Exemption 5

Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." Courts have construed this somewhat opaque language "to exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context."

Although originally it was "not clear that Exemption 5 was intended to incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery," the Supreme Court subsequently made it clear that the coverage of Exemption 5 is quite broad, encompassing both statutory privileges and those commonly recognized by case law, and that it is not limited to those privileges explicitly mentioned in its legislative history. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated that the statutory language "unequivocally"

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2 See, e.g., DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 19 n.1 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting and commenting on a point not reached by majority) (discussing "most natural meaning" of threshold and "problem[s]" inherent in reading it in that way).


incorporates "all civil discovery rules into FOIA [Exemption 5]."\textsuperscript{6} The D.C. Circuit has also declared that in order to "justify nondisclosure under Exemption 5, an agency must show that the type of material it seeks to withhold is generally protected in civil discovery for reasons similar to those asserted by the agency in the FOIA context."\textsuperscript{7}

It is important to bear in mind a difference between the application of privileges in civil discovery and in the FOIA context. In the former, the use of qualified privileges may be overcome by a showing of relevance or need by an opposing party.\textsuperscript{8} In the FOIA context, however, the Supreme Court has held that the standard to be employed is whether the documents would "routinely be disclosed" in civil litigation.\textsuperscript{9} By definition, documents for which a party would have to make a showing of need are not routinely disclosed and thus do not fall into this category.\textsuperscript{10} As a result, in the FOIA context there is no difference between qualified and absolute privileges, and courts do not take into

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{6} Martin, 819 F.2d at 1185; see also Badhwar v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Exemption 5 requires the application of [] existing rules regarding discovery.").
  \item\textsuperscript{7} Burka, 87 F.3d at 517.
  \item\textsuperscript{8} See, e.g., Grolier, 462 U.S. at 27 (discussing circumstances under which attorney work-product privilege may be overcome in civil discovery).
  \item\textsuperscript{9} Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 799; see Grolier, 462 U.S. at 26; see also Nkihtaqmikon v. Bureau of Indian Affs., 672 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153-54 (D. Me. 2009) (holding that "[n]o less than a private party engaged in litigation, individuals within the [agency] must be able to freely discuss their 'uninhibited opinions and recommendations'" (quoting Providence J. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 557-59 (1st Cir. 1992))).
  \item\textsuperscript{10} See Grolier, 462 U.S. at 28 ("It is not difficult to imagine litigation in which one party's need for otherwise privileged documents would be sufficient to override the privilege but that does not remove the documents from the category of the normally privileged.").
\end{itemize}
account a party's need for the documents in ruling on a privilege's applicability.\textsuperscript{11} This approach prevents the FOIA from being used to circumvent civil discovery rules.\textsuperscript{12}

The three primary, most frequently invoked privileges that have been held to be incorporated into Exemption 5 are the deliberative process privilege (referred to by some courts as "executive privilege\textsuperscript{13}"), the attorney work-product privilege, and the attorney-client privilege.\textsuperscript{14} First, however, Exemption 5's threshold requirement must be considered.

"Inter-Agency or Intra-Agency" Threshold Requirement

The initial consideration under Exemption 5 is whether a record is of the type intended to be covered by the phrase "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} See id.; NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); see also, e.g., Martin, 819 F.2d at 1184 ("[T]he needs of a particular plaintiff are not relevant to the exemption's applicability."); Swisher v. Dep't of the Air Force, 660 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1981) (observing that applicability of Exemption 5 is in no way diminished by fact that privilege may be overcome by showing of need in civil discovery context); Jud. Watch Inc. v. DHS, 841 F. Supp. 2d 142, 162-63 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting argument that need of plaintiff may overcome deliberative process privilege); MacLean v. DOD, No. 04-2425, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2005) ("[S]ince there is no 'need' determination under FOIA, there is no room for this Court to balance the public's interest in disclosure against defendants' interest in protecting the deliberative process."); aff'd on other grounds, 240 F. App'x 751, 754 (9th Cir. 2007). But see In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1203, 2000 WL 1545028, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2000) (stating that court must balance "relative interests of the parties" in determining applicability of deliberative process privilege under Exemption 5).

\textsuperscript{12} See Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 801 ("[R]espondents' contention that they can obtain through the FOIA material that is normally privileged would create an anomaly in that the FOIA could be used to supplement civil discovery. We have consistently rejected such a construction of the FOIA."); see also Martin, 819 F.2d at 1186 ("[P]laintiff was unable to obtain these documents using [normal] civil discovery methods, and FOIA should not be read to alter that result.").

\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., Marriott Int'l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that deliberative process privilege is one of many privileges that generally fall under rubric of "executive privilege") (non-FOIA case).

\textsuperscript{14} See Sears, 421 U.S. at 149.

\textsuperscript{15} 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018); see, e.g., Shapiro v. DOJ, 969 F. Supp. 2d 18, 35 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that, "by definition, any document filed in a federal court is not an inter-agency or intra-agency memorandum because the destination of the document is not an 'agency'"); cf. Am. Immigr. Council v. DHS, 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 238 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment after finding that defendant did not provide sufficient information for court to determine that Exemption 5 threshold is met).
The Supreme Court has stated that relevant statutory definitions of the term "agency" define it to mean "'each authority of the Government,' . . . and 'includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government . . . , or any independent regulatory agency.'"\(^{16}\)

**Consultant Corollary**

As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[a]lthough neither the terms of the exemption nor the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders, some Courts of Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government may nevertheless qualify as an 'intra-agency' memorandum under Exemption 5."\(^{17}\) As those Courts of Appeals recognize, federal agencies frequently have "a special need for the opinions and recommendations of temporary consultants,"\(^{18}\) and such expert advice can "play[] an integral function in the government's decision[making]."\(^{19}\) Consistent with this analysis, some Courts of Appeals have allowed agencies to protect advice generated by a wide range of outside experts, regardless of whether these experts provided their assistance pursuant to a contract,\(^{20}\) on

\(^{16}\) Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 2 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 9 (recognizing that "some Courts of Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government may nevertheless qualify as an 'intra-agency' memorandum under Exemption 5").

\(^{17}\) Id. at 9 (discussing cases); see also Rojas v. FAA, 989 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that "[r]ead Exemption 5 to exclude communications with outside consultants altogether, as [the requester] urges [the court] to hold, would require us to assume that Congress saddled agencies with a strong disincentive to employ the services of outside experts, even when doing so would be in the agency's best interests" and joining "the six other circuits that have recognized some version of the consultant corollary").

\(^{18}\) Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

\(^{19}\) Hoover v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980); see also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[F]ederal agencies occasionally will encounter problems outside their ken, and it clearly is preferable that they enlist the help of outside experts skilled at unraveling their knotty complexities."); Ryan v. DOJ, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Congress apparently did not intend 'inter-agency' [or] 'intra-agency' to be rigidly exclusive terms.").

\(^{20}\) See, e.g., Hanson v. AID, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying privilege analysis to documents prepared by attorney hired by private company in contractual relationship with agency); Badhwar v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding application of Exemption 5 to material supplied by outside contractors); Gov't Land Bank v. GSA, 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1982) (protecting appraiser's report solicited by agency); Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1138 (same); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (protecting consultant's report concerning safe levels of workplace lead exposure); Gov't Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep't of State, 699 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103-04
a volunteer basis,\(^{21}\) or in some other capacity,\(^{22}\) creating what courts frequently refer to as the "consultant corollary" to the Exemption 5 threshold.\(^{23}\) In these cases, courts have emphasized that the agencies sought this outside advice,\(^{24}\) and that in providing their expertise, the consultants effectively functioned as agency employees,\(^{25}\) providing the agencies with advice similar to what it might have received from an employee. The

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\(^{21}\) See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just. v. DOD, 512 F.3d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (protecting advice provided by individuals whose counsel Army had solicited concerning regulations for terrorist trial commissions); Wu v. Nat'l Endowment for the Humans., 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972) (protecting recommendations of volunteer consultants); Heffernan v. Azar, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2019) (protecting advice provided by individual whose counsel was affirmatively solicited by agency personnel via email prior to individual formally becoming a "Special Government Expert").

\(^{22}\) See, e.g., Tigue v. DOJ, 312 F.3d 70, 77-79 (2d Cir. 2002) (protecting recommendations from a United States Attorney's Office to the Webster Commission, which was established to serve "as a consultant to the IRS"); Burns v. BOP, 804 F.2d 701, 704 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying Exemption 5 to presentence report prepared by probation officer for sentencing judge, with copies provided to Parole Commission and BOP), vacated on other grounds & remanded, 486 U.S. 1029 (1988); Miller, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (protecting discussions between U.S. government and government of St. Kitts and Nevis concerning possible prosecution of plaintiff); Lardner v. DOJ, No. 03-0180, 2005 WL 758267, at *14-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (protecting documents written by judges and special prosecutors whose opinions were solicited by agency).

\(^{23}\) See, e.g., Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001); Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just., 512 F.3d at 682.

\(^{24}\) See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just., 512 F.3d at 680 (discussing importance of outside advice having been solicited by agency).

\(^{25}\) See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 10 (discussing prior consultant cases, and noting that documents provided "by outside consultants played essentially the same part in an agency's process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done"); Am. Oversight v. HHS, 380 F. Supp. 3d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that communications do not qualify as intra-agency where "the record does not support a finding that the communications with Congress 'played essentially the same part in an agency's process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel'").
District Court for the District of Columbia has found that there is no requirement that an agency not have its own employee with relevant expertise before seeking the assistance of an outside consultant.26

In 2001, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the Exemption 5 threshold in Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n.27 Its ruling implicitly accepted (but did not directly rule on) the concept of the consultant corollary,28 while placing important limitations on its use. In its unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the threshold of Exemption 5 did not encompass communications between the Department of the Interior and several Indian tribes which, in expressing their views to the Department on certain matters of administrative decisionmaking, not only had "their own, albeit entirely legitimate, interests in mind,"29 but also were "seeking a Government benefit at the expense of other applicants."30 As a result, the records submitted to the agency by the Tribes were not deemed to fall within the threshold of Exemption 5, and so did not qualify for attorney work-product and deliberative process privilege protection in the case.31

Since Klamath was decided, courts have had a number of occasions to rule on whether the consultant corollary applied.32 In McKinley v. Board of Governors of the

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26 See Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just. v. DOD, 404 F. Supp. 2d 325, 345 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that there is "no requirement . . . that outside consultants possess expertise not possessed by those inside the agency"), aff'd, 512 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

27 532 U.S. 1 (2001); see also OIP Guidance: Supreme Court Rules in Exemption 5 Case (posted 04/04/2001) (discussing meaning, contours, and implications of Klamath decision).

28 See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 10-11, 12 n.4 (discussing prior cases upholding use of consultant corollary and noting that two such cases, Pub. Citizen Inc. v. DOJ, 111 F.3d 168, 170-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (protecting records involving former Presidents who were consulted by NARA and DOJ concerning treatment of their records) and Ryan v. DOJ, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (protecting records involving members of Senate who DOJ consulted with on judicial nominations), "arguably extend beyond" the "typical examples"); see also Ctr. for Diversity v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 450 F. App’x 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing Klamath and recognizing that consultant corollary is available to fulfill Exemption 5’s threshold requirement).

29 Klamath, 532 U.S. at 12.

30 Id. at 12 n.4.

31 Id. at 16.

32 See, e.g., Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 306 F. Supp. 3d 97, 111 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that "fact that an individual [nominee] has been nominated to a high-level agency position suffices to trigger a consulting relationship under the consultant corollary"); 100Reporters LLC v. DOJ, 248 F. Supp. 3d 115, 148 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that consultant corollary
Federal Reserve System, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that communications exchanged between the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York qualify as intra-agency memoranda under Exemption 5. The D.C. Circuit found that "[u]nlike the Indian tribes [in Klamath] the [Federal Reserve Bank of New York did] not represent an interest of its own, or the interest of any other client, when it advise[d] the [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve] on the Bear Stearns loan." The court found two points dispositive of the consultant corollary issue. First, the court determined that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was not representing an interest of its own or of one of its clients when it advised the Board, and second, its advice had been solicited by the Board.

In another case, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. DHS, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that "to be excluded from the exemption," the outside party "must assume a position that is 'necessarily adverse' to the government." In that case, the outside party was a contractor providing security scanning equipment to the government with the ultimate goal of expanding its contractual relationship with the

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33 647 F.3d 331, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

34 Id. (holding that Federal Reserve Bank of New York's interests were aligned with Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System when advising on whether to extend loan to Bear Stearns through JP Morgan Chase).

35 Id. at 337 (citing Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001)).

36 Id. at 336-38.

37 Id. at 338; see Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2010) (holding that Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Treasury "were on the same team" and that any documents passed between them qualified as intra-agency communications); see also Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 320 F. Supp. 3d 110, 121 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that consultant corollary applies to records concerning evidence-based assessment tools that sought to predict statistical probability of individual's recidivism because "[plaintiff] has identified no evidence suggesting that the Department has withheld records submitted by alleged consultants who were advocating their own interests").


39 Id. at 46 (quoting Klamath, 532 U.S. at 14).
Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act

Exemption 5

government.\textsuperscript{40} The court acknowledged that the outside party was seeking a government benefit at the expense of other parties – other companies who sought contracts to provide similar services.\textsuperscript{41} However, after noting the requirements set out in \textit{Klamath}, the court ruled that "[s]elf-advocacy is not a dispositive characteristic and does not control Exemption 5’s scope in this case."\textsuperscript{42} Because the outside party's interests were not adverse to the government's interests, the court ruled that the outside party was distinguishable from the Native American tribes in \textit{Klamath} and that documents passed between the government and the outside party met the Exemption 5 threshold.\textsuperscript{43}

Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim that a paid consultant should be disqualified from serving as a consultant solely on the basis of his "deep-seated views" on the subject in question.\textsuperscript{44} Instead, the court noted that the consultant was not seeking a government benefit (beyond the intellectual satisfaction of having his advice followed) and that he was functioning "akin to an agency employee."\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, as the court pointed out, it would be "unusual" if agencies restricted themselves to seeking expert advice from those with no published record of their views on their areas of expertise.\textsuperscript{46}

Conversely, other decisions have found that the outside parties do not qualify under the consultant corollary.\textsuperscript{47} In \textit{Center for International Environmental Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative},\textsuperscript{48} the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the United States Trade Representative could not protect documents exchanged by his office with the Government of Chile in the course of bilateral trade

\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 45-46.

\textsuperscript{41} Id.

\textsuperscript{42} Id.

\textsuperscript{43} Id.

\textsuperscript{44} Stewart v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009).

\textsuperscript{45} Id.

\textsuperscript{46} Id.

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., \textit{COMPTEL v. FCC}, 910 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118-19 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying application of Exemption 5 to documents submitted by company under investigation by FCC because company submitted documents in pursuit of its own interests); \textit{Merit Energy Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior}, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191 (D. Colo. 2001) (holding that communications between Native American tribe and agency did not meet "inter or intra-agency" test because tribe was advocating its own interests).

negotiations between the United States and the Chilean government. The court ruled that the "critical factor" in the case before it was the "degree of self-interest" pursued by the outside party, "as compared to its interest in providing neutral advice." In a later case, the District Court for the District of Columbia expanded on this idea when analyzing five draft pages concerning global warming shared with a university professor. The court held that the professor "had a professional and reputational stake in OSTP's decision to reject Plaintiff's request to correct [the] statements, which endorsed [the professor's] climate theory" and, therefore, the professor "cannot be likened to a government employee whose 'only obligations are to truth and its sense of what good judgment calls for.'"

In another case the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Exemption 5 could not be used to protect documents submitted by an NIH grant applicant because the applicant failed to qualify as a consultant under the test laid out in Klamath. In so ruling, the court referred to the fact that the applicant had submitted the grant application documents with his own interests in mind and that he was competing for a governmental benefit at the expense of other applicants. This reading of Klamath was echoed by the District Court for the District of Columbia in another case in which the court explained that "[f]airly read, the holding of Klamath is only that a communication from an 'interested party' seeking a Government benefit 'at the expense of other applicants' is not an intra-agency record."

While agencies often are the recipients of expert advice, they also occasionally provide it. In Dow Jones & Co. v. DOJ, the D.C. Circuit held that documents conveying advice from an agency to Congress for purposes of congressional decisionmaking are not

49 See id. at 25-27.
50 Id. at 27.
52 Id. at 132-35.
53 Id. at 133-34 (finding that "[w]hether a person is self-interested in a particular situation is not a binary question[;] [r]ather, self-interest exists on a spectrum, with altruism at one end and greed or avarice on the other").
55 See id.
57 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
"inter-agency" records under Exemption 5 because Congress is not itself an "agency" under the FOIA. However, communications with Congress to assist agency decisionmaking have been deemed inter-agency records where these communications are "part and parcel of the agency's deliberative process." This holds true even where it is recognized that Congress may simultaneously act with its own self-interest.

The D.C. Circuit has found the threshold satisfied for communications exchanged with the Office of the President, even though the President and their immediate advisors are not themselves an "agency" under the FOIA. Indeed, the presidential communications privilege, which exists to protect advisory communications made to the President and their close advisers, has been repeatedly upheld in FOIA cases, in spite of

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58 Id. at 574-75; accord Elec. Frontier Found. v. Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., No. 08-1023, 2009 WL 3061975, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (concluding that "[t]o the extent the withheld materials reflect communications between ODNI and DOJ and members of Congress in an effort to facilitate the agency's own deliberative process to craft legislation to reform FISA, these communications do not fall under the exemption as there is no evidence that they were used in an effort to aid any agency in its own deliberative process "), amended & superseded on other grounds, 639 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 699 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (presaging Dow Jones by suggesting that agency responses to congressional requests for information may not constitute protective "inter-agency" communications); cf. Hennessey v. AID, No. 97-1133, 1997 WL 537998, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (rejecting use of deliberative process privilege because agency had not intended deliberations to be internal, but rather intended to involve outside parties) (unpublished disposition); Texas v. ICC, 889 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that document sent from agency to outside party did not meet threshold standard because it was 

59 Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 574-75; see also Ryan v. DOJ, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that communications from Congress to agency regarding judicial nominations are "intra-agency" where "record is submitted by outside consultants as part of the deliberative process" and is solicited by agency); Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 474 F. Supp. 3d 251, 264 (D.D.C. 2020) (holding that records are "intra-agency" where Treasury communicated with Congress regarding development of tax reform legislation and sufficiently demonstrated that communications with Congress were relied on akin to how agency would rely on analysis and recommendation of outside consultant).

60 See Am. Oversight, 474 F. Supp. 3d at 265 (finding that D.C. Circuit has recognized that communications between agency and outside party can fall within consultant corollary "even when the outsider has interests and goals that differ from those of the agency").

61 See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 365 F.3d 1108, 1110 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that Office of the President is not an "agency," but "embrac[ing] the definitional analysis set forth" in In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749-50, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997), to protect documents covered by the Presidential Communications Privilege without any further discussion of threshold).

62 See, e.g., Loving v. DOD, 550 F.3d 32, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding, without specifically addressing threshold, that Exemption 5 "incorporates" Presidential Communications Privilege, which "protects communications directly involving and
the fact that the President is not an "agency." \textsuperscript{63} (For further discussion of this privilege, see Exemption 5, Other Privileges, below.)

Similarly, in 2005, the D.C. Circuit upheld Exemption 5 protection for documents generated for a presidentially created commission, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), in spite of the fact that such commissions are not agencies subject to the FOIA. \textsuperscript{64} In reversing a lower court ruling, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the NEPDG did not qualify as an agency as defined by the FOIA. \textsuperscript{65} However, it noted that because the NEPDG was created specifically to advise the President on a policy issue, it would be "inconceivable" for Congress to have intended for Exemption 5 to apply to decisionmaking processes where the decisionmaker was an agency official subject to presidential oversight but not to decisionmaking processes where the decisionmaker is the President. \textsuperscript{66}

This ruling is in line with the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in \textit{EPA v. Mink}, \textsuperscript{67} in which the Court declared that it was "beyond question that [agency documents prepared for a presidentially created committee organized to advise him on matters involving underground nuclear testing] . . . are 'inter-agency or intra-agency' memoranda or 'letters' that were used in the decisionmaking processes of the Executive Branch." \textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{63} See, e.g., \textit{Berman}, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that Exemption 5 could not protect documents addressed to President even though President is not an "agency").

\textsuperscript{64} See \textit{Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOE}, 412 F.3d 125, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

\textsuperscript{65} See \textit{id.} at 129.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Id.} at 130.

\textsuperscript{67} 410 U.S. 74 (1973).

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 85; see also \textit{Ryan v. DOJ}, 617 F.2d 781, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting argument that Attorney General is not "agency" when acting in advisory capacity to President).
Some courts have also found the threshold satisfied for documents exchanged between agencies and presidential transition teams or future agency employees.\footnote{See Leopold v. DOJ, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17-19 (D.D.C. 2020) (upholding use of presidential communications privilege to protect communications involving transition officers concerning post-inauguration presidential decisionmaking without direct discussion of threshold issue); Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. DOE, 330 F. Supp. 3d 515, 527 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that "assuming that the transition team is not in fact an 'agency' under FOIA, [it] is not certain it necessarily follows that documents shared between DOE and the transition team fall outside Exemption 5" because "'[w]hat matters . . . is whether a document will expose the pre-decisional and deliberative processes of the Executive Branch'" (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOE, 412 F.3d 125, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2005))); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of State, 306 F. Supp. 3d 97, 111 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that "fact that an individual [nominee] has been nominated to a high-level agency position suffices to trigger a consulting relationship under the consultant corollary"). But cf. Am. Oversight v. GSA, 311 F. Supp. 3d 327, 342 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that any communications between GSA and presidential transition team regarding planning for presidential transition cannot be withheld under Exemption 5 after noting that agency conceded that "'transition teams are considered non-agencies for purposes of the FOIA'" in the context of Exemption 6).}

There have been mixed outcomes on the issue of whether representatives of state and local governments engaged in joint regulatory operations qualify as consultants to federal agencies. In one instance, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a local government was not a consultant because it was acting as a co-regulator with a federal agency, and not in an advisory capacity.\footnote{See People for the Am. Way Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 516 F. Supp. 2d 28, 39 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that documents submitted by District of Columbia Mayor's Office could not be protected because District and agency "share[d] ultimate decision-making authority with respect to a co-regulatory project"); see also Grand Cent. P'ship Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 484 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that letter sent from city councilman to agency did not meet threshold test, but specifically leaving open question of whether communication from state agency to federal agency pursuant to joint state-federal operation might be protected).} In a different case, however, the same court held that communications from state officials working with FEMA to coordinate Hurricane Katrina evacuation plans could be protected under the Exemption 5 threshold.\footnote{See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DHS, 514 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2007) (protecting documents obtained from emergency management officials in Mississippi and Louisiana); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that particular documents provided by state agency to Department of Interior had not contributed to Department's deliberative process and therefore could not be protected by Exemption 5, but agreeing that such documents provided by state agency to federal agency could meet Exemption 5's threshold).}

*Common Interest*
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has applied the common interest doctrine to allow the withholding of communications between the Department of Justice and a private party that the Department had partnered with in litigation. The court held that the common interest doctrine, while not mentioned in Klamath, was entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]t would eviscerate the meaning of Exemption 5 if we were to read it to exclude communications between federal agencies and their litigation partners where those communications advance an interest that is both common [to the government and its litigation partner] and, in the government's considered view, critical to the public's interest." As the Fourth Circuit explained:

The common interest doctrine permits parties whose legal interests coincide to share privileged materials with one another in order to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims. Under [the plaintiff's] reading, however, the decision of a party, here the government, to partner with others in the conduct of litigation would somehow subject that party to the loss of its most basic civil discovery privileges. This is a sweeping view, and its impact on the government's ability to conduct complex and multi-faceted litigation would be staggering. We have made clear that the government was entitled . . . to a level playing field. . . . And there is nothing in FOIA that prevents the government from drawing confidential counsel from the private sector.

Further, the Fourth Circuit opined that "[i]t does not matter that [the private party] was motivated by the commercial benefit that would accrue to it if it succeeded in [litigation] . . . while the government was motivated by concern for the public interest." Instead, the doctrine merely requires a unity of interest between the government and the private party. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Exemption 5 threshold

72 Hunton & Williams v. DOJ, 590 F.3d 272, 288 (4th Cir. 2010).
73 Id. at 279.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 277-78.
76 Id. at 282-83.
77 Id.; see also Am. Small Bus. League v. DOD, 372 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that common interest doctrine applies to Exemption 5 but holding that, where parties communicated about matter over four year period but only entered into formal joint defense agreement for one month before agreement was withdrawn, common interest doctrine does not apply to "communications that were not legitimately made pursuant to a joint defense agreement"); Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 842 F. Supp. 2d 859, 875 (E.D. Va. 2012) (finding that "for the common interest doctrine to apply, an agency must demonstrate that, at the time of the communication in question, it
requirement should not deprive the government of the ability, available to any private litigant, to obtain undiscoverable advice from a common interest partner.  

The Fourth Circuit, in another decision, also made clear that the common interest doctrine does not attach until an agency has agreed to assist a private party. While the court did not require a written agreement to be executed or that the agency and private parties be co-parties in litigation, for the common interest doctrine to attach it held that there must be an "agreement or a meeting of the minds." Additionally, one court has held that "[a] financial interest of a party, no matter how large, does not preclude a court from finding a legal interest shared with another party where the legal aspects materially affect the financial interests." Finally, courts have noted that, while the common interest doctrine may be used to fulfill the threshold requirement of Exemption 5, it is not a privilege in and of itself.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not find any textual justification for the application of the common interest doctrine in Exemption 5 when considering a request for records concerning the requester's arrest, detention, and interrogation in Austria. The Sixth Circuit found that "[t]he [Office of International Affairs ('OIA')], undoubtedly an authority of the Government of the United States, sent the [requests for assistance] to the Central Authority of Austria and an unnamed country, had decided to support an outside party in a legal matter, and that doing so was in the public interest"), aff'd, 703 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2013).

78 Hunton & Williams, 590 F.3d at 287-88.

79 See Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of Army, 703 F.3d 724, 732-33 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that "an agency must show that it had agreed to help another party prevail on its legal claims at the time of the communications at issue because doing so was in the public interest").

80 Id. at 733.

81 Welby v. HHS, No. 15-195, 2016 WL 1718263, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2016) (finding that threshold met in communications between HHS, New York Department of State, and subject nongovernmental entity because of joint litigation strategy (quoting Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 2015))).

82 United States v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 00-1262, 2012 WL 1565228, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2012) (finding that common interest doctrine is "not a privilege in and of itself"); Am. Mgmt., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 878 ("The common interest doctrine satisfies only the inter-agency or intra-agency requirement of Exemption 5; it does not satisfy the second requirement, namely that the withheld documents be privileged.

83 See Lucaj v. FBI, 852 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that requests for assistance from Office of International Affairs to the Central Authority of Austria and an unnamed country are not inter-agency).
undoubtedly not authorities of the Government of the United States."84 The Sixth Circuit explained, "however important it may be for the OIA to have frank communications with the Central Authority of Austria and an unnamed foreign government, however common the interest between the OIA and its international partners, the Central Authority of Austria and an unnamed foreign government are not, so far as Congress has defined the term, agencies."85

**Deliberative Process Privilege**

The most commonly invoked privilege incorporated within Exemption 5 is the deliberative process privilege, the general purpose of which is to "prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions."86 Specifically, three policy purposes consistently have been held to constitute the bases for this privilege: (1) to encourage open, frank discussions on matters of policy between subordinates and superiors; (2) to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they are actually adopted; and (3) to protect against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency's action.87

The deliberative process privilege is designed to protect the "decision making processes of government agencies."88 In concept, this privilege protects not merely

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84 Id.

85 Id. at 549 (emphasis added by circuit court).


87 See, e.g., **Russell v. Dep't of the Air Force,** 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982); **Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE,** 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); **Jordan v. DOJ,** 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); **Brown v. EEOC,** No. 09-111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46466, at *9 (W.D. Ky. May 12, 2010) (holding that Exemption 5 was properly applied to prevent potential chilling effect on agency's discussions and undermining of agency's ability to perform its duties); **Morley v. CIA,** 699 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that privilege is "intended to prevent chilling future government employees from engaging in frank discussions during the deliberative process" (citing Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866)), aff'd in pertinent part, vacated & remanded on other grounds, 466 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012); **Kidd v. DOJ,** 362 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting documents on basis that disclosure would "inhibit drafters from freely exchanging ideas, language choice, and comments in drafting documents") (internal citation omitted); **Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Loc. 1164 v. HHS,** 63 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that release of predecisional documents "could cause harm by providing the public with erroneous information"), aff’d, No. 99-2208, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10993 (1st Cir. May 18, 2000); **Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,** 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 n.19 (D.D.C. 1998) (concluding that Exemption 5 is designed to prevent chilling of agency deliberations).

88 **Sears,** 421 U.S. at 150; see also **Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ,** 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (protecting documents that "'comprise[e] part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated'" (quoting **Pub. Citizen v. OMB,** 598 F.3d 865, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
documents, but also the integrity of the deliberative process itself where the exposure of that process would result in harm.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, even the status of an agency decision within an agency decisionmaking process may be protectable if the release of that information would have the effect of prematurely disclosing "the recommended outcome of the consultative process . . . as well as the source of any decision."\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{89} See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he ultimate objective of exemption 5 is to safeguard the deliberative process of agencies, not the paperwork generated in the course of that process."); Schell v. HHS, 843 F.2d 933, 940 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Because Exemption 5 is concerned with protecting the deliberative process itself, courts now focus less on the material sought and more on the effect of the material's release."); Dudman Commc'ns Corp. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress enacted Exemption 5 to protect the executive's deliberative processes—not to protect specific materials."); Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. DOJ, 334 F. Supp. 3d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that "courts have generally found that documents created in anticipation of press inquiries are protected" (quoting Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. DOD, 320 F. Supp. 3d 162, 177 (D.D.C. 2018))); Protect Democracy Project, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 177 (finding talking points to respond to press and Congress withholdable because "[r]aveling their contents would expose the process by which agency officials crafted a strategy for responding"); Davidson v. U.S. Dep't of State, 264 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that communications generated before adoption of agency policy on litigation at time when the Department was actively formulating litigation strategy reflected "the give-and-take of the consultative process"); Skinner v. DOJ, 744 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205-06 (D.D.C. 2010) (protecting emails between ATF agents and ATF attorneys discussing ongoing criminal investigation as release "would inhibit the candid, internal discussion necessary for efficient and proper . . . preparation").

\textsuperscript{90} Wolfe v. HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (protecting records indicating what actions had been completed by FDA, but awaited final decision or approval by Secretary of HHS or OMB because Exemption 5 "allows agencies a space within which they may deliberate" and finding that disclosure of where proposal was in decisionmaking chain "would force officials to punch a public time clock" which could lead to "hasty and
The FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 created a sunset provision on the deliberative process privilege, amending the text of Exemption 5 of the FOIA to provide that "the deliberative process privilege shall not apply to records created 25 years or more before the date on which the records were requested."\(^{91}\)

Traditionally, courts have established two fundamental requirements, both of which must be met, for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked.\(^{92}\) First, the communication must be predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy."\(^{93}\) Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters."\(^{94}\) The burden is upon the agency to show that the information in question precipitous decisionmaking"); see also Elec. Frontier Found., 739 F.3d at 7 ("The deliberative process privilege protects agencies from being 'forced to operate in a fishbowl.'" (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973))); cf. W. Values Project v. DOJ, 317 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting agency's attempt at using Exemption 5 Glomar response because "[t]he existence of a responsive record here would show only that OLC engaged in some deliberation, full stop . . . [and it] would not necessarily reveal the content [of] any deliberations – any details about the agency's 'give-and-take' – surrounding a decision of whether to rescind a prior opinion").

\(^{91}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018); see also OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 (posted 8/17/2016).

\(^{92}\) See Mapother v. DOJ, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The deliberative process privilege protects materials that are both predecisional and deliberative." (citing Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Adamowicz v. IRS, 672 F. Supp. 2d 454, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (protecting documents that "temporally precede and relate to specific agency decisions," and that "reflect the consultative process underlying the IRS's decisions").

\(^{93}\) Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep't of State, 641 F.3d 504, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that agency "recommendations are pre-decisional because they were created '[a]ntecedent to the adoption of an agency policy'" (quoting Jordan v. DOJ, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc))).

\(^{94}\) Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ, 697 F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that documents are deliberative when they are "related to the process by which policies are formulated") (internal citations omitted).
satisfies both requirements.\textsuperscript{95} The quality of an agency's declaration and Vaughn Index have been found to be crucial to the agency's ability to meet this obligation.\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Predecisional}

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a document is "predecisional" if it is "generated before the adoption of an agency policy."\textsuperscript{97} In determining whether a document is predecisional, courts have found that an agency does not necessarily have to point specifically to an agency final decision,\textsuperscript{98} but must instead

\textsuperscript{95} Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that burden is upon agency to demonstrate that withheld documents are exempt from disclosure).

\textsuperscript{96} See, e.g., Cuban v. SEC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that agency had met its burden under Exemption 5 to withhold certain documents but had not met its burden for other documents based upon content of agency's Vaughn Index); FPL Grp. Inc. v. IRS, 698 F. Supp. 2d 66, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2010) (same). Compare Henson v. HHS, 892 F.3d 868, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that agency "detail[ed] on an individual basis the topics discussed by the agency's employees and the purposes for the communications"); Andela v. Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., 569 F. App'x 80, 85 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that unredacted Substantial Weight Review is exempt from disclosure in part because the agency's declaration sufficiently described substantial weight review decisionmaking process), Mo. Coal. for the Env't. Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding agency's use of deliberative process privilege where it could be "fairly concluded" from Vaughn Index and declaration that release of documents could reveal deliberative process), Crisman v. DOJ, No. 12-1871, 2019 WL 1330587, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2019) (finding that "[t]he agency's declaration provides context, and the disclosures are detailed as opposed to categorical assertions regarding the content of the redacted material"); and Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. OMB, No. 07-04997, 2009 WL 1246690, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (same), with Rein v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 553 F.3d 353, 368 (4th Cir. 2009) (determining that "the Agencies' descriptions of many of the challenged documents lack the specificity and particularity required for a proper determination of whether they are exempt from disclosure"), Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (criticizing "minimal information" provided in agency submissions as being inadequate for court to determine if privilege was claimed properly), Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 826 F. Supp. 2d 157, 174-75 (D.D.C. 2011) (ordering agency to supplement its Vaughn Index because previous submission did not provide adequate basis for evaluating applicability of Exemption 5), Long v. DOJ, 703 F. Supp. 2d 84, 106-07 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (same), Info. Network For Responsible Mining (INFORM) v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1188-89 (D. Colo. 2009) (same), and Columbia Snake River Irrigators Ass'n v. Lohn, No. 07-1388, 2008 WL 750574, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2008) (ordering in camera review of documents where agency's submissions had not made clear whether withheld documents were party of agency's deliberative process).

\textsuperscript{97} Jud. Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

\textsuperscript{98} See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 19 F.4th 177, 192 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting claim that record must "relate to a specific decision facing the agency" and finding that "a record is
establish "what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents [at] issue in the course of that process." 99 On this point, the Supreme Court has been clear:

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predecisional if it relates to a specific decision or a specific decisionmaking process and was generated before the conclusion of that decision or process); Rein, 553 F.3d at 373 ("Contrary to [plaintiff's] argument, the Agencies were not required to identify the specific policy judgment at issue in each document."); Techserve All. v. Napolitano, 803 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendants failed to show predecisional nature of certain documents where they did not "match the document with the corresponding final document"); Gold Anti-Trust Action Comm. Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 762 F. Supp. 2d 123, 136 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that "the Board must identify a specific decision corresponding to each [withheld] communication"); The Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Kempthorne, 652 F. Supp. 2d 345, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that agencies "are not required to point to a specific agency decision in order to establish that the deliberative process is involved"); Nielsen v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 252 F.R.D. 499, 522 (D. Minn. 2008) (rejecting claim that agency was required to link withheld documents to specific agency decision); Perdue Farms Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-27, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14579, at *17 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1997) ("Although some [deliberative] processes do not ripen into agency decisions, this does not preclude application of the deliberative process privilege."). But see ACLU of Mass., Inc. v. ICE, 448 F. Supp. 3d 27, 40 (D. Mass. 2020) (finding that "ICE has not, as is its burden, 'pinpoint[ed] the specific agency decision to which the [last-in-time version of the draft talking points] correlates' or 'verif[ied] that the [last-in-time version of the draft talking points] precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it relates'" (quoting Providence J. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1992))).

99 Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868; see also Providence J. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 559 (1st Cir. 1992) (protecting IG’s recommendations even though decisionmakers were not obligated to follow them); Formaldehyde Inst. v. HHS, 889 F.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (protecting recommendations on suitability of article for publication, though decision on "whether and where to publish article had not yet been made"); Schell v. HHS, 843 F.2d 933, 941 (6th Cir. 1988) ("When specific advice is provided, . . . it is no less predecisional because it is accepted or rejected in silence, or perhaps simply incorporated into the thinking of superiors for future use."); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Dep't of State, 225 F. Supp. 3d 582, 586 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding that while agency has not pointed to particular decision that documents related to, "there is an additional burden on State to justify nondisclosure["] and "State has met that burden . . . by demonstrating how the withheld information related to the formulation of actual agency policy"); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 478 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding protection because agency was "generally considering" whether to support particular proposal); Maydak v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 326 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting information concerning federal inmate that was used by BOP officials as part of continuing process of making decisions regarding inmate's status); cf. Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153-54 (D. Or. 2001) (holding that adjusted census data not examined by decisionmaker "cannot be said to have contributed" to decisionmaking process; and rejecting argument that data were nevertheless predecisional because agency was actively considering using them in future), aff'd, 307 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002).
Our emphasis on the need to protect pre-decisional documents does not mean that the existence of the privilege turns on the ability of an agency to identify a specific decision in connection with which a memorandum is prepared. Agencies are, and properly should be, engaged in a continuing process of examining their policies; this process will generate memoranda containing recommendations which do not ripen into agency decisions; and the lower courts should be wary of interfering with this process.\(^{100}\)

The Supreme Court reiterated that recommendations reflecting a preliminary view rather than a final decision are protected even if they prove to be the last word, when such recommendations are last not because they are final but because they died on the vine.\(^{101}\) Thus, so long as a document is generated as part of such a continuing process of agency decisionmaking, courts have found Exemption 5 can be applicable.\(^{102}\) In a particularly instructive decision, Access Reports v. DOJ,\(^{103}\) the D.C. Circuit emphasized the importance of identifying the larger process to which a document contributes.\(^{104}\)


\(^{101}\) U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777, 786-88 (2021) (holding that "deliberative process privilege protects the draft biological opinions at issue here because they reflect a preliminary view – not a final decision – about the likely effect of the EPA's proposed rule on endangered species").

\(^{102}\) See, e.g., N.H. Right to Life v. HHS, 778 F.3d 43, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2015) (conducting review of "the relevant decisional timeline" and finding that documents are all in fact predecisional); ACLU of Wash. v. DOJ, No. 09-0642, 2011 WL 887731, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2011) (holding that the FBI properly withheld four documents that "are drafts that do not reflect final agency decisions" and "are integral parts of an on-going decision-making process within the agency"), reconsideration granted on other grounds, 2011 WL 1900140 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2011); Gordon v. FBI, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (protecting documents concerning government's "no-fly" list even after implementation of these lists, because withheld documents discussed potential revisions to relevant regulations); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2004) (acknowledging that deliberations concerning implementation of policy are part of agency’s deliberative process); Tarullo v. DOD, 170 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277 (D. Conn. 2001) (concluding that, because withheld material consisted "primarily of specific subjective recommendations about future agency conduct and policy" and was part of ongoing policy considerations, withholding was proper).

\(^{103}\) 926 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

\(^{104}\) Id. at 1196 (upholding use of privilege where withheld documents had been shown to contribute to agency's decisionmaking process on "how to shepherd [a] bill through Congress"); see also Assassination Archives Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 781 F. App’x 11, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (upholding use of privilege where "it is evident that the redacted matter amounted to predecisional communications from staff made for the purpose of informing the agency’s ultimate decision as to what the law required of the Agency in response to the Center’s FOIA request"); Nielsen v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 252 F.R.D. 499, 522 (D.
The Supreme Court has held the predecisional character of a document is not altered by the fact that an agency has subsequently made a final decision or has decided not to make a final decision. The predecisional character of a document has been found not to be altered by the mere passage of time.

In contrast, however, are postdecisional documents. They generally embody statements of policy and final opinions that have the force of law, that implement an 

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105 See, e.g., Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360 (1979) (holding that, because Exemption 5 is intended to protect free flow of advice, issuance of decision does not remove need for protection); Smith v. Dep’t of Lab., 798 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281-82 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that fact that OIG report was published "after the citations were issued" does not alter deliberative nature of communications "because the question is whether the deliberation, not the publication of the report, preceded the citation"); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 384 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112-13 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that materials lose their Exemption 5 protection once a final decision is taken, it is the document’s role in the agency’s decision-making process that controls."); Jud. Watch of Fla., Inc. v. DOJ, 102 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting as "unpersuasive" assertion that deliberative process privilege is inapplicable after deliberations have ended and relevant decision has been made).

106 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 n.18 (1975) (extending protection to records that are part of decisionmaking process even where process does not produce actual decision by agency); Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. 04-1724, 2006 WL 696053, at *21 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that documents relating to action ultimately not taken did not qualify as predecisional); Jud. Watch Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that to release deliberative documents because no final decision was issued would be "exalting semantics over substance"), aff’d on other grounds, 76 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf. Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 112 (holding that documents concerning now-abandoned agency program were nonetheless predecisional).


108 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777, 787 (2021) (explaining that while decision's "real operative effect" is an indication of its finality, "that reference is to the legal, not practical, consequences that flow from an agency's action"); Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that chief counsel opinions, indexed
established policy of an agency,\textsuperscript{109} or that explain actions that an agency has already taken.\textsuperscript{110} The Supreme Court has declared that Exemption 5 ordinarily does not apply to postdecisional documents as "the public is vitally concerned with the reasons which did supply the basis for an agency policy actually adopted."\textsuperscript{111} At the same time, it is possible

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\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{109}]
\item See, e.g., Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ACLU v. DOD, No. 15-9317, 2017 WL 4326524, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017) (finding that guidance "clearly intended to have 'operative effect'" was not deliberative even though agency characterized as "preliminary input in advance of final decision from Headquarters"); Nissei Sangyo Am., Ltd. v. IRS, No. 95-1019, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22473, at *23-24 (D.D.C. May 8, 1997) (magistrate’s recommendation) (declining to apply deliberative process privilege to results of tax audit in which agency was merely "applying published tax laws to factual information regarding a taxpayer"), adopted, (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1998).
\item See, e.g., Sears, 421 U.S. at 153-54; Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 490 F. Supp. 3d 246, 272 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that certain information withheld is not predecisional because it explains decisions already made by the Special Counsel, and such information is not protected by the deliberative process privilege); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. ICE, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that "[d]eliberations about how to present an already decided policy to the public, or documents designed to explain that policy to . . . the public, including in draft form, are at the heart of what should be released under FOIA"); Ford Motor Co. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 06-13346, 2008 WL 4899402, at *17 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2008) (magistrate’s report and recommendation), adopted in part & rejected in part on other grounds, 2008 WL 4899401 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2008); Jud. Watch Inc. v. HHS, 27 F. Supp. 2d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that "deliberative process privilege does not protect documents that merely state or explain agency decisions"); see also Badhwar v. DOJ, 622 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (D.D.C. 1985) ("There is nothing predecisional about a recitation of corrective action already taken.").
\item Sears, 421 U.S. at 152; see, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A strong theme of our [deliberative process] opinions has been that an agency will not be permitted to develop a body of "secret law" . . ." (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 869 (denying protection for memoranda that "were not suggestions or recommendations as to what agency policy should be," but instead were "straightforward explanations of agency regulations in specific factual situations"); Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that certain documents "are not the ideas and theories which go into the making of the law," but instead "are the law itself, and as such should be made available to the public"); Safeway Inc. v. IRS, No. 05-3182, 2006 WL 3041079, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (ordering release of documents characterized as "intraagency discussion of how to apply established policy and law to the particular facts of Plaintiff’s audit"); Evans v. OPM, 276 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that deliberative process privilege does not protect memorandum issued by OPM’s Office of General Counsel that is "clear statement" of OPM’s position on adoption of governmentwide hiring policy); Hansen v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 817 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (D.D.C. 1992) (ordering disclosure of History of the Air
for communications to be postdecisional in form and timing, but predecisional in content.\(^{112}\)

Several criteria have been fashioned by the courts to clarify what has been called the "often blurred" distinction between predecisional and postdecisional documents.\(^{113}\) First, an agency should determine whether the document is a "final opinion" within the meaning of one of the two proactive disclosure provisions of the FOIA.\(^{114}\) In Rockwell International Corp. v. DOJ,\(^{115}\) the D.C. Circuit determined that "as a general principle[, an] action taken by the responsible decisionmaker in an agency's decision-making process which has the practical effect of disposing of a matter before the agency is 'final' for purposes of FOIA."\(^{116}\) In addition, the D.C. Circuit held that if a final decision is

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\(^{112}\) See Sears, 421 U.S. at 151 (noting that postdecisional documents may still reflect protected "prior communications and the ingredients of the decisionmaking process"); see also Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It would exalt form over substance to exempt documents in which staff recommend certain action or offer their opinions on given issues but require disclosure of documents which only 'report' what those recommendations and opinions are."); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 233-34 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that records created after an agency decision had been made could be protected because they contained discussions of predecisional deliberations); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS, No. 04-1625, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94615, at *22-24 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006) (protecting email message generated after agency decision made that "recanted" deliberations preceding decision); cf. N. Dartmouth Properties Inc. v. HUD, 984 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that author may not have known that final decision had been reached at time he composed message because "[n]o one would waste time preparing an e-mail message in an attempt to persuade someone to reach a conclusion if he knew that the conclusion he was advocating had already been reached").

\(^{113}\) Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

\(^{114}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A); see Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360-61 n.23 (1979) (holding that "with respect to final opinions, Exemption 5 can never apply" but that the "mutually exclusive relationship between final opinions and statements of policy, on one hand, and predecisional communications, on the other, does not necessarily exist between final statements of policy and other Exemption 5 privileges"); Skelton v. USPS, 678 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that Congress intended proactive disclosure provisions of FOIA "to help the citizen find agency statements 'having precedential significance' when he becomes involved in 'a controversy with an agency'"") (internal citation omitted).

\(^{115}\) 235 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

\(^{116}\) Id., at 602-03 (concluding that report was not final opinion because it contained "conclusions of a voluntarily undertaken internal agency investigation, not a conclusion about agency action (or inaction) in an adversarial dispute with another party"); see Common Cause v. IRS, 646 F.2d 656, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting claim that
accompanied by an explanation from the decisionmaker discussing the basis of the decision, that explanation would be considered part of the final decision and must be disclosed.\textsuperscript{117} In another case discussing final opinions, the D.C. Circuit held that Field Service Advice memoranda (FSAs) issued by the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel are not predecisional documents, because they constitute "statements of an agency's legal position."\textsuperscript{118} The court reached this conclusion even though the opinions were found to be "nonbinding" on the ultimate decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{119}

Second, courts have considered the nature of the decisionmaking authority vested in the office or person issuing the document.\textsuperscript{120} If the author lacks "legal decision authority," the document is far more likely to be predecisional.\textsuperscript{121} For example, the D.C. document was final opinion, because agency’s action involved "the voluntary suggestion, evaluation, and rejection of a proposed policy by an agency, not the agency’s final, unappealable decision not to pursue a judicial remedy in an adversarial dispute").

\textsuperscript{117} Rockwell, 235 F.3d at 603; see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. GSA, 358 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that a document is not predecisional where it "was intended to be an expression of the agency's official position" rather than an 'expression of the individual author's views" and holding that "[t]he document is announcing what the agency is doing (and why), not arguing for what it should be doing" (quoting Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).

\textsuperscript{118} Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 483 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2007) (ordering release of documents reflecting agency’s official position on tax code); Evans v. OPM, 276 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding documents at issue "indistinguishable" from records at issue in Tax Analysts for purposes of Exemption 5); Ginsberg v. IRS, No. 96-2265, 1997 WL 882913, at *4 & nn.4, 5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 1997) (magistrate’s recommendation) ("Although the opinions of District Counsel may not represent final opinions or policy statements of the IRS . . . [they were] relied upon and specifically referenced" by IRS agent in conduct of examination.), adopted, (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1998), appeal dismissed, No. 98-2384 (11th Cir. June 5, 1998); cf. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 97 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting IRS Legal Memoranda, and distinguishing them from FSAs, on basis that "[w]hereas [Legal Memoranda] flow 'upward' from staffers to reviewers, [FSAs] flow 'outward' from the Office of Chief Counsel to personnel in the field").

\textsuperscript{119} Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 617.

\textsuperscript{120} See Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D.D.C. 1989) ("What matters is that the person who issues the document has authority to speak finally and officially for the agency.").

\textsuperscript{121} Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1975) (finding that reports prepared prior to final decision of full Board were predecisional); see also A. Michael's Piano Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding staff attorney's recommendation predecisional as she had no authority to close investigation); Worldnetdaily.com, Inc. v. DOJ, 215 F. Supp. 3d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that memorandum to supervisors recommending declination of prosecution of two Assistant
Circuit held that a legal memorandum from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to the FBI was predecisional because OLC does not have decisionmaking authority for the FBI. The court noted that "[t]he OLC Opinion instead amounts to advice offered by OLC for consideration by officials of the FBI." The D.C. Circuit has, however, looked "beneath formal lines of authority to the reality of the decisionmaking process." Hence, the D.C. Circuit has held that even though an official lacks ultimate decisionmaking authority, if agency "practices" commonly accord decisionmaking authority to that official they will be considered to be final authority in the context of determining whether a document is predecisional. Conversely, an agency official who appears to have final authority may in fact not have such authority or may not be wielding that authority in a particular situation.

United States Attorneys "does not reflect a determination to decline to prosecute, but a recommendation that the United States Attorney decline to do so, along with the evidence and analysis supporting that recommendation" and, therefore, is deliberative); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2001) (protecting memoranda "written by a component office without decisionmaking authority to a different component office" that had such authority), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds & remanded, 294 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Tax Analysts, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 17 ("Because the drafters lack ultimate [decisionmaking] authority, their views are necessarily [predecisional].").

122 Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 739 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel] is not authorized to make decisions about the FBI's investigative policy, so the OLC Opinion cannot be an authoritative statement of the agency's policy.").

123 Id. at 8.

124 Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that Schlefer compelled release of recommendations to Regional Forester, finding that documents contained "merely opinions, recommendations, and queries aimed at improving" forest plans and were not "final, binding agency policy"); cf. Goldstein v. Off. of Indep. Couns., No. 87-2028, 1999 WL 570862, at *7 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) (protecting recommendations on possible criminal investigations from head of DOJ's Criminal Division to Director of FBI).

125 Schlefer, 702 F.2d at 238, 241; see, e.g., Badran v. DOJ, 652 F. Supp. 1437, 1439 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (concluding that INS decision on plaintiff's bond was final, even though it was reviewable by immigration judge, "because immigration judges are independent from the INS, and no review of plaintiff's bond occurred within the INS").

126 See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife, 861 F.2d at 1122-23 (finding that headquarters' comments on regional plans were opinions and recommendations); Heggestad v. DOJ, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that top official in DOJ's Tax Division actually had made decision to prosecute despite fact that authority to make such decisions was normally exercised by chief of Tax Division's Criminal Section and so all document prepared prior to that decision were predecisional).
Careful analysis of the decisionmaking process is sometimes required to determine whether the records relate only to a previously made, final decision, or also relate to another, future decision, whereby they may retain their deliberative nature. For example, agency recommendations to OMB concerning the development of proposed legislation to be submitted to Congress have been found to be predecisional because, while the agency made a final decision concerning the substance of the recommendation made to OMB, the final decision regarding the proposed legislation rested with OMB and the recommendation was predecisional to that determination.

Third, it is useful to examine the direction in which the document flows along the decisionmaking chain. A document "from a subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be predecisional" than is one that travels in the opposite direction: "[F]inal

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127 See, e.g., Stalcup v. CIA, 768 F.3d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that the documents were predecisional because the CIA's task did not end when it reached its initial conclusion but rather continued when it was presented with new data and undertook to determine whether it needed to change its position); City of Va. Beach v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 995 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993) (protecting documents discussing past decision insofar as it influences future decision); Access Reps. v. DOJ, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that staff attorney memorandum on how proposed FOIA amendments would affect future cases not postdecisional working law, but rather opinion on how to handle pending legislative process); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 12 F. Supp. 3d 100, 121 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that "[d]eliberations over how to commemorate a past event are obviously 'predecisional' to the actual commemoration—they bear little, if at all, on the event itself"); Gordon v. FBI, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (upholding decision to withhold documents that concerned possible revisions to "no-fly" list regulations); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting documents discussing how to promote presidential decision in Congress); Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2004) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that mere fact that documents in question were created after relevant settlement agreement was concluded mandated holding that they were postdecisional; agency may properly withhold documents evaluating prior agency decision); cf. Steinberg v. DOJ, No. 91-2740, 1993 WL 385820, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (holding that protection of exemption is not lost where decision to conduct particular type of investigation was merely intermediate step in larger process).


129 Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Machado Amadis v. State, 971 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that "recommendations from subordinates to superiors lie at the core of the deliberative process privilege"); Casad v. HHS, 301 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2002) (highlighting usefulness of identifying "relative positions in the agency's 'chain of command' occupied by the document’s author and recipient” in determining whether document is predecisional); Muttitt v. Dep't of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 308 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Coastal States and noting that documents from subordinate to supervisor are more likely to be predecisional than documents flowing in other direction); Trea Senior Citizens League v. Dep't of State, 923 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); see also Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 1479, 1491 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[A]
opinions'... typically flow from a superior with [policymaking] authority to a subordinate who carries out the policy."\textsuperscript{130} However, under certain circumstances, recommendations can flow from the superior to the subordinate.\textsuperscript{131}

Of final note, courts have found documents to be "predecisional" not only when they are circulated within the agency, but also when they originate from an agency lacking decisional authority that advises another agency possessing such authority.\textsuperscript{132} The privilege has been found to protect "documents which the agency decisionmaker herself prepared as part of her deliberation and decisionmaking process,"\textsuperscript{133} or documents that

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\textsuperscript{130} Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

\textsuperscript{131} See Nat'l Wildlife, 861 F.2d at 1123 (finding comments from headquarters to regional office, under circumstances presented, to be advisory rather than directory); N. Dartmouth Properties Inc. v. HUD, 984 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D. Mass. 1997) (dictum) ("Conversation is, after all, a two-way street. A superior would be willing to engage a subordinate in candid debate only if he knows that his opinions will also be protected by the 'deliberative process' privilege.").

\textsuperscript{132} See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 188 (1975); Bureau of Nat'l Affs., 742 F.2d at 1497 (holding "that views submitted by one agency to a second agency that has final decisional authority are predecisional materials"); Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting documents relating to ethics investigation that were prepared by Department of the Interior and given to Office of Government Ethics, which had final authority over investigation); see, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Empls., Loc. 2782 v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 907 F.2d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (protecting promotion recommendations made to official with authority to accept or reject them).

do not end up being considered by the agency decisionmaker at all. 

Lastly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the privilege is not limited to deliberations connected solely to agency activities that are specifically authorized by Congress. 

**Deliberative**

In addition to being predecisional, in order to fall within the deliberative process privilege, the material must be "deliberative." 

As the D.C. Circuit has held, to be protected by the deliberative process privilege, the document must "reflect[] the give-and-take of the consultative process," either by assessing the merits of a particular viewpoint, or by articulating the process used by the agency to formulate a decision.

(withholding handwritten notes constituting senior officials' comments on another document).

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134 See, e.g., Moye, O'Brien, O'Rourke, Hogan & Pickert v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that documents which had contributed to decisionmaking process are privileged even though they had not been considered by final decisionmaker); Hamilton Sec. Grp. Inc. v. HUD, 106 F. Supp. 2d 23, 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting draft audit report that was never reviewed by agency decisionmaker; holding that "only those materials that are reviewed and approved by the District Inspector General represent the agency's final position"), aff'd per curiam, No. 00-5331, 2001 WL 238162, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2001); Greenberg v. Dep't of the Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 (D.D.C. 1998) (rejecting argument that documents were not deliberative because they were not actually relied upon, observing that "[i]f the author had known that the notes discussing the proposed questions and issues would be subject to FOIA disclosure if not actually used, the author likely would have been more cautious in what he or she recommended"); Brooks v. IRS, No. 96-6284, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21075, at *23-24 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1997) (stating that "[g]overnmental privilege does not hinge on whether or not the District Counsel relied on or accorded any weight to the information at issue in rendering its final decision").

135 See Enviro Tech Int'l Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 2004) (protecting documents that contained EPA recommendations on workplace exposure limits to n-Propyl Bromide, despite fact that EPA lacks statutory authority to regulate such exposure limits).

136 McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 647 F.3d 331, 339 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("To qualify for Exemption 5 protection under the deliberative process privilege, 'an agency's materials must be both "predecisional" and a part of the "deliberative process."'" (quoting Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just. v. DOD, 512 F.3d 677, 680 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).

137 Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberative process privilege "covers recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency"); see also Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 781 F. App'x 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that redacted material "amounted to predecisional communications from staff made for the purpose of informing the agency's ultimate decision as to what the law required of the Agency in response to the [requester's] FOIA request" and "'reflects the give-and-take' of a 'consultative process' through which the agency sought to identify records within its possession potentially responsive to the . . .
Courts have protected under the deliberative process privilege material that would expose the opinions, advice, or recommendations offered in the course of agency decisionmaking.\(^{138}\)

Generally, factual information is not covered by the deliberative process privilege because the release of factual information does not expose the deliberations or opinions of agency personnel.\(^{139}\) Courts have found that, not only would factual material "generally requests"); Whitaker v. Dep't of State, No. 14-5275, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1086, at *4 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that "[t]he twelve documents at issue pre-dated the CIA's ultimate disposition of appellant's requests and reflect the 'give-and-take' at the core of the deliberative process privilege"); Docufreedom Inc. v. DOJ, No. 17-2706, 2019 WL 3858166 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2019) (concluding that discussions about how to respond to a FOIA request fall squarely under the deliberative process privilege because such "discussions would demonstrate the 'give-and-take of the consultative process"").


\(^{139}\) See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973) (refusing to extend deliberative process privilege protection to "factual material otherwise available on discovery merely [on the basis that] it was placed in a memorandum with matters of law, policy, or opinion"); Kowack v. U.S. Forest Serv., 766 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that even though facts are not automatically subject to disclosure, facts must reveal the deliberative process in order to be protected); Batton v. Evers, 598 F.3d 169, 183-84 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that, while IRS agents' opinions and recommendations were properly withheld, government's declarations were insufficient to allow court to determine whether factual information had been properly segregated out and released); Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 867 (holding that deliberative process privilege only applies to "opinion" or "recommendatory" portions of documents not factual information (citing Mink, 410 U.S. at 93)); Hajro v. USCIS, No. 08-1350, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117964, at *44 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011) (requiring agency to "isolate the [specific] factual information requested and disclose it"); McGrady v. Mabus, 635 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2009) (distinguishing between letters and memoranda which are deliberative and documents that contain only factual material); Unidad Latina en Acción v. DHS, 253 F.R.D. 44, 58 (D. Conn. 2008) (ordering release of "purely factual material" needed to respond to inquiry to agency); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USDA, 170 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941 (D. Ariz. 2000) (concluding that release of "raw research data" would not expose agency's deliberative process, on grounds that such data were not recommendations, not subject to alteration upon further agency review, and not "selective" in character), aff'd on other grounds, 314 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
be available for discovery,\textsuperscript{140} but its release usually would not risk chilling agency deliberations.\textsuperscript{141} This seemingly straightforward distinction between deliberative and factual materials can become less clear, however, where the facts themselves reflect the agency's deliberative process\textsuperscript{142} — which has prompted the D.C. Circuit to observe "that use of the factual matter/deliberative matter distinction produced incorrect outcomes in a small number of cases."\textsuperscript{143} In some cases, there has been disagreement about whether to characterize material as "fact" or "opinion" in the first place.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{140} Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88.

\textsuperscript{141} See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that release of factual material would not be "injurious" to decisionmaking process); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DHS, 648 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-59 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that request for assistance in determining what sector of agency should have responsibility for particular task does not involve agency policy considerations, is factual, and does not risk chilling future agency discussions); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 409 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ordering release of documents on basis that "preliminary findings as to objective facts" are not protectable); Dean v. FDIC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 780, 794 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (distinguishing between portions of documents containing opinions of Inspector General investigators and sections that merely discuss substance of investigations); Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of State, No. 91-746, 1991 WL 179116, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1991) (citing Montrose Chem. and noting principle that release of "purely factual matters" generally "would not threaten agency deliberations"); cf. Kubik v. BOP, No. 10-6078, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71300, at *23 (D. Or. July 1, 2011) (noting that withholding of factual material was proper because disclosure "has the potential to chill frank discussions").

\textsuperscript{142} See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting simplistic fact/opinion distinction, and instead focusing on whether documents in question play role in agency's deliberative process); Skelton v. USPS, 678 F.2d 35, 38-39 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that focus should be on whether release of documents would reveal agency's evaluative process); Vento v. IRS, No. 08-159, 2010 WL 1375279, at *5 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2010) (stating that factual information may be withheld if it "would indirectly reveal the advice, opinions, and evaluations circulated . . . as part of [the] decisionmaking process" (quoting Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977))).

\textsuperscript{143} Dudman Commc'nns Corp. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

\textsuperscript{144} Compare Fla. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 961 F.2d 941, 950 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that "adjusted" 1990 census figures submitted to, but not used by, Secretary of Commerce constituted protectible "opinion"), with Pub. Citizen Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that list of agencies allowed to decline to submit materials for OMB clearance was factual information and not protected under Exemption 5), Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 307 F.3d 1084, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Assembly and issuing similar ruling with regard to statistical estimates created for 2000 census), Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 968 F.2d 916, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that raw census data was factual in nature and release would not reveal agency's decisionmaking process), and Cornucopia Inst. v. Dep't of Agric., No. 16-148, 2018 WL 4637004, at *6
The full D.C. Circuit has declared that factual information should be examined "in light of the policies and goals that underlie" the privilege and in "the context in which the materials are used." 145 Following this approach, for example, the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld an agency decision to withhold "vote sheets" that were used in the process of determining retirement benefits. 146 Even though these vote sheets were factual in nature, the court found that they were used by agency personnel in developing recommendations to an agency decisionmaker and thus were "precisely the type of pre-decisional documents intended to fall under Exemption 5." 147

Recognizing the shortcomings of a rigid factual/deliberative distinction, courts generally allow agencies to withhold factual material in an otherwise "deliberative" document under a few types of circumstances. The first of these is when the author of a document selects specific facts out of a larger group of facts, and this very act is

(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (rejecting defendant's position that by "determining what to capture on camera during the trip, agency employees made value judgments about what material might be useful in their several decisionmaking processes").

145 Wolfe v. HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Nat'l Wildlife, 861 F.2d at 1119 (explaining that the "ultimate objective" of Exemption 5 is to safeguard agency's deliberative process); Sakamoto v. EPA, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that facts may be withheld when they are "directly tied to the deliberative process").


147 Id.; see also Kan. v. DOD, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1246 (D. Kan. 2018) (finding that Exemption 5 protects agency’s cost estimation for closing Guantanamo Bay because event had not yet occurred); Nat'l Sec. Couns. v. CIA, 206 F. Supp. 3d 241, 275 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that "both the search terms and results of the agency’s preliminary searches in connection with the relevant FOIA requests is easily characterized as predecisional" because they "are used to guide the agency’s later response to a particular FOIA request and generally cannot be said to support a decision already made"); Bloomberg, L.P. v. SEC, 357 F. Supp. 2d 156, 169 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting notes taken by SEC officials at meeting with companies subject to SEC oversight; finding that, though factual in form, notes would, if released, "severely undermine" SEC's ability to gather information from its regulatees and in turn undermine SEC's ability to deliberate on best means to address policymaking concerns in such areas).
Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act

Exemption 5

deliberative in nature.148 In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train.149 for example, the summary of a large volume of public testimony compiled to facilitate the EPA Administrator’s decision on a particular matter was held to be part of the agency’s internal deliberative process.150 The D.C. Circuit held that the very act of distilling the testimony, of separating the significant facts from the insignificant facts, constituted an exercise of judgment by agency personnel.151

148 Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 320 F. Supp. 3d 110, 119 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that "the selection or organization of facts can be part of an agency’s deliberative process and so exempt from FOIA"); see also Almeda v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-5087, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 26258, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2020) (per curiam) (finding "drafts and corresponding emails were part of a deliberative process, spanning several months, during which the government summarized the benefits process for Filipino veterans from a large universe of facts").

149 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

150 See id. at 71.

151 Id. at 68; see also, e.g., Poll v. U.S. Off. of Special Couns., No. 99-4021, 2000 WL 14422, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1999) (protecting factual "distillation" which revealed significance that examiner attributed to various aspects of case); Providence J. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 562 (1st Cir. 1992) (revealing IG’s factual findings would divulge substance of related recommendations); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 1979) (disclosing factual segments of summaries would reveal deliberative process by "demonstrating which facts in the massive rule-making record were considered significant by the decisionmaker"); Hardy v. ATF, 243 F. Supp. 3d 155, 169 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that factual summaries "'culled by [OIG] from [a] much larger universe of facts presented to it’ . . . 'reflect an "exercise of judgment as to what issues are most relevant to the pre-decisional findings and recommendations"'" (quoting Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641 F.3d 504, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2011))); McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 849 F. Supp. 2d 47, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that "purely factual" material was protectable under Exemption 5 because "[defendant] culled selected facts and data from the mass of available information"); ViroPharma Inc. v. HHS, 839 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193-94 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that "[t]he choice of what factual material and prior final agency opinions to include or remove during the drafting process is itself often part of the deliberative process, and thus is properly exempt under Exemption 5"); Columbia Snake River Irrigators Ass’n v. Lohn, No. 07-1388, 2008 WL 750574, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2008) (protecting agency documents that included factual information in part because "the process of prioritizing facts and conclusions and weighing their importance and relevance is often an exercise of judgment that can affect Agency policy") (internal quotations omitted); Jud. Watch Inc. v. DOJ, No. 01-639, 2006 WL 2038513, at *7 (D.D.C. July 19, 2006) (quoting favorably from government declaration explaining that "very act of selecting those facts which are significant from those that are not, is itself a deliberative process"); Env’t Prot. Servs. v. EPA, 364 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (protecting notes of agency investigator who previously had been briefed on investigation and had geared his queries accordingly, thereby making his notes selectively recorded information); Hamilton Sec. Grp. Inc. v. HUD, 106 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting facts in draft audit report on grounds that "any factual information that could be [released] would reveal decisions made
Similarly, in Mapother v. DOJ, the D.C. Circuit upheld protection for portions of a report consisting of factual materials prepared for an Attorney General decision on whether to allow former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to enter the United States. The D.C. Circuit found that "the majority of [the report's] factual material was assembled through an exercise of judgment in extracting pertinent material from a vast number of documents for the benefit of an official called upon to take discretionary action," and that it therefore fell within the deliberative process privilege. In making its ruling, the court distinguished its prior holding in Playboy Enterprises v. DOJ, in which the court had ordered release of a factual document because the document in question "was prepared only to inform the Attorney General of facts which he in turn would make available to members of Congress," and did not involve any decisionmaking by the Attorney General. By contrast, the existence of a connection to a decisionmaking process was key to the Mapother court's analysis and the different outcome it reached for certain portions of the report. However, in Mapother the D.C.

by the auditor" and thereby chill future agency deliberations), aff'd per curiam, No. 00-5331, 2001 WL 238162, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2001); Mace v. EEOC, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (protecting factual "distillation" in otherwise deliberative EEOC report), aff'd, 197 F.3d 329 (8th Cir. 1999); Farmworkers Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 639 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that list of farmworker camps was "selective fact" and thus protectable).

152 3 F.3d 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

153 See id. at 1538-40.

154 Id. at 1539.

155 677 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

156 Id.

157 See id.; see also S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 06-2485, 2008 WL 2523819, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2008) (quoting Playboy Enters. for proposition that "'a report does not become part of the deliberative process merely because it contains only those facts which the person making the report thinks material'"); Lacy v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 593 F. Supp. 71, 78 (D. Md. 1984) (holding that photographs attached to deliberative report "do not become part of the deliberative process merely because some photographs were selected and others were not").

158 See Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1539 (distinguishing Playboy Enters.); see also City of Va. Beach v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 995 F.2d 1247, 1255 (4th Cir. 1993) (observing similarly that in Playboy Enters. "[the] agency identified no decision in relation to the withheld investigative report"); S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 500 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that agency had demonstrated that release of factual materials would reveal agency's decisionmaking process, and in particular which facts decisionmaker considered most important); Edmonds Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 460 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71
Circuit also held that the portion of the report consisting of a chronology of Waldheim's military career was not deliberative, as it was "neither more nor less than a comprehensive collection of the essential facts" and "reflect[ed] no point of view."\(^{159}\)

In Trentadue v. Integrity Committee,\(^{160}\) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit discussed, but declined to follow, its understanding of the D.C. Circuit's analysis on factual selection in Mapother,\(^{161}\) and declared that "factual materials do not become privileged merely because they represent a summary of a larger body of information."\(^{162}\) And, in situations where agencies have not shown that factual studies were used selectively, the D.C. Circuit has ordered release of the documents, regardless of their connection to a decisionmaking process.\(^{163}\)

Factual information may also be withheld as deliberative material when it is so thoroughly integrated with deliberative material that its disclosure would expose or cause

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\(^{159}\) Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1539-40; see also D.C. Tech. Assistance Org., No. 98-0280, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) ("The order in which the [factual portions] are listed is apparently random, so that disclosing them reveals nothing of the decision-making process or of the subjective assessment that follows.").

\(^{160}\) 501 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).

\(^{161}\) See id. at 1229 (discussing Mapother).

\(^{162}\) Id. at 1232; see also Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 2019) (determining "slides contain only a list of factual statements, and "factual materials do not become privileged merely because they represent a summary of a larger body of information"" (quoting Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1232)).

\(^{163}\) See Am. Radio Relay League Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that agency erred in withholding studies relied upon in promulgating rule and declaring that Exemption 5 "does not authorize an agency to throw a protective blanket over all information"); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that survey results cannot be protected where they merely "provide the raw data upon which decisions can be made [and] are not themselves a part of the decisional process").
harm to the agency's deliberations. Exemption 5 thus has been found to protect scientific reports that constitute the interpretation of technical data, insofar as "the opinion of an expert somehow reflects the deliberative process of decision or policy making." It has also been extended to cover successive reformulations of computer

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164 Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 739 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that "context matters," and here entire document, including factual material, "reflects the full and frank exchange of ideas" so that factual portions "could not be released without harming the deliberative processes of the government" (citation omitted)); Quarles v. Dep't of the Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (withholding factual material because it would expose agency's decisionmaking process and chill future deliberations); see, e.g., Rein v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 553 F.3d 353, 375 (4th Cir. 2009) (protecting factual portions of document because such information, when viewed as part of a larger document "would reveal the very predecisional and deliberative material Exemption 5 protects"); Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (protecting requested document where the decisionmaker's "thought processes are woven into document to such an extent" that any attempt at segregating out information would reveal agency deliberations); Wolfe v. HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 774-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (protecting mere "fact" of status of proposal in deliberative process); Goodrich Corp. v. EPA, 593 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (D.D.C. 2009) (protecting draft model because "evolving iterations" of model may not represent agency's "ultimate opinions . . . . Therefore, even if the data plugged into the model is itself purely factual, the selection and calibration of data is part of the deliberative process"); Reliant Energy Power Generation Inc. v. FERC, 520 F. Supp. 2d 194, 204 (D.D.C. 2007) (protecting documents related to factual investigation because release "would allow a reader to probe too deeply into the thought processes of the drafters and would have a chilling effect on communication between agency employees"); Sakamoto v. OPM, No. 06-1215, 2007 WL 1722424, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2007) (holding factual portions of audits as non-segregable material because release would reveal "mental processes" of auditors); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep't of the Air Force, 781 F. Supp. 31, 36 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that release of summaries of negotiations would inhibit free flow of information, as "summaries are not simply the facts themselves"); Jowett Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 729 F. Supp. 871, 877 (D.D.C. 1989) (determining that disclosing manner of selecting and presenting even most factual segments of audit reports would reveal process by which agency's final decision is made); SMS Data Prods. Grp. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, No. 88-481, 1989 WL 293230, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1989) (holding technical scores and technical rankings of competing contract bidders predecisional and deliberative); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 86-1255, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 1987) (protecting variables reflected in computer program's mathematical equation); Brinderson Constructors Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 85-905, 1986 WL 293230, at *5 (D.D.C. June 11, 1986) (holding that computations made to evaluate claim for compensation "are certainly part of the deliberative process"). But see Warren v. SSA, No. 98-0116E, 2000 WL 1209383, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2000) (holding that privilege does not protect ordered ranking of job applicants, and reasoning that such ranking "is not pre-decisional . . . as [it is] the result of the panel's decisions rather than intermediate step in a multi-layered decisionmaking process), aff'd on other grounds, 10 F. App'x 20 (2d Cir. 2001).

165 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980); see also Reliant, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06 (protecting the "spreadsheets and tables that 'analyze raw data,'" because even though materials "are not themselves deliberative, their use by agency
programs that were used to analyze scientific data, whereas routine computations not involving agency discretion are not covered.

Indeed, the government interest in withholding technical data has been found to be heightened if such material is requested at a time when disclosure of a scientist's "nascent thoughts... would discourage the intellectual risk-taking so essential to technical progress." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit echoed this view in National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service, explaining as follows:

Opinions on facts and the consequences of those facts form the grist for the policymaker's mill. Before arriving at a final decision, the policymaker may alter his or her opinion regarding which facts are relevant or the likely consequences of these facts, or both. Tentative policies may undergo massive revisions based on a reassessment of these variables. Subjecting a policymaker to public criticism on the basis of such tentative assessments is precisely what the deliberative process privilege is intended to prevent.

employees in writing the Staff Report renders them part of the deliberative process") (internal citation omitted); Horsehead Indus. v. EPA, No. 94-1299, slip op. at 15-20 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1996) (finding that agency scientists' "open discussion of the effectiveness of ... testing results and frank exchanges of view regarding the interpretation of those results reside near the core of an agency's deliberative process"). But see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1973) (characterizing scientific material as "technological data of a purely factual nature").


See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 954 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2020) (determining core model is akin to a specialized calculator and is therefore not withholdable because releasing standard computations over which the agency has no significant discretion is unlikely to injure the quality of agency decisionmaking); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding "release of materials that do not embody agency judgments – for example, materials relating to standard or routine computations or measurements over which the agency has no significant discretion – is unlikely to diminish officials' candor or otherwise injure the quality of agency decisions").


861 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 1120 (protecting "working drafts" of forest plan and "working drafts of environmental impact statements").
In other cases, courts have ruled that factual material is so mixed in with deliberative material that it would not be possible to release meaningful portions of a document.\footnote{See, e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 892 F. Supp. 2d 28, 49 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that government must only disclose factual information that is "not inextricably intertwined with deliberative portions of the withheld records"); Kellerhals v. IRS, No. 2009-90, 2011 WL 4591063, at *7 (D.V.I. Sept. 30, 2011) (allowing withholding of factual material because "while some of the documents contain factual material, that material is so intertwined with the analysis that any attempt to reveal only factual material would reveal the agency's deliberations"); Hawkins v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., No. 05-269J32, 2005 WL 2063811, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2005) (protecting factual portions of deliberative document that could not be "segregated in a meaningful way" from deliberative sections); Delta Ltd. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Bureau, 384 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that factual portions of records were too closely mixed in with deliberative portions and therefore were not releasable); Tarullo v. DOD, 170 F. Supp. 2d 271, 278 (D. Conn. 2001) ("Although the document does summarize relevant facts, that summary is so intertwined with . . . recommendations and opinions . . . that production of a redacted version would be incomprehensible.").}

Applying Deliberative Process Privilege

The D.C. Circuit has held that documents qualify as predecisional and deliberative only if they "reflect[] advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."\footnote{Tax’n With Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 739 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that recommendation memorandum that "examines policy options available to [an agency]" is "precisely the sort of 'advisory opinion . . . comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated' that is covered by the deliberative process privilege" (quoting Pub. Citizen Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2010))); Pub. Citizen, 598 F.3d at 875 (concluding that "[t]o the extent the documents at issue in this case neither make recommendations for policy change nor reflect internal deliberations on the advisability of any particular course of action, they are not predecisional and deliberative despite having been produced by an agency that generally has an advisory role").} The key factor, the D.C. Circuit has stressed is the "role, if any, that the document plays in the process of agency deliberations."\footnote{Formaldehyde Inst. v. HHS, 889 F.2d 1118, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Huntington v. Dep’t of Com., 234 F. Supp. 3d 94, 110 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that "[t]he challenged documents precede the final patentability decision and are part of the process by which that decision is made; they therefore are predecisional and deliberative"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Reno, 154 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18 (D.D.C. 2001) ("It is not enough to say that a memorandum 'expresses the author's views' on a matter [because the] . . . role played by the document in the course of the deliberative process must also be established.").} There are several categories of documents that are routinely protected by the deliberative process privilege. Among them are "all papers
which reflect the agency's group thinking in the process of working out its policy and
determining what its law shall be."174 They are protected because, by their very nature,
their release would likely "stifle honest and frank communication within the agency."175

174 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (internal citations omitted);
accord Tax'n With Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 677 (noting that "advisory opinions,
recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated" are routinely protected by deliberative process
privilege); see, e.g., Solers, Inc. v. IRS, 827 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2016) (protecting agent's
notes consisting of thoughts, impressions, possible direction of examination, and
preliminary evaluation of issues); AIDS Healthcare Found. v. Leavitt, 256 F. App'x 954, 956
(9th Cir. 2007) (protecting deliberations concerning grant applications); Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Recommendations on how to
best deal with a particular issue are themselves the essence of the deliberative process.");
Asian Law Caucus v. DHS, No. 08-00842, 2008 WL 5047839, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24,
2008) (protecting email exchanges reflecting deliberations on whether to create new agency
procedure); Ctr. for Medicare Advoc. v. HHS, 577 F. Supp. 2d 221, 236 (D.D.C. 2008)
(protecting documents containing "advice, recommendations, and suggestions"); Carter,
Fullerton & Hayes, LLC v. FTC, 520 F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (D.D.C. 2007) (protecting
handwritten meeting notes of senior FTC employee as representative of his "thoughts and
impressions of the meeting") (internal quotations omitted); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 306 F.
Supp. 2d 58, 70 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting "handwritten notes" on an invitation to the
Attorney General, because disclosure "would reveal what the staff member who wrote the
notes considered to be important . . . and how the decision to attend the event may have
been reached" (quoting agency declaration)); Dorsett v. Dep't of the Treasury, 307 F. Supp.
presented by plaintiff and others to Secret Service protectees); Warren v. SSA, No. 98-
scoresheets on basis that "[t]he decisions of a hiring panel to emphasize certain types of
skills or how many points to award to an applicant for a particular educational experience or
previous employment experience are deliberative decisions in that they set the policy for the
hiring process"), aff'd on other grounds, 10 F. App'x 20 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Jud. Watch
of Fl., Inc. v. DOJ, 102 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting notes taken by Attorney
General at campaign finance task force meeting, but not shared with any other person,
because their release "could reveal how the [Attorney General] prioritized different facts and
considerations in deliberating whether or not to appoint an independent counsel . . . [and]
reveal her interpretation of public policies which she deemed relevant" to decision whether
to appoint independent counsel).

175 Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Missouri ex
rel. Shorr v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 147 F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that "it
was not improper for the [agency] to conclude that open and frank intra-agency discussion
would be 'chilled' by public disclosure"); Schell v. HHS, 843 F.2d 933, 942 (6th Cir. 1988)
("It is the free flow of advice, rather than the value of any particular piece of information,
that Exemption 5 seeks to protect."); Lewis-Bey v. DOJ, 595 F. Supp. 2d 120, 133 (D.D.C.
2009) (protecting documents whose release "would have the effect of inhibiting the free
flow of recommendations and opinions") (internal citation omitted); Reliant Energy Power
communications . . . can hamper the candid exchange of views and the ultimate policy-
Materials of this nature go to the very heart of the privilege, because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news."\(^{176}\)

Of a similar nature are "briefing materials" – reports or other documents that summarize issues and advise superiors, either generally or in preparation for an event such as congressional testimony.\(^{177}\) Similarly, talking points and materials regarding how making process."\(^{177}\) (internal citation omitted); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007) ("Premature disclosure of . . . recommendations or comments 'would discourage free ranging criticism and consideration of alternatives within an agency.'") (internal citation omitted); Fortson v. Harvey, 407 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that subordinate's report did not qualify as deliberative simply because it would be either accepted or rejected, and not debated, by superior). Compare Prop. of the People v. OMB, 330 F. Supp. 3d 373, 383 (D.D.C. 2018) (release of names of meeting attendees "would expose no suggestions, no recommendations, no proposals, and no other aspect of the agency communications, and it is not apparent how disclosure . . . might in any way discourage candid discussion within the agency"), with Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 875 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44-46 (D.D.C. 2012) (protecting emails discussing which agency employees to invite to meeting because "the presence or absence of a name conveys an agency's or employee's opinion about a potential attendee's value to the meeting" and stating that "[d]isclosure of potential invitees would also have a chilling effect on . . . interagency discussions").

\(^{176}\) Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2001); accord Casad v. HHS, 301 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Klamath); see, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Dep't of Treasury, 308 F. Supp. 3d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that "the need for staff to speak candidly and confidentially is perhaps most important when the discussion concerns unmapped and unexplored terrain at the border of agency authority").

\(^{177}\) See, e.g., Access Reps. v. DOJ, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that memorandum written for purpose of preparing senior agency officials for Congressional testimony was protected under deliberative process privilege); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 12 F. Supp. 3d 100, 120 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that internal agency communications discussing "how to communicate with members of Congress . . . and how to prepare for potential points of debate or discussion [in upcoming congressional testimony]," and "related to . . . how to prepare for potential points of debate or discussion" are predecisional) (internal citation omitted); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DHS, 880 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111-12 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that deliberations regarding "how to present [a previously decided] policy in the press" qualified as a decisionmaking process for purposes of the deliberative process privilege and finding that documents prepared in advance of that type of press statement were predecisional); Performance Coal Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 847 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15-16 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2012) (allowing withholding of documents that discussed how to respond to certain allegations made against government agency); Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. EPA, No. 10-2103, 2012 WL 685334, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 2012) (holding that agency properly asserted deliberative process privilege to withhold email communications, "press releases, talking points and 'Q & A,'" drafts, and briefing materials);
While some district courts have found that messaging discussions regarding how to respond to outside inquiries are often found to be predecisional and deliberative.\textsuperscript{178}  


\textsuperscript{178} See N.H. Right to Life v. HHS, 778 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2015) (protecting documents that "deal with the Department's decision of how and what to communicate to the public, which is a decision in and of itself"); Cath. Legal Immigr. Network, Inc. v. USCIS, No. 19-1511, 2020 WL 5747183, at *8, 10 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2020) (determining that deliberative process privilege applies to "nonfinal recommendations of junior staff to senior management about how policy decisions should be communicated to the public" because they concern the formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment); Manatt v. DHS, 473 F. Supp. 3d 409, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding that "documents about potential statements to Congressional inquiries, press inquiries, or public communication are all deliberative, even if they do not relate to the adoption of a 'Policy'"); Leopold v. Off. of Dir. of Nat'l Intel., 442 F. Supp. 3d 266, 276 (D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that "[g]overnmental decisions and policies can include the formulation of an agency's statements to the public and other outside entities" and rejecting argument that "discussions about how to articulate policy decisions already made" should not be protected); Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. DOJ, 392 F. Supp. 3d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding talking points both predecisional and deliberative because they constitute recommendations by staff for Attorney General advising how to respond to inquiries and reflect give-and-take between drafter and superior leading up to external interactions with the public and the press); Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. DOJ, 334 F. Supp. 3d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that talking points at issue "can fairly be categorized as predecisional because they were 'drafted before and in preparation for communications with the press and public' and are 'a critical aspect of the decision-making process'" (quoting agency declaration));
present already-decided policy decisions, as opposed to policy decisions that have not been finalized yet, are not protected by the deliberative process privilege.\textsuperscript{179} several Courts of Appeals have come to the opposite conclusion, protecting deliberations about how to publicly message previously-decided policies.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. DOD, 320 F. Supp. 3d 162, 177 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that talking points "qualify as predecisional and deliberative" because "[r]eveling their contents would expose the process by which agency officials crafted a strategy for responding to the press and to Congress"); ACLU v. DHS, 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that talking points are also predecisional because "the document itself suggests that a public statement was anticipated at the time of its creation, and given that no official statement has yet been made, the talking points remain ripe recommendations that are ready for adoption or rejection by the Department"). But see People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. HHS, 464 F. Supp. 3d 385, 396 (D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that even though the deliberative process privilege may apply to responses to press inquiries and Congressional inquiries, it does not apply to these responses to inquiries from non-profits because these communications "do not constitute 'the process by which policy is formulated,' nor could they 'reasonably be said to reveal an agency's or official's mode of formulating or exercising policy-implicating judgment'" (quoting Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).}

\textsuperscript{179} See Stevens v. DHS, No. 14-3305, 2020 WL 1701882, at *6, 8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2020) (finding that an agency's "internal communications about its responses to outside inquiries from the press, Congress, advocacy groups, and the public are not protected by the deliberative process privilege" because these "merely reflect[] 'deliberations about what "message" should be delivered to the public about an already-decided policy decision'" (quoting New York v. U.S. Dep't of Com., No. 18-2921, 2018 WL 4853891, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2018))); ACLU of Mass., Inc. v. ICE, 448 F. Supp. 3d 27, 38 (D. Mass. 2020) (determining that central inquiry should be whether materials reflect deliberations about what message should be delivered to public about already-decided policy decision or whether communications would reveal deliberative process underlying not-yet-finalized policy decision); N.Y. Times Co. v. DOD, 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (ruling that agency had not established that talking points were "contemplative, deliberative, analytical documents" and finding that they were created after implementation of the policy and appeared to relate to routine operating decisions rather than policy oriented judgment) (internal citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{180} See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 19 F.4th 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding that "[b]ecause communications decisions involve 'the formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment,' deliberations about—and preceding—those decisions are protected by the deliberative process privilege" and that "a[n agency exercises policy-oriented judgment when communicating its policies 'even when [the] underlying decision or policy has already been established by the agency']") (internal citations omitted); Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBL 3 F.4th 350, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (holding that "the [deliberative process] privilege may extend to internal deliberations over how best to promote or preserve an existing policy in the midst of public debate over whether the government should have such a policy"); N.H. Right to Life, 778 F.3d at 54 (protecting documents that "deal with the Department's decision of how and what to communicate to the public, which is a decision in and of itself"); Krikorian v. U.S. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding
Draft documents have frequently been found exempt under the deliberative process privilege. Many courts have found that the very process by which a "draft" that deliberative process privilege protected draft documents proposing two options for replies to public inquiries.

181 See, e.g., Wadhwa v. VA, 707 F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that draft reports and internal communications generated as part of agency decisionmaking may be properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 5); Nat’l Sec. Archive v. CIA, 752 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding draft exempt in its entirety under Exemption 5 because in creating draft, selection of facts thought to be relevant was part of deliberative process); Abdelfattah v. DHS, 488 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2007) (protecting draft ICE incident report); City of Va. Beach v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 995 F.2d 1247, 1253 (4th Cir. 1993) (highlighting draft documents as well as recommendations, proposals, and suggestions as protectable material); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st Cir. 1992) (protecting draft letter that was never signed and ultimately rejected); Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (protecting draft document because disclosure of editorial process would "stifle the creative thinking and candid exchange of ideas necessary to produce good historical work"); Russell v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (withholding draft manuscript because release could lead to "confusion of the public"); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1979) (protecting draft documents containing factual material as compilation in draft document reflected deliberative process); Weigel Broad. Co. v. FCC, No. 11-236, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37065, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2012) (concluding that FCC properly asserted deliberative process privilege to withhold certain "draft decisions and orders on plaintiff’s applications [to transfer its broadcasting licenses], internal memoranda and e-mails discussing the agency’s possible decisions on the applications, its procedures with respect to the possible decisions and its response to an inquiry about the status of the review"); Kortlander v. BLM, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1012 (D. Mont. 2011) (protecting draft documents); Dolin, Thomas & Solomon LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 719 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that drafts may be withheld because "[t]o the extent that the letters are identical to the DOL’s final determination, they are duplicative of information already produced to plaintiff, and to the extent they differ, they pose a substantial risk of confusing the public, and/or intruding on the deliberative process privilege by revealing the DOL’s chain of reasoning"); Antonelli v. BOP, 623 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that draft of administrative adjudication was properly withheld); Gerstein v. CIA, No. 06-4643, 2008 WL 4415080, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (protecting draft letters); Donham v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 07-111, 2008 WL 2157167, at *5 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2008) (finding draft documents to be "precisely the kind of documents that Exemption 5 and the deliberative process privilege seek to protect from disclosure"); Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. Bloch, 532 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting draft "position descriptions"); Ebersole v. United States, No. 06-2219, 2007 WL 2908725, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2007) (protecting draft Memorandum of Understanding, noting that draft "does not memorialize a final agency decision"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 337 F. Supp. 2d 146, 174 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting draft agreement and draft of letter from Secretary of Commerce); Hamilton Sec. Grp. Inc. v. HUD, 106 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding "disclosure of the draft audit report would threaten the integrity of the agency’s policymaking processes"), aff’d per curiam, No. 00-5331, 2001 WL 238162, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2001).
evolves into a "final" document can itself constitute a deliberative process warranting protection. As a result, some courts have noted that a draft document may be protected regardless of whether it differs from its final version. At the same time, however, the

\[182\] See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 1988) ("To the extent that [requester] seeks through its FOIA request to uncover any discrepancies between the findings, projections, and recommendations between the draft[s] prepared by lower-level [agency] personnel and those actually adopted, . . . it is attempting to probe the editorial and policy judgments of the decisionmakers."); Marzen v. HHS, 825 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting the "exemption protects not only the opinions, comments and recommendations in the draft, but also the process itself"); Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569 ("[T]he disclosure of editorial judgments – for example, decisions to insert or delete material or to change a draft's focus or emphasis – would stifle the creative thinking and candid exchange of ideas necessary to produce good historical work."); Russell, 682 F.2d at 1048 ("Failure to apply the protections of Exemption (b)(5) to the . . . editorial review process would effectively make such discussion impossible."); Hooker v. HHS, 887 F. Supp. 2d 40, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (withholding documents discussing development of draft because disclosure would reveal "ongoing, collaborative dialogue about the manuscript"); Pub. Emps. for Env't Resp. v. Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, 881 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (protecting draft documents because they would reveal specifics of how agency working group makes decisions); Sussman v. DOJ, No. 03-3618, 2008 WL 2946006, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008) (upholding agency's decision to withhold draft policy document, noting that release of it would allow public "to compare the draft and final versions of the policy"); Nevada v. DOE, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1264 (D. Nev. 2007) (citing Dudman and Russell and noting that meaningful inquiry into nature of "draft" document is required); Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Kempthorne, No. 04-339, 2007 WL 915211, at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing Russell and noting that "the drafting process is itself deliberative in nature"); Parker v. USDA, No. 05-0469, 2006 WL 4109672, at *6 (D.N.M. July 30, 2006) (finding draft document "part of the internal process by which the Forest Service generates a final version of the document"); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO, Loc. 1164 v. HHS, 63 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding draft indoor air quality survey protectable because release would "enable a careful reader to determine the substance of HHS's proposed and adopted changes" and thereby "discourage candid discussion within the agency"), aff'd, No. 99-2208, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10993 (1st Cir. May 18, 2000). But see Nielsen v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 252 F.R.D. 499, 528 (D. Minn. 2008) (upholding agency's witholding of drafts, but noting, in dicta, its rejection of idea that documents can be withheld simply "because they are successive versions of a document and as such, would tend to show the internal development of an agency's decision on a policy matter").

\[183\] See Reliant Energy Power Generation Inc. v. FERC, 520 F. Supp. 2d 194, 204 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that agency not required to show how draft differed from final document because doing so would expose agency's deliberative process); Exxon Corp. v. DOE, 585 F. Supp. 690, 698 (D.D.C. 1983) ("[T]here is no merit to Exxon's argument that in order to establish the privileged character of a draft, DOE must show to what extent the draft differs from the final document."); see also Tigue v. DOJ, 312 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (protecting documents discussing which parts of draft to include in final, public version because "editorial decisions such as determining which parts, if any, of a confidential document to include in a public record are precisely the type of internal agency decisions that Exemption
D.C. Circuit has declared that the designation of a document as a draft "does not end the inquiry,"\(^{184}\) and some courts have denied protection.\(^{185}\)

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\(^{184}\) Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 254, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Nevada, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1264-65 (declaring that while "the word 'draft' is not talismanic" and therefore inquiry into nature of document is required, fact that no final document was "created, approved, and released" is "crucial[]" to court's analysis).

\(^{185}\) See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, No. 09-0642, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137204, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2012) (declining protection for four documents withheld in full "solely on the ground that they are drafts"); N.Y. Times Co. v. DOD, 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that agency had not demonstrated role draft documents played in decisionmaking process); Heartwood Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 431 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling that draft reports prepared by Federal Advisory Committee Act committee for defendant agency could not be protected, because evidence showed that agency viewed draft reports as merely factual, not as containing "recommendations or policy judgments"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. USPS, 297 F. Supp. 2d 252, 261 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Arthur Andersen for proposition that "drafts are not presumptively privileged"); Lee v. FDIC, 923 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declaring that document's draft status is not sufficient reason "to automatically exempt" it from disclosure where it has not been shown that disclosure would "inhibit the free flow of information" between agency personnel); cf. Hansen v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 817 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (D.D.C. 1992) (concluding that unpublished internal document lost its draft status when consistently treated by the agency as finished product over many years).
Notably, under some circumstances disclosure of even the identity of the author of a deliberative document has been found to chill the deliberative process, thus warranting protection of that identity under Exemption 5.\textsuperscript{186} Of additional note, the deliberative process privilege may apply with special force to deliberations relating to foreign relations.\textsuperscript{187}

Additionally, in Petroleum Information Corp. v. United States Department of the Interior,\textsuperscript{188} the D.C. Circuit explained that "[t]o fall within the deliberative process privilege, materials must bear on the formulation or exercise of agency policy-oriented judgment" and held that certain material should be released in part because it did not involve "some policy matter."\textsuperscript{189} Some courts have applied this concept in finding that various materials are not covered by the privilege when they are not sufficiently connected to "policy."\textsuperscript{190} Multiple circuits, following the standard set forth in Petroleum Information Corp., have explained that records discussing matters "peripheral to" policy-oriented judgments fall outside the scope of the privilege.\textsuperscript{191} Other courts have placed less emphasis on whether deliberations concern specific agency policies.\textsuperscript{192} In part, these varying decisions may stem from differing views about what constitutes "policy," with some courts holding that the term includes virtually anything that is part of an agency's deliberations, while other courts have held that the category is limited to matters closer to an agency's core substantive mission.\textsuperscript{193}

\textit{Adoption and Incorporation}

Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that even if a document is protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege, it may lose this protection if a final

\textsuperscript{186} See, e.g., AIDS Healthcare Found. v. Leavitt, 256 F. App'x 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that if names of reviewers of grant applications were released, "[i]t would be impossible to have any frank discussions of . . . policy matters in writing") (internal citation omitted); Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (protecting identities of attorneys who provided legal advice to Secretary of State); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 3d 29, 44 (D.D.C. 2019) (protecting identity of author of emails under deliberative process privilege because releasing name would reveal information about decisionmaking process and instill reluctance to explore all options and request other opinions in the future); Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 913 F. Supp. 608, 616-17 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding internal routing notations possibly leading to identification of employees involved in decisionmaking protectable); Miscavige v. IRS, No. 91-1638, 1993 WL 389808, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 1992) (protecting handwritten signatures of agency employees involved in ongoing examination of church's claim of exempt status), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 366 (11th Cir. 1993); cf. Wolfe v. HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (discussing how particularized disclosure can chill agency discussions); Greenberg v. Dep't of the Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 n.19 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that mere redaction of authors’ names would not remove chilling effect on decisionmaking process).

\textsuperscript{187} See Canning, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (finding "use of translations is presumably most common when the Executive Branch focuses on matters relating to foreign relations and foreign commerce, areas where the deliberative process privilege applies with special
force"); Fulbright & Jaworski v. Dep't of Treasury, 545 F. Supp. 615, 620 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing the particular sensitivity around disclosure where the decision in question implicates foreign relations).

188 976 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

189 Id. at 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also BuzzFeed, Inc. v. DOJ, 419 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that draft fill-in-the-blank forms seeking purely factual information are not protectable because agency was not formulating policy at all and had no discretion as it was merely assisting in accurate completion of forms); Shapiro v. CIA, 247 F. Supp. 3d 53, 64 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Logistical details around funeral arrangements are far from the 'conclusions, recommendations, or opinions' that Congress intended to protect under the exemption.").

190 See, e.g., Hennessy v. AID, No. 97-1133, 1997 WL 537998, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (determining that "report does not bear on a policy-oriented judgment of the kind contemplated by Exemption 5" (citing Petroleum Info., 976 F.2d at 1437)) (unpublished disposition); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DHS, 648 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160 (D.D.C. 2011) (requiring release of portion of emails not discussing policy); People for the Am. Way Found. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 301-02 (D.D.C. 2007) (refusing to allow agency to withhold document containing "predecisional guidance relating to upcoming events" because agency had not shown connection to "any type of governmental policy formulation or decision"); Sun-Sentinel Co. v. DHS, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1277-78 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (refusing to protect email communications containing advice to agency director because these messages contained recommendations on press relations, not on matters relating to agency's "mission"), aff'd sub nom. News-Press v. DHS, 489 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2007); Legal & Safety Emp. Rsch. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. 00-1748, 2001 WL 34098652, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2001) (concluding that contractor performance evaluations, which were required to be considered in future government contract award determinations, were not "the type of policy decision contemplated by Exemption 5"); Chi. Trib. Co. v. HHS, No. 95-3917, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2308, at *50 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1997) (magistrate's recommendation) (holding that scientific judgments are not protectable when they do not address agency policymaking), adopted, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1997); Larue v. IRS, No. 3-93-423, 1994 WL 315750, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 1994) (holding that privilege covers documents "actually related to the process by which policy is formed").

191 See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 19 F.4th 177, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that agency exercises "policy-oriented judgment" when communicating its policies externally and therefore messaging records could be protected, but noting that some records "'peripheral to' that communication decision, such as what time of day an agency will be available to deliver that message or which conference room to use for a press briefing, lie outside the scope of the privilege" (quoting Grand Cent. P'ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482 (2d Cir. 1999))); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "privilege does not protect a document [that is] merely peripheral to actual policy formulation"); accord Petroleum Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1436 (discussing that materials that "do not embody agency judgments—for example, materials relating to standard or routine computations or measurements over which the agency has no significant
discretion—[are] unlikely to diminish officials' candor or otherwise injure the quality of agency decisions”).

192 See, e.g., Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 1997) (ignoring issue of "policy" and protecting letter in which employee was "fighting to preserve his job and reputation" by offering his "candid and confidential responses . . . to the head of his agency in order to rebut the charges made against him"); Providence J. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 560 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Nat'l Wildlife and ruling that agency's decision to discipline personnel for alleged misconduct is no less "deliberative task . . . than the formulation or promulgation of agency disciplinary policy"); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that record must "contain recommendations on law or policy to qualify as 'deliberative'"); Touarsi v. DOJ, 78 F. Supp. 3d 332, 346 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding CBP officer's notes withholdable because "[t]he deliberative process privilege . . . protect[s] materials that concern individualized decisionmaking as well as 'the development of generally applicable policy' and thus protects routine decisionmaking" (quoting Hinckley v. United States, 140 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. 01-409, 2002 WL 32136200, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2002) (holding that limiting privilege to "'policy' decisions is overly narrow and inconsistent with Ninth Circuit law"); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Empls., AFL-CIO, Loc. 1164 v. HHS, 63 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff's contentions that document must be related to "essential function" of agency to be protected), aff'd, No. 99-2208, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10993 (1st Cir. May 18, 2000); Citizens Comm'n on Hum. Rts. v. FDA, No. 92-5313, 1993 WL 1610471, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 1993) (citing Nat'l Wildlife and holding that appropriate test is simply whether document in question contributes to agency's deliberative process), aff'd in pertinent part & remanded in part, 45 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1995).

193 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, No. 16-6120, 2017 WL 4712636, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (finding that threat assessments of Guantanamo Bay detainees are deliberative "because they are related to the formulation of policy, i.e. they 'include[e] express advice and recommendations regarding the proper disposition determination for each detainees'"); Fox News Network, LLC v. Dep't of Treasury, No. 09-3045, 2012 WL 5931808, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (allowing withholding of public relations documents when "their release would reveal the status of internal agency deliberations or substantive policy matters" rather than mere messaging regarding past events); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 800 F. Supp. 2d 202, 218-19 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Petroleum Info. and protecting emails discussing internal report designed to prepare agency officials prior to public statements and interviews); ACLU v. DHS, 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 108-09 (D.D.C. 2010) (allowing withholding of documents discussing development of talking points because agency "must be allowed to make discretionary judgments and consider policy choices in an environment protected from public scrutiny and unnecessary disclosures or otherwise the environment 'would tend to 'discourage candid discussion within an agency.'"" (quoting Petroleum Info., 976 F.2d at 1434)). Compare Nielsen v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 252 F.R.D. 499, 522 (D. Minn. 2008) (approving use of privilege for documents involving "policy-related . . . process of how to . . . address the possible public perception that would flow from [agencies'] actions"); and ICM Registry, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 538 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that "deliberations regarding public relations policy are deliberations about policy, even if they involve 'massaging' the agency's public image"), with Habeus Corpus Res. Ctr. v.
decisionmaker "chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate [it] by reference." Courts consider recommendations to be adopted when an agency decisionmaker accepts the rationale of a recommendation as the agency's policy. Relatively, courts consider recommendations to be incorporated into the final decision when an agency decisionmaker references a particular recommendation in the public statement of the agency's final decision. In general, courts do not find "approval" of a predecisional

194 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161 (1975); see, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 739 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that adoption occurs when it is evident that "reasoning in the report is adopted by the [agency] as its reasoning," which is different showing than simply demonstrating that agency "agrees with the conclusion of a report" (quoting Sears, 421 U.S. at 168)); Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1977) (ordering disclosure of "underlying memorandum" that was "expressly relied on in a final agency dispositional document"); Pub. Emps. for Env't Resp. v. U.S. Sec. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, 839 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322-23 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that document lost its predecisional status because agency’s website indicated that it was ultimately adopted and implemented by agency); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Surface Transp. Bd., No. 96-1153, 1997 WL 446261, at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 31, 1997) (finding that staff recommendation was adopted in both written decision and commission vote and therefore must be released); Burkins v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 1480, 1501 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that final report's statement that findings are same as those of underlying memorandum constituted adoption of that document).

195 See Sears, 421 U.S. at 161 (holding that when a recommendation is "adopted, the reasoning becomes that of the agency"); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. ICE, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that recommendation of agency employee becomes adopted when agency accepts conclusion and rationale of recommendation as its own).

196 See Sears, 421 U.S. at 161 (holding that "if an agency chooses [to] expressly . . . incorporate by reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered by Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final opinion" that memorandum loses its predecisional status); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[E]ven if the document is predecisional at the time it is prepared, it can lose that status if it is adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position on an issue or is used by the agency in its dealings with the public."); Am. Soc'y of Pension Actuaries v. IRS, 746 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.D.C 1990) (ordering disclosure on basis that IRS's budget assumptions and calculations were "relied upon by the government" in making its final estimate for President's budget).
document to constitute express incorporation of its underlying rationale,\textsuperscript{197} and courts have not generally inferred incorporation on the agency's part.\textsuperscript{198} This is consistent with

\textsuperscript{197} See, e.g., Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOD, 847 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding that Secretary's signing of letters is not necessarily ratification of memo's reasoning and therefore memo is not decisional document subject to disclosure); Abtew v. DHS, 808 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (determining that "[i]ntialing a memo may suggest approval of the memo's bottom-line recommendation, but it would be wrong and misleading to think that initialing necessarily indicates adoption or approval of all of the memo's reasoning"); Azmy v. DOD, 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that decision maker's "signature indicating his decision says nothing about how he arrived at the decision or what information he found compelling or persuasive in making his choice" and therefore "none of these assessments and recommendations can be deemed incorporated by reference"); Mokhiber v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 01-1974, slip op. at 13 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2003) (protecting portions of document explaining recommended settlement amounts; ruling that decisionmaker's initialing of document signified only adoption of actual settlement amounts, not approval of document author's reasoning); Ahearn v. U.S. Army Materials & Mech's. Rsch. Ctr., 580 F. Supp. 1405, 1407 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that fact that general officer reached same conclusion as report of investigation did not constitute incorporation of report's reasoning).

\textsuperscript{198} See, e.g., Casad v. HHS, 301 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2002) (refusing to order disclosure where there was "no indication in the record" of express incorporation of underlying rationale of recommendations); Mayer, Brown, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 134-35 (refusing to rule that incorporation had taken place where there was "an absence of proof" on this question, rejecting plaintiff's claim that agency bore burden of proof on this issue); Hawkins v. U.S. Dept' of Lab., No. 05-269J32, 2005 WL 2063811, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2005) (protecting documents that were used as part of basis for final agency decision, because there was no evidence of "clear adoption or incorporation" by agency); Trans Union, LLC v. FTC, 141 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 2001) (following Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng's Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975) and rejecting argument that burden is on agency to prove that documents were not adopted as basis for policy); N. Dartmouth Properties Inc. v. HUD, 984 F. Supp. 65, 69-70 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that fact that agency ultimately reached conclusion advocated by author of withheld document did not constitute adoption of author's reasoning); Perdue Farms Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-27, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14579, at *20-23 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1997) (holding that fact that document was created only two days before issuance of final decision was insufficient to give rise to inference of adoption); Greyson v. McKenna & Cuneo, 879 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (D. Colo. 1995) (deciding that use of phrase "the evidence shows" not enough for inference of adoption); Afr. Fund v. Mosbacher, No. 92-289, 1993 WL 183736, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1993) (concluding that record did not suggest either "adoption" or "final opinion" of agency); see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep't of the Army, 441 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding that decisionmaker's letter setting forth reasons for decision, not underlying report, constituted final agency decision). But see Am. Soc'y of Pension Actuaries, 746 F. Supp. at 191-92 (inferring incorporation on basis of similarity between figures used in draft document and figures used in budget proposal); Martin v. MSPB, 3 Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) ¶ 82,416, at 83,044 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1982) ("In the
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., where the Court refused to order release of a document where the “evidence utterly fail[ed] to support the conclusion” that the decisionmakers had incorporated the reasoning contained in recommendations prepared for them, even where they agreed with the recommendations themselves.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found adoption to have occurred and ordered the release of a DOJ memorandum concerning enforcement of immigration law by state and local law enforcement agencies. In so ruling, the court noted that DOJ had relied on the memorandum as a statement of agency policy, making repeated public references to the document in justifying its position on the matter in question. The Second Circuit found that this evidence of adoption went beyond "mere speculation," which would have been insufficient. Furthermore, the appeals court pointed out that "casual reference[s]" to an otherwise privileged document would not be enough to demonstrate adoption, nor would the privilege have been lost had DOJ merely adopted absence of a reasoned Board decision, the inference arises that the Board acted on the basis of the staff recommendation.


200 Id. at 184-85; see also Machado Amadis v. State, 971 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that "a recommendation does not lose its predecisional or deliberative character simply because a final decisionmaker later follows or rejects it without comment"); Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1143 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that "only express adoption in a nonexempt memorandum explaining a final decision will serve to strip [otherwise predecisional] memoranda of their predecisional character. . . [because if] the agency merely carried out the recommended decision without explaining its decision in writing, [the court] could not be sure that the memoranda accurately explained the decisionmaker’s thinking" but ultimately concluding that, in instant case, "substantial evidence" existed indicating that adoption had occurred and remanding case for further findings) (internal citations omitted); cf. ACLU v. DOJ, No. 12-794, slip op. at 59-61 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2013) (requiring existence of evidence beyond "sheer speculation" indicating that particular document was adopted as agency policy).

201 Nat’l Council of La Raza v. DOJ, 411 F.3d 350, 361 (2d Cir. 2005); accord Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ, 697 F.3d 184, 205 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that when an agency "referenc[es] a protected document as authoritative, it cannot then shield the authority upon which it relies from disclosure"); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. ICE, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing and applying La Raza to hold that memorandum was adopted because "agency has continually relied upon and repeated in public the arguments made in the Memorandum").

202 See La Raza, 411 F.3d at 358 (noting statements by agency official relying on document in question as sole means of explaining agency position on matter at issue).

203 See id. at 359 (comparing substantial evidence of adoption of memorandum in present case, as compared to other cases where such evidence was lacking).
the memorandum's conclusions. Rather, the court found DOJ had "publicly and repeatedly depended on the Memorandum as the primary legal authority justifying and driving . . . [its policy decision] and the legal basis therefor." The Second Circuit noted that this distinguished the case from Grumman Aircraft, where the Supreme Court ruled that there was no adoption because the "evidence [had] utterly fail[ed] to support the conclusion that the reasoning in the reports [had been] adopted." In contrast, when a document does not operate as functionally binding authority, the Second Circuit has found that adoption has not occurred.

Other courts have rejected claims of adoption in the absence of sufficient evidence that it has occurred. For instance, the D.C. Circuit held that an opinion written by

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204 See id. at 358 ("Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis . . ."); see also Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 739 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("We have thus recognized that 'the Court has refused to equate reference to a report's conclusions with adoption of its reasoning, and it is the latter that destroys the privilege.'" (quoting Access Reps. v. DOJ, 926 F.2d 1192, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991))).

205 La Raza, 411 F.3d at 358; see also Bronx Defs. v. DHS, No. 04-8576, 2005 WL 3462725, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005) (ordering release of memorandum because government had cited it in multiple public documents as basis for government policy).

206 421 U.S. at 184.

207 Id.

208 N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 479, 492 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that "an 'express adoption' inquiry is only relevant insofar as the previously-privileged intra-agency document has become binding 'working law'" and therefore finding recommendations to the Attorney General on whether to formally investigate or prosecute, even if expressly adopted by the Attorney General in his final decision, are not binding on the public, and thus cannot constitute "working law"); ACLU v. NSA, 925 F.3d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that "'working law' describes a category of post-decisional material, and 'express adoption' and 'incorporation by reference' describe two methods by which pre-decisional material can become post-decisional" and finding no evidence that agency ever adopted the OLC memorandum as binding nor incorporated it by reference); see also ACLU v. DOD, 435 F. Supp. 3d 539, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (explaining that "'mere agreement with a document's reasoning and conclusion is insufficient to transform advice into law'' but rather "'document must be treated as binding by the agency (i.e. "[express] adoption") or explicitly relied upon in a formal decision (i.e. "incorporation by reference")'" (quoting ACLU v. NSA, 925 F.3d at 598) and finding that document did not bind public).

209 See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found., 739 F.3d at 11 (finding that plaintiff failed to "point to any evidence supporting its claim" of adoption); Robert v. HHS, 217 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim of adoption or incorporation where there was "no evidence in the record" of either); Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 890 F. Supp. 2d 35, 45 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting argument that deliberative process privilege may not apply to documents recommending negotiating position because "there is no indication that the agencies that participated in the [High Level Contact Group (HLCG)] negotiations . . . formally or
DOJ’s OLC was not adopted by the FBI because the FBI never publicly invoked or relied upon the OLC opinion as the basis for an agency decision.  While DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General had referenced the OLC opinion in a public report, and the FBI had answered Congressional inquiries about the OLC opinion, the court found that this did not demonstrate that the FBI adopted the OLC opinion.

**Attorney Work-Product Privilege**

The second traditional privilege incorporated into Exemption 5 is the attorney work-product privilege, which protects documents and other memoranda prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation. As its purpose is to protect the adversarial trial proceedings, Attorney Work-Product Privilege protects documents and other memoranda prepared in anticipation of legal action. It is often used to shield communications between attorneys and clients, as well as behind-the-scenes planning and strategy sessions. The privilege is designed to encourage open and honest discussion among attorneys, which is critical for effective legal representation.


210 Elec. Frontier Found., 739 F.3d at 11-12; see also Samahon v. DOJ, No. 13-6462, 2015 WL 857358, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2015) (finding that two OLC opinions "do not constitute 'working law'" because "[t]hey are not an expression of final agency policy because they are advisory and cannot bind the President in his decisionmaking").

211 Elec. Frontier Found., 739 F.3d at 11 ("The OIG's references to the OLC Opinion do not establish that the FBI adopted the Opinion as its own reasoning. Nor does [the FBI's] response to inquiries from members of Congress establish that the FBI adopted the OLC opinion's reasoning as its own reasoning. . . . Far from publicly using the OLC Opinion to justify the FBI's positions, [the FBI's] testimony [before Congress] indicates that the OLC Opinion did not determine the FBI's actions or policy.").

212 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1947); Wisdom v. USTP, 266 F. Supp. 3d 93, 108 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Because the need to protect attorney work product is at its greatest when the litigation with regard to which the work product was prepared is still in progress,' . . . the Court has little difficulty finding that the discussions between the AUST and the Acting AUST about Plaintiff's ongoing related litigation are exempt from disclosure."); Adionser v. DOJ, 811 F. Supp. 2d 284, 297 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that EOUSA properly invoked attorney work-product privilege "to protect records reflecting 'such matters as trial preparation, trial strategy, interpretations, and personal evaluations and opinions pertinent to Plaintiff's criminal case'" (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 800 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212-13 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that documents created in reasonable anticipation of motion to be filed in ongoing case were properly
process by insulating the attorney’s preparation from scrutiny, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the work-product privilege ordinarily does not attach until at least "some articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation," has arisen. The privilege is not limited to civil proceedings, but rather extends to administrative

| 213 See Jordan v. DOJ, 591 F.2d 753, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Stein v. DOJ, 134 F. Supp. 3d 457, 479 (D.D.C. 2015) (determining that if opposing party could obtain monographs that contain legal strategies, it would give them benefit of agency’s legal and factual analysis and reasoning and thus an unfair advantage in litigation).
| 214 Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 865. |
proceedings and to criminal matters as well. Similarly, the privilege has also been held applicable to documents generated in preparation of an amicus brief.


See, e.g., Liounis v. Krebs, No. 18-5351, 2019 WL 7176453, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2019) (per curiam) (finding that "government properly invoked Exemption 5 to withhold the draft indictment, draft information, and handwritten attorney notes on the indictment under the attorney work-product privilege as those documents were prepared by attorneys in connection with a criminal prosecution"); Sorin v. DOJ, 758 F. App’x 28, 32 (2nd Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (holding that emails concerning legal theories and litigation strategies and attorney notes "fall within the work-product privilege as communications within and among federal law enforcement agencies created in anticipation of a criminal prosecution and for the purpose of furthering that prosecution"); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. DOJ, 235 F.3d 598, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying privilege in case involving prosecution of environmental crimes); Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 1479, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying privilege in bribery investigation), abrogated on other grounds, DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Antonelli v. Sullivan, 732 F.2d 560, 561 (7th Cir. 1983) (ruling privilege applicable in bank-fraud prosecution); Lazaridis v. DOJ, 766 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that agency properly asserted Exemption 5 to withhold "predominantly as attorney work-product but also as deliberative process material" various records prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office pertaining to plaintiff’s "pending kidnapping case") (internal citations omitted); Miller v. DOJ, 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 113 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting documents created in considering whether to bring criminal charges against requester); N.Y. Times Co. v. DOD, 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (protecting documents that "provided[ed] guidance for responding to motions made in criminal litigation") (internal citation omitted); Wiggins v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., No. 05-2332, 2007 WL 259941, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2007) (upholding use of privilege to withhold criminal case history report); Butler v. DOJ, 368 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785-86 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (applying privilege to prosecution memorandum and draft indictment prepared as part of narcotics investigation); Slater v. EOUSA, No. 98-1663, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *9 (D.D.C. May 24, 1999) (protecting portions of letter from Assistant United States Attorney to FBI revealing investigative strategy in criminal case).
To fall within the protection of the attorney work-product privilege litigation need not have actually commenced, so long as specific claims have been identified which make litigation probable.\textsuperscript{218} Significantly, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that the privilege "extends to documents prepared in anticipation of foreseeable litigation, even if no specific claim is contemplated."\textsuperscript{219} The privilege also has been held to attach to records of law


\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Schiller v. NLRB}, 964 F.2d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by \textit{Milner v. Dep't of the Navy}, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011); see also \textit{ACLU of N. Cal. v. DOJ}, 880 F.3d 473, 487-88 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that portions of USABook that detail DOJ's developed legal arguments regarding process of obtaining court authorization for certain investigative techniques fall within attorney work product privilege, and declining to hold that attorney work product must be prepared in anticipation of specific litigation to be privileged); \textit{Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Laws. v. EOUSA}, 844 F.3d 246, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that "[i]n the case of a document like the Blue Book, prepared entirely for use in wholly foreseeable (even inevitable) litigation, there is no need to apply any specific-claim test to conclude that litigation is sufficiently likely to warrant application of the work-product privilege"); \textit{Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS}, 826 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that privilege extends to documents prepared when identity of prospective litigation opponent unknown); \textit{Docufreedom Inc. v. DOJ}, No. 17-2706, 2019 WL 3858166, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2019) (upholding the withholding of certain records because "[t]hey are 'veritable "how to" manuals for building defenses and litigating"")
enforcement investigations, when the investigation is "based upon a suspicion of specific wrongdoing and represent[s] an attempt to garner evidence and build a case against the suspected wrongdoer."220

However, the mere fact that it is conceivable that litigation might occur at some unspecified time in the future will not necessarily be sufficient to protect attorney-generated documents; it has been observed that "the policies of the FOIA would be largely defeated" if agencies were to withhold any documents created by attorneys "simply because litigation might someday occur."221 But when litigation is reasonably regarded as inevitable under the circumstances, a specific claim need not yet have arisen before courts have found the attorney work-product privilege applicable.222

220 SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Darui v. Dep’t of State, 798 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that emails "prepared by attorneys for DOJ and State," which "were prepared in connection with a law enforcement proceeding" are protected by the attorney work-product privilege) (internal citation omitted); Durrani v. DOJ, 607 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying privilege to materials prepared as part of criminal prosecution of requester); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *9 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007) (upholding use of privilege to protect documents created as part of investigation into possible violations of securities laws); Winterstein v. DOJ, 80 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (protecting prosecution memorandum "prepared for the purpose of pursuing a specific claim"); Germosen v. Cox, No. 98-1294, 1999 WL 1021559, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999) (protecting correspondence between United States Attorney's Office and Postal Inspection Service regarding criminal investigative and prosecution strategy); Pagen Techs. Int’l v. United States, No. 98-4831, 1999 WL 378345, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1999) (upholding application of privilege to attorney notes regarding qui tam suit in which government ultimately declined to intervene); Sousa v. DOJ, No. 95-375, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9010, at *20 (D.D.C. June 18, 1997) (protecting documents that agency sufficiently demonstrated were prepared during murder investigation); Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F. Supp. 2d 774, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (protecting documents pertaining to preliminary examination "based upon a suspicion of specific wrongdoing and represent[ing] an effort to obtain evidence and to build a case against the suspected wrongdoer").

221 Senate of P.R. v. DOJ, 823 F.2d 574, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

In a situation where a document may have been created for more than one purpose, the work-product privilege has been found to apply if the agency can show that the document was created at least in part because of the prospect of litigation.²²³ However, document that was prepared by defendant's consultant's attorneys in anticipation of litigation by another party against defendant; Delaney, 826 F.2d at 127 (protecting "agency's attorneys' assessment of [a] program's legal vulnerabilities" crafted before specific litigation arose); Animal Welfare Inst. v. NOAA, 370 F. Supp. 3d 116, 136 (D.D.C. 2019) (determining that "it does not matter that Plaintiff had not made a specific threat of litigation against Defendants at the time the draft memorandum was prepared" because Defendants reasonably anticipated litigation with full knowledge of Plaintiff's interest and position); Hertzberg, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (protecting documents concerning investigation where agency has determined that claims were likely to arise); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1289 (D. Kan. 2001) (protecting documents containing guidance for agency attorneys on litigation of environmental law cases); Heggestad v. DOJ, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the privilege applies "even without a case already docketed or where the agency is unable to identify the specific claim to which the document relates"); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Surface Transp. Bd., No. 96-1153, 1997 WL 446261, at *6 (D.D.C. July 31, 1997) (finding future litigation "probable" when agency is aware that its legal interpretation will be contested in court); Lacefield v. United States, No. 92-1680, 1993 WL 268392, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 1993) (holding that agency's knowledge that adversary plans to challenge agency position constitutes sufficient anticipation of articulable claim).

²²³ See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2002) (amended opinion) (overturning district court ruling that litigation had to be "primary motivating factor" behind document creation for privilege to apply); see also Shapiro v. DOJ, 239 F. Supp. 3d 100, 126 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that "[g]iven that the records at issue were created 'because of' [a specific] litigation; the evidence that those records differ in at least certain material respects from the records that would have been generated in the absence of the litigation; and the inherent difficulty in determining how the pendency of the litigation affected each specific entry," work-product privilege applies); Woods v. Elec. Surveillance Unit, 155 F. Supp. 3d 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that even though logging notes have a partially administrative character, fact that they were compiled in anticipation of a specific criminal prosecution qualifies them as attorney work product); Thompson v. DOJ, 146 F. Supp. 3d 72, 84-86 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that D.C. Circuit employs a because-of test and holding that work-product privilege protects these quasi-administrative records because they were compiled in anticipation of a specific criminal prosecution and are not generic agency records); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 1997 WL 446261, at *6 (holding that privilege applies where document was created "in part" for litigation); Hertzberg, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (rejecting "'primary motivating purpose'" test). But see Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (requiring that litigation be "'primary motivating purpose'" in document's creation), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 276 F.3d 634 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
documents prepared in an agency's ordinary course of business, not under circumstances sufficiently related to litigation, may not be accorded protection.224

The attorney work-product privilege also has been held to cover documents "relat[ing] to possible settlements" of litigation.225 It has also been used to protect the recommendation to close a litigation or pre-litigation matter.226 Conversely, documents prepared subsequent to the closing of a case are presumed, absent some specific basis for

224 See ACLU of N. Cal., 880 F.3d at 486 (finding that "[t]he portions of the USABook that provide instructions to investigators regarding obtaining court authorization for electronic surveillance would have been created in 'substantially similar form' regardless of whether those investigations ultimately lead to criminal prosecutions" and therefore privilege does not apply to those portions); Hennessey v. AID, No. 97-1113, 1997 WL 537998, at *6 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (declining to apply privilege to report commissioned to complete project and not "because of the prospect of litigation," despite threat of suit) (unpublished disposition); Zander v. DOJ, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding "two e-mails do not fall under the attorney work product doctrine because the e-mails are communications to and from clients regarding litigation, rather than actual preparation by attorneys for litigation (or anticipated litigation)"); Hill Tower Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 718 F. Supp. 562, 567 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (declining to apply privilege after concluding that aircraft accident investigation information in JAG Manual report was not created in anticipation of litigation); cf. Nevada v. DOE, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260-61 (D. Nev. 2007) (refusing to apply privilege to license permit applications because the proceedings were not adversarial and thus not "akin to . . . litigation") (internal citation omitted).

225 United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that it is "beyond doubt that draft consent decrees prepared by a federal government agency involved in litigation" are covered by attorney work product privilege, but remanding to determine if privilege was waived); see also Fischer v. DOJ, 723 F. Supp. 2d 104, 113-14 (D.D.C. 2010) (protecting drafts of settlement agreement related to plaintiff's criminal case which were prepared by U.S. Attorney's Office); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2001) (protecting recommendations concerning settlement of case), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds & remanded, 294 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cities Serv. Co. v. FTC, 627 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1984) ("attorney's notes or working papers which relate to . . . possible settlement discussions . . . are protected under the attorney work-product privilege"), aff'd, 778 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).

226 See, e.g., A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that work product privilege still was applicable even if staff attorney was considering or recommending closing investigation); Kishore v. DOJ, 575 F. Supp. 2d 243, 259 (D.D.C. 2008) (applying privilege to document explaining government's reasons for declining prosecution); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *9 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007) (approving use of privilege for documents recommending closing of SEC investigations); Heggestad, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11 (holding privilege applicable to prosecution-decision memoranda); cf. Grecco v. DOJ, No. 97-0419, slip op. at 12 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 1999) (holding privilege applicable to records concerning determination whether to appeal lower court decision).
concluding otherwise, not to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation.227 Moreover, courts have found that documents not originally prepared in anticipation of litigation cannot assume the protection of the work-product privilege merely through their later placement in a litigation-related file.228

Regarding the requirement that the information be prepared by an attorney, courts have found that not only do documents prepared by agency attorneys who are responsible for the litigation of a case which is being defended or prosecuted by DOJ qualify for the privilege,229 but also documents prepared by an attorney "not employed as a litigator,"230 or even documents prepared by someone not employed primarily as an attorney.231 Courts have also accorded work-product protection to materials prepared by non-attorneys who are supervised by attorneys.232 Conversely, in the absence of a showing

227 See Senate of P.R. v. DOJ, 823 F.2d 574, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that "absent any additional support, [the court is] reluctant to credit a claim that documents generated while there was no active investigation underway were prepared 'in anticipation of litigation'" (emphasis added)); Rashid v. DOJ, No. 99-2461, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26353, at *12-13 (D.D.C. June 11, 2001) (holding privilege inapplicable to documents drafted after case was settled); Canning v. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 94-2704, slip op. at 12 (D.D.C. May 7, 1998) (holding prosecutor's letter setting forth reasons relied upon in declining to prosecute case and "written after the conclusion of the investigation and after the decision to forgo litigation was made," not covered by privilege); Grine v. Coombs, No. 95-342, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1997) (finding privilege inapplicable where no further agency enforcement action was contemplated at time of document's creation). But see Senate of P.R. v. DOJ, No. 84-1829, 1992 WL 119127, at *8 (D.D.C. May 13, 1992) (finding reasonable anticipation of litigation still existed after case was formally closed, because agency was reevaluating it in light of new evidence).

228 See MacLean v. DOD, No. 04-2425, slip op. at 13 n.13 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2005) (finding that "the occurrence of litigation cannot magically transform every attorney prepared document into a document prepared in anticipation of litigation"), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F. App'x 751, 754 (9th Cir. 2007); Dow Jones & Co. v. DOJ, 724 F. Supp. 985, 989 (D.D.C. 1989) aff'd on other grounds, 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990).


231 See Hanson v. AID, 372 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding privilege even though attorney in question testified that he had been hired as engineer, not as attorney; finding that it was clear that despite being hired as engineer, attorney had exercised legal judgment in undertaking his analysis).

232 See, e.g., Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 806 F. App'x 5, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that "the government has adequately demonstrated that the FD-302s [FBI forms used by agents to
that the non-attorney was acting as the agent of the attorney, the work-product privilege has not been extended to protect the material prepared by the non-attorney.\textsuperscript{233}

The work-product privilege has been held to remain applicable when the information has been shared with a party holding a common interest with the agency.\textsuperscript{234}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{233} See Boyd v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 99-2712, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27734, at *8-9 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2002) (rejecting attorney work-product applicability where documents were prepared by non-attorney who merely "may" have been acting at direction of attorney); Hall v. DOJ, No. 87-474, 1989 WL 24542, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1989) (magistrate’s recommendation) (concluding that agency’s affidavit failed to show that prosecutorial report of investigation was prepared by Marshals Service personnel under direction of attorney), adopted, (D.D.C. July 31, 1989); Nishnic v. DOJ, 671 F. Supp. 771, 772-73 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding historian’s research and interviews privileged).
\item \textsuperscript{234} See, e.g., Hunton & Williams, LLP v. DOJ, No. 06-477, 2008 WL 906783, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (allowing use of privilege for documents exchanged between DOJ and private party after parties developed "joint strategy" on issue of common interest), aff’d in
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
For example, this situation may arise when the government shares documents with a private party with whom it is jointly prosecuting a qui tam suit, or when an agency has a common fiscal interest with a private party.

In FTC v. Grolier Inc., the Supreme Court held that the "test under Exemption 5 is whether the documents would be 'routinely' or 'normally' disclosed upon a showing of relevance." Factual work-product enjoys qualified immunity from civil discovery, and therefore such materials are discoverable "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need" of materials which cannot be obtained elsewhere without "undue hardship." Because the rules of civil discovery require a showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" in order for a party to obtain any factual work-product, such materials are not "routinely" or "normally" discoverable and, as a result, the Supreme Court has held, factual material is protected under the attorney work-product part.
privilege recognized under the FOIA.\footnote{See Martin v. Off. of Special Couns., 819 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The work-product privilege simply does not distinguish between factual and deliberative material."); accord Pac. Fisheries Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "if a document is covered by the attorney work-product privilege, the government need not segregate and disclose its factual contents"); A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The work-product privilege draws no distinction between materials that are factual in nature and those that are deliberative."); Norwood v. FAA, 993 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that work-product privilege protects documents regardless of status as factual or deliberative); Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 1479, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992) ([U]nlike the deliberative process privilege, the work-product privilege encompasses factual materials.");, abrogated on other grounds, DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Meza v. DOJ, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that "if [as shown here] a document is fully protected as work-product, then segregability is not required" (quoting Jud. Watch, 432 F.3d at 371)); Trentadue v. CIA, No. 08-788, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29234, at *10-11 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2010) (holding that CIA was not required to segregate and release factual materials, "because attorney work-product 'shields both opinion and factual work-product from discovery'") (citations omitted); Carter, Fullerton & Hayes, LLC v. FTC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that "factual material is itself privileged when it appears within documents that are attorney work-product" (citing Jud. Watch, 432 F.3d at 371)); Berger v. IRS, 487 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing Martin for point that privilege applies to both factual and deliberative material), aff'd on other grounds, 288 F. App'x 829 (3d Cir. 2008); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that agency must segregate and release factual work-product material); Rugiero v. DOJ, 35 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("[T]he law is clear that . . . both factual and deliberative work-product are exempt from release under FOIA.");, aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 777 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1985); see also, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that district court was in error to limit protection to "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories

\footnote{Grolier, 462 U.S. at 27 (holding that "the work-product of agency attorneys would not be subject to discovery in subsequent litigation unless there was a showing of need and would thus fall within the scope of Exemption 5"); accord Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[F]actual material is itself privileged when it appears within documents that are attorney work-product."); see also Krocka v. EOUSA, No. 17-2171, 2019 WL 690341, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019) (holding that factual summaries created by prosecutors and investigators in preparation for criminal proceedings were properly withheld in full under the attorney work-product privilege); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 118 F. Supp. 3d 266, 274 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that "where time records are not only created by legal personnel but also reference the subject of legal research, persons contacted and interviewed by the attorney, or other issues bearing on the mental impressions of the attorneys, those portions of the time records are protected work product")]. As a result, courts have found that no segregation of factual information is required for information falling within the privilege.\footnote{See Martin v. Off. of Special Couns., 819 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The work-product privilege simply does not distinguish between factual and deliberative material."); accord Pac. Fisheries Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "if a document is covered by the attorney work-product privilege, the government need not segregate and disclose its factual contents"); A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The work-product privilege draws no distinction between materials that are factual in nature and those that are deliberative."); Norwood v. FAA, 993 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that work-product privilege protects documents regardless of status as factual or deliberative); Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 1479, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992) ([U]nlike the deliberative process privilege, the work-product privilege encompasses factual materials.");, abrogated on other grounds, DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Meza v. DOJ, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that "if [as shown here] a document is fully protected as work-product, then segregability is not required" (quoting Jud. Watch, 432 F.3d at 371)); Trentadue v. CIA, No. 08-788, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29234, at *10-11 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2010) (holding that CIA was not required to segregate and release factual materials, "because attorney work-product 'shields both opinion and factual work-product from discovery'") (citations omitted); Carter, Fullerton & Hayes, LLC v. FTC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that "factual material is itself privileged when it appears within documents that are attorney work-product" (citing Jud. Watch, 432 F.3d at 371)); Berger v. IRS, 487 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing Martin for point that privilege applies to both factual and deliberative material), aff'd on other grounds, 288 F. App'x 829 (3d Cir. 2008); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that agency must segregate and release factual work-product material); Rugiero v. DOJ, 35 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("[T]he law is clear that . . . both factual and deliberative work-product are exempt from release under FOIA.");, aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 257 F.3d 534, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2001); Manchester v. DEA, 823 F. Supp. 1259, 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (deciding that segregation not required where "factual information is incidental to, and bound with, privileged" information), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994); United Techs. Corp. v. NLRB, 632 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D. Conn. 1985) ("[I]f a document is attorney work-product the entire document is privileged.");, aff'd on other grounds, 777 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1985); see also, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that district court was in error to limit protection to "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories...}
Nonetheless, the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits have required agencies to address whether nonexempt material can be reasonably segregated if found in longer documents with reasonably divisible sections.\(^{243}\)

The work-product privilege also has been found applicable even when the document has become the basis for a final agency decision.\(^{244}\) In *NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*,\(^{245}\) the Supreme Court allowed the withholding of an agency decision that had real

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\(^{243}\) See *ACLU of N. Cal. v. DOJ*, 880 F.3d 473, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that government need not segregate and disclose factual contents of attorney work product, but finding that where only portions of documents are covered by privilege, nonexempt portions that are not attorney work product may be appropriately segregated); *Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. v. EOUSA*, 844 F.3d 246, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding it appropriate to assess whether Blue Book contains nonexempt statements of government’s discovery policy that are reasonably segregable from protected attorney work product); see also *Docufreedom Inc. v. DOJ*, No. 17-2706, 2019 WL 3858166, at *12 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2019) (agreeing that “[i]n cases involving voluminous or lengthy work-product records . . . it [is] generally preferable for courts to make at least a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of segregating nonexempt material” (quoting *NACDL*, 844 F.3d at 256-57)).

\(^{244}\) See *Wood v. FBI*, 312 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting prior rulings that incorporation or adoption do not vitiate work-product protection); *Uribe v. EOUSA*, No. 87-1836, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5691, at *6-7 (D.D.C. May 23, 1989) (protecting criminal prosecution declination memorandum); *Iglesias v. CIA*, 525 F. Supp. 547, 559 (D.D.C. 1981) ("It is settled that even if a document is a final opinion or is a recommendation which is eventually adopted as the basis for agency action, it retains its exempt status if it falls properly within the work-product privilege."). But see *Grolier*, 462 U.S. at 32 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring and commenting on a point not reached by the majority) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine how a final decision could be ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.’"); *New York Times Co. v. DOJ*, 138 F. Supp. 3d 462, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (concluding that express adoption doctrine applies to work-product privilege), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 939 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2019).

\(^{245}\) 421 U.S. 132, 155 (1975) (holding that "Exemption 5 does not apply to those Appeals and Advice Memoranda which conclude that no complaint should be filed and which have the effect of finally denying relief to the charging party; but that Exemption 5 does protect from disclosure those Appeals and Advice Memoranda which direct the filing of a complaint and the commencement of litigation before the Board").
operative effect on the basis that it was shielded by the work-product privilege because the decision only directed the filing of a complaint, which did not finally dispose of the matter and contained case theory and litigation strategy.\textsuperscript{246} At the same time, the Supreme Court concluded that a decision \textit{not} to file a complaint should be disclosed because it constituted an unreviewable final agency decision, and the Court expressed reluctance to "construe Exemption 5 to apply to documents described in [FOIA subsection (a)(2)]."\textsuperscript{247} the proactive disclosure provision of the Act.\textsuperscript{248} Any potential confusion caused by this opinion was cleared up by the Supreme Court in \textit{Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill}.\textsuperscript{249} In \textit{Merrill}, the Court explained its statements in \textit{Sears},\textsuperscript{250} and stated that even if a document is a final opinion, and therefore falls within subsection (a)(2)'s mandatory disclosure requirements, it still may be withheld if it falls within the work-product privilege.\textsuperscript{251} (For a discussion of the proactive disclosure requirements of subsection (a)(2), see Proactive Disclosures, Subsection (a)(2): Public Inspection in an Electronic Format.)

A collateral issue is the applicability of the attorney work-product privilege to witness statements. Within the civil discovery context, the Supreme Court has recognized at least a qualified privilege from civil discovery for such documents – such material was held discoverable only upon a showing of necessity and justification.\textsuperscript{252} Applying the

\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id}, at 160.

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id}, at 153-54.


\textsuperscript{249} 443 U.S. 340 (1979).

\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Id}, at 360 n.23 (clarifying that \textit{Sears} observations were made in relation to privilege for predecisional communications only).

\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Id}, ("It should be obvious that the kind of mutually exclusive relationship between final opinions and statements of policy, on one hand, and predecisional communications, on the other, does not necessarily exist between final statements of policy and other Exemption 5 privileges."); see also \textit{Tax Analysts v. IRS}, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing \textit{Merrill} for the proposition that "agency working law contained in a privileged attorney work-product is exempt material in and of itself" and, therefore, "need not be segregated and disclosed"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds & remanded, 294 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{252} See \textit{Hickman v. Taylor}, 329 U.S. 495, 511-13 (1947) ("Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such production.").
"routinely and normally discoverable" test of Grolier and United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.;253 the D.C. Circuit has held that witness statements are protectable by the attorney work-product privilege of Exemption 5.254 A particular category of witness statements, aircraft accident witness statements, are protected by a distinct common law privilege first announced in Machin v. Zuckert255 and applied under the FOIA in Weber Aircraft.256 (For further discussion on this privilege, see Exemption 5, Other Privileges, below.)

Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Grolier resolved a split in the circuits by ruling that the termination of litigation does not vitiating the protection for material otherwise properly categorized as attorney work-product.257 Thus, under the Supreme Court's ruling, there is no temporal limitation on work-product protection under the FOIA.258 The D.C. Circuit has found that such protection may be vitiated if the withholding of attorney work-product material would also shield from disclosure the unprofessional practices of an attorney by whom or under whose direction the material

254 See Martin v. Off. of Special Couns., 819 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying Hickman and Weber Aircraft to hold that witness statements are protected under attorney work-product privilege); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 138 F. Supp. 3d 462, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that witness statements are work product when they reveal an attorney's strategic impressions and mental processes), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 939 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2019). But see Uribe v. EOUSA, No. 87-1836, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5691, at *7 (D.D.C. May 23, 1989) (declaring that statements made by plaintiff during his interrogation did not "represent the attorney's conclusions, recommendations and opinions"); Wayland v. NLRB, 627 F. Supp. 1473, 1476 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (reasoning that because witness statements in question were not shown to be other than objective reporting of facts, they "do not reflect the attorney's theory of the case and his litigation strategy" and therefore cannot be protected).
255 316 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
256 Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. at 799; see also Badhwar v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he disclosure of 'factual' information that may have been volunteered would defeat the policy on which the Machin privilege is based.").
258 See 462 U.S. at 26; see also Gutman v. DOJ, 238 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294-95 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that attorney work-product privilege applies to documents prepared to advise Attorney General that government had appealed judge's decision to release requester on bond, even though by time of FOIA litigation requester had been convicted and was serving prison sentence); see also FOIA Update, Vol. IV, No. 3, at 1-2 (Exemption 5 Upheld in Grolier) (discussing Supreme Court's rejection in Grolier of any temporal limitation on attorney work-product privilege).
was prepared. Otherwise, the District Court for the District of Columbia has held that there is no "public interest" exception to the application of the work-product privilege under Exemption 5.

**Attorney-Client Privilege**

The third traditional privilege incorporated into Exemption 5 concerns "confidential communications between an attorney and his client relating to a legal matter for which the client has sought professional advice." Unlike the attorney work-product

259 See Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (remanding to district court for evaluation of attorney's conduct and, "if it is found [to be] in violation of professional standards, a determination of whether his breach of professional standards vitiated the work-product privilege" otherwise applicable to withheld material); see also Rashid v. DOJ, No. 99-2461, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26353, at *7-9 (D.D.C. June 11, 2001) ("While there are cases in which a lawyer's conduct may render inapplicable the work-product privilege . . . this is clearly not one of them.").


privilege, the attorney-client privilege is not limited to the context of litigation. Although it fundamentally applies to facts divulged by a client to their attorney, courts have found that this privilege "also encompasses any opinions given by an attorney to his client based upon, and thus reflecting, those facts," as well as "communications because they "were created by attorneys . . . and contain legal analysis and guidance to Border Patrol agents regarding the use of race or ethnicity in executing their duties, and [finding that] analysis of case law concerning racial profiling in law enforcement" constituted attorney-client documents and were not a body of "secret law"); Vento v. IRS, No. 08-159, 2010 WL 1375279, at *6 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2010) (applying attorney-client privilege to communications between IRS agent and IRS and DOJ counsel where agent was seeking advice on development and interpretation of law); Harrison v. BOP, 681 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that attorney-client privilege "exists to protect 'open and frank communication' between counsel and client").

262 See, e.g., Rein, 553 F.3d at 377 (noting that privilege "extends beyond communications in contemplation of particular litigation to communications regarding 'an opinion on the law'"); Mead Data, 566 F.2d at 252-53 (distinguishing attorney-client privilege from attorney work-product privilege, which is limited to litigation context); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 384 F. Supp. 2d 100, 114 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that attorney-client privilege is not limited to context of litigation (citing Mead Data and Crooker v. IRS)); Crooker v. IRS, No. 94-0755, 1995 WL 430605, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1995) ("Unlike [with] the work-product privilege, an agency may claim the attorney-client privilege for information outside the context of litigation.").


between attorneys that reflect client-supplied information." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, has also noted that "it is clear that when an attorney conveys to his client facts acquired from other persons or sources, those facts are not privileged" unless they reflect client confidences. Finally, while the privilege typically involves a single client (even where the "client" is an agency) and their attorneys, it also applies in situations where there are multiple clients who share a common interest.

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266 Brinton v. Dep’t of State, 636 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

267 See, e.g., Hanson v. AID, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that privilege applies to documents created by attorney hired by private contractor of agency and, by agreement, then shared between contractor and agency, who had common interest in ongoing contractual dispute); Animal Welfare Inst. v. NOAA, 370 F. Supp. 3d 116, 133 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that privilege applies to a document created by attorneys of one agency that is shared with two additional agencies, where each agency has a common interest in the proper administration of a statute); Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that "involvement of . . . a third party to the attorney-client relationship, [] does not destroy the privilege because the communications are covered by the common interest doctrine"); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. OMB, No. 07-04997, 2009 WL 1246690, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (finding that "attorney-client privilege [can be extended] to multiple parties who share a common interest in a legal matter"); Akin, Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. DOJ, 503 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that attorney-client privilege is not waived when government shares documents with private party with whom it is jointly prosecuting qui tam action).
The Supreme Court, in the civil discovery context, has emphasized the public policy underlying the attorney-client privilege – "that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client." To that end, courts have required that the primary purpose of the communication be to seek or provide legal advice. As is set out in detail in the discussion of the attorney work-product privilege above, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp. and in FTC v. Grolier Inc. that the scopes of the various privileges are coextensive in the FOIA and civil discovery contexts. Finally, just as in the discovery context, the privilege can be waived by the client, who owns it, but it cannot be waived unilaterally by the attorney.

The D.C. Circuit has held that confidentiality between an attorney and client may be inferred when the communications suggest that "the Government is dealing with its attorneys as would any private party seeking advice to protect personal interests," but

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268 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 3d 29, 43 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding use of privilege where "[d]isclosure of such information . . . creates the risk that agency clients may feel constrained from reaching out to legal counsel for required legal advice due to fear of public disclosure" and "[t]his chilling effect would render it more difficult for agency attorneys to provide sound legal support and advice, which would inhibit the proper functioning of governmental departments"); FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 2, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: The Attorney-Client Privilege").

269 See Jordan v. DOL, 308 F. Supp. 3d 24, 43 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that attorney-client privilege does not apply to withheld email because it is difficult to say that one of the primary purposes of the email was to obtain legal advice as it was specifically directed to a non-attorney and only seeks information from that non-attorney), aff'd, No. 18-5128, 2018 WL 5819393 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 2018); ACLU v. DOD, No. 15-9317, 2017 WL 4326524, at *7-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017) (finding documents in which client is requesting legal advice and documents in which lawyer is providing analysis in response to information provided by client exempted from disclosure under attorney-client privilege but finding that where "predominant purpose of the communication" was not "to render or solicit legal advice," that information is not covered by attorney-client privilege (quoting In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2d Cir. 2007))).


273 See Hanson v. AID, 372 F.3d 286, 294-94 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that agency attorney's unauthorized release of otherwise privileged document, though it breached document's confidentiality, did not prevent agency from invoking privilege because "an attorney may not unilaterally waive the privilege that his client enjoys").

274 Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
in other cases it, as well as other courts, have required the government to demonstrate the confidentiality of the attorney-client communications. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege covers attorney-client communications when the specifics of the communication are confidential, even though the underlying subject matter is known to third parties. The privilege has been found

275 See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2002) (amended opinion) (holding that district court did not err in finding privilege inapplicable where defendants failed to show confidentiality of factual communications); Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding district court record insufficient to support claim of privilege because it contained "no finding that the communications are based on or related to confidences from the client"); Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring government to make affirmative showing of confidentiality for privilege to apply); Climate Investigations Ctr. v. DOE, 331 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2018) (determining that withholding communications was improper where outside company's counsel was included because attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications between attorney and client); Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. DOD, 320 F. Supp. 3d 162, 175-76 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that because "there is no evidence that the specific legal advice provided in the [outline] was disclosed beyond that group[,]" confidentiality was maintained and document is protected by attorney-client privilege); Cuban v. SEC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 60, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring agency to "demonstrate that confidentiality was expected in the handling of these communications," and that steps were taken to keep the records confidential in order to apply attorney-client privilege); Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring agency to establish "that the purported 'legal advice' was conveyed 'as part of a professional relationship in order to provide [the agency] with advice on the legal ramifications of its actions'" (citing Mead Data, 566 F.2d at 253)); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DHS, 648 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release of information because "redacted material does not contain confidential client information, nor does it solicit legal advice"); Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. DOD, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that privilege requires agency to demonstrate that withheld documents reflect confidential communication between agency and its attorneys, not merely that they be exchanges between agency and its attorneys).


277 Id. at 395-96; see also ACLU v. NSA, 925 F.3d 576, 590 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding that "informational disclosures have no effect on whether a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege" because "[t]he attorney-client privilege 'protects communications rather than information'" (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2nd Cir. 1984) (emphasis added by circuit court))); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[W]e do not suggest that an attorney-client privilege is lost by the mere fact that the information communicated is otherwise available to the public. The privilege attaches not to the information but to the communication of the information."); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1203, 2000 WL 1545028, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2000) ("While the underlying facts discussed in these communications may not be privileged, the communications themselves are privileged."); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 388 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that privilege applies even where information in question was not confidential, so long as client intended

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not to apply to the fact that a client did or did not request advice about an issue unless confirming the existence or nonexistence of responsive records would in effect unveil a confidential communication between client and attorney.\textsuperscript{278}

The Supreme Court in \textit{Upjohn} concluded that the privilege encompasses confidential communications made to the attorney not only by decisionmaking "control group" personnel, but also by lower-level employees.\textsuperscript{279} This broad construction of the attorney-client privilege acknowledges the reality that such lower-level personnel often possess information relevant to an attorney's advice-rendering function.\textsuperscript{280} The District Court for the District of Columbia has ruled that an agency is required to identify who its client is in order to sustain a claim of this privilege.\textsuperscript{281} As with the other privileges, the quality of an agency's declaration and \textit{Vaughn} Index has been found to be crucial to the agency's ability to withhold records under Exemption 5.\textsuperscript{282}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{278} W. Values Project v. DOJ, 317 F. Supp. 3d 427, 434 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that Exemption 5 Glomar response based on attorney-client privilege would only be justified if confirming the existence or nonexistence of responsive records would in effect unveil confidential communication between OLC and particular agency client related to legal advice sought by that client and here it would not).
\item \textsuperscript{279} 449 U.S. at 392-97.
\item \textsuperscript{280} See \textit{id.}; see also Sherlock v. United States, No. 93-0650, 1994 WL 10186, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 1994) (holding privilege applicable to communications from collection officer to district counsel); Murphy v. TVA, 571 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that circulation of information within agency to employees involved in matter for which advice sought does not breach confidentiality); LSB Indus. v. Comm'r, 556 F. Supp. 40, 43 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (protecting information provided by agency investigators and used by agency attorneys).
\item \textsuperscript{281} See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65, 80 (D.D.C. 2008) (declining to apply privilege to certain documents because agency failed to "indicate what agency or executive branch entity is the client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege").
\item \textsuperscript{282} See Buckovetz v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 15-838, 2016 WL 1529901, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2016) (finding agency failed to meet its burden of showing that responsive documents are subject to Exemption 5 because \textit{Vaughn} index only stated that defendant "was informed [withheld records] were all communications with an attorney and that the attorney exerted privilege" and court cannot grant summary judgment based on conclusory statements); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. USPS, 297 F. Supp. 2d 252, 267 (D.D.C. 2004) (determining that agency failed to show documents involved provision of specific legal advice or that they were intended to be confidential).
\end{itemize}
The D.C. Circuit has held that otherwise confidential agency memoranda are not protected under the attorney-client privilege if they are authoritative interpretations of agency law because "[E]xemption 5 and the attorney-client privilege may not be used to protect . . . agency law from disclosure to the public."\(^{283}\) This holding was reinforced by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which likewise denied protection for documents adopted as, or incorporated into, an agency's policy.\(^{284}\)

**Other Privileges**

The Supreme Court has indicated that Exemption 5 may incorporate virtually all civil discovery privileges; if a document is immune from civil discovery, it is similarly protected from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA.\(^{285}\) Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence\(^ {286}\) allows courts to create privileges as necessary,\(^ {287}\) and new privileges are

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\(^{284}\) See *Nat'l Council of La Raza v. DOJ*, 411 F.3d 350, 360-61 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that attorney-client privilege's rationale of protecting confidential communications is inoperative for documents that reflect actual agency policy); *Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ*, No. 09-8756, 2011 WL 4001146, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) (concluding that memoranda from the Office of Legal Counsel to HHS and USAID that would otherwise be covered by the attorney-client privilege lost that protection when HHS and USAID adopted the OLC memoranda as agency policy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds & remanded, 697 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2012); see also *Robert v. HHS*, No. 01-CV-4778, 2005 WL 1861755, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005) (citing *La Raza* though at same time finding that withheld documents did not reflect agency policy and therefore protecting requested documents).


\(^{286}\) Fed. R. Evid. 501.

\(^{287}\) See *Jaffee v. Redmond*, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1996) (discussing conditions under which new privileges may be recognized).
recognized from time to time by federal courts, and occasionally are thereafter recognized under Exemption 5.

In 1979, in *Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill*, the Supreme Court found an additional privilege incorporated within Exemption 5 based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7), which provides that "for good cause [shown] . . . a trade secret or other confidential research, development or commercial information" is protected from discovery. This qualified privilege is available "at least to the extent that this information is generated by the Government itself in the process leading up to [the] awarding of a contract" and expires upon the awarding of the contract or upon the withdrawal of the offer. The theory underlying the privilege is that early release of such information would likely put the government at a competitive disadvantage by endangering consummation of a contract; consequently, "the sensitivity of the

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289 See *Burka v. HHS*, 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that exemption 5 "incorporates . . . generally recognized civil discovery protections"); see also *Ass'n for Women in Sci. v. Califano*, 566 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The FOIA neither expands nor contracts existing privileges, nor does it create any new privileges.") (non-FOIA case).


292 Merrill, 443 U.S. at 360.
commercial secrets involved, and the harm that would be inflicted upon the Government by premature disclosure should . . . serve as relevant criteria."\textsuperscript{293}

This harm rationale has led one court to hold that the commercial privilege may be invoked when a contractor who has submitted proposed changes to the contract requests sensitive cost estimates.\textsuperscript{294} The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has declined to extend this privilege to scientific research, holding that the agency failed to show that such material is "generally protected in civil discovery for reasons similar to those asserted by the agency in the FOIA context."\textsuperscript{295}

While the breadth of this privilege is still not fully established, a realty appraisal generated by the government in the course of soliciting buyers for its property has been held to fall squarely within it,\textsuperscript{296} as have documents containing communications between agency personnel, potential buyers, and real estate agents concerning a proposed sale of government-owned real estate,\textsuperscript{297} an agency's background documents which it used to calculate its bid in a "contracting out" procedure,\textsuperscript{298} and portions of inter-agency cost estimates prepared by the government for use in the evaluation of construction proposals submitted by private contractors.\textsuperscript{299} By contrast, purely legal memoranda drafted to

\textsuperscript{293} Id. at 363.

\textsuperscript{294} See Taylor Woodrow Int'l v. United States, No. 88-429, 1989 WL 1095561, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1989) (concluding that disclosure would permit requester to take "unfair commercial advantage" of agency).

\textsuperscript{295} Burka v. HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USDA, 170 F. Supp. 2d 931, 942-43 (D. Ariz. 2000) (rejecting proposed "research data privilege" on basis that such information is routinely discoverable in civil litigation), aff'd on other grounds, 314 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Hornbostel v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 305 F. Supp. 2d 21, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Burka and recognizing privilege for "confidential research information," but refusing to allow withholding of documents under it because agency had not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that privilege was being used in FOIA context for reasons similar to its use in civil discovery context).

\textsuperscript{296} See Gov't Land Bank v. GSA, 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1982) ("FOIA should not be used to allow the government's customers to pick the taxpayers' pockets.").


assist contract-award deliberations have been found not to be encompassed by this privilege.\textsuperscript{300}

The Supreme Court in \textit{United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.}\textsuperscript{301} held that Exemption 5 incorporates the special privilege protecting witness statements generated during Air Force aircraft accident investigations.\textsuperscript{302} Broadening the holding of \textit{Merrill} that a privilege "mentioned in the legislative history of Exemption 5 is incorporated by the Exemption,"\textsuperscript{303} the Court held in \textit{Weber Aircraft} that the long-recognized civil discovery privilege for aircraft accident witness statements, even though not specifically mentioned in the FOIA’s legislative history, nevertheless falls within Exemption 5.\textsuperscript{304} The "plain statutory language"\textsuperscript{305} and the clear congressional intent to sustain claims of privilege when confidentiality is necessary to ensure efficient governmental operations supported this result.\textsuperscript{306} This privilege also has been applied to protect statements made in Inspector General investigations.\textsuperscript{307}


\textsuperscript{301} 465 U.S. at 799.

\textsuperscript{302} See id. at 798-99 (noting that privilege for accident investigation privilege was first recognized in \textit{Machin v. Zuckert}, 316 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and holding that it applies in FOIA context as well).

\textsuperscript{303} Id. at 800.

\textsuperscript{304} Id. at 804; see Karantsalis v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 12-23469, 2013 WL 1768659, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013) (recognizing applicability of Machin privilege under Exemption 5 and holding that witness statements and opinions of air crash investigators are protectable under this privilege).

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Weber Aircraft}, 465 U.S. at 802.

\textsuperscript{306} See id.; see also Badhwar v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying aircraft accident investigation privilege to contractor report).

In *Hoover v. Department of the Interior*,\(^\text{308}\) the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized under Exemption 5 a privilege based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4),\(^\text{309}\) which limits the discovery of reports prepared by expert witnesses.\(^\text{310}\) The document at issue in Hoover was an appraiser's report prepared in the course of condemnation proceedings.\(^\text{311}\) In support of its conclusions, the Fifth Circuit stressed that such a report would not have been routinely discoverable and that premature release would jeopardize the bargaining position of the government.\(^\text{312}\)

In *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ*,\(^\text{313}\) the D.C. Circuit applied the presidential communications privilege under Exemption 5 of the FOIA to protect Department of Justice records regarding the President's exercise of their constitutional power to grant pardons.\(^\text{314}\) The D.C. Circuit found that this privilege, which protects communications among the President and their advisors, is unique among those recognized under Exemption 5 of the FOIA in that it is "inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution."\(^\text{315}\) Although similar to the deliberative process privilege, it is broader in its coverage because it "applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones."\(^\text{316}\) Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit noted that the privilege is limited to "documents 'solicited and received' by the President or his immediate White House advisers who have 'broad and significant

\(^{308}\) 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980).


\(^{310}\) *Hoover*, 611 F.2d at 1141.

\(^{311}\) Id. at 1135.


\(^{313}\) 365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

\(^{314}\) Id. at 1114.

\(^{315}\) Id. at 1113 (quoting *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)); see also *Amnesty Int'l USA v. CIA*, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding "that all twenty documents reflect or memorialize communications between senior presidential advisers and other United States government officials and are therefore properly withheld").

responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given to the President."\(^{317}\)

Subsequent to this decision, several other cases have further explored the contours of this privilege. These decisions have rejected claims that (1) the privilege must be invoked by the President;\(^ {318}\) (2) that the privilege could be lost simply due to the passage of time;\(^ {319}\) (3) that the privilege only covers documents whose release would "reveal the

\(^{317}\) Jud. Watch, 365 F.3d at 1114 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 752); see Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOD, 913 F.3d 1106, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that five memoranda were solicited and reviewed by president and his national security advisors, prepared for purpose of advising president regarding raid on terrorist's compound, and reflected presidential decisionmaking and thus that presidential communications privilege applies); Campaign Legal Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 18-1771, 2020 WL 2849909, at *8 (D.D.C. June 1, 2020) (rejecting DOJ's use of the presidential communications privilege where agency declaration "falls short of asserting that the President was actually involved or would be involved in [the] decision" underlying the communications) (appeal pending); Prop. of the People, Inc. v. OMB, 394 F. Supp. 3d 39, 44-49 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding use of privilege to protect calendar communications concerning NSC meetings because "the NSC is a purely advisory entity" and it's "structure gives the Court confidence that the meetings 'occurred in conjunction with the process of advising the President."' (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 752)); Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. DOD, 320 F. Supp. 3d 162, 174 (D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that "even if the legal analysis in the memorandum was not communicated to the President," the fact that "the staff of a close national security adviser leading up to an important military decision" solicited the opinion "shows that the document was created for the purpose of advising the President"); Samahon v. DOJ, No. 13-6462, 2015 WL 857358, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2015) (holding that memorandum "falls squarely within the presidential communications privilege because it was communicated to one of the President's senior advisors – the Counsel for the President – in connection with the President's deliberations and use of his appointment power"); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. OMB, No. 07-04997, 2009 WL 1246690, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (protecting "any document which is a draft of a presentation or memorandum for the President or his senior advisors[,]" but not intra-agency communications pertaining to such documents); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 80-81 (citing In re Sealed Case and protecting documents that were either received by President or his immediate advisors).

\(^{318}\) See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 320 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (finding that agency has authority to invoke presidential communications privilege when making Exemption 5 withholdings); Elec. Priv. Info Ctr., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 80 ("There is no indication in the text of FOIA that the decision to withhold documents pursuant to Exemption 5 must be made by the President."); Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1220-21 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that such requirement "would expose the President to considerable burden"), aff'd on other grounds, 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).

President’s mental processes;”320 and (4) that the privilege does not apply to documents that memorialize otherwise protected communications.321 The D.C. Circuit has also held that in cases involving the presidential communications privilege, the person protected by the privilege is the President, and not an individual discussed in the documents solicited by the President.322 The District Court for the District of Columbia declined to extend the privilege to cover visitor logs for the White House and Vice President’s residence, ruling that the privilege only covers “communications.”323 In the civil discovery context, the privilege can be overcome by a showing of need, however, the D.C. Circuit has found that no need can overcome the presidential communications privilege in the FOIA context “because the particular purpose for which a FOIA plaintiff seeks information is not relevant in determining whether FOIA requires disclosure.”324

Although in a 2003 non-FOIA case the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized a civil discovery privilege for settlement negotiation documents,325 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to follow that decision holding “that settlement negotiations . . . are not protected by a settlement negotiation privilege.”326 To date, in


322 See Loving v. DOD, 550 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (ruling in case involving documents sent to President concerning requester's death sentence where requester argued unsuccessfully that privilege should not be invoked against him, given that he was subject of document).

323 See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DHS, 592 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118-19 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that visitor logs "shed[] no light on the content of communications between the visitor and the President or his advisors, whether the communications related to presidential deliberation or decision-making, or whether any substantive communications even occurred"), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 09-5014, 2009 WL 4250490 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 2009).

324 Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOD, 913 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see, e.g., Protect Democracy Project v. NSA, 453 F. Supp. 3d 339, 352 (D.D.C. 2020) (declining to "extend the government misconduct exception to the presidential communications privilege in a FOIA Exemption 5 context").

325 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 976 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[A]ny communications made in furtherance of settlement are privileged.").

326 In re MSTG, Inc., 675 F.3d 1337, 1342-48 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing and declining to follow Goodyear Tire) (non-FOIA case); see also Performance Aftermarket Parts Grp., Ltd. v. TI Grp. Auto. Sys. Inc., No. 05-4251, 2007 WL 1428628, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2007) (declining to recognize settlement negotiation privilege, further noting that Goodyear Tire "has not been widely followed") (non-FOIA case); In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity
the FOIA context, the privilege has only been recognized once and that was under Exemption 4.\footnote{M/A-COM Info. Sys. v. HHS, 656 F. Supp. 691, 692 (D.D.C. 1986) (applying settlement privilege under Exemption 4); cf. Jud. Watch v. DOJ, 271 F. Supp. 3d 264, 268-73 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that local district court rule prohibits disclosure of settlement discussions because, while local rule does "not clearly fit within a recognized FOIA exemption," parties are bound by local rules and "[t]he parties agree that 'the proper test for determining whether an agency improperly withholds records [subject to a local rule] is whether the [rule], like an injunction, prohibits the agency from disclosing the records'" (quoting Morgan v. DOJ, 923 F.2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1991))), aff'd, 719 F. App'x 21, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that plaintiff does not challenge district court's conclusion that local rule prohibits disclosure of settlement related documents under FOIA, but instead only challenges that local rule applies to documents, and concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that documents sought were covered by local rule, but explicitly reserving judgment on "when (if ever) a district court's collateral interpretation of its local rules can serve as the basis of a FOIA exemption").}

Lastly, courts also have recognized the applicability of other privileges, whether traditional or recently recognized, in the FOIA context.\footnote{See Martin v. Off. of Special Couns., 819 F.2d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that Exemption 5 "unequivocally" incorporates "all civil discovery rules into FOIA"). But see Burka v. HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusing to recognize "confidential research information" privilege under the FOIA because it is not yet "established or well-settled . . . in the realm of civil discovery").} Among those other privileges that have been recognized for purposes of the FOIA are the presentence report privilege,\footnote{See DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 9 (1988) (recognizing privilege, but finding it applicable to third-party requesters only); United States v. Kipta, No. 97-638-1, 2001 WL 477153, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001) (citing Julian for proposition that, at least in absence of compelling justification, no third party "is to be given access to another person's [presentence investigation] report").} the expert materials privilege,\footnote{See Nissei Sangyo Am., Ltd. v. IRS, No. 95-1019, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2966, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1998) (holding that because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "established a separate exception to discovery for expert materials . . . Exemption 5 of the FOIA . . . incorporates" it).} the confidential report privilege,\footnote{See Wash. Post Co. v. HHS, 603 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (D.D.C. 1985) (applying "confidential report" privilege under Exemption 4), rev'd on other grounds, 795 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986).} and the

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critical self-evaluative privilege, though it should be noted that the last two of these have been recognized under Exemption 4, not Exemption 5.

Foreseeable Harm and Other Considerations

After the codification of the "foreseeable harm" standard in the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, an agency "shall withhold information" under the FOIA "only if the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption" or if "disclosure is prohibited by law." Courts have clarified this statutory requirement for agencies in the context of the deliberative process privilege, reasoning that an agency must "connect[] the harms" in a "meaningful way to the information withheld, such as by providing context or insight into the specific decision-making process or deliberations at issue, and how they in particular would be harmed by disclosure." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained that an agency cannot simply rely on "generalized" assertions of the harm in disclosure, but rather must "focus on the information at issue" and connect that particular information to a specific harm in disclosure. An agency may group like records

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334 Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 19-800, 2020 WL 5798442, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2020) (determining that agency must provide the "link between the alleged harm and the information in the withheld material"); Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 436 F. Supp. 3d 90, 106 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that agency did not satisfy the foreseeable harm requirement because it only provided general explanations and boiler plate language); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 17-0832, 2019 WL 4644029, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (finding that agency "failed to identify specific harms to the relevant protected interests that it can reasonably foresee would actually ensue from disclosure of the withheld materials"); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 17-5928, 2019 WL 4142725, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (finding "overall that the agency has adequately articulated 'the link between this harm and the specific information contained in the material withheld'").

335 Machado Amadis v. U.S. Dep't of State, 971 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding that agency "cannot simply rely on 'generalized' assertions that disclosure 'could' chill deliberations," explaining that disclosure "'would' chill future internal discussions" is sufficient to meet the "governing legal requirement"); see also Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (determining that agencies need to provide "a focused and concrete demonstration of why disclosure of the particular type of material at issue will, in the specific context of the agency action at issue, actually impede those same agency deliberations going forward"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 487 F. Supp. 3d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2020) (determining that agency affidavit exceeds standard because it
together on a category-by-category basis, as long as it explains the foreseeable harm that would result from release for each category.\textsuperscript{336} The District Court for the District of Columbia has found that "the mere recitation of similar reasoning in showing harm does not by itself render that reasoning 'boilerplate.'"\textsuperscript{337} Similar harms can be used to support the withholding of multiple categories of records, as long as an agency specifically explains why the stated reason applies to each category, and connects each harm to the release of the records in each category.\textsuperscript{338} The amount of detail needed to show "explains why the disclosure of these particular draft memoranda would implicate the specific harms identified" as well as "identifies the content of the withheld documents" and "specifically connects the disclosure of these drafts to a tangible chilling effect"); Am. Ctr. for Law & Just. v. NSA, 474 F. Supp. 3d 109, 136 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that "declarations provide a reasonable basis to think that disclosure of the withheld materials would harm several interests that Exemption 5 protects, such as encouraging candid discussions and guarding against premature disclosure and public confusion" and that "foreseeable harm from disclosure is 'particularly heightened in the context of foreign affairs'"; Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. Dep' t of the Interior, No. 18-1599, 2020 WL 1695175, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2020) (concluding that agency "must show that disclosure would cause reasonably foreseeable harms, not that it could cause such harms").

\textsuperscript{336} See Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 369 (explaining that while agencies may satisfy foreseeable harm requirement "on a category-by-category basis rather than a document-by-document basis. . . the basis and likelihood of that harm must be independently demonstrated for each category"); Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. DOD, 486 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that agencies categorized withholdings under Exemption 5 and explained particular harm that would be caused by release of information in each category and therefore met requirements of FOIA Improvement Act); Rosenberg v. DOD, 442 F. Supp. 3d 240, 259 (D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that agency "may take a categorical approach" and "group together like records" but "must explain the foreseeable harm of disclosure for each category").


\textsuperscript{338} See id. (finding agency "sews a sufficient thread of reasoning between each withheld category of documents and the particular potential harm that would result from its release" and determining that a completely different rationale for each category is not required).
foreseeable harm may depend on the context or sensitivity of the withheld information, or on the privilege that applies.\textsuperscript{339}

Even after Exemption 5 is found to apply to documents, waiver, when the specific information sought has already been "officially acknowledged" or is in the "public domain," can affect the use of the privilege.\textsuperscript{340} (For a further and more in depth discussion of Waiver in FOIA, see Waiver and Discretionary Disclosure, Waiver.)

\textsuperscript{339} See Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 372 (determining for certain records that "[t]he very context and purpose of those communications bearing on sensitive undercover operations in the midst of a policy crisis make the foreseeability of harm manifest"); Selgjekaj v. EOUSA, No. 20-2145, 2021 WL 3472437, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2021) (reiterating that what is needed to meet this burden is "context specific" and may be "satisfied if '[t]he very context and purpose of' the withheld document 'make the foreseeability of harm manifest'") (quoting Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 372); Rosenberg, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (finding that "degree of detail necessary to substantiate a claim of foreseeable harm is context-specific" and when withheld information is obviously sensitive, "a simple statement illustrating why the privilege applies and identifying the harm likely to result from release" may be sufficient).

\textsuperscript{340} See, e.g., Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 567 F. Supp. 3d 97, 120 (D.D.C. 2021) (observing that attorney-client privilege is "sacrosanct" and that "foreseeable harm requirement may be more easily met when invoking . . . privileges and exemptions for which the risk of harm through disclosure is more self-evident and the potential for agency overuse is attenuated"), appeal dismissed, No. 21-5293, 2022 WL 801357 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2022); Selgjekaj, 2021 WL 3472437, at *5 (finding disclosure would harm interests protected by attorney work-product privilege because it is "hardly debatable" that government's ability to prosecute would be impeded if file jacket prepared in contemplation of a complex financial fraud prosecution were released).

\textsuperscript{341} Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 479, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that certain public statements made by former Attorney General Holder about a requested memoranda were "sufficiently specific that they are tantamount to public disclosure" thus having "waived the privilege over the parts of the relevant memoranda relating to those statements," but other statements had not divulged "the content of the memoranda with enough specificity to constitute waiver of the work product privilege," and finding that while waiver occurred with respect to parts of a document, it "does not automatically mean that the government waived the privilege with respect to the whole document"); Leopold v. DOJ, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2020) (rejecting "plaintiffs' argument that the Department waived the attorney work product privilege because of information contained in the Mueller Report" where "plaintiffs have offered no basis to discredit the Department's representations" that waiver did not occur); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep't of Com., No. 18-3022, 2020 WL 4732095, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2020) (finding agency waived the deliberative process privilege over documents sent to a non-governmental third party, even though there was no evidence that the recipient reviewed or disclosed the information, because "the government has failed to demonstrate that it attempted to protect the information after its disclosure"); cf. Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that an "exemption can serve no purpose once information . . . becomes public").
Finally, a "government misconduct" exception, which could negate the use of Exemption 5 privileges in circumstances of significant government misconduct, has not been recognized in a FOIA case.342

342 Leopold, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 14-15 (holding that plaintiffs’ allegations do not concern any egregious discussion regarding what agency has withheld, but instead allegedly egregious underlying conduct, and therefore plaintiffs’ government misconduct exception argument must be rejected); Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. DOD, 486 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331 (D.D.C. 2020) (noting that "it is not clear in this circuit whether a government misconduct exception may properly be invoked in a FOIA case;" observing that even if it exists, alleged misconduct was not sufficiently egregious to meet high standard for exception; and no authority found for applying this exception to information withheld under attorney client privilege or presidential communications privilege in FOIA context); Protect Democracy Project, Inc. v. NSA, 453 F. Supp. 3d 339, 352 (D.D.C. 2020) (declining to extend government misconduct exception, if it even applies to deliberative process privilege in FOIA context, to presidential communications privilege); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 241 F. Supp. 3d 174, 183 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding "that the only applicable Circuit authority militates against recognizing a government misconduct exception in a FOIA case"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 235 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313-14 (D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s efforts to apply "the narrow government-misconduct exception" and finding that "[e]ven assuming that the conduct hypothesized by [plaintiff] would rise to the level required for the narrow government-misconduct exception, the records show no such acts"); cf. Nat’l Immigrant Just. Ctr. v. DOJ, 953 F.3d 503, 510 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that "[a]ttorneys assisting an adjudicator do not engage in ex parte communications when performing their duties" and therefore plaintiff’s argument that the presence of ex parte communications removes records from the protection of Exemption 5 misses the mark).