GLEN MURPHREE, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 85-7059 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Brief for the United States in Opposition OPINION BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-9) is reported at 783 F.2d 605. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 4, 1986. A petition for rehearing was denied on March 26, 1986. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 23, 1986. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the district court deprived petitioner of due process of law by declining to give a particular jury instruction. STATEMENT Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, petitioner was convicted on three counts of importing switchblade knives, in violation of the Switchblade Knife Act, 15 U.S.C. 1241 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. 545. Petitioner's sentence was suspended on all three counts in favor of 18 months' probation and a $1000 fine. /1/ 1. The evidence at trial established that on November 2, 1982, Customs inspectors seized packages addressed to petitioner and his son-in-law Larry Tidwell that the inspectors believed contained switchblade knives. The inspectors sent petitioner and Tidwell a formal notice of the seizure of the knives, explaining that their importation was unlawful. III Tr. 368-371, 389-393, 415-417. /2/ In January 1983, Customs inspectors seized three additional packages from Germany, one addressed to Tidwell and the other two to petitioner. Although the Customs forms declared that the packages contained only pocket knives, the inspectors concluded that the knives were switchblade knives. IB Tr. 60-62, 82-85, 95-97. Close examination of the knives further revealed that the knives had been tooled to accommodate a spring (IB Tr. 113, 118, 126-127, 138-140). The inspectors telephoned petitioner, who denied knowing that the packages contained any switchblade knives (IB Tr. 103, 105). During a subsequent interview, petitioner stated that he had been ordering knives from a German company since 1982, but he denied ever having ordered switchblade knives. The manufacturer, petitioner claimed, had sent them without direction. Petitioner also acknowledged having received the November 1982 Customs notice of seizure of switchblade knives, and he acknowledged knowing that the importation of switchblade knives is illegal. He added, however, that the German manufacturer had informed him that if switchblade knives were not assembled, they were not illegal. Petitioner also identified the contents of the two seized packages addressed to him, describing them as switchblade knives and switchblade knife parts, and admitted that he had received springs for the knives in a separate delivery about a week before. Finally, petitioner explained that he sold the knives to finance his knife-collecting hobby. IB Tr. 105-108, 133-134, 169. In May and June 1984, Customs agents seized three more packages of knives. Like the knives in the January shipment, the knives in the later shipments had been designed to accommodate springs, and the blades locked in both the open and closed positions. The three packages were addressed to petitioner's son, Robert Murphree, but the invoices packed inside referred to a different address where, according the petitioner's previous interview with Customs inspectors, petitioner maintained knife catalogues (IB Tr. 103-105; II Tr. 180-181, 185, 225). The Customs declaration accompanying the shipments described the contents as folding knives. The enclosed invoice listed the knives by a designation that the manufacturer's catalogue identified as referring to a "springmesser" or "flicking knife." III Tr. 336-338. Petitioner claimed the packages at the post office (II Tr. 194-195, 234). 2. A grand jury indicted petitioner on nine counts. The three counts on which petitioner was ultimately convicted charged him with unlawfully importing the switchblade knives in the May and June 1984 shipments. /3/ At trial, petitioner moved for acquittal on the ground, inter alia, that under applicable Department of Treasury regulations the knives seized by the Customs inspectors were not "switchblade knives" (IA Tr. 23-26, 33-34; III Tr. 440-442; IV Tr. 585). The Treasury regulations define a switchblade knife as either a knife with a blade that opens automatically (19 C.F.R. 12.95(a)(1)), or a knife with "a stiletto or other blade style which is designed for purposes that include a primary use as a weapon" and which, by insignificant preliminary preparation "can be altered or converted so as to open automatically" (19 C.F.R. 12.95(a)(2); see Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 378 F.2d 1014, 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967)). Consistent with this definition, the regulations also provide that it is not unlawful to import knives with primarily utilitarian blades that cannot open automatically at the time of entry. 19 C.F.R. 12.96(a). Petitioner contended at trial that his knives had merely utilitarian blades and did not open automatically upon entry into the country. Therefore, he claimed, they fell outside the reach of the Switchblade Knife Act and its implementing regulations (IA Tr. 23-26, 33-34; III Tr. 440-442; IV Tr. 585). The district court denied petitioner's motions for acquittal (IA Tr. 43-48; III Tr. 465-468; IV Tr. 589). According to the court, a jury could reasonably conclude that the blade on each of petitioner's knives was the equivalent of a stiletto or otherwise had a primary purpose as a weapon (see IA Tr. 45; III Tr. 450; IV Tr. 589). The court concluded that the jury should be allowed to determine whether petitioner's knives were switchblade knives (IA Tr. 44-46; III Tr. 467; IV Tr. 589; see also Fall v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 297 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1961) ("Because of the dual nature of certain instruments as tools or weapons, the determination of the character of the instrument for purposes of litigation is usually one for the jury."). The court stressed, however, that the "weapon" limitation set forth in the Treasury regulations would have to be included in the jury instructions (III Tr. 467), which the court subsequently accomplished by including the contents of Section 12.95 of the regulations in the charge to the jury (IV Tr. 618-620). The court declined petitioner's request that the contents of Section 12.96 similarly be included in the instructions (J. App. 42). The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the three counts charging him with unlawfully importing switchblade knives; the jury acquitted petitioner on all the other counts. 3. The court of appeals affirmed. The court rejected petitioner's claim, repeated here, that the district court's refusal to include in its jury instructions the contents of Treasury regulation Section 12.96, along with Section 12.95, violated due process (Pet. App. 3-8). /4/ The court concluded that the district court's jury instructions accurately stated the law, which makes unlawful the importation of either fully assembled and operational switchblade knives or knives that can be converted to switchblade knives with insignificant alterations (Pet. App. 3-5). The court also suggested that if Section 12.96 of the regulations had been included in the instructions, "the case would have had a different result of necessity" because that "regulation refers to the condition of the knives 'as entered' without regard to the effect of any 'insignificant alteration,' and since they indisputably did not upon automatically at that time" (Pet. App. 5). The court concluded, however, that Section 12.96 was not binding on the courts and, therefore, the district court did not err in declining to include that regulation in its instructions (Pet. App. 5-8). ARGUMENT The district court did not violate due process by refusing to include Section 12.96 of the Treasury Department regulations in its jury instructions. 1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 5-7) that the district court's decision not to include Section 12.96 in its jury instructions violated due process because it deprived petitioner of the opportunity to prove his reliance on the terms of that regulation, as required by this Court's decision in United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973). Petitioner, however, misapprehends the role of jury instructions, and his reliance on Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. is misplaced. The purpose of jury instructions is for the judge to state accurately the law for the jury to apply. Because the judge does not give the jury instructions until after all the witnesses have testified and counsel have completed their closing arguments, the content of those instructions in no manner adversely affects, let alone deprives, a defendant of his ability to offer exculpatory evidence at trial. Certainly, in this case, petitioner's ability to establish at trial that he had relied on and somehow been misled by the Treasury regulations, including Section 12.96, was in no sense dependent on the content of the jury instructions subsequently given by the district court. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. does not suggest a different result. In Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., the Court held that the district court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to prove that it had been affirmatively misled by administrative practice into believing that its actions were lawful (see 411 U.S. at 673-675). In this case, however, the district court never refused to permit petitioner to prove his reliance on the content of the Treasury regulations -- indeed, from the record it does not appear that petitioner ever attempted to make such a showing. The district court simply held that Section 12.96 did not have to be incorporated into the jury instructions in order to give the jury an accurate statement of the law. 2. The district court, moreover, did not err in its charge to the jury because an accurate statement of the law did not require inclusion of Section 12.96. Section 12.95, which the district court included in its instructions, sufficiently defined the meaning of a "switchblade knife" and the scope of the relevant statutory prohibitions, without the need to resort to Section 12.96. Section 12.95 makes plain that if a knife does not open automatically at the time of entry into the country, it is a switchblade knife only if (1) the knife's blade is a stiletto or otherwise of a style the primary purposes of which include use as a weapon, and (2) the knife may, with insignificant preliminary preparation, be converted so as to open automatically. Section 12.95 also defines the meaning of a "utilitarian use" of a knife (12.95(c)). Section 12.96 simply provides explicitly what is already made plain implicitly by Section 12.95 -- that is, that a person may lawfully import a knife that does not open automatically at the time of entry as long as the blade is designed for a utilitarian use and its primary purposes do not include use as a weapon. The district court's decision not to include Section 12.96 in the jury instructions, therefore, did not affect the accuracy of its presentation of the law to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-676 (1975); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147 (1973). /5/ 3. Although petitioner couches his complaint in terms of erroneous jury instructions, petitioner's claim is, at bottom, an assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction (Pet. 7-8). In particular, petitioner argues that there was no "evidence that the blades in the knives in question had a primary use as a weapon" (Pet. 8). The district court rejected this same argument on three occasions and held that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to resolve that question (IA Tr. 23-26, 33-34; III Tr. 440-442; IV Tr. 585). The court itself concluded that a blade, like the type of blade in petitioner's knives, which can be locked in an extended position, could be characterized as a "stiletto" (IA Tr. 45; III Tr. 450, 468). In addition, a knife collector testified at trial that the ability of the blade to lock into place bore on its functional purpose, and he concluded that petitioner's knives, whether operational or not, were switchblades (see II Tr. 286, 289-290). Petitioner's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict is, therefore, refuted by the record. /6/ In all events, such a factbound contention presents no legal issue warranting this Court's review. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General STEPHEN S. TROTT Assistant Attorney General GLORIA C. PHARES Attorney AUGUST 1986 /1/ Petitioner was tried with his son, Robert Murphree, and his son-in-law, Larry Tidwell. Robert Murphree was convicted and acquitted on the same counts as his father and received the same suspended sentence and fine. He has not sought review in this Court. Tidwell was acquitted on all counts. /2/ "Tr." refers to the trial transcript and "J.App." refers to the joint appendix in the court of appeals. /3/ Petitioner was also charged with one count of conspiracy, four counts of introducing switchblades into interstate commerce, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1242, and one count of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). /4/ The court also rejected petitioner's claims that (1) the Switchblade Knife Act, 15 U.S.C. 1241 et seq., is unconstitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to him, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Pet. App. 8-9. /5/ Although the court of appeals agreed that Section 12.95 accurately states the law (see Pet. App. 5), the court added that, in its view, if Section 12.96 had been included in the jury instructions "the case would have had a different result of necessity" (ibid.). We disagree with the court's suggestion on that point and, for that reason, we believe the court's inquiry into the binding effect of Section 12.96 was unnecessary. Section 12.96 is wholly consistent with Section 12.95. Section 12.96 concerns knives with utilitarian blades that do not open automatically, while Section 12.95(a)(2) concerns knives with weapon-style blades. In this case, the district court properly allowed the jury to determine whether the particular knives at issue fell under the permissive scope of 12.96 or the prohibitory scope of 12.95. There is no reason to believe that the jury would have reached a different result if the jury instructions had included Section 12.96 because, as discussed above, that regulation merely states explicitly what Section 12.95 already makes plain implicitly. /6/ Petitioner's focus on the court of appeals' characterization of the knives as having "a general purpose blade" is unavailing. Even if that characterization is accurate, the court was not addressing the issue whether a primary purpose of a general purpose blade may include use as a weapon. The record in this case demonstrates, moreover, that there was ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion that use as a weapon was a primary purpose of petitioner's knives. The court of appeals never questioned that finding; to the contrary, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict (see Pet. App. 8).