THOMAS LINDLEY ROBERTS, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 90-6474 In The Supreme Court Of The United States October Term, 1990 On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit Brief For The United States In Opposition OPINION BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-4) is reported at 915 F.2d 889. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on September 12, 1990. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 10, 1990. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). QUESTION PRESENTED Whether petitioner's provisional sentence, imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4244(d), impermissibly exceeds the maximum prison term he could receive under the Sentencing Guidelines. STATEMENT After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, petitioner was convicted of threatening to murder a United States judge, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). Prior to sentencing, the district court determined that petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect and that, in lieu of being sentenced to imprisonment, he should be committed to a suitable facility for treatment. Accordinly, under authority of 18 U.S.C. 4244(d), the court provisionally sentenced petitioner to five years' commitment in a treatment facility. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-4. 1. In December 1987, petitioner sent a letter to the chambers of Justice O'Connor stating as follows: "To O'Connor: Since the court insists upon violating my kids' rights to life (survive), you are all now notified that either Brennan, Stevens or Kennedy is to die." The FBI viewed the letter as a possible threat and commenced an investigation. Federal agents determined that petitioner was involuntarily committed at the Veterans' Administration Hospital at Perry Point, Maryland, and interviewed him there. During the interview, petitioner indicated that his letter was prompted by his opposition to abortion. He stated that he had "a love in his heart" for all the Justices of the Supreme Court, but that he found no conflict between that love and his desire to kill certain Justices. Pet. App. 2. In November 1988, petitioner became a voluntary patient at Perry Point with grounds privileges. This change in status led the FBI to swear out a criminal complaint against petitioner in order to prevent him from leaving the Perry Point grounds. Pet. App. 2. Before trial, the government raised the question of petitioner's competence to stand trial. Petitioner insisted that he was competent and that he did not intend to raise an insanity defense. After a hearing, the court found petitioner competent. Ibid.; Gov't C.A. Br. 17 n.9. 2. At trial, petitioner's illness was identified as paranoid schizophrenia. Pet. App. 2. After conviction, the district court held a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4244(c) to determine if petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect. Both parties agreed that he did so suffer, and the court concluded that, in lieu of imprisonment, he should be committed to a suitable facility for care and treatment. Pet. App. 3. As required on such a finding (18 U.S.C. 4244(d) & (e)), the court committed petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization in a suitable facility pending a determination by the facility that petitioner has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that he is no longer in need of custody for care or treatment. Under Section 4244(d), such commitment for treatment of mental illness "constitutes a provisional sentence of imprisonment to the maximum term authorized by law for the offense for which the defendant was found guilty." Because 18 U.S.C. 115, the statute under which petitioner was convicted, provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, the court entered a provisional sentence of treatment for that length of time. Pet. App. 3. 3. On appeal, petitioner contended that the length of his provisional sentence should have been determined, not by reference to the maximum sentence prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 115, but by reference to the Sentencing Guidelines, which would have yielded a sentence of six to 12 months. The court of appeals rejected that contention, explaining that "the words 'maximum sentence' are generally understood to and often employed to refer to the greatest amount of punishment that the law will permit," and that "if Congress had wanted maximum term authorized by law to mean maximum term authorized by the sentencing guidelines, it could have said so." Pet. App. 4. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that his provisional sentence deprived him of equal portection of the laws because individuals found to exhibit mental problems at different stages of the proceeding are subject to the requirements of different statutory provisions. Pet. App. 3. The court explained that petitioner, who was found to be suffering from a metal disease prior to sentencing, was not similarly situated to a defendant found incompetent to stand trial, or to a prisoner found to be mentally ill while serving his sentence. The court also noted that the statutes "do not treat the mentally ill differently" insofar as each "sets definite standards for the length of commitment." Finally, the court concluded that any differential treatment under the provision was justified by a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose. Pet. App. 4. ARGUMENT Petitioner renews his challenge to his five-year provisional sentence and commitment for treatment under Section 4244(d). Specifically, he contends that, as a matter of statutory construction and equal protection, his provisional sentence and commitment for treatment impermissibly exceed the maximum prison term to which he is subject under the Sentencing Guidelines. That contention, which implicates no conflict with any decision of any other court of appeals, is without merit. 1. The Sentencing Guidelines do not govern the length of commitments under Section 4244(d). That Section explicitly provides for a provisional sentence "to the maximum term authorized by law for the offense for which the defendant was found guilty." Interpreting that provision to mean what it says -- that the "maximum term" in question is the term authorized by the statute under which the defendant was convicted -- is both logical and, indeed, consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. In implementing the classification scheme for offenses, the legislation mandating the Guidelines defines the phrase "maximum term of imprisonment" to mean the prison term prescribed by the statute defining the offense. 18 U.S.C. 3559(b). As the Senate report explained, "(t)he definition of maximum prison terms (under the scheme) does not alter existing statutory maximums: the existing Federal statutes still determine the maximum terms of imprisonment." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1983). If Congress had wanted the phrase "maximum term authorized by law" in Section 4244 to mean the maximum term authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines, it would, as the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 4), have made that intention explicit. Moreover, petitioner's proposed reference to the Sentencing Guidelines would be essentially unworkable. The Guidelines apply except "as otherwise specifically provided." 18 U.S.C. 3551(a). That is precisely the case when a defendant is committed under 18 U.S.C. 4244(d). A defendant committed in accordance with that provision is not sentenced under the Guidelines; hence, it would be impossible to determine what the maximum Guidelines sentence would be unless the district court were to engage in a hypothetical sentencing exercise for the purpose of determining whether an upward departure was permissible and appropriate. The Guidelines become relevant only if, before the expiration of the provisional sentence, petitioner is determined to have made a sufficient recovery to obviate the need for further confinement for treatment in an appropriate facility and is returned to court for sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 4244(e). Because Section 4244 provides for immediate treatment in lieu of immediate sentencing, it is apparent that Congress could not have intended the Guidelines sentence to govern the maximum term of commitment of a mentally ill defendant. Petitioner argues (Pet. 6) that subjecting mentally ill convicted persons to longer periods of confinement than healthy convicts produces disparate results that conflict with the spirit of Guideline Section 5H1.3. That provision states that "(m)ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines." This argument fails to appreciate that Section 4244 reflects Congress's conviction that, in sentencing mentally ill defendants, the objective of eliminating sentencing disparities must give way to the need to provide effective care and treatment. Accordingly, rather than invoking the Sentencing Guidelines in the first instance, the statute deploys a more flexible remedy in order to provide care and treatment to mentally ill defendants according to their individual needs. It is, no doubt, partly because there are distinct procedures for sentencing mentally ill persons that the Guidelines discount mental and emotional conditions as a basis for departure. /1/ 2. Assuming that the Guidelines do not govern his provisional sentence as a matter of statutory construction, petitioner contends (Pet. 6) that equal protection principles preclude his confinement for treatment beyond the maximum term of imprisonment he could receive under the Guidelines. Sepcifically, he argues that any provisional sentence exceeding the maximum sentence authorized by the Guidelines unconstitutionally subjects him to a longer term of commitment than is provided by 18 U.S.C. 4241 for defendants found incompetent to be sentenced, or by 18 U.S.C. 4245 for persons whose mental illness is discovered after imprisonment. /2/ Equal protection principles recognize that legislatures may draw distinctions between classes of persons based on a rational connection to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595-1596 (1989). /3/ Under this Court's decisions, a mentally ill defendant who is about to be sentenced occupies a different legal position than a defendant who is incompetent or a mentally ill prisoner. Incompetent defendants, to whom Section 4241 applies, may not be tried or sentenced. The purpose of providing treatment for such persons is therefore to help such persons attain competency so that they may be subjected to the legal process. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), this Court held that a person who is committed solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial cannot, under the Due Process Clause, be held more than the reasonable period of time required to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. Section 4241 is premised on that holding. Prisoners who become mentally ill after sentencing, to whom Section 4245 applies, may not have their terms of imprisonment extended beyond the expiration of their previously imposed sentences. This Court has held that, under the Due Process Clause, a person may not be civilly committed for mental illness without a finding that he is dangerous. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-427 (1979). The compelled hospitalization of a prisoner after the term of his sentence has expired would effectively constitute civil commitment. Accordingly, Congress has provided that prisoners whose sentences have expired may be subject to continued confinement for care and treatment only on a finding that they are suffering from a mental illness as a result of which they pose a danger to the community. 18 U.S.C. 4246. Absent a finding of dangerousness, a prisoner's commitment for treatment for mental illness must terminate with the completion of his sentence, even if that sentence is shorter than the maximum sentence authorized by the charging statute. Section 4244, in contradistinction to both of those provisions, is a sentencing statute for the mentally ill. There can be no doubt that Congress may properly make mental illness a factor in prescribing sentence length; personal factors bearing on a defendant's chances for rehabilitation have long been regarded as relevant to sentencing. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-564 (1984); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-248 (1949). Thus, Congress was free in Section 4244 to require that mentally ill defendants be committed for care and treatment for a period not to exceed the maximum term authorized for the offense; it could not have applied a similar requirement to either incompetent defendants or to prisoners whose illness becomes manifest after sentencing. Accordingly, the disparate treatment afforded mentally ill persons under Sections 4241, 4244, and 4245 does not violate equal protection principles. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. KENNETH W. STARR Solicitor General ROBERT S. MUELLER, III Assistant Attorney General JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ Attorney FEBRUARY 1991 /1/ Petitioner's reliance (Pet. 5) on United States v. R.L.C., 915 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1990), is unaviling. That case involved the construction of the phrase "maximum term of imprisonment" in 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(1)(B), which provides that a juvenile delinquent who is less than 18 years old may be sentenced to official detention not to extend beyond his twenty-first birthday or "the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult," whichever comes first. The court in R.L.C. held that that statute prohibits a court from sentencing a juvenile to a sentence greater than an adult would receive for the same offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. 915 F.2d at 325. Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See United States v. Marc L., 868 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.) (holding that a juvenile may be sentenced under Section 5037(c)(1)(B) to the maximum sentence authorized by the charging statute), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 369 (1989). But the crucial point here is that the court in R.L.C. did not address the meaning of the phrase "maximum term authorized by law" in Section 4244, nor did it consider the history and purposes of that Section. There is no conflict among the circuits on the issue presented in this case. /2/ Under Section 4241(d), a defendant found to be incompetent any time prior to sentencing may be hospitalized for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, in order to determine if he will become competent in the foreseeable future, and for an additional reasonable period of time (to be determined by the court) if he is likely within that further time to become competent. Under Section 4245, a prisoner suffering from mental illness may be committed for treatment for a period not to extend beyond the expiration of his sentence. /3/ Petitioner does not contend that any form of heightened scrutiny applies in this case.