think we all agree that in general we like
|
3 |
lower prices to consumers as long as it is not an
|
4 |
exercise of monopoly power. You will not get a lot of
|
5 |
disagreement on that.
|
6 |
MR. MEYER: Is your question, Will, whether in
|
7 |
certain situations the loyalty rebates that are being
|
8 |
offered to particular customers actually result in the
|
9 |
overall prices paid by them being higher rather than
|
10 |
lower in the short term, or is this a long-term versus
|
11 |
short-term problem you are identifying?
|
12 |
MR. TOM: Even in the short term, there are
|
13 |
issues of what would the stand-alone prices have been,
|
14 |
absent allowing it.
|
15 |
MR. MEYER: Have we seen any cases where the
|
16 |
prices in the short term were higher?
|
17 |
MR. TOM: There was one mentioned this morning.
|
18 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: The SmithKline case this
|
19 |
morning.
|
20 |
The discussion this morning was that in
|
21 |
SmithKline, the offer was a 3 percent increase
|
22 |
accompanied by a bundled discount to buying the package,
|
23 |
which would suggest there was the possibility that even
|
24 |
in the short run, the defendant was not sacrificing
|
25 |
profits immediately by taking market share from |
172
1 |
single-product rivals.
|
2 |
MR. MEYER: Fine. Going back to the beginning
|
3 |
here and with Will's amendment, if the bundled discount
|
4 |
or loyalty discount results in lower prices in the short
|
5 |
term, we all agree that care should be taken to avoid
|
6 |
chilling such conduct?
|
7 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: I agree. Let me add, I wasn't
|
8 |
here this morning, but I assume that Professor Nalebuff
|
9 |
was probably the most aggressive on behalf of his
|
10 |
various rules.
|
11 |
If you look at Tim Brennan's comment on his
|
12 |
paper, it shows that in the equilibria, consumers are
|
13 |
better off in the short run virtually all the time.
|
14 |
That's the nature of excluding, what it means.
|
15 |
So the theory is really a long-run theory. It is not a
|
16 |
theory in the model. But that is really the theory.
|
17 |
And that's I think a very strong reason to agree with
|
18 |
the proposition that we need to be very careful.
|
19 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think to emphasize what
|
20 |
Tim said, I agree 100 percent. And that is in order to
|
21 |
close the model of these adverse effects, you really
|
22 |
have to have the second stage or the third stage and
|
23 |
when something bad actually does happen from a price
|
24 |
discount, unless you can show that, you don't have a leg
|
25 |
to stand on in the rest of the case. |
173
1 |
It could be a complicated set of issues to be
|
2 |
addressed, these intertemporal linkages, the R&D
|
3 |
incentives. But if the marketplace is not of the sort
|
4 |
that it is susceptible to exclusionary conduct over a
|
5 |
long haul, then I think we should really be very
|
6 |
protective of price cutting.
|
7 |
I think where the problem comes in is much of
|
8 |
the literature on loyalty rebates, as summarized in much
|
9 |
of Professor Elhauge's writings, actually show this
|
10 |
concept -- sort of like the rug carpet dealership or the
|
11 |
vitamin store where you always get 20 percent off. They
|
12 |
don't say what the benchmark over which you are
|
13 |
discounting is.
|
14 |
There is that issue. The equilibria in many of
|
15 |
these games, the discount is off of what appears to be a
|
16 |
super-monopoly price, and then really it boils down to
|
17 |
another point Tim made very importantly earlier today,
|
18 |
which is to say is that a credible threat for the
|
19 |
incumbent firm to say if you don't buy it from me, I
|
20 |
will charge you monopoly price plus 15 percent on top of
|
21 |
that.
|
22 |
Again, that is a complicated analytical issue,
|
23 |
whether or not this is a credible threat or not. It
|
24 |
really much depends on how you view this monopolist
|
25 |
power to guide the transactions. |
174
1 |
After all, you can say the same thing to a
|
2 |
monopolist who says, "look, I'm charging you $10 for the
|
3 |
widget." You say "hell with you, I'm not paying $10."
|
4 |
He says, "okay, okay, I will charge you 9." Then the
|
5 |
whole thing begins to unravel.
|
6 |
Every monopolist issue is that of credibility.
|
7 |
I think as Carlos pointed out, when the monopolist
|
8 |
cannot stick credibly to his threat, the monopolist
|
9 |
competing against himself will drag the price down to
|
10 |
his marginal cost.
|
11 |
We have the same question here. How credible is
|
12 |
the super-monopoly price as a way to enforce an
|
13 |
equilibrium in which everybody is paying close to
|
14 |
monopoly price, which is what the outcome is in the
|
15 |
naked exclusion model.
|
16 |
That's the story of that basic model which
|
17 |
Elhauge finds very attractive.
|
18 |
MR. TOM: For a clarification point, aren't most
|
19 |
of these models that are based on a super monopoly price
|
20 |
for the monopolized good and a discounted price for the
|
21 |
competitive good ones in which commitment is not
|
22 |
necessary because the purchaser of the bundle does not
|
23 |
face a price increase? That is, the excess of the
|
24 |
monopoly price on good A is no greater than the discount
|
25 |
on the competitive price. |
175
1 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: You end up in equilibrium
|
2 |
with something close to the monopoly price. In the
|
3 |
naked exclusion model, you end up with an equilibrium
|
4 |
where everybody is getting a penny off the dollar price.
|
5 |
That is again supported by what some people may
|
6 |
consider not credible threats of how the firm will
|
7 |
behave out of equilibrium.
|
8 |
That is the same problem in all of these models
|
9 |
potentially, actually, other than the Ordover-Shaffer
|
10 |
model in which the equilibrium is supported by credible
|
11 |
contracts.
|
12 |
I'm talking about game theory stuff. I don't
|
13 |
know whether it makes any difference to anybody here.
|
14 |
If you are trying to be serious about it, you try to
|
15 |
model it seriously. It is very difficult because it
|
16 |
does require this credibility.
|
17 |
MR. TOM: The credibility issue is that you will
|
18 |
still give the discount on the below marginal cost on
|
19 |
the competitive product even if he doesn't buy the
|
20 |
monopoly product?
|
21 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Right. Or if somebody
|
22 |
refused to transact with you, that you will not revise
|
23 |
the market off.
|
24 |
MR. MEYER: Didn't you mean the other way
|
25 |
around? If you don't buy the competitive product, the |
176
1 |
monopolist will still charge just the monopoly price,
|
2 |
not the super-monopoly price.
|
3 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Right. A couple points.
|
4 |
On FTC.gov, you can find in terms of naked
|
5 |
exclusion the originator of the concept, Michael Winston
|
6 |
-- unfortunately, this was a workshop we had that turned
|
7 |
out to be on September 11, 2001, which was a pretty
|
8 |
crazy day.
|
9 |
Anyway, the economists, they all stayed and
|
10 |
talked. And he said he didn't have a clue whether this
|
11 |
has any empirical significance or not, which I think is
|
12 |
an honest position.
|
13 |
In terms of the super-monopoly price, the
|
14 |
de facto time is the special case here. The reason the
|
15 |
Nalebuff thing is so important if it had empirical
|
16 |
significance is it is above-cost exclusion with mixed
|
17 |
bundling.
|
18 |
One of the interesting results of the
|
19 |
experiments that I did talk about is mixed bundling
|
20 |
still occurs a lot, virtually under every setting.
|
21 |
Mixed bundling again being where they are selling the
|
22 |
stand-alone as well as the bundle offering and selling
|
23 |
it.
|
24 |
And a further point of interest of the
|
25 |
experiments and in terms of -- remember, when you talk |
177
1 |
about exclusionary behavior, we are all agreeing the
|
2 |
point is on welfare, not on excluding competitors.
|
3 |
When ICES tweaked their model to try to really
|
4 |
push and show that bundling decreased welfare, they did
|
5 |
show big-time exclusion. But they showed very small
|
6 |
reductions in welfare, not statistically significant,
|
7 |
even under very extreme assumptions.
|
8 |
MR. MEYER: Let's go to proposition number 5, if
|
9 |
we could.
|
10 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: I think he is trying to
|
11 |
confuse us.
|
12 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Like Lenin, two steps
|
13 |
forward, one step back.
|
14 |
MR. MEYER: I think the comments that Janusz and
|
15 |
Tim made may be a good segue to this proposition, and
|
16 |
that is a loyalty discount that allows a competitor to
|
17 |
operate profitably at some scale can never be harmful to
|
18 |
consumers.
|
19 |
Anyone want to take that one on?
|
20 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think that to use such
|
21 |
things as "never," even in the proposition --
|
22 |
MR. MEYER: How about taking it on as usually
|
23 |
can't?
|
24 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think we just don't know.
|
25 |
I think if the competitor can operate profitably, then |
178
1 |
there has to be a showing to condemn the practice that
|
2 |
somehow that scale which it can operate is so
|
3 |
sufficiently constricted as to render basically the
|
4 |
competitor, the rival marginally profitable, much less
|
5 |
constraining of the market outcome than in a less
|
6 |
constricted equilibrium.
|
7 |
So the question is that of the benchmark,
|
8 |
really. The consumers benefit from having competition.
|
9 |
If the scale is sufficiently large, the
|
10 |
competitor cannot be profitable and exert competitive
|
11 |
pressure. Then I would say that's good enough. If the
|
12 |
competitor is completely marginalized, it is one of the
|
13 |
few competitors that can exert any kind of competitive
|
14 |
pressure, I believe that possibly could be a
|
15 |
circumstance that may require some remedial
|
16 |
intervention.
|
17 |
MR. MEYER: Others?
|
18 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Let me preface this by saying
|
19 |
all of my comments reflect this basic framework of the
|
20 |
efficient legal system.
|
21 |
George Stigler once wrote a piece where he just
|
22 |
numbered the comments, the first one, of course, being a
|
23 |
Chicagoist, this is just a coast theorem.
|
24 |
Everything I'm saying is in the context of
|
25 |
efficient legal rules. Here the models that people are |
179
1 |
positing are models of complete exclusion. If we have
|
2 |
quote partial exclusion, Janusz is absolutely right; I'm
|
3 |
sure you can conjure up a situation where that is bad.
|
4 |
As a practical matter we ought to be cautious if
|
5 |
the exclusion is partial in terms of false positives.
|
6 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I agree. The European
|
7 |
Union's white paper, pink paper, whichever color they
|
8 |
use on anticompetitive conduct has some complicated rule
|
9 |
dealing with something called the suction test and the
|
10 |
loyalty rebates.
|
11 |
I tried to figure out what it means empirically,
|
12 |
how to apply it. It strikes me as a rather difficult
|
13 |
undertaking.
|
14 |
If the competitor can operate profitably, the
|
15 |
burden shifts drastically against the complaining rivals
|
16 |
to show that something else could have happened but for
|
17 |
this conduct that truly would benefit welfare.
|
18 |
I would apply a very strict test to what it is
|
19 |
that can be shown or should be shown. It was a minimum
|
20 |
showing in such a circumstance from the competitor.
|
21 |
MR. TOM: In fact, you are looking for the
|
22 |
rival's marginal cost to be raised in such a way that
|
23 |
the perpetrator can raise prices.
|
24 |
MR. MEYER: In the spirit of jumping around, I
|
25 |
think we will go to slide 8. |
180
1 |
We have already heard a little bit of debate
|
2 |
about this in the earlier dialogue, but to state this
|
3 |
proposition. In a loyalty discount case "intent is
|
4 |
relevant to proving monopolization." Quoting from
|
5 |
LePage's.
|
6 |
I will start this, conscious of the prior
|
7 |
comments, by first asking whether if you have intent --
|
8 |
maybe we can all agree on this. If the evidence is
|
9 |
simply that the defendant intended to cause harm to his
|
10 |
rivals, to drive its rivals out of business, to raise
|
11 |
their costs, to steal sales from them, is that ever
|
12 |
enough to get to a jury?
|
13 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: Just to repeat what I said
|
14 |
before, part of the problem is I don't know what a
|
15 |
corporation's intent is.
|
16 |
A corporation is a fictional person. Will's
|
17 |
suggestion that we can't simply lump all intent in the
|
18 |
same category maybe is right in theory.
|
19 |
When you get to actual litigation, if the legal
|
20 |
standard is framed as an intent-oriented standard or one
|
21 |
where intent is a relevant proposition, how do we
|
22 |
separate out the different kinds of intent and at what
|
23 |
stage in the litigation?
|
24 |
Is this a role for the court in summary judgment
|
25 |
to sort of talk about different kinds of intent and sort |
181
1 |
of sort them out as a screening device?
|
2 |
I think that would get rather difficult to do.
|
3 |
Again, it would also create a predictability problem.
|
4 |
In most cases, the objective economic evidence
|
5 |
will be available for something like the Ortho test, and
|
6 |
it really should not be necessary to go to intent.
|
7 |
MR. MEYER: Any other reactions to the first
|
8 |
question?
|
9 |
MR. TOM: To your specific question, certainly I
|
10 |
think everyone would agree on 1 and 3. I'm not sure
|
11 |
that everyone would agree that a demonstration that your
|
12 |
plan was to raise your rival's cost would necessarily
|
13 |
get a free pass.
|
14 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Competition is about killing
|
15 |
your rival, really, or diminishing its capability as far
|
16 |
as you can do that.
|
17 |
The real question is is it done in a way that is
|
18 |
conducive to consumer welfare or done in a way that
|
19 |
harms it for horizons we are comfortable to deal with,
|
20 |
whether you can sort it out efficiently without running
|
21 |
into these other problems or without having the current
|
22 |
rival abusing the system.
|
23 |
I think one should not view intent as really a
|
24 |
bunch of nasty e-mails. One should look to intent as a
|
25 |
manifestation of business practice that has a likelihood |
182
1 |
of harming competition.
|
2 |
From my perspective, when I teach my kids about
|
3 |
competition, they say what do you do when you run
|
4 |
experiments at NYU, yes, you try to vanquish your rival,
|
5 |
but try to do it in such a way that is conducive to
|
6 |
welfare. Let them figure out what that means. That's
|
7 |
the true story.
|
8 |
MR. TOM: Is that the jury instruction?
|
9 |
MR. MEYER: What if instead of being evidence of
|
10 |
1 and 3, as the shorthand we will use, and I think what
|
11 |
that means, if I'm recalling my own comment, is evidence
|
12 |
of a desire to kill the rival or eliminate the rival or
|
13 |
steal sales from the rival, instead of that you had
|
14 |
documents or testimony that constituted a very detailed
|
15 |
analysis of the reasons why the business wanted to
|
16 |
engage in this practice of structuring the discounts in
|
17 |
the way they were structured that had appeared on its
|
18 |
face to have nothing to do with hurting the rival or
|
19 |
excluding the rival.
|
20 |
Would that be probative in some way?
|
21 |
MR. TOM: It seems like it would be probative of
|
22 |
an efficiency justification or lack of competitive
|
23 |
effect, if I'm understanding your question right.
|
24 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: It could be probative of the
|
25 |
fact that the practice makes sense, that the competitive |
183
1 |
practice irrespective potentially of how it affects the
|
2 |
competitive marketplace, if that's your question.
|
3 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Under Brooke Group, since I'm
|
4 |
arguing for modified Brooke Group, you have this
|
5 |
price-cost safe harbor. If you fail that, you need to
|
6 |
show the entity competitive effect. There are obviously
|
7 |
places where the law makes intent relevant, including
|
8 |
Norr Pennington, for example, especially in the
|
9 |
so-called pattern case because of the nature of the
|
10 |
First Amendment protection.
|
11 |
But here I think you need -- this is one of your
|
12 |
other propositions, if I'm jumping the gun. I think you
|
13 |
do need price-cost benchmarks to start with.
|
14 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: Intent is certainly relevant
|
15 |
in an attempt-to-monopolize case, because intent is a
|
16 |
specific intent crime and the Supreme Court has made
|
17 |
clear that intent is relevant.
|
18 |
But intent in a case like Spectrum Sports would
|
19 |
only come in in addition to a showing of exclusionary
|
20 |
conduct.
|
21 |
As to that element, a legal defense might
|
22 |
concern LePage's in that it seems to make intent part of
|
23 |
that element of the offence, which is anticompetitive or
|
24 |
exclusionary conduct, which seems to suggest that even
|
25 |
if you have weak evidence, sort of economic evidence of |
184
1 |
exclusionary conduct, that intent can make up for the
|
2 |
weakness in that showing, which I think should not be
|
3 |
right.
|
4 |
MR. MEYER: What are your thoughts on this
|
5 |
question? Can good intent save you even if it turns out
|
6 |
that you were wrong?
|
7 |
For example, there are detailed analyses that
|
8 |
all the prices are going to be above cost, no matter how
|
9 |
you measure them incrementally or in the aggregate, and
|
10 |
it turns out there was a math error. How does that case
|
11 |
come out?
|
12 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: That's the historical accident
|
13 |
standard, where you monopolize completely by mistake. I
|
14 |
will use that on my antitrust exam. It is a
|
15 |
hypothetical case.
|
16 |
I don't think the defendant should have a
|
17 |
defense that we had benign intent. But, of course,
|
18 |
pro-competitive justifications as the explanation for
|
19 |
the conduct could be like the defendant's intent. I
|
20 |
think, of course, that's always permissible.
|
21 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Especially in certain areas
|
22 |
of business conduct, for example, R&D, research, it may
|
23 |
turn out it is more costly than you planned or more
|
24 |
successful than you thought it was going to be.
|
25 |
When you have business activities with |
185
1 |
themselves, random outcomes hard to predict, it is key
|
2 |
that one should not hang somebody for a circumstance
|
3 |
that is one of the possible many outcomes, most of which
|
4 |
or at least ex ante believe that you are going to be
|
5 |
acting in a pro competitive manner.
|
6 |
If you embark on an R&D program which may cause
|
7 |
some problems for your competitors but it turns out you
|
8 |
are now going to be spending 10 percent more, somebody
|
9 |
said if you knew you were going to spend 10 percent
|
10 |
more, now you are killing us.
|
11 |
It is the sort of ex ante nature of the
|
12 |
calculation that is the right way to look at it.
|
13 |
MR. MEYER: Janusz, you promised one step back.
|
14 |
We will go back to slide 7.
|
15 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I'm no Lenin.
|
16 |
MR. MEYER: Loyalty discounts, either single
|
17 |
product or bundled, should never be condemned without
|
18 |
applying some kind of price-cost test.
|
19 |
Tim, I think you said you agree with that.
|
20 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Sure, for the reasons of
|
21 |
administrability and an efficient operation of the legal
|
22 |
system.
|
23 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: I would add in addition to
|
24 |
what Tim said also just for the purpose of disciplining
|
25 |
litigation. |
186
1 |
The problem with sort of open-ended standards
|
2 |
that don't contain sort of concrete legal rules is that
|
3 |
the district courts tend to interpret these as
|
4 |
invitations to punt issues downstream to juries, and
|
5 |
that then leads to forced settlement because people are
|
6 |
risk averse and don't want to go to trial.
|
7 |
Part of this is not simply from business
|
8 |
planning purposes. It is also to give a more
|
9 |
disciplined structure to motions to dismiss, and for
|
10 |
summary judgment that allows very serious screening of
|
11 |
cases so that only the very most meritorious cases ever
|
12 |
make it to a jury.
|
13 |
MR. TOM: I'm not sure if this one is right or
|
14 |
not. The reason I say that is that what you are
|
15 |
essentially saying is the application, the passing or
|
16 |
failing of a price-cost test is part of plaintiff's
|
17 |
burden of proof and that without meeting that burden,
|
18 |
the plaintiff should fail.
|
19 |
Maybe that's right. Maybe we know enough about
|
20 |
these price-cost tests and we know enough about the
|
21 |
ability to prove this that it should be part of
|
22 |
plaintiff's burden.
|
23 |
On the other hand, if you take my board of
|
24 |
directors hypothetical, if you will, maybe one should
|
25 |
say, well, the ultimate question under the law as it has |
187
1 |
been handed down to us is is this conduct on that
|
2 |
pro-competitive or anticompetitive.
|
3 |
Plaintiff has come forward with some evidence.
|
4 |
If defendant is able to rebut it by application of the
|
5 |
price-cost tests, then we will accept that as a trump.
|
6 |
But it is not part of plaintiff's prima facie case.
|
7 |
I don't know which one is right. Maybe the
|
8 |
economists on the panel or others can give us all some
|
9 |
empirical basis for knowing which is more likely to lead
|
10 |
to better results.
|
11 |
MR. MEYER: It sounds like your alternative
|
12 |
approach as you have described it would mean there is no
|
13 |
safe harbor that a business can rely upon but, rather,
|
14 |
that cases would go to summary judgment, past summary
|
15 |
judgment to the jury if there is any evidence from which
|
16 |
a jury could reasonably find --
|
17 |
MR. TOM: No, I don't think that's quite right,
|
18 |
because, of course, if it is a trump, if the price cost
|
19 |
is a trump, it is defendant's trump, of course the state
|
20 |
of the record on summary judgment may be such that there
|
21 |
is no question of material fact in dispute as to that
|
22 |
trump. Then it doesn't go to the jury.
|
23 |
It is really -- I think that the difference is
|
24 |
not whether these cases automatically go to the jury.
|
25 |
The difference is who has to come up with this evidence |
188
1 |
and which way do these cases get decided under a state
|
2 |
of uncertainty as to the price-cost test.
|
3 |
Or another way of putting it is is our knowledge
|
4 |
of the price-cost test so superior to any other
|
5 |
knowledge that we can bring to bear on the ultimate
|
6 |
question of competitive effect that we should make it
|
7 |
part of the prima facie case.
|
8 |
MR. MEYER: Let me flip the question around a
|
9 |
little bit and ask let's say it were an affirmative
|
10 |
defense so that at summary judgment the defendant could
|
11 |
prevail if it demonstrated there was no dispute that
|
12 |
prices were above cost.
|
13 |
Is it a different answer in that case or you
|
14 |
still want to allow more of what I will call an
|
15 |
open-ended inquiry into that.
|
16 |
MR. TOM: If defendant can show that, that's
|
17 |
pretty convincing.
|
18 |
MR. MEYER: Janusz, any thoughts?
|
19 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: As an economist, I'm very
|
20 |
fond of tests that are clear-cut and also try to compare
|
21 |
some sort of price to some sort of cost.
|
22 |
But I think a price versus cost test is a very
|
23 |
ambiguous standard because we already have heard today
|
24 |
that there could be average price, average cost, there
|
25 |
could be marginal price vis-a-vis opportunity cost, |
189
1 |
which is what the Ortho cost was, where the marginal
|
2 |
price was the incremental revenue under tests that Ortho
|
3 |
could have provided against Abbott. And the question
|
4 |
was which of the allocation of the costs ought to be
|
5 |
brought into the particular calculation.
|
6 |
So there is nothing wrong with price versus cost
|
7 |
tests. The question is is it the right test in each and
|
8 |
every case that involves possibly anticompetitive
|
9 |
conduct.
|
10 |
As an economist, I really don't know. If I were
|
11 |
to be advising petitioners, I would say let's try to
|
12 |
come up with as clear rules as we can. We ought to be
|
13 |
comfortable with understanding the meaning of the price
|
14 |
and the meaning of the cost in the test, comfortable
|
15 |
with advocating the correct price and the correct cost.
|
16 |
MR. MEYER: Is there a clear rule you would be
|
17 |
comfortable with, Janusz, as to a particular price and a
|
18 |
particular cost as a safe harbor for these kind of
|
19 |
loyalty discounts?
|
20 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: In the Ortho test, I thought
|
21 |
the rule, which was already my prior work and which is
|
22 |
consistent with much of the telecommunications
|
23 |
regulatory practice, where it came from, the efficient
|
24 |
component pricing rule, which is the progeny for all of
|
25 |
this, I thought was a good rule. And I would like to |
190
1 |
see that be applied if possible.
|
2 |
But there could be circumstances in which one
|
3 |
can try to argue that it is not the right one, that a
|
4 |
better calculation would be to look at the average cost
|
5 |
versus average price of some sort.
|
6 |
I think that in, for example, U.S. versus
|
7 |
American Airlines, I thought that the relevant test
|
8 |
would be applied to profitability of the route, because
|
9 |
the contestable object there was the route or a large
|
10 |
portion of the route, as opposed to marginal flight,
|
11 |
which was not what the gain was all about.
|
12 |
I don't have a hard and fast rule, and I would
|
13 |
like to be able to argue for some degree of flexibility,
|
14 |
in part because different circumstances may call for a
|
15 |
different version of this thing called the price-cost
|
16 |
test.
|
17 |
MR. MEYER: Is there any rule that you would say
|
18 |
a monopolist or a firm --
|
19 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Let me come back next year.
|
20 |
MR. MEYER: -- could take comfort in as a safe
|
21 |
harbor?
|
22 |
Is there some minimum least common denominator
|
23 |
in your various approaches so that you would be
|
24 |
comfortable with a rule that said these situations will
|
25 |
never be the source of Section 2 liability? |
191
1 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I don't think that I'm that
|
2 |
smart or that obnoxious to have such a vision.
|
3 |
Again, as I said, I said something along these
|
4 |
lines in the Ortho test. I thought that was not a bad
|
5 |
test.
|
6 |
I also think in different settings, much broader
|
7 |
increments of output ought to be the test. I think it
|
8 |
has to be looked at in the specifics of a particular
|
9 |
case as much as possible.
|
10 |
MR. MEYER: Tim?
|
11 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: I think then-Judge Breyer said
|
12 |
we just have to remind ourselves, in Barry Wright,
|
13 |
"unlike economics, law is an administrative system, the
|
14 |
effects of which depend on the content of rules and
|
15 |
precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries
|
16 |
in courts and by lawyers advising their clients" in this
|
17 |
pricing area.
|
18 |
We get ourselves away from price-cost benchmarks
|
19 |
and we are lost, I think.
|
20 |
That's what the world was like when predatory
|
21 |
pricing cases were brought at the drop of a hat.
|
22 |
I sat in a Commission conference room in 1975
|
23 |
and 1976 when the coffee case was debated, and it was a
|
24 |
case that everyone in this room would now regard as nuts
|
25 |
but was seriously being pursued as any of the above. |
192
1 |
And what happened there was when Proctor &
|
2 |
Gamble was relieved from a Commission order that
|
3 |
prevented it from expanding that was the condition of
|
4 |
purchasing Folger's, it immediately marched into the
|
5 |
east into General Foods' territory.
|
6 |
General Foods, panic faced with the Proctor &
|
7 |
Gamble of the 1960s, 1970s, created horrendous
|
8 |
documents, and the FTC wanted to bring the case and they
|
9 |
voted repeatedly not to bring it, and the staff kept
|
10 |
bringing it back until they voted to bring it.
|
11 |
Again, it was a manifestation of lots of things,
|
12 |
but there were lots of predatory pricing litigation,
|
13 |
lots of uncertainty. And it was ended by Brooke Group,
|
14 |
and I think purposely so.
|
15 |
Even now we still have fighting at the edges.
|
16 |
It was ended by a test that will have some mistakes, but
|
17 |
I think it is essential.
|
18 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I want to comment on this.
|
19 |
I think as you so beautifully said, the thing that makes
|
20 |
me be less sure than I generally try to be of myself is
|
21 |
that the source of that price quote status was a notion
|
22 |
that in a perfectly competitive environment, the firm
|
23 |
would not go below marginal cost. That's what it was.
|
24 |
That was the foundation.
|
25 |
The problem that we have is in many of these |
193
1 |
cases that we are dealing with, all of them do not take
|
2 |
place in perfectly competitive environments.
|
3 |
Because they don't take place in perfectly
|
4 |
competitive environments, the question then becomes what
|
5 |
lessons can we learn out of a perfectly competitive
|
6 |
model that would illuminate the competitive effects of
|
7 |
these interactions in markets which are by definition or
|
8 |
by experience two or three standard deviations from the
|
9 |
perfectly competitive ones.
|
10 |
I really want to make sure that we don't get
|
11 |
ourselves entangled in this price-cost test as being an
|
12 |
economic foundation of anything. But I am perfectly
|
13 |
happy to view those as being the right things to look at
|
14 |
given the administrability and the clear-cut statement
|
15 |
that one can make to the firm that is trying to compete
|
16 |
hard in the marketplace.
|
17 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Perfect competition exists
|
18 |
nowhere. I would agree with that.
|
19 |
My favorite example is the hot dog vendors out
|
20 |
there on the street. When they rise their price, they
|
21 |
don't lose all of their sales. That means they have a
|
22 |
downward-sloping demand curve, period.
|
23 |
That is because of transaction costs and various
|
24 |
things, not because of market power. Even Areta and
|
25 |
Turner in the article admitted that firms for lots of |
194
1 |
reasons would price below something that looked like
|
2 |
marginal cost for their average variable cost proxy.
|
3 |
I obviously accept that and understand, as you
|
4 |
said, that administrability is a key part of the
|
5 |
equation.
|
6 |
MR. MEYER: I will jump to proposition 2, which
|
7 |
is an extension from the prior proposition. Maybe we
|
8 |
will make progress if you will move backwards.
|
9 |
This is a quote from Herb Hovenkamp's recent
|
10 |
paper.
|
11 |
"Single-product discounts should be per se
|
12 |
lawful if the overall price for all units exceeds cost."
|
13 |
Janusz, why don't we start with you.
|
14 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I was paying attention to
|
15 |
something else.
|
16 |
MR. MEYER: Talking about various price-cost
|
17 |
tests and situations where you thought a broader
|
18 |
calculation of price cost -- is this one?
|
19 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think, again, it much
|
20 |
depends on the circumstances. I think that if the
|
21 |
average price is above cost, then again there is a
|
22 |
burden-shifting exercise saying, well, there are these
|
23 |
discontinuities or jumps in the loyalty schedule and
|
24 |
they have potentially serious competitive effects.
|
25 |
Is there a reason why we should not look at the |
195
1 |
average price versus average cost as being the right
|
2 |
indication of how competition will play itself out?
|
3 |
It could be that in some particular settings,
|
4 |
comparing the two averages may just be inadequate in
|
5 |
trying to really sort out all the potential competitive
|
6 |
effects. But I would try to do that through the burden
|
7 |
kind of shifting as opposed to per se blanket rule.
|
8 |
In particular, in Ortho it was quite clear that
|
9 |
Abbott was going to get an average return on all of its
|
10 |
five tests that were way above its total average cost
|
11 |
across these five tests. There was still a potential
|
12 |
competitive issue.
|
13 |
MR. MEYER: This statement is limited by its
|
14 |
terms to a single-product situation.
|
15 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: Wait a second. If you
|
16 |
believe in the competitive equilibrium model, every good
|
17 |
is a single different thing.
|
18 |
We shouldn't get all hung up on this just
|
19 |
because I called something -- there is something to be
|
20 |
said about the uniformity of widgets versus not.
|
21 |
But what about airline flights? Is flight 05
|
22 |
the same product as flight 07? How should we look at
|
23 |
it?
|
24 |
We have to try to think a little bit more
|
25 |
broadly as opposed to saying this is a bundled rebate |
196
1 |
and therefore two different products as opposed to the
|
2 |
single product and, therefore, the 17th widget is the
|
3 |
same thing as the 15th widget. That is all true.
|
4 |
In particular circumstances, the 17th widget
|
5 |
gets a certain kind of weight in how the equilibrium
|
6 |
outcome looks that you have to try to pay attention to.
|
7 |
In my opinion, we should not hide behind just
|
8 |
the differences in the product names but in the economic
|
9 |
circumstance that is driving it.
|
10 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: To the extent this is directed
|
11 |
at the Concord Boat situation as opposed to the LePage's
|
12 |
situation, it is correct. One can imagine circumstances
|
13 |
where single product loyalty discounts or volume
|
14 |
discounts, market share discounts could have
|
15 |
anticompetitive consequences.
|
16 |
The same sort of discipline that one needs in
|
17 |
litigation for bundled discounts also applies in cases,
|
18 |
in fact, applies arguably even more in cases involving a
|
19 |
discount on a single product.
|
20 |
I think this actually is a law today in Brooke
|
21 |
Group quite clearly and it is appropriately law.
|
22 |
MR. TOM: Let me just take exception to that.
|
23 |
I actually find what you just said a little bit
|
24 |
surprising in light of the fact that you were defending
|
25 |
an incremental revenue, incremental cost test in the |
197
1 |
multiproduct situation. And I think Janusz is
|
2 |
completely right, that it can be very difficult to
|
3 |
distinguish single product from multiproduct situations
|
4 |
as a theoretical matter.
|
5 |
So in terms of appropriate safe harbors, the
|
6 |
ones that we have mostly had on the table today have
|
7 |
been either incremental revenue, incremental cost or
|
8 |
average revenue, average cost, which I think Professor
|
9 |
Muris was advocating.
|
10 |
I think this proposition can only be justified
|
11 |
on the administrability and cost of false positives and
|
12 |
false negatives kind of argument because there are
|
13 |
certainly plenty of possibility proofs that show that
|
14 |
you can have anticompetitive effects in this situation
|
15 |
even with overall price exceeding overall cost.
|
16 |
So the piece that I'm not hearing -- and maybe
|
17 |
Hovenkamp lays it out in this article, and I haven't had
|
18 |
the opportunity to read it -- is how do we know, what do
|
19 |
we know about the prevalence of false positives or the
|
20 |
prevalence of false negatives and the cost of false
|
21 |
positives and the cost of false negatives?
|
22 |
Is this situation such that you would advocate
|
23 |
an average cost, average revenue rule rather than an
|
24 |
incremental cost and incremental revenue rule?
|
25 |
MR. MEYER: For the benefit of all of us, the |
198
1 |
average revenue/average cost rule is what you are
|
2 |
saying --
|
3 |
MR. TOM: What I read this proposition to say,
|
4 |
yes.
|
5 |
MR. MEYER: Divide total units by total dollars.
|
6 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Let Dan respond.
|
7 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: I wasn't trying to defend any
|
8 |
particular measure of cost, whether it is variable cost
|
9 |
or average total cost.
|
10 |
I was simply suggesting that you should use a
|
11 |
cost-based test in all cases involving single-product
|
12 |
discounts.
|
13 |
Again, even in a classic predatory pricing case,
|
14 |
what the appropriate measure of cost should be is
|
15 |
something that there is a lot of debate over.
|
16 |
Without defending any particular cost test,
|
17 |
though, I think that the proposition is correct, that is
|
18 |
to say, whatever the appropriate measure of cost is, if
|
19 |
that cost is recouped on the overall sale to a client,
|
20 |
then the discount that created the overall sale should
|
21 |
be legal.
|
22 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: Perhaps Professor Hovenkamp
|
23 |
had some idea of long run here. It doesn't matter. If
|
24 |
you are going to apply these tests, in the short run
|
25 |
real world, you will have to separate out the variable |
199
1 |
costs, I would think.
|
2 |
You can have differences in different industries
|
3 |
and how you define costs. And the airline case raises
|
4 |
lots of complex problems, I agree. But I don't think I
|
5 |
read this to say that we are talking averages total cost
|
6 |
versus average total revenue.
|
7 |
MR. TOM: Sorry for being less than clear. I
|
8 |
wasn't really addressing what kind of cost is
|
9 |
appropriate in the Brooke Group kind of situation.
|
10 |
What I was addressing was the kinds of tests
|
11 |
that have been applied in the writings on Concord Boat.
|
12 |
Do you look at the incremental sales that were
|
13 |
induced by the loyalty program and look at the revenues
|
14 |
from those incremental sales and compare it to the
|
15 |
incremental cost or do you apply a Brooke Group test
|
16 |
that says you take all of the sales, all of the revenues
|
17 |
and compare it to all of the costs for all of the sales.
|
18 |
That's all I was saying. Frankly, I don't know
|
19 |
which is the right test. I think if finding out what
|
20 |
the facts were cost free and error free, then I would
|
21 |
think this is clearly the wrong test.
|
22 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: If you take the Concord Boat
|
23 |
stylized example in which the challenger can go
|
24 |
profitably after a particular dealership in the view of
|
25 |
the loyalty schedule that applies to the dealership, |
200
1 |
obviously there is nothing to debate anymore, right?
|
2 |
If indeed it is profitable to serve that by
|
3 |
virtue of the fact that what the incumbent is charging
|
4 |
is sufficiently above cost, whatever the right measure
|
5 |
is, then you would think the effective or efficient
|
6 |
challenger should be able to squeak under it somehow and
|
7 |
capture the sale, which is why these price-cost tests
|
8 |
make some economic sense.
|
9 |
But, again, the issue is what it is that can be
|
10 |
challenged and how much of an obstacle it is if you are
|
11 |
required to challenge just the margin.
|
12 |
MR. MEYER: If you all have a few more minutes,
|
13 |
I would like to ask one further question, taking us out
|
14 |
of the realm of safe harbors.
|
15 |
Assume that whatever safe harbor is out there is
|
16 |
not applicable, and we are now asking the question
|
17 |
should the court condemn a particular loyalty discount
|
18 |
program.
|
19 |
What sorts of business justifications or
|
20 |
efficiencies should the defendant be entitled to bring
|
21 |
forward to escape liability?
|
22 |
And, for example, perhaps it is obvious that if
|
23 |
there is a particular efficiency associated with
|
24 |
incenting a bundle, that that ought to be clearly
|
25 |
cognizable, but what about simply the lower prices that |
201
1 |
are being paid by consumers in the short run or gains in
|
2 |
share that the firm realizes by making its bundle more
|
3 |
attractive to those consumers. Reactions?
|
4 |
MR. TOM: I'm not sure how we quite leapfrogged
|
5 |
from the safe harbor to the efficiency justification.
|
6 |
It seems to me we have skipped the anticompetitive step
|
7 |
in between.
|
8 |
You can fail the price-cost test, but you would
|
9 |
still want some sensible explanation of how this gives
|
10 |
the defendant power over price, how prices go up as a
|
11 |
result. And if price doesn't go up or indeed goes down,
|
12 |
then I think you never get to those efficiencies.
|
13 |
MR. MEYER: Assume a plaintiff is coming forward
|
14 |
and arguing that you are going to be excluding your only
|
15 |
competitor by pricing this way, that you won't have any
|
16 |
competition because a competitor cannot match the
|
17 |
bundled price or the program. Assume that.
|
18 |
MR. TOM: Then you may get into a debate I don't
|
19 |
like to get into about consumer welfare versus total
|
20 |
welfare, which is a little too theological for my taste
|
21 |
or at least for my knowledge.
|
22 |
So I will leave that to more expert folks.
|
23 |
MR. MEYER: What justifications can a firm offer
|
24 |
for successfully excluding its rival using some kind of
|
25 |
pricing program like this? |
202
1 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: I think obviously there are
|
2 |
plenty of pro-competitive reasons, like it costs less to
|
3 |
sell the bundle. Those are obvious ones.
|
4 |
The real question would come up if the plaintiff
|
5 |
met whatever its prima facie case was and then the
|
6 |
defendant was put to the burden of responding through
|
7 |
some sort of explanation for why they offer the discount
|
8 |
package. And things like price discrimination would
|
9 |
come up.
|
10 |
To the extent that mixed bundling is explicable
|
11 |
because it is device for price discrimination, how
|
12 |
should that cut? Price discrimination could be good for
|
13 |
output. It can increase output. It can reduce output.
|
14 |
Very hard to show sort of which way that cuts.
|
15 |
So to me, any explanation that the defendant
|
16 |
could offer that's accepted as the true explanation that
|
17 |
is not an exclusionary explanation should be legitimate.
|
18 |
MR. MEYER: That sounds like a no economic sense
|
19 |
test.
|
20 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: It is a good one.
|
21 |
PROFESSOR CRANE: It is a pretty good one. We
|
22 |
have some support on the panel for it.
|
23 |
I think the sacrifice test or no economic sense
|
24 |
test is difficult as a starting point. When it comes to
|
25 |
defenses, it makes some sense, I think. |
203
1 |
MR. MEYER: Other reactions?
|
2 |
MR. TOM: Let me just pose a question on that
|
3 |
last one.
|
4 |
I said I didn't want to get into the total
|
5 |
welfare versus consumer welfare. But I want to know if
|
6 |
that's the question you are posing.
|
7 |
You are hypothesizing that the result of this
|
8 |
conduct is that prices to consumers go up. That is,
|
9 |
whatever the efficiency justification, it doesn't lower
|
10 |
the monopolist cost sufficiently that the price actually
|
11 |
goes down. Am I correct in understanding that?
|
12 |
MR. MEYER: That's a good question. I wasn't
|
13 |
being nearly so theological.
|
14 |
MR. TOM: Go ahead.
|
15 |
PROFESSOR MURIS: There are lots of them, and I
|
16 |
prefaced them at the beginning and in the paper,
|
17 |
specific efficiency justifications one can think of to
|
18 |
stick with bundling.
|
19 |
We need to step back and realize we are in a
|
20 |
world where bundling is everywhere in very competitive
|
21 |
markets. That in itself is an enormous empirical
|
22 |
proposition of the efficiency benefits of bundling.
|
23 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: I think that is
|
24 |
undisputable. In fact, it is the case with many of
|
25 |
these kinds of loyalty rebates as well. |
204
1 |
You go to Starbucks. You used to get your 10th
|
2 |
cup of coffee free if you bought nine. Then you have a
|
3 |
big discontinuity.
|
4 |
MR. MEYER: No one else can sell you that 10th
|
5 |
cup, right?
|
6 |
PROFESSOR ORDOVER: It makes you drink the 10th
|
7 |
cup and get jittery.
|
8 |
There are some good reasons for stimulating
|
9 |
demand, especially when you have a world in which the
|
10 |
marginal cost is really low and you want to drive
|
11 |
demand. It is a very powerful driver.
|
12 |
When you have asymmetric information between the
|
13 |
buyer and the seller or in many of these environments
|
14 |
that people talk about, the GPO is insisting on
|
15 |
discounts that are not volume driven but share driven in
|
16 |
part on this theory that the differently situated
|
17 |
hospitals are to be equally treated. And just because
|
18 |
you are a small hospital, you can only buy 10 units of
|
19 |
X, and if you are the big one, you can buy 100 units.
|
20 |
You should not be somehow disadvantaged because of that
|
21 |
because you are under the umbrella of the GPO.
|
22 |
Some people say that is silly or what. There
|
23 |
are -- if you go back to the case that was not quite
|
24 |
fully litigated, Virgin British Airways case which
|
25 |
pitted Schmazi against Bernheim, two pillars of |
205
1 |
antitrust and higher economics.
|
2 |
There was a lot of discussion as to the
|
3 |
usefulness of these various mechanisms as drivers of
|
4 |
volume of sales at the travel agency level, which is
|
5 |
where much of the action was.
|
6 |
Rewinding the Areta paper by ten years, we will
|
7 |
learn a lot of what the economics was at that time.
|
8 |
Schmazi had a large number of defenses that he
|
9 |
put forth why share-driven contracts were in fact
|
10 |
efficient or optimal in some cases, and Bernheim took a
|
11 |
somewhat different legal, working for Virgin.
|
12 |
It is a case which we have not cited here, but
|
13 |
it has a lot of levity in economics.
|
14 |
MR. MEYER: We could go on forever here, but we
|
15 |
won't.
|
16 |
I want to thank everyone on the panel for an
|
17 |
excellent discussion. Thank you all for attending.
|
18 |
The next session will be next week, December
|
19 |
6th, I think, on misrepresentation and deceptive
|
20 |
practices.
|
21 |
Thank you all for coming.
|
22 |
(Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the hearing was
|
23 |
concluded.)
|
24 |
|
25 |
|
206
1 |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F R E P O R T E R
|
2 |
DOCKET/FILE NUMBER: P062106
|
3 |
CASE TITLE: SECTION 2 HEARING
|
4 |
DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 2006
|
5 |
|
6 |
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained
|
7 |
herein is a full and accurate transcript of the notes
|
8 |
taken by me at the hearing on the above cause before the
|
9 |
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my knowledge and
|
10 |
belief.
|
11 |
|
12 |
|
13 |
|
14 |
|
15 |
|
16 |
|
17 |
|
18 |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F P R O O F R E A D E R
|
19 |
|
20 |
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I proofread the transcript
|
21 |
for accuracy in spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and
|
22 |
format.
|
23 |
|
24 |
|
25 |
|
|