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\par No. 93-1577
\par 
\par In the Supreme Court of the United States
\par 
\par OCTOBER TERM, 1994
\par 
\par QUALITEX COMPANY, PETITIONER
\par 
\par v.
\par 
\par JACOBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC.
\par 
\par ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
\par THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
\par FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
\par 
\par BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
\par AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
\par 
\par NANCY J. LINCK\tab \tab \tab 
\par Solicitor\tab \tab \tab 
\par \tab \tab \tab \tab      
\par ALBIN F. DROST\tab \tab \tab 
\par Deputy Solicitor
\par 
\par NANCY C. SLUTTER
\par Associate Solicitor
\par 
\par LINDA MONCYS ISACSON
\par Assistant Solicitor
\par 
\par Patent and
\par Trademark Office
\par Arlington, VA 22215
\par 
\par DREW S. DAYS, III
\par Solicitor General
\par 
\par FRANK W. HUNGER
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par 
\par ANNE K. BINGMAN
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par 
\par LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
\par Deputy Solicitor General
\par  
\par DIANE P. WOOD
\par Deputy Assistant Attorney
\par General
\par 
\par JAMES A. FELDMAN
\par Assistant to the Solicitor General
\par 
\par WILLIAM KANTER
\par MARC RICHMAN
\par DAVID SEIDMAN
\par Attorneys
\par 
\par Department of Justice
\par Washington, D.C. 20530
\par (202)514-2217
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par QUESTION PRESENTED
\par 
\par Whether a color alone may be protected as a registered
\par trademark under the Lanham Act.
\par 
\par (I)
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par       
\par TABLE OF CONTENTS
\par 
\par Page
\par 
\par Interest of the United States . . . . 1
\par Statement . . . . 2 
\par Summary of argument  . . . . 4
\par Argument:
\par Color alone may be protected as a trademark, so
\par long as the legal prerequisites to such protection
\par are satisfied . . . . 6 
\par A. Color per se may satisfy all of the Lanham Act's
\par requirements for trademark protection . . . . 6
\par B. The Ninth Circuit's policy concerns do not war-
\par rant complete exclusion of color from trademark
\par protection . . . . 17
\par C. If this Court finds the statute ambiguous or
\par silent on the subject, deference should be given
\par to the PTO'S interpretation of the Lanham Act . . . . 23
\par Conclusion . . . . 27 
\par      
\par TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
\par 
\par Cases:
\par 
\par A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom
\par Rope Co., 201 U. S. 166 (1906) . . . . 19, 21
\par AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th
\par Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) . . . . 19
\par Amsted Indus., In re, 972 F.2d 1326 (Fed. Cir.
\par 1992) . . . . 17
\par Bose Corp., In re, 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . 13
\par Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Limited, Nos.
\par 94-1049 & 94-1050 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 1994) . . . . 14, 15, 18
\par Clarke, In re, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) . . . . 9
\par Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Channellock, Inc., 788 F.
\par Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1992) . . . . 26
\par Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85
\par (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.
\par 1983) . . . . 15
\par         
\par (III)
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par             
\par IV
\par 
\par Cases-Continued:              
\par 
\par Page
\par 
\par Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142
\par F. 727 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589
\par (1906) . . . . 13
\par Eagle Fence Rentals, Inc., In re, 231 U.S.P.Q. 228
\par (T.T.A.B. 1986) . . . . 26
\par Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document
\par Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir.
\par 1993) . . . . 24
\par Edward Week Inc. v. IM Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142
\par (T.T.A.B. 1990) . . . . 26
\par Electrolyte Laboratories, Inc., In re, 929 F.2d 645
\par (Fed. Cir. 1990) . . . . 19
\par Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston,
\par Inc., 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980) . . . . 19
\par Fotomat Corp. v. Ace Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q. 92 (S.D.
\par Calif. 1980) . . . . 8
\par General Electric Broadcasting Co., In re, 199
\par U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) . . . . 9
\par General Petroleum Corp., In re, 49 F.2d 966
\par (C.C.P.A. 1931) . . . . 21
\par Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc.,
\par 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960) . . . . 19
\par Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
\par Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) . . . . 11, 13
\par Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822
\par (3d Cir. 1981) . . . . 15
\par Kotzin, In re, 276 F.2d 411 (C.C.P.A. 1960) . . . . 7
\par Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) . . . . 24
\par Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d
\par 219 (8th Cir. 1993) . . . . 4, 17, 18, 19, 21
\par McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp.
\par 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) . . . . 19
\par Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., In re, 335 F.2d 836
\par (C.C.P.A. 1964) . . . . 8
\par Mogen David Wine Corp., In re, 328 F.2d 925
\par (C.C.P.A. 1964) . . . . 8
\par Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., In re, 671 F.2d 1332
\par (C.C.P.A. 1982) . . . . 12
\par Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397
\par (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933
\par (1988) . . . . 19
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par             
\par V
\par 
\par Cases-Continued:              
\par 
\par Page
\par 
\par National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
\par Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992) . . . . 23, 24
\par Northwest Airlines, Inn. v. County of Kent, 114
\par S. Ct. 855 (1994) . . . . 24
\par NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th
\par Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991) . . . . 4, 18, 19
\par Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., In re:
\par 221 U.S.P.Q. 1195 (T.T.A.B. 1984), rev'd, 774
\par F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . 25, 26
\par 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . passim
\par Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
\par U.S. 189 (1985) . . . . l0, 15,24
\par Philco Corp.  . Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663
\par (7th Cir. 1943) . . . . 22
\par Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d
\par 925 (7th Cir. 1984) . . . . 19
\par Ritchie Mfg. Co., In re, 170 U.S.P.Q. 291 (T.T.A.B.
\par 1971 ) . . . . 25
\par Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber
\par Works of America, Inc., 257 F. 937 (2d Cir.),
\par cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919) . . . . 8
\par Security Engineering Co., In re, 113 F.2d 494
\par (C.C.P.A. 1940) . . . . 21
\par Shaw, In re, 184 U.S.P.Q. 253 (T.T.A.B. 1974) . . . . 25
\par Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65
\par (lOth Cir. 1958) . . . . 19
\par Swift & Co., In re, 223 F.2d 950 (C. C.P.A. 1955) . . . . 8, 11
\par Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
\par 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . 12
\par Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
\par 2753 (1992) . . . . l0, 12, 14
\par Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, 644
\par F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981) . . . . 11
\par William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265
\par U.S. 526 (1924) . . . . 8, 13
\par World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World
\par Carpets, 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . . 19
\par World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., In re, 474 F.2d
\par 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973) . . . . 8
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par           
\par VI
\par 
\par Statutes:                 
\par 
\par Page
\par 
\par Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427:
\par 2, 60 Stat. 428 . . . . 22
\par 45, 60 Stat. 443 . . . . 7, 22
\par Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127 . . . . 1
\par 2, 15 U.S.C. 1052 . . . . 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17
\par 2(a), 15 U.S.C. 1052 (a) . . . . 9
\par 2(b), 15 U.S.C. 1052 (b) . . . . 9
\par 2(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052 (c) . . . . 9
\par 2(d), 15 U.S.C. 1052 (d) . . . . 9
\par 2(e), 15 U.S.C. 1052 (e) . . . . 9, 10
\par 2(f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(f) . . . . 10, 11
\par 7(b), 15 U.S.C. 1057 (b) . . . . 20, 24, 27
\par 9(a), 15 U.S.C. 1059 (a) . . . . 13
\par 12, 15 U.S.C. 1062 . . . . 24
\par 15, 15 U.S.C. 1065 . . . . 20, 24
\par 17, 15 U.S.C. 1067 . . . . 25
\par 21, 15 U.S.C. 1071 . . . . 25
\par 22, 15 U.S.C. 1072 . . . . 20
\par 32(1), 15 U.S.C. 1114 (1) . . . . 2
\par 32(1) (a), 15 U.S.C. 1114 (1) (a) . . . . 18
\par 32(1) (b), 15 U.S.C. 1114 (1) (b) . . . . 18
\par 42, 15 U.S.C. 1124 . . . . 20
\par 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 1125 (a) . . . . 2, 17, 20
\par 45, 15 U.S.C. 1127 . . . . 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16
\par Trade Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 . . . . 22
\par Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
\par 100-667, Tit. 1, 102 Stat. 3935 . . . . 22
\par 134(3), 102 Stat. 3947 . . . . 7
\par 15 U.S.C. 81 et seg. (repealed) . . . . 22
\par 
\par Miscellaneous:
\par 
\par Lawrence D. Grewach, Recent Case, In re Owens-
\par Corning Fiberglas Corp.: The Federal Circuit
\par Puts Owens-Corning "In the Pink", 35 Am.
\par U. L. Rev. 1221 (1986) . . . . 22
\par Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks
\par and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis:
\par I, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 168 (1930) . . . . 8
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par VII
\par 
\par Miscellaneous-Continued:           
\par 
\par Page
\par 
\par Brian Richard Henry, Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In
\par re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and
\par the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76 Trade-
\par mark Rep. 389 (1986) . . . . 22
\par Janet R. Hubbard, Note, Think Pink! Color Can
\par Be A Trademark, 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1433
\par (1986) . . . . 22
\par S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) . . . . 10, 15, 22
\par S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) . . . . 23
\par The Random House Dictionary of the English
\par Language (2d ed. 1987) . . . . 7
\par Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (2d
\par ed. 1993) . . . . 26
\par Webster's Third New International Dictionary
\par (1986) . . . . 7
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par In the Supreme Court of the United States
\par       
\par OCTOBER TERM, 1994
\par        
\par No. 93-1577
\par     
\par QUALITEX COMPANY, PETITIONER
\par           
\par v.
\par      
\par JACOBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC.
\par 
\par ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
\par THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
\par FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
\par 
\par BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
\par AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
\par 
\par INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
\par 
\par This case presents the question whether the Lanham
\par Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, authorizes the registration of
\par color alone as a trademark with the Patent and Trade-
\par mark Office (PTO), a component of the United States
\par Department of Commerce. The United States has a sub-
\par stantial interest in the resolution of that question, because
\par it is the PTO that must in the first instance determine
\par whether a "word, name, symbol, or device," 15 U.S.C.
\par 1127, is registrable as a trademark. The United States
\par also has an interest in protecting the pro-competitive pol-
\par icies of both the trademark and the antitrust laws. In
\par addition, the United States has an interest in the ques-
\par tion presented because the United States must address the
\par proper protection afforded trademarks in international
\par treaty negotiations. The United States has advocated in
\par           
\par (1)
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 2
\par 
\par such negotiations that other countries recognize that color
\par per se may function as a trademark.
\par        
\par STATEMENT
\par 
\par 1. In 1957, petitioner began manufacturing and selling
\par pads with a "unique green-gold color" for use on dry
\par cleaning presses. In 1989, respondent began manufactur-
\par ing and marketing press pads with the same green-gold
\par color. Pet. App. 2a.
\par In March 1990, petitioner filed this action in federal
\par district court, alleging that respondent infringed petition-
\par er's trade dress and that respondent "passed off" its goods
\par as those of petitioner, in violation of Section 43(a) of the
\par Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). While the suit was
\par pending, petitioner obtained Trademark Registration No.
\par 1,633,711 for a green-gold color as applied to press pads
\par for use in the dry cleaning industry. 1. Petitioner filed a
\par supplemental complaint, which added the claim that re-
\par spondent infringed that trademark, in violation of Section
\par 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1). Respond-
\par ent counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that peti-
\par tioner's trademark was invalid on the ground that a trade-
\par mark could not be granted for color alone and that, even
\par if such a trademark could in some instances be granted, it
\par should not have been granted to petitioner for the green-
\par gold color. Pet. App. 2a-4a.
\par 2. After a bench trial, the district court entered judg-
\par ment for petitioner on its claims of trademark infringe-
\par ment and unfair competition and ruled against respond-
\par ent's counterclaim for cancellation of the trademark. Pet.
\par App. 30a-31a. The court awarded damages in the amount
\par of $8,208 to petitioner and enjoined respondent from
\par "manufacturing, marketing or selling press pads made of
\par any fabric using the same green-gold color * * * or so
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 1 The PTO presently has pending an administrative proceeding in-
\par volving petitioner's registration. That proceeding is currently
\par suspended, because of the pendency of this case. Jacobson Prods.
\par Co. V. Qualitex Co., Cancellation No. 19,712.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 3
\par 
\par close to said color that it cannot be easily distinguished
\par from * * * [petitioner's] color by the casual user." Pet.
\par App. 3 la.
\par With respect to the trademark infringement claim and
\par the cancellation counterclaim, the court found that peti-
\par tioner had spent substantial sums advertising the color of
\par its press pads since 1960, and that the color had "ac-
\par quired distinctiveness or secondary meaning." Pet. App.
\par 17a. The court also found that respondent had "inten-
\par tionally copied the overall look of [petitioner's] green-gold
\par press pad," Pet. App. 20a, and that, based on anecdotal
\par evidence and a survey conducted by petitioner, respond-
\par ent's use of the green-gold color "has created the likeli-
\par hood of confusion, deception or mistake in the market-
\par place," Pet. App. 21a. Finally, the court found that the
\par green-gold color was non-functional. It is not the natural
\par color of the yam used to make the press pad, it "does
\par not make the press pad perform better," and it "is more
\par expensive than other colors." Pet. App. 22a. In addi-
\par tion, "there is no danger of 'color depletion.'" Pet. App.
\par 24a. The court found that "[t]here are hundreds or thou-
\par sands of distinctive shades of greens, yellow, blues, and
\par browns or tans available to the competitors without dan-
\par ger that recognizing [petitioner's] trademark will hinder
\par competition." Ibid.
\par 3. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's find-
\par ing of trademark infringement, affirmed its finding of un-
\par fair competition, and ordered cancellation of Qualitex's
\par registered mark. Pet. App. 1a-14a. With respect to the
\par trademark infringement claim and cancellation counter-
\par claim, the court based its ruling on the principle that "a
\par trademark should not be registered for color alone." Pet.
\par App. 7a. The court recognized that "[registration of
\par mere color is not explicitly barred by the Lanham Act."
\par Pet. App. 5a. But, the court concluded, "the better rule"
\par is that color per se is not registrable. Pet. App. 7a. The
\par court based its decision on (1) the "color depletion"
\par theory, under which registration of colors threatens to
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 4
\par 
\par close the market if primary colors or other available
\par colors all become unavailable to new competitors; (2)
\par the contention that "[d]rawing distinctions between close
\par shades of color could present unnecessary problems"; and
\par (3) the contention that "[adequate protection is available
\par when color is combined in distinctive patterns or designs
\par or combined in distinctive logos." Ibid.
\par The court of appeals noted that its decision conflicted
\par with recent decisions of the Federal and Eighth Circuits
\par holding that color alone could be a trademark, see In re
\par Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed.
\par Cir. 1985); Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986
\par F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993), but that its decision was con-
\par sistent with the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Nutra-
\par Sweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (1990), cert.
\par denied, 499 U.S. 983 ( 1991). Pet. App. 6a-7a.
\par 
\par SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
\par 
\par The definition of a trademark under the Lanham Act
\par broadly encompasses "any word, name, symbol, or device
\par * * * used * * * to identify and distinguish" a seller's
\par products "and to indicate the source of the goods." 15
\par U.S.C. 1127. That provision imposes no limit on what
\par kind of product feature can be subject to trademark pro-
\par tection, provided the feature can serve the function of
\par identifying the source of a product. Accordingly, where
\par it is demonstrated that color serves, in a given use, as a
\par symbol or device that identifies the source of a product,
\par the color satisfies the Lanham Act definition.
\par The Ninth Circuit's policy arguments concerning color
\par depletion do not provide a basis for recognizing an extra-
\par statutory exception to the Lanham Act's coverage. To be
\par sure, where a particular use of color is "functional," such
\par as where its use as ornamentation increases the utility or
\par appeal of a product or where there is danger that the
\par available colors for that product would be depleted, pro-
\par tection could not be granted under ordinary trademark
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 5
\par 
\par principles. But that fact does not entail denying trade-
\par mark protection to color in all circumstances, even when
\par -as in this case-the use of a color to identify the source
\par of a product satisfies a careful application of the ordinary
\par prerequisites for trademark protection.
\par Nor do the Ninth Circuit's concerns about the possi-
\par bility of shade confusion and the Ninth Circuit's recogni-
\par tion of the availability of other protection under the un-
\par fair competition provisions of the Lanham Act provide a
\par basis for a rule categorically refusing trademark protec-
\par tion for color. Differentiating among shades to determine
\par whether a use of color has infringed a color trademark is
\par in principle no more difficult than determining whether a
\par use of other kinds of symbols or devices that have some
\par resemblance to a particular trademark is infringing. The
\par fact that unfair competition protection may be available
\par provides no basis for altering Congress's determination to
\par provide for overlapping, distinct forms of protection for
\par trademarks under the unfair competition and trademark
\par provisions of the Lanham Act.
\par Finally, insofar as any ambiguity remains, the PTO'S
\par determination that color may be registered as a trademark
\par is entitled to deference. Congress has expressly delegated
\par authority to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
\par to register trademarks and to administer the Lanham Act.
\par The PTO, which has considerable expertise in this area,
\par has interpreted the Lanham Act to authorize registration
\par of color per se where it serves as a trademark and does
\par not deprive competitors of any reasonable right or com-
\par petitive need. That interpretation is reasonable and con-
\par sistent with the statute, and it should be given deference
\par by reviewing courts.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 6
\par 
\par ARGUMENT
\par 
\par COLOR ALONE MAY BE PROTECTED AS A TRADE-
\par MARK, SO LONG AS THE LEGAL PREREQUISITES
\par TO SUCH PROTECTION ARE SATISFIED
\par 
\par A. Color Per Se May Satisfy All Of The Lanham Act's
\par Requirements For Trademark Protection
\par 
\par 1. Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that a
\par color alone may not be the subject of a trademark, it
\par correctly held that "[r]egistration of mere color is not
\par explicitly barred by the Lanham Act." Pet. App. 5a. A
\par single color may satisfy the Lanham Act's definition of a
\par "trademark," and a color need not be excluded by any
\par of the specific exceptions to registrability in Section 2
\par of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052.
\par Under Section 45 of the Lanham Act, the term "trade-
\par mark" is defined to
\par 
\par include[] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
\par combination thereof-
\par (1) used by a person, or
\par (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to
\par use in commerce and applies to register on the
\par principal register established by this chapter,
\par to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including
\par a unique product, from those manufactured or sold
\par by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
\par even if that source is unknown.
\par 15 U.S.C. 1127.
\par 
\par That definition is very broad. The initial portion of the
\par definition-" word, name, symbol, or device''-does not
\par limit the definition at all, and we are aware of no case
\par construing those terms to exclude a product feature for
\par which a seller sought trademark protection. 2. It is the
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 2  The present definition of a trademark is similar to the Lanham
\par Act's original definition, which provided that " [t]he term 'trade-
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 7
\par 
\par function of a feature in distinguishing a product and in-
\par dicating its source, rather than the nature of the feature,
\par that determines whether it may be subject to trademark
\par protection. Cf. In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411, 414-415
\par (C.C.P.A. 1960) (definition not "intended to restrict
\par registrable trademarks" in view of use of the term "in-
\par cludes" in definition).
\par The terms "symbol" and "device" are particularly
\par broad. A leading dictionary defines "symbol" as "some-
\par thing used for or regarded as representing something else."
\par The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
\par 1926 (2d ed. 1987). 3. A color may easily satisfy that
\par definition, for colors frequently stand for or represent
\par other things. Familiar examples would include the color
\par green as representing Ireland; the color white when used
\par on a flag, banner, or cloth as a symbol of non-belligerence
\par or truce; and the colors red and green in a traffic signal
\par representing "stop" and "go." The term "device" is de-
\par fined even more broadly as "a thing made for a particular
\par purpose." Id. at 543. 4. A color alone may qualify as
\par either a "symbol" or "device," See Kotzin, 276 F.2d at
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par mark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combina-
\par tion thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
\par identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured
\par or sold by others. " Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 45, 60 Stat. 443.
\par The only difference is that the original definition was limited to
\par marks that were actually used on the goods, while the present defi-
\par nition, adopted in 1988, includes marks that a person has a bona
\par fide intent to use in commerce. See Trademark Law Revision Act
\par of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, Tit. I, 134(3), 102 Stat. 3947. The
\par predecessor to the Lanham Act included no comparable definition
\par of "trademark." See pp. 21-22, infra.
\par 
\par 3 Another leading dictionary defines "symbol" as "something that
\par stands for or suggests something else by reason of relationship,
\par association, convention, or accidental but not intentional resem-
\par blance." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2316 (1986).
\par 
\par 4 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "device"
\par as "something that is formed or formulated by design." Id. at 618.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 8
\par 
\par 415 (mere location of tag on a garment may be "a sym-
\par bol or device or a combination thereof").
\par A color may also qualify under the balance of the stat-
\par utory definition. Prior to the Lanham Act, statutory pro-
\par tection of trademarks extended only to "technical" com-
\par mon law trademarks-i.e., trademarks that are "inher-
\par ently distinctive" and thus have no descriptive content. 5.
\par But the broad definition incorporated into the Act re-
\par quires only that what is sought to be registered serve "to
\par identify and distinguish [a person's] goods, including a
\par unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
\par others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
\par source is unknown. " 15 U.S.C. 1127. Virtually any
\par product feature can satisfy that definition, including entire
\par product designs and packaging. See, e.g., In re World's
\par Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
\par (shape of wrapped candy bar); In re Minnesota Mining
\par & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (triangular
\par shape of chemical); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328
\par F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (decanter wine container);
\par In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950 (C.C.P.A, 1955) (polka
\par dot bands on packaging); Fotomat Corp. v. Ace Corp.,
\par 208 U.S.P.Q. 92 (S.D. Calif. 1980) (building design of
\par photo-finishing store ). So long as the feature is of a type
\par that may be perceived by purchasers to identify the source
\par of a product, it may be protected as a trademark. See,
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 5 See William R. Warner & Co. V. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526,
\par 528 (1924) ("A name which is merely descriptive of the ingredi-
\par ents, qualities or characteristics of an article of trade cannot be
\par appropriated as a trademark and the exclusive use of it afforded
\par legal protection."); Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber
\par Works of America, Inc., 257 F. 937, 946, 957 (2d Cir.) (referring
\par to protection of "technical trade-marks"), cert. denied, 250 U.S.
\par 644 (1919). See also In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774
\par F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See generally Milton Handler &
\par Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and
\par Synthesis: I, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 168, 169-170 (1930).
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 9
\par 
\par e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
\par (fragrance registered as trademark of sewing thread and
\par embroidery yarn ); In re General Electric Broadcasting
\par Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (discussing
\par registration of sound as service mark for radio broadcast-
\par ing services. 6.
\par 2. Section 2 of the Lanham Act confirms the broad
\par scope of the definition of "trademark" in Section 45. It
\par provides that "[n]o trade-mark by which the goods of the
\par applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others
\par shall be refused registration * * * on account of its na-
\par ture unless" it fails within five categories of exceptions,
\par none of which includes color per se. 15 U.S.C. 1052
\par (emphasis added ). 7. Thus, "the nature of a mark is no
\par basis for refusing to register it either as a service mark
\par or as a trademark if it performs as an indication of source
\par and does not fall within" the Section 2 exceptions. Gen-
\par eral Electric, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 562.
\par 3. The legislative history of the Lanham Act con-
\par firms that Congress intended to eliminate arbitrary re-
\par strictions on the types of product features that could be
\par granted trademark protection. The Senate report on the
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 6 A number of sounds have been registered as trademarks, includ-
\par ing Registration No. 916, 522 issued to the National Broadcasting
\par Co the familiar NBC chimes. The notes of the NBC chimes-
\par G, E, and C-are the initials of General Electric Corp., which
\par once owned (and now again owns) the network.
\par 
\par 7 Those categories consist primarily of "immoral, deceptive, or
\par scandalous matter," or the like, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a); "the flag or
\par coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any
\par State or municipality, or of any foreign nation," 15 U.S.C. 1052(b);
\par "a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living
\par individual except by his written consent," 15 U.S.C. 1052(c); "a
\par mark which so resembles" a registered mark "as to be likely,
\par when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to
\par cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive," 15 U.S.C.
\par 1052 (d) ; and a mark which is "merely descriptive" or "deceptively
\par misdescriptive," 15 U.S.C. 1052(e).
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 10
\par 
\par Act explained that Congress's general purpose was "to
\par simplify registration and to make it stronger and more
\par liberal, [and] to dispense with mere technical prohibitions
\par and arbitrary provisions." S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong.,
\par 2d Sess. 3 ( 1946) (emphasis added). In enacting the
\par Lanham Act, Congress determined that "a sound public
\par policy requires that trade-marks should receive nationally
\par the greatest protection that can be given them." Id. at 6.
\par 4. Although Sections 45 and 2 of the Lanham Act do
\par not wholly exclude any type of feature from protection as
\par a trademark, they do impose the requirement that a fea-
\par ture must be used as a trademark in order to receive pro-
\par tection. As this Court has explained, "[i]n order to be reg-
\par istered, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the ap-
\par plicant's goods from those of others." Two Pesos, Inc. v.
\par Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 ( 1992); see
\par Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
\par 189, 194 ( 1985). A mark is thus "distinctive and cap-
\par able of being protected if it either (1) is inherently dis-
\par tinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through sec-
\par ondary meaning." Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
\par A color may not ordinarily receive trademark protec-
\par tion on the ground that it is "inherently distinctive." As
\par this Court explained in Two Pesos, "inherently distinctive"
\par marks are those whose "intrinsic nature[s] serve[] to iden-
\par tify a particular source of a product," and they are usually
\par categorized as "suggestive," "arbitrary," or "fanciful."
\par 112 S. Ct. at 2757. A color is ordinarily applied to a
\par product, however, not to identify its source, but to pro-
\par vide ornamentation; since it therefore ordinarily does not
\par function as a trademark at all, it may not be said to be
\par inherently suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. Rather, it is
\par protectible only if it "has acquired distinctiveness through
\par secondary meaning." Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
\par See 15 U.S.C. 1052(f). 8.
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 8 In the case of "descriptive" marks, Section 2(e) of the
\par Lanham Act specifically permits refusal of registration, unless
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 11
\par 
\par "To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must,
\par show that, in the minds of the public, the primary sig-
\par nificance of a product feature or term is to identify the
\par source of the product rather than the product itself."
\par Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
\par U.S. 844, 851 n.11 ( 1982). In many cases, the "primary
\par significance" of a color will not be "to identify the source
\par of the product," and the color will accordingly not be
\par subject to trademark protection.
\par The question whether a color applied to a particular
\par article has secondary meaning, however, is generally an
\par empirical one to be decided on the basis of the facts of
\par a given case. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
\par 774 F.2d 1116 (1985), for example, the Federal Circuit
\par noted that the producer of the insulation had featured
\par the pink color of its insulation in its very extensive adver-
\par tising campaigns and had shown, through a customer sur-
\par vey, that 40-50% of male homeowners (to whom the in-
\par sulation was marketed ) identified the producer as the
\par manufacturer of pink insulation, Id. at 1126-1127. The
\par court concluded that the "totality of the evidence" estab-
\par lished secondary meaning. Id. at 1128.
\par The same conclusion follows from the district court's
\par factual findings in this case, The district court found that
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par they can satisfy the "distinctiveness'' -or secondary meaning-
\par requirement of Section 2(f). Colors, like other ornamental features
\par of a product, are not "descriptive" of the product. Nonetheless,
\par because such features are not "inherently distinctive," their treat-
\par ment is similar to that of "descriptive" features: it cannot be
\par concluded that the mark functions as a trademark unless a show-
\par ing of distinctiveness has been made. See, e.g., Owens-Corning,
\par 774 F.2d at 1124-1125 (sustaining registration of pink color for
\par fiberglass insulation) ; Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enter-
\par prises, 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981) (sustaining registration
\par for overall design applied to luggage as a source indicator); Swift
\par & Co., 223 F.2d at 953 (holding polka dot banding was "an artistic
\par and unique design or pattern which may be constituted a trade-
\par mark 'device' within the meaning of [the Lanham Act]").
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 12
\par 
\par petitioner had extensively advertised the green-gold color
\par of its press pads, that some customers order the press pads
\par over the telephone by color, and that other manufacturers
\par had used other colors. Pet. App. 17a-18a. The district
\par court also found that survey evidence showed that 39% of
\par those questioned identified petitioner as the manufacturer
\par when shown a green-gold press pad, that none named
\par respondent, and that "[n]umerous" people who partici-
\par pated in the survey stated that they identified the press
\par pad as petitioner's because of its "color." Pet. App. 21a.
\par The district court's conclusion that that evidence is suffi-
\par cient to establish that the green-gold color had acquired
\par secondary meaning was not clearly erroneous.
\par 5. Aside from the statutory definition in Section 45
\par and the exclusions of Section 2, there is another restric-
\par tion on the circumstances under which a feature of a
\par product may be protected as a trademark: A "functional"
\par feature of a product is not susceptible of trademark pro-
\par tection. See, e.g., Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758 (trade
\par dress ); Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'1 Trade Comm'n,
\par 753 F.2d 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The functional-
\par ity doctrine derives from recognition of the "fundamental
\par right to compete through imitation of a competitor's prod-
\par uct." In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,
\par 1336 (C. C.P.A. 1982). That right may be "temporarily
\par denied by the patent or copyright laws," ibid., but per-
\par petual protection of a functional product feature through
\par trademark protection would defeat that right altogether.
\par Thus, although the trademark laws protect symbols which
\par identify the source of particular goods, a trademark may
\par not be used to limit competitors' ability to copy features
\par that render goods more useful. 9.
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 9 Careful application of the functionality doctrine and the re-
\par quirement of secondary meaning is required to obviate the concern
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 13
\par 
\par a. This Court has explained that, "[i]n general terms,
\par a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use
\par or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
\par of the article." Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. at 850
\par n.10. There are a number of circumstances in which
\par color per se would have such a functional quality, and
\par thus would not be eligible for trademark protection. For
\par example. if there is a limited range of colors that `may
\par be applied to an article-i.e., if there is a danger of
\par "color depletion," see Pet. App. 7a-competing firms and
\par new producers would require the availability of those
\par colors in order to participate in the market, and it would
\par be reasonable to view those colors as "essential to the
\par use or purpose of the article." Inwood Laboratories, 456
\par U.S. at 850 n.10. 10. Similarly, if the use of one or more
\par colors would make production of the product less expen-
\par sive or the resulting product function better, or if the
\par application of one or more colors could make the article
\par more marketable to consumers than would the application
\par of others, the color or colors would have a functional
\par quality. and trademark protection would be precluded. 11.
\par The fact that trademark rights are renewable every ten
\par years in perpetuity, see 15 U.S.C. 1059(a), emphasizes
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par that registration of color as a trademark could otherwise frustrate
\par the pro-competitive policies of the Lanham Act and the antitrust
\par laws.
\par 10 see Diamond Match Co. V. Saginaw Match CO., 142 F. 727,
\par 729 (6th Cir. ) ("The primary colors, even adding black and
\par white, are but few. If two of these colors can be appropriated
\par for one brand of tipped matches, it will not take long to appro-
\par priate the rest."), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906) ; cf. In re Bose
\par Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no trademark protection
\par where a "feature asserted to give a product distinctiveness is the
\par best, or at least one, of a few superior designs for its * * * purpose").
\par 11 Cf. William R. Warner & Co.. 265 U.S. at 531 (party has no
\par exclusive rights to brown color of quinine preparation, because it
\par arose from addition of chocolate, which made preparation more
\par palatable).
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 14
\par 
\par the necessity for competitors and potential competitors to
\par have access to the color.
\par This Court has addressed analogous issues regarding
\par depletion of available trade dress features in Two Pesos,
\par Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., supra. In that case, the Court
\par held that the owner of inherently distinctive trade dress is
\par not required to show that the trade dress has acquired dis-
\par tinctiveness. Petitioner argued that such a showing should
\par be made, because the initial user of the trade dress could
\par otherwise cut off competition from products of similar de-
\par signs and shapes. The Court relied on functionality con-
\par siderations in rejecting that argument:
\par 
\par Only nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is pro-
\par tected under  43(a) [of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
\par 1125 (a)]. The Fifth Circuit holds that a design
\par is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if it is
\par one of a limited number of equally efficient options
\par available to competitors and free competition would
\par be unduly hindered by according the design trade-
\par mark protection. This serves to assure that competi-
\par tion will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited
\par number of trade dresses.
\par 
\par 112 S. Ct. at 2760-2761 (emphasis added; citation
\par omitted).
\par 
\par In Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Limited, Nos.
\par 94-1049 & 94-1050 (Sept. 14, 1994), the Federal Circuit
\par recently held that a manufacturer of outboard marine
\par engines may not register the color black as a trademark.
\par The court noted that "[t]he color black * * * does not
\par make the engines function better as engines" or "affect
\par [their] mechanical purpose." Slip op. 7. But the color
\par black   "exhibits both color compatibility with a wide va-
\par riety of boat colors and ability to make objects appear
\par smaller." Ibid. Because of those "advantages for poten-
\par tial customers," the color was properly found to be func-
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 15
\par 
\par tional and hence not subject to protection as a trade-
\par mark. Ibid. Cf. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc.,
\par 653 F.2d 822 ( 3d Cir. 1981) (shape of wall-mounted
\par lighting fixture held functional because of compatibility
\par with building style); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560
\par F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (color green may not be
\par common law trademark because consumers wanted farm
\par equipment to match), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.
\par 1983).
\par b. There are circumstances, however, in which there
\par is little danger that recognition of trademark rights would
\par cause color depletion. In those circumstances, if the color
\par serves no other functional purpose, there is no basis for
\par refusal to recognize the producer's trademark rights in the
\par color. Indeed, recognition of trademark rights in that
\par context can serve a pro-competitive purpose. As the Sen-
\par ate report on the Lanham Act explained:
\par   
\par Trade-marks * * * are the essence of competition,
\par because they make possible a choice between com-
\par peting articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish
\par one from the other. Trade-marks encourage the
\par maintenance of quality by securing to the producer
\par the benefit of the good reputation which excellence
\par creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to pro-
\par tect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition,
\par and to secure to the business community the advan-
\par tages of reputation and good will by preventing their
\par diversion from those who have created them to those
\par who have not.
\par 
\par S. Rep. No. 1333, supra, at 4. See also Park `N Fly, 469
\par U.S. at 198.
\par 
\par In Owens-Corning, the Federal Circuit accordingly rec-
\par ognized that trademark protection could be granted be-
\par cause the use of color at issue was non-functional. 774
\par F.2d at 1122. In that case, the manufacturer dyed its
\par fiberglass insulation pink, which is "a color different from
\par that which it has as a result of the manufacturing proc-
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 16
\par 
\par ess," and promoted that identifying feature for many
\par years. Ibid. The type of insulation involved "ordinarily
\par has a light yellow-white coloring." Ibid. In its customary
\par use, insulation is hidden inside a wall, and its ornamental
\par properties would not be expected to be of substantial
\par significance to consumers. The Federal Circuit held that,
\par in those circumstances, the color "has no utilitarian  pur-
\par pose, does not deprive competitors of any reasonable right
\par or competitive need, and is not barred from registration
\par on the basis of functionality." Ibid.
\par In light of the district court's findings, the same con-
\par clusion follows in this case. The district court found that
\par the natural color" of the materials in petitioner's press
\par pad is "yellowed off-white." Pet. App. 22a. The non-
\par primary "[g]reen-gold color dye * * * does not make the
\par press pad perform better, " it "does not affect the quality
\par of the goods one way or another," and it "does not make
\par the press pad last longer. " ibid. Although "[t]here is a
\par competitive need in the press pad industry for color,"
\par other  colors are "equally usable," and the "range of tones
\par of available distinctive suitable colors * * * is in the
\par hundreds, if not thousands." Ibid. Petitioner's green-gold
\par color is accordingly not barred from recognition as a
\par trademark on the ground of functionality.
\par 6.  Based on the district court's findings, the color of
\par petitioner's press pads thus satisfies the statutory pre-
\par requisites for recognition as a protectable trademark. The
\par color is a "symbol" or "device." By virtue of its second-
\par ary meaning, it has acquired the ability "to identify and
\par distinguish" petitioner's press pads "from those manu-
\par factured or sold by others" and "to indicate the source of
\par the goods." 15 U.S.C. 1127. It is not precluded by any
\par of the specific exclusions of Section 2 of the Lanham Act.
\par as used in press pads, the green-gold color is non-
\par functional. Accordingly, applying ordinary principles of
\par trademark law, the district court correctly concluded that
\par petitioner's trademark in the green-gold press pads was
\par valid.  Pet. App. 23a.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 17
\par 
\par B. The Ninth Circuit's Policy Concerns Do Not Warrant
\par Complete Exclusion Of Color From Trademark
\par Protection
\par 
\par The Ninth Circuit did not dispute any of the district
\par court's factual findings. The court of appeals remarked
\par that "[r]egistration of mere color is not explicitly barred
\par by the Lanham Act," and that color "is not listed" as
\par "one of the specific exceptions to registrability" in Section
\par 2 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052. Pet. App. 5a.
\par Indeed, the court relied on most of the district court's
\par factual findings in ruling that respondent had violated
\par Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a),
\par by infringing on petitioner's trade dress. See Pet. App.
\par 10a-14a. The court of appeals nevertheless held peti-
\par tioner's trademark invalid because "the better rule is that
\par a trademark should not be registered for color alone."
\par Pet. App. 7a. The court erred in reaching that conclusion.
\par 1. The court of appeals based its conclusion in part
\par on the "color depletion" theory. Pet. App. 7a. According
\par to that theory, permitting the protection of colors could
\par injure competition, by deterring new entrants if and when
\par all available colors became divided up among current
\par market participants. 12.
\par Regardless of whether they have permitted or denied
\par trademark protection for color per se, every court that
\par has considered the matter has agreed with the court of
\par appeals in this case that color depletion is a genuine con-
\par cern. See, e.g., Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp.,
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 12 The color depletion argument apparently assumes that if an
\par applicant receives a registration for a color, it could subsequently
\par stop use of any shade of that color or combination with that color.
\par A color mark, however, would not ordinarily be entitled to such
\par broad protection. See In re Amsted Indus., 972 F.2d 1326, 1327
\par (Fed. Cir. 1992) (trademark consisting of orange encapsulated wire
\par rope not confusingly similar to "bare" wire rope containing an
\par orange strand or orange and black strands). Indeed, affording a
\par needlessly broad scope of protection would be incompatible with the
\par pro-competitive policies of the antitrust and trademark laws.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 18
\par 
\par 986 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1993); NutraSweet Co. V.
\par Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027-1028 (7th Cir. 1990),
\par cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 ( 1991); Owens-Corning, 774
\par F.2d at 1120. As we explain above, however, the threats
\par to competition posed by depletion do not exist in every
\par case, and, based on the district court's findings, they do
\par not appear to exist in this case. See p. 16, supra. Cases
\par in which color depletion is a threat can be addressed under
\par a careful application of traditional trademark principles
\par by requiring those who seek trademark protection for a
\par color to demonstrate secondary meaning and-of particu-
\par lar importance-to demonstrate that the color is non-
\par functional. 13. There is no need, and no basis in law, for
\par the creation of a blanket, extra-statutory prohibition of
\par trademark protection for color in order to deal with the
\par threat of color depletion in particular cases.
\par 2. The Ninth Circuit also based its rule against trade-
\par mark protection for color on the problem of "shade con-
\par fusion. " Pet. App. 7a. Presumably, the Ninth Circuit was
\par concerned that sellers would have difficulty determining
\par when use of a particular shade infringed the trademark of
\par another firm that had rights in a similar shade, and that
\par courts would have difficulty resolving infringement litiga-
\par tion over use of similar shades.
\par In order to show infringement under ordinary trade-
\par mark principles, the owner of the mark must establish
\par that the alleged infringer's use of the mark "is likely to
\par cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15
\par U.S.C. 1114(1) (a) and (b). Although it has been said
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 13 See Brunswick, slip op. 9 ("While disavowing in Owens-
\par Corning the color depletion theory as a per se rule, this court
\par nevertheless recognized its applicability in appropriate circum-
\par stances."); Master Distributors, 986 F.2d at 223 (noting that
\par "allowing a manufacturer to monopolize red `in all of its shades'
\par would deplete the color choices available," but recognizing that
\par trademark protection for particular shades may be appropriate);
\par Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120 (color depletion "not faulted for
\par appropriate application," but no basis for precluding trademark
\par registration of color in particular case).
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 19
\par 
\par that likelihood of confusion "is necessarily a subjective
\par determination," In re Electrolyte Laboratories, Inc., 929
\par F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990), courts have made use
\par of a number of devices, including survey evidence 14. and
\par evidence of actual confusion by customers or potential
\par customers, 15. to determine whether there is a "likelihood
\par of confusion" in a variety of circumstances. There is no
\par reason why issues regarding "shade confusion" would be
\par more difficult to determine than the likelihood of con-
\par fusion in cases involving traditional non-color trademarks.
\par Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123; Master Distributors,
\par 986 F.2d at 222.
\par Indeed, regardless of how this case is decided, courts
\par must resolve problems at least as difficult as the problem
\par of when a particular use of a color creates a likelihood
\par of confusion with an existing color trademark. As the
\par Ninth Circuit acknowledged, it has long been recognized
\par that color is subject to trademark protection when it is
\par "combined in distinctive patterns or designs or combined
\par in distinctive logos." Pet. App. 7a. See also NutraSweet,
\par 917 F.2d at 1027; A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v.
\par Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171
\par (1906) (color "[doubtless" may constitute a valid trade-
\par mark "if it be impressed in a particular design"). When
\par infringement of such trademarks is alleged, the court
\par must determine not only how the shade of color in the
\par allegedly infringing product compares with the mark, but
\par also how significant the similarity of color is in light of
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 14 See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397,
\par 400-401 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988) ; Piper
\par Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1984);
\par Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d
\par 500, 506-507 (5th Cir. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Standard
\par Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74-76 (l0th Cir. 1958) ; McDonald's Corp. v.
\par McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1277-1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
\par 
\par 15 See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543-1544
\par (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ; World Car-
\par pets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489
\par (5th Cir. 1971); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebroagh-Pond's,
\par Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761-762 (2d Cir. 1960).                                                                        
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par           
\par 20
\par 
\par the overall similarity of design. That endeavor is at least
\par as difficult as addressing "shade confusion" in the case
\par of purely color trademarks. The difficulty of determining
\par when infringement occurs thus provides no basis for ex-
\par cluding protection for color per se when the other pre-
\par requisites for trademark protection are satisfied.
\par 3. In deciding that color alone may not be protected
\par as a trademark, the Ninth Circuit also relied on the
\par proposition that "further protection is afforded [for such
\par color marks] by the Lanham Act's unfair competition
\par provisions." Pet. App. 8a.
\par That protection is, of course, also generally available,
\par and its availability does not justify artificially constricting
\par the scope of protection under the Act's trademark provi-
\par sions. Moreover, protection against unfair competition
\par under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
\par 1125 (a), is not equivalent to the protection afforded a
\par registered trademark. Unlike trademark protection, Sec-
\par tion 43( a) does not give a party the ability to stop the
\par importation of confusingly similar goods by Customs, see
\par 15 U.S.C. 1124; does not give constructive notice of
\par ownership, 15 U.S.C. 1072; does not provide for prima
\par facie evidence of validity and ownership, 15 U.S.C.
\par 1057 (b); and does not provide for incontestable status,
\par 15 U.S.C. 1065. Trademark registration thus affords an
\par applicant significant rights not otherwise available under
\par other provisions of the Lanham Act, or under the law
\par generally. Those rights should not be denied based on a
\par per se rule that prohibits registration based on the nature
\par of the mark, where neither the statute nor compelling
\par policy reasons support such a denial.
\par 4. Finally, the Ninth Circuit commented that "the
\par courts of appeals generally have refused to grant trade-
\par mark protection for color alone." Pet. App. 5a. In re-
\par cent decisions, the courts of appeals have been gradually
\par abandoning the refusal to permit trademark protection for
\par color alone. The Eighth and Federal Circuits have both
\par recognized that, in appropriate cases, color may be pro-
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 21
\par 
\par tected as a trademark. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at
\par 1123; Master Distributors, 986 F.2d at 223. But it is
\par nonetheless true that courts have historically been reluc-
\par tant to recognize trademark protection for color alone.
\par In our view, that reluctance was based on an interpreta-
\par tion of trademark statutes that were superseded by the
\par Lanham Act and by recent amendments to that Act that
\par have confirmed Congress's intent to permit broad trade-
\par mark protection for any product feature-including color
\par -that qualifies.
\par Prior to the Lanham Act, the leading case concerning
\par whether trademark protection could be afforded to color
\par alone was A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick &
\par Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 ( 1906). That case arose
\par from an infringement action by the owner of a registered
\par trademark consisting of a wire rope that included a "dis-
\par tinctively colored streak." Id. at 170. The Court held
\par that the trademark was invalid because it was not limited
\par to a streak of some specified color, but instead included
\par a streak of any distinctive color. Id. at 171. But the
\par Court also commented that "[w]hether mere color can
\par constitute a trade-mark may admit of doubt." Ibid. 16.
\par In succeeding years, lower courts frequently cited that
\par statement as support for the proposition that mere color
\par cannot constitute a trademark. See, e.g., In re Security
\par Engineering Co., 113 F.2d 494, 496 (C.C.P.A. 1940)
\par (refusing registration for blue-and-aluminum color for oil
\par well reamers); In re General Petroleum Corp., 49 F.2d
\par 966, 968 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (refusing trademark protec-
\par tion for the color violet for gasoline).
\par This Court's decision in Leschen Rope in 1906 pre-
\par dated the Lanham Act by 40 years. The trademark stat-
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 16 The Court also stated that " [c]ertainly a trade-mark could
\par not be claimed of a rope, the entire surface of which was colored."
\par 201 U.S. at 170-171. In context, however, that statement appears
\par not to refer to an attempt to obtain trademark protection for a
\par rope of a particular color, but to an attempt to obtain trademark
\par protection for a rope of any color.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 22
\par 
\par ute in 1906 did not provide a definition of the term
\par "trademark." See Trade Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33
\par Stat. 724, 15 U.S.C. 81 et seq. (repealed); Philco Corp.
\par v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 1943).
\par Courts therefore applied the common law understanding
\par of the term, under which only "technical" trademarks-
\par i.e., trademarks that contained no descriptive content at
\par all-could be protected. Most marks that were descrip-
\par tive could not be registered despite their acquisition of
\par secondary meaning. See note 5, supra.
\par In 1946, the Lanham Act changed the legal landscape
\par substantially. The Act included a new, very broad defini-
\par tion of "trademark," as well as a specific prohibition-
\par qualified only by exceptions not applicable here-on re-
\par fusing registration "on account of [the] nature" of a mark.
\par Ch. 540, 2, 45, 60 Stat. 428, 443. See pp. 6-9,
\par supra. As discussed above, the Lanham Act's provisions
\par were designed "to dispense with mere technical prohibi-
\par tions and arbitrary provisions." S. Rep. No. 1333, supra,
\par at 3. Accordingly, the Act superseded prior common law
\par doctrines that limited the categories of product features
\par that could receive trademark protection.
\par Congress confirmed the principle that any product fea-
\par ture that can satisfy the requirements of the trademark
\par laws can receive trademark protection when it reenacted
\par and amended the Lanham Act in 1988. Trademark Law
\par Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, Tit. I, 102
\par Stat. 3935. Three years previously, the Federal Circuit
\par in Owens-Corning had affirmed the ruling of the Trade-
\par mark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) that a color
\par may be protected as a trademark, a ruling that received
\par wide attention in the legal community. 17. The Senate
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 17 See, e.g., Janet R. Hubbard, Note, Think Pink! Color Can Be A
\par Trademark, 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1433 (1986) ; Lawrence D.
\par Grewach, Recent Case, In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.: The
\par Federal Circuit Puts Owens-Corning "In the Pink", 35 Am. U. L.
\par Rev. 1221 (1986) ; Brian Richard Henry, Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In
\par re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation and the Demise of the
\par Mere Color Rule, 76 Trademark Rep. 389 (1986).
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 23
\par 
\par report accompanying the legislation stated that "[t]he re-
\par vised definition [of `trademark'] intentionally retains * * *
\par the words 'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the
\par registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations
\par where they function as trademarks." S. Rep. No. 515,
\par 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1988) (emphasis added).
\par The terms and legislative history of the Lanham Act
\par and the 1988 amendments thus make clear that Congress
\par intended to eliminate previous arbitrary restrictions on
\par the types of product features that can receive trademark
\par protection. There is no longer any basis in the statute to
\par exclude color per se from trademark protection. The
\par Ninth Circuit's adherence to an extra-statutory restriction
\par is no longer justifiable.
\par 
\par C. If This Court Finds The Statute Ambiguous Or Silent
\par On The Subject, Deference Should Be Given To The
\par PTO'S Interpretation Of The Lanham Act
\par 
\par As we argue above, the Lanham Act unambiguously
\par permits trademark protection for color alone, where other
\par appropriate legal requirements for trademark protection
\par are satisfied. Even if the Act were ambiguous or simply
\par failed to speak to the issue, however, it would be appro-
\par priate to defer to the PTO'S construction of it. Since at
\par least 1984, the PTO has interpreted the Lanham Act to
\par permit trademark protection for color alone. Because
\par that interpretation is, at the very least, a permissible one,
\par the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to it and recog-
\par nized the validity of petitioner's trademark.
\par 1. "Judicial deference to reasonable interpretations by
\par an agency of a statute that it administers is a dominant,
\par well settled principle of federal law." National Railroad
\par Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394,
\par 1401 ( 1992). This Court explained in National Railroad
\par Passenger Corp. that
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 24
\par 
\par when a court is reviewing an agency decision based
\par on a statutory interpretation, "if the statute is silent
\par or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
\par question for the court is whether the agency's answer
\par is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
\par Chevron U.S.A. [Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
\par Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 ( 1984)]. If the
\par agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain
\par language of the statute, deference is due. K Mart
\par Corp. [v. Cartier, inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 ( 1988)].
\par 
\par Ibid.
\par 
\par Because the PTO administers the Lanham Act, its con-
\par struction of the Act is entitled to deference. Congress
\par has delegated authority to the Commissioner of Patents
\par and Trademarks to examine trademarks and to determine
\par their registrability. 15 U.S.C. 1062. When the Commis-
\par sioner issues a registration, the "certificate of registration
\par of a mark upon the principal register provided by th[e]
\par [Act] shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
\par registered mark." 15 U.S.C. 1057(b). Under Section 15
\par of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1065, the right of a regis-
\par trant to use a registered trademark becomes incontestable,
\par with certain exceptions, after the mark has been in contin-
\par uous use for five-consecutive years after registration. See
\par generally Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
\par supra. The PTO occupies a similar role with respect to
\par the Lanharn Act as that of other agencies that have been
\par granted deference in construing statutes entrusted to them
\par to administer. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County
\par of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855, 863 (1994) (Secretary of Trans-
\par portation); National Railroad Passenger Corp., 112 S. Ct.
\par at 1398, 1401 (Interstate Commerce Commission);
\par Lechhmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847 ( 1992)
\par NLRB). Thus, deference is due to the PTO'S construc-
\par tion of the Lanham Act. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell
\par & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569
\par (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron analysis to the
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 25
\par 
\par TTAB's interpretation of the Lanham Act in other than a
\par rule-making context ).
\par 2. Historically, the PTO maintained that color applied
\par in an arbitrary pattern to goods or packaging for goods, as
\par distinguished from overall product color, could be regis-
\par tered as a trademark. It was thought, however, that color
\par per se was not registrable. See, e.g., In re Ritchie Mfg.
\par Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. 291, 292 (T.T.A.B. 1971); In re
\par Shaw, 184 U.S.P.Q. 253, 255 (T.T.A.B. 1974). As trade
\par practices progressed, the PTO'S view on the registrability
\par of color per se also evolved. In Owens-Corning, the TTAB
\par concluded that there is no absolute ban on registering
\par overall color as a trademark. 18. In re Owens-Corning Fiber-
\par glas Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1195, 1198 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
\par The Board also expressly rejected the color depletion
\par argument, stating:
\par 
\par In considering the weakness of the "color deple-
\par tion" theory * * * we are not so much impressed
\par by the idea that there are many shades of color that
\par might function as trademarks as we are by the no-
\par tion that the color depletion argument is premised
\par on a competitive need that may not exist. Thus, in
\par a case where there is no competitive need (whether
\par characterized as "aesthetic" or otherwise) for colors
\par to remain available to all competitors, the color de-
\par pletion argument is an unreasonable restriction on
\par the acquisition of trademark rights.
\par 
\par Ibid. 19. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed, stating that
\par "[t]he Board's conclusion that there is no inherent bar to
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par 18 The TTAB includes a number of specified PTO Officials, in-
\par cluding the Commissioner. 15 U.S.C. 1067. A party dissatisfied
\par with the decision of the Board may take an appeal to the Federal
\par Circuit or file a civil action in a district court. 15 U.S.C. 1071.
\par 
\par 19 In a portion of its decision later overturned by the Federal
\par Circuit, see 774 F.2d at 1124-1128, the TTAB found that Owens-
\par Corning had introduced insufficient evidence that the color pink,
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 26
\par 
\par trademark registration of the color of goods, when the
\par color is an overall color rather than in the form of a
\par design, is in harmony with modern trademark theory and
\par jurisprudence." Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
\par In the intervening period, the PTO has clearly set forth
\par its trademark examination policy regarding the registra-
\par bility of color marks:
\par 
\par [C]olor can function as a trademark if it is used on
\par the goods in the manner of a trademark and if it is
\par perceived by the purchasing public as identifying and
\par distinguishing the goods on which it is used and
\par indicating their source.
\par 
\par Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure  1202.04(e),
\par at 1202-13 ( 2d ed. 1993). However, "registration is
\par refused irrespective of any showing of acquired distinc-
\par tiveness if there is a competitive need for colors to remain
\par available in the industry" or "[i]f the proposed mark
\par identifies a color which is functional," such that it "serves
\par a utilitarian purpose or yields a utilitarian or functional
\par advantage." Ibid.
\par The PTO has consistently applied its policy in determin-
\par ing registrability of color per se. See, e.g., Cooper Indus.,
\par Inc. v. Channellock, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 873, 877 (W.D.
\par Pa. 1992) (denying summary judgment seeking cancella-
\par tion of registration for blue applied to hand tools);
\par Edward Week Inc. v. IM Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1142, 1145
\par (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding that "[t]here is no inherent bar
\par to trademark registration of the overall color of goods,"
\par but denying registration of green applied to surgical instru-
\par ments for lack of acquired distinctiveness); in re Eagle
\par Fence Rentals, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 228, 230-231 (T.T.A.B.
\par 1986 ) (granting registration of alternately colored wire
\par strands arranged vertically in chain-link fencing on the
\par basis that color functioned as ornamentation which is
\par registrable absent functionality upon a showing of ac-
\par quired distinctiveness ).
\par 
\par ___________________(footnotes)
\par 
\par as applied to its insulation, had acquired distinctiveness. 221
\par U.S.P.Q. at 1199.
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 27
\par 
\par 3. In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit recognized
\par that a statutory presumption of validity is accorded to a
\par certificate of registration under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
\par 1057 (b). But the Ninth Circuit failed to accord any
\par deference to the PTO'S determination that petitioner's
\par mark is registrable or to its interpretation of the Lanham
\par Act. Rather, the Ninth Circuit chose to substitute what
\par it believed to be "the better rule" for the PTO'S statutory
\par interpretation. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit failed to
\par give due deference to the expertise of the PTO.
\par         
\par CONCLUSION
\par 
\par The judgment of the Ninth Circuit on petitioner's
\par trademark claims should be reversed, and the case should
\par be remanded for further proceedings.
\par 
\par Respectfully submitted.
\par 
\par NANCY J. LINCK
\par Solicitor
\par 
\par ALBIN F. DROST
\par Deputy Solicitor
\par 
\par NANCY C. SLUTTER
\par Associate Solicitor
\par 
\par LINDA MONCYS ISACSON
\par Assistant Solicitor
\par Patent and
\par Trademark Office
\par 
\par DREW S. DAYS, III
\par Solicitor General
\par 
\par FRANK W. HUNGER
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par 
\par ANNE K. BINGAMAN
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par 
\par LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
\par Deputy Solicitor General
\par 
\par DIANE P. WOOD
\par Deputy Assistant Attorney
\par General
\par 
\par JAMES A. FELDMAN
\par Assistant to the Solicitor General
\par 
\par WILLIAM KANTER
\par MARC RICHMAN
\par DAVID SEIDMAN
\par Attorneys
\par 
\par NOVEMBER 1994
\par 
\par *U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1994  387147  20003
\par 
\par ---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------
\par 
\par 
\par }}