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                                                            April 16, 2012
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                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                   FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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                               SOUTHERN DIVISION
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      ) SA CR No. 09-00077-JVS
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                     Plaintiff,
                                        PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
                                        STUART CARSON
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    STUART CARSON,
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                     Defendant.
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         1.
               This constitutes the plea agreement between STUART
    CARSON ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for
    the Central District of California ("the USAO") and the United
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States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section ("the Fraud Section") (the USAO and the Fraud Section are, together, referred to as "the Department of Justice") in the above-captioned case. This agreement is limited to the Department of Justice and cannot bind any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

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2. Defendant understands and agrees that this agreement is part of a "package deal" in which the disposition of the case against defendant is tied to and conditioned on the disposition of a case against one other defendant, namely, Hong "Rose" Carson. Accordingly, defendant and the Department of Justice agree that this agreement and the obligations it creates will not become binding on the Department of Justice and defendant unless and until: (a) defendant executes this agreement and enters a guilty plea in accordance with this agreement; and (b) Hong "Rose" Carson executes her plea agreement with the Department of Justice and enters a guilty plea in accordance with that agreement. Defendant acknowledges that defendant has discussed with defendant's attorney, and carefully considered, the possible advantages and disadvantages to defendant of entering into this agreement as part of the package deal; defendant is entering into this agreement as part of the package deal freely and voluntarily because defendant believes this agreement and the package deal to be in defendant's best interests; and defendant is not entering into this agreement as part of the package deal because of threats, coercion, or other undue influence by the Department of Justice or by the other defendant who is part of the package

deal, her counsel, or anyone acting on his behalf.

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RULE 11(c)(1)(C) AGREEMENT

Defendant understands that this agreement is entered into pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Accordingly, defendant understands that, if the Court determines that it will not accept this agreement, absent a breach of this agreement by defendant prior to that determination and whether or not defendant elects to withdraw any guilty plea entered pursuant to this agreement, this agreement will, with the exception of paragraph 23 below, be rendered null and void and both defendant and the Department of Justice will be relieved of their obligations under this agreement. Defendant agrees, however, that if defendant breaches this agreement prior to the Court's determination whether or not to accept this agreement, the breach provisions of this agreement, paragraph 25 below, will control, with the result that defendant will not be able to withdraw any guilty plea entered pursuant to this agreement, the Department of Justice will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement, and the Court's failure to follow any recommendation or request regarding sentence set forth in this agreement will not provide a basis for defendant to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- 4. Defendant agrees to:
- a) Give up the right to indictment by a grand jury and, at the earliest opportunity requested by the Department of Justice and provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to a one-count information in the form attached to this agreement as

Exhibit A or a substantially similar form, which charges defendant with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (g)(2)(A).

- b) Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- c) Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- d) Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- e) Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States

 Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines")

 § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- f) Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.
- g) Pay the applicable special assessment at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and prior to sentencing submits a completed financial statement to the Department of Justice on a form to be provided by the Department of Justice.
- 5. Defendant further agrees to cooperate fully with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and, as directed by the Department of Justice, any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authority. This cooperation requires defendant to:
- a) Respond truthfully and completely to all questions that may be put to defendant.

- b) Attend all meetings as well as trial or other proceedings at which defendant's presence is requested by the Department of Justice or compelled by subpoena or court order.
- c) Produce voluntarily all documents, records, or other tangible evidence relating to matters about which the Department of Justice, or its designee, inquires.
- 6. For purposes of this agreement: (1) "Cooperation Information" shall mean any statements made, or documents, records, tangible evidence, or other information provided, by defendant pursuant to defendant's cooperation under this agreement; and (2) "Plea Information" shall mean any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing and the agreed to factual basis statement in this agreement.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S OBLIGATIONS

- 7. The Department of Justice agrees to:
 - a) Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- b) Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement and affirmatively recommend to the Court that it impose sentence in accordance with paragraph 18 of this agreement.
- c) At the time of sentencing, move to dismiss the underlying indictment as against defendant.
- d) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under

that section.

- e) Recommend that defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment no higher than 10 months, provided that the offense level used by the Court to determine that range is 10 or higher prior to any departure downward in offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and provided that the Court does not depart downward in criminal history category or offense level except to the extent requested by the Department of Justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
- f) Not further criminally prosecute defendant for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (g)(2)(A), arising out of any conduct of which the government is presently aware. Defendant understands that the Department of Justice is free to criminally prosecute defendant for any other unlawful past conduct or any unlawful conduct that occurs after the date of this agreement.
 - 8. The Department of Justice further agrees:
- a) Not to offer as evidence in its case-in-chief in the above-captioned case or any other criminal prosecution that may be brought against defendant by the Department of Justice, or in connection with any sentencing proceeding in any criminal case that may be brought against defendant by the Department of Justice, any Cooperation Information.
- b) Not to use Cooperation Information against defendant at sentencing for the purpose of determining the applicable guidelines range, including the appropriateness of an upward departure, or the sentence to be imposed, and to recommend to the Court that Cooperation Information not be used in

determining the applicable guidelines range or the sentence to be imposed. Defendant understands, however, that Cooperation Information will be disclosed to the probation office and the Court, and that the Court may use Cooperation Information for the purposes set forth in U.S.S.G § 1B1.8(b) and for determining the sentence to be imposed.

c) In connection with defendant's sentencing, to bring to the Court's attention the nature and extent of defendant's cooperation.

d) If the Department of Justice determines, in its exclusive judgment, that defendant has both complied with defendant's obligations under paragraphs 4 and 5 above and provided substantial assistance to law enforcement in the prosecution or investigation of another ("substantial assistance"), to move the Court pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 to fix an offense level and corresponding guideline range below that otherwise dictated by the sentencing guidelines, and to recommend a sentence within this reduced range.

DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING COOPERATION

- 9. Defendant understands the following:
- a) Any knowingly false or misleading statement by defendant will subject defendant to prosecution for false statement, obstruction of justice, and perjury and will constitute a breach by defendant of this agreement.
- b) Nothing in this agreement requires the Department of Justice or any other prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authority to accept any cooperation or assistance that defendant may offer, or to use it in any particular way.

c) Defendant cannot withdraw defendant's guilty plea if the Department of Justice does not make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a reduced guidelines range or if the Department of Justice makes such a motion and the Court does not grant it or if the Court grants such a Department of Justice motion but elects to sentence above the reduced range.

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- d) At this time the Department of Justice makes no agreement or representation as to whether any cooperation that defendant has provided or intends to provide constitutes or will constitute substantial assistance. The decision whether defendant has provided substantial assistance will rest solely within the exclusive judgment of the Department of Justice.
- e) The Department of Justice's determination whether defendant has provided substantial assistance will not depend in any way on whether the government prevails at any trial or court hearing in which defendant testifies or in which the government otherwise presents information resulting from defendant's cooperation.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

- 10. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in count one of the information, that is, a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a), (g)(2)(A), the following must be true:
- (1) defendant is a domestic concern, or an officer, director, employee, or agent of a domestic concern;
 - (2) defendant acted corruptly and willfully;
 - (3) defendant made use or caused the use of the mails,

wires, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of conduct that violates the FCPA;

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- (4) defendant offered, paid, promised to pay, or authorized the payment of money, or offered, gave, promised to give, or authorized the giving of anything of value to a foreign official;
- (5) the payment or gift at issue in element (4) was to (a) a person the defendant knew or believed to be a foreign official or (b) any person and the defendant knew that all or a portion of such money or thing of value would be offered, given, or promised (directly or indirectly) to a person the defendant knew or believed to be a foreign official, although a belief that an individual was a foreign official does not satisfy this element if the individual was not in fact a foreign official;
- (6) the payment or gift at issue was intended for at least one of four purposes: (a) to influence any act or decision of a foreign official in his or her official capacity; (b) to induce a foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of that official's lawful duty; (c) secure any improper advantage; or (d) to induce a foreign official to use his or her influence with a foreign government or department, agency, or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government, department, agency, or instrumentality; and
- (7) the payment or gift was intended to assist the defendant in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.

For the purposes of the FCPA, a person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if (1) the person is aware that the person is engaging in the

conduct, that the circumstance exists, or that the result is substantially certain to occur, or (2) the person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. Knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of a circumstance.

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PENALTIES

- 11. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a), (g)(2)(A), is: five years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$100,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greater; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 12. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 13. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to

serve on a jury. Defendant understands that once the court accepts defendant's guilty plea, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

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14. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony conviction in this case may subject defendant to: removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory; denial of citizenship; and denial of admission to the United States in the future. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony conviction in this case. Defendant understands that unexpected immigration consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's quilty plea.

FACTUAL BASIS

15. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offense to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant and the Department of Justice agree to the statement of facts provided below and agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support a plea of guilty to the charge described in this agreement and to establish the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth in paragraph 17 below but is not meant to be a complete

recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

Defendant S. CARSON was the President of Control Components, Inc. ("CCI") from in or around 1989 through in or around 2005. Defendant S. CARSON was a citizen of the United States and thus was a "domestic concern" as that term is defined in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(A).

CCI was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Rancho Santa Margarita ("RSM"), California, that designed and manufactured control valves for use in the nuclear, oil and gas, and power generation industries worldwide. CCI sold its products to both state-owned and private companies in over thirty countries around the world. Because CCI was organized under the laws of a State of the United States and had its principal place of business in the United States, it was a "domestic concern" as that term is defined in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).

In conducting its business, CCI utilized a sales model known as "friend-in-camp" or "FIC," in which CCI employees and agents cultivated relationships with employees of its customers. FICs, who sometimes were referred to as "consultants," sometimes included officers and employees of CCI's state-owned customers who had the ability to influence the technical specifications of an order or otherwise to direct business to CCI. S. CARSON advocated the FIC sales model and trained CCI employees to take good care of FICs. He also stated during a training session that

"typically our consultants are friends in camp," and "[w]e have consultants that are on retainer with us."

One of CCI's projects in 2000 was the modernization of the Turow Power Plant in Poland ("Turow"). At the time Turow was owned and operated by Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne ("PSE"), a Polish state-owned entity. At the time of the transaction described below, defendant S. CARSON knew that power plants in Eastern Europe were usually owned by the state; thus, defendant S. CARSON was on notice and accordingly had reason to believe that Turow was likely a state-owned plant. Defendant S. CARSON understands that at any trial, the government would prove sufficient facts to demonstrate that Turow was a government instrumentality within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), and its employees "foreign officials" within the meaning of the FCPA.

In or around 2000, CCI was negotiating to provide components to a third-party company supplying new boilers for the rehabilitation of Turow plants 4, 5 & 6. On or about March 7, 2000, a CCI employee wrote an e-mail to defendant S. CARSON and others discussing the bid price to the third-party company, stating: "There is a total 7% commission + consultancy payable at this price." On or about March 8, 2000, defendant S. CARSON responded with the following email: "How much is the consultant agreement? Who will negotiate with the [third party company]? I do not approve without knowing the answer to these questions." On or about March 8, 2000, a different CCI employee wrote back to defendant S. CARSON and others stating, in part: "The following has been agreed upon and communicated to the different parties

involved: . . . 2% consulting fee to the Polish end customer."

On or about March 8, 2000, defendant S. CARSON responded by email stating, among other things: "I approve."

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Although defendant S. CARSON did not actually know that all or a portion of this requested commission was to be offered, given, or promised to an employee at Turow or PSE for the purpose of securing the business, he was aware of a high probability of this circumstance and failed to make additional inquiries concerning the nature of the commission and the suspected recipient in order to determine whether the proposed commission payment might be made to an employee at Turow or PSE for the purpose of securing the business. This awareness arose, at least in part, from defendant S. CARSON's knowledge that, as described above, CCI's sales model included the cultivation of FICs who sometimes included employees of CCI's customers.

Although defendant S. CARSON did not know about the prohibitions of the FCPA, defendant S. CARSON was aware that the law would forbid making an undisclosed payment to an employee of a customer for the purpose of securing the customer's business.

SENTENCING FACTORS AND AGREED-UPON SENTENCE

- 16. Defendant understands that in determining defendant's sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only.
- 17. Applying the November 1, 2000 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, defendant and the Department of Justice agree to the

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following applicable sentencing guidelines factors:
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         Base Offense Level :
                                             U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1(a)
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         Specific Offense
         Characteristics-
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         Value of the Bribe/
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                                             U.S.S.G. \S 2B4.1(b)(1)
         Improper Benefit
                                   +4
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         Adjustments-
 .7
         Acceptance of
                                             U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
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         Responsibility
                                   -2
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         Total Offense Level:
                                   10
1.0
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         Criminal History
                                   I
         Category
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         Guideline Range
                                   6 - 12 months imprisonment
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                                   $2,000 - $ 20,000 fine
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    The parties agree not to argue that any other specific offense
    characteristics, adjustments, or departures, other than a
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    downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, be imposed.
              Defendant and the Department of Justice agree that,
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    taking into account the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-
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    (7) and the relevant sentencing guideline factors set forth
    above, an appropriate disposition of this case is that the court
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    impose a sentence of: a term of imprisonment of no more than 10
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   months; three years supervised release with conditions to be
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    fixed by the Court; a fine of no more than $20,000; no amount of
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   restitution; and a $100 special assessment. The parties agree
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   that any fine ordered shall be paid within 30 days of defendant's
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   sentencing hearing.
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WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

19. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:

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- a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
- b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c) The right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at every other stage of the proceeding.
- d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f) The right to testify and to present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify.
- g) The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.
- h) Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

20. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving

up any right to appeal defendant's conviction on the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty.

LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE

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- 21. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes the sentence specified in paragraph 18 above, defendant gives up the right to appeal any portion of that sentence.
- 22. The Department of Justice agrees that, provided the Court imposes the sentence specified in paragraph 18 above, the Department of Justice gives up its right to appeal any portion of that sentence.

RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

Defendant agrees that if, after entering a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty plea on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was involuntary, then (a) the Department of Justice will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement; and (b) should the Department of Justice choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations will be tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and (ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

24. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

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BREACH OF AGREEMENT

Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the Department of Justice may declare this agreement breached. All of defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the Department of Justice to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the Department of Justice in writing. If the Department of Justice declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty plea, and (b) the Department of Justice will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement.

COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

26. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the Department of Justice's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors. Defendant understands that the Court will determine the

facts, sentencing factors, and other considerations relevant to sentencing and will decide for itself whether to accept and agree to be bound by this agreement.

Defendant understands that both defendant and the Department of Justice are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and the sentence it chooses to impose are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that the calculations and sentence referenced in paragraphs 17 and 18 are consistent with the facts of this case. While this paragraph permits both the Department of Justice and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, this paragraph does not affect defendant's and the Department of Justice's obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.

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NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the Department of Justice and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

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1	PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING				
2	29. The parties agree that this agreement will be				
3	considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing				
4	as if the entire agreement had been read into the record of the				
5	proceeding.				
6	AGREED AND ACCEPTED				
7	UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
8 9	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. Unified States Attorney				
10	Anil 14 200				
11	DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK Date Assistant United States Attorney				
12	FRAUD SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE				
·14	Ch C1 Lelle 4-16-12				
15	CHARLES G. LA BELLA Date Deputy Chief				
16	a. gent 4/16/12				
17 18	ANDREW GENTIN Trial Attorney				
19	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /				
20	441				
21	Mul (aum / Uprel 14,2012				
22	Defendant Date				
23	1 relationer 4/11/12				
24	NICOLA T. HANNA Date				
25	Attorney for Defendant				
26	STUART CARSON				
27					

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I have read this agreement in its entirety. enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading guilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason.

STUART CARSON

Defendant

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CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

I am Stuart Carson's attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement.

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TTCOTA	m	TT 70 STST70

Date

4/14/12

NICOLA T. HANNA

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Attorney for Defendant STUART CARSON

to a foreign government official (or to any person, while knowing

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that the money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised to a foreign official), for the purpose of securing any improper advantage, or of assisting in obtaining or retaining business for and with, or directing business to, any person.

- 2. Control Components, Inc. ("CCI") was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Rancho Santa Margarita, California, that designed and manufactured service control valves for use in the nuclear, oil and gas, and power generation industries worldwide. CCI sold its products to both state-owned enterprises and private companies in approximately thirty countries around the world. Because CCI was organized under the laws of a State of the United States and had its principal place of business in the United States, it was a "domestic concern" as that term is defined in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1).
- 3. Defendant STUART CARSON ("S. CARSON") was the President of Control Components, Inc. ("CCI") from in or around 1989 through in or around 2005. Defendant S. CARSON was a citizen of the United States and an employee and agent of CCI and thus a "domestic concern" as that term is defined and used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1).
- 4. CCI's customers included Turow Power Plant ("Turow") in Poland. Turow was a department, agency, and instrumentality of a foreign government, within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). The officers and employees of Turow were "foreign officials" within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).

COUNT ONE

[15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2]

- 5. Paragraphs 1 through 4 are realleged and incorporated by reference as through set forth herein.
- On or about March 8, 2000, in the Central District of 6. California and elsewhere, defendant S. CARSON, did willfully make use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value to a foreign official, and to a person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money and thing of value would be offered, given, and promised to a foreign official, for purposes of: (i) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official in his or her official capacity; (ii) inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do acts in violation of the lawful duty of such official; (iii) securing an improper advantage; and (iv) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and instrumentality, in order to assist defendant S. CARSON and others in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business to, CCI and others, to wit, defendant S. CARSON corruptly caused an e-mail to be sent authorizing the payment of approximately \$16,000 to officials of Turow for the purpose of securing Turow's business.

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1	In violation of	Title	15, United States Code, Section 78dd-
2	2.		
3		. •	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney
4			ROBERT E. DUGDALE
5			Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division
6			DENNISE D. WILLETT
.7			Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office
8			onici, banca ma branch office
9			
10			DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK Assistant United States Attorney
11			Deputy Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office
12			KATHLEEN McGOVERN Acting Chief, Fraud Section
13			Criminal Division United States Department of Justice
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16			CHARLES G. LA BELLA Deputy Chief, Fraud Section
17			Criminal Division United States Department of Justice
18			ANDREW GENTIN
19			Trial Attorney, Fraud Section Criminal Division
20			United States Department of Justice
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, REBECCA SATO, declare: That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Orange County, California; that my business address is United States Attorney's Office, 411 West Fourth Street, Suite 8000, Santa Ana, California 92701; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California, who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose discretion the service by mail described in this Certificate was made; that on April 16, 2012, I deposited in the United States Mails, United States Attorney's Office, 411 West Fourth Street, Suite 8000, Santa Ana, California 92701 in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of:

PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT STUART CARSON [UNDER SEAL] addressed to:

SEE ATTACHMENT

at their last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by CERTIFIED United States Mail.

This Certificate is executed on <u>April 16, 2012</u>, Santa Ana, California. I declare under penalty or perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

REBECCA SATO