

I C I T A P

Promoting Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development



**International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
Curriculum Development and Training Unit**



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About ICITAP

What is ICITAP?

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is a law enforcement development organization whose mission is to work with foreign governments to develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism, in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

ICITAP is situated organizationally within the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Since its creation in 1986, ICITAP has become an internationally recognized leader in law enforcement development worldwide and has worked in more than 100 countries.

Authority and funding

ICITAP's programs are funded and authorized by interagency agreements between ICITAP and these U.S. Government (USG) partners:

- U.S. Department of State
- U.S. Department of Defense
- U.S. Agency for International Development

Support of the DOJ mission

As ICITAP works within the framework of the USG's foreign assistance strategy, it focuses on key DOJ concerns: international terrorism and transnational

crime. DOJ efforts to protect the United States require effective international law enforcement partnerships, and strengthening national security calls for the promotion overseas of democracy, regional stability, and rule of law. ICITAP supports DOJ and USG missions through its development activities and its participation in foreign assistance planning efforts.

Global reach and program scope

Programs vary in size and cover a range of functions including police, corrections, security, and forensics. Large, full-time programs are managed in the field by ICITAP federal personnel, and small programs are managed by regional assistant directors in ICITAP headquarters.

Development strategy

ICITAP focuses on long-term comprehensive, sustainable reform. When possible, ICITAP and its sister agency, the DOJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, integrate their programs and work with other federal law enforcement agencies to develop all three pillars of the criminal justice system: police, courts, and corrections.

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Foreword

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The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has done a brave thing. It has developed a template for overseas law enforcement development that recognizes the importance of institutional changes both in the host countries and in American foreign-assistance. It takes seriously the requirement of the federal Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to evaluate results of programmatic initiatives. It challenges the too-prevalent strategy of spending money without clear objectives and without having mechanisms in place to learn from experience.

ICITAP's new approach is referred to as SILED—Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development. In developing the template, ICITAP implicitly reframes its mission from providing technical assistance, mentoring stakeholders, and training law-enforcement personnel to a new focus on developing institutions in host countries to undergird the long-term success of U.S. programs. The report describes with commendable frankness its traditional approach as “buying expensive chandeliers for a mansion before its foundation has been built.” (Executive Summary, p.viii) One can argue that the approach is not new; the importance of institutional reform is well known. But giving primacy within ICITAP to sustainable institutional development is new.

SILED also requires changes in the way foreign law enforcement assistance is planned and delivered. Forthrightly, it challenges ICITAP to become more

rigorous in the implementation of its programs, especially its evaluations. The elements of this are outlined in a helpful diagram on page 15 as follows:

- **Phase 1:** Preliminary research and preassessments in Washington, DC, involving desk research and consultation about host-country needs and capabilities.
- **Phase 2:** Analysis of in-country security threats; institutional development analysis including standard operating procedures, crime threat analysis, job-task analysis, and training capabilities.
- **Phase 3:** Development of programs to address shortcomings in institutional capabilities, including tracking progress and evaluating results.

In sum, SILED expands ICITAP's traditional roster of operational competencies in terrorism, transnational crime, border security, and criminal investigation to the institutions that determine the success and sustainability of programmatic assistance.

The report is not only brave in ambition but also in the candor of its presentation. It provides detailed case studies of its programs in seven countries—Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Ukraine. In this way it allows readers to measure the SILED paradigm against ICITAP's current in-house evaluations. It also correctly stresses the importance of ICITAP's program managers on the ground, in particular their ability to develop rapport with host-country officials and the public. Sustainability depends not only on intellectual rigor but on the “art” of people management.

The report discusses at length the problems of evaluation. It makes the critical distinction between outputs—things that programs do—with their outcomes—their lasting effects. As their own conclusions show about programs in the seven countries, it is much easier to track ICITAP actions (courses taught, equipment provided) than ICITAP effects (adherence to human rights, public knowledge of reform). Although this distinction has become commonplace, it is brave on ICITAP's part to acknowledge overreliance on outputs in its own evaluations.

With respect to outcomes, the report discusses the utility of using surveys of practitioners and publics. Citing technical issues like clarity of questionnaires, sampling methodology, pretesting, and ethical issues of access, it concludes that ICITAP needs to develop a richer inventory of evaluative tools. In order to do this, the report recognizes that it doesn't have the in-house expertise to explore and test new methodologies. Its own staff focuses understandably on program development and implementation.

Accordingly, the report proposes enlisting expertise from outside its own ranks, such as from universities and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], to devise new evaluation methodologies. These might involve on-site visits from previous program managers and experienced experts. Commendably, ICITAP has already begun to do this through its University

Partnership Projects, which support one-semester “capstone” projects for students to study new evaluation techniques applicable in particular settings. It is also essential to build evaluations into program budgets from the beginning, not as an afterthought.

ICITAP might also consider that the sustainability of its projects might improve if the host countries developed their own evaluation capabilities, particularly in universities. Although offshoring program evaluations would be problematic for any U.S. agency, it could lead to a more holistic development agenda across the U.S. foreign-assistance community, increasing ownership within host countries and improving coordination among foreign donors.

In conclusion, SILED is audacious in highlighting the importance of institutional reform in law enforcement agencies. It challenges “business as usual” in the host country as well as ICITAP. Difficult though institution building may be, it is essential to sustainability. It is the elephant-in-the-room of foreign assistance. Furthermore, SILED's insistence on outcome evaluation is necessary for transforming law-enforcement assistance programs from ad-hoc allocations of money among projects to the development of ICITAP's own ability to learn meaningful lessons from its own hard-won experience.

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This publication is dedicated to all the men and women who between 1986 and 2018 have worked hard to make the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program a strong and innovative international law enforcement development organization.

Executive Summary

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was created in 1986 through an act of Congress. ICITAP resides in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and partners with the Department of State's Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (S/CT); the Department of Defense (DoD) combatant commands; and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). From 1986 to 1989, ICITAP's name made sense because it solely provided training to police in Latin America. ICITAP's mandate was considerably broadened in 1990, when the program was tasked with helping the government of Panama to develop a completely new police force after the ouster of Manuel Noriega. ICITAP quickly evolved from simply being a training organization into an organization focused on promoting sustainable institutional law enforcement development (SILED).

Sustainable Institutional Development, of which SILED is a subset, is a commonly used term in multiple fields that defines the ultimate goal of international development. ICITAP defines SILED as providing technical assistance, mentoring, training, and internships that enable host-country law enforcement organizations to improve their capacity and efficiency of operations, their ability to effectively serve citizens, their respect for human rights and human dignity, and their professional standards. Institutional development becomes sustainable when the host-country law enforcement organization is able to maintain and improve upon these and other advancements well after ICITAP assistance ends.

Simply training and equipping foreign law enforcement agencies does not promote SILED. Pursuing a train-and-equip approach to law enforcement development is akin to buying expensive chandeliers

for a mansion before its foundation has been built. A tremendous amount of analytical work must be done in conjunction with the host country law enforcement agency and government before training can be usefully implemented. ICITAP personnel are skillful at building close relationships with host-country law enforcement and government officials based on trust. This trust-building approach requires ICITAP and the host-country police and government officials to work in close partnership while ICITAP personnel employ a model of listen first, talk last. This is the key to a successful, sustainable international development program.

This publication, *Promoting Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development*, offers detailed and multilevel analyses of ICITAP's approach to promoting SILED. The document is divided into three sections:

Section I: ICITAP's framework for laying the groundwork to promote SILED, including a diagram representing the ten-step process ICITAP believes is the best method for creating the necessary conditions to promote SILED;

Section II: multilevel analyses of seven ICITAP programs that emphasize the successful promotion of SILED; and

Section III: examples of how ICITAP monitors and evaluates its programs and a summary of ICITAP's strategy to pursue partnerships with university professors and their graduate students who can design and implement both performance and impact evaluations for its programs.

ICITAP realizes it will not be possible in all cases to follow the entire ten-step process in order because law enforcement development, like all types of international development assistance, is complicated and unpredictable. Therefore, section I of this publication focuses on the four analytical steps at the

heart of the model: (1) conducting a crime threat analysis in the host country; (2) conducting a job task analysis of the host-country law enforcement institutions to determine how people are organized to do their jobs and what their prescribed job duties are; (3) conducting an institutional development analysis of the host-country law enforcement institutions, focusing on structure, policies, procedures, standards and practices, and the governance of the institutions; and (4) conducting a training needs analysis to look at the types of training police personnel currently receive and what additional training is needed based on the results of the other three analyses.

In section II of this document, ICITAP carefully analyzes seven of its programs to demonstrate how SILED was promoted in each. The seven programs are the Ukraine Police Patrol Program, the Nepal Polygraph Examiners Development Program, the Bangladesh Community Outreach Program, the Pakistan Youth Summer School Program, the Indonesian National Police Precinct Reorganization Program, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Order Management Program, and the Philippines Maritime Security Program. These are very diverse programs, but they all have one common attribute: ICITAP managers on the ground who have cultivated deep relationships based on trust with host-country law enforcement and government officials. Trust is the key ingredient in promoting SILED.

Examples of SILED provided in the seven program analyses include the following:

1. After a group of strong reformers in the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs set the stage for the Police Patrol Program to be launched, ICITAP skillfully partnered with them to design, implement, and evaluate the program, which has spread throughout the entire country.

2. With ICITAP's support and assistance, the Nepal Police (NP) established a Polygraph Examination Unit staffed by one supervisor and two officers and refurbished a structure that became a polygraph examination room. ICITAP Nepal is currently working with the NP to develop a train-the-trainer program to ensure sustainability of the Polygraph Unit.
3. To engage the broader community and build sustainability into the program, Bangladesh police officers developed partnerships with local government agencies and community leaders to address community-specific needs.
4. The Pakistan Youth Summer School was started 14 years ago, and ICITAP has supported it with both funding and personnel for the past four years. During the time ICITAP has been involved in the program, it has administered satisfaction surveys to both the children who attend the school and their parents. The extremely positive survey results and the waiting lists of interested students indicate that the program has strong sustainability.
5. The Precinct (Polsek) Reorganization Project that ICITAP designed and implemented with the Indonesia National Police (INP) has led to positive attitudinal changes in the INP, increased women's participation in the INP, and improved public trust of the police. This project has impacted more than 230,000 of the approximately 435,000 INP members.
6. ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) worked with its Bosnian police counterparts to establish a working group with five to seven BiH law enforcement command officials who represented their agencies effectively and could work efficiently and expertly to develop necessary curricula for public order management. The working group approach ensures that the various law

enforcement agencies represented by the working group have ownership of the project and that these agencies will ensure the progress and sustainability of the project well beyond the end of ICITAP's involvement.

7. The Maritime Unit (MU) that ICITAP worked to develop in the Philippines has become highly sustainable. ICITAP focused on creating a "maintenance culture" within the MU. The unit has a routine schedule it follows, which includes doing its own boat repairs and self-inspections. The MU is therefore capable of maintaining and keeping its boats on the water with little assistance from ICITAP.

Section III of this publication covers monitoring and evaluation. ICITAP provides several examples of countries where strong outcome measures have been achieved. ICITAP is embarking on an innovative partnership program with universities, where it will

seek to have university professors and students conduct impact evaluations for selected ICITAP projects. By seeking traditional performance evaluations and impact evaluations for some of its programs, ICITAP is determined to commit itself to a process of rigorous monitoring and evaluation.

Through its SILED approach, ICITAP is putting forth an innovative paradigm for international law enforcement development. ICITAP hopes this publication will encourage extensive discussion among law enforcement development professionals and experts in international affairs and international development in the U.S. interagency and international donor community, as well as officials in the DoD, academia, and the think tank community. This continued dialogue on SILED will improve the return on investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars for international law enforcement development assistance programs while also improving the national security of the United States.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper

People who work in international development fields ranging from agriculture and public health to law enforcement and criminal justice consistently refer to sustainable institutional development (SID) as their ultimate goal. Among U.S. programs, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau and its Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (S/CT) Bureau, the Justice Department's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) all promote SID, as do the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) and other programs worldwide. However, because sustainable institutional development may look different in different contexts, it is important to define it more specifically.

In this paper, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) offers a working definition of sustainable institutional law enforcement development (SILED) and presents an analytical model for setting the stage to promote SILED. While ICITAP recognizes this analytical model cannot always be rigidly used in the order the steps are laid out in this paper, the four recommended core analyses are

keys to promoting SILED. ICITAP is always aware that development theories must be tailored to meet the different realities that exist in every one of ICITAP's program countries. This approach offers the international donor community a pragmatic way to logically assess, design, and monitor and evaluate law enforcement development programs. The framework is particularly relevant for post-conflict or comprehensive law enforcement reform situations, such as those that existed in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Indonesia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

After detailing ICITAP's approach to setting the stage to promote SILED, the paper analyzes seven ICITAP projects that have successfully promoted SILED. These projects are geographically and topically diverse, and illustrate the key role that ICITAP program managers, assistant program managers, and senior law enforcement advisors play in promoting SILED. The final section of the paper reviews the key elements of monitoring and evaluation systems to include both performance and impact evaluations.

ICITAP hopes this document will spur a spirited discussion throughout Congress, academia, and the interagency and think tank communities about promoting SILED, how ICITAP's SILED model might be used in a variety of different countries, and the



ICITAP Program Manager Larry Kelley pays his respects at the memorial for fallen Kyrgyz police officers

criticality of effectively evaluating the outcomes and impacts—not just the outputs—of law enforcement assistance programs.

ICITAP in brief

The United States Government (USG) began assisting foreign police in the 1950s.¹ In the 1960s, this foreign police assistance expanded when the Kennedy administration became concerned about communist insurgencies and created a public safety program within USAID that trained foreign police.²

By 1968, USAID was spending \$60 million a year to train police in 34 countries in areas such as criminal investigation, patrolling, interrogation, counterinsurgency techniques, riot control, weapon use, and bomb disposal. The United States also provided weapons, telecommunications, transport, and other equipment.³

In the early 1970s, Congress became concerned over a lack of clear policy guidelines and “the use of program funds to support repressive regimes that committed human rights abuses.”⁴ This applied most prominently to countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Congress decided that the USG would discontinue existing support and cease all future support to foreign police forces, and it implemented this prohibition in 1974 as Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.⁵

In December 1980, three American nuns and an American church layperson were murdered in El Salvador by a government death squad. While members of the death squad were eventually tried and convicted, the colonel and general who were responsible for the squad, were never brought to justice. This incident made waves in USG foreign policy circles, and momentum built for a means to help improve police capacity to conduct thorough, evidence-based criminal investigations that respected human rights and human dignity in Latin American countries.

In 1986, Congress passed an exception to Section 660 which allowed for the creation of ICITAP. Initially, the focus on training in ICITAP’s name made sense,

because it was simply providing criminal investigative training to police in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, this changed in 1990 after the overthrow of Manuel Noriega in Panama, when the State Department tasked ICITAP to work with the Panamanian government to develop an entirely new police department. This effort of basic institution building was followed by the State Department funding ICITAP to work with host countries to develop sustainable law enforcement institutions in more than 100 countries, including Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Poland, Ukraine, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Mexico, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, Mali, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania.

ICITAP’s mission is to work with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that combat the threats of terrorism and transnational crime, fight corruption, and protect human rights. ICITAP has thirteen core competencies:

1. Organizational development
2. Terrorism and transnational crime (e.g. terrorism, trafficking in persons, organized crime, drug trafficking, cyber crime, intellectual property crime)
3. Marine and border security
4. Criminal investigations
5. Public integrity and anticorruption
6. Specialized and tactical skills
7. Forensics
8. Basic police services
9. Academy and instructor development
10. Community policing
11. Corrections
12. Criminal justice coordination
13. Information systems (e.g., criminal and personnel database systems)

While ICITAP is situated in the Criminal Division of the DOJ, it works in close partnership with and receives funding for its programs from the INL Bureau and the Counterterrorism Bureau at the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense. ICITAP's federal employees—at headquarters and in the field—are law enforcement and civilian professionals with substantial international experience in the design and implementation of foreign law enforcement development, technical assistance, and training programs. Most have decades of federal, state, or local law enforcement experience, having served in management- and command-level positions. Virtually all of those field representatives who supervise ICITAP programs abroad are federal employees with decades of police experience.

ICITAP also draws on the resources of U.S. law enforcement agencies through formal partnering activities. Active duty personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the U.S. Marshal's Service (USMS); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and other law enforcement entities assist in delivering ICITAP-sponsored institutional development assistance in their areas of expertise.

ICITAP engages state and local subject matter experts, when appropriate, to fulfill technical assistance and training requirements. ICITAP ensures that only the highest-caliber instructors and advisors are recruited, selected, and deployed to the field. Selected candidates have substantial experience in federal, state, or local law enforcement, forensics, or corrections and have executive-level leadership and management experience.



ICITAP instructor gives directions to Ghana Police Service trainees in Bicycle Patrol and Maintenance course

ICITAP's philosophy toward training plays an important role in helping it promote SILED. ICITAP is keenly aware that off-the-shelf American law enforcement training will rarely be effective in foreign countries because the realities on the ground are so very different. For that reason, ICITAP develops the capacity of host-country police instructors through instructor development programs and then engages with them to design training courses that meet the countries' needs. ICITAP's curriculum developer is also skilled at adapting courses that were developed in one country for use in others.

Whenever possible, ICITAP also engages prosecutors in curriculum development, because legal issues invariably arise regarding police techniques, policies and procedures, and laws. ICITAP training is skills-based and incorporates teaching techniques such as practical exercises and scenarios to complement lecture presentations.

ICITAP's field managers work on a daily basis with senior and mid-level police and other government officials in their host countries to develop excellent professional and personal relationships based on trust, shared law enforcement experiences, and a commitment to public service. They provide technical assistance and mentoring to their counterparts and lay the groundwork for successfully promoting SILED. It is important to understand that while ICITAP's work focuses on law enforcement, corrections, and

forensics, its approach to promoting SILED is a model for promoting good governance in general which makes it very consequential in the international development field writ large.

ICITAP's University Partnership Projects

A number of universities have graduate and undergraduate capstone projects in which students are tasked with taking the theoretical knowledge they have learned in the classroom and applying it in a practical manner to address issues that either government agencies or private corporations need resolved. ICITAP has collaborated with Yale University, American University, the University of Michigan, Syracuse University, Georgetown University, and George Mason University to do 23 such capstone projects since June 2013, which have included the development of ICITAP curricula, country-specific research, and strategic planning initiatives. Students work with both a university professor and the Curriculum Development and Training Unit (CDTU) at ICITAP to complete capstone projects that typically last one semester.

ICITAP looks to university partnerships to help implement different elements of SILED, including conducting preassessment desk studies and gathering data for crime threat, job task, institutional development, and training needs analyses. On this project, graduate students from Syracuse, Georgetown, and Michigan, under the skillful supervision of those institutions' faculty, provided ICITAP with valuable research and writing assistance on all three sections of this paper.

ICITAP instructor demonstrates how to inflate a tire during ICITAP's Bicycle Patrol and Maintenance course for the Ghana Police Service (*top right*)

Trainees consult during ICITAP's Bicycle Patrol and Maintenance course for the Ghana Police Service (*middle right*)

ICITAP instructor teaches low-speed balancing to Ghana Police Service officers (*bottom right*)



Suggested Strategies for Achieving SID

ICITAP Indonesia Program Manager Jerry Heuett developed an excellent guide for promoting SILED that can be usefully applied in any country.

▶ **Structured flexibility: A negotiated agenda**

Avoid using rigid blueprints for institutional development, or transplanting institutions from developed countries (so-called ‘monocropping’). Approaching host countries’ law enforcement with a set agenda is unlikely to engender trust or create programs tailored to meet local needs. Instead of a template, use guiding principles to inform SILED decision-making. Craft and communicate a shared mission and a negotiated agenda.

▶ **Building legitimacy and trust**

In building legitimacy within host countries, ask what is being sustained, and for whom? In many countries, institutions serve the government and not the public. For law enforcement agencies to be legitimate they must first and foremost benefit citizens.

Develop trust. Mentoring is also a part of sustainability, and it is important to talk softly and be collaborative and open. Let people know you are there for the long haul.

▶ **Facilitating alignment between internal capabilities and external environment**

Internal capabilities such as strategic focus, resources, and skills should all be deployed to tackle the most critical public safety problems. Making sure that the two are aligned should be a continuous process, which the analytical framework outlined on page 6 can help facilitate.

▶ **Keep it simple**

Complexity is often inversely correlated with sustainability. Using simple models and strategies increase the chances of them being replicated and embedded locally. To avoid assessment fatigue only collect data that you think may be relevant.

Setting the Stage to Promote Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development (SILED)

International law enforcement development is a very complex field. ICITAP strongly believes that a series of preparatory steps are necessary to effectively design, implement, and evaluate a comprehensive international law enforcement development program. Government agencies charged with providing foreign assistance in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice development should avoid initiating projects with preconceived notions of what a host government needs. Assistance programs should be based on thorough assessments and sector analyses to ensure that the programs created focus on the current and projected crime threats, institutional challenges, and systemic deficiencies of the host country.

This paper suggests that taking the time and resources to conduct the targeted assessments and factual analyses discussed herein greatly increases the likelihood that assistance programs will have a sustainable, positive impact both on the law enforcement institutions themselves and on the law enforcement personnel that populate the institutions. While the architects of many international programs have attempted to use less expensive and less time-consuming approaches, these too often prove haphazard, superficial, and not geared toward promoting SILED. ICITAP contends that using a highly organized approach, one that stresses deep level analyses to set the stage for developing a program design and monitoring and evaluation framework, increases the chances for success in promoting SILED. This latter approach embodies the best principles of good governance.

The analytical framework for promoting SILED

ICITAP proposes a rigorous analytical framework to set the stage for promoting SILED, consisting of ten steps:

1. Conduct an initial desk study, to include a country analysis that looks beyond the criminal justice system to the country's history, culture, government and politics, and socio-economic situation
2. Distribute preassessment questionnaires to police, other criminal justice officials, government officials, citizens, and civil society members¹
3. Hold a follow-up discussion on the preassessment questionnaires with host-country officials, by telephone, Skype, video conferencing, or— if it is the only option—by email

1. Civil society refers to “the arena, outside the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organizations, and institutions to advance shared interests” (CIVICUS, *State of Civil Society 2013* and other publications; the definition is widely used within the international development community.) In this paper, civil society should be assumed to include community and religious leaders, chambers of commerce, nongovernmental organizations, etc.

4. Conduct an on-the-ground assessment with an evaluation expert
5. Conduct a crime threat analysis (CTA), to include surveys of police, other criminal justice officials, government officials, citizens, and civil society members
6. Conduct a job task analysis (JTA)
7. Conduct an institutional development analysis (IDA)
8. Conduct a training needs analysis (TNA)
9. Develop a program design and tailored training curricula
10. Develop a monitoring and evaluation plan

After the completion of these ten steps, the program is ready for implementation. All of these steps, especially the four analyses in steps 5, 6, 7, and 8, provide essential, in-depth data about the vital functions of a law enforcement entity and are critical empirical components of designing an assistance program that promotes SILED. An assistance program that is implemented without the benefit of these analyses risks failure because it will lack essential data pertaining to one or more of the vital functions of a law enforcement institution and may therefore have difficulty reaching the desired end state.

Having said this, it may not be practical in a number of country landscapes to conduct all four analyses before designing a program plan for two reasons: (1) each of the four analyses takes a significant amount of time to complete and (2) the trust building so important to international development may dictate that the four analyses be conducted once host-country law enforcement agencies have become comfortable with ICITAP personnel. For these reasons, ICITAP may need to conduct the four analyses in an overlapping fashion and not continuously one after the other. In certain countries it may also be necessary to do less complicated analyses than those described in this paper.

To increase the adaptability of its approach, ICITAP will be working with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and the Oregon State Police Training Academy to develop templates for the four analyses that will allow some of the data for the analytical work to be gathered in the preassessment stage by university partnership groups. This process of front-loading analytical work will save ICITAP time and money and set the stage for more effective crime threat, job task, institutional development, and training needs analyses.

In certain cases, when it will take a significant amount of time to complete the crime threat, job task, institutional development, and training needs analyses, it will be necessary to create a provisional program design. The provisional program allows ICITAP to start providing some activities that are essential to any police development program while the four analyses are underway. When they are completed, ICITAP will develop a full program design based on the goals, objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and performance indicators revealed in the four analyses. This is not ideal from an administrative standpoint, but is critical for promoting SILED.

Defining sustainable institutional law enforcement development (SILED)

Across the spectrum of international development, a variety of complex definitions of SID exist, but for the purposes of this paper,

ICITAP defines SILED as providing technical assistance, mentoring, training, and internships that enable host-country law enforcement organizations to improve their capacity and efficiency of operations, their ability to effectively serve citizens, their respect for human rights and human dignity, and their professional standards, and then to sustain these improvements once ICITAP assistance ends.

While many definitions of SID stress achieving the financial sustainability of institutions, this is applicable to law enforcement in only some of the countries where ICITAP operates—it might be realistic in Colombia, but wholly unrealistic in Benin, Mali, Bangladesh, or any number of other countries. ICITAP strives to create sustainable changes to organizational culture that continue to evolve after USG financial support ends.

It is also important to point out that the term “promoting SILED” is used throughout this document instead of “achieving SILED.” ICITAP can successfully promote SILED, but if the host country does not embrace the concepts ICITAP is promoting, or if a regime change ushers in a new police administration that does not accept SILED, it will not be achieved. While good principles of promoting SILED take into account how political buy-in can best be achieved, ICITAP cannot ultimately directly influence political will.



ICITAP Fire Scene Forensic Investigations course taught in Algeria

Initial Steps in the Analytical Framework

ICITAP's empirical foundation for designing a comprehensive approach to promoting SILED in a foreign law enforcement institution comprises three preliminary fact-gathering stages and four factual analyses. The four factual analyses should be part of the ongoing management regime of any law enforcement institution. While it will take several months to complete all of these pre-program empirical studies, the scope and depth of these analyses will provide ICITAP, the host nation and its law enforcement institutions, the U.S. embassy, and ICITAP's funding entity with highly relevant, detailed information and evaluations upon which targeted and timely programs can be based. Using this analytical framework will help ICITAP to provide tailored and more focused programming. When used to improve host-country law enforcement policies, processes, and practices, this framework puts law enforcement agencies on a path to self-reliance and strategic management and makes them more responsive to and capable of meeting the law enforcement needs of their constituencies.

Desk study

The initial step in the ICITAP analytical framework is an internet-based desk study. Although its primary focus is on countries' criminal justice systems, the desk study will also analyze countries' histories, governments, political systems, and existing socioeconomic factors. It has three primary goals:

1. Learn what data are already available, so as to avoid reinventing the wheel in the on-ground assessment.
2. Open any channels for collaboration with those already working with criminal justice institutions in the country.
3. Develop a baseline of knowledge to move forward in developing a preassessment questionnaire.

The study should draw upon such sources as prior studies and assessments; media reports; the host country's statutory foundation for law enforcement (such as a Police Law); crime statistics (if they exist); citizen surveys about perceptions of the police and the criminal justice system; and records of national crime and law enforcement policy development over the past several years, the budget process, and the extent of available resources, both in legislative appropriations and in human capital. Using this information, the study should attempt to answer the following questions:

- What are the key structures and baseline capacities of the institutions of the criminal justice sector, i.e., police, corrections, forensics, military (to the degree it is involved in law enforcement-related tasks such as domestic counterterrorism and public order management), prosecutors, and courts?
- What structural and political support exists for law enforcement reform?
- What are the major crime threats?
- Have there been other law enforcement reform efforts in the past several years, and if so, what were their outcomes?
- What stakeholder groups need to be involved in the on-ground assessment and analyses?

Preassessment questionnaire

Upon completion of the desk study, ICITAP should draft preassessment questionnaires to gather additional data from the primary stakeholders. The questionnaires should focus on primary crime threats, core capabilities of law enforcement entities (police, corrections, and forensics), areas of needed reform in the law enforcement agencies, deficiencies in resources, training needs, the role of law enforcement agencies vis-a-vis the military in the host-country internal

security system, and the relationship between law enforcement and the citizenry. This last topic must be raised with caution, because of the adversarial relationship between police and citizens in most developing countries. See Appendix A for a list of potential law enforcement questions that ICITAP has used in the past.

The information gathered by the preassessment questionnaires will allow the on-ground assessment to be as efficient and focused as possible. Sending out questionnaires prior to the assessment also demonstrates ICITAP's commitment to institutional development and reform in the host country. Low response rates to this questionnaire may foreshadow resistance to reform, but may also indicate that individuals do not understand what is being assessed or that there is little political will to support the initiative. Low response rates could also be a sign of assessment fatigue, which occurs when assessments are completed but programs are never implemented. The next section of this paper suggests ways to overcome assessment fatigue and to manage a long gap between the funding of the program and the initial delivery of assistance.

The preassessment questionnaires should not exceed 15 questions. They can be distributed via the U.S. Embassy in the host country, or, with U.S. Embassy approval, ICITAP can email questionnaires directly to survey subjects. ICITAP can create free and anonymous electronic surveys through Google Docs, which can be a very effective tool. Questionnaires can be sent to the country's embassy in Washington, DC; host-country law enforcement organizations; other government officials as appropriate (such as the Minister of Interior or the National Security Advisor); the legislative committee or committees overseeing law enforcement institutions; research institutions; civil society organizations; and other nongovernmental organizations (NGO), both in

the host country and the United States, with expertise in crime, human rights, or host-country law enforcement institutions. It is important to understand that the host-country government may consider some of the data requested to be state information and refuse to provide it.

Follow-up discussion between ICITAP and host-country officials

As a next step, ICITAP gets approval from the U.S. embassy in the host country and the funding agency in Washington, D.C. to set up a video conference with host-country police officials to follow up on the preassessment and discuss principles of SILED. Video is preferred over voice or text formats, because it allows for a face-to-face introduction and helps participants develop a rapport before the on-ground assessment begins. ICITAP has been using video conferencing since 1998, when a conference with Ghanaian police officials required special arrangements with Voice of America. Today, video conferences can easily be set up using Skype or What's App.

During the video conference, ICITAP will explain to the host-country officials that we wish to enter into a partnership to develop the best possible law enforcement or criminal justice development program. ICITAP will stress that the preassessment is an important part of this process, and that it is important to collect detailed responses from all stakeholders. ICITAP should then review the questionnaire or questionnaires with host-country personnel to clarify any questions or translation issues and to ensure that all areas of concern are addressed. This will reinforce the questionnaires' importance with the host-country officials and lessen the chances of assessment fatigue. Assessment fatigue tends to occur when host-country officials are bombarded with questions by assessment teams from various donor countries without any preliminary preparation. ICITAP's

approach is more respectful; it broaches important issues in a way that police officials can respond to over the course of days or weeks, rather than saving them for the on-ground assessment and expecting to get immediate answers in a one-hour meeting.

While ICITAP is well versed in avoiding hot-button questions that can alienate host-country officials, it is still critical that U.S. embassy personnel in the host country review ICITAP's preassessment questionnaires for both tone and content before they are sent to the host-country officials for completion or are reviewed in the video conference.

On-ground assessment

The purpose of the on-ground assessment is to build on the responses to the preassessment questionnaires and to gain a deeper understanding of issues surrounding law enforcement and the criminal justice system, as well as the host country's political, cultural, and socioeconomic situations. The assessment team should select interview targets in the host country who will help them construct a multidimensional view of criminal justice institutions. These interviews should incorporate non-state actors who are not readily accessible from the United States.

The on-ground assessment should elicit information about the social and political forces that shape the security environment. This should include information about major crime threats (including public sector corruption within the law enforcement agencies), how law enforcement institutions respond to major crime threats, how those responses are coordinated with other security entities such as the military, how the police coordinate with other criminal justice actors, and how the law enforcement response to various types of crime can be improved. The assessment should cross-reference key crime challenges and

institutional capacities. It should also seek information on gaps and deficiencies in the governance of the law enforcement institutions—policies, processes and procedures that are outmoded or ineffective, and possible remedies for those gaps and deficiencies.

Another important element for the assessor to understand is the interaction between formal and customary or traditional legal systems. This distinction is particularly salient throughout Africa and Asia, the most prominent recent example being that of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, as in many sub-Saharan African countries, experts estimate that 80 percent of the population pursues its justice through customary or traditional systems.⁶ In countries with large customary and traditional legal systems, assessors should consider how to bridge these systems with formal legal systems, since one system will never supersede the other.

It is critical, however, that the assessment not focus too sharply on crime, as this framework tends to foster assumptions that may be erroneous in an international environment—most commonly and perniciously, the assumptions that the law enforcement system is at least semifunctional. Understanding the people's perception of crime and the police's ability to respond to it is far more important—crime or the perception of crime may be the symptom of a dysfunctional police, and not a driving factor in that dysfunction. Assessors ask how the community perceives itself—what stakeholders believe they should be doing or are doing.

The information collected in the on-ground assessment will be used in the four core analyses. The process of cooperating to gather this information should begin to build trust, confidence, and co-ownership on the part of host-country officials.

Designing On-ground Assessments to Promote SILED

ICITAP Indonesia Program Manager Jerry Heuett

Organizational operational ratios can provide a strategic and critical perspective on the functionality of a law enforcement organization. These ratios can be foundational and provide critical data assessment information. Assessors should ensure they get this information, either during the on-ground assessment or in the preassessment phase:

- ▶ **Management Ratio.** Percentage of personnel responsible for the management of the organization, or percentage at the organizational levels where decisions are made. In Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and other countries in South Asia, the management ratio is woefully inadequate (1–2 percent) to manage the organization and integrate sustainable strategies that are replicable and able to be integrated into institutional practice, whether a policy, procedure, training initiative, or organizational restructuring. The ratio for Southeast Asia is typically around 8–10 percent, which on paper is almost at the desirable percentage of 10–15 percent; however, decision-making is concentrated at the executive level, which causes organizational paralysis, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and dysfunctionality.
- ▶ **Investigative Ratio.** Percentage of personnel directly or indirectly responsible for conducting, assisting, and facilitating investigation, including pre- and post-investigation and forensic processes. This ratio determines the potential for assistance in investigative development to be sustainable. Calculations of investigative ratio should include the tenure of investigators, personnel rotation policies, career tracks, internal training or certification processes, investigative processes and protocols, laws and regulations regarding the ability of police and prosecutors to collaborate on investigations (for example, in Indonesia this is forbidden by regulation), evidentiary procedures, and lab processes. Again, South and Southeast Asian law enforcement agency percentages are inadequate, at less than 10 percent in both regions.
- ▶ **Functionary Ratios.** Percentage of personnel involved in police line functions, including patrol operations, community engagement, and tactical response such as public order management. This calculation should consider patrol structures' place within the organization and, just as importantly, their authorities, tasks, and responsibilities. Also assess what communication architecture exists. This is the sort of data that will be revealed through a job task analysis.
- ▶ **Budget Processes.** Percentage of the national gross budget allocated to the police organization, and three additional figures: percentages of the budget dedicated to human resources/salaries, procurement, and operations.

The management, investigative, and functionary ratios, as well as the budget processes, will be explored much more comprehensively in the institutional development analysis chapter on page 29, but it is important to gather this type of data both at the on-ground assessment and preassessment stages. This type of data can also be researched during the desk study phase and specifically solicited through preassessment questionnaires to police officials.


Interviewing law enforcement and other officials

A week-long assessment can typically yield a total of 15-20 interviews. However, because of the vast number of meetings and visits to police stations and academies that are required during an on-ground assessment, ICITAP recommends that on-ground assessments be at least two weeks long. Steve Fields, an ICITAP deputy assistant director, recommends starting the week off by meeting with the Minister of the Interior and progressively working down the chain of command. By the end of the week, the assessor might, for example, visit a police station. Going through the ranks gives an extensive amount of information on the culture and operating procedures (both formal and informal) of the police force.

The on-ground assessment is an appropriate time to inquire about what the police force thinks it needs to succeed. This step is an important gesture that communicates ICITAP's intention to engage in a contextual and collaborative process. Responses, however, must be subject to the caveat that the host-country police may recite a long list of "stuff" that ICITAP cannot provide, or simply say "everything." The overwhelming scale of physical needs is part of what makes SILED so essential, but can also make it difficult to explain. However, maintaining this dialogue throughout and beyond the on-ground assessment is important for engendering positive political will and ownership of programs among host-country officials.

Interviewing non-law enforcement stakeholders

It is important to receive input about the needs of the community from those outside of the law enforcement and criminal justice communities. The perspectives of NGOs, religious leaders, community



ICITAP instructor teaches Tanzanian police how to use flexible handcuffs during a public order management course

associations, and marginalized groups will contribute to the development of a more complete picture of the needs on the ground.

Since the on-ground assessment is often short, it is important to identify as many representatives from civil society groups as possible before arriving in the host country. Initial contacts can be made with the assistance of U.S. embassy staff and local development workers.

As more representatives are interviewed, their different points of view can be analyzed. Ideally, a large representative sample study would be carried out to determine broader group and societal perceptions of police abilities, effectiveness, and legitimacy and the related perception of state corruption. Conducting a large-scale survey is beyond both the scope of the on-ground assessment and the capabilities of many host countries. However, a monitoring and evaluation specialist should accompany the assessment team to gather information on how such a large scale survey might be carried out in the future as part of a monitoring and evaluation process. This expert might also assess the feasibility of an impact evaluation in the country.

Cooperation with local academic institutions and government and private research entities is essential, as these bodies can carry out and analyze national surveys and produce quantitative reports on public opinion. In many countries, independent studies are already carried out on perceptions of crime, police conduct, and judicial efficiency. For example, the United Nations conducts surveys about citizens' attitudes toward the police in a variety of different countries.

Challenges

Corruption

In some institutions and governing environments there is a certain level of tolerance for corruption. This is especially true in many underdeveloped countries, where it is plausible for officers to ask citizens for a pen and paper to write a report or for taxi fare to get to a crime scene. In some cases, citizens express understanding for police who ask for bribes because they know the police are not paid a living wage. Elsewhere, particularly in post-conflict areas, corruption is systemic throughout the organization, from the executive level to the line level. The assessment process provides an opportunity to identify if corruption within law enforcement or government bureaucracies may affect program efficiency.

Although global corruption can seem overwhelming, principled leaders do exist who champion honesty and transparency. Consider the case of Ugandan General Edward Katumba Wamala, who was appointed chief of police in 2001. When he came to lead the national police, line-level officers were not being paid a living wage. Two line-level officers and their families would be housed in the same small aluminium "igloo" with only a curtain separating the two families' living space and a single door for ventilation. Katumba Wamala originally appealed to parliament and the ministry of finance to raise the salaries of the line officers but was told the resources were not available. Taking matters into his own

hands, General Katumba Wamala used the report of a former Ugandan Supreme Court Justice's independent criminal investigation of the police force to justify the dismissal of corrupt senior police officials who had been diverting official police funds. Katumba Wamala then used the money he recouped to double the size of his line-level officers' salaries and to provide each family its own igloo.

Systemic corruption can affect the assessment process if those who profit from the current structure stand to gain from keeping practices the way they are. Many of ICITAP's sponsored upgrades to data information systems in countries like Macedonia have given public servants the ability to make their processes more transparent and decrease the opportunities for corruption.

Practical implementation

Because few foreign assistance initiatives use preassessments, individuals may not understand the reasons they are being assessed. This may affect response rates and the willingness of U.S. embassy staff to assist in facilitating preassessment questionnaires, especially in countries where assessment fatigue has set in from participation in other assistance efforts.

There are both internal and external challenges to carrying out truly disciplined, in-depth preassessments and on-ground assessments. However, the programmatic benefits to financial efficiency, accurate planning, attainable goal setting, and sustainability justify the small investment required to conduct them. Upon completion of the on-ground assessment visit, ICITAP will draft, within 45 days, a trip report containing the findings of the assessment, including initial recommendations for acutely needed training that can be delivered within six months. The ICITAP trip report will also make and support recommendations as to the need for a CTA, a JTA, an IDA, and a TNA. A copy of the trip report will be sent to the U.S. Embassy and the funding agency.

Figure 1. Traditional international law enforcement development process




Figure 2. ICITAP's framework for preparing to promote sustainable institutional development



Crime Threat Analysis

What are the key crime threats facing communities?

How are these threats likely to develop?

Is law enforcement in a position to address them?

Do people trust the police?

A crime threat analysis (CTA) aims to evaluate whether the current priorities, activities, and capabilities of law enforcement meet the demands of citizens and the threats posed by key crime and public safety issues. This analysis considers both the host organization's external political environment (which contains the expectations and demands of citizens and their representatives) and its external task environment (which shapes the magnitude and character of the organization's work).

Nature of the analysis

Crime threat analyses should paint a holistic, high-level picture of criminal and public safety problems facing law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.⁷ CTAs address the what, where, when, how, who, and why of crime (the 5W1H questions) by identifying key patterns,

relationships, and trends.⁸ CTAs take a transnational view of criminal activity and look at criminal groups and markets.⁹

CTAs should give a sense of the nature and scale of the identified problems, along with the overall impact if these problems are left unaddressed.¹⁰ A CTA should be both present- and future-oriented,¹¹ analyzing the current situation and forecasting how crime and public safety issues are likely to develop.¹² A CTA should also address law enforcement's capabilities to respond to outlined threats by analyzing internal operations and evaluating police efforts.¹³ A thorough analysis of current and future problems can help law enforcement achieve the following goals:

1. Craft novel and relevant strategies to address problems, improve crime prevention, and lead to more proactive policing.¹⁴
2. Assess organizational procedures and crime-fighting techniques.¹⁵
3. Prioritize and target time and resources by allocating resources to certain types of crime.¹⁶
4. Direct and optimize operational responses, including those related to the deployment of police in crime-prone areas.¹⁷
5. Improve coordination between law enforcement sectors.¹⁸
6. Engage in strategic planning, including budgeting and resource allocation, procurement, and human resources.¹⁹

A CTA has both an operational and strategic function and must ultimately translate analysis into strategies that will improve citizens' quality of life.²⁰ The intelligence gleaned from the CTA should drive tasking, support the development of job descriptions, roles, and responsibilities, and be used to identify areas where law enforcement needs to develop new skills.²¹ Threats and gaps identified by the CTA should

Goals of a Crime Threat Analysis

- ▶ Identify present and future crime problems.
- ▶ Create impetus for institutional development and capacity building.
- ▶ Allow for strategic management, planning, and policy development.
- ▶ Align internal capabilities with the external environment.
- ▶ Facilitate the development of community-based, problem-oriented, and intelligence-led policing practices.

create impetus for action. In this sense, a CTA may also serve as a communication and advocacy tool for SILED.

It is also very important that any CTA involve the citizens the police serve. Their concerns about crime, security, and quality of life issues will often differ from the crime problems identified by police. Their inclusion in this process is the very basis of a community-based policing philosophy; it helps both to create public support for the police and to hold the police accountable.

CTAs are increasingly used as a means of understanding and responding to crime on local, national, and regional levels.²² Although their use in transitional and developing countries remains limited, in this setting CTAs could prove particularly useful as a means of determining how to maximize limited resources.²³

Key steps to conducting a CTA

There are seven steps to a CTA:

1. Planning and tasking
2. Data collection
3. Data evaluation
4. Processing and collation
5. Scanning and analysis
6. Review and prioritization
7. Making and disseminating recommendations

Summary

Conducting a CTA begins with planning and tasking, which engages the host government in a discussion about process and methodology. Next, data collection leverages a broad range of quantitative and qualitative data sources, which typically include surveys of both the public and the police. Getting input from the public is critical because in many countries where citizens are afraid to interact with police, the police do not have a good understanding of the most pressing crime problems people face. A rating system is then used to evaluate the validity and accuracy of data collected.



Tanzania police command staff observe public order management training

Data are then processed and collated to discern patterns and key themes, and a situation report is compiled. Once the main crime threats have been identified, the factors that enable and constrain the threats can be considered. A review stage allows the institution to prioritize threats by immediacy, threat level, and the human and financial resources needed to combat them. Lastly, a CTA should make recommendations that will allow law enforcement agencies to better address threats through improved or modified strategic and operational planning, the acquisition of additional resources, and training.

Step 1: Planning and tasking

Crafting a framework

Conducting the CTA requires a good conceptual framework, process, and research methodology.²⁴ It also requires a good understanding of the host country's priorities. Crafting a CTA is inherently an exercise in making value judgments. It is imperative to work closely with the host country's national law enforcement to create common definitions and agree on crime indicators.²⁵

Understanding the local perception of crime and public safety

There are likely to be varying views of what constitutes crime and public safety issues.²⁶ The definition of crime may depend on political and social contexts: for example, where there is widespread corruption people might use the term "crime" to describe police

activity.²⁷ Agreement on the purpose, parameters, methodology, sources, and timeframe for the CTA is a critical part of planning, which must be completed ahead of data collection.²⁸

Local ownership

Ideally the CTA should be commissioned by host-country law enforcement, and its scope should be articulated as part of a structured agreement or terms of reference (ToR).²⁹ Host-country law enforcement should also be encouraged to own the process³⁰ so as to ensure the CTA process aligns with the goals of host-country law enforcement agencies.³¹ Engaging host-country law enforcement in related problem analysis techniques is also likely to help foster their capacity in community-based, problem-oriented, and intelligence-led policing.³²

Understanding the context

The ToR or other agreement should also highlight relevant legislation, existing policy structures, and available stakeholder data.³³ Having a thorough understanding of the local context will be key. Review of findings from the preassessment and

on-ground assessment will inform this first step in the CTA process. Depending on the host country's circumstances, it may be possible to gather data regarding the four analyses during the desk study or through preassessment questionnaires. ICITAP will be investigating ways that graduate students, during the preassessment stage, can collect data that will be needed to conduct the four analyses. This will improve the efficiency of the SILED framework.

Step 2: Data collection

Crime analysis should be based on reliable qualitative and quantitative data and techniques.³⁴ These may include reviewing crime data, such as that related to location and nature of arrests, victims, and offenders, or reviewing general police information such as calls for service and traffic information.³⁵

Host-country law enforcement should be involved in crafting a data collection plan that considers the breadth, depth, number, and reliability of the sources available.³⁶ However, this does not mean that law enforcement will be the sole source of data. Table 1 contains a list of possible data sources:

Table 1. Potential crime threat analysis data sources

ORIGIN OF SOURCE	TYPES OF SOURCE	METHODS OF DATA GATHERING
Victims and perpetrators of crime	Former gang members, incarcerated persons, victims of crime	One-on-one interviews
Law enforcement agencies and associated agencies	Databases and records, human sources, reports	Questionnaires, focus groups, workshops, one-on-one interviews, desk research
Other public agencies and governmental departments	Databases and records, human sources, reports (e.g., of court hearings)	Questionnaires, focus groups, workshops, one-on-one interviews, desk research
Public sector organizations, civil society organizations, private sector, academia, law enforcement and criminal justice experts, media outlets	Open sources, academic publications, media reports	Questionnaires, focus groups, workshops, one-on-one interviews, desk research
International organizations and donor governments	Databases and records, human sources, reports	Desk research, one-on-one interviews

Data audit

In the United States, crime analysis is typically data-driven. However, in many countries crime data may be neither readily available nor reliable. What data exists may reflect the current activities and focus of law enforcement, leading to higher-than-normal reporting in areas of focus and underreporting elsewhere. Available data may therefore not reflect the actual level of crime.³⁷ For example, researchers conducting a CTA in South Africa were faced with a stark lack of quantitative data.³⁸ Data were often very basic, seldom standardized nationwide or stored electronically, making access and comparison challenging.³⁹ Some data gaps were also a likely consequence of underreporting.⁴⁰

Gaps can in themselves be useful indicators of poor reporting patterns and procedures that ought to be addressed by developing a culture of data collection.⁴¹ They may also be linked to low literacy. Additionally, citizens—including members of law enforcement agencies—may avoid giving candid responses to police or ICITAP assessors for fear of reprisal, also reducing the reported crime rate. Conversely, host-country agencies may also attempt to inflate statistics in order to secure additional resources. Obviously, ICITAP's clear challenge will be adapting the entire framework for use in countries with weak statistical capacity. It can be done, though, just as colored pins on a map can be an effective alternative to a computerized crime database.

It is imperative to recognize and bridge intelligence gaps wherever possible.⁴² Where there is a lack of quantitative data, there will be more reliance on qualitative research methodologies like consultations and field research.⁴³

Consultation

Surveying police at different levels

Street-level police can be a valuable source of primary data.⁴⁴ They can be asked to brainstorm and discuss what they see as the most prevalent

problems in their areas, the factors contributing to crime, and how law enforcement currently responds.⁴⁵ Often, however, lower ranking police officers can be punished for providing information to third parties if the information is deemed to be embarrassing to the host nation agency or government. It is important to find a way for officers to share such information without reprisal, as the views of lower-ranking officers who actually work the streets and are more intimately familiar with the crimes that occur in that community may differ significantly from those of leadership.

Surveying the public

Police policy should reflect the priorities of external stakeholders and citizens.⁴⁶ One way to determine these priorities is to have a neutral body—such as a university, nonprofit, or think tank—conduct community surveys.⁴⁷ Comparing community perceptions with law enforcement data is likely to reveal discrepancies, competing definitions, and biases. Awareness of these discrepancies can shed light on what factors shape a community's perception of crime and on why certain crimes might go underreported—knowledge that may inform strategy.

Moreover, surveying public opinion is likely to reveal the level of social tolerance for current crime and public safety issues.⁴⁸ It may also serve the dual purpose of educating communities on how to report crime, which is critical for intelligence-led policing.⁴⁹

Step 3: Data evaluation

Each source and data point received ought to be evaluated, as the validity of the data will affect the validity of the analysis.⁵⁰ One method of evaluation is the four by four (4x4) system, which assigns each item a value based on how information was obtained, the reliability of the source, and whether the data can be corroborated.⁵¹

Step 4: Processing and collation

The next stage involves compiling, indexing, summarizing, and comparing data, and then discerning patterns and common themes.⁵² When possible, a CTA should leverage all common methods of crime analysis: crime statistical analysis; geographic and spatial crime analysis/crime mapping (for example, by using a geographic information system (GIS) to identify hot spots); linkage analysis; crime and time series analysis; case docket analysis; crime patterns; frequency analysis; temporal analysis; and criminal group inventory matrix (profiling and studying the operations of criminal groups).⁵³ The depth of analysis will obviously vary widely among countries depending on their levels of statistical sophistication.

Step 5: Scanning and analyzing

Step 5 begins the use of the SARA problem-solving process.⁵⁴ SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment; it is a model often used in community policing to identify and solve repeat crime and community problems. In the CTA, it is used to help identify the main problems so that they can be described, and the 5W1H questions answered, in a current situation report.⁵⁵ The CTA should also seek to identify broader societal factors (also referred to as drivers and crime-related factors) that enable or constrain crime.⁵⁶ These crime related factors affect the nature, scale, location, and behavior of criminals and victims.⁵⁷

Step 6: Review and prioritization

Continuing the SARA model, the findings of the previous steps should be reviewed and conclusions drawn from the data analysis to determine policing priorities. These priorities will be based on each problem's threat level, which depends on multiple factors: the probability of the issue continuing, its scale and volume, the vulnerability of law enforcement and its preparedness to deal with the issue, and the level of harm caused.⁵⁸

Table 2. Effect indicators

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Physical and psychological	Negative effect on individuals' physical and psychological well-being and public health
Political	Negative effect on public policy, democracy, judicial systems, corruption
Financial and economic	Damage caused by crime and loss of income
Social	Effect on privacy, perception of public safety, disturbance of public order
Technological	Negative impact on technology (e.g., data security) that may in turn affect privacy
Environmental	Negative effects on the environment that may in turn affect public health

Harm may be tangible or intangible, direct or indirect, and have effects on an individual, community, or national level.⁵⁹ The magnitude of negative effects on society may be difficult to gauge, especially if they affect the general quality of life.⁶⁰ Effect indicators (see table 2) may therefore provide a useful tool for considering the full range of possible social consequences, drawing conclusions, and prioritizing.⁶¹ The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) model may be used to build arguments and make recommendations.⁶²

Step 7: Making and disseminating recommendations

The final step is making and disseminating recommendations in a final situation report. ICITAP sometimes presents recommendations as an arguments

map, which lists priority threats, associated crime related factors, and effect indicators along with information sources, thus allowing law enforcement leadership to make informed choices.⁶³ The final report should also include horizon scanning, which looks at future crime threats and possible trends.⁶⁴ Statistical modelling can also be used as part of this process to create an early warning system.⁶⁵

Any recommendation should follow the SMART model (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Time-bound).⁶⁶ The CTA must be conscious of day-to-day realities of host-country law enforcement.⁶⁷ The CTA should also be tailored to the relevant audience, and should be disseminated in a way that encourages and allows for feedback.⁶⁸

Challenges

If possible, the release of the CTA report should be integrated as part of the local or national policy or business planning cycle, in order to increase its likelihood of informing decision-making and policy development.⁶⁹ The shelf life of a CTA is also limited, as crime adapts to change, particularly changes in policing.⁷⁰ It is therefore imperative that national law enforcement replicate the CTA process in due course.

Job Task Analysis

What are the key job tasks for a law enforcement officer?

With what frequency and criticality are job tasks performed?

How accurate are job descriptions in prescribing officer duties and responsibilities?

A job task analysis (JTA) is a mechanism to evaluate tasks and competencies that are necessary for the successful execution of a specific job. The JTA process should be inclusive, transparent, and replicable: input should be gathered from stakeholders at all levels of an organization, the process and benefits should be communicated clearly, and steps should be simple and reproducible.

Note that JTAs do not evaluate an individual employee's performance of job tasks.⁷¹

Goals of a Job Task Analysis

- ▶ Document primary job tasks and the competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities) necessary for their successful execution.
- ▶ Inform when competencies should be developed: pre-, during, or post–basic training.
- ▶ Determine the relevance of current job tasks.
- ▶ Facilitate the creation of accurate job descriptions and uniform hiring standards.
- ▶ Identify gaps or inconsistencies between current training curricula and related skills on the ground.

Nature of the analysis

The Ratio of Police to Citizens Fallacy

In many countries there is little correlation between the jobs that police are hired to do and citizens' and governments' real needs for service. As an example, many countries with colonial traditions cling to a police structure designed to serve the state rather than citizens. Sworn police officers in these nations may actually spend their days working as cooks, drivers, coffee and tea servers, and electricians, doing jobs that have nothing to do with preventing, reducing, or solving crimes. The negative impact of these situations has been magnified by what we may call the Ratio of Police to Citizens Fallacy.

The ratio of police to citizens is one of many measures used to evaluate the capacity of a police department. ICITAP staff in Nigeria, Mozambique, and Uganda have all heard the ratio of 1:450 cited to law enforcement leadership as ideal, but the source of the recommendation remains murky.⁷² Whatever its source, while this ratio makes sense in major cities such as New York, Los Angeles, or London, where the organizational infrastructure is relatively healthy, it is a deceptive statistic when dealing with national police forces in developing countries.⁷³ For example, the ratio of police to citizens for an entire national police force might be 1:900, while in major cities within the country it might be 1:450⁷⁴—in other words, the country's ratio of police to citizens is higher in urban than in rural areas, just as it is in the United States and other developed countries. The fallacy comes into play because international development donors have used this ratio to justify significant increases in police forces in developing countries—for example, doubling the police force of our example country to achieve the 1:450 ratio—whether or not more police are actually needed.

However, even if other analyses agree that more *policing* is required, adding more *police* may not be the answer. If many sworn police officers are doing jobs that have nothing to do with police work, increasing the police force is no guarantee that more police functions will be performed.

Situations like these demonstrate the importance of a JTA. A JTA might reveal that a police force is sufficiently large, but that duties are not optimally assigned—that for example, fewer sworn officers should be working as coffee and tea servers and more should be given patrol duties or investigative assignments.

The most troubling result of this scenario plays out in countries where police are not paid a living wage. In some nations officers may make as little as \$40 a month, when they get paid at all. In such situations, increasing the number of police officers to meet a set ratio can increase police corruption. If police resources are limited, then a massive increase in force can cause a dramatic reduction in salaries. This leads to police on the street resorting to more petty corruption in order to survive, contrary to every stated tenet of the international donor community to promote good governance and reduce corruption.⁷⁵ Donors' failure to partner with foreign police and law enforcement agencies to conduct JTAs has hampered sustainable institutional law enforcement development.

Job descriptions

Even in organizations where police perform police functions, management and other organizational personnel may have inaccurate perceptions of police activities, priorities, and responsibilities. Conducting a JTA ensures that job tasks are widely understood so they can be accurately reflected in the job's description. It can also allow the organization to identify the skills required for creating any new positions that the CTA deems necessary.

Above all, a JTA must define what a law enforcement officer is. The definition of a police officer, and the conception of police duties, may be very different in the host country than in the United States. Once this basic definition is in place, the different roles (patrol, traffic, investigations, etc.) that police officers perform within their respective institutions can be further identified and defined.⁷⁶

Training

By identifying how officers actually spend their time, a JTA can validate relevant training, identify unnecessary material, and reveal any gaps in the training process. For example, in Colombia, ICITAP found that investigative officers received training in forensic intelligence and other specialized areas unrelated to their job duties. After conducting a JTA, ICITAP and curriculum developers were able to reduce officers' training from a year to 16 weeks by tying each component of the curriculum to a specific job task.

Key steps to conducting a JTA

There are three steps to a JTA:

1. Compile a comprehensive list of job tasks.
2. Determine which tasks are the most essential by rating their frequency and the consequences of inadequate performance of these tasks.
3. Identify the competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities) necessary for the successful completion of these critical and essential tasks.

Before undertaking a JTA, it is important to gain the support and investment of upper-level law enforcement officials, particularly management and administration. Otherwise, those not engaged in the JTA process may be resistant to the results, revelations, or recommendations produced. Further, it is better to know beforehand if critical personnel are opposed to reevaluating or changing job positions, descriptions, or training curricula.



Nigerian police officers ride in Kaduna, Nigeria to mark the end of their Bicycle Patrol course

Summary

A JTA is a mechanism to evaluate tasks and competencies that are necessary for the successful execution of a specific law enforcement agency job. A JTA also helps to determine the police institution's commitment of human and material resources to each particular area of work, from investigators assigned to specific areas of crime, to street and patrol police visible and active in the communities, to staff engaged in training, management, and administration.

A common first step of a JTA is to compile a comprehensive list of job tasks. While this may be done by consulting a working group of subject matter experts or working from existing records such as job descriptions, the most accurate assessment is created through general polling of the police. General polling reveals what jobs are actually being done, rather than what may be stated in job descriptions or set forth in planning documents. These latter sources should still be consulted, if they exist, to determine how the job task distribution set forth in the documentation compares with the actual assignments. A wide discrepancy between personnel records and planning documents and the actual count revealed by the JTA

reveals a serious management deficiency or even a corrupt personnel assignment process.

The second step of the JTA is to determine which tasks are most essential by quantifying the number of people who should be devoted to a particular area (e.g., crime prevention, criminal investigation, prosecution of specified crimes, training, management, or administration).

The third and final step is to identify the competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities) necessary for the successful completion of essential tasks such as preventing and fighting particular crimes, recruitment, selection, and training. With these data, management can shift

resources to high-priority areas and seek additional resources to fill in the gaps. Curriculum developers can compare competencies to current training curricula to ensure that priority topics are adequately addressed in either basic or advanced training. Discrepancies between resources' planned allocation and their actual use may reveal flaws in the institution's policies, procedures, processes, and planning.

Step 1: Compiling a comprehensive list of job tasks

Methods of data collection can include the following:

- 1. General Polling.** Through a survey or other means, ask practitioners to record their daily activities, such as stopping cars, writing citations, or responding to distress calls. Not only does this provide accurate data in real time, but it can reveal if tasks are being performed that fall outside of the scope of a particular position, or if officers are underused.⁷⁷ As referenced in the "Nature of the analysis" section on page 22, in some countries, sworn police officers are deployed as drivers, tea servers, door openers, or security officers to private sector VIPs.

2. Consulting Subject Matter Experts. Recruit a representative working group of subject matter experts (SME) to list a job’s duties and requirements. The criteria for selecting this group should be defined to ensure that members have experience in the day-to-day duties of police officers.⁷⁸ The group should include members from diverse levels and classifications to ensure the perspectives of both line-level officers and their supervisors are represented.⁷⁹ It is critical, however, to determine whether a supervisor at any level has the knowledge to be considered an SME, as in some countries supervisors are generally appointed directly to supervisory positions without previous experience in policing.

Additionally, the working group’s meetings should be planned to allow all perspectives to be heard. Subordinates may be reluctant to speak up in front of their supervisors or to publicly contradict them.⁸⁰

3. Building on Previous Task Lists. Use previous JTAs if available, or build on comparable past job analyses by the host country, even though they may not be as thorough as a formal JTA. Using this as a foundation, ask SMEs to review each task for relevance.

Data collection can draw on any of these sources or on all three. Whichever method is used, it is essential to only include tasks unique to the function of the particular job—for example, though an officer must fill out a timesheet in order to get paid, this is an administrative task and not a critical job function.

Step 2: Determining criticality and essential job tasks

An initial list of job tasks must be narrowed down to those that are critical and essential. According to Oregon’s Department of Public Safety Standards and Training, to meet this criterion, “. . . a task or job requirement must be either performed relatively frequently by the majority of incumbents, or competent performance of the task must be required because of the potentially serious consequences of NOT performing the task.”⁸¹

One method of determining if tasks are critical and essential is to design a survey that provides rating scales for frequency and importance of correct execution and distribute it to employees, the working group of SMEs, or supervisors and management. This survey might ask employees if they execute a task “multiple times daily, once daily, weekly, monthly, annually, or never.”⁸² In turn, a criticality rating might specify the potential impact of poor execution of a job task. For example, categories might include “mild to moderate (have a mildly negative impact), moderate (definite negative impact), moderately high (serious negative impact), or severe (potential for disastrous consequences, serious injury, loss of life, significant property damage).”⁸³

Though less common, respondents can also be asked to rate the relative difficulty of a particular task: “not difficult, less difficult, difficult, more difficult, and very difficult.”⁸⁴

Distribution

Often, the easiest way to distribute a survey is through an online tool like SurveyMonkey, LimeSurvey, or Google Survey that can organize, analyze, and interpret the data. The survey can be sent to employees via email or placed as a hotlink on agency computers. In cases where the majority of officers do not have access to computers or email, a survey can also be administered on paper. Regardless of the method used, employee responses should be kept confidential. If officers are illiterate, ratings may be obtained through in-person interviews, focus groups, or polling.

Interpreting results

Determine in advance a frequency and criticality cut-off or measurement mechanism. One option is to select tasks that occur daily, weekly or monthly, or have a moderate or severe negative impact.⁸⁵ In Kosovo, ICITAP excluded the bottom 10 percent of tasks. Other agencies choose to maintain those rated in the top 51 percent. Depending on the preferences of the local agency, criticality and frequency might



Former ICITAP Assistant Director Denver Fleming with his Nigeria Police Force colleague

also be weighed differently to more accurately reflect tasks that occur infrequently but have severe consequences, such as discharging a firearm. In Kosovo, a task's frequency rating was multiplied by 0.33 while its criticality rating was multiplied by 0.66, and the two products were added for a final score. Items that did not make the cutoff were also reviewed by SMEs prior to exclusion to ensure they had not been left out through statistical irregularities. For example, in Kosovo, all of the items associated with community policing were originally in the exclude range. This was because Kosovo police supervisors had not yet attended ICITAP's community policing course. These items were identified in review and kept in the JTA task lists.

Step 3: Identifying necessary competencies

The working group of SMEs, or management and administration, should identify competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities) required to complete critical and essential tasks.⁸⁶ Curriculum developers can then review the competencies by comparing them to existing training curricula, ensuring topics are adequately addressed in either basic or in-service training. This will help identify training gaps. It is critical to determine when and to what level of understanding officers should demonstrate competencies.⁸⁷

Challenges

When undertaking a JTA, be careful to do the following:

1. Include only core tasks and competencies, as SMEs or working groups may list every actionable facet of their jobs. Remind them from the outset that they will need to prioritize tasks.
2. Include only standard tasks. Although each particular job will differ, only include those tasks or competencies that the majority of personnel in a particular position will have learned to perform. For example, accident reconstruction will be a standard task of only a small number of specialists, while all officers will have been trained in basic traffic control functions.
3. Ensure that the JTA continues to be used as a meaningful tool for analysis and reflection. Don't let it become a shelf document!

Evaluating results: Comparing to CTA

After conducting the JTA, compare the results to those of the CTA. Are areas of concern receiving appropriate levels of time and attention from officers? Are current resource levels adequate, or do personnel need to be reassigned? Are there areas of concern where the police currently do not have the training necessary to address the situation (e.g. cybercrimes, transnational crime, corruption)?

Sustainability

If possible, JTAs should be conducted every three to five years or whenever a new CTA shows the need to develop new capacity, so that tasks and competencies remain relevant and incorporate changes in technology and resource levels. Because the first JTA will provide a comprehensive list of tasks and competencies, subsequent JTAs will likely take less time to complete. However, care should be taken to assemble a diverse and representative working group of SMEs during each JTA process.

Kosovo

In the spring of 2013, ICITAP conducted a JTA and training needs assessment (TNA) to validate the basic training curriculum and identify any training gaps at the Kosovo Academy of Public Safety. The assessments also included recommendations for advanced and specialized training in areas identified by Kosovo police officers as directly related to the performance of their specific job duties. ICITAP's process began with a review of the structure of the organization, using shared skill sets to define sections such as Operations, Border, Investigations, and Administration. Specific job duties were then identified and job task lists were created. Using online survey software, agency personnel were asked to rate tasks they perform by frequency, while supervisors were asked to rate the same tasks by criticality. The results were then compared with existing job descriptions and training curricula.

The entire process was done in cooperation with the Kosovo Police training division and the results of the findings were turned over to them for review and implementation of corrective action. Unfortunately, as is often the case in international development, funding for ICITAP's continued mentoring in this process ended before final implementation. Although the host agency was trained in how to conduct the process and the recommendations for action were provided to the host agency, the political will did not exist to replicate the process in the future.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2014, ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina launched a project management approach for conducting JTAs and TNAs using working groups. Project management is the discipline of planning, initiating, executing, controlling, and finishing the work of a working group to achieve specific goals and meet specific success criteria. A project management approach might include the following steps:

- Analyzing the problem
- Agreeing on a problem-solving approach
- Discussing financial considerations
- Determining training needs
- Determining equipment needs
- Addressing policy development issues
- Developing future budgeting strategies
- Establishing maintenance capability
- Ensuring sustainability
- Facilitating performance reviews
- Making course corrections
- Preparing lessons learned

A working group, in ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina's approach, comprised five to seven Bosnian law enforcement command officials—but never the chief—who represented their agencies; had the ability to make command decisions and agency commitments; and possessed the experience, education, and training to contribute to the working group's mission. The use of appropriately staffed working groups ensures that

- the project is workable, useful and relevant to the host-country police;
- the working group, and therefore the involved law enforcement agencies, have ownership of the project;

- there is both individual and agency commitment to the project;
- the success of the project rests on host-country law enforcement agencies, not on ICITAP or the U.S. Government;
- host-country law enforcement agencies will ensure progress and sustainability of the project beyond ICITAP or USG involvement.

ICITAP technical advisors and local staff can play a variety of functions in this process:

- Acting as facilitators for these processes
- Providing logistical support for working group meetings
- Keeping careful records of working group proceedings
- Acting as advisors, mentors, and resource agents for the working group
- Brokering agreements and implementation strategies for working group projects⁸⁸

Pakistan

In Pakistan, ICITAP worked with the National Police Academy to conduct a JTA of district police officers. A strategic plan was developed, after which academy and ICITAP members of the JTA Training Task Force conducted three workshops on the JTA process. Once ten core duties and 273 tasks had been identified and prioritized, ICITAP members designed a survey questionnaire, which was completed by district police officers throughout the country. The survey results were then carefully analyzed. In an ongoing, collaborative effort with the staff of the National Police Academy, ICITAP members of the task force identified curriculum target areas that required instructional system design. Class modules could then be tailored specifically for the district police officer.

Institutional Development Analysis

What are the gaps and deficiencies in the significant policies, procedures, processes, and practices of the institution?

What institutional weaknesses can be improved by the creation of new policies, procedures, processes, and practices?

What remedies to the gaps and deficiencies in the institution's policies, procedures, processes, and practices can be achieved by drafting, implementing, and enforcing new policies, procedures, processes, and practices, including addressing unwritten practices which undermine the governance of the institution?

An institutional development analysis (IDA) is a mechanism that reviews the governance of an institution to determine if there are any significant gaps or deficiencies in its policies, procedures, processes, or practices that impact the institution's basic operations. If gaps or deficiencies do exist, the institution should take steps to correct those deficiencies and fill those gaps. ICITAP can work with host-country law enforcement agencies to draft new policies, procedures, processes, and practices and create a detailed implementation plan. An IDA should be conducted after a JTA to ensure that policies, procedures, processes, and practices are established by persons who know what the work entails and what tasks need to be performed.⁸⁹

The governance of an organization is at the heart of its sustainability as an institution. Effective policies, procedures, processes, and practices, consistently promoted and enforced, sustain the institution's operations. For a law enforcement organization, good governance means responding to the peoples' needs by providing effective law enforcement in a professional and consistent manner.⁹⁰

Goals of an IDA

- ▶ Develop, on the part of senior and middle management, the political will to identify gaps and deficiencies in the governance of the institution.
- ▶ Identify significant gaps in important policies, processes, procedures, and practices or deficiencies on the part of senior and middle management in the implementation of existing policies, etc.
- ▶ Assist the institution in drafting and implementing new policies, procedures, processes, and practices or new approaches to implementing existing ones.
- ▶ Institute training of front-line police officers on any changes to important policies, procedures, processes, or practices.

The end result is an institution in which policies, procedures, processes, and practices are sustainable: they support the overall goals of the institution, are consistently and transparently implemented and followed by senior and middle management, and are adaptable to changing conditions.⁹¹

Nature of the analysis

The subject areas covered by the IDA include the structure of the institution (including chain of command and span of control), the creation and implementation of policies, long-term planning and its execution on the ground, recruiting and training, the appropriations and budgetary processes, and the use of human and operational resources.⁹²

Problems in these and other police systems usually reveal themselves by the extent to which the actual implementation of the policies, procedures, processes and practices is inconsistent with the intent of senior management. It may also be that senior management is not interpreting or implementing the policy, etc., as its authors intended. This intent should be plainly set out in the wording of the policy, procedure, process, or practice. Implementation, meanwhile, should be taken to include the standardized process of distributing policy documents and ensuring all personnel are properly trained on their contents and implications. The IDA should examine both the intent and the implementation of policies.

The culture of the organization, including unwritten understandings and practices, should also be examined to determine if that culture is consistent with, or inimical to, the written policies, procedures, processes, and practices or to the operation of a viable and effective law enforcement organization. It is not uncommon for an agency's customary practices and procedures to vary significantly from its written policy.⁹³

Modifying the ways in which an institution is operated is a highly political process, affecting both powerful officials of the institution and the daily practices of front-line officers.⁹⁴ Because this process usually involves a power shift, it will usually be resisted by management.

The culture of the institution should be centered around responding to the legitimate needs of the people, both through the prevention and prosecution of crime, and adhering to the rule of law.⁹⁵ The techniques of enlightened management, comprehensive administrative systems, robust financial practices, and objective criteria for job evaluations should all be part of the consideration of institutional reform.⁹⁶

Key steps to conducting an IDA

There are five steps to an IDA:

1. Determine the structure of the organization.
2. Determine existing policies, procedures, processes, and practices.
3. Identify gaps or variance between the letter and spirit of the policies, etc. and their implementation.
4. Convene decision-makers to create new policies, etc. to fill gaps or to align the implementation with the original intent.
5. Monitoring and follow-up.

Step 1: Determine the structure of the organization

Before judging whether a law enforcement organization's policies suit its structure, it is first necessary to determine whether that structure is itself sustainable. The sidebar on page 12 explains the management, investigative, and functionary ratios and the budget processes which ICITAP uses to make this determination.

Step 2: Determine existing policies, procedures, processes, and practices

Next, the IDA determines both the institution's formal policies, procedures, processes, and practices, such as the authority governing the ways in which police are supposed to investigate crime, and the unwritten practices it tolerates, such as unethical conduct like accepting graft, demanding bribes, or using torture as part of the interrogation process.⁹⁷

Step 3: Identify gaps

According to ICITAP Pakistan Program Manager Daniel Miller, "With the rise of terrorism, the external environment is changing. The ability to adapt is key. That doesn't just mean creating a new unit. The ability to change an organization's design is key to good policing." This step identifies gaps that may indicate such a design change is needed.

Where no clear policy is being followed, it should be determined whether the relevant policy is ineffective, or whether there is a gap—that is, no policy at all. It is very common for gaps to exist alongside formal policies, simply because personnel never received training on the policies.

Other starting points include the procedures by which the institution sets its preventative and enforcement priorities (or has those enforcement priorities set for it by the legislature or an executive branch agency) and those controlling how the institution compiles its requests for resources (directly from the legislative branch or as part of an overall request for resources from the ministry that oversees the police).

While senior managers in the organization are sometimes in the best position to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the institution's governance, sometimes they are out of touch with middle management or line-level officers and with how they are carrying out—or not carrying out—policy directives. ICITAP must gauge which senior officials are savvy enough and possess the political will to bring about positive change.

Experts outside of law enforcement will also have their own ideas about how a police institution sets its preventative or enforcement priorities and the behavioral standards that govern its officers, particularly those relating to the gathering and preservation of evidence, how the police institution handles unethical behavior by police officers in their preventative and enforcement capacities, and how law enforcement officers are to engage with other members of the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors or corrections officials. These experts are well-placed to describe how these functions appear from outside and the unspoken rules that, to the public, may appear to be governing the institution. It is critical, however, that ICITAP take into account that civil society actors sometimes have personal agendas about police and may be less than objective.⁹⁸

Step 4: Convene decision-makers to create new policy to fill gaps

Senior, mid-level, and first-line supervisors and rank-and-file members who want to improve the institution should take leading roles in suggesting improvements to policies, procedures, processes, and practices. Their involvement ensures the institution's decision-makers (see above) and implementers have full buy-in for the contemplated changes in policies. Each step in the making of a policy, procedure, process, or practice, together with the tasks it is meant to accomplish, should be explained by the policy maker to those who will enforce and implement the policies to make sure that the process and goals are clear to all of them. At each level, impediments to clear communication in the implementation of the policy, procedure, process, or practice should be discussed. Implementers, down to the line level, must understand that the policy, etc. has the backing of senior officials and they must determine whether they have sufficient resources to carry out a particular policy, procedure, process, or practice. If possible, the institution's normal policy-making system should be employed.

Step 5: Monitoring and follow-up

Implementation is the weak point in the reform process. Relentless follow-up is the key. The drafting and implementation processes for new or revised policies, procedures, processes, and practices can be monitored by a group of outside experts, including those from civil society. Once the policies, etc. have been in effect for a reasonable period of time, those most affected should be surveyed to determine whether the policies have been fully implemented and if they are accomplishing their stated purposes. The representatives from civil society and subject matter experts who monitored the drafting and implementation of the new policies, procedures, processes, or practices should also be surveyed to determine whether they believe the desired ends are being achieved.



Three boys at the Kaduna Police College in Nigeria, where ICITAP presented some of its training

Finally, citizen satisfaction surveys should be done in order to determine whether citizens noticed a difference in police response and behavior.

Line officers are unlikely to warm to directives to materially change their conduct unless they believe that the changes are in their interests as law enforcement officers. They must believe that reforms will reduce crime and promote order.⁹⁹ This is a particular challenge when instituting human rights–related reforms, such as strengthening codes of conduct or disciplinary systems,¹⁰⁰ because police may believe these protections will weaken the fight against crime.¹⁰¹ To overcome these objections, human rights protections should be accompanied by measures aimed at crime control.¹⁰² But just as importantly, new disciplinary and oversight systems, and the internal and external bodies responsible for them, must be independent, objective, transparent, and effective. Creating such systems within police organizations is one of ICITAP’s top priorities.¹⁰³

If applicable, the goals to be achieved by any new policies, procedures, processes, and practices developed as part of the IDA should be compared

to the results of the CTA and JTA to be sure that the new policies, etc. are not inconsistent with the conclusions of those two other analyses. Well-planned and implemented improvements in an organization’s governance should measurably contribute to the organization’s sustainable institutional development.

Challenges

The first challenge of an IDA is often to convince senior management—and middle management, who are often the greatest impediment to change—to fully participate in assessing the institution’s governance, to accept the conclusions of that assessment, and to commit to improving the policies, procedures, processes, or practices, and their implementation. Management must be

a leading partner in every way in this kind of sustainable institutional development; if they lack the political will to change, developing that will must be the first step.

Civil society organizations, as representatives of the public that suffers from a poorly managed law enforcement institution, should be part of the process of assessing that organization’s governance. Management may resist the participation of civil society organizations, alleging that some representatives of civil society are simply anti–law enforcement. Civil society participants should be carefully chosen to participate in this analysis based on their overall support for effective and fair law enforcement that serves the people, rather than the state.

All middle management personnel, front-line supervisors, and line officers should be trained in all changes to policies, procedures, processes, and practices, so they can conform their conduct to the new rules. Short (10- to 35-minute) roll-call training for line officers is an efficient way of disseminating this information.

Training Needs Analysis

*What are the gaps in training at the organizational, task, and individual levels that need to be addressed in order for police to combat crime threats facing communities?*¹⁰⁴

*What gaps can be addressed by training?*¹⁰⁵

*Who needs to be trained?*¹⁰⁶

*What type of training is needed?*¹⁰⁷

A Training Needs Analysis (TNA) is a way to assess law enforcement's current capabilities, identify areas and populations where training is needed, and determine the type of training required. A TNA should involve significant input from community stakeholders to ensure that public and police perceptions of training needs are aligned. The TNA process should be inclusive, transparent, and replicable.

Nature of the analysis

Purpose and goals

In an ideal world with plentiful resources, a TNA is a “planned and continuous process”¹⁰⁸ comprising extensive surveys and stakeholder analyses of relevant actors in the law enforcement system. A TNA should examine the organization's effectiveness in achieving its goals and identify gaps or discrepancies between employees' current skills and those they require. It should consider not only the skills needed to perform tasks identified by current employee job descriptions, but also new skills that may be needed to address the threats identified in a CTA. Additionally, a thorough TNA will highlight problems that may not be resolved by training alone.

Goals of a Training Needs Analysis

- ▶ Determine performance and growth gaps in current training processes.
- ▶ Clarify the current needs of the organization.
- ▶ Inform training program design, guided by CTA and JTA.
- ▶ Identify where training is needed, which skills or competencies should be taught, and who should be trained.*†
- ▶ Complete the Assessment phases and the stage for subsequent steps of the ADDIE training process (Assessment – Design – Development – Implementation – Evaluation)‡
- ▶ Thoroughly describe goals of police department trainings.
- ▶ Describe structural environment of criminal justice sector in host country.
- ▶ Analyze performance of police and new recruits.
- ▶ Make recommendations for training.
- ▶ Make recommendations for follow-up of TNA.
- ▶ Establish a replicable process that can be adapted over time to the needs and capabilities of the police organization.

* Ghuffli, “Training Needs Analysis.”

† Shaw, “Know Your Enemy.”

‡ Shaw, “Know Your Enemy.”

Unfortunately, most TNAs are not performed in an ideal world; while country programs have vastly different budgets, most countries where ICITAP works have scarce resources. A TNA requires significant intellectual investment from the host country. Therefore, one of the elements of promoting SILED is convincing the host government that TNAs are worth conducting—not only once, but on a regular basis. A regular TNA process allows police to best allocate resources for training to match the needs of the force and emerging crime threats. As discussed earlier, while it may not be possible to conduct a TNA in developing countries as rigorously as in the United States, in many countries where ICITAP works there are host country–relevant ways of conducting TNAs, comparable to using colored pins in maps to track crime trends instead of computer systems.

The results of a TNA help policymakers design training programs that build competencies and skills, close performance gaps, and improve work operations; as well, they can inform a cost-benefit analysis for conducting training.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, a TNA allows for the identification of problem areas in the organization in a way that gains the buy-in of senior administrators.¹¹⁰

On a methodological level, a TNA requires both qualitative and quantitative data to determine the organization’s training needs.¹¹¹ A TNA may identify a performance gap, in which training can help bring police officers to a recognized standard of job task execution, or a growth gap, in which training may help boost police capacity to meet future threats.

A TNA determines the nature, scope, breadth, and depth of a training and development program.¹¹² Additionally, it will assist managers in determining the impetus for training, what material is to be covered, and the best method of training delivery.¹¹³ A TNA should be conducted at three levels: organizational, task, and individual.¹¹⁴



Baton Training with padded Red Man suit as part of ICITAP’s Public Order Management training in Yemen

Methods

A CTA describes the crime problems that a law enforcement institution needs to address; an IDA reveals whether it has the right policies in place to solve them; a JTA determines whether it has the right structure and staffing to solve them; and a TNA determines the best way to move the organization from where it is to where it needs to be. The key to promoting SILED is to partner with host-country law enforcement agencies to facilitate pragmatic approaches to conducting all four analyses.

The typical process for conducting a TNA includes identifying data sources, data collection and analysis, and adhering to the rest of the ADDIE model training process. The ADDIE model is the generic process traditionally used by instructional designers and training developers. The five phases—Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation—represent a dynamic and flexible guideline for building effective training and performance support tools. Because it will not be possible to conduct a broad-based and in-depth analysis of training needs in certain ICITAP countries, what follows are a variety of different approaches for conducting a TNA.

Key steps to conducting a TNA

There are four steps to a TNA:

1. Identify data sources (existing training curricula, stakeholders, etc.).
2. Collect data (relevant curricula, interviews, etc.).
3. Analyze data.
4. Provide training recommendations (and pursue rest of ADDIE process).¹¹⁵

TNA methods are not prescriptive and they should be customized to fit the country-specific context, based upon available ICITAP and host-country resources and host-country needs.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, a well-executed TNA allows ICITAP to tailor future training programs to the specific needs of a police organization to maximize the impact of available funding.¹¹⁷

Step 1: Identifying data sources

A wide range of sources should be identified in order to gain the most comprehensive picture of the organization as possible. However, time and funding inevitably constrain the tools that may be used. Step 2 describes data sources and collection methods that may be used.¹¹⁸

Step 2: Collect data

Potential sources of JTA data include the following:

- Current job-holders
- Entire chain of command
- Administrative staff
- Local NGOs
- Elected officials
- Community leaders
- Surveys
- Internal documents including existing training curricula

Table 3. Potential TNA data collection methods

DATA COLLECTION METHOD	NOTES
Observation	May take considerable time but will provide first-hand knowledge of how work-related tasks are completed.
Work diaries	Provides a ledger of activities during a period of time by a current jobholder, allowing for a detailed account of what tasks are completed on the job.
Interviews	Structured interviews with stakeholders allow ICITAP to gain insight from primary sources to determine training needs and follow-up with additional questions and ideas. May include data gleaned from JTA.
Questionnaires	Questionnaires can be incredibly useful in gathering and analyzing quantitative data from employees. However, in host countries with limited technological or literacy capacity, questionnaires may not be feasible. May incorporate data from CTA or JTA.
Focus group of stakeholders and SMEs	Allows for effective comparison and understanding of employee attitudes. May be costly, as it requires employees to be actively engaged, detracting from their job tasks. Necessitates thorough planning and skill to guide discussion.
Document search	Police departments may be unaware of importance of certain documents, or hide their existence. Document searches can take a significant amount of time, but allow for a comprehensive overview of the organization.

Conducting a TNA requires in-depth data collection, which may often be time-consuming or tedious if the host country has a low technological capacity. For instance, if ICITAP staff are directed to do a complete review of a police department which has no computer capabilities, data collection and analysis will need to be completed by hand, which may further stress the resources available.

Surveying police at different levels

Internal surveys provide the most comprehensive picture of a police or corrections department's true training needs. These should be administered to the top of the force, mid-level managers, officers working on the line, and administrative staff. Surveying a broadly representative population allows for comparison between what is perceived as a training need at the top of the organization and what is truly needed by the police walking the streets every day. Officers often request training they want rather than what they actually need; therefore, surveys should be designed in close consultation with the findings of the CTA, the JTA, and the IDA and their results should be closely scrutinized in light of the information gathered by the other analyses.

Surveying the public

As in the CTA, a TNA should survey key stakeholders in the community, including NGOs, local government officials, and community leaders. This integration of an outside perspective may alert police to gaps in training that they had not perceived and allow for an opportunity to build a relationship of trust with the community. It may also illuminate potential corruption, inappropriate behavior, or other deficiencies that require training to correct. To find such problems, it is also important to research the types of complaints filed against officers by the public, prosecutors, etc.

Step 3: Analysis

While no one method of data analysis is most effective in all scenarios, a good starting point is the pyramid method. This technique provides a basic framework for assessing training needs while involving key stakeholders—these could include police officers; police instructors; individuals aware of the results of the CTA, JTA, and IDA; and civic leaders. These stakeholders participate in a workshop, where they initially work individually to identify the main training needs they perceive based on the collected data. Gradually, they are paired in groups of two, then four, then eight to reach a consensus on key training needs they identify.¹¹⁹

Regardless of the method used, analysis of training needs should identify any existing performance gaps, in which employees need training in order to fill a current need. A vital aspect of a TNA is determining if training needs identified by police officers match those of the public they serve. If there are discrepancies, further analysis should be undertaken to identify what is causing these different perspectives.

Step 4: Provide training recommendations

As a final step, ICITAP makes recommendations for training based on the results of the TNA. These may include plans for new recruit training, mid-level management training, and leadership training for all levels of a police organization. The suggested areas of training may include but are not limited to technology, administration, investigations, forensic evidence processing, patrol, and operations. The TNA's tailored recommendations will inform future training design, development, implementation, and evaluation.

Understanding the limits of training

It is necessary to understand the limits of training. In some cases, problems identified by a training needs analysis may not be resolvable through further



Participant in ICITAP's Public Order Management training in Yemen

Training for training's sake is worthless, as training is only one aspect of the overall SILED process. However, if you're going to change behavior, you have to train people. It's the fuse.

–David Snodgrass,
*Curriculum Development
Specialist, ICITAP*

training. Larger issues, such as overall management and leadership incompetency, may trump any further training efforts. In such cases, the management and leadership of an organization must change before training can have significant impact. Systemic problems such as corruption will also not be addressed through training, and attempting to mitigate corruption through a training program will waste valuable and limited resources.

On the individual level, training may also not be the best approach to a problem. In some situations simple repetition and practice of a job task may be all that is necessary to fill the performance gap for a police officer. Supervisor feedback and practice of skills may also improve performance without extensive or costly training.¹²⁰

Challenges

Changes in technology and crime threats may make training programs obsolete or irrelevant; few agencies today would need training on tapping telephones with hardware, for example. This is why it is important that the CTA and JTA anticipate the emergence or growth of certain kinds of crime and responses to crime.¹²¹

Other challenges of a TNA include the following:

- Changes in funding/donor fatigue
- Fluctuation in host-country support, resulting in change of mission or political support
- Inadequate host-country laws, regulations, and standard operating procedures
- Training instructors who are then almost immediately transferred to other duties, undermining the SILED process

Sustainability

If possible, a TNA should be conducted every 3-5 years, or whenever major changes in training are being considered. This schedule will not be practical in many of the countries where ICITAP works, but the goal should be to maintain relevant training curricula while incorporating changes in technology, resource levels, and program direction. Future TNAs should use the initial TNA as a model, but adapt it to current contexts.¹²² With this TNA as a baseline for future training programs, the rest of the training process will be easier to execute.

Philippines

In fiscal year 2016, ICITAP Philippines was funded to assist the Philippine National Police (PNP) Directorate of Human Resources and Doctrine Development (HRDD) to improve curricula for Regional Director (brigadier general equivalent), Provincial Director (colonel equivalent), and City Director (lieutenant colonel equivalent) courses. The HRDD advises the Chief of PNP on matters such as policy development and human resources; formulates training programs; assigns training slots in programs offered by the PNP and by donor nations; and formulates plans, policies, and directives for the conduct, supervision, control, administration, and monitoring of police training in public and private schools.

ICITAP advisors worked with the PNP Training Service to prepare a data instrument (loosely based on a model borrowed from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and then gathered information from position incumbents on the efficacy of existing courses. Once the raw data were gathered, the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School for Public Policy assigned a team to process the raw data into immediately useful information, finishing its portion of the project in December 2015. These data provided excellent, digestible information, which was provided to the HRDD to help them identify strengths and needs in their current curricula. As a whole, the TNA concretely demonstrated both the process for training needs analysis and the value of police-higher education institution partnerships.

ICITAP's Curriculum Development and Training Philosophies

ICITAP's Curriculum Development and Training Unit (CDTU) was established at ICITAP headquarters in June 2013 and is designed to enhance the effectiveness of ICITAP's global operations by providing technical support and assistance to the regional components. CDTU is committed to producing high quality course materials that reflect current best practices in modern, democratic policing. All curricula also carry a reminder for instructors to be mindful of realities on the ground, and to tailor their instruction to the host nation's laws, regulations, policies, and cultural practices.

CDTU has also created standardized templates for all of its training materials. In order to be considered complete, curricula must include pre- and post- tests; lesson plans; PowerPoint presentations; an instructor guide; a student guide; and student handouts, to include practical scenario-based exercises. These standards and templates ensure a consistent level of quality in all ICITAP-developed curricula. In May 2015, ICITAP developed a cloud-based curriculum library system that makes curricula available for download worldwide; it has video conferencing and synchronous and asynchronous remote training capabilities.

As of November 2017, CDTU had 128 complete ICITAP courses in this system, 94 technical manuals and model policies on law enforcement and development topics, and nine exterior links to free online training programs, one of which is a portal to almost 50 free forensics classes. ICITAP has a total of 24 licenses for direct access to the training library, video conferencing, and remote training capacities; however, ICITAP's curriculum developer can

also respond to requests for course materials by sending hyperlinks to requestors enabling them to download material directly.

CDTU has collaborated with six universities to develop training materials on emerging topics. Courses developed through these initiatives include Genocide and Mass Atrocities Prevention; LGBTI Sensitization for Police; Women in International Policing; Combating Trafficking in Persons; Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Emergency Management and Major Event Planning; Foreign Fighters; Countering Violent Extremism; and Developing Case Studies, Scenarios, and Role Plays for Human Rights/Human Dignity, Police Ethics, and Community Policing.

CDTU's experience in numerous countries has proven that off-the-shelf law enforcement training is of very limited value. For training to be successful, relevant, and sustainable, it must develop organically as part of the SILED analytical framework, and the host country must feel invested in the curriculum development process.

ICITAP is committed to using a variety of different educational methodologies in its courses: not only lectures, but Socratic dialogue (questioning students to arrive at an answer), case studies, scenarios, and role-plays—all of which make the educational experience much more interesting, interactive, and effective. By presenting this comprehensive approach to better educational practices, ICITAP curricula and course presentations have the potential to positively impact entire educational systems in the countries where ICITAP works.

Case Studies of ICITAP Projects

The following case studies describe how ICITAP has successfully promoted sustainable institutional law enforcement development (SILED) in seven countries: a patrol police development program in Ukraine, a community engagement initiative in Bangladesh, a police maritime patrol program in the Philippines, a police summer camp for children in Pakistan, a polygraph examination program in Nepal, a train-the-trainer public order management program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a major police reorganization program in Indonesia.

These case studies predate the development of the SILED framework described in Section I of this paper. That framework, however, grew out of ICITAP's long and successful experience in promoting sustainable institutional law enforcement development. The seven case studies in this section are evidence of that experience.

The ICITAP SILED framework could not have been developed—and cannot be properly implemented—without the skills and abilities of ICITAP program

managers, assistant program managers, and senior law enforcement advisors in the field. ICITAP field staff must be diplomatic, patient, flexible, articulate, and culturally sensitive in order to successfully promote SILED. The framework is a logical, methodical systematization of their years of experience and observation. While the ICITAP SILED framework is an important contribution to the field of international law enforcement development, strong and skilled field staff will always be at the core of promoting SILED.

Police Precinct (Polsek) Reorganization Program in Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia was a possession of the Dutch East India Company from 1603 to 1800, when it was nationalized as part of the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese occupied the archipelago from 1942 to 1945. At the end of World War II, Indonesia waged a four-year war against the Dutch and achieved its independence in December 1948. Although the country began as a parliamentary democracy, President Sukarno introduced a new authoritarian political system called “Guided Democracy,” through which he reduced the power of the parliament; by 1965, Sukarno’s successor General Suharto was ruling as a dictator.¹²³

Under Suharto’s rule, the Indonesian Police Force operated under the Armed Forces Chief as a part of the military.¹²⁴ Years of authoritarian rule, in conjunction with the financial crisis of 1997, pushed many Indonesians into poverty and led to widespread riots; civil unrest continued even after Suharto’s resignation in 1998.

In 2000 the Indonesian government separated the police force from the military, creating the country’s first civilian police force. The primary task of the Indonesia National Police (INP) is to maintain security and public order.¹²⁵

In response to the problem of excessive use of force by police, ICITAP worked with the INP to develop a use of force policy. ICITAP developed INP master instructors, who have trained more than 240,000 INP officers in Indonesia’s law enforcement training academies. (This program, with the exception of travel expenses, has now been entirely transferred to the INP). As a result, the percentage of citizen complaints against the INP which involved torture or other violence have dropped substantially, from 15 percent in 2010 to 6.31 percent in 2015, according to the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights.¹²⁶



Indonesian kindergarteners
with a motorcycle officer

In 2010, ICITAP Indonesia received funding for the Countering Violent Extremism and Conflict through Community-Based Strategies project that ICITAP managed through an Indonesian civil society group. The project's focus was to identify the precursors to community violence, volatility, and vulnerability to extremism. The process involved over 30 community assessment meetings in six cities and over 1,000 participants. These community assessments consistently revealed four factors that participants felt were the most likely sources of community conflict:

1. Nonresponsive and non-proactive government institutions, down to the local level of law enforcement
2. Corruption and nepotism within government, law enforcement, and political parties
3. Lack of economic and educational opportunities
4. Increased ethnic, religious, and social intolerance

After reviewing the results, the president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, declared that the greatest threat to Indonesia's stability was social conflict, and he ordered the INP National Police Chief to address the problem. The INP, after identifying over 2,700 areas throughout Indonesia susceptible to disruptive social conflict, approached ICITAP for further assistance. ICITAP conducted its own surveys, and concluded that the key to reducing social conflict was increasing the effectiveness of the local police patrol officers (Sabhara), community action officers (Binmas), and the officers assigned to the villages (Babinkamtipmas). If communities learned to trust the police through increased and continuous sincere engagements, social conflict could and would be reduced.

After study, ICITAP proposed taking some senior-level INP officers to a progressive and effective U.S. police agency to see how its officers work within their communities. ICITAP arranged the first of seven policing comparison studies with the Phoenix Police

Department (PPD),² with meetings with the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (AZPOST) and the Arizona Law Enforcement Academy (ALEA).

Over 80 INP officers travelled to Phoenix and went on patrols, met community leaders, observed the PPD's training philosophy and methodologies, and were briefed by executive staff on modern policing, community engagement philosophies, and patrol operations.

The Precinct (Polsek) Reorganization Plan

After the initial trip to Phoenix, the INP realized its policing methods were inadequate to address the needs of Indonesia. ICITAP Indonesia Program Manager Jerry Heuett wrote a white paper for the INP's consideration on an organizational transition and restructuring of polseks (precincts) to focus on providing proactive and responsive police services to communities. Heuett emphasized that an organizational reorganization would leverage behaviors and practices more reflective of effective community policing. After reviewing the ICITAP white paper, the INP requested that ICITAP develop a template or model for the reorganization. The result was the Precinct (Polsek) Reorganization Plan, "An Indonesian Model of Police Service."

The plan emphasized the adoption of a more decentralized system, in terms of both authority and responsibility. The polsek structure had been originally designed as a reactive military component, not a proactive law enforcement unit.¹²⁷ The plan's restructuring process redefined INP management and reporting structure to allocate more responsibilities to officers, with greater transparency, and addressed the hierarchical decision-making, the frequent rotation of senior officers, and other sources of dysfunction. The plan contained recommendations for restructuring metropolitan, urban, and rural polseks, as well as personnel recommendations to reduce

2. The PPD was recognized by U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch in 2015 as one of the top six agencies in the U.S. in community engagement and community policing.

operational costs and increase the efficiency of management.¹²⁸ It included process management guidelines for INP managers to ensure compliance to work rules, processes, and standard operating procedures.¹²⁹

Organizational transformation is crucial to effecting organizational and individual behavioral changes.¹³⁰ To overcome knowledge and training gaps in the police force, the INP identified key organizational development needs and approached countries with strong police forces to learn from them. To address social problems in the communities and improve public confidence in the police force, community engagement and community policing became important components of the reorganization plan.

What Is Community Policing?

Community policing is often understood as a set of programs, such as midnight basketball, McGuff the Crime Dog, foot patrols, bike patrols, or police substations. Although each of these may be incorporated as a part of a broader community policing philosophy, these initiatives are not community policing. Rather, community policing is an overarching philosophy that guides all aspects of police business.^{*} This philosophy promotes organized strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities, to allow all stakeholders to work together to address the nation's crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and effectively allocate resources.[†]

^{*} COPS Office, *Community Policing Defined*.

[†] Heuett, *White Paper on Polsek Reorganization*.

On March 1, 2017 the chief of the INP signed the Patrol Regulation and Reorganization Plan, heavily based on Heuett's white paper, to restructure the INP. This plan calls for community patrols on the streets 24/7, the continuation of community dialogues, and the training of police officers to serve as patrol police. This change in the job tasks is expected to affect some 230,000 officers out of the INP's total of approximately 435,000 personnel.

An important component of the reorganization plan, and the subject of a second ICITAP white paper, is the hiring of additional female police officers to increase the participation of women in the INP. Historically, gender norms led to the systematic exclusion of women from operational roles; the total female population in the pre-reform INP had expanded at the approximate rate of only 300 per year. The reorganization plan strategically focuses on gradually increasing the participation of women in the INP, giving due consideration to the prevailing gender norms in the country.

INP officers sent to Phoenix were struck by seeing women police officers, commanders, investigators, and executives; their engagement with the PPD led to the hiring of 7,000 female police officers (Polwan) in 2014 and 2,100 more the following year. The reorganization plan calls for women to be integrated into more operational positions at the polsek level, as well as into strategic roles. This inclusion will have spillover effects, most notably increased economic opportunities for women. In addition, the IPD is strongly considering integrating women police investigators at the polsek level, in what is referred to as Women's Desks, to handle issues concerning women and children and gender-based violence within communities.

This reorganization is a monumental step forward in achieving sustainable institutional law enforcement development within the INP. However, strong and sincere leadership within the INP at all levels and by all officers is the most critical factor in achieving



Indonesian policewoman patrolling in a market

behavioral change within the organization.¹³¹ For this reason, ICITAP advisors and program managers in Indonesia have also worked hard to develop good leadership skills among host-country police, fostering a generation of officers who can build important relationships, implement policing strategies, and offer solutions and mentorship, all while upholding the mission and values of the organization.

Increasing public trust

The INP's increased community engagement in Indonesia has led to increased public trust in the police. According to local newspapers, public trust, which stood at 13 percent in June 2010, increased to 63 percent by June 2016. The direct beneficiaries are the Indonesian people, who can now approach the police without fear of reprisals and with higher confidence that the law will be justly enforced.

Ten Principles of SILED

On June 5, 2013, the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia sent an action cable to the Department of State and other U.S. embassies around the world describing ten best practices that ICITAP and its sister agency, DOJ's Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), which works to develop foreign prosecutorial and judicial systems, had used to promote sustainable institutional development in the police and justice sector in Indonesia.

These are golden principles of SILED.

- 1. Communicate early and often.** The host government should be included throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation stages of programs. Establishing working groups associated with each program/project that are made up of host government representatives is an example of a good mechanism to ensure regular communication. ICITAP establishes a working group associated with each of its project initiatives.
- 2. Develop your people.** Developing the expertise of locals, host-country government officials, nongovernmental representatives, as well as local employees involved in program implementation, can pay huge dividends. Developing local program staff so they no longer require outside assistance, such as foreign contractors, is cost effective and more sustainable. By developing locals, replication capacity is also developed. Both ICITAP and OPDAT have worked to develop the capacity of local staff as a means of reducing the need for outside assistance.
- 3. Root programs in local law and policy** rather than trying to root them in U.S. law and policy. While explaining how things work in the U.S. context can be useful for comparison pur-

poses, programming should be focused on building from the legal and policy framework that exists in the host country.

- 4. Recruit program “champions” or “cultural enablers.”** No program overseas can be effective without the support of key individuals within the host government. All programming should be backed by host government champions who can help line up support for and participation in the programming. These champions are also key to the replication of successful interventions and need not be the most senior officials.
- 5. Listen to the locals.** Program implementers should understand the balance between when one should present information and when one should facilitate host-country national discussions utilizing an adult learning model. Locals should be integrated into programming not just as attendees, but as active participants who facilitate and lead discussions themselves. For example, ICITAP organized a series of Track II Trilateral Inter-Agency Maritime Law Enforcement Workshops that utilized tabletop exercises, scenarios, and group discussions that were largely facilitated by workshop participants who also presented summaries to the larger group. Those summaries and recommendations led to bilateral agreements at the ministerial level that are now in effect.
- 6. Understand program prerequisites.** It is important for program implementers to understand the prerequisites required to reach desired outcomes. Putting programming in place when the prerequisites either have not been met or will not be addressed in the programming is a recipe for failure. For example, prior to working with police to develop curriculum and training scenarios, ICITAP worked with Indonesian counterparts to identify the core tasks performed by police officers and the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform those tasks. A professional job task analysis was performed as a prerequisite to beginning the process of reforming police curriculum.
- 7. Measure performance.** Measuring performance is a must, but implementers should avoid relying on quantitative measures that are not reliable. In situations when quantitative measures of outcomes are unreliable, a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures (of both outputs and outcomes) is often the best means of measuring program performance.
- 8. Avoid one-time events that are not related to an in-country program.** While a one-time event or activity can sometimes be useful to start a conversation, one-time events that are not connected to or part of a broader program should generally be avoided. Study tours should be focused on in-country programming and aimed at supporting the collaboratively developed outcomes of that programming. OPDAT recently led a study tour to the United States that related to in-country efforts to put in place effective Anti-Money Laundering (AML) protocols and procedures and to highlight the utility of an effective AML regime as a tool to address corruption and transnational organized crime.
- 9. Design programs with implementation phases.** By designing programs that are divided into clearly defined phases that are operational in

Moving forward

Now that the chief of the INP has signed off on the national polsek regulation, development of and training in community engagement and policing principles can be instituted at all levels and ranks of the INP. ICITAP will integrate this training into basic police training schools, midlevel and senior management schools, and the AKPOL (which is essentially West Point for police). In the future, the program will also expand to focus on innovative training techniques.

Conclusion

The polsek reorganization project in Indonesia is one of ICITAP's strongest examples of SILED. Good law enforcement processes, continuously pursued over



ICITAP Indonesia Program Manager Jerry Heuett with a leader in the taxi cab community who helps police with traffic management

twelve years of engagement, not only led to the success of this project, but exemplified ICITAP's commitment to partnership with local authorities. ICITAP and the government of Indonesia collaborated fully in the design, planning, and implementation of the reorganization.

Ten Principles of SILED cont'd from page 45

and of themselves, each phase can stand alone as a success that can be institutionalized whether the subsequent phases come to fruition or not. This is particularly important for multi-year programs when future funding is in question or when changing leadership within host government organizations could jeopardize future phases of the program.

- 10. Complete and institutionalize programs and projects.** It is important to understand what successful completion of a program looks like and to identify the desired outcomes during program design. While programs should not exist in perpetuity, completion should not mean there is no follow up to ensure the benefits of the program continue to be realized. Importantly, realize that training alone has never led to institutionalization of practices. Practices must be institutionalized through

policy, procedures, and regulation. For example, providing operational training in regard to the appropriate use of force is valuable, but to be institutionalized it must be defined in and supported by policy, procedures, and regulations, and fully integrated into curriculum. In the case of use of force law and policy, ICITAP utilized developmental strategies to develop interventions with collaboratively designed outcomes, build the replication capacity of the host government agency, and most critically, integrate the intervention into the institution or institutional practice.

To build on these best practices, U.S. Embassy Jakarta requested that other U.S. embassies around the world with INL-funded programs, share success stories about their own strategies for promoting sustainable development with host-country criminal justice systems.

Source: Mobley, Terry D., "Best Practices in Law Enforcement."

Youth Summer School in Pakistan

Introduction

Pakistan is an overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim country with a population of about 183 million. The region that is present-day Pakistan has a history marked by colonial rule, turmoil, and instability. In 1857, sepoys (Indian soldiers) in the town of Meerut revolted against the rule of the British East India Company. Subsequently, Britain reorganized the Indian Administration and established direct rule, making India, including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh, part of the British Empire. The Crown instituted not only political changes, but also a series of economic, religious, and military reforms. One of those reforms was the Police Act of 1861.¹³² This was a repressive law that allowed British colonial administrators to forcibly repress the native population in the name of preserving the British Empire. The Police Act of 1861 held in Pakistan until the Police Order of 2002 was passed.

The aim of the Police Order of 2002 was to reform the police force and create a truly professional, service-oriented, operationally autonomous, and democratically accountable police force.¹³³ The law introduced new institutions of public oversight and accountability of police at district, provincial, and national levels, as well as measures to separate police from the office of the magistrate and insulate them from political influence.¹³⁴ Unfortunately, the reforms of the Police Order of 2002 were not widely adopted, as the government and the police force have focused on the immediate threats of extremism and terrorism.

In 2002, in response to persistent border control issues with Afghanistan, ICITAP launched a program in Pakistan funded by the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL). The program has focused on improving seven law enforcement entities headquartered in Islamabad in several key areas: organizational development



Archery class at the Summer Youth Camp in Islamabad, Pakistan

through capacity building among mid- and upper-level police commanders, including but not limited to leadership development, strategic planning, and community policing concepts; promotion of modern training practices, through the modernization of training academies and the development of master trainers; and encouraging the integration of internationally accepted police practices, including standard operating procedures, use of force options, and respect for and protection of human rights.

The Youth Summer School

One of ICITAP's projects that cuts across all three of its program efforts—organizational development, implementation of modern training practices, and integration of internationally accepted police practices—is the Islamabad Capital Territory Police (ICTP) Youth Summer School. This community engagement initiative embodies the essence of community policing, outlined in the Police Order of 2002, which calls for a police agency empowered to provide services to help citizens, as opposed to repressing them. The Youth Summer School, which began in 2003 and has been supported by ICITAP through



Swimming lessons at the Summer Youth Camp in Islamabad, Pakistan

personnel and financial support since 2013, is a six-week summer camp aimed at building trust between the community, particularly parents and children, and the ICTP. This program engages new children every year and provides them with all the resources necessary to attend the camp at no cost to their families, including camp uniforms, transportation to and from the police academy, medical coverage while at the camp, and all food and materials during the camp. More than 300 children annually are taught by hundreds of entry-level police officers, known as constables, who are extracted from their normal law enforcement duties to conduct the daily training activities for the participants. Activities include swimming, music, archery, gymnastics, martial arts, safety and first aid lessons, and more.

Evidence for success

Positive anecdotal evidence about the camp, including feedback from parents, children, and police officers to both ICTP and ICITAP, has been strong. The initiative, which relies mostly on word of mouth from previous participants for recruitment, has been so well received over the last fourteen years that there are waiting lists to attend the Summer School every year. In addition to the anecdotal evidence, ICITAP has collected qualitative data over several



Horseback riding lesson at the Summer Youth Camp in Islamabad, Pakistan

years demonstrating the camp's successes in overall community engagement and improved perception of the ICTP.

In 2014, ICITAP collected feedback through qualitative surveys from parents whose children participated in the program. Feedback was positive, as 100 percent of surveyed parents responded that they were happy with the camp experience and 96 percent responded that they were satisfied with the camp's safety and security. In 2015 the program expanded its qualitative data collection to include feedback from both students and parents about their perception of the ICTP. A large majority of respondents—85 percent of children and 95 percent of parents—reported an improved impression of the ICTP after the camp experience, and 64 percent of children and 78 percent of parents reported that they would be interested in joining or having their child join the ICTP, respectively. The 2016 data remained positive, with 87 percent of children and 94 percent of parents reporting improved impressions, and 80 percent of children and 78 percent of parents surveyed reporting career interest.

The improvement in community engagement has worked in both directions. Families are leaving the Summer School believing the Islamabad police to be more worthy of their trust and support; at the same



Obstacle course at Summer Youth Camp in Islamabad, Pakistan

time, constables have told ICTP and ICITAP dozens of stories about the camp's impact on their own interactions with the community. Of the hundreds of ICTP constables who participate in the camp every year, many have reported anecdotally that the camp is changing their perspectives on policing. Constables describe lowering their use of force during peaceful demonstrations, feeling like a larger part of the community, and understanding their role as not just a job, but as a force to promote positive societal change. Engaging young constables in this initiative creates a long-term positive community-police connection and is an essential building block for project sustainability.

Sustainability

The success and sustainability of the initiative is due in part to the school's location in Islamabad, which is relatively insulated from much of the violence in other regions and cities of Pakistan. It is due as well to the motivation and innovation of its founder, then-Inspector General of Police (IGP) in Islamabad,

Dr. Syed Kaleem Imam. In spite of great resistance within the police force and the government, Dr. Imam recognized the importance of investing in long-term positive change by sharing the experiences of police with the children and parents of the community.¹³⁵ Dan Miller, ICITAP's Program Manager in Pakistan, has wholeheartedly supported the school since 2013. Miller's commitment to the Youth Summer School has allowed it to grow and improve. (His contagious enthusiasm can be seen in the photograph on the cover of this report.)

ICITAP and the IGP hope to establish Youth Summer Schools in other parts of Pakistan. To replicate the outputs and outcomes achieved in Islamabad will require visionary police leadership to spearhead the efforts. Finding the right location is also vitally important: to have the most effect, the Summer Schools should be in communities where distrust between police and youth is rampant, while for sustainability, they should be in places where the sponsoring agency can actually devote the resources (both personnel and facilities) to a long-term initiative.



First aid awareness class at Summer Youth Camp in Islamabad, Pakistan

Strengthening the program

As shown by the data collected, the Youth Summer School has improved the relationships between the ICTP and communities within Islamabad. Moving forward, ICTP and ICITAP hope to expand both qualitative and quantitative data collection in several ways. The program is not currently collecting qualitative data from police officers, outside of anecdotal information concerning their changing perceptions of the community and changing behaviors and actions on duty. ICTP and ICITAP hope to begin collecting these data more systematically, as well as to expand the surveys distributed to children and parents. Outside of this additional qualitative data, quantita-

tive data could aid the program in further hypothesis testing of its outcomes and successes—in particular, evidence of changes in police academy enrollment among children who have attended the camp or in use of force by participating police officers could confirm or confound anecdotally-supported claims about the program’s effects on community relations. Qualitative data could also reveal details about the statistical significance of the program on community perceptions of the police force, police perceptions of the community, actions of the police force while on duty, and levels of violent extremism and terrorism.

Conclusion

The success of the Summer Youth Program in Islamabad has demonstrated that given the right leader, the right location, and the proper level of personnel and financial commitment, such interventions with children can be very effective in building trust between police and communities. While the Youth Summer School in Islamabad has demonstrated sustainability, the real test of the model comes in replicating its results elsewhere.

In a May 9, 2017 letter to ICITAP staffer Shahzad Hameed, Pakistan Police Officer Sultan Temuri stated he had replicated the Youth Summer School in Multan, located in the Punjab province. The 160 children who attended Multan’s four-week summer school participated in activities including martial arts, horseback riding, computer classes, music, spoken English, archery, obstacle courses, and self-defense. (See attached Appendix D for a copy of the letter.) The establishment of the Multan program is a promising development that addresses the ultimate goal of law enforcement development assistance: the replicability of SILED throughout a country.

ICITAP's Public Order Management Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

From 1946 until his death in 1980, Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito suppressed centuries-old ethnic hatreds through his own brand of nationalism, while maintaining an independent relationship with the Soviet Union. After his death, Yugoslavia dissolved, roughly along ethnic lines, into eight federated entities: the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, and the two autonomous provinces within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. In 1991 and 1992, the fragile balancing act among these entities collapsed. In all, six different conflicts were fought in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2001. The most brutal was the three-year conflict among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in BiH.

The Bosnian war ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995, which established the internal political division of BiH into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska, or Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). (A third division, the Brčko District, was created in 2000 out of land from both entities).¹³⁶ In 1996, ICITAP assessed, designed, and implemented a law enforcement development program in BiH, funded by the INL Bureau at the Department of State. Over the years, this program has evolved to keep pace with changes in political climate and legislation, police restructuring, and the U.S Government (USG)'s post-9/11 shift from focusing on development of general policing services to prioritizing the development of state-level law enforcement capacities. In 2013, ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina refocused its efforts on policing agencies that provide direct, day-to-day policing services to citizens.

Roughly the size of West Virginia, BiH has a population of around 3.9 million. The country has 18 autonomous police departments and three police academies. As well as the state-level agencies, ICITAP also provides assistance and support to the ten FBiH cantonal police agencies, the RS police in its eight Public Safety Centers, and to the Brčko District Police.

The Bosnian Spring and police response

On February 7, 2014 a series of riots broke out in major cities throughout BiH. According to the *New York Times*,

Thousands of angry Bosnians took to the streets on Friday for a fourth day of protests against the political paralysis and economic stagnation that have engulfed one of Europe's poorest and most divided countries.

In protests labeled the "Bosnian Spring" for the sheer depth of their intensity; unemployed youths, war veterans, and disgruntled workers, among others, set fire to government buildings in the capital of Sarajevo and across the country.

The Bosnian news media reported hundreds injured during the protests, including dozens of police officers, with bursts of violence in Sarajevo, in the northern city of Tuzla, in Mostar in the south, and in Zenica in central Bosnia.

Srecko Latal, an analyst at the Social Overview Service, a research organization based in Sarajevo, said in a telephone interview that the capital looked like a “war zone,” with cars set on fire and overturned, buildings burning, and smoke from tear gas billowing into the sky. He said protesters had attacked the headquarters of the Bosnian presidency on Friday, a potent symbol of the country’s chronic dysfunction.

“We haven’t seen violent scenes like this since the war in the 1990s,” he said. “People are fed up with what has become total political chaos in Bosnia, with infighting over power, a dire economic situation and a feeling that there is little hope for the future. The protests are a wake-up call for the international community not to disengage from Bosnia.”¹³⁷

ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina Program Manager Chuck Bennett witnessed the riots in Sarajevo, and saw firsthand the ineffectiveness of the police response. There was no coordination among law enforcement agencies, especially in Sarajevo: no mutual aid agreements, no emergency operations center, no collective radio system, and no crowd control plans in place.

At the invitation of the U.S. government and ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina, an interagency working group to address these issues was formed by the five law enforcement agencies responsible for the security of Sarajevo: The Sarajevo Cantonal Police; the Federation Ministry of Police; the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies; the State Investigation and Protection Agency; and the Border Police, which are responsible for policing Sarajevo. In June 2014, with the active support of the U.S.

Embassy and the U.S. Chargé, this working group produced a three-page mutual aid agreement signed by all five agencies. As a result of this initial effort, a series of mutual aid agreements have been developed and signed throughout the country. ICITAP also worked closely with BiH authorities to develop sustainable and effective public order management training that provided police with the skills they needed to deal effectively with crowds during protests and emergencies.

Promoting SILED

Program Manager Bennett realized that any sustainable institutional development in emergency management and crowd control would require an effective communication and coordination element within the BiH government. It was also critical for the BiH government to buy into, not only the concept of any proposal, but also the process for implementation. This meant that while ICITAP could play an important advising and facilitation role, the BiH government would need to drive the process and take ownership of the results.

ICITAP uses a strategic three-pronged approach to developmental and support projects in BiH, combining (1) needs assessments, (2) host-country instructors, and (3) certified curricula. To develop the public order management program, ICITAP worked with senior BiH police leadership to identify and train experienced officers as potential instructors. These officers then received public order management training, which was developed locally with ICITAP facilitation. Finally, they became public order management master instructors in the Bosnian law enforcement agencies, institutionalizing the training in all three BiH law enforcement academies. As a result of ICITAP’s efforts, BiH law enforcement agencies, which previously operated without certified instructors, now have a cadre of 317 officers who are certified as instructors in areas such as crowd control, basic first aid, and tactical trauma management.

The ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina developmental model relies on direct engagement with in-country law enforcement colleagues and partners, through working groups, in all aspects of the development process. This ensures that project outcome is tailored to the situation in the country, is relevant and useful, and is sustainable. There is ownership of the entire process by the in-country law enforcement institutions; as Bennett explains, “People support what they help create!”

ICITAP’s Project Management Approach

In ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina’s approach, a project is a planned set of interrelated tasks to be executed over a fixed period and within certain cost and other limitations to achieve a specific goal.

Project processes fall into five interrelated groups:

- ▶ Initiating
- ▶ Planning
- ▶ Executing
- ▶ Monitoring and Controlling
- ▶ Closing

The project management knowledge set draws on ten areas:

- ▶ Integration
- ▶ Scope
- ▶ Time
- ▶ Cost
- ▶ Quality
- ▶ Procurement
- ▶ Human resources
- ▶ Communications
- ▶ Risk management
- ▶ Stakeholder management

The Public Order Management Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina marked the beginning of a new project-based approach to collaboration between ICITAP and its law enforcement colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Rather than attempt to bring in “canned” programs from some other country (like the United States)—programs that did not conform to BiH law and rules and lacked local relevance—the project was developed locally from the outset. Planning was done by a dedicated working group of leadership representatives from the involved BiH law enforcement agencies. ICITAP personnel acted as facilitators, reference sources, and mentors but did not drive the process. Together, the working group possessed the knowledge sets necessary to advance the project.

This project approach is messier and more time-consuming than merely following the prescriptions of a foreign expert, but projects created in this way have a much greater likelihood of success and sustainability. Taking a project approach ensures details are addressed that outsiders may see as insignificant. The project is “owned” by the agencies involved—it becomes part of their normal process, and a part of their culture.

ICITAP’s approach also ensures that processes vital to a project’s success are put in place early on. Budgeting, human resources, policy and procedure changes, and equipment maintenance are all planned for and their long-term sustainability is addressed. ICITAP identifies and develops champions within the in-country law enforcement agencies to carry on and advance the project.

Conclusion

ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina understands that training alone is not a magic bullet; it will not solve all ills nor guarantee success or sustainability. Training must be part of a project but cannot be its sole outcome. Success and sustainability require a



Bosnian Police establish a formation they learned in ICITAP's Public Order Management Train-the-Trainer Program

broader plan that involves all aspects of change and improvement management. ICITAP Bosnia and Herzegovina and its in-country law enforcement colleagues work in partnership to develop relevant, workable, sustainable plans for improving policing services.

ICITAP's approach to public order and emergency management in Bosnia and Herzegovina exemplify the best principles of SILED. ICITAP facilitated a process that provided an approach to public order and emergency management that was uniquely relevant to the country. Process development is a relatively low-cost endeavor and can serve to promote good governance.

ICITAP's Bangladesh Community Engagement Initiative

Introduction

Located in South Asia and bordered by India and Myanmar, Bangladesh has about 150 million people and the third-largest Muslim population in the world. Though the country has made significant strides in achieving human development goals in the past decade, Bangladesh still suffers from high rates of poverty, poor governance, crime, and the threat of violent extremism. Global warming is a major threat as the entire country is just barely above sea level.

From 1757 to 1947, Bangladesh (then known as Bengal) was under British rule. Police forces during this time were mainly used to protect British elites, maintain existing power structures, and suppress any threat of dissent.¹³⁸ The Police Act of 1861 gave complete control of the police to the British government, resulting in widespread corruption and cronyism. Today, the Bangladesh Police are still ruled by the 1861 law, so the institution remains weak and corruption is still endemic.

In an attempt to improve police efficiency and citizen-police relations, the Bangladesh Police and the Ministry of Home Affairs launched the Police Reform Program (PRP) in 2005, with funding and technical assistance from the United Nations Development Program, the UK Department for International Development, and the European Commission. The program laid out a framework for community policing, including the establishment of Community Policing Forums to bring together police and community members and leaders to address crime, transparency, and police accountability. The PRP and the subsequent country-level community policing strategy was a strong shift in the right

direction, but ICITAP found that, though many of the right structures were in place, community policing was still not being widely practiced.

Program design and implementation

Building on the movement of the PRP and several years of previous experience working with the Bangladesh Police, ICITAP launched a three-year community policing project, the Community Engagement Initiative (CEI), in Bangladesh in July 2010, with funding from INL. Through this initiative, ICITAP aimed to shift the Bangladeshi police's understanding of community policing away from a short-term project model to a management philosophy in which police and citizens form partnerships based on trust to combat, prevent, and lessen crime and other community problems.

The Portland Police Bureau (PPB) in Oregon formalized the philosophy of community policing in the late 1980s and has been recognized as one of the United



Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau Officer James Powell marches in an anti-drug parade in Rajshahi, Bangladesh



Officer Adam Shirilla from the Macomb County (Michigan) Police Department, prepares to board a train in Dhaka for Rajshahi

States' leading law enforcement agencies in community policing and building non-traditional partnerships. With ICITAP's coordination, in 2011 PPB members began

a unique partnership with the Bangladesh Police in Rajshahi, a range, or district, in northwest Bangladesh. There are many Bangladeshi immigrants in the Portland area, and the PPB was eager to develop better relationships with these members of their community. PPB officers traveled to Bangladesh to conduct basic skills and community policing trainings, immerse themselves in Bangladeshi culture, and improve their cultural competence by working closely with Bangladeshi police and interacting extensively with Bangladeshi citizens. The PPB agreed to pay the salaries of its officers for their three-week deployments to the city of Rajshahi, the range's capital, while ICITAP covered their travel-related expenses.

Rajshahi was chosen as the site for the project primarily because it is the site of the Bangladesh National Police Academy. With a population of about a million, it is similar in size to Portland and its nearby suburbs, and its significant distance from the capital, Dhaka, meant the PPB officers were less likely to be influenced by national politicians.

Over the course of three years, 148 PPB officers traveled to Bangladesh, generally in teams of three officers, all from different units so as to maximize knowledge sharing upon return. Incoming teams overlapped with the outgoing teams to ensure a smooth transition. The first PPB officers were deployed to Rajshahi in September 2011 and, through a partnership between ICITAP and the Asia Foundation, taught a community policing course at

the Rajshahi District Police In-Service Training Center of Bangladesh. These training courses, developed by ICITAP or the PPB and taught primarily by PPB officers, continued throughout the project's lifetime. Early trainings covered basic policing skills and equipping the Bangladesh Police Officers (BPO) to respond to citizens' basic needs. As BPOs became more effective, they increased their legitimacy, and citizens' confidence grew in their ability to address crime. This encouraged citizens to report more crimes, serve as witnesses, and provide information to police. PPB officers were instructed to take on the role of both teacher and student, not only sharing their expertise with the BPOs, but immersing themselves in the culture and everyday life, so as to better understand the challenges facing the Bangladeshi community in Portland.

The trainings were designed to do the following:

- 1. Improve police-citizen cooperation and trust.** Offer hands-on training to Bangladeshi police officers and citizens in community policing strategies and implementation so that citizens feel safer and more confident approaching and cooperating with police.
- 2. Reduce crime and violence.** Leverage local citizens' knowledge to address crime and violence affecting Bangladeshi communities, both in Rajshahi and in Portland. This will also serve to reduce the overall workload of police.
- 3. Identify stakeholders.** Support the overall community by identifying and engaging additional stakeholders within the community and the Rajshahi Metropolitan Police. Key stakeholders include the regional police general, police chiefs, local government officials, faith leaders, and community leaders.
- 4. Bolster cultural competence.** Immerse PPB officers in Bangladeshi culture, dismantle existing stereotypes, and improve PPB officers' ability to empathize with and relate to the Muslim and Bangladeshi communities in Portland.



Sgt. Tim Sessions of the Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau teaches an interviewing course to Bangladesh National Police

The overarching idea was that by creating safer, more stable communities in Bangladesh, the threat of crime and terrorism would be reduced not only in Bangladesh, but also in Bangladeshi communities in Portland.

PPB trainers regularly conducted needs assessments in local police stations in the Rajshahi range and nearby areas. The needs assessments determined the highest-priority areas of training. PPB teams would then conduct both standard community policing trainings on areas including criminal investigations and interview techniques, leadership, case management, and human rights, and trainings tailored to that department's specific needs. For example, in 2013, upon request, PPB officers provided arson investigation courses to police and firefighters in response to the 2012 Dhaka factory fire that killed 112.¹³⁹

The trainings also focused on flattening the policing structure so that administrators and command staff worked more closely with subordinate officers—an unconventional approach in Bangladesh, where younger officers are not empowered to make decisions or problem solve autonomously. While engaging senior officers, especially the regional police general, was key to the program's success, the

program also placed a strong emphasis on training junior and mid-level officers, who, as ICITAP found, are less likely to receive the extensive benefits and political favors that senior-level officers do, and thus are more likely to see a need for reform. Though these younger officers may not have much power currently, they will eventually rise through the ranks and become catalysts for a generational shift in law enforcement management practices. These organizational factors are expected to boost the sustainability of the BPOs' community policing program.

Sustainability of the project

To engage the broader community and build sustainability into the program, BPOs developed partnerships with local government agencies and community leaders to address community-specific needs. In one case, BPOs and a community partnered to improve lighting in poorly lit areas, in order to deter criminal activities. To normalize police-citizen communication, PPB trainings also included immersion exercises, in which BPOs were required to spend time in communities interacting with citizens on a personal level. Officers trained at the Bangladesh Police Academy were encouraged, for the first time, to leave the confines of the academy and interact with citizens in the nearby town. Moreover, the BPOs implemented the "Just Say Hi" campaign, in which officers were simply encouraged to say hello to citizens as they passed. Though citizens were skeptical at first, officers persisted, and eventually citizens reciprocated. BPOs visited high schools and universities to raise awareness about the role of the police and the "Just Say Hi" campaign, and students from schools across Rajshahi committed to saying hello to police officers when they saw them. In addition to holding their own community policing festivals, BPOs also took advantage of local events to raise awareness about the benefits of citizen-police cooperation.



Officer Dean Hedges of the Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau and ICITAP Learning Assistant Zishan Chowdhury at a market in Rajshahi

Conclusion

As a result of both increased police effectiveness in responding to basic crimes, as well as improved community relations, crime in Rajshahi has decreased. One Bangladeshi police commander who attended ICITAP training courses reported a 35 percent decrease in crime in his division. A survey led by ICITAP revealed increases in crime reporting and public confidence in the police in the areas where trainings had been conducted. In addition to the decrease in crime, the Bangladesh Police successfully increased the number of nontraditional partnerships that engage stakeholders nationally and internationally.

ICITAP Program Manager Karl Clark's innovative vision for the Community Engagement Initiative was integral to the successful launch of the program. In the early stages, the Bangladesh Inspector General of Police was an important advocate for pushing this

program forward and protecting it from the government bureaucracy. While today there is a new Inspector General, Clark returned to Bangladesh as program manager in January 2017 after serving nearly three years as ICITAP's program manager in the Philippines. The reforms they advanced remain in place.

The Community Engagement Initiative in Bangladesh demonstrates how critical it is for ICITAP to facilitate partnerships and collaborations between host-country police and the citizens they serve. Some in the international law enforcement development community argue that ICITAP should only work with police while NGOs should work with citi-

zens and civil society groups to teach them about police, but this is a poor model. In order to effect sustainable police reform and improve relationships between police and citizens, it is critical for police to work directly with citizens. ICITAP has a long track record of building sustainable relationships between police and citizens that result in successful community policing initiatives, and in turn promote good governance.

On February 18, 2017 two PPB officers deployed to Bangladesh for a three-week community policing assignment in Rajshahi. This marked the first time since 2014 that ICITAP and the PPB have been able to work on this initiative, due to security concerns in the country. Two other U.S. police departments are interested in working with ICITAP to expand the Community Engagement Initiative in Bangladesh.



Sgt. Bret Barnum, Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau officer and four-time veteran of ICITAP's Bangladesh Community Outreach Program, at a demonstration in Portland, Oregon in December 2014 to protest police actions in Ferguson, Missouri. Barnum credits his participation in ICITAP's Bangladesh program with making him a better police officer and a better person.

Polygraph Examination Program in Nepal

Introduction

In 1990 Nepal instituted a multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.¹⁴⁰ A Maoist insurgency broke out in 1996, developing into a civil war that lasted until 2006.¹⁴¹ In 2008, a newly formed constituent assembly declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, abolished the monarchy, and elected the country's first president.¹⁴² On September 20, 2015, Nepal enacted a new constitution.

ICITAP began working in Nepal in 2007 with funding from the INL Bureau: advising Nepali law enforcement leadership on strategies for modernizing and promoting organizational development, training and equipping the Nepal Police (NP), and election security management; providing technical support for information technology development projects; providing specialized training; and funding critical capital improvement projects to improve police operations.

Program summary

Pretrial detention in Nepal

Nepal's criminal justice system is confession-based. Probable cause is not necessary to make an arrest. When a complaint is lodged against an individual by a victim or victim's family, an arrest is made directly, prior to any investigation. Police then attempt to prove the arrestee's guilt.

There is no bail or bond system in Nepal. While arrestees are released if the police do not find sufficient evidence to bring a trial, they may languish in prison for months while this determination is made. As a result, many people have had malicious complaints levied against them for reasons of revenge, jealousy, business advantage, or other reasons.¹⁴³

The country has been severely criticized by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International for human rights abuses perpetrated by The Nepal Police (NP). According to an Amnesty report, "Torture and other ill-treatment by police continued, particularly during pretrial detention, to extract confessions and intimidate individuals."¹⁴⁴

An innovative solution

When ICITAP Nepal Program Manager Larry Kelley first met the inspector general (IG) of the NP in 2012, the IG immediately told Kelley that the NP needed a polygraph examination program. The IG had attended a conference in the United States and had been extremely impressed with a polygraph demonstration.

Kelley had served as a polygraph examiner for four years during his law enforcement career, so he was well-qualified to oversee such a program. In January 2014 ten NP officers (three of whom were women) completed a ten-week, 400-hour Basic Polygraph Examiners Course that ICITAP facilitated. ICITAP partnered in the training with the Academy of Polygraph Science and the Stoelting Company, a polygraph device manufacturer. At the training's end, INL donated 12 polygraph systems to the NP.

Since this was the first time that polygraph training had been conducted in Nepal, infrastructure was needed to ensure the program's sustainability.¹⁴⁵ With Kelley's support and assistance, the NP established a polygraph examination unit staffed by three permanent NP personnel (one supervisor and two officers), and the NP refurbished a building to create a polygraph examination room. A certified U.S. polygraph examiner, Chip Morgan of Bellevue University's PEAK Credibility Assessment Training Center, served as a technical advisor to the new unit for three months.



Nepalese police setting up polygraph equipment for ICITAP polygraph examination training in Kathmandu

In March 2015, ICITAP facilitated another basic polygraph examination course for three Armed Police Force officers and seven NP officers. Four of the ten were women. The resident legal advisor from ICITAP's sister agency, the Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program, addressed the class and explained that polygraph examinations are not independently admissible in U.S. criminal court proceedings but that the use of polygraph in the United States has proven to be very beneficial to investigators. As in 2014, ICITAP facilitated the four-month stay of a veteran polygraph examiner to ensure that the newly trained examiners were properly integrated into the polygraph examination system. In December 2016, a third class graduated from basic examiner training and began filling several openings in the polygraph unit throughout Nepal. In addition to police, ICITAP also provided classes for judges and prosecutors in the proper administration of polygraph.

Human rights protections

At their discretion, the NP can offer arrestees the opportunity to take a polygraph test. If they refuse the test, the investigation continues, and the arrestee remains in detention until the case is either dismissed

or brought to trial. However, according to Chip Morgan, “if the test results show that the person is truthful when they deny involvement in the crime, the person may then be released from prison while the rest of the investigation continues.”¹⁴⁶

To protect the rights of individuals, ICITAP's technical advisor worked with the NP to develop policies and procedures that clearly state the NP cannot force a suspect to take a polygraph examination. Before any examination can be conducted, all examinees must voluntarily sign a statement, developed by ICITAP, affirming the polygraph is voluntary.

Great care was taken, Mr. Morgan explains, to ensure the polygraph system was not used to bully arrestees or extort confessions:

The examiners were instructed to use a script which was developed by the instructional staff to explain the polygraph and the examinee's rights during the entire polygraph process, including the right to refuse the test with no negative consequences.

In setting up the Nepal polygraph program, ICITAP made use of all available input, like that from the Innocence Project, to mitigate the possibility of obtaining false confessions. All polygraph appointments, in their entirety, are audio/video recorded and that recording is preserved for five years for any future use or inspection. In addition, all polygraphs are quality controlled by in-house supervisory staff and by outside polygraph instructional staff as needed.

*The Nepal Police Procedures Manual clearly delineates the method and practices of administering polygraphs in Nepal, with all of the above safeguards built into policy.*¹⁴⁷



ICITAP polygraph examiner training in Kathmandu, Nepal

Promoting SILED

As occurred with ICITAP’s Pakistan Youth Summer School and the Ukraine Police Patrol Program, ICITAP did not need to gain host-country buy-in for the Polygraph Examination Development Program in Nepal. This made the design and implementation of the program significantly easier than it would have been if ICITAP had needed to convince the NP of the program’s value.

ICITAP is currently working with the NP to develop a train-the-trainer program to ensure the sustainability of the polygraph unit. The IG allocated funding to sustain the polygraph examination program into the NP budget; including rent and utilities for buildings as well as travel expenses for examiners to deliver this service to investigators in remote locations. The assistant IG told Program Manager Kelley on December 8, 2016, that Nepalese judges have a

very positive perception of the polygraph and the NP are campaigning to have polygraph examinations be made admissible in court.

ICITAP built a strong sustainability component into this program, instituting the polygraph examiner train-the-trainer program and developing policies and procedures that the NP institutionalized. While primarily active in Kathmandu, the program has a real opportunity to be replicated throughout Nepal.

Conclusion

The polygraph system was instituted to deal with a very particular and difficult set of legal challenges: to mitigate the problem of malicious charges by giving low-risk arrestees a chance to leave pre-trial detention without exacerbating the problems of intimidation and false confessions. With the care exercised by the NP and the ICITAP program staff, it appears to be doing just that. As of August 2017, over 1,600 polygraph examinations had been administered by the NP, resulting in 87 confessions and the clearance of over 750 suspects in criminal cases. These cases included many cold cases the NP had on inactive status, such as homicide, rape, human trafficking, drug-smuggling, and child sexual abuse.

“To date,” according to Chip Morgan, “there has never been a case where someone passed a polygraph and was released, only to have the investigation lead to their rearrest. As a result, the citizens of Nepal now have been asking if they can take a polygraph after their arrest, to prove their innocence.”¹⁴⁸

Maritime Policing Program in the Philippines

Introduction

The Philippine Islands became a Spanish colony during the 16th century; Spain ceded them to the United States in 1898 after losing the Spanish-American War. In 1935 the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth, but in 1942 the Japanese captured the archipelago and occupied it until the end of World War II in 1945.¹⁴⁹ The Philippines gained independence from the United States on July 4, 1946. Ferdinand Marcos was president from 1966 to 1986, and his rule was characterized by widespread corruption. After he fled into exile, Corazon Aquino succeeded him as president.¹⁵⁰ Historically, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has been close.

In January 2011, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines launched its Internal Peace and Security Plan, referred to as “Bayanihan.” The main objective of Bayanihan is to remove the responsibilities for internal peace and security from the armed forces and return these functions to the Philippine National Police (PNP), as mandated by Republic Act 6975, the 1998 law which reformed and reorganized the modern PNP. According to Bayanihan, the intent

of Republic Act 6975 was to confer to the PNP primary responsibility on matters affecting internal security, including the suppression of insurgency. Insurgency is a threat to the Philippine government, which faces challenges from four terrorist groups: the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf, which operate primarily in the southern part of the nation, where most of the country’s Muslim minority live, and the New People’s Army.

The PNP, however, has used this authority to participate in President Duterte’s campaign of extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups have documented over 1,400 killings, allegedly by vigilante groups, in Davao between 1998 and May 2016; numbers nationwide since his election vary, but may exceed 7,000. The victims of the national campaign were mainly accused of being drug users or dealers, but some seem to be just petty criminals and even street children. The police and the vigilante organizations enjoy impunity for these killings. As a result, ICITAP and the U.S. Department of State have restricted training assistance provided to the PNP to instructor development, human rights, ethics, leadership,



Philippines National Police
Special Operations Unit (SOU)
Boat on Patrol

community policing, and maritime law enforcement. Neither individuals nor units accused of gross human rights violations are trained by ICITAP as a matter of integrity, as well as to comply with the Leahy Vetting Law. It is noteworthy that the ICITAP-trained maritime units have not been accused of any drug war human rights violations.

Since ICITAP law enforcement development assistance to the Philippines began in 2006, more than 40,000 law enforcement officials have received training in competencies ranging from basic police skills to executive leadership and human rights, from maritime policing to advanced laboratory forensics. All assistance is provided in partnership with recipient agencies to enhance assistance efficacy and sustainability over the long term. ICITAP partners with the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Philippine Public Safety College, and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to strengthen institutional capacities to provide law enforcement leadership, training, and police services for traditional as well as maritime police personnel.

Funding for ICITAP in the Philippines is provided by the Department of State's INL and Counterterrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Bureaus, as well as by the Department of Defense (DoD).

Program summary

In 2007, ICITAP Philippines launched the Special Operations Unit – Maritime (SOU), through the ICITAP Maritime Border Security Initiative (MBSI, previously known as the Maritime Police Project). This included the construction of a series of facilities and stations, thorough ICITAP training and mentoring for the SOU, and significant equipment donations. It resulted in an effective tactical maritime enforcement capability for the PNP which it had never before possessed. This project has allowed the SOU to project a law enforcement presence along the Malaysian sea border, into the Sulu Archipelago, and into the South China Sea. To date, ICITAP has graduated approximately 4,000 PNP and PCG personnel from over 800

criminal investigation, human rights/ethics, and instructor development (train-the-trainer) courses through the MBSI. ICITAP procured and delivered six high-speed patrol boats to enable the SOU – Maritime to patrol the waters between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. INL procured and donated four additional boats in 2016.¹⁵¹ (In an interesting additional note regarding the selection of the boats in question, ICITAP Acting Director Gary Barr is a licensed merchant seaman, and his expertise led ICITAP to play an active role in selecting and designing the boats that INL donated to the PNP as part of the MBSI.)

Since the boats hit the water in 2010, ICITAP has trained trainers on a variety of topics at SOU locations, including basic maritime patrol procedures, small craft maintenance, marine engine maintenance and repair, first aid, and underwater investigations. These types of maritime-specific courses complement ICITAP's standard curriculum of community-oriented police station development. ICITAP's MBSI project also stresses a commitment to intelligence-led policing rather than traditional reactive policing.

The MBSI project has allowed strategic and permanent placement of PNP patrol boats along the southern coastal waters of the Philippines, thereby providing deterrence and interdiction capabilities against the movement of international terrorist groups, pirates, drug traffickers, weapons smugglers, human traffickers and traffickers of wildlife goods, all of whom are known to transit in the southernmost coastal areas of the Philippines. One of ICITAP's strongest partners in SOU development in the Philippines is the U.S. DoD Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATFW), the counternarcotics and counter-transnational crime arm of the U.S. Pacific Command. In their Southern Philippines Maritime Security Enhancement Initiative, which mirrors the goals of ICITAP's MBSI, JIATFW has complemented the MBSI and provided much greater impact than either project could have achieved on its own. To

date, JIATFW has funded the construction of three PNP Special Boat Units (now Maritime SOU) stations with boat maintenance facilities in Puerto Princesa, Balabac, Taganak, and Bongao; construction and subsequent expansion of a law enforcement training facility in Puerto Princesa; and the ongoing construction of an additional station. Once this last station is completed, the PNP will have maritime law enforcement basing and logistical capabilities along the entire length of the maritime border separating the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as the southern and western entrances to the Sulu Sea and the Sulu Archipelago. This completed project allows the Philippine government for the first time ever to provide a law enforcement response to smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, terrorist infiltration, and more general seaborne emergencies in this critical maritime region, as well as the ability to rescue people from drowning.

Since 2009, JIATFW has funded and provided logistical and planning support to several annual tactical training exercises for the SOU, led by instructors from the U.S. Special Forces (Army Green Berets; U.S. Navy Seals; and U.S. Marine Corps). JIATFW also funds subject matter expert (SME) training, leveraging the skills of the U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School and other leaders in the maritime security field. (The military SMEs provide training because of their knowledge of the relevant logistics, terrain, and tactics; the SOU remains a civilian authority.)

ICITAP has full-time law enforcement advisors who provide SOU members with mentoring and technical assistance. Since 2008, the ICITAP maritime technical advisor (MTA) has mentored SOU leadership on good management principles, budgeting, and logistics, including the importance of proper maintenance and care of the boats and other USG-donated equipment. Many development projects fail because



SOU officers board a vessel

host countries cannot maintain complex and expensive equipment that other countries donate to them. ICITAP's MTA established a maintenance culture within the SOU, providing intensive train-the-trainer instruction for different marine maintenance issues. The MTA also lived full-time with the SOU members and provided them with constant mentoring. Today, members of the SOU successfully maintain the boats that ICITAP, INL, and JIATFW donated to the PNP. The MTA has identified and addressed other training needs as well; for example, some SOU members did not know how to swim, so ICITAP provided training in this critical safety issue. ICITAP's MTA has been key to the MBSI's success.

Promoting SILED

When former ICITAP Philippines Program Manager and former ICITAP Acting Director Richard Miller first launched the MBSI, the chief of the PNP was very supportive, as was the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Initially, however, there was not enough funding to support an extensive program. Additionally, Miller realized that the PNP would need to acquire land deeded to it for the construction of the SOU. Otherwise, the project would lack even the most basic sustainability if landowners could hold their deeds over the head of the PNP. Fortunately, the mayor of

Puerto Princesa was very supportive of the United States in general and of the MBSI in particular, and solutions to these problems were found. In addition to these collaborations with host-country officials, ICITAP's collaboration with JIATFW, detailed in the project summary, was a good example of how civilian and military agencies in the USG should work together to bring value added to U.S. foreign aid dollars and to better promote SILED.¹⁵²

The SOU – Maritime has a routine schedule in which they do their own repairs and conduct inspections. Thanks to initial mentoring, the SOU is now capable of maintaining its boats with little assistance from ICITAP. It has the capacity to service power plants and conduct its own training—even training within the unit, which other units in the PNP don't often do.¹⁵³ PNP officers want to transfer to and remain in the SOU because it is so highly regarded.

Some challenges to the sustainability of the program include whether the PNP can get fuel to keep the boats on the water and replace aging boat engines in the coming years. While local governments typically fund police stations, the SOU funding comes from the national police budget, and there is a lot of competition for those funds. At this time the PNP lacks the capacity to replace boats, a real stumbling block to sustainability, but another reason why the maintenance culture that ICITAP has fostered is so vital.

According to ICITAP Program Manager Bill Kuehl, the SOU is the most effective and respected unit within the PNP. It is popular among the general population and is seen as largely free of corruption. Although there are few media outlets in the Philippines, SOU activities are reported on nationally. By May 2017, SOUs had arrested 600 persons for a variety of offenses from illegal commercial fishing (including Chinese commercial fishermen taking endangered sea turtles) to murder, seized 30 vessels used in illegal commercial fishing and other illegal activities, and rescued 298 people at sea. Filipinos view the SOU as willing to stand up to China and to a wide variety of smugglers and terrorist groups.



SOU officers rescue people from the sea (*top*)

SOU officers rescue a child from the water near Palawan (*bottom*)

Conclusion

To date, no SOU – Maritime unit has received a human rights complaint. This fact, even more than their local reputation for incorruptibility, emphasizes that the SOUs should be treated as distinct from the rest of the PNP, and from Duterte's War on Drugs, for purposes of USG engagement.

ICITAP has supported and mentored the SOU from its beginning—working with local governments to obtain land deeds to build SOU stations, instilling sustainability through train-the-trainer programs and a strong culture of maintenance, and building a strong partnership with JIATFW, the counter-narcotics and counter-transnational crime arm of the U.S. Pacific Command. Together, ICITAP's actions have strongly promoted SILED in the Philippines.

The Ukraine Police Patrol Program

Introduction

Ukraine has a population of 42 million and is bordered by Russia to the east and Belarus and Poland to the west. It achieved its independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991 and is still transitioning politically from Soviet-era institutions to more democratic ones. In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and there was subsequent pro-Russian separatist violence in the Donbass region; both conflicts continue today. As a result, Ukrainian officials placed a renewed emphasis on strengthening the country's security in order to protect its sovereignty.

Under a 1990 militia law enacted prior to independence, the traffic police and foot patrols who were Ukraine's primary public safety providers were poorly trained and had much less authority than militias organized under a ministry. Moreover, many of their training manuals and standard operating procedures were based on documents produced in Moscow three decades earlier. Public perception of the police in Ukraine was extremely negative due to the rampant corruption of the militias, including their involvement in criminal activities such as extortion and drug trafficking. Officers had to pay bribes to get into the police force, and once they were part of the police force bribe payments made up the largest share of their income.¹⁵⁴ The police force thus supported the elites in return for free reign to disregard the law themselves.

Ukraine's economy has been unable to achieve its full potential because billions of dollars in revenue have been hidden in offshore tax havens, depriving the Ukrainian government of the tax revenue to adequately fund institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the police force. Despite



Ukrainian Patrol Police graduates sing their national anthem

a lack of funding, Ukraine's MIA employed 300,000 police officers in 2013, further straining the country's budget.¹⁵⁵ In addition, political parties in Ukraine are often funded by oligarchs, regional clans, and even criminal syndicates, so any reform towards more transparency and good governance will be opposed by the business interests of the parties. Finally, Ukraine seeks to be the first country in European history to implement systemic reform while engaged in an active war on its territory.

Major domestic hurdles to police reform include the criminal and political elites' connections to regional MIA bosses, the MIA bureaucracy, corruption of top officials, and lack of accountability.

Police Patrol Program

ICITAP began working in Ukraine in 2005 to help build the capacity of law enforcement and border management agencies. ICITAP's work has been funded by INL, the DoD's European Command, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the State Department's Bureau of



Ukrainian Police officers prepare to mark the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine National Police in 2016

International Security and Non-Proliferation. ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement Advisor (SLEA) Robert Peacock is based in Kyiv, where he manages a Police Patrol Program that includes supervisor and patrol officer recruitment, selection, and training.

In late 2014, ICITAP partnered with the MIA to launch the Police Patrol Program, recruiting, selecting, and training the country's first patrol police departments (PPD). ICITAP developed and continues to administer a secure database to track officer candidates through the five-step selection process developed by the project team. ICITAP advisors and staff developed a general skills examination, prepared physical, medical, and psychological tests for more than 45,000 officer candidates; and established interview commissions composed of civil society and human resources personnel to select cadets for basic training.

In 2015, the government, fulfilling promises made during the 2013 Maidan protests in Kyiv, proceeded with the next step in the reform process. In this step—sometimes called “shock therapy”—the government liquidated the former militia and stood up the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), integrating the already-functioning PPD into the new police force.¹⁵⁶

Besides administering the officer selection process, ICITAP's primary role in police reform has been to stand up an entirely new professional training program for the PPD. This program has used a train-the-trainer approach, in which active-duty officers from the United States conduct training using U.S. police curricula. Training teams from the Reno (Nevada) Police Department, the Dayton (Ohio) Police Department, the Houston (Texas) Police Department, and the California Highway Patrol have trained more than 150 instructors, who are now responsible for the tactical portion of patrol basic training. These tactical instructors, along with more than 120 ICITAP-supported outside lecturers, have in turn trained more than 13,500 new police officers since 2015. ICITAP also collaborates with other donors to train the police force in tactical aspects of policing including public order management, conflict resolution, de-escalation, and negotiation. In addition, ICITAP has trained more than 250 police supervisors, who now hold management positions in more than 32 city patrol departments.

Sustainability

Ukraine's neighbor Georgia applied the shock therapy approach to its own law enforcement reform in 2004.¹⁵⁷ Its success convinced reformers in the Ukrainian MIA to hire the Georgian Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, who led the reforms there, to serve in the same capacity in Ukraine and to take charge of the Police Patrol Program.

Since this was a successful regional initiative openly embraced by the Ukrainian reformers, ICITAP did not have to spend any time gaining host-country buy-in at the top, unlike in the vast majority of law enforcement development programs that ICITAP undertakes. The existence of host-country buy-in at the beginning of a program greatly increases the chances of long-term sustainability.

Indicators of success

Since the reform, public satisfaction ratings of the patrol police have more than tripled to 60–80 percent, depending on the city, the highest of any government workers. Similarly, there was a 70 percent increase in calls for service—indicating a higher level of public trust—and a drop in response time from 30 minutes to 9.5 minutes.¹⁵⁸ Police reform is seen as an example of government’s commitment to reform and a move towards democratic institutions that serve the people. The government of Ukraine has committed to vastly expanding the Police Patrol Program nationwide.

Since the liquidation of the former militia in November 2015, the MIA and the new NPU have increasingly turned more and more responsibilities over to the growing PPD. In 2017, the PPD is transitioning to become the sole law enforcement agency for providing public order management and will stand up the country’s first highway patrol department. Moreover, the NPU Chief announced that he would send more than 100 patrol officers to the corrupt narcotics department in order to address the systemic corruption and poor performance in the NPU’s response to Ukraine’s growing heroin problem.

Overarching issues

SLEA Peacock and Gary Corder, in their paper “‘Shock Therapy’ in Ukraine: A Radical Approach to Post-Soviet Police Reform,” mention six key issues that reformers should address in order to promote successful police reform in post-Soviet countries:¹⁵⁹

1. Reformist Parliamentary Coalition

The post-Maidan coalition has liquidated the militia and created a platform for a more autonomous MIA and police force. While this is a huge step in the right direction, it is important to maintain the reformist coalition in parliament to prevent reversals. In light of increased patriotism and public demand for reform, it is in the interest of members of parliament to support the agenda

of the Maidan protests. Reform in the security sector, including law enforcement, improves the government’s capacity to deal with internal and external threats.¹⁶⁰

2. Overcoming MIA Bureaucracy

Passing new legislation aimed at overhauling police bureaucracy is a huge challenge. While increased accountability and transparency is desirable for a few reform-minded leaders within the MIA, it is a direct threat to the income of other corrupt senior officials. There were several conditions that prevented the supervisory and executive level MIA staff from sabotaging the reform. First, after the Maidan protests, press coverage about the luxurious lifestyles of senior police officials, which were sustained by corruption, reinforced political will among the public to adopt a new policing law. Second, salaries of newly hired, entry-level police were more than doubled to reduce economic pressures on the police force to engage in corrupt practices. Third, a proportionately larger equipment and programming budget, due to a reduction in staff, provided reform-minded officials within the MIA with the incentive to change.¹⁶¹

3. Internal Division and External Insurgency

Public support for sovereignty recently increased due to political developments in Ukraine. This is making it easier for reform coalitions to overcome obstruction from pro-Russian parties inside and outside of parliament.¹⁶²

4. Effect of Dismissals

The leadership of the police avoided backlash from officers, after the swift dismissal of thousands of officers, by increasing wages. The salary increases also aided the attempt to root out police corruption. Hiring officers from more educated backgrounds and effectively training them helped reframe the image of police as public officials who contribute meaningfully to

society. Furthermore, hiring better-educated officers facilitated knowledge transfer to new officers.

5. Battling Corruption

Tackling the systemic issue of corruption requires long-term commitment from the highest political leadership; the MIA will need to create mechanisms to ensure the culture of corruption does not permeate to the reformed police force. In the future, the MIA will need to develop suitable indicators to measure public perception of the police force and corruption levels, and formulate adaptive policies that address problems promptly.¹⁶³

6. Public Approval

Soviet nations that have undergone successful reforms have always seized the momentum when public approval for reforms is high. The shock therapy approach, which established

professionalism in the police force within a short period, had an immediate positive effect on the daily life of people in Ukraine. This not only creates a favorable agenda for future reforms, but also ensures future government coalitions cannot reverse them.¹⁶⁴

Conclusion

ICITAP's Police Patrol Program in Ukraine is not only proving sustainable, but has also been successfully replicated in cities around the country. Even under normal circumstances, this would be remarkable; to accomplish such sweeping reforms while Ukraine is fighting a war against Russia is a staggering success. Through ICITAP's skillful facilitation and close partnership with both police and Ministry of Interior officials, the Ukrainian government has taken complete ownership of the program, helping to ensure its future sustainability.



Ukrainian Patrol Police line up in front of Deputy Chief of National Police Fatsevych in 2016

Monitoring and Evaluation for International Law Enforcement Development Programs

ICITAP is in the process of developing a new monitoring and evaluation policy that will stress strong outcomes, measured by good performance indicators. The first step in this process is to develop definitions of program design terms—such as goals, objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and performance indicators—that are understood by the entire organization. This will lead to uniform and consistent program design throughout ICITAP, design that lends itself to effective monitoring and evaluation of programs.

Strengthening monitoring and evaluation in the federal government

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was born out of Congressional leaders' frustration that they, and executive decision-makers, often lacked good information on the results of federal program efforts.¹⁶⁵ While Republican lawmakers first pushed for a GPRA-type bill in the late 1980s, it quickly became a bipartisan effort and was strongly embraced by the new Clinton administration prior to its enactment in 1993. GPRA initially applied to all 14 cabinet departments, virtually all independent establishments (agencies), and all government

corporations. GPRA was intended to fundamentally transform the way U.S. government programs and operations were managed and administered.¹⁶⁶ It went into effect government-wide in 1997.

In 2010, President Obama signed into law the GPRA Modernization Act. The updated legislation created a better-defined performance framework by “prescribing a governance structure and by better connecting plans, programs, and performance information.”¹⁶⁷ The GPRA Modernization Act required more frequent reporting and reviews (quarterly instead of annually) to increase the use of performance information in program decision-making.¹⁶⁸



ICITAP first aid training for police in Pakistan

GPRA and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 are important markers in the evolution of accountability in the U.S. Federal Government. Both statutes addressed how critical it is for the Federal Government to use uniform and consistent performance standards to demonstrate the results of its programs. GPRA and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 made the federal government more accountable to U.S. taxpayers by incorporating the principle of return on investment (ROI), which had historically been limited to private business.

The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (FATAA) covers all federal departments and agencies that administer United States foreign assistance.

Section 3 of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (FATAA) requires monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on the performance of United States foreign assistance and its contribution to the policies, strategies, projects, program goals, and priorities undertaken by the Federal Government. The Act also supports and promotes innovative programs to improve effectiveness and seeks to coordinate the monitoring and evaluation processes of Federal agencies that administer covered U.S. foreign assistance. Finally, the Act calls for the President to set forth guidelines according to best practices.¹⁶⁹

The United States has an enormous national debt that hovers near \$20 trillion, and as such it is advisable for the federal government to justify its expenditure of taxpayer dollars for international law enforcement development.

ICITAP's current approach to monitoring and evaluation

To monitor its ongoing training programs, ICITAP established a Training Events Log in 2006. This is a headquarters-based system that tracks all ICITAP

training presented around the world. Data are submitted on a quarterly basis by ICITAP programs in the field, including course titles, number of training iterations provided, number of host-country nationals trained, and a separate listing of female students who attended the training. This system has provided a consistent means for maintaining accurate training records for the entire organization. Data collected through this process are included in ICITAP quarterly reports to funders.

ICITAP has developed working definitions for the following seven program design terms:

Goal. A program's highest aim which is achieved by the successful completion of objectives.

Objective. The state(s) one expects to achieve toward accomplishing a goal, if positive outcomes occur.

Inputs. The resources invested to start and maintain program implementation.

Activities. Training, technical assistance, mentoring, study tours, and internships that are provided to law enforcement, corrections, and forensic personnel.

Outputs. The immediate, tangible results of program activities. They are often measured at the training event and include the number of people trained and the number of iterations of a course presented.

Outcomes. The expected results that usually start the day after an activity concludes and indicate progress in the attainment of an objective. Outcomes usually take the form of changes in agency behavior or public perceptions following a program.

Performance Indicators. Means for determining whether outcomes have been achieved.

ICITAP believes that if the entire organization adopts standardized definitions for program design terms and develops strong outcome performance indicators for a variety of its programs, this will lead to better and more effective monitoring and evaluation

for all its programs. This approach may also lead to more consistent and clearer interagency agreements with its funders.

ICITAP is currently developing model program designs for its thirteen core competency areas: Organizational Development, Terrorism and Transnational Crime (e.g., Trafficking in Persons, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Cyber Crime, Intellectual Property Crime), Criminal Investigations, Public Integrity and Anticorruption, Specialized and Tactical Skills, Forensics, Basic Police Services, Academy and Instructor Development, Community Policing, Corrections, Marine and Border Security, Information Systems, and Criminal Justice Coordination. The outcomes and performance indicators developed during this undertaking will be particularly valuable for future ICITAP program design work and for improving coordination with funders on interagency agreements.

Following are analyses of ICITAP's approaches to monitoring and evaluation in its programs in Pakistan, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Ukraine.

Pakistan

ICITAP's program in Pakistan involves providing sustainable institutional law enforcement development assistance to federal law enforcement agencies in Islamabad. ICITAP Program Manager Daniel Miller has devised a highly efficient system that uses both American and Pakistani subject matter experts to develop and present law enforcement training tailored to Pakistan's needs. From July 30, 2015 until June 30, 2016, ICITAP's program in Pakistan presented 123 classes to Pakistani law enforcement officials. All ICITAP training courses presented in Pakistan have detailed evaluation reports that capture basic data like course title, total number and full names of those trained, the number of female trainees, and the percentage difference between the average of the pre- and post-tests. Reports depict data in chart and graph format, together with student

comments and a box that summarizes the students' numeric satisfaction with the course. (See appendix B for a sample evaluation.)

It is important to evaluate course effectiveness both from the perspective of student learning achievement and from direct student feedback. A student might score very highly on a post-course test, but that same student might provide feedback indicating that the course content was weak or was not presented in an interesting way. It is critical to capture this information in order to strengthen curricula in the future.

A program output is the number of officers trained in each set of related courses. The target outcome of each of these sets is a significantly better-skilled police force member in the areas it covers. Another type of outcome could be the results of a survey of police who took a group of related courses, focused on the trainees' own assessments of how the courses improved certain skills. If given to rank and file police, the survey would include queries to their commanding officers about how their performance has changed since the training.

Indonesia

In 2006, ICITAP began working with the Indonesian National Police (INP) to develop the Standardized Emergency Management System, or SEMS. This program was launched in response to the devastating tsunami that struck Indonesia on December 26, 2004, and resulted in the deaths of approximately 150,000 Indonesians as well as tens of thousands of people in other Indian Ocean countries.¹⁷⁰ ICITAP's Program Manager Jerry Heuett and his staff helped the INP develop policies, procedures, and a training program that trained and deployed over 1,742 INP master instructors to 29 of the archipelago's 33 regions. In addition to INP personnel, over 3,650 personnel from other Indonesian government agencies were trained on SEMS.

Because SEMS is a whole-government approach to emergency management, master instructors were also trained from the president's cabinet; the office of emergency services; and the fire, social services, health, planning, transportation, and airport authorities, as well as from universities, media, the Red Cross, and many other nongovernmental organizations (NGO). This allowed for better integration and coordination of stakeholders in different regions throughout the country.

On September 30, 2009 a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck off the west coast of Sumatra and leveled the City of Padang. More than 1,300 Indonesians lost their lives in the earthquake. Government reports indicated that an estimated 1,250,000 people were affected by the earthquake through the total or partial loss of their homes and livelihoods. Thanks to the SEMS training, Indonesia's response to the earthquake was well coordinated through the Incident Command Center concept. The INP served as a chief first responder and was able to help implement the National Disaster Management Plan, thereby saving countless lives and properties.¹⁷¹

ICITAP's program in Indonesia also worked with the INP to develop a Use of Force (UoF) policy. The UoF project began at the end of 2007, and the INP introduced the UoF policy in January 2009 after extensive vetting, including review by NGOs and other civil society actors. In May 2009, ICITAP trained 20 INP master instructors in the UoF policy, and these master instructors participated in an extensive train-the-trainer program. Through this cascade effect, the INP trained more than 80,000 of the INP's 421,000 police in the UoF policy by the end of 2009. In 2012, the UoF policy was formally institutionalized into the curriculum of all 30 of the INP's Basic Police Academies. This program resulted in the INP developing a sustainable policy to educate the entire police force in applying the use of force to the appropriate degree in a wide variety of circumstances.

Output measures, by themselves, are typically not very useful for evaluating law enforcement development programs. Merely training police in certain skills does not guarantee that they can or will implement what was taught. However, consistently applying that training to real world conditions through a train-the-trainer approach can fairly be labeled as an outcome of the training. The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights issues statistics about citizen complaints against the INP. In 2010, citizens brought 1,063 complaints against the INP, of which 15 percent were for torture or other violence.¹⁷² In 2015 citizens brought 1,820 complaints against the INP, of which 6.31 percent were for torture or other violence.¹⁷³ This reduction by nearly two-thirds in the percentage of complaints involving use of force is an important outcome of the Indonesia program. Another outcome was the establishment of the cadre of master trainers who serve as a permanent, continuous force for SEMS training throughout Indonesia.

Sierra Leone

In 2011 and 2012 ICITAP assessed, designed, and implemented an Election Security Program in Sierra Leone, working in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in Freetown. This program was funded by USAID. ICITAP worked with USAID and Social Impact, Inc. to help conduct what was described by the evaluation team as a process-oriented evaluation of ICITAP's training of the SLP.¹⁷⁴ The training consisted of information about recent changes in the election law; the duties, responsibilities, and methods of the police in dealing with prospective election-related violence; and the importance of showing tolerance and respect toward different points of view and political allegiances. The information was delivered to both individual police officers and members of the community through roll call training: brief microtraining sessions, usually delivered at the morning parade (roll call).

ICITAP built a close working relationship with five SLP instructors over many months, and then presented an instructor and curriculum development course to those five instructors as well as five police prosecutors. (Police prosecutors handle most criminal cases in Sierra Leone, with the exception of murder, treason, and high-value fraud cases.) Training was rolled out in three levels. During level 1 training, ICITAP worked with these ten master instructors to develop nine modules of roll call microtraining—15- to 30-minute learning modules about security around the November 2012 elections. The modules covered the following topics:

1. Understanding the new election laws
2. Proper conduct at polling places
3. Prosecuting electoral offenses
4. Tolerance and respect during the election period
5. Gender discrimination in elections
6. Persons with disabilities and vulnerable persons around elections
7. Police neutrality around elections
8. Police/community communication
9. Stress management

All of the modules started with a skit or role-play to set the scene for the lesson.

The ten ICITAP-trained SLP master instructors, in teams consisting of a police instructor and a police prosecutor, then travelled throughout the country and conducted the level 2 training. In this stage, they conducted 32 one-day workshops and trained more than 700 SLP instructors, who then went on to provide level 3 training to the officers. They also trained approximately 130 community members, including religious leaders, paramount chiefs, a community radio editor, and members of citizen/community police boards. This training of community leaders was essential because most citizens did not know what police should be doing so they could not



Skit starts off a roll call training module on election security at a police station in Makeni, Sierra Leone

hold them accountable for their actions. In an example of how grassroots technology can be harnessed to efficiently promote good governance principles, the community radio editor had his sound engineer record all nine roll call training modules and then repeatedly played all nine modules for his listeners. This approach holds a great deal of potential for exponentially expanding the reach of police training and civic education throughout many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

In level 3 of the training, those police and citizens trained as instructors in level 2 presented microtraining modules to police at station roll calls, as well as to citizens in those communities.

Because the USAID evaluation did not begin until the level 1 training had been completed and some of the level 2 training had already occurred, the evaluators decided to adopt a process-oriented approach, including a heavy focus on documenting the way in which the roll call training was actually implemented. Through this qualitative approach, the evaluation focused on three core aspects of roll call training: implementation, quality, and effectiveness.

Implementation addressed the extent to which each level of the roll call training had taken place, the process by which trainings were organized, the chain



Sierra Leone Police instructors use a photographic poster developed by ICITAP to reinforce points about election security at a roll call training in a Makeni police station

of responsibilities in place to ensure that trainings occurred as planned, and a normative description of the training as observed by the evaluation team or as recollected by interviewees. Also included in this evaluation were some descriptive statistics on the number of trainings and number of participants. Quality addressed the way in which each level of roll call training was delivered and whether the trainings were conducive to learning, including whether the learning methods stipulated in the roll call training manual (i.e., lectures, roleplays, scenarios, and question and answer sessions) were used to the greatest extent possible. The effectiveness of the different levels of the roll call training were assessed on the basis of how much learning had taken place, based on direct observation of certain trainings, answers to learning questions by participants, and participants' assessments of whether the training provided new and relevant information.

Due to the condensed timeframe in which the evaluation was conducted, the evaluators were not able to observe any of the level 1 training or the earlier parts of the level 2 training. Instead, they relied upon interviews with the level 1 and level 2 trainees and the level 1 instructor. Three of the master trainers were interviewed and all three expressed a high

degree of satisfaction with the level 1 training, indicating that the information conveyed would be highly relevant to both police and community level 3 trainees. The master trainers said they were well prepared to present the level 2 training and that this kind of roll call training would be an effective way to present other relevant information to police officers around the country.

The evaluators concluded the greatest weakness of the level 2 training was that the master instructors did not explain to the level 3 instructors how they should go about presenting the level 3 trainings at the station and post level, or explain the timing for the trainings. The ICITAP acting program manager should have continuously emphasized the issue to the inspector general of police

and the assistant inspector general for training, and these SLP officials should have communicated directly through the leadership hierarchies in the different regions of Sierra Leone to ensure that level 3 training was mandated, widespread, and uniform. This is a valuable lesson learned, and will help ICITAP avoid this issue when replicating roll call training programs in other countries.

Going forward, the evaluation recommended that USAID and ICITAP should support a series of roll call training modules designed to enable roll call training to be better institutionalized within the SLP's training procedures. The evaluators determined that much of the success of the roll call training program was the result of effective personal interaction between the ICITAP police advisor and the master trainer team. This very positive relationship should have been complemented by better relationships with the highest levels of the SLP.

Ukraine

In Ukraine, ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement Advisor (SLEA) Robert Peacock and his staff, working in concert with the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology (KIIS), have conducted impact evaluations,

considered the gold standard of program evaluation, to monitor and evaluate the Police Patrol Program described in the case studies in Part II. In May 2016, ICITAP conducted a survey of 3,302 Police Patrol officers and management officials of the National Police of Ukraine in the 14 cities where the Police Patrol Program was operational. The purpose of the survey was to determine which trainings were most important for the management and officers of the patrol police and to evaluate the effectiveness of in-service training based on the results of previous trainings. In some cases, baseline data were obtained through citizen surveys. Control groups and treatment groups were then established through random sampling, and both groups completed follow-on surveys.

The survey was an electronic questionnaire conducted via Survey Monkey. Respondents included 2,953 Patrol line officers, of whom 77.9 percent were men and 22.1 percent were women, and 349 supervisors and higher levels of management, of whom 84.1 percent were men and 15.9 percent were women.

In March 2016, KIIS surveyed 1,600 citizens (200 each from eight cities) about their perceptions of their personal safety, police reform, and trust in law enforcement. The eight cities were grouped into two categories, based on whether or not their cities had functional police patrols at the time of the surveys. The surveys were conducted by telephone through random sampling and weighted by gender and age.

The survey questions assessed the public's

- level of personal security and readiness to contact the law enforcement authorities;
- evaluation of the results of the launch of the patrol police (in the cities where patrol police already operated) and of the expectations of their eventual implementation (in the cities where patrol police had not begun operating at the time of the study);
- awareness of and level of interest in the patrol police;

- awareness of the functions and rights of the patrol police;
- experience of interactions with the patrol police (in the cities where patrol police already operated).

The data showed that the overall satisfaction with law enforcement agencies was higher in cities where the patrol police were operational at the time of the survey. The survey results also demonstrated that the public still had no clear understanding of the functional responsibilities of patrol police. The respondents were inclined to choose all or nearly all the proposed options, but none of the public respondents provided the exact correct answer. With regard to public contacts with patrol police, at the time of the survey only 16 percent of the respondents in Uzhhorod and Mykolaiv, 12 percent in Lutsk, and only 9 percent in Khmelnytsky had interacted with them. This number has likely increased, since in March 2016 the patrol police had only been operational for a few months.

These data show how valuable surveys can be for both determining midstream programmatic modifications and for measuring impact. It is notable that SLEA Peacock had a staff intern who is a PhD candidate in criminal justice at the City University of New York and who worked exclusively on ICITAP monitoring and evaluation issues.

Surveys as critical tools for program monitoring and evaluation

Surveys, especially when accompanied by key informant interviews and focus group discussions, are a helpful part of any evaluation, especially an impact evaluation. Surveys provide real-world insights into how institutions have developed under new approaches to governing and how officers have reacted to changes in governance and training. Statistics, on their own, can be misleading. For example, a fall in the reported crime rate can reflect the deterrent effect of better criminal investigations and higher arrest rates—or it can mean that the

public has less confidence in the police's ability to solve crime and is less likely to report it, while a rise in the crime rate may mean that citizens have developed faith and trust in the police and are thus reporting more crimes. Scientifically conducted surveys of police and the public, especially when enhanced with key informant interviews and focus group discussions, tend to illuminate the real reasons for changing crime statistics—unlike numerical indicators, such as number of trainings or number of participants, they can show whether citizen perceptions of the police have improved during the implementation of a community engagement project. They can also reveal the level of confidence the police have in their own capabilities and the public's level of trust and confidence in the police. Surveys can therefore be both useful outcome and impact evaluation tools because they produce generalizable conclusions about the implementation of a project.¹⁷⁵

As ICITAP's Framework for Preparing to Promote Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development illustrates at the beginning of this publication, evaluation experts should be included on ICITAP assessment teams from the beginning. During the assessment phase, evaluation experts can determine host countries' survey capabilities and the best way to develop and implement citizen surveys. Data from

these surveys can identify unforeseen gaps in service delivery and offer nuanced insights into how police are perceived differently across various demographic sectors—information which can be used to shape development programs. For instance, a survey may reveal that women distrust police more than men. With this knowledge, ICITAP program managers/SLEAs can incorporate activities designed to increase police contact with the community, a practice to improve trust, in the areas most frequented by women.

Citizen surveys provide empirical evidence to demonstrate community need for projects, while also adding legitimacy to project implementation. Furthermore, surveys can double as tools to increase communication, engagement, and input from the community, enabling critical cooperation between communities and law enforcement agencies that paves the way for sustainable institutional law enforcement development.¹⁷⁶

Good survey practices

Effective surveys possess several common elements. Their goals must be clear and explicit. The sampling methodology, sample size, and questionnaire design should be adapted to the specific country context, and the organizations that will administer the surveys should be pre-trained to ensure quality. Survey

Using Community-Police Perceptions Surveys for Monitoring and Evaluation

In 2006, Timor-Leste faced a period of violence and civil unrest that led to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In 2008 and 2013, the Asia Foundation conducted nationwide public opinion surveys on community-police perceptions. The 2013 survey sought to gauge perceptions of the security environment and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) following the departure of the United Nations Police, which highlighted PNTL internal and operational challenges. The survey tracked key indicators identified in 2008 to help inform policymakers and stakeholders on the improvement of national security. Building on questions from the 2008 survey, a total of 3,016 citizens, community leaders, and police officers were interviewed to assess their perceptions on the current context.¹⁷⁷

The survey results provided relevant evidence in favor of the continuation of community policing and security sector reforms. Survey analysis provided a baseline for evaluating the effectiveness of the support given by The Asia Foundation and the New Zealand Police to the PNTL. Baseline information produced by the survey also served to track the PNTL's five-year Strategic Plan 2014–2019.

results should be cross-validated with different data sources: for example, surveys of the police can be validated against surveys of the community to determine where the data reinforce each other.

Clear and explicit survey purpose

Good surveys have a clear and explicit purpose. A street-level police survey, for example, aims to collect information on local policemen's perceptions of program operations and their own responsibilities,¹⁷⁸ while the objective of a public perception survey is to collect information about the public's views on police behavior and effectiveness.¹⁷⁹ Surveys with an explicit and clear purpose can help generate an actionable list of recommendations for mid-course corrections or for newly needed projects. For instance, a survey conducted by the United Nations Development Program in Kosovo aimed to determine the public's perceptions of Kosovo Police Service behavior and effectiveness in an effort to identify specific ways to improve aspects of police professionalism, providing valuable insights regarding necessary police behavioral change.¹⁸⁰

Reasonable sampling methodology and sample size

A clear understanding of a survey's objectives informs data requirements like sampling methodology and sample size.¹⁸¹ Both large- and small-scale citizen perception surveys need a sample that is representative of the population in size and demographics. For surveys at the national level, selecting a sample size between 1,000 and 3,000 households will strengthen the reliability of the survey. To ensure the sample is representative, it is important also to consider demographic characteristics within the sample, such as age, sex, income level, education, and residence. A good sampling methodology uses randomized samples and, depending on the desired

characteristics of the sample, may use stratification or cluster sampling. In stratified random sampling the following occurs:

Rather than taking samples at random straight from the population, the population is separated into groups using an inherent characteristic of the elements (homogeneous groups). Then random samples are taken from the group. The amount of random samples taken from each group is dependent on the number of elements within the group.¹⁸²

Cluster sampling is defined as follows:

Cluster random sampling is a sampling method in which the population is first divided into clusters. (A cluster is a heterogeneous subset of the population.) Then a simple random sample of clusters is taken. All the members of the selected clusters together constitute the sample. This method is often used when natural groupings are obvious and available.

In cluster sampling, it is the clusters that are selected at random, not the individuals. It is assumed that each cluster by itself is an unbiased representation of the population, which implies that each of the clusters is heterogeneous.¹⁸³

Suitable questionnaire design

Questions on a citizen perception survey should be designed to produce an actionable list of recommendations for ICITAP's engagement in a country's security and justice sector. Ideally, prior to instituting

the assistance program ICITAP should develop, distribute, and analyze at least one public survey which probes the citizens' perceptions of the police. The wording, clarity, relevance, and style of questions in a survey are critical to the quality of the responses. Questionnaires should be tailored to take into account demographic characteristics and cultural factors that can potentially influence the validity of answers. For example, there may be instances in which some citizens are unable to offer representative information about income levels due to their fear of disclosing their salaries, since they received income from informal activities that they have not divulged.¹⁸⁴ In cases like this, it is necessary to use proxy questions to collect similar data that direct questions may fail to accurately capture.

"A proxy indicator is really just a fancy way of identifying a thing based on something that is more easily visible," explains Justin Loiseau of MIT's Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. "[T]elevision cable dishes in a shantytown is a good example," indicating households with higher incomes. "Conversely, a group in Kenya uses huts that have thatch roofs (instead of corrugated metal ones) as a proxy indicator for poverty, since thatch roofs are cheaper (and worse) than metal ones. Another historic proxy indicator would be the literal canary in the coal mine."¹⁸⁵ Other examples of proxy indicators include night time lights as a measure of economic activity in a location, children's height and weight for household consumption, and yard signs for political views.¹⁸⁶

Partnership approach to designing and conducting citizen perception surveys

Partnerships with local institutions to collect data, such as ICITAP's partnership with the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology (discussed on page 76), can improve prospects for project success. Locals' grassroots knowledge of the political, social, and economic context allows them to tailor survey questions and adapt survey administration techniques



Sierra Leone Police Master Instructors John Tumbay and Esther Kaintor present roll call training in Freetown

to the local culture.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, establishing local partnerships to conduct surveys allows host countries to build statistical capacity beyond the scope of the implementation of the initial partnership survey.¹⁸⁸ Take for example a host-country university professor who is mentored by an American academic on how to develop an effective citizen survey. After learning effective surveying techniques, the host-country professor might develop a law enforcement development survey that his students implement. The professor could then have more of his classes implement the same survey a number of times over a 10- to 15-year period, long after the ICITAP program has ended, and establish a low-cost means for conducting local surveys on the impact of ICITAP programs.

It is very important to provide necessary training to local partners and local survey facilitators on proper survey administration techniques.¹⁸⁹ Survey facilitators are especially important for conducting face-to-face surveys in countries with low literacy rates or where limited phone and internet access prevents paper and electronic surveys from being used. Facilitators should be trained in uniform and standardized approaches to explaining a survey, phrasing and asking questions, and recording responses.

Efforts to establish a uniform approach to administering surveys helps minimize confirmation and observer biases.¹⁹⁰

*[Observer bias is] a form of reactivity in which a researcher's cognitive bias causes him to subconsciously influence the participants of an experiment. Confirmation bias can lead to the experimenter interpreting results incorrectly because of the tendency to look for information that conforms to his hypothesis, and overlook information that argues against it.*¹⁹¹

Partners such as NGOs, universities, and independent research institutes can have much to contribute to the design, implementation, and analysis of public perception surveys. Global studies that measure democracy and governance rely on research networks of such partners. For example, Afrobarometer, a pan-African and nonpartisan research network, has national partnerships with academic institutions such as the Center for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town and the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi.¹⁹²

Cross-validation with different data sources

Surveys are commonly supplemented with key informant interviews (KIs) and focus group discussions. KIs are “qualitative, in-depth interviews of people selected for their first-hand knowledge about a topic of interest”;¹⁹³ focus group discussions are “facilitator-led small group discussion[s] about experiences, feelings, and preferences about a topic. The facilitator raises issues identified in a discussion guide and uses probing techniques to solicit views, ideas, and other information.”¹⁹⁴ Both techniques are particularly useful to cross-validate or interpret data collected through citizen perception surveys. Data collected through citizen perception surveys provides information on the situation and attitudes of the

individuals receiving public services; KIs and focus groups, on the other hand, provide in-depth explanations about the underlying attitudes and reasons.¹⁹⁵ Collecting data from different sources improves the quality and effectiveness of survey analysis.¹⁹⁶ For instance, a police perception survey in Bangladesh combined expert opinions, household surveys, and KIs to examine the capacity, priorities, and needs of police institutions. Similarly, the 2008 community-police perceptions survey in Timor-Leste mentioned in the sidebar on page 78 used a series of stakeholder workshops to expand and deepen analysis, which provided relevant and actionable recommendations for Timorese policy makers.¹⁹⁷

Limitations of surveys for evaluation

While citizen perception surveys can be a useful tool for collecting baseline data and informing monitoring and evaluation, they have limitations that must be considered when they are being used in fragile and post-conflict countries. Common challenges that affect the implementation and evaluation of surveys include access to information, statistical bias, and ethical issues. Ethical considerations must be made when conducting citizen perception surveys, especially when surveys ask for sensitive information that, if revealed, could result in a backlash against citizens by government authorities. Fear of backlash due to mistrust of surveyors can limit people's survey response levels or result in people providing false opinions to surveyors. Data collection in a sociopolitically fragile context can be challenging due to physical risks, restricted access to survey respondents, manipulation of data, and limited national statistical capacity.¹⁹⁸

Use of impact evaluations

Impact evaluations are more rigorous than performance evaluations. Randomized control trials are the source of their rigor and complexity; these compare a control group of people who did not receive training

or technical assistance with the treatment group of those who did. While performance evaluations focus mainly on measuring outputs and outcomes and can be done by practitioners, impact evaluations require experts to perform statistical and mathematical analyses based upon surveys and other sources of information. An impact evaluation seeks to find causal links between a program treatment and the ensuing results.

The presence of a control group distinguishes an impact evaluation from a performance evaluation based solely on outputs and outcomes. For example, designing an impact evaluation to measure the overall effect of the INP's use of force policy and practice (discussed on page 74) would require a survey of the public designed to look for any direct causal relationship between the socialization of the policy and a significant percentage decrease over several years in the number of excessive use of force complaints against the INP. Outcomes could be defined based on surveys of police who received the training in question, or of citizens who were exposed to police who received the training. Either group would constitute a treatment group. An impact evaluation would also survey citizens exposed to police who had had not been trained in the use of force policy to determine the number of use-of-force complaints filed by the latter group of citizens. This latter group constitutes the control group. The higher mathematics (regression analysis) that arise in an impact evaluation come into play in comparing the opinions of the treatment group who actually received or were exposed to the use of force training with the opinions of citizens exposed to untrained police.

While many impact evaluations have been conducted over the years on international development projects in education, health, economics, and agriculture, there is a paucity of impact evaluations on law enforcement development projects. This is partly because of the difficulty of measuring, for example, the percentage decrease in crime specifically

attributable to a law enforcement development project or the increased sense of safety and security that citizens have after a law enforcement development program is successfully implemented in their country.

It is not sufficient to rely on crime statistics to determine if an anticrime assistance program has been successful. Earlier we offered the example of the number of reported crimes going down as not necessarily reflecting an actual diminution of crime, but possibly as an outgrowth of lack of confidence in the police and the resulting belief that reporting crime was futile. Conversely, an assistance program, while it has the effect of lowering crime, may result in the public, with greater confidence in the police, actually reporting more crimes than in the past. This will result in the incidence of reported crime actually going up, with the resulting conclusion that the police are less effective in fighting and deterring crime.

While ICITAP will continue to emphasize performance evaluations that focus on monitoring and evaluating program outputs and outcomes, it lacks the expertise to conduct impact evaluations on its own programs, nor does it make sense for it to develop the expertise. Evaluations should also always be conducted by objective parties, not parties who have led the assessment, design, and implementation of programs. ICITAP has begun a process of relationship building which it hopes will result in partnering with unbiased institutions with extensive impact evaluation expertise. Specifically, ICITAP has had discussions with two consortia, Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) at MIT.

EGAP is an international consortium of impact evaluation experts, most of whom work in academia.

EGAP is a cross-disciplinary network of researchers and practitioners which is united by a focus on experimental research and is dedicated to generating and disseminating rigorous

*evidence on topics of governance, politics, and institutions. We seek to forge partnerships between researchers and practitioners committed to understanding the politics of global development, advance evidence-based policy making, and improve the quality of empirical research in the social sciences.*¹⁹⁹

Members of EGAP have experience in conducting impact evaluations for the U.S. Government. One option under consideration is for ICITAP to partner with EGAP members and universities to lead impact evaluations for ICITAP, with the understanding that, rather than getting a significant fee, EGAP could use the research and results of the evaluations of ICITAP programs for their own research and publication purposes.

ICITAP is considering a similar arrangement with JPAL. JPAL is an academic consortium of impact evaluation experts with more than 150 members. JPAL's mission is to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific evidence. JPAL does this through research, policy outreach, and training.

ICITAP's discussions with EGAP and JPAL members along these lines are at a preliminary stage. Heretofore, the U.S. Government has been hesitant to fund impact evaluations in the area of international law enforcement development, presumably based on the expected high costs. However, impact evaluations can help promote a culture of learning in the field of sustainable international law enforcement development. They will complement and not replace performance evaluations. ICITAP proposes that funding agencies consider partnering with ICITAP to establish a working relationship with institutions with the capacity for conducting impact evaluations. Funders should not discount impact evaluations out of hand because the results of impact evaluations may end up saving time and money in the long run by streamlining the planning and implementation of future international law enforcement development programs. This is particularly true of pilot projects. To continue to be a leader in sustainable institutional law enforcement development around the world, ICITAP understands that its programs must demonstrate an outstanding return on investment to the Department of Justice, ICITAP's funding organizations, and to Congress.

Appendix A. Potential Assessment Questions

1. What are the major crime and security threats in the country?
2. How can the coordination between police investigators and prosecutors be improved?
3. Describe a case that was successfully prosecuted due to good coordination between police and prosecutors.
4. Describe a case that failed because of poor coordination between police and prosecutors.
5. Are there forensic means to analyse physical evidence? If so, describe.
6. Can circumstantial evidence be used to prosecute cases? If so, describe.
7. Is plea-bargaining possible under current law?
8. Is a tracking system (either paper or automated) in place that monitors how long prisoners are kept in remand before being charged with a crime, and how long those that are charged with a crime wait in prison before going to trial? If so, describe.
9. Are people held on remand imprisoned with convicts?
10. Are there any programs that explain to citizens how the criminal justice system should work and what their rights are within the system?
11. Is joint training ever conducted that includes police, prosecutors, and magistrates or judges?
12. Does the police agency have a use of force policy in effect?
13. Is the concept of force options taught to police?
14. Are there current policies and procedures in place for the police?
15. Describe the basic academy and how it functions.
16. How do the police identify and train instructors?
17. How many full-time instructors do they have?
18. How often are instructors rotated back to regular assignments?
19. Do police instructors train their replacements before being reassigned?
20. Do the officers receive regular in-service training? What topics are taught and stressed?
21. What methods are employed to conduct the training?
22. Do the officers receive regular in-service training on proficiency skills such as firearms, use of force, baton, public order management, handcuffing, use of less lethal munitions and chemical munitions, pursuit driving, emergency management, and active shooter situations?
23. Do police receive training in crime scene protection? If so, please describe.
24. Is there a significant case backlog in the courts?
25. Does the police agency have a Police Law or similar guiding document in place?
26. Does the police agency have internal oversight mechanisms in place?
27. How is police/community engagement?
28. Do citizens trust police? (ethics, corruption, etc.)
29. How is the female/minority recruitment carried out?
30. What are the police management, investigative and functionary ratios?

Appendix B. Sample Course Evaluation



United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division, ICITAP Pakistan
American Embassy-Islamabad



Date: May 05, 2017

To: Daniel Miller
Senior Law Enforcement Advisor

From: Mazhar Zaidi
Measurement & Evaluation Officer

Thru: Shahzad Hameed
Program Manager


Re: Course Evaluation, Crime Scene Management, (Course # 17-046)

Overview: This evaluation report covers Crime Scene Management Course # 17-046 conducted from May 02, 2017 to May 05, 2017 at City Police Office, Karachi. ICITAP's Instructors were Mr. Irshad Hussain and Mr. Abdul Rehman.

- Number of Participants: **20**
- Total Male Participants: **20**
- Total Female Participants: **0**
- Average age of participants: **53**
- Average Years of Education: **15**
- Average Years of Service: **31**

- **Agencies Trained:**
 - Pakistan Customs: **13**
 - Sindh Police: **7**

- **Course participants Ranks:**
 - Superintendent of Preventive Services: **3**
 - Inspector Preventive Services: **4**
 - Senior Preventive Officer: **4**
 - Inspector: **2**
 - Preventative Officer: **2**
 - Sub-Inspector: **5**



Summary: This one week course on Crime scene management in today's times is contentious. Dealing with large scale events is a daunting task and requires special skills and abilities including the responsibility of informing the media of releasable information. This course will equip the police supervisor to successfully oversee and manage crime scenes. Practical exercises are an integral part of this course which is designed for those officers who will be responsible for supervising a crime scene.

Course contained the following modules:

- Phases of Crisis Management
- Concept of Mitigation
- Elements and Incidents of Command Systems
- Symptoms of stress
- Communication systems

Evaluation Method: The course was evaluated from two perspectives;

1. Student Learning - Evaluation of student performance,
2. Training Feedback - Evaluation by students about the class.

Student learning was gauged through multiple choice questions.

Class tests focused on key areas taught to them during the course. The class tests not only helped to assess student learning but also provided an indication of what topics of the curriculum needs more focus, time and attention in order to meet the course goals. The training feedback questionnaire solicited opinions from the participants regarding course content, teaching style, training facilities, materials etc.

Students' feedback: The participants regarded this course as an excellent course. They said that it was very informative and will improve their capabilities as officers and will assist them in court cases when presenting evidence. The participants said that the course was very relevant to their job especially investigation and prosecution. They also said that the training was unique and provided them with many new skills which will be invaluable to their investigations. The participants suggested including some practical exercises for a better experience.

Feedback

Most rewarding, educative and informative experience. The course layout was ingeniously designed and executed most efficiently and professionally by both the instructors. The instructors themselves were thorough professionals and veterans and experts in their fields. Training was imparted in a relaxed and comfortable atmosphere. I feel privileged to have participated in this course.

M&E-IE/R001/2016

Measurement & Evaluation

Feedback

The course was designed, conducted and carried out so professionally and it covered all the aspects of the subject and topics. The best part was the interactivity of this workshop. As a participant I definitely have learned new things to be carried out in the line of duty.

M&E-IE/R001/2016

Measurement & Evaluation

Student Learning: Overall learning by the participants is calculated by the Percentage change method. Results of each student are presented below in two different tables for the course conducted:

SR #	PARTICIPANT NAME	PRE-TEST SCORE	POST-TEST SCORE	LEARNING IMPROVEMENT
1	Fakhr ud Din	30	30	0%
2	Zulfiqar Ali Shaikh	60	40	-33%
3	Imran Tahir Qureshi	60	70	16.7%
4	Tariq Mehmood	30	50	66.7%
5	Saeed Ahmed Markhand	70	50	-28.6%
6	Khayyam Ally Soomro	60	70	16.7%
7	Nayyer H. Rizvi	60	50	-16.7%
8	Raza Abbas Kazmi	50	40	-20%
9	Abrar Ahmed	50	50	0%
10	Muhammad Saleh Solangi	60	60	0%
11	Javed Raza	60	50	-16.7%
12	Zahid Siraj	70	40	-42.9%
13	Muhammad Ameen Khan	0	80	-
14	Muhammad Ayaz	20	30	50%
15	Masood Malik	50	40	-20%
16	Muhammad Aslam Naz	0	60	-
17	Manzoor Ali	0	0	0%
18	Ch. Azam Hussain	0	30	-
19	Sarfraz Ahmed	30	50	66.7%
20	Syed Nehal Ashrafi	0	50	-
	Average	38	47	-

Method of calculation: Marks of each question: 10

Total questions: 10

10 (marks of each question) X 10 (total questions) = 100 marks

Marks obtained in post-test – Marks obtained in pre-test

Training Feedback: The ratings provided by students are tabulated below representing the number of students whose opinions ranged from excellent to unacceptable regarding different factors involved with the training.

Irshad Hussain

SR #	Factors of Consideration	Unacceptable	Fair	Average	Good	Excellent	Not attempted
1	Planning / Organization of Course				7	13	
2	Instructor's Knowledge				5	15	
3	Ability to Motivate and Encouragement to Participate				4	16	
4	Speech & Language Skills				4	16	
5	Classroom Management and Professionalism of the Instructor(s)				6	14	
6	Support / Coordination between Instructors(s)				3	17	
	Total				29	91	

Formula used for calculation:

Excellent = 5 X number of times received

Good = 4 X number of times received

Average = 3 X number of times received

Fair = 2 X number of times received

Unacceptable = 1 X number of times received

Marks obtained / Total Marks

Ideal situation: Instructor gets a maximum score of five in every field X number of evaluations

Good = 4 x 29 = 116

Excellent = 5 x 91 = 455

Marks Obtained = 571

571 / 600 X 5 = **4.75**

Abdul Rehman

SR #	Factors of Consideration	Unacceptable	Fair	Average	Good	Excellent	Not attempted
1	Planning / Organization of Course				5	15	
2	Instructor's Knowledge				2	18	
3	Ability to Motivate and Encouragement to Participate			1	3	16	
4	Speech & Language Skills				4	16	
5	Classroom Management and Professionalism of the Instructor(s)			1	6	13	
6	Support / Coordination between Instructors(s)				3	17	
	Total			2	23	95	

Average = 3 x 2 = 6

Good = 4 x 23 = 92

Excellent = 5 x 95 = 475

Marks Obtained = 573

573 / 600 X 5 = **4.77**

The trainers were graded separately according to the given key and were marked out of the possible score of 5.



Conclusion: The participants showed a fair amount of improvement in their knowledge, as only a few participants showed improvement in their scores. The participants were experienced in their fields and had the relevant knowledge however they could not demonstrate this knowledge on paper. On the last day of the course there was no electricity and the generator was also not working. Due to high temperatures and absence of air conditioning in class, students were unable to concentrate and to perform to their full capacity. The overall course learning improvement of the participants was **8.0%** and overall evaluation average score given by the participants was **4.76 out** of a possible score of **5.0**.

Appendix C. ICITAP Training Feedback from Participants



United States Department of Justice
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICITAP Pakistan



Funded by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Course Participant Training Impact Statements 2016-2017

Compiled by Hasan Jamshaid – Program Support Officer, ICITAP

Preface

During a meeting held at the ICITAP Office (Marvi Road, F-7/4) on March 2, 2016, Inspector General of Police Muhammad Amlish (then DG NPB now DG FIA) asked us a direct question. “How can you quantify the impact of ICITAP training on our law enforcement community in Pakistan?” I was intrigued by his question and resolved at that time to attempt to find out the real ground truth about what we accomplish every day. This document tracks the

direct statements made to me by course participants that I have encountered over the past year. I have collected these statements, while operating as the assigned class coordinator, for many of our courses held at several different training sites.

The results of my effort to answer DG Amlish’s question are listed below.

Maria Mahmood **SP CIA, Punjab Police**

“During my training period as an under-training officer, ICITAP trained us in the Collection of Evidence which has been helping me ever since. As a commanding officer and as a master trainer for training investigators, I have been able to train many investigation officers, especially when I was posted as SP Investigations. ICITAP has been with me over these years building my capacity both as a leader and as a police officer.”

Sardar Mavarhan Khan **ASP, KPK Police**

“During my posting as SDPO Hub, Balochistan, the ICITAP training module regarding Crowd Management Course assisted me to a great extent. Due to which, I was able to control and manage the mob successfully who were protesting against power shortages. I found ICITAP standing shoulder to shoulder with me on that day. The style of ICITAP training and its pristine hope to impart knowledge remains a constant.”

Jamil Ahmad Jamil
SP, AJK Police

“During press briefings involving high profile cases, I have felt very comfortable answering the questions of media while narrating the case stories. The ICITAP course Media Relations really taught me how to handle the media effectively.”

Asad Mehmood Khan
Deputy Director, NAB

“I attended “Performance Based Training Course” at Police College Sihala which helped me in my daily routine. I have also attended ICITAP’s Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Courses at NPA. I have dealt with many cases of White Collar Crimes at NAB where I have continually used the techniques taught in those ICITAP courses. The courses were helpful for me as the content was relevant.

I learned techniques for successful Interviewing & Interrogation in another ICITAP course. I follow these techniques in my interrogations and get so much success, in that I have recovered millions of rupees for Pakistan. Now, I am supervising many cases being a Case Officer and these techniques are useful even today.”

Ali Mardan
ADO FC, Hangu KPK

“ICITAP training assisted me in a murder case wherein a person named Nasir bled to death using a shaving blade. Initially, it seemed like it was a suicide case, but later it turned out to be a case of homicide. Your Crime Scene Investigation Course helped in initial containment and preservation of the evidence and also recording of the scene through sketches and photographs. The preservation helped us in reaching the right conclusion. Photography of the scene helped record the blood splatter patterns of the incident, wherein it was proved that the victim was moved after his throat was slit. Which was more than enough to justify homicide.”

Khalid Mehmood Awan
Inspector, Punjab Police

“On March 3, 2015 there was a terrorist attack at a Lahore church. ICITAP training helped me in maintenance of order at the scene, crime scene investigation, evidence collection, post mortem of dead bodies and the recording of statements of eye witnesses. I handled the crime scene very meticulously. My first response was within 2 minutes and I made a SOS call. All counter terrorism teams responded within 5 minutes. The terrorists were engaged and neutralized without further loss of lives. Due to ICITAP training skills from your Crime Scene Management Course it helped in curtailing further casualties and injuries.”

Umair Khan
DSP, Karak Prison

“I am utilizing the lessons learned from ICITAP’s Leadership Development Course on a daily basis in prison management. I learnt that a leader should be accessible to all his subordinates so now my team is my strength. I also learned that at times a leader should be proactive while at other times he needs to be a democrat. I must confess that your ICITAP course brought meaningful change in my prison.”

Muhammad Rizwan Khan
Additional Director, NAB

“The ICITAP course White Collar Crimes enhanced my overall capacity in conducting investigations pertaining to technical crimes specially STRs (Suspicious Transaction Records).”

Hassan Qayyum
SP, AJK Police

“During the ICITAP Crisis Management Course the most important thing which I learned was, Negotiators Don’t Command and Commanders Don’t Negotiate. Further, the hostage negotiation training was very helpful to me. I now know the tactics and interviewing techniques used by negotiators during hostage stand-offs. Especially, the techniques used to gain time for a peaceful resolution was a life-time learning experience.

“I used information from your Crime Scene Investigations Course in a murder case recently as the techniques learned were very helpful in the proper collection of evidences at the murder scene. Most of the time due to lack of knowledge the circumstantial evidence is usually lost. The techniques which I learned during ICITAP’s Conducting & Managing Criminal Investigations Course played a pivotal role in my efforts to collect the evidence and preservation of the crime scene.”

Irfan Tariq
SSP, Punjab Police

“Your course on First Aid helped me to provide aid and assistance to persons when required. This course provided me with skills and knowledge on how to deal with such situations and respond in a timely manner.”

M.M. Mumtaz Hayat Maneka
ASP, Karachi

“One thing I learned from your Media Relations Course was that you need to provide information to media on a high profile incident, otherwise they will produce their own news. I have started issuing necessary information in a press statement for every high profile incident and manage the media more effectively now. Thanks ICITAP!”

Muhammad Ehsan ul Haq
DSP, AJK Police

“During crime investigations, I have used the knowledge gained from ICITAP’s Advanced Criminal Investigations Course. ICITAP courses regarding crime scene management also help in maintaining good management and discipline”

Haider Raza
SP, Sindh Police

“I had to handle the incident after the IED bomb attack on the life of Mr. Maqbool Baqir (Senior Most High Court judge and later Chief Justice Sindh High court). It was a directional IED which caused signifi-

cant casualties to the escorting police and civilians. The lessons learned at ICITAP’s Critical Incident Management Course allowed me to take proper measures to ensure management of crime scene for collection of forensic evidence and controlling access of media and other personnel to the crime scene.”

Imam Baksh
Inspector, FIA

“ICITAP training has helped me in conducting the scientific investigations using modern techniques.”

Abid Hussain
Inspector, FIA

“ICITAP assisted me in the acquisition of criminal investigation techniques and developing informants. I was able to get information and arrest an accused person by conducting a surveillance of his actions. I kept the whole investigation confidential as I learned in the course to keep things confidential until the end.”

Abdul Hayee
SP Bannu, KPK Police

“During the recent visit of the Prime Minister to District Bannu I was in-charge of security of main ground where the PM was going to address the people. There were many people from the press and a huge crowd. There were no issues though as I handled the media and crowd effectively according to the tips given in the ICITAP Media Relations Course.”

Muhammad Fayaz
Inspector, ICT Police

“While I was SHO Police Station Shahzad Town, a religious ceremony was happening in the mosque. A 15-year-old suicide bomber came for the blast, but before coming inside the premises of mosque, he fell down and bomb was exploded. I used the knowledge gained in two Post Blast Investigation trainings from ICITAP and the FBI to manage this situation. These trainings helped me a lot.”

Muhammad Wajid Cheema
ASI, ICT Police - Anti Car Lifting Cell

“I applied the techniques of the Geo-Fencing Course and got a location of the culprits of different crimes. Techniques taught in the course of Interview & Interrogation Course helped me to analyze the statement of the victims and accused effectively and your Advanced Investigation Course boosted up my skills in criminal investigation. Recently, I recovered a snatched car and got fingerprints from the hand brake that helped me to solve the case. Another time, a car was recovered during my duty. When I stopped the driver he replied that he is the officer of FC. I asked him about his service course and his posting location. Interview & Interrogation Course helped me in analyzing that he was a liar. I further checked his service card and vehicle and found that his chassis number was tampered with and therefore I arrested him.”

Farooq Ahmad
ASI, ICT Police - CIA

“Techniques that I learned from First Aid Course organized by ICITAP, helped me while I was traveling on the motorway. A bus crashed into a truck and people were screaming, but there was no one to guide them. I applied my knowledge of First Aid and I handled the situation accordingly. First, I called the rescue service then I categorized the patients according to seriousness of their injury level. I got the first aid kit from the bus and provided first aid to the injured. Thanks ICITAP!”

Malik Abid Ikram
Inspector, Lohibheer

“I attended the ICITAP Hostage Negotiation Course that helped me to deal with real life situations. Recently a man made his family hostage and I handled the situation effectively and arrested this person without any loss of life.”

Nabeela Yasmeen
DSP, NPA, Islamabad

“ICITAP’s Instructor Development Course helped me to handle participants better during a management course that I delivered here as a master trainer. I delivered my knowledge in a beneficial manner to the participants.”

Muhammad Behzad Safdar
FIA Academy, Islamabad

“ICITAP’s course Managing Site Security helped me to perform my duty as shift security in-charge more effectively and efficiently. I learnt how to deal with visitors, conduct vehicle searches and have better effective control of security personnel. Your Instructor Development Course also really helped me in training newly recruited officers.”

Abdus Salam Khalid
SDPO, Chamkani, Peshawar

“It is pertinent to mention that whenever I investigate different crime scenes, I follow the investigative guidelines that I learnt from ICITAP’s Crime Scene Management Course; for instance; preserving a crime scene and assigning different teams for performing various specialized tasks.”

Sohail Khalid
SSP, Charsaada

“Stress Management Course from ICITAP has helped me to perform and manage better during difficult situations related to counter-terrorism operations. Your VIP Security Course helped me in effectively managing my frequent VIP duties.”

Aamir Abbas
CTW- FIA, Quetta

“I now use modern techniques to investigate crimes. The ICITAP courses of Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering taught me those techniques.”

Nasir Malik**DSP, Training College Lahore**

“Your Instructor Development Course helped me in conducting training courses at the Police Academy by delivering my lectures more effectively.”

Mohammad Shahzad**Wing commander, PAF Kamra**

“ICITAP training on Criminal Investigation helped me to solve a robbery case.”

Syed Rizwan Shah**Assistant director FIA, Peshawar**

“I received ICITAP training on the Interview & Interrogation Course that helped me in investigating many cases. This course really sharpened my skills of interrogating.”

Zulifqar Ali**Constable, Punjab Police - Rawalpindi**

“A few days ago my daughter badly injured herself. I gave her first aid and treated her wounds and stopped her bleeding. These techniques were learned from your First Aid Course.”

Abdul Rahim**ASI, ICT Police**

“Crime Scene Management course taught me how to stop the car of a traffic rule violator and now I prepare myself before going toward the car. Initially, I observe the movements of people sitting in the car. I have started approaching vehicles from the rear side of the car as I was taught in that great course.”

Shaukat Ali Jatoi**Wing Commander, PAF**

“Incident Command Course has helped me in handling a terrorist attack that involved a VBIED attack on one of our convoys carrying security troops. The ICITAP course gave me exposure to the following topics under the guidelines provided by the instructor such as:

- Situational awareness
- Analytical thinking
- Professional excellence

- Logical approach
- Sequential investigation
- Exploitation of vital leads
- Formulation of policy and plans”

Sajjad Ahmed**ASI, ITP Police - Education**

“While delivering a presentation on road safety and accident dealing; your Instructor Development Course was quite helpful.”

Shakeel Arshad**Head Constable, ICT Police**

“Training given in ICITAP’s Instructor Development Course has helped me in delivering lectures in different colleges and universities.”

Shazma Haider**Head Constable, ICT Police - CID**

“The training given in your First Aid Course helped me to stop the bleeding of an injured woman in a road accident.”

Syed Abuzar Sibtain**Assistant Director, FIA**

“I have attended your Anti-Money Laundering Course. I found that the said training was quite helpful in the investigations of these matters and I am in a better position to investigate and understand the concepts regarding the law.”

Aftab Ahmad**DSP, Punjab Police)**

“I got insights into modern criminal investigation techniques in an ICITAP course. I solved a triple murder case using them.”

Afnan Amin**SP, Sindh Police**

“I used the lessons learned from your VIP Protection Course to improve the VIP security and movement SOP in Karachi. In a bomb blast the critical incident management training was very useful. I was able to manage various police units acting within the crime scene. The course was well thought out and precise.

Interaction and managing the crime scene becomes easier if ICS is followed in letter and spirit. This curtails chaos and mayhem and also prevents duplication of assigned roles.”

Hazrat Jamal Anjum
ASI, Railway Police

“Once when I was at my home my 5-year-old daughter broke her arm while playing. I gave her first aid and then took her to a nearby hospital. The basics learned in your First Aid Course helped me to save my daughter.”

Bakhtiar Ahmad Lillah
DSP, ICT Police

“Instructor Development Course training helps me daily to make my trainings at Police Training School (Islamabad) more effective.”

Muhammad Waqar Azeem
DSP, Punjab Police

“Once there was a suicide attack on the residence of President Musharraf in 2007-08 in Rawalpindi. I was posted at Police Station Rawat and this incident occurred on my way back to Rawalpindi. I was the very first responder. I cleared off the crime scene from the public and then called all the concerned authorities. ICITAP’s First Responder to Crime Scene Course helped me a lot in the particular case.”

Syed Asif Hussain Shah
Inspector, FIA

“I improved my verbal skills in your Communication Skills Course as I had a chance to interact among field units of FIA throughout Pakistan. This training helped me to overcome ambiguities as I was able to converse with them more confidently. Recently, I participated in your Leadership Development Course to which I got clarity regarding leader vs management issues, mission, values and vision etc.”

Khabbir Muhammad
DSP, KPK Police

“I was tasked with commanding a VVIP movement in my area of Abbottabad, which is mountainous terrain. Using the skills acquired in your VIP Protection Course, I collected and analyzed information from a variety of sources and made required arrangements successfully.”

Muhammad Imran
In charge Crime Scene Unit/ NFSA

“The very first training I received after assuming my charge as crime scene officer was conducted by ICITAP Crime Scene Management Course and it was very helpful to me in my daily routine. I also attended your First Aid Course in 2011 and it proved very helpful in giving assistance to people in roadside accidents. Once, I gave first aid to a person who was severely injured (head injury) in an accident.”

M. Saleem Durrani
DSP, AJK Police

“As a first responder in a murder case, I reached the crime scene, secured the scene, collected all the evidence and numbered them properly. I learnt a lot of new concepts and knowledge about managing crime scene to perform my job effectively in the ICITAP class.”

Nasir Mahmood Malik
DSP, Punjab Police

“ICITAP Instructor Development Courses are very helpful for police instructors for better teaching and training techniques for their students to become better trainers.”

Muhammad Zubair
Sub Inspector, FIA

“I was posted at Multan International Airport, as a shift in charge. I had arrested a person who was involved in money laundering. I found my ICITAP training manual for Interviewing & Interrogation Course which was a useful guide in detecting/ investigating/interviewing the culprit.”

Muhammad Tariq
Inspector, FIA

“I am posted to the FIA Academy so I have gained so much knowledge from several of the courses held by ICITAP here. As an instructor, I incorporate that knowledge into training for other FIA officers/officials.”

Aurang Zeb
DSP, NPA

“I completed the Hostage Negotiations and Critical Incident Response Courses from ICITAP a few years back that helped me in dealing with crowds and mobs. We once went to arrest a criminal and all the people in that area were obstructing us. They let us arrest that person only after intense negotiations. We negotiated and cooled them down after which we were able to arrest the criminal otherwise it would have been very difficult to handle such a big crowd.”

Muhammad Anwar
DSR, Rangers

“I used the knowledge from your Crowd Management Course during performing my duties at a bomb blast incident where the general public was out of control. It really helped!”

Shahid Moharram
Sub Inspector, Punjab Police

“I attended the Diplomatic Security Course from ICITAP. I gained a lot of knowledge from the said course. The attained knowledge really helped me to react in emergency and rescue the people in any terrorist attack. After a blast at Lahore Railway Station and Sibi Station, I protected the crime scene and remained close with the investigation team and provided my full technical assistance to them.”

Farooq Ahmed
ASI, ICT Police - CIA

“I was going from Islamabad to Lahore via M-2 motorway, when our bus reached near Kalarkahar, a horrible accident of a mini bus occurred in front of our bus. On inspecting the accident vehicle we found that there were nine passengers on board including

three children and all of them were critically injured. As I had First Aid training from ICITAP so when we started the rescue operation I gave first aid to the passengers till the ambulance arrived. The children lived because I knew what to do.”

Javed Iqbal Khan
DSP, Punjab Police

“During my classes when student responses were weak, ICITAP Instructor Development Course principles helped me to tackle the situation and successfully I got back the attention of the students.”

Ameer Ali Soomro
ASI, ICT Police

“The ICITAP program is a very good and knowledgeable program. I have done three courses conducted by ICITAP. This program enhances our capabilities and our skills. It should provide many more trainings for improving the Islamabad Police. I learned how to conduct a good interview from your Interview & Interrogation Course. I can find the truth from verbal and non-verbal behaviors after this course.”

Saqib Zareen
ASI, ICT Police

“I applied techniques learned in your Geo-Fencing Course in one of the criminal investigation and we found it very useful for us. Only because of geo-fencing were we able to trace the criminals. We got the specific mobile record of that area and arrested the criminals.”

Aftab Ahmad
DSP, ICT Police

“In the investigation of a murder case, I secured the crime scene as per the SOP's taught in ICITAP's Crime Scene Management Course. When a forensic team arrived, it picked all the related evidences without tampering with the scene. Forensic evidence like blood stains, firearm empties were sent to forensic lab. These evidences helped us to reach the culprit and were explained in court properly.”

Khalid Mahmood Afzal
DSP, Punjab Police

“I attended the training of First Responder to Crime Scenes. The training was very helpful in providing the latest concepts. While being in RPRG, I conducted the same training myself and also developed a SOP for my people. During my posting as SDPO, I faced so many law and order situations. Previously, before I completed Media Relations training, I always avoided media and faced many issues. After this training, I have been able to communicate with media better.”

Aamir Hayat
ASI, ICT Police

“ICITAP training assisted me during an interview of a suspect. A thief was caught and handed over to me. I interviewed him and applied the techniques from your Interviewing & Interrogation Course and observed his body gestures and found him innocent. I did not torture him, just applied the techniques learned in the course.”

Syed Akram Shah
DSP, Punjab Police

“ICITAP’s Crime Analysis Course assisted me in investigation of theft of bicycles which took place in surrounding areas of my place of posting. It was only possible because of the knowledge of crime patterns which I got from the course. I prepared/record data of crime which took place at border area and used that information to catch the culprits.”

Syed Shahid Hussain
Squadron Leader, Pakistan Air Force

“Once a person was kidnapped for ransom and afterwards a call was received for ransom. I briefed the relatives of the abducted about how to negotiate with the kidnappers. These relatives were briefed regarding “proof of life” and how to negotiate for ransom. Your Hostage Negotiations Course assisted me throughout that incident.”

Mirza Hassan
SSP, GB Police

“I was DPO of district Astore. One night, unknown persons broke the locks of 11 shops and robbed them and the next morning the local media were right in front of me with very difficult questions for me to answer. I had learned during an ICITAP course on Media Relations that whenever you talk to media, start with good messages. So I was first explained to them our night patrolling plan. Then I explained the minor negligence in that plan that led to the big tragedy for the businessmen.”

Zaheer Uddin
SI, Sindh Police

“I have done the Training Management Course from ICITAP and that training was very useful and it helped me in designing and developing trainings in different U.N missions. Due to this training, I was able to know how to allocate the course budget and find out the effective target areas using a Training Needs Assessment.”

Waqas Hussain
ASI, ICT Police

“I attended ICITAP’s Interview & Interrogation Course that has been very helpful for me. I captured an accused and observed his body posture during the interrogation and successfully charged him.”

Conclusion

Based on this direct feedback, it is clear to me that ICITAP has had a major positive impact on Pakistan’s law enforcement community. ICITAP’s capacity building programs have developed professionalism and improved technical skills.

Police officers trained by ICITAP have saved precious lives and helped my country. I am proud of my association with this program.

Appendix D. Letter of Appreciation for Summer Youth Camp



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

OFFICE OF THE
REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER,
MULTAN

My dear *Shahzad Hameed,*

No. *37586/ADK7*
Date *05-08-2017*

Assalam-O-Alekum.

Subject: - SUMMER SCHOOL CAMP.

I would like to thank ICITAP for the support extended to the Community Policing Project of Summer School in Islamabad which was initiated in 2002. It was due to your ultimate support and motivation that the project in Islamabad is still very popular and children from all walks of life and ages join it for training in martial arts, swimming, horse riding, computer, music, spoken English, archery and obstacles / self defence.

2. This is to just share that over more than a decade I have known and worked with ICITAP and in addition to the excellent mentoring their team members continuously supported the capacity building of law enforcement agencies in Pakistan and the knowledge gained personally by attending ICITAP Courses enhanced my personal capabilities and abilities which enabled me in successful implementation of many concepts in my recent position as RPO, Multan.

3. One example is the replication of Islamabad Summer School here in Multan.

4. I have successfully initiated a Summer Camp with 160 kids attending a 04 weeks long programme comprising of many activities including training in martial arts, horse riding, computer, music, spoken English, archery and obstacles / self defence.

5. ICITAP role and contribution in the capacity building of Pakistani Police/ Law Enforcement Agencies is highly commendable. I wish ICITAP could work us in Multan, Punjab as well.

6. Your coordination in this regard will be highly appreciated.

With profound regards!

Yours sincerely,

S.A. Temuri
(SULTAN-AZAM TEMURI) PSP

Mr. Shahzad Hameed,
Program Manager, ICITAP,
Bureau of International Narcotics,
and Law Enforcement-Pakistan (INL-P),
United States Embassy,
Islamabad, Pakistan.

Acronyms

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina	NGO – Nongovernmental organization
BPO – Bangladesh Police Officer	NP – Nepal Police
CDTU – Curriculum and Development Training Unit	NPU – National Police of Ukraine
CEI – Community Engagement Initiative	OPDAT – Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
COPS – Community Oriented Policing Services	PCG – Philippine Coast Guard
CPFs – Community Policing Forums	PPB – Portland Police Bureau
CTA – Crime threat analysis	PPD – patrol police department
DOJ – Department of Justice	PPD – Phoenix Police Department
FBiH – (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GPRA – Government Performance and Results Act	PRP – Police Reform Program
ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program	PTPR – Police-To-Population Ratio
ICTP – Islamabad Capital Territory Police	SEMS – Standardized Emergency Management System
IDA – Institutional development analysis	SID – Sustainable Institutional Development
IGP – Inspector General of Police	SILED – Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development
INAF – Indonesian National Armed Forces	SLEA – Senior Law Enforcement Advisor
INL – International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	SLP – Sierre Leone Police
INP – Indonesian National Police	SME – Subject Matter Expert
JIATFW – Joint Interagency Task Force West	SOU – Special Operations Unit
JTA – Job task analysis	TNA – Training needs analysis
MBSI – Maritime Border Security Initiative	USAID – United States Agency for International Development
MIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs	USG – United States Government
MTA – Maritime Technical Advisor	USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MU – Maritime Unit	
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization	

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About the COPS Office

The **Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office)** is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation's state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our nation's crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strategic problem-solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire community policing officers and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than \$14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation's streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide

training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. Other achievements include the following:

- To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 129,000 additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation's 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and flash drives.
- The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums focused on issues critical to law enforcement.

COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing topics such as school and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety and wellness, can be downloaded via the COPS Office's home page, www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) resides in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Created to provide technical assistance, mentoring, and training to law enforcement personnel in host countries, it has recently developed an analytical framework for Sustainable Institutional Law Enforcement Development (SILED), designed to support the long term success of institutional reforms in host countries. This publication provides detailed analyses of ICITAP's approach to promoting SILED in three sections: an analytical framework for promoting SILED, case studies and analysis of programs in seven nations, and examples of ICITAP's methods for monitoring and evaluating its programs. The importance of trust-building and collaboration among ICITAP personnel and the police and government officials of each host country is emphasized throughout the publication.



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