DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

<u>Voting</u>

UNITED STATES V. LOUISIANA

Selected Papers

Transcript of Proceedings - March 4, 1963

A. Opinion
B. Judge West's Dissent

, det:

to Dow House

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA BATON ROUGE DIVISION

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

vs.

Number

State of Louisiana et als

Civil Action

Transcript of Proceedings on March 4, 1963.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA BATON ROUGE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Number 2548

versus

Civil Action

STATE OF LOUISIANA, et als.

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Transcript of Proceedings in the above entitled and numbered cause heard in Open Sourt at the United States District Courtroom, New Orleans, Louisiana, on March 4, 1963, before the Honorables John Kinor Wisdom, United States Circuit Judge, Herbert W. Christenberry, and Z. Gordon West, United States

16 APPEARANCES:

John Doar, Esq. David Norman, Esq. Frank N. Dunbaugh, Esq.

District Judges, presiding.

United States Department of Justice, Attorneys for Plaintiff

Harry Kron, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General State of Louisiana Attorney for Defendants.

Reported by

Felix L. Olivier, Official Court Reporter.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Gentlemen, we have the case of United States of America against State of Louisiana et al. Are counsel here representing the United States?

MR. DOAR:

Yes sir, your Honor.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Will you state your name for the record?

MR. DOAR:

Your Honor, my name is John Doar, and also appearing as counsel for the Government are Mr. David Norman and Mr. Frank N. Dunbaugh.

MR. KRON:

I am Harry Kron, representing the State of Louisiana, Assistant Attorney General.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Do you have any witnesses, Mr. Doar?

MR. DOAR:

Your Honor, we have no witnesses. As a result of very extensive pre-trial procedures in this case, we have -- the parties have stipulated to use the depositions in lieu of oral testimony and we have also stipulated as to the authenticity of a great number of documents and, therefore, we do not contemplate calling any witnesses as part of the Government's

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case.

MR. KRON:

By the same token, due to the same pre-trial agreements, we have certain verbal stipulations to make in addition to those that Mr. Doar has referred to. We have one or two verbal stipulations to make here this morning. We will not, therefore, need any witnesses to be called or testify.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Mr. Doar, would you care to dictate into the record the oral stipulation between you and Mr. Kron?

MR. DOAR:

Yes, your Honor.

The first stipulation deals with the record in the case of United States versus Fox, Eastern District of Louisiana. I do not, right at this time, have the number of the case, but the parties stipulate that the entire record in that case, including the pleadings, testimony, exhibits and depositions which were used in that case, may be made -- and the memorandum opinion and judgment -- may be made part of the record in this case.

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

Is that the Plaquemines case?

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MR. DOAR:

That is the Plaquemines case.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Do you have any other oral stipulations?

MR. DOAR:

The other stipulation is one which Mr. Kron has.

MR. KRON:

You have one more, with respect to the testimony, if they should be called, the Registrars of New Orleans and soforth.

MR. DOAR:

The parties further stipulate that the Registrars and former Registrars of Orleans Parish, East Baton Rouge Parish, and Jefferson Parish, if called to the stand, would testify that in those parishes the "Constitutional Interpretation Test" has not been used.

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

Is that correct, Mr. Kron? Do you have anything to add?

MR. KRON:

It is correct only with respect to the Registrars.

I have no authority nor information about the former

Registrars, but I think that our agreement was in all

of those cases as to the Registrar in East Baton

Rouge, who, incidentally, has been there a long time,

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Mr. Gallinghouse in New Orleans, and his Executive Assistant, who has been in office a number of years, and the Registrar in Jefferson Parish have not, during their encumbency, used -- applied or used the Interpretation Test.

MR. DOAR:

That is correct, your Honor, and we will furnish
to the Court, as a written stipulation, the dates
that these four gentlemen were in office, so that
the Court will be clear as to what period of time
we are speaking about.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Does that complete your tender of oral stipulations?

MR. DOAR:

It does, your Honor.

MR. KRON:

With respect to the State, on behalf of the

State, it is agreed by counsel that Mr. Hugh Cutrer,

ex officio member and Secretary of the Board of Registration, if called, would testify that since

October of 1962 and continually from that time up to
and including now, the Constitutional Interpretation

Test, which is the subject matter of this controversy,
has not been and is not being administered by any

Registrar of Voters in the State of Louisiana, and that he would so testify.

THE COURT (JUDGE WISDOM) ?

Does that complete the stipulations?

MR. DOAR:

Yes sir.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

The Court is very appreciative of the fine spirit of cooperation that enabled you to get together on these stipulations, and I will assure you that you have saved an enormous amount of the Court's time and of your time.

Mr. Doar, are you ready to proceed with the case?

MR. DOAR:

Yes sir, I am, your Honor.

Depending upon the wishes of the Court, I am prepared to outline for the Court this morning the gist of what this record contains, more as an aid to the Court, in connection with the trial brief which we submitted to the Court, and I am also prepared to argue our theory of the case and to call the Court's attention to those pertinent cases that we think bear upon the issues which the Court, we feel, is called upon to decide in this case.

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THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

That is agreeable to the Court. It is agreeable with the Court that you proceed on that basis.

MR. KRON:

May I --? I have something to say at this point for the purpose of clearing the record so we all will have a thorough understanding of the procedure herein.

This case has been relatively unusual in that we have actually pre-tried this lawsuit. As I understand it, most of this information here are excerpts and portions and quotations from the bulk of the pretrial information and factual data, depositions, and whatnot in this record for the purpose of pointing up strong points and argumentative situations in the Plaintiff's brief. In addition, however, there are other matters to be introduced here this morning, which are not now presently in the record to which, as we have said before, we have agreed to their introduction insofar to agreing to their authenticity, but I would like here to register objection to the admissibility of all of this material insofar as any rights that we may have to object.

Now, at this point --

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THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

We will take the case with the full understanding that you reserve your rights to object to the admissibility as to any and all of those.

MR. KRON:

That's correct.

As a coincidence of this thing, all of this material in its present form actually only came to our attention this past Wednesday. As the Court can well see, it is a very comprehensive thing and, therefore, we would like to say that we are not prepared specifically, this morning, to object to each and every detail concerning this thing. By the same token, if the Court please, there may be in our rebuttal to this brief and these exhibits -- there may be other phases and portions of the original record that we would like also to point up by specific introduction.

It may be just as well that we cover this point at this time. As far as the State is concerned, we have no objection to proceeding as Mr. Doar has pointed out and as the Court has already agreed. So far as we are concerned, we would like the Court's permission to either have an opportunity to come back at some future time to make our full argument or we certainly

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would like the Court to give us and grant us time to file our brief.

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

How much time would you want, Mr. Kron?

MR. KRON:

I think we can do the job in about thirty days, everything being now in, but, as I am trying to make clear to the Courts, this is the first time -- within the last few days -- that we have got the case in its final form.

THE COURT (JUDGE WISDOM):

You have a massive amount of material there.

MR. KRON:

Yes sir.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I think thirty days would be agreeable. I would be agreeable to thirty days if my colleagues are.

MR. KRON:

We would simply like to leave with the Court
this idea: To allow the Government to present its
substantive argument this morning but to give us
leave to first file a brief in rebuttal thereof and,
secondly, at a proper time and upon proper request
to properly come back in and make our verbal argument.

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THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I would suggest that you make your argument and answer to Mr. Doar's argument today; that you be given thirty days in which to file your brief and that should we think it necessary at that time, that there be further argument, we will ask you and we will give you the opportunity to argue it, but that probably will be unnecessary after we hear the argument this morning and also receive your brief.

MR. KRON:

That will be perfectly all right.

THE COURT ((Judge Christenberry):

I would like to suggest, with respect to the objections that you are making to this material, I think we should have the benefit of the grounds of your objection.

MR. KRON:

One of the particular grounds we are going to contend that a great portion of this material is irrelevant, that the material has nothing to do with the issues in the case. That is one thing that I can see, just by a cursory examination of all of those exhibits. There may be others which we will comprehensively argue in our brief itself and I think, if the Court will permit us to take this procedure

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we will argue our whole case in our brief and in our rebuttal of this argument.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

We will see that your rights are fully protected there, but you should spell out the basis for your objections in your brief.

MR. KRON:

Yes sir, we shall do that.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Is that agreeable with you?

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

Yes .

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Now, before you start, Mr. Doar, and also Mr. Kron, you should understand that all of the members of this Court have read the Government's brief, so that we are familiar with it. To the extent that the argument is laid out in the brief, we are familiar with the issues.

MR. DOAR:

May it please the Court, the record in this case can be divided into two parts: The first part is evidence based on stipulations entered into between the parties and the second part is the documentary evidence which has been stipulated to by the parties.

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Now, we have marked each one of the exhibits. including the depositions, with an exhibit number, and we have described generally the content of that exhibit. I would like to hand to the Court an original and two copies of that description of the exhibit list.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I assume you have given a copy to Mr. Kron? MR. DOAR:

Yes sir, although in fairness, your Honor, I am sure that he has not had a fair opportunity to go through it all because of the typing job. We were not able to give it to him until this morning. However, the description corresponds with the oral outline of what the exhibits would contain, which we had with Mr. Kron at an informal conference last Fri day. Now, briefly, the evidence is based upon the stipulations and consists of three things:

First, depositions; second, transcript of cases filed by the United States against local registrars under 1971 A and C; and third, admissions by the registrars through Federal Bureau of Investigation agents when they were interviewed with respect to certain events that took place in the local registrar's office in 1956.

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The depositions, your Honor, are first of state officials, second of local registrars, and third of white and negro witnesses in East Feliciana Parish, fourth of negro witnesses in Ouachita and Webster Parishes. That comprises the depositions.

Now, for the benefit of the Court, we digested,
as fairly and as accurately as we could in our digest,
certain of the depositions and, referring to the
first page of the appendices, I would like to just
call the Court's attention to --

Judge Christenberry, would you like an extra copy?

THE COURT: (Judge Christenberry):

I have a copy. I have read that.

MR. DOAR:

Anyway, Appendix B is the deposition of the Registrars. That is arranged alphabetically.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Appendix B is the deposition of the Registrars?

MR. DOAR:

That is one of the four sets of depositions that have been received. Now, if you look back to B-O, you will see that there was the deposition of, I think, twenty-five registrars or deputy registrars and they are arranged alphabetically by name, by last

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name. That is on B-O.

Their depositions in Appendix B are digested in a uniform fashion. We subdivided the Registrars' depositions into various sub-headings and we tried to follow the same outline in each deposition so that the Court would have an easier time in following those depositions.

As I say, this is a digest. we have attempted to be as fair as is humanly possible. Where the question appears on cross examination in the deposition, the record citation is C-R, rather than just to the page number.

Going back, then, your Honors, to Appendix C.

That includes the deposition of approximately ten
state officials. Mr. Cutrer, Mr. Fowler, Mr. Rainach,
Mr. Shaw, Mr. Garrett and one Citizen's Council Official, Mr. Billy L. Adams, among others. Again
the same procedure is followed. These depositions
are digested.

Appendix D is the deposition of rejected negroes in Webster Parish, I think there are four of them.

Appendix E is in connection with rejected negroes in Ouachita Parish. F and G are depositions of white and negro witnesses in East Feliciana Parish. Appendix H is a summary of the testimony in one of the

1971-A cases that are referred to in Appendix A, a summary of testimony in the second 1971-A case. We have not digested the Plaquemines Parish case because those exhibits, those depositions and that testimony is already digested as a part of that record and we did not repeat that work.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Where are those stipulations?

MR. DOAR:

They have all been filed as part of the record, your Honor, as one of the stipulations, and likewise the depositions, these admissions or statements, have been given a number.

Now, the other part of the case, your Honor, is the documentary evidence in the case. Now, briefly, the documentary evidence is broken down into several categories, four in fact.

The first category, and I won't refer to each exhibit because I think it is easier for the Court if I break it down into broad summaries -- the first is statistical data, and that deals with census figures, voting age population by race and by parish; registration statistics by race and by parish in Louisiana. Now, as the Court knows, Louisiana has a very comprehensive system of keeping accurate track of persons

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registered by race, by parish and this system has been in effect since around 1890, I believe, and we have for the Court's benefit all of the registration statistics from 1890 up to the present time. And, of course, in our brief we have only excerpted those parts that we think the Court would be particularly interested in.

The second part of the documentary evidence, your Honors, is the record in the case. Now, all of the records have been given an exhibit number. These are the records. There is also in the record a stipulation between the parties which is marked "Stipulation 1", and that is described. We have offered the microfilms.

Now, then, these are the registration voting records which, for example, were photographed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under Title 3 of the 1960 Act, this one happening to be one of the films in Ouachita Parish. Each one of those is identified clearly in the stipulation and the stipulation has been made a part of the record.

Now, briefly with respect to those records, I would like to tell the Court what these records contain. First of all, the records contain a standard application form of all applicants, which is required

to register. This application form contains questions which are designed to determine, under the constitution, whether the applicant is literate, is also designed to give the registrar certain basic information that is necessary to run an ordinarily comprehensive system of applications.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

That is the original application form in the registration rolls?

MR. DOAR:

The application form, yes sir. The second -THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

That is standard, of course, throughout the whole State?

MR. DOAR:

It is standard throughout the whole State, yes sir.

The second part of the record are the test cards which we found in some of the parishes where we photographed records. These test cards are cards that certain registrars used, your Honors, to administer the Constitution Interpretation Test. Now, we have for the benefit of the Court, because we thought this material was particularly relevant and important -- we have made a set of one exhibit, Exhibit 11, which

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contains the test cards -- we have made three Exhibits

11, one for each member of the Court -- and these exhibits contain test cards used throughout Louisiana
in administering the Constitutional Interpretation

Test.

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

Where you were able to find them?

MR. DOAR:

Yes sir, where we were able. I think we found six or seven different types of tests.

Now, the third information that you get from the record is that in certain parishes the registrars indicate on the application card or by preserving a copy of the test card, or by administering the tests in writing, indicate which section of the constitution was used for which applicant when he applied to register, and where we have been able to obtain that information, we have gotten it from these records.

Now, the fourth thing that the records show, as relevant, -- that is, relevant to this case -- is the test answers, and there are not many times in Louisiana -- Plaquemines Parish happens to be one -- where the Registrar preserved the applicants' answers there is no requirement under the constitution or statute that they be preserved and most of the

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registrars have been administering the test orally.

If this was a 1971-A case involving discriminatory application of qualification tests for registration, the card and the test answers would be the thing that we would look at to determine whether or not there was any discrimination in either selection, assistance or grading of the tests. The 1971-A cases break down into selection, assistance and rating. I just mention that in passing and tell the Court that there are not too many of the records preserved in Louisiana on this subject, but the ones that have been preserved have been organized and catalogued for the convenience of the Court.

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

You mentioned in your brief that in one instance you found that an applicant had inadvertently signed the answers that had been furnished him by the Registrar. Do you remember that?

MR. DOAR:

I believe that the card was a Plaquemines Parish card.

THE COURT: (Judge Christenberry):

Is that in this exhibit?

MR. DOAR:

Yes sir.

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

The Registrar furnished the applicant with the answers and the applicant never signed the card that he filled out but signed the sample?

MR. DOAR:

That's correct.

Now, of course, that would be relevant evidence on a question of assistance if we were trying a 1971-A case.

Now, the next document, your Honors, concerns documents that were in the possession of the defendants, the State Board of Registrars, state agencies, or local registrars. Now, some of this evidence is extremely significant. I only want to pause at this time to direct the Court's attention to Plaintiff's Exhibits 101 through 152 which contain --

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

What are those numbers?

MR. DOAR:

101 through 152, which contain the minutes, among other things, of the number of meetings held throughout the State of Louisiana in late in 1958 and early 1959 under the auspices of the State Board of Registrars and the Joint Legislative Committee. We also cite these minutes of meetings -- there are

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various reports that we think are relevant, made by one or more of the committees concerned with registration, and finally there is a small amount of correspondence which we thought we thought was relevant and which we have offered in evidence.

Now, finally, if the Court please, with respect to the documentary evidence, we have here certain news articles back in 1921 with respect to the constitutional convention which adopted the interpretation tests in Louisiana.

Now, my research, if the Court please, has satisfied me that this particular material is admissible but that judges fluctuate widely as to the weight which should be given to newspaper testimony and that there is a different type. If we had a newspaper report, as was found in the case involving the fire in Dallas, where it was a direct report of what happened, that would be given considerably more weight than a newspaper report as to what the purpose was of a particular meeting or of a particular convention.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

In the Snell case, I don't know whether that was cited in this connection or not, but the Court in the Snell case paid particular attention to newspaper reports.

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MR. DOAR:

As I recall, they did, your Honor, but I will have to say in fairness that those newspaper reports were much more direct than the editorial reporting which we find here. However, this is the best we could get back in 1921 and I think that it does shed some light in weighing it along with other evidence, as to what was the purpose of the constitutional convention in adopting this particular constitutional section. Even, for example, in the case of Darby versus Daniel which was decided in 1957 in the State of Mississippi, there were three Mississippi judges who sat on this case, and they, in that case, your Honors, admitted some newspaper stories as to the convention of 1954 in Mississippi, concerning their constitutional interpretation tests. They held that it was not convincing. They held that it was not entitled to much weight, but they did not quarrel with its admissibility.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

There was an article last week in the newspaper about the 1921 convention. I don't know whether you saw it.

MR. DOAR:

We did, but unfortunately it discussed a part

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of the convention that we were not concerned with.

Now, that summarizes in brief, if the Court please, what the evidence is in this case.

Now, this case involves the Louisiana interpretation tests and the question before the Court is whether the interpretation test in Louisiana is a legitimate method of testing qualifications for voting or a matter which is constitutional and which is left to the State, or whether it is illegal and unconstitutional because it is contrary to the prohibitions of the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

It seems to us, your Honors, that before the Court can determine this question it must know the facts, and the facts begin in 1890, thirty-one years before the first enactment of an interpretation test as part of the Louisiana Constitution.

Briefly, in 1890, in Louisiana, approximately the same number of negroes were registered to vote as white people. I think there were about 120,000 each. In addition, over eighty per cent of the eligible negroes were registered in this State.

In 1898, we had a convention in Louisiana and a constitutional provision was enacted, incorporating the so-called grandfather clause. The grandfather clause, provided that certain individuals who voted

per cent of the total number of voters in the State.

In 1915 the Supreme Court of the United States outlawed the grandfather clause and in 1921 it is our contention that the evidence shows that the interpretation tests replaced the grandfather clause.

It is our contention that the newspaper reports, plus the great secrecy that surrounded the passage of this amendment to the Constitution, is evidence that the purpose of the interpretation tests was to discriminate against negroes. We think that this inference grows stronger as you review the facts as they have taken place since 1921.

Mow, what has been the history of the use of the interpretation tests? They were not used until 1946 and between 1921 and 1948, as a result primarily of the white primaries, never over two-tenths of one per cent of the negroes who were of voting age in Louisiana ever registered to vote. Beginning in 1948, when the white primary was outlawed, the negro

registration began to increase and increased substantially between 1948 and 1956. In this case it went up to almost fifteen per cent of the total vote and during that period of time, as clearly evident, the effort of the negro community to participate in the electoral processes is reflected in the number and extent of litigation involving voting rights in this State.

In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the School

Desegregation Case and shortly after that the Constitutional Interpretation Tests were first used in Plaquemines Parish. It was first used there in late

1954 and it was used only on a local basis, in one parish in the State.

In 1955, there was the creation of the Joint
Legislative Committee which became important later in
the history and the purpose of that committee was to
maintain school segregation. In 1955, we also had
the formation of a great number of Citizens' Council
Organizations in this state and part of the program
to achieve their purposes, which was to maintain segregated facilities -- public facilities and schools
and otherwise -- was to conduct a campaign directed
at voter qualification laws and to insist, if the
Court please, that voter qualification laws be enforced

strictly throughout the State of Louisiana.

The voter qualification law was called by the white Citizens' Council the key to victory in their struggle with respect to carrying their ideas to victory in the State of Louisiana.

And now the next part of the history deals with the efforts of the people in Louisiana to put the tests into operation. We first see that officials of the Citizens' Councils were given jobs as Representatives of the State. Mr. Shaw, who was one of the attorneys for the Citizens' Councils was made

Advisor to the Attorney General's Office. He traveled around the State, urging Registrars to use the Constitution Interpretation Tests.

Congressional District Conferences were held in 1957 and 1958. Now, these conferences are very valuable, it seems to me when you look at the people who attended these conferences in the Congressional Districts. The Joint Legislative Committee, the Director of the State Board of Registration, all district attorneys were involved. All of the chairmen of the local police juries were invited, and many of those attended. All of the Registrars of Voters were invited; the Attorney General also had representatives there. The Citizens' Council had representatives

there, and, in many instances, the newspapers had representatives there.

Now, I have just briefly indicated a number of instances, as contained in here, which reflect what the purpose of those meetings was and, if the Court will excuse me just a minute -- I have mislaid that Here it is right here:

For example, these meetings were designed to indicate to the Registrars that they must strictly use the Constitutional Interpretation Tests. At the second meeting in early 1959 at Monroe, the Attorney General, Mr. Gremillion, told the people there, as this is reported in the minutes, that the Office of Registrar is an extremely important adjunct in the battle to maintain segregated facilities, and that the time may come when the Registrar should be elected by the parishes themselves. This may be the answer, and he went on to tell them that he wanted them to know that the legal, legislative and executive branches are agreed on seeing that the voter qualification laws are enforced.

At the third meeting, Mr. Rainach asked the newspapers to publish nothing about the various meetings.

At the fourth meeting, Mr. Rainach said he would outline the part of the program for maintaining the State's separate school system and indicated that the entire emphasis on the segregation struggle is shifting to the field of voter qualifications and at the time Mr. Rainach distributed a number of registration statistics by race, showing how the registration of negroes had increased from two-tenths of one per cent to fifteen per cent of the total vote.

At the fifth meeting, the report of Mr. Rainach dealt specifically with this particular question. There was discussion on the floor with respect to how the older people of the State would react to requiring them to take this difficult interpretation test and he indicated "... that the old people were the most loyal age group of all to our racially separated institutions; that many of those fine old people vividly remember the voter clean-up drive of 1890 and now the scandalous condition that made the clean-up drive so necessary. They realized," he said, "that similar conditions were making another such drive necessary, and for that reason they supported the Committee's program more solidly than any other group in the State."

Mr. Perez, at another meeting, indicated how they had adopted this card system. That was shortly after the Supreme Court decision in the school case.

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Now, I don't want to burden the Court with a complete history of this. As I say, it is all set forth in here but it reflects clearly that here was a great part of the official arm of the State of Louisiana directing that program, purportedly to increase the level of the electorate in Louisiana but, day after day, time after time, the emphasis was on race and we finally come to 1960, when the State's Sovereignty Commission was created and, in December 1960, there is a very interesting report of the State Sovereignty Commission which I would like to call the Court's attention to particularly. It is found in this exhibit, as Exhibit Number 121, your Honors, and it is not referred to very extensively in our brief as a result of oversight on my part, but this report traces the history of registration in Louisiana and it relates back and runs the statistics and shows, as I have out lined, just exactly what took place from 1890 until 1956 and then says that, as a result, or seems to say, certainly, the inference is clear, that as a result of " ... our efforts in the last four years, the trend has been reversed; only thirteen per cent of the total vote is negro and we seem to be able to maintain this relationship of the total negro vote to the total white vote in Louisiana."

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

Is that the report of the Sovereignty Commission?

MR. DOAR:

Yes, your Honor, it is.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

In the exhibits that you have made up, you only have one set of this exhibit?

MR. DOAR:

But I was going to ask leave of Court to permit me to withdraw it and make three sets of this particular exhibit. I respectfully feel that it is probably one exhibit that the Court will be happy to have extra copies of -- this entire document -- and we can do that when the proceedings are through.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Suppose you do that, then.

MR. DOAR:

All right.

At the end of this report the Sovereignty Commission says this: --

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I think, too, that you should have the right, Mr. Kron, too, to withdraw any of the exhibits in order to make additional copies for the Court.

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MR. KRON:

All right, your Honor.

MR. DOAR:

In the conclusions, the recommendations, it is suggested that it would be well to approach the use of this Constitutional Interpretation Test with reasonableness.

At that time, of course, the Civil Rights Commission had held hearings in Louisiana. We had the 1957 Civil Rights Act and then we had the 1960 Civil Rights Act.

We have the case, United States versus McElveen in which Judge Skelly Wright directly held that the purge of Washington Parish was unconstitutional and ordered the reinstatement on the rolls of some eleven hundred negroes.

We have a suit filed in the Western District of Louisiana, United States versus Culpepper, I think that was in the Bienville Parish suit, in which the testimony before Judge Dawkins, as is reflected in the record, indicated quite clearly that in that particular parish the Registrar was using the Constitutional Interpretation Test solely to discriminate against negroes. The test questions used to deny registration there involved some of the most

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complicated sections of the Louisiana Constitution.

And so I say that in 1960 the Sovereignty Commission began to say, "Let us not push this too far or utter chaos will result, to take it easy. The situation is stable and we seem to be holding the line. Let's relax a little bit. However, in 1961, -- we finally come to the conclusion in this history of events -- In March of 1961 there was a resolution by the Board of Registrars to enforce the test strictly and in October of 1961 there was the first indication of a switch from the interpretation tests to the objective six-question test, and that is reflected, I think, in Exhibit E or F in this set of test cards. That was never put into use. The United States, in December of that year, under 1791-A and C, commenced this action to declare the Louisiana statute unconstitutional and to enjoin Registrars from discriminating on the basis of race in the registration process.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I didn't follow that.

Do you have that?

MR. DOAR:

Well, your Honor, Plaintiff Exhibit E, as I handed it up to the Court --

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THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):
                    I don't have E up here.
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          MR. DOAR:
                    Plaintiff 11-E contains a set of cards.
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          THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):
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                    11-B. I don't see 11-E.
          MR. DOAR:
                    11-E is right there.
          THE COURT (Judge wisdom):
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                    Oh, I see it, right there.
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          MR. DOAR:
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                    There is 11-E.
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                    Judge West, do you have an 11-E?
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          THE COURT (Judge West):
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                    No. This is 11-F and G. I have two copies of
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               11-F and G.
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          MR. DOAR:
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                    Somehow we got them mixed up.
                    Judge Wisdom, I think you have two copies before
               you there. I think you have two copies of the same
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               exhibits.
          THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):
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                    Two copies of these.
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         MR. DOAR:
                    At any rate, if you look at 11-E -- I wonder,
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Judge West, do you have 11-E?

THE COURT (Judge West):

No, I have A, B, F and G.

MR. DOAR:

If you will get this --

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

I will not ask you to repeat this whole thing.

MR. DOAR:

I think I have one of them on the table, here.

Here is one, right here.

At any rate, those test cards there were never used, never circulated, but were a part of a resolution providing for their use which was made in October of 1961.

As the Court notices, there were five objective questions and the sixth question was an interpretation test. The questions were very simple sections of the Constitutional Interpretation, but it is a transition card.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Now, those objective test cards were not circulated to the registrars?

MR. DOAR:

Not at that time, no. They were not.

They were not circulated 'til after the

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Legislature met in the spring of 1962 and enacted some additional legislation that authorized the Board of Registration to have additional authority with respect to providing for tests and in the fall of 1962 the Board circulated throughout the State those test cards and the current tests are Plaintiff Exhibit 18.

Do we also have three copies of this?

MR. DUNBAUGH:

No, we don't.

MR. DOAR:

At any rate, this is the new test that was circulated -- really it was in September of 1962 that the new test went into effect. The new test is contained as part of this exhibit.

Now, it happens, your Honors, that on your exhibit list that Exhibit 18 is not referred to, it was not described in here, and I think it would be helpful if the Court could mark their exhibit lists because this is one document that Mr. Kron was particularly concerned got into the record.

If the Court will permit, we will make three copies of this, too, as Plaintiff Exhibit 18.

We will furnish the Court a little addendum to this exhibit list so as to be sure it is complete.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Please do that.

MR. DOAR:

But, in the meantime, I think if the Court could mark their exhibit lists Plaintiff Exhibit 18 is the new test. And it indicates the new test was circulated on September 7 and it resulted from a Resolution of the State Board on August 3, 1962.

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

Is it the State's contention that this card, in effect, rendered the case moot? These new tests?

MR. DOAR:

I think the State's contention is that the case is not moot, but there is no necessity -- that these tests make it appear or prove that the Court should not issue any kind of injunction in this case. I don't want to speak for the State with respect to whether the new tests are relevant under the question of declaratory judgment as to constitutionality, so I will leave that to Mr. Kron.

Now, finally, with respect to --

THE COURT: (Judge Wisdom):

Tell me, before you do that, what is the difference between the new tests and the old tests?

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Is it their objectivity?
MR. DOAR:

Their objectivity plus the fact they are much easier. They are multiple choice, such questions as, "The church you attend is chosen by the National Government, by yourself, by congress, or that the President must be at least 25, 30 or 35 years old."

I think that is a quite hard one for the layman but it is unfair to read that section alone because there are some questions that are not that hard at all. Also, I want to say to the Court that the standard is not one hundred per cent. The standard is sixty-six and two-thirds, two out of three -- four out of six is the passing grade, four out of six.

Now, I have some summarized for the Court everything that is in the record except the evidence on how the test has been used. We have summarized that in our brief in considerable detail.

I do want to go back over that to summarize what I consider are the highlights.

The first thing is that the test was used in twenty-one parishes, or in about one-third of the State, that is what the proof shows in this case.

And secondly, it shows there have been various types of test cards used and the test cards vary in

difficulty considerably. That is within a set of test cards, one set can be very easy whereas another set can be very difficult.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

You are talking about the old test cards?

MR. DOAR:

The old test cards I am speaking of now.

The gross statistics are quite remarkable. Now, I have prepared, and one of the things that in our brief isn't clear -- is the statistical effect of the use of the test in these particular parishes. I would like to offer as an aid to the Court, after the hearing is over, a statistical summary of the gross statistics of those twenty-one counties. We believe what they show is that in those counties where the tests have been used there were approximately twenty five thousand, or maybe twenty per cent, of the negroes of voting age who were registered at that time that these tests were begun to be used -- I think it's about twenty-five thousand -- and after four years, after four years of using the test the number of negroes in those parishes that were registered have been reduced to eight thousand. What has happened with respect to the white registration? The white registration has gained in those parishes and

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so that now instead of being about twenty per cent of the total vote in those parishes, the negro vote in those particular parishes just may be five or six per cent of the negroes of voting age are registered.

Now, the application cards, as I say, are different from the test cards. We have prepared for the Court's benefit what we had called display exhibits, showing a number of application cards of white persons who were registered in parishes that use the interpretation tests. Now, we don't have in their case the questions, we don't have in most instances the test answers.

In some of these the card with respect to the negro witnesses, the card reflects that they were rejected for failure to pass the Constitutional Interpretation Test, but it is our position that these cards, these application cards, compel the inference that the interpretation test has not been used as a barrier or as a means of eliminating any white person who desires to register in Louisiana. Now, why do we say that compels the inference? We say that because the writing, the spelling and the answers on the application cards reflect that these particular applicants -- and there are quite a number of them -- just would not be able to intelligently answer, without

assistance, any of the questions that have been given to negro applicants in those parishes. These are the cards. There is a great number of them, they have to be looked at, but at any rate this deals with white persons registered under the Interpretation Test.

Finally, we have negro citizens who were denied registration under the registration tests and we say here, and I would like to just pass this up to the Court, we say that a study of those application forms Cf negroes who were rejected because of the tests, compel the inference that the Constitutional Interpretation Test as used in Louisiana was not a test to determine a person's literacy but rather a calculated scheme to lay springs for the negro citizen. Now, the words "calculated scheme to lay springs for the negro citizen' are not mine. They were the words of the United States Supreme Court in the Lassiter case in which they discussed literacy tests and the Court says that the question the Court must determine has to be whether it is a fair way of determining whether the person is literate or whether it is a calculated scheme to lay springs for the citizen. Now, obviously the citizen they are talking about is the negro citizen. Now that is the question that the Court is going to have to decide in this case, and we submit that

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the evidence here compels that inference.

Now, we have also cited in our brief a number of specific examples of cards of particular negroes who were particularly qualified by education, application cards of qualified negroes being rejected because able to they were not/answer to the satisfaction of the Registrar this test, as well as a number of white applicants with very low qualifications who were either not given the test or obviously, from their testimony, were not able to make satisfactory answers.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Let me ask you something. How do you know that these applicants were rejected for failure to pass the interpretation tests?

MR. DOAR:

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That is reflected on the application card.

MR. DUNBAUGH:

It is reflected on the application card.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I just noted some of them say it but some of them don't.

MR. DUNBAUGH:

Those from Ouachita Parish, and the answers to the interrogatories in that suit, says in all but one of those applications, all but one of those applications is mentioned in those answers as having failed the interpretation test. That is the reason she gave.

THE COURT (JUDGE WISDOM):

I see, because it simply gives at the bottom a section of the Constitution and there is no indication that that was necessarily the reason why the applicant was rejected.

MR. DUNBAUGH:

And in that particular instance the applicant scratched out something, scratched out -- It says give your age in number of years, months and days, and this particular applicant scratched out "months".

MR. DOAR:

We have not put in application cards unless there was something in the record to reflect that this person was rejected because of the constitutional interpretation, but we can key that in for the Court if you wish.

THE COURT (JUDGE WISDOM):

I am just curious to know how you knew that these applicants were rejected for failure to pass the Constitutional Interpretation Test.

MR. DOAR:

In each one of those, then, perhaps we can withdraw

them and cue that to the particular place in the record where it is demonstrated and then return them to the Court for their use.

You see, these are not exhibits, these are just displays for the assistance of the Court, like a drawing on the blackboard or the like.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I realize that there is one in the microfilm somewhere and while the microfilm is in evidence, this is the only way we will ever really be able to look at them.

MR. DOAR:

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I just want to make the point that since it is not an exhibit there would not be such objection to make an additional notation on it.

MR. KRON:

I have no objection to cross referencing or whatever you want to do.

THE COURT (Judge Christenberry):

Is it not correct that in the purge in Ouachita Parish the basis was the failure of negro applicants to pass the constitutional test although at the time the test was not being given?

MR. DOAR:

That is true in Ouachita and that is also true

in East Feliciana. We have here one of the challenges from East Feliciana, in which the card indicated that the person who made the challenge says that he was not required to give a reasonable interpretation of any provision, yet at the time this particular negro was registered that was not being used.

Since it was so close to a very important election, it was humanly impossible, under our system of litigation, for those particular people to get any effective relief in 1956.

THE COURT (Judge wisdom):

I have no doubt that if that had consistently been done with regard to people of standing and prominence, someone would have been lynched.

MR. DOAR:

Well, the fact is that it was not done, the purges were not carried out except against negro citizens.

Now, I just want to briefly touch upon the law, your Honors, and I think the three leading cases in this field are Davis against Schnell, the Lassiter case and the Gomillion case, and those cases hold, it seems to me, or stand for the proposition that an interpretation test is unconstitutional if the legislative setting at the time it was passed and

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the time it was put into use put a broad discretion, which is vested in the Registrar, to determine who passes or fails.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

I can give you a fourth case that to my mind is applicable and that is the Grosjean case. The Grosjean case involves the newspaper tax.

MR. DOAR:

I am not familiar with that case.

THE COURT: (Judge wisdom):

Well, it is a very important case in which the

Court -- there was a newspaper tax and the Court

looked behind what was apparently an innocent tax and
held that the purpose of it was to penalize newspapers.

MR. DOAR:

Is that a state case or a federal case?
THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

That is United States Supreme Court case. The

Court looked behind and said the purpose was to pe
nalize newspapers which had attacked the government.

MR. DOAR:

Well, at any rate, your Honor, we have set forth these three cases and we have set forth what we think these cases hold. We think these cases compel the Court to find that this statute is unconstitutional.

The only cases contrary to that are Williams versus Mississippi, which was an old jury selection case where there was no proof at all whether there was any evil use, it was just a possibility of use. There is a second case of Trudeau versus Barnes which was an action for damages which went to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals where the Court held that it did not declare the constitutional interpretation test unconstitutional but the basis for the holding was that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies. They actually didn't reach Constitutional (interpretation.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

These cases are discussed in your brief?

These cases are discussed in your brief?
MR. DOAR:

Yes, they are.

And the third case is Darby versus Daniel, which was a three-judge case in Mississippi decided in 1957, in which that court distinguishes Davis against Schnell. It doesn't discuss Lassiter because I don't think Lassiter had been decided. The holding there was there was insufficient showing of either the legislative setting or of the great discretion or that there had been any discriminatory use and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. Now we think that Darby against Daniel is wrong but, in

any event, the cases are clearly distinguishable because in that case there was no proof of the discriminatory use, just the possibility of discriminatory use

Now, finally, I come to the matter of the relief, the question of the relief in this case. The matter of relief can be broken down into four or five parts.

First of all, whether or not we are entitled to a declaratory judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional. Now, the question is: Is the United States entitled to that finding? In view of the fact that the evidence is clear that the test is no longer used at this time in Mississippi -- in Louisiana, we say that we are entitled to that finding, and the case that we rely principally upon for that proposition is the case in 365 U.S., which is cited in the brief. Excuse me. It is not that case. It is the case 365 U.S.125, which is United States versus Parke Davis, decided in 1961.

THE COURT (Judge Wisdom):

Will you add that as an addendum to your brief?
MR. DOAR:

Yes sir, I will.

At any rate, the Court held that the fact that the defendant had ceased the conduct which formed the basis for the government's lawsuit, was not any