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III-1.2000                                      April 20, 1992   



DJ 181-06-0002






Mr. William B. Ingersoll
Ingersoll and Block
1401 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20036

Dear Mr. Ingersoll:

     This letter responds to your August 21, 1991, letter on
behalf of Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. (Marriott), requesting
guidance on the application of certain provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the timesharing resorts
operated by Marriott under its Vacation Ownership System. 
Specifically, you have requested guidance as to whether
"timesharing that is sold in increments of one week or less is a
public accommodation as that term is defined in the ADA."

     The ADA authorizes the Department to provide technical
assistance to entities that are subject to the Act.  This letter
provides informal guidance to assist you in understanding how the
ADA may apply to your client.  However, this technical assistance
does not constitute a determination by the Department of Justice
of your client's rights or responsibilities under the ADA and
does not constitute a binding determination by the Department of
Justice.

     Based on our review of your letter and supporting materials,
it is our understanding that the specific question you pose is
the following:  Is a vacation property owned in the form of
ownership referred to by Marriott as "timesharing," and sold by
Marriott in increments of one week or less, a "place of public
accommodation" as defined in this Department's regulation
implementing title III of the ADA?  See, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544 
(July 26, 1991) to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36.

     To be considered a place of public accommodation under the
title III regulation, a facility must be operated by a private
entity, its operations must affect commerce, and it must fall
within one of the 12 categories listed in {36.104 of the
regulation.  Each category includes representative examples of
covered facilities.  However, the examples included are meant to
be illustrative, not exhaustive.  Thus, a facility does not have
to be specifically listed in order to be covered.

     Therefore, in order for Marriott's timesharing resorts to be
considered places of public accommodation, they must fall within
one of the 12 categories.  In this instance, the analysis turns
on whether any given resort is a "place of lodging" such as an
inn, hotel, or motel.  These terms are not defined in either the
Act itself or the title III regulation.  However, the preamble to
the title III regulation does note that the category "places of
lodging" would "exclude solely residential facilities because the
nature of a place of lodging contemplates the use of the facility
for short-term stays."

     Thus, one factor that should be considered in determining
whether a particular facility is a place of lodging is whether
the facility is intended or used for, or permits short-term
stays.  Although the regulation does not define "short-term," the
Department would consider stays of one week or less to be "short-
term" stays.  While this interpretation may be consistent with
certain Federal court precedents established under title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and cited in the materials you
provided to us, you should be aware that the Department may look
to such precedents for guidance but does not consider itself
bound by them in interpreting its ADA regulations.

     In addition to considering whether a given facility is
intended or used for, or permits short-term stays, in making a
determination as to whether a facility is a place of lodging,
each entity should also consider the extent to which the facility
does or does not share the characteristics of the examples listed
as places of lodging.  For example, one potentially significant
difference between inns, hotels, and motels, as a group, and
facilities held in Marriott's form of timeshare ownership is
that, according to your April 23, 1991, letter to John Wodatch,
timeshare owners are deeded a fee interest in the timesharing
resort.  Obviously, a deeded fee interest differs from the
interest normally conveyed to the patron of a hotel or motel. 
However, if, as you point out in the April 23rd letter, the fee
interest conveyed is subject to recorded restrictive covenants
that substantially restrict the "traditional possessory rights of
ownership" and the properties are, in fact, operated in a manner
very similar to the manner in which hotels are operated,
timeshare facilities are more likely to be treated as places of
lodging covered under the ADA.

     Based on the representations made in your April 23, 1991,
letter, we believe that timeshare facilities in Marriott's
Vacation Ownership System are nonresidential places of public
accommodation.  In reaching this conclusion we have considered
the following factors to be of particular significance:

     1.   Ownership of timesharing units is sold in intervals of
one week or less, which is consistent with the requirement that a
place of lodging be a facility that is intended or used for, or
permits short-term stays;

     2.   While ownership to individual units is conveyed in fee
simple, recorded restrictive covenants substantially limit rights
of ownership and owners have no right to occupy, alter, or
exercise other control over any specific unit;

     3.   Owners of timesharing interests are not required to
return to the same unit or project and may utilize various
exchange options to exchange their units for units at other
resorts; and

     4.   Marriott's timeshare accommodations are operated like
hotels (i.e., reservations, central registration, and room
assignments are required) by a company that is in the hotel
business.

     We wish to stress that we have reached this conclusion based
on your description of the ownership and operation of Marriott's
Vacation Ownership System.  Thus, this conclusion should not be
viewed as a general statement of the Department's position with
respect to other types of timesharing facilities; our position on
this issue may well be different given a different set of facts
concerning the ownership and operation of such facilities.

     As you note in your April 23, 1991, letter, as places of
public accommodation, timeshare facilities are subject to the
title III requirements for readily achievable barrier removal;
and any new construction or alteration of such facilities must
follow the Accessibility Guidelines adopted as Appendix A to the
Department's title III regulation.  We would also like to point
out that, as a public accommodation, Marriott is also subject to
other significant non-discrimination requirements under title III
of the ADA.  For example, Marriott must provide auxiliary aids
and services to guests with hearing, speech, or vision
impairments, unless doing so would result in an undue burden or a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the services or
accommodations being offered.

     I hope this information has been helpful to you.

                                   Sincerely,




                                 John R. Dunne
                           Assistant Attorney General
                             Civil Rights Division