## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

## Enforcement of Court Desegregation Orders

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI

Meredith v. Fair

Trial Files

Transcripts - U. S. v. Barnett -Johnson

| way an oath or affirmation that he will do or assert -- in other words, you wanted a written statement as to what he 3 would do, as I understood it.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Well, I think we would want a great deal more than that. I think we would want at least for you to come in and tell us that he has now agreed to comply unequivocally with the Court's order, and that could be supplemented in writing. But you are not proposing to?

MR. CLARK: No, sir.

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JUDGE TUTTLE: You don't have any reason to think 11 he would agree to that, and you are not asking --

MR. CLARK: I say that he could not.

JUDGE TUTTLE: All right.

MR. CLARK: And I have to be very positive to answer to that question.

JUDGE TUTTLE: All right.

MR. CLARK: But I thought Judge Brown said he should file a written statement of exactly what his position is.

JUDGE TUTTLE: We have killed a lot of time in this case, and I think the Court is of the disposition that a further delay to let the Governor file a written statement to the effect that he will use his own judgment as to whether to comply with the order of the Court is something that would not cause us to separate today.

MR. CLARK: I obviously believe that is what the statement would contain, because it was my position I understand I was authorized to present to the Court. I thought Judge Brown wanted a personal reaffirmation of that.

JUDGE TUTTLE: You needn't expect any further delay from the Court then waiting for his agreement to write anything of that kind to the Court. Is that a fair statement? So in the light of the fact that the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor have made their qualified statement, I am going to ask if you will let me -- I am going to ask the Government now if they will state their position as to what we should do and the Appellant's position as to what we should do under the circumstances.

MR. PATTERSON: Will the Court permit me just to clarify myself with the Court?

JUDGE TUTTLE: Yes, sir.

MR. PATTERSON: When we were down here the past Tuesday a week ago, I believe, in response to the Court's question, which I believe came from Judge Rives, I want the Court to know that I was dealing with the Court in all sincerity.

JUDGE TUTTLE: We don't doubt that at all, Mr.

Patterson. We do question this -- and I think it is fair to
say it: When you found out that what you said there could
not be carried out, we think -- let me say for myself -- I

think that you should have notified us that we misunderstood, because it was perfectly plain that the decision to postpone it was based on the assumption that that language meant pretty much what it said. We think that Counsel should have let us know before we met here today that the position of the Governor is different from what you thought it was on last Tuesday.

MR. PATTERSON: Well, frankly --

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JUDGE TUTTLE: Aside from that, no one holds you responsible for the fact that you cannot carry out what you said the Governor would do.

MR. PATTERSON: Well, I thought frankly last Tuesday, and I still think today, that the issues boil down to relatively simple and clear-cut issues. The lawsuit was to get Meredith in the University of Mississippi and to --

JUDGE WISDOM: -- and to keep him --

MR. PATTERSON: -- there, and to permit his continued attendance there. He is in the University of Mississippi, he is in attendance today.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Just barely.

MR. PATTERSON: The injunction directed that the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor, as I understood it, or the restraining order was to prevent them from interfering.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Read it, read it, just read it, Mr. Patterson, just read it.

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MR. PATTERSON: I am just stating, basically that is what it was, to prevent their interfering --

JUDGE TUTTLE: It was more than that.

MR. PATTERSON: -- with his attendance, admission and attendance. That is being done without any interference on their part whatsoever. Therefore, I thought it was being complied with. Furthermore, the Governor has called for law and order in the State, and it was based upon those simple factual matters that I made my statement to this Honorable Court, and I think they are being complied with this very minute.

JUDGE TUTTLE: We do understand correctly under our agreement with Mr. Clark as to what the Governor's response now is, what his present position now is. You agree with what Mr. Clark said the Governor's present position is?

MR. PATTERSON: As I understand Mr. Clark --

JUDGE TUTTLE: I hope you understand him.

MR. PATTERSON: As I understood his statement to the Court, I think it was correct, yes, but I also think that the orders of this Court are being complied with.

JUDGE RIVES: May I ask you just one question.

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir.

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JUDGE RIVES: You heard us once or twice read the question I addressed to you last week and your answer to it?

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIVES: Do you think the Governor's position is the same this week that it was last week?

MR. PATTERSON: I think so in that he is not interfering with the carrying out of the order of this Court.

JUDGE RIVES: And you this week would give me the same answer, yes, that you gave me last week to that question I asked you?

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir.

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JUDGE RIVES: You would?

MR. PATTERSON: In the vein that I meant to reply to Your Honor last week, that is, we are not interfering with the order of this Court, which was to admit Meredith, and --

JUDGE RIVES: We have indeed entered the field of Alice in Wonderland where language doesn't mean what it says when you tell me last week that the Governor and Lieutenant Governor will comply with the orders of this Court to the best of their ability --

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIVES: -- and this week you tell me they will comply if in their judgment they should comply.

MR. PATTERSON: No, sir, I am not saying that to
Your Honor. I was saying last week and I still say this
week, Your Honor, they are doing nothing to interfere with
the carrying out of the main order and judgment of this Court,

and that was to permit the admission of Meredith into the University of Mississippi and his continued attendance therein. They are doing nothing to interfere with that:

JUDGE GEWIN: You have read the transcript wherein you and Mr. Clark and Mr. Satterfield appeared before a panel of this Court. Do you amend, modify, or change in any respect any of the representations you made to the Court at that time?

MR. PATTERSON: No. sir.

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JUDGE GEWIN: Do you still reassert and reaffirm on behalf of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and as Attorney General of Mississippi the statements that were made to the Court and the same representations that were made to the Court on that occasion?

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir, as I understand it, Your Honor.

JUDGE GEWIN: I mean in the words that you used then.

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir, but what I am trying to say, Your Honor, is that in my opinion -- maybe I have got it wrong, but in my opinion they are complying now. They are not interfering with the order of this Court.

JUDGE GEWIN: Do you represent to the Court now that they intend to comply in the future?

MR. PATTERSON: Well, I don't know what Your Honor

means by compliance. I would say this --

JUDGE GEWIN: In the same fashion that they have since you were here?

MR. PATTERSON: In my opinion, they will not be found seeking interference with the order of this Court.

JUDGE WISDOM: Anave they notified any law enforcement officers to cease resistance and to cooperate with the officers and agents of this Court? Have they done that?

You know that that is in the order.

MR. PATTERSON: That I don't know.

JUDGE WISDOM: Well, one of the terms of the order is that he show to this Court that he is fully complying with the terms of the restraining order and that he has notified all law enforcement officers and all other officers under his jurisdiction or command to cooperate. Has he done that?

MR. PATTERSON: That I don't know, but do I understand Your Honor to say that this Court would attempt to relieve the Army and the United States Marshals of their responsibilities and impose those responsibilities upon the Governor?

JUDGE TUTTLE: That is ridiculous! That is ridiculous, Mr. Patterson! The fact that the Army is protecting a man because he can't be protected by the State forces doesn't relieve the State forces of their obligation under the order of the Court to protect him. Really, that

is ridiculous!

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MR. PATTERSON: No, sir, Your Honor, I didn't mean it ridiculous.

JUDGE TUTTLE: I can't help it.

MR. PATTERSON: I meant to pose the question, would this Court seek to impose that responsibility upon the Governor and relieve those authorities that are there carrying out the orders of this Court.

JUDGE TUTTLE: The question you asked was whether we seek to relieve the Army of the United States and put on the Governor of the State of Mississippi the duty to protect the man. Isn't that the question you were asking?

MR. PATTERSON: Yes, and the Marshals --

JUDGE TUTTLE: Excuse me for being so positive, but to me that sounds ridiculous.

MR. PATTERSON: Well, I certainly didn't mean to be ridiculous.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Because the order of the Court is that the Governor of the State should direct his officials to carry on this protection of the individual. Well, I think we have your position anyway, Mr. Patterson. Thank you.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Mr. Marshall, in the light of this present situation, what do you recommend?

MR. MARSHALL: May it please the Court, this is clearly a very serious situation for the United States. I

would like to start out by saying that I find it very difficult to believe that a state which is defending the rights of the state is at the same time apparently denying a responsibility to exercise the basic right of the states to maintain law and order within their borders, if that is the position of the attorneys representing the State.

Now it is a fact, I think, that Governor Barnett has taken steps to purge himself of the contempt in which this Court found him. The Governor did during the few days preceding the finding of contempt interfere directly and physically with the carrying out of the Court's order by preventing Mr. Meredith from entering on the campus and becoming registered. He has taken steps, I think, to purge himself of that contempt of Court. Whatever his lawyers say in this court today, he did in fact instruct the law enforcement officers of the State to cooperate with the Federal law enforcement officers in bringing Mr. Meredith on the campus a week ago Sunday and physically permitting him to enter the campus and to register there as a student. To that degree, Governor Barnett has certainly brought himself in compliance with the Court.

The order of the Court which he was required to meet also required him to notify all law enforcement officers of the State of Mississippi that they should co-operate with the officers and agents of the Court and of the

United States to the end that James Meredith be permitted to register and remain as a student at the University of Mississippi under the same conditions as apply to all other students. I think that the showing of purging on that aspect of the Court's order is not sufficient. The Governor has now shown what instructions, if any, he gave to the law enforcement officers of the State, and as far as the record is concerned, and as far as the Government's personal knowledge is concerned, I do not know what instructions he gave to the law enforcement officers of the State.

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This is still a civil contempt proceeding, it is still a remedial proceeding. Any questions of punishment for past actions are properly the subject of criminal contempt action. The fact is that at the moment law and order is maintained in the City of Oxford and on the campus of the University of Mississippi by Federal officials, Federal officers. I do not know of any specific action that this Court can ask the Governor to take within the next few days or at any particular time, because I do not know when it will appear to be possible for the Federal Government to withdraw force in sufficient numbers so that the responsibility resumes in the State to maintain law and order on that campus and in that city, but I think that the Court should look -- I think that the Court cannot on the present record and on the statement of Counsel find that the

Governor has purged himself of contempt.

I think that the Court should look again to the future, because I think that he has purged himself enough to show that the sanctions set by the Court do not necessarily have to be imposed now. I think that the future to which the Court should look is the time when the Federal Government feels that it is safe and that they have met their responsibilities and that conditions are stable enough so that the basic Federal force protecting Mr. Meredith and maintaining law and order can be withdrawn. I think at that time it will be the performance of the Governor which is significant. I think at this time the assurances given to the Court by the Governor are unsatisfactory and that the Court may wish to take steps to make sure that they become satisfactory.

I think that is the best that I can suggest, Judge Tuttle, considering that this is a change of position by the State, which I did not expect.

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JUDGE BROWN: May I ask a question. Keeping clearly in mind that it is a civil contempt, the terms of this order, of our order, were that unless he showed by 11:00 o'clock on Tuesday that he had purged himself by taking these steps, that he shall be fined \$10,000 a day. Now a representation was made on that day which now turns out to have been unauthorized. As a civil contempt matter, has the Governor been in violation of that part of the order

since Tuesday last, so that he has incurred \$10,000 a day in fines during that interim?

MR. MARSHALL: Well, Judge Brown, I think the situation is this: I think that he has not purged himself in accordance with the order of the Court. I think that he has purged himself in part of the basic action required by the Court's order, the cessation of interference with Mr. Meredith's entrance into the University. To that extent, he has purged himself. Accordingly, I think that the Court has an area of discretion. I think that the fine can be said to have run in whole or in part since the day he was supposed to have purged himself, but I don't think that it is necessary to vindicate the processes of the Court that the full amount be gathered. I think that is within the discretion of the Court, in other words.

JUDGE TUTTLE: I gather you do not ask the Court then to take the further step to remand Governor Barnett to custody until he does purge himself?

MR. MARSHALL: Judge Tuttle, I do not at this time. The reason for that is that, as I said, under the conditions that are existing now at Ocford, I do not know what specific action of the Governor you would be attempting to compel by that.

JUDGE TUTTLE: You say then that as to how much, if any, of the daily fine he should be required to pay is a

matter that could be decided at a later date when it is determined more clearly just what remains to be done by the Governor to effectuate the order of the Court?

MR. MARSHALL: I think that would be a perfectly proper further course of action by the Court, Judge Tuttle.

JUDGE BROWN: Do you think it is proper or advisable at this time to spell out in more detail some of the minimum steps which are to be taken, looking toward the day when troops can be withdrawn, such as a decision or resolution, proclamation, issuance of affirmative instructions?

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MR. MARSHALL: I think that it should be clear that whatever instructions the Governor gives and is required to give supersede all of the steps that were taken by the Governor and at the Governor's command to interfere with the Court's order previously. I think that it would be a mistake for the Court to get into too much detail on the way in which the Governor controls the law enforcement mechanism of the State.

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JUDGE BELL: Are you saying -- I am trying to catch what you are saying -- are you saying that it would be better to leave the matter in abeyance for a few more days until you see what the situation develops into in Oxford?

MR. MARSHALL: Well, Judge Bell, no, that is not precisely what I am saying. I am not suggesting the Court

can leave the matter in abeyance, because I think the Court should decide whether he has or has not purged himself.

JUDGE BELL: Now --

MR. MARSHALL: And my view on that would be that he has not purged himself, --

JUDGE BELL: Yes.

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MR. MARSHALL: — that he has not made a sufficient showing either in terms of what he says he will do in the future or in terms of what he has shown he has done in the past to have purged himself of the contempt the Court found him to be in.

JUDGE JONES: What have you understood he says he will do in the future?

MR. MARSHALL: Judge Jones, I cannot understand it, I do not understand it. A great deal again, I think, depends on what he in fact does at the time that it becomes necessary for him to take action and I would put much weight on that, but I think that the Court should — I think that it would be good for the Court to seek further clarification of what his position is, because, as I heardest in Court this afternoon, I thought that Mr. Clark and Attorney General Patterson took different positions and that both of them were in varying degrees different from the position, as I read the transcript, of the hearing on Tuesday.

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JUDGE BELL: Can you make any suggestion about how

we could find out what Governor Barnett's position is?

MR. MARSHALL: Judge Bell, I would like on that and on these other matters -- I think the best thing to do, since I haven't had time to consider what kind of --

JUDGE BELL: I understand that this came as a rather --

MR. MARSHALL: --would be to suggest an order to the Court that would be specific on that.

JUDGE BROWN: Well, this is my difficulty: You suggest here, as I understand it, that probably no commitment should be used now and that the fine, if any, should be in our discretion moderated some, --

MR. MARSHALL: But, Judge --

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JUDGE BROWN: -- depending on what he does in the future. Now it seems to me on what has been shown to us so far you are talking like they are now, in Never-Never Land, because there is one thing we know: that, unless there is some positive leadership for law and order, Meredith's life is imperiled the moment those troops leave. It seems to me that is so. Now we cannot await the day to put that kind of a test up to see what is going to happen with Mr. Barnett when the consequences to Meredith are so severe.

MR. MARSHALL: Well, Judge Brown, I think that necessarily you have to look to the future, because it is a civil contempt proceeding, that the only thing that you

can do — there are two things that the Court can decide today: One is whether or not he has purged himself and what to do about that. That relates to his actions since the time the purge order became effective and today. I suggest to the Court that he has not purged himself.

The question then arises, what sanctions the Court should impose on him. I suggested to the Court that there would be no remedial purpose served in this commitment, in his commitment at this time. I further suggested to the Court that as far as the fine was concerned, that has run. Now I think the Court would be justified in imposing a fine. I think the Court would also be justified in imposing part of the fine now. I think the Court would also be justified in imposing the fine but permitting it to be remitted at some other date, the date for the purging action. Now that is as far as what he has done to date.

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As far as what he is to do in the future, Judge Brown, the problem with making specific recommendations today is that the -- at the moment the Federal Government is enforcing law and order. At the moment I do not see what day or what week that condition will end, so that I can't suggest to the Court, as I could the last time we were before you on this problem, that he must do something by a certain date or else something will happen. Under the conditions that are -- I think were inevitably created by the

pentire course of action taken by the Governor and the State under those conditions, which are troops within the City of 3 Oxford and within the State of Mississippi, I don't -- I just 4 think that I have to say as to that aspect of it, it has to 5 be held in abeyance, at least as far as dates are concerned.

JUDGE RIVES: Mr. Marshall, you tell us he has not purged himself. Hasn't the Court already said that sanctions swill be imposed? I can't follow you that it is not remedial. The Court's order was that Ross R. Barnett shall be committed 10 to and remain in the custody of the Attorney General of the United States and shall pay a fine to the United States of 12 \$10,000 per day unless on or before Tuesday, October 2, 1962, 13 at 11:00 a.m. he shows to the Court that he is fully comply-14 ling with the terms of the restraining order, and that he has notified all law enforcement officers and all other officers under his jurisdiction or command (a), and then (b) -- and we are familiar with (a) and (b).

Now why would it not be remedial to order Governor Barnett's arrest and commitment to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States until he issues those orders?

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MR. MARSHALL: Well, Judge Rives, there are two reasons. I say that, though I do not say it is beyond the power of the Court. I think it is within the power of the Court.

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JUDGE RIVES: Aren't you in effect asking this Court to recede from its former order, modify its former order?

MR. MARSHALL: I think modify is the proper (word). The reason I think that that is justified and within keeping of the dignity of the Court and the protectiveness of the Court is that the Court's order issued Friday, September 28th, was in fact very effective.

JUDGE TUTTLE: In other words, a large part of it accomplished. Even though there is some part that is clearly not accomplished, there is a large part of it accomplished?

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, Judge Tuttle. We must -- it is very difficult to have to call on this Court all the time, it is an imposition on the Court, but in terms of what has been accomplished, I think that a lot was accomplished by that order and a lot has been accomplished by the successive orders of the Court. On September 13th the Governor called upon the entire state, every official of the State of Mississippi, to intervene in a physical sense, interpose themselves between the University of Mississippi and the orders of this Court, and when Mr. Meredith went to the campus -- in fact, despite that statement of Governor Barnett's and despite what he had done during the previous week, Mr. Meredith was met by state law enforcement officials, he was taken to the campus; the state law enforcement

officials did not, despite the number of previous indications to the contrary, interfere in any way with the United States Marshals when they took Mr. Meredith on there. Now that is not satisfactory, that doesn't end the matter, but it was a major step by the Governor toward meeting the orders of the Court, and that is why --

JUDGE TUTTLE: Which you say might in some degree justify our modifying, at the moment at least, the initial order? Is that your position?

MQ. MARSHALL: That is right, Judge Tuttle.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Mrs. Motley, have you something to say about the remedial -- bear in mind, <u>remedial</u> -- order that we are seeking to issue?

MRS. MOTLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I think that the Appellant takes the position that the Governor has had two opportunities now to purge himself of contempt of this Court's order. I was frankly shocked, as I feel the Court must have been, by the statements made by Mr. Clark today that he did not have the authority to say what he said to this Court on October 2nd. I think that what this Court has to do today is to find that the Governor has not purged himself, and this Court cught to impose the sanctions which the order itself contains, because I think it is within the power of the Governor and it would be remedial for him to notify all law enforcement officers and all other officers

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under his jurisdiction to do what is required by (a) and (b) of this order.

Now it is not my understanding that he has done that. There is nothing in this record today which I see which is tantamount to an order by the Governor of Mississippi to all law enforcement officers and all other officers under his command to comply with (a) and (b) of this Court's order, and we say that he can do that, he can issue an order to the State Police and to all other law enforcement officers to maintain order on the campus at the University of Mississippi, and that is not being done. The law and order, as I understand it, is being maintained by the United States, but this Court's order requires Governor Barnett to cooperate with the United States in the maintenance of law and order, and I think the reason the students are continuing to throw rocks and whatever else they are doing on the campus is wholly and solely because the Governor has not (1) cooperated in maintaining law and order, and (2) has not ordered the law enforcement officers of the State of Mississippi to do so. So that would be entirely by way of remedial relief to the Plaintiff in this case for the Court to impose the sanctions which it has already set until such time as the Governor does issue the notice to all law enforcement officers to do (a) and (b).

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JUDGE GEWIN: Judge Tuttle, may I ask Mr. Clark a

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question or two?

JUDGE TUTTLE: Certainly.

JUDGE GEWIN: Mr. Clark, may I propound a question or two to you. I refer to the document which is the transcript of the proceedings which took place in this Court on the 2nd day of October, 1962, here in Room 222, Post Office, New Orleans, when you, Mr. Satterfield, and Attorney General Patterson appeared before a panel of this Court and made the representation that you then and there represented the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Mississippi, Ross R. Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Johnson, and were making representations for them and on their behalf and as their counsel. You remember that occasion?

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir, I do.

JUDGE GEWIN: Now do you in any way now modify, amend, or change what you said to the Court at that time?

MR. CLARK: Judge Gewin, I would say no, sir. The remarks that I made to you were because I know that this Court at that time, from the reaction you have expressed today, did not construe what I said at that time in the sense that it was said and within the authority that I had to say it.

JUDGE GEWIN: I don't want to get into the authority behind the words or the construction of the words.

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE GEWIN: Do you take the same position before the Court -- I am speaking to you now as an officer of the Court --

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

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JUDGE GEWIN: -- do you take the same position and make the same representations to this Court now that you made on the occasion mentioned?

MR. CLARK: I do not make those representations in the same words, because I am sure that the words were misunderstood by the Court, and as an officer of the Court and as a man standing here before you and wanting to tell you exactly what I -- to present my clients! position to you, I would now present it to you in different words, but please understand me on one thing, sir: I have not meant to say today that Governor Barnett is going to turn his back on James Meredith or to send anybody in to intimidate him or harass him or threaten him. All I am saying is that I have a positive requirement from my clients today, the Governor of the State of Mississippi and the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Mississippi, to make it absolutely plain to this Court that as far as future actions are concerned, they do not construe their activities to date to have constituted a violation of the Court's temporary restraining orders, and they want to represent to you that as far as future action is concerned, they cannot in their best judgment come before this Court now and say on next Thursday or two weeks from now or whenever the forces are diminished or removed, I will take a specific action, or I will at that time follow this Court's decree. They will say to you: I will preserve law and order in the State of Mississippi to the best of my ability.

JUDGE GEWIN: Well, of course, we are not asking them to do something that is impossible, but taking the words without interpreting what you think we mean or interpreting the authority behind the words, do you affirm what was said in court on the occasion mentioned?

MR. CLARK: I do not, sir.

JUDGE GEWIN: You do not?

JUDGE TUTTLE: You made it plain, I think, when you were here before that you couldn't honestly do that now in the light of what you now understand we think the words mean.

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir, I couldn't do it. Would Your Honors permit -- you know, the Governor has never -- the Governor has never been permitted to present a legal response, and I understand that this moment is not one to extend the legal debate.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Wait a minute. The Governor has never paid the Court the courtesy to respond to its first

order ---

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MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE TUTTLE: -- which was to appear in person in the action.

MR. CLARK: I only spoke of the fact, sir, not the cause of the fact, his position, his legal position in response --

JUDGE TUTTLE: Of course, he is in contempt, No. 1, by never having responded to the order to appear personally, if the Court sought to take advantage of it. Now do you want to make a legal argument?

MR. CLARK: Just a very brief one. I have here extracts from the state laws of the State of Mississippi of which this Court can take judicial notice, but I would like to leave them with the Clerk of the Court in the event that you have some question about who has the primary responsibility for maintenance of law and order on the Ole Miss campus in Lafayette County, and then what the Governor's legal prerogatives are, what he could do.

JUDGE TUTTLE: It would be very simple for him to do exactly what we said in the Court's order. If it doesn't apply to anybody, it doesn't apply to anybody, but he won't agree to do what we said in the order.

MR. CLARK: You speak now of the contempt order instead of the temporary restraining order?

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JUDGE TUTTLE: The contempt order, exactly what was said -- a, b, and c -- in the contempt order. You are not able to say to us, as you told us a while ago, that he will comply with those requirements as far as he is physically able?

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir, I cannot make that statement, and further than that I say the legal position of the Governor is that he is not required --

JUDGE TUTTLE: I understand.

MR. CLARK: -- to do those things because of this Terminal Railway case -- I think it constitutes an extension of the temporary restraining orders that were issued against him. He can't be in contempt for something that was not directed to him as an injunction. In other words, the purge requirements couldn't extend to him.

JUDGE BELL: Well, he is willing to obey the temporary restraining order, to in good faith comply with the terms of the temporary restraining order?

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MR. CLARK: I would have to phrase my response to that in exactly the same language, Judge Bell, as to future action. As to the past action, he claims that he hasn't violated it, his actions have not constituted violation of any temporary restraining order issued to him either in behalf of Appellant's petition or Amicus's petition. Second, as to future action, he will have to see the situation and do

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34. 25 what he considers his oath requires him to do at that time, and he cannot now in his opinion --

JUDGE JONES: Did he take an oath to support and uphold the Constitution of the United States?

MR. CLARK: My recollection is that is part of his oath.

JUDGE JONES: I thought it was too.

MR. CLARK: I would say --

JUDGE RIVES: Mr. Clark, as a requirement or permission to file briefs on the legal question --

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIVES: -- might go to the validity of the restraining order and the contempt order and all, --

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIVES: -- do you desire beyond Monday for the filing of those briefs?

MR. CLARK: No, sir, I believe that will be sufficient, only this, unless the Court is going to make some order today with regard to the contempt order, which I believe to be a criminal contempt order and not pursuant to the notice given here. I think that the terms of the contempt order --

JUDGE RIVES: I am asking you. I don't see how the Court can make an order with regard to the contempt order until we have decided upon the jurisdictional questions that are raised in your legal problems.

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE TUTTLE: We have already indicated you can have some additional time to file a brief.

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIVES: If you want until Monday to file a brief, I don't see how the Court could issue any order today on -- contempt order.

MR. CLARK: Of course, this would be my position: You have asserted jurisdiction. I have questioned it and respectfully say, if I am right, of course, the contempt would fall with it.

JUDGE RIVES: You will file your brief by Monday?
MR. CLARK: By Monday, yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVES: You understand, do you, that the restraining orders and all other orders issued by this Court remain in effect?

MR. CLARK: In full force and effect, just as they did before at the previous recess of this hearing, and would Your Honor permit me to expand that nevertheless beyond the Motion to Dismiss and into <u>Cliett vs. Hammond</u> and <u>Estes vs. Potter</u> cases that I think control the contempt order? I didn't understand that I had permission to file on that, but I will present either orally --

JUDGE RIVES: I think we would be happy to have

your advice on any legal problems connected with the case.

MR. CLARK: In the Monday brief?

JUDGE RIVES: In the Monday brief.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Anything that attacks the validity of our finding of contempt or our having the authority to impose the sanctions --

MR. CLARK: That you did impose?

JUDGE TUTTLE: That we did impose -- can be covered in this brief.

MR. CLARK: Yes, sir.

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JUDGE BROWN: Let me ask you this, Mr. Clark. In a civil contempt, civil contempt only, where a fine, a coercive fine, is laid and it is conditioned upon a showing of compliance, purgation, by a certain hour, and if a court finds that he did not purge himself by that stated time, but that, in spite of that, the order somehow was partially enforced, does the court lack the power then to go back and make him pay the fine which was asserted as a coercion?

MR. CLARK: Judge, you have asked me a double-barrelled question there, because basically I think that the opinion written by yourself, Judge Rives and Judge Tuttle concurring, in the Cliett case makes it impossible to impose a fine in a civil contempt case, a conditional fine payable to the United States in a civil contempt case. I think that the analogy that you used there with regard to the 90-day

Jail sentence is completely analogous to the fine portion of this order. Where no remission is provided for, I think it becomes an executed affair as soon as the interval, whether you make it one minute or one day or thirty days, has expired, and I think Estes vs. Potter keeps you from imposing both fine and imprisonment for a single course of what you call civil contempt, but I would say certainly that if you took the other construction, that this Court would have a discretionary authority, in my opinion. This is really from the hip, but I will say that you have authority, since (it is) remedial relief, to say if it has been partially remedied, then a partial part of the sentence will be imposed.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Mr. Marshall; do you want to be heard on this?

MR. MARSHALL: I just had one suggestion to make to the Court, also on the question of briefing. I gathered from Mr. Clark's remarks that he has some doubt of the power of the Court to impose sanctions, and particularly the sanction of arrest, on a governor of a state. I would think that it would be useful if the Court when it decides these issues also decides that issue so that, if the Court feels that it does have that power, it makes it entirely clear to this Governor, so that we don't come in here at some other later date and re-argue that question. I would suggest that

if the briefs could also cover that point, it would be appropriate.

JUDGE TUTTLE: Do you propose to cover that point in any brief that you want to file?

MR. MARSHALL: We would be glad to, Judge Tuttle.

JUDGE TUTTLE: And you also suggested that the Government would like to file a requested form of order?

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, Judge.

JUDGE TUTTLE: We would be glad to have that. Of course, we would be glad to have that from any party, including the Respondents, but I guess they are not interested, except that they would simply dispose of it and dismiss it, so, if you will, file a formal requested order that you feel is appropriate, and, Mrs. Motley, if you would, file what you feel is appropriate under these existing facts.

MR. MARSHALL: By Monday, Judge Tuttle?

JUDGE TUTTLE: By Monday, if you will.

JUDGE BELL: Can you get a brief in on Monday on the power of arrest of a governor?

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, Judge.

JUDGE WISDOM: You had that briefed already, I

guess?

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MR. MARSHALL: Yes, Judge.

JUDGE TUTTLE: I think it is appropriate to say the Court, as I said last time we were here en banc, has

appreciated the significance of this case to the extent that we have felt it proper to meet en banc on these critical issues. I don't know how much longer the Court can devote the judicial time to it to have any further en banc hearings, but this matter is submitted to the Court en banc and all of the issues that we have discussed today will be disposed of by the Court en banc, by those who are here today. Any further motions that may come up later on, I simply want all parties to know that the Court may decide to have them decided by a panel of three judges, as the law clearly provides.

Is there anything further on either side? RESPONSE) Well, the Court will dispose of the matter as soon as it can after getting the briefs on Monday. The Court will now stand adjourned.

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....Thereupon, at 4:03 o'clock p.m., hearing in the above-entitled matters was concluded ....

## CERTIFICATE

I, Helen R. Dietrich, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing (169 pages of typewritten matter) is a true and correct transcription of the stenographic (Stenotype) notes of the proceedings herein, taken down by me, and transcribed in part by me and in part under my supervision, on the day and date hereinbefore noted, in the above-entitled and -numbered cause now pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the

United States.

Helen R. Dirtiel