

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRAY TELEVISION, INC., and
SCHURZ COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendants.

CASE NO.

JUDGE:

FILED:

COMPETITIVE IMPACT STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (“APPA” or “Tunney Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h), plaintiff United States of America (“United States”) files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING

Defendants Gray Television, Inc. (“Gray”) and Schurz Communications, Inc. (“Schurz”) entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement, dated September 14, 2015, pursuant to which Gray would acquire Schurz for approximately \$440 million. Defendants compete head-to-head in the sale of broadcast television spot advertising in the following Designated Market Areas (“DMAs”): South Bend, Indiana; and Wichita, Kansas (collectively “the DMA Markets”).

The United States filed a civil antitrust Complaint on December 22, 2015, seeking to enjoin the proposed acquisition. The Complaint alleges that the acquisition’s likely effect would

be to increase broadcast television spot advertising prices in each of the DMA Markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States also filed a Hold Separate Stipulation and Order (“Hold Separate”) and proposed Final Judgment, which are designed to eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. The proposed Final Judgment, which is explained more fully below, requires Defendants to divest the following broadcast television stations (the “Divestiture Stations”) to Acquirers approved by the United States in a manner that preserves competition in each of the DMA Markets: WSBT-TV, located in the South Bend, Indiana DMA; and KAKE-TV, located in the Wichita, Kansas DMA. The Hold Separate requires Defendants to take certain steps to ensure that the Divestiture Stations are operated as competitively independent, economically viable, and ongoing business concerns, uninfluenced by the consummation of the acquisition so that competition is maintained until the required divestitures occur.

The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION

A. The Defendants and the Proposed Acquisition

Gray is incorporated in the state of Georgia, with its headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. Gray owns and operates broadcast television stations in 44 metropolitan areas. It owns and operates broadcast television stations in each of the DMA Markets.

Schurz is an Indiana corporation, with its headquarters in Mishawaka, Indiana. Schurz owns and operates 10 broadcast television stations in 7 metropolitan areas. It also owns and operates, or provides programming, operating, or sales services to broadcast television stations in each of the DMA Markets.

Pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement dated September 14, 2015, Gray agreed to acquire Schurz for approximately \$440 million.

Gray and Schurz compete head to head against one another for the business of local and national advertisers that seek to purchase television advertising time in each of the DMA Markets.

B. Anticompetitive Consequences of the Transaction

1. Broadcast Television Advertising

The Complaint alleges that the sale of broadcast television spot advertising to advertisers targeting viewers located in each of the DMA Markets constitutes a relevant product market for analyzing this acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Gray and Schurz sell television advertising to local and national advertisers that seek to target viewers in each of the DMA Markets. A DMA is a geographical unit designated by the A.C. Nielsen Company, a company that surveys television viewers and furnishes broadcast television stations, advertisers, and advertising agencies in a particular area with data to aid in evaluating television audiences. DMAs are widely accepted by television stations, advertisers, and advertising agencies as the standard geographic area to use in evaluating television audience size and demographic composition. A television station's advertising rates typically are based on the station's ability, relative to competing television stations, to attract viewing audiences that have certain demographic characteristics that advertisers are seeking to reach.

Gray's and Schurz's broadcast television stations in the DMA Markets generate almost all of their revenues by selling advertising to local and national advertisers who want to reach viewers present in those DMAs. Advertising placed on broadcast television stations in a DMA is aimed at reaching viewing audiences in that DMA, and television stations broadcasting outside that DMA do not provide effective access to these audiences.

Broadcast television spot advertising possesses a unique combination of attributes that sets it apart from advertising using other types of media. Because of this unique combination of attributes, broadcast television spot advertising has no close substitute for a significant number of advertisers.

Television combines sight, sound, and motion, thereby creating a more memorable advertisement when compared to other types of advertising. For example, radio spots lack the visual impact of television advertising; and newspaper and billboard ads lack sound and motion, as do many internet search engine and website banner ads.

Broadcast television spot advertising also generally reaches the largest percentage of potential customers in a targeted geographic area and is therefore especially effective in introducing, establishing, and maintaining a product's image.

Spot advertising differs from network and syndicated television advertising, which are sold on a nationwide basis by major television networks and by producers of syndicated programs and are broadcast in every market area in which the network or syndicated program is aired. Spot advertising on subscription television channels and internet-based video advertising also lacks the same reach as broadcast television spot advertising.

In addition, through information provided during individualized price negotiations, broadcast television stations can identify advertisers with strong preferences for using broadcast

television spot advertising and charge different prices to those advertisers. Consequently, if there were a small but significant and non-transitory increase in the price (“SSNIP”) of broadcast television spot advertising on broadcast television stations in the DMA Markets, advertisers would not reduce their purchases sufficiently to render the price increase unprofitable. Advertisers would not switch enough purchases of advertising time to television stations outside the DMA Markets, or to other media to render the price increase unprofitable.

2. Harm to Competition in Each of the DMA Markets

The Complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and likely would have the following effects, among others:

- a) competition in the sale of broadcast television spot advertising in each of the DMA Markets would be substantially lessened;
- b) competition between Gray broadcast television stations and Schurz broadcast television stations in the sale of broadcast television spot advertising in each of the DMA markets would be eliminated; and
- c) the prices for spot advertising on broadcast television stations in each of the DMA Markets likely would increase.

The acquisition, by eliminating Schurz as a separate competitor and combining its operations with Gray’s, would allow the combined entity to increase its market share of broadcast television spot advertising and revenues in each of the DMA Markets. In the South Bend, Indiana DMA, combining the two stations that Defendants operate would give Gray approximately 67 percent of all television station gross advertising revenues in that DMA. In the Wichita, Kansas DMA, combining the three stations that Defendants operate would give Gray approximately 57 percent of all television station gross advertising revenues in that DMA.

Gray's acquisition of Schurz would further concentrate the already highly concentrated broadcast television market in each of the DMA Markets. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), a standard measure of market, the post-acquisition HHI in each of the DMA Markets would be over 2,500. Gray's acquisition of Schurz would result in a substantial increase in the HHI set forth above for each DMA Market in excess of the 200 points presumed likely to enhance market power under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.

Moreover, the acquisition combines stations that are close substitutes and vigorous competitors in a product market with limited alternatives. In each of the DMA Markets, Defendants have broadcast stations that are affiliated with the major national television networks, ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX. Their respective affiliations with those networks, and their local news operations, provide Defendants' stations with a variety of competing programming options that are often each other's next-best or second-best substitutes for viewers and advertisers.

Finally, the Complaint alleges that entry or expansion in broadcast television spot advertising each of the DMA Markets would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent any anticompetitive effects. New entry is unlikely because any new station would require an FCC license, which is difficult to obtain. Even if a new station became operational, commercial success would come over a period of many years. The number of 30-second spots available at a station is generally fixed. Accordingly, other television stations in each of the DMA Markets could not readily increase their advertising capacity in response to a small but significant price increase by Gray.

In summary, for all these reasons, the Complaint alleges that Gray's proposed acquisition of Schurz would substantially lessen competition in the sale of television spot advertising time to advertisers targeting viewers in each of the DMA Markets, eliminate head-to-head competition between Gray and Schurz television stations in those markets, and result in increased prices and reduced quality of service for television advertisers in each of those markets, all in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

III. EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The divestiture requirement of the proposed Final Judgment will eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in each of the DMA Markets by maintaining the Divestiture Stations as independent, economically viable competitors. The proposed Final Judgment requires Gray to divest WSBT-TV, located in South Bend, Indiana to Sinclair Broadcast Group; and KAKE-TV, located in Wichita, Kansas to Lockwood Broadcast Group. The United States has approved each of these divestiture buyers. The United States required Gray to identify each Acquirer of a Divestiture Station in order to provide greater certainty and efficiency in the divestiture process.

The "Divestiture Assets" are defined in Paragraph II. I of the proposed Final Judgment to include all assets, tangible or intangible, principally devoted to or necessary for the operation of the Divestiture Stations as viable, ongoing commercial broadcast television stations. With respect to each Divestiture Station, the divestiture will include assets sufficient to satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that such assets can and will be used to operate each station as a viable, ongoing, commercial television business.

To ensure that the Divestiture Stations are operated independently from Gray after the divestitures, Sections IV and XI of the proposed Final Judgment prohibit Defendants from

entering into any agreements during the term of the Final Judgment that create a long-term relationship with or any entanglements that affect competition between Gray and an Acquirer of a Divestiture Station concerning the Divestiture Assets after the divestitures are completed. Examples of prohibited agreements include agreements to reacquire any part of the Divestiture Assets, agreements to acquire any option to reacquire any part of the Divestiture Assets or to assign the Divestiture Assets to any other person, agreements to enter into any time brokerage agreement, local marketing agreement, joint sales agreement, other cooperative selling arrangement, or shared services agreement, or agreements to conduct other business negotiations jointly with the Acquirer(s) with respect to the Divestiture Assets, or providing financing or guarantees of financing with respect to the Divestiture Assets, during the term of the Final Judgment. The time brokerage agreement prohibition does not preclude Defendants from entering into an agreement pursuant to which an Acquirer can begin operating a Divestiture Station immediately after the Court's approval of the Hold Separate in this matter, so long as the agreement with the Acquirer expires upon the consummation of a final agreement to divest the Divestiture Assets to the Acquirer.

Defendants are required to take all steps reasonably necessary to accomplish the divestitures quickly and to cooperate with prospective purchasers. Because transferring the broadcast license for each of the Divestiture Stations requires FCC approval, Defendants are specifically required to use their best efforts to obtain all necessary FCC approvals as expeditiously as possible. The divestiture of each of the Divestiture Stations must occur within 90 calendar days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter. If applications have been filed with the FCC within the period permitted for divestiture seeking approval to assign or transfer licenses to the Acquirers of the Divestiture Assets, but an order or other dispositive action by the

FCC on such applications has not been issued before the end of the period permitted for divestiture, the period shall be extended with respect to divestiture of the Divestiture Assets for which no FCC order has issued until 5 calendar days after such order is issued. The United States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of this time period not to exceed 90 calendar days in total, and shall notify the Court in such circumstances.

In the event that Defendants do not accomplish the divestitures within the periods prescribed in the proposed Final Judgment, the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court, upon application of the United States, will appoint a trustee selected by the United States to effect the divestitures. If a trustee is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides that Gray will pay all costs and expenses of the trustee. The trustee's commission will be structured to provide an incentive for the trustee based on the price obtained and the speed with which the divestitures are accomplished. After his or her appointment becomes effective, the trustee will file monthly reports with the Court and the United States describing his or her efforts to accomplish the divestiture of any remaining stations. If the divestiture has not been accomplished after 6 months, the trustee and the United States will make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such orders as appropriate, to carry out the purpose of the trust, including extending the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.

IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO POTENTIAL PRIVATE LITIGANTS

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides that any person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,

15 U.S.C. § 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

**V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR MODIFICATION
OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT**

The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.

The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period will be considered by the United States Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will be filed with the Court. In addition, comments will be posted on the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's Internet website and, under certain circumstances, published in the Federal Register.

Written comments should be submitted to:

David C. Kully
Chief, Litigation III Section
Antitrust Division
United States Department of Justice
450 5th Street, N.W. Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530

The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action, and Defendants may apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against Defendants. The United States could have continued the litigation and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against Gray's acquisition of Schurz. The United States is satisfied, however, that the divestiture of assets described in the proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition for the sale of broadcast television spot advertising in each of the DMA Markets. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment would achieve all or substantially all of the relief the United States would have obtained through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the Complaint.

VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE APPA FOR THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the Court shall determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment "is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1). In making that determination, the Court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is required to consider:

- (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the

court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and

(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is entitled to "broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of the public interest." *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *see generally United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc.*, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public interest standard under the Tunney Act); *United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc.*, 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the "court's inquiry is limited" in Tunney Act settlements); *United States v. InBev N.V./S.A.*, No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3, (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires "into whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment are clear and manageable.").¹

As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree

¹ The 2004 amendments substituted "shall" for "may" in directing relevant factors for court to consider and amended the list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. *Compare* 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004) *with* 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2006); *see also SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments "effected minimal changes" to Tunney Act review).

may positively harm third parties. *See Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the decree, a court may not “engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.” *United States v. BNS, Inc.*, 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting *United States v. Bechtel Corp.*, 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); *see also Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; *United States v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court’s role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is “*within the reaches of the public interest.*” More elaborate requirements might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).² In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a district court “must accord deference to the government’s predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that a court should not reject the proposed remedies because it believes others are preferable); *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be “deferential to the government’s predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies”); *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that

² *Cf. BNS*, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court’s “ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving the consent decree”); *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to “look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist’s reducing glass”). *See generally Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether “the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’”).

the court should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).

Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of liability in a litigated matter. “[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is ‘within the reaches of public interest.’” *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), *aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States*, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (noting that room must be made for the government to grant concessions in the negotiation process for settlements) (citing *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461); *United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd.*, 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States “need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Moreover, the Court’s role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the Court to “construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case.” *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459; *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine whether there is a factual foundation for the government’s decisions such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are reasonable); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (“the ‘public interest’ is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even

should have, been alleged”). Because the “court’s authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,” it follows that “the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,” and not to “effectively redraft the complaint” to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459-60. As this Court confirmed in *SBC Communications*, courts “cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.

In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene.” 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2); *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney Act). The language wrote into the statute what Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: “[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.” 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest determination is left to the discretion of the Court, with the recognition that the Court’s “scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489

F. Supp. 2d at 11.³ A court can make its public interest determination based on the competitive impact statement and response to public comments alone. *U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76.

VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: December 22, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mark A. Merva
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³ See *United States v. Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the “Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact statement and response to comments alone”); *United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, No. 73-CV-681-W-1, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980, *22 (W.D.Mo. 1977) (“Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should . . . carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances.”); S. Rep. No. 93-298, at 6 (1973) (“Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.”).

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

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GRAY TELEVISION, INC., and
SCHURZ COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendants.

CASE NO.

JUDGE:

FILED:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Mark Merva, hereby certify that on December 22, 2015, I caused copies of the Complaint, Competitive Impact Statement, Hold Separate Stipulation and Order, Proposed Final Judgment, and Plaintiff's Explanation of Consent Decree Procedures to be served upon defendants Gray Television, Inc., and Schurz Communications, Inc, by mailing the documents electronically to the duly authorized legal representatives of each Defendant as follows:

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