### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.

JUAN ANTONIO GAONA,

No. 5:10-cv-00494-XR

Defendant,

v.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD

SEXUAL HEALTHCARE,

Third-Party Defendant.

# **MOTION TO DISMISS**

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States of America (the "United States Attorney General"), in his official capacity, by the undersigned attorneys, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moves to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims as stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action:

1. Defendant states two counterclaims in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand. Both counterclaims allege the United States Attorney General is in violation of "28 U.S.C. 1983." No such provision exists in Title 28 of the United States Code. The Defendant's counterclaims fail to both affirmatively demonstrate federal

jurisdiction and state a cause of action upon which this federal court may grant relief.

- 2. Defendant did not plead sufficient facts to support his counterclaims against the United States Attorney General. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a counterclaim must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. A pleading must state facts that are sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." <u>Id.</u> at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Defendant's counterclaims as pled in paragraphs 30 and 31 of Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand do not contain the necessary factual content to reasonably infer that the United States Attorney General violated the Defendant's constitutional rights. In fact, the Defendant's counterclaims state no facts at all. To be sure, the only fact one can infer from the Defendant's pleading is the fact that the United States Attorney General filed a Complaint against the Defendant alleging a violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances ("FACE") Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248. This fact alone does not, in any way, give rise to a cause of action against the United States Attorney General. The Defendant's counterclaims are speculative conclusions and fall far short of the pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. As such, the Defendant's counterclaims must be dismissed by this Court.
- 3. Defendant's counterclaims against the United States Attorney General are barred because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit for damages

that are based on a federal official's violation of the Constitution.

- (A) <u>Standard of Review</u>: "Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature."

  <u>Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer</u>, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Defendant has the burden of proving this Court's jurisdiction over his counterclaims. <u>Boudreau v. United States</u>, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995). In contrast, in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. <u>Capital Parks</u>, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising & Sales Systems, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994). When the relief sought is barred by an affirmative defense, such as sovereign or absolute immunity, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim. <u>See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales</u>, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
- (B) Sovereign Immunity: Defendant's counterclaims seek damages from the United States Attorney General for alleged violations of the Defendant's constitutional rights. The United States Attorney General, however, brings this civil FACE action against defendant in his official capacity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(2). It is the filing of this civil FACE action by the United States Attorney General in his official capacity that forms the basis of the Defendant's counterclaims. As such, the Defendant's counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 510 U.S. at 483-486. The Supreme Court has stated that "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus, a suit against a federal official in his official capacity is a suit against the United States. Id.; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal

Government and its agencies from suit." Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 510 U.S. at 475; see also Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that "no action lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it"). The Defendant's counterclaims against the United States Attorney General are barred because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit for damages that are based on a federal official's violation of the Constitution. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 510 U.S. at 483-486. Accordingly, Defendant's counterclaims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Paragraph 32 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand requests a trial by jury. As this Court should dismiss Defendant's counterclaims stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), so too should this Court dismiss the Defendant's request for a jury trial.

WHEREFORE, the United States Attorney General respectfully requests this Court to issue an Order granting Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims as stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN E. MURPHY United States Attorney Western District of Texas THOMAS E. PEREZ Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

JUDY C. PRESTON Acting Chief Special Litigation Section

JULIE ABBATE
Deputy Chief
Special Litigation Section

/s/ Joe Rodriguez

/s/ Wm. E. Nolan

JOE RODRIGUEZ
Assistant United States Attorney
Western District of Texas
601 N.W. Loop 410
Suite 600
San Antonio, TX 78216
(210) 384-7100
(210) 384-7105 (fax)
joe.rodriguez@usdoj.gov
Ohio Bar Number 0072958

WILIAM E. NOLAN
Senior Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Special Litigation Section
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 353-8560
(202) 514-6273 (fax)
william.nolan@usdoj.gov

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ERIC H.	HOLDER,	JR.,	:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

• :

v.

JUAN ANTONIO GAONA,

No. 5:10-cv-00494-XR

Defendant,

:

PLANNED PARENTHOOD SEXUAL HEALTHCARE,

v.

:

Third-Party Defendant.

## **ORDER**

The Court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, hearby GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's counterclaims as stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Defendant's Original Answer and Jury Demand, and his jury demand, are stricken from the above-styled and numbered cause.

SIGNE	ED this	, 2010.
$\alpha$	or uns	. 4010.

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ UNTIED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this 10<sup>th</sup> day of September 2010 I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Allan E. Parker, The Justice Foundation, 8122 Datapoint Drive, Suite 812, San Antonio, Texas 78229;

Kathleen Cassidy Goodman, Law Office of Kathleen Cassidy Goodman, PLLC, 8122 Datapoint Drive, Suite 805, San Antonio, Texas 78229; and

David L. Ortega, Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 711 Navarro, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205.

I hereby certify that on this  $10^{th}$  day of September 2010 a true and correct copy of the forgoing was served via first-class US Mail on the following:

R. Clayton Trotter, The Justice Foundation, 8122 Datapoint Drive, Suite 812, San Antonio, Texas 78229.

JOSEPH C. RODRIGUEZ
Assistant United States Attorney