U.S. Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration

FY 2021
Performance Budget
Congressional Budget Submission
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I. Overview for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Introduction

Since its creation in 1973, DEA has evolved from a small, domestic-oriented law enforcement agency to a globally-recognized organization with approximately 10,000 positions (all funding sources) assigned to 239 domestic offices in 23 field divisions and 90 foreign offices in 67 countries. The mission of DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States (U.S.) and bring to the criminal and civil justice system those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S. Additionally, DEA recommends and supports non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

DEA personnel assigned to domestic and foreign offices focus their investigative efforts on Priority Target Organizations (PTOs). PTOs engage in the highest levels of drug trafficking and/or drug money laundering operations that significantly impact international, national, regional, or local drug availability. DEA focuses its resources on PTOs with and without a direct connection to a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT). A CPOT is the command and control element of a major international drug trafficking organization and/or money laundering enterprise that significantly impacts the U.S. drug supply.

Today’s most significant drug trafficking organizations are the dangerous and highly sophisticated Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that traffic drugs throughout the U.S. using established transportation routes and distribution networks. Mexican TCOs continue to be the principal suppliers of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana to the U.S. Out of the 74 current CPOTs, 30 are Mexican. Domestically, distribution cells have forged alliances with Mexican TCOs, resulting in an increasing threat to the safety and security of communities across the country. For example, TCOs have formed relationships with gangs, who in turn commit violent crimes and serve as retail-level drug distributors for TCOs, presenting a serious risk to public health and safety. It is estimated that there are over one million active gang members, comprising more than 33,000 gangs in the U.S., many of which provide distribution and/or transportation networks to drug cartels. DEA is uniquely positioned to target and dismantle these local distribution cells and the international drug trafficking organizations with whom they conspire.
Overdose deaths in the United States are on the rise and have already reached record levels. While the most recent provisional overdose death data published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicate that deaths involving all drugs have begun to stabilize in the past year, deaths from synthetic opioids continue to rise. In 2017, over half of the death certificates for cocaine- or heroin-involved overdose deaths also involved a synthetic opioid such as fentanyl. While a number of factors appear to be contributing to this public health crisis, one of the chief causes is the proliferation of illicitly-produced fentanyl and potent substances structurally related to fentanyl, commonly called “fentanyl analogues” or “fentanyl-like substances.” Fentanyl’s analgesic potency is approximately 100 times greater than morphine, and the substances structurally related to fentanyl tend to be even more potent. Because of fentanyl’s low dosage range and potency, one kilogram of fentanyl purchased in China for $3,000 - $5,000 can generate upwards of $1.5 million in revenue on the illicit market.

**SINALOA CARTEL**

The Sinaloa Cartel (aka the Pacific Cartel), based in the Mexican State of Sinaloa, is one of the oldest and more established DTOs in Mexico. The Sinaloa Cartel controls drug trafficking activity in various regions in Mexico, particularly along the Pacific Coast. Additionally, it maintains the most expansive international footprint compared to other Mexican TCOs. The Sinaloa Cartel exports and distributes wholesale amounts of methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl in the United States by maintaining distribution hubs in cities that include Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, Atlanta, and Chicago. Illicit drugs distributed by the Sinaloa Cartel are primarily smuggled into the United States through crossing points located along Mexico’s border with California, Arizona, New Mexico, and West Texas.
Illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other novel psychoactive substances (NPS) are inexpensive, available via the Internet, and often manufactured in China where they may be shipped (via the international postal system or express consignment couriers) to the United States. Alternatively, they may be shipped directly to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean. Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are combined with heroin, cocaine, and other substances, and/or pressed into counterfeit pills made to look like controlled prescription drugs containing oxycodone or hydrocodone. They are then sold online on anonymous darknet markets, and even on overtly-operated websites or on the street.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) face serious challenges while addressing the threat of illicit importation at ports of entry due to the following: questionable legal status of these substances; enormous volume of international parcel traffic by mail and express consignment couriers; and, the technological and logistical challenges of detection and inspection. These challenges have paved the way for both cartel and non-cartel-affiliated individuals to engage in fentanyl trafficking.

Opium Poppies Ordered Online from the United Kingdom Make Their Way to Indiana

In May 2019, DEA, the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) conducted an enforcement operation that led to the federal arrest of Prashant Patel and the seizure of approximately 106 kilograms of opium (poppies & powder).

In May 2019, law enforcement personnel intercepted two Royal Mail parcels containing six pounds of dried opium poppies from the UK. During the execution of a State of Indiana search warrant at the residence, consent was obtained to search a detached garage revealing over 30 boxes of dried opium poppies and powder, large digital scales, a wooden press, and three commercial blenders, as well as US and Royal Mail packages. The investigation indicates that throughout the past year, Patel utilized the 'clear web' to order and import hundreds of boxes containing dried opium poppies from the UK directly into Indiana.

Poppy straw pods raw material contained within parcels
Mexican TCOs remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States. These Mexican poly-drug organizations traffic heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and now more than ever illicit fentanyl and synthetic opioid analogues, which are responsible for so many deaths over the last several years throughout the United States. Mexican TCOs control drug trafficking across the Southwest Border and are moving to expand their share of U.S. illicit drug markets. Their influence up and down the supply chain, ability to enter into new markets, and associations with domestic gangs are of particular concern for DEA. DEA will continue to address this threat domestically and abroad by attacking the crime and violence perpetrated by the Mexican-based TCOs, which have brought tremendous harm to American communities.

Targeting the world’s most prolific and dangerous drug traffickers is a dynamic and evolving mission, and with it comes myriad challenges. But throughout the agency’s history, DEA has met those challenges and produced impressive results.

**Drug Threat Assessment**

The National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), produced by DEA’s Intelligence Division, is an annual assessment that provides strategic drug-related intelligence needed to inform effective counterdrug policy, establish law enforcement priorities, and assist in making resource allocations. The NDTA provides a comprehensive, strategic assessment of the threat posed to our communities by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the illicit drugs they distribute throughout the United States.

Illicit drugs, and the transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic them, continue to represent significant threats to public health, law enforcement, and national security in the United States. The opioid threat (controlled prescription drugs, synthetic opioids, and heroin) continues at ever-increasing epidemic levels, affecting large portions of the United States. Meanwhile, the stimulant threat (methamphetamine and cocaine) is worsening and becoming more widespread as traffickers continue to sell increasing amounts outside of each drugs’ traditional markets. New psychoactive substances (NPS) remain challenging and the domestic marijuana situation is evolving as state-level medical and recreational legalization continues. Drug poisoning deaths are the leading cause of injury death in the United States. In 2017, drug poisoning deaths reached their highest recorded level and, every year since 2011, have outnumbered deaths by firearms, motor vehicle crashes, suicide, and homicide. In 2017, approximately 192 people died every day from drug poisoning.
2019 NDTA Findings

Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids: Fentanyl and other highly potent synthetic opioids—primarily sourced from China and Mexico—continue to be the most lethal category of illicit substances misused in the United States. Fentanyl continues to be sold as counterfeit prescriptions pills as traffickers—wittingly or unwittingly—are increasingly selling fentanyl to users both alone and as an adulterant, leading to rising fentanyl-involved deaths. Fentanyl suppliers will continue to experiment with other new synthetic opioids in an attempt to circumvent new regulations imposed by the United States and China.

Heroin: Heroin-related overdose deaths remain at high levels in the United States, due to continued use and availability, while fentanyl is increasingly prevalent in highly profitable white powder heroin markets. Mexico remains the primary source of heroin available in the United States according to all available sources of intelligence, including law enforcement investigations and scientific data. Further, high-levels of sustained opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Mexico allow Mexican TCOs to continue to supply high-purity, low-cost heroin.

Controlled Prescription Drugs (CPDs): CPDs are still responsible for the most drug-involved overdose deaths and are the second most commonly abused substances in the United States. Traffickers continue to manufacture and distribute counterfeit CPDs often-containing fentanyl and other opioids along with non-opioid illicit drugs in attempts to expand their customer base and increase profits. Overall diversion incidents continue to decline; however, CPDs lost in transit or diverted by medical professionals remains a prevalent threat across the United States.

Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): Mexican TCOs remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other groups are currently positioned to challenge them. The Sinaloa Cartel maintains the most expansive footprint in the United States, while the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación or CJNG) has become the second-most dominant domestic presence over the past few years. Although drug-related murders in Mexico continue to reach epidemic proportions, U.S.-based Mexican TCO members still generally refrain from domestic inter-cartel conflicts, resulting in minimal spillover violence in the United States.

Illicit Finance: U.S. drug sales continue to account for tens of billions of dollars in illicit proceeds annually. These proceeds change hands multiple times across various levels of the illegal drug market. Bulk cash smuggling seizure amounts remain at lower levels than in previous years, indicating that TCOs may be employing different methods of moving monetary value through the financial system. While traditional methods of laundering money are still the most widely used, the advent of 21st century methods may increase the complexity of anti-money laundering enforcement activities in the future.

Cocaine: Cocaine is a resurgent threat in the United States as domestic indicators—such as seizures, availability, and overdose deaths—remain at elevated levels. Cocaine-involved overdose deaths continue to exceed established benchmarks, primarily due to the continued
spread of fentanyl into the cocaine supply. In addition, coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, the primary source of supply for cocaine in the United States, remain at high levels.

**Methamphetamine:** Methamphetamine remains widely available, with traffickers attempting to create new customers by expanding into new, non-traditional methamphetamine markets such as the Northeast, or other user bases with new product forms. Most of the methamphetamine available in the United States is produced in Mexico and smuggled across the Southwest Border (SWB). Domestic production occurs at much lower levels than in Mexico and seizures of domestic methamphetamine laboratories have declined steadily for many years while overall supply has increased.

**Gangs:** National and neighborhood-based street gangs and prison gangs remain the dominant distributors of illicit drugs through street-sales in their respective territories throughout the country. Struggle for control of lucrative drug trafficking territories continues to fuel the majority of the street-gang violence facing local communities. Meanwhile, some street gangs are working with rival gangs to increase both gangs’ drug revenues, while individual members of assorted street gangs have profited by forming relationships with friends and family associated with Mexican cartels.

**Core Functions & Strategies**

**Enforcement Strategy**

To accomplish its mission, DEA focuses its investigations on CPOTs and PTOs, which are the most significant international and domestic drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.¹

Consistent with the FY 2018- FY 2022 DOJ Strategic Plan, DEA’s current long-term outcome goal is to dismantle² 420 and disrupt³ 535 CPOT-linked drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s coordinated enforcement and intelligence efforts with federal, state, local, and international partners are resulting in the largest and most dangerous drug trafficking organizations being put out of commission. For example:

- Through the end of FY 2019, DEA disrupted or dismantled 1,490 domestic and foreign priority targets, of which 101 were linked to CPOT organizations.

- Through the 4th quarter of FY 2019, 39 of the 67 CPOTs identified on the FY 2019 CPOT list (58%) have been indicted. In addition, 16 (24%) of the 67 CPOTs have been arrested and 4 (6%) were extradited.

¹ PTOs are identified by DEA Special Agents in Charge (SACs) and Regional Directors.
² Dismantlement occurs when the organization’s leadership, financial base, and supply network are destroyed, such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.
³ Disruption occurs when the normal and effective operation of a targeted organization is impeded, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including financing, trafficking patterns, communications, or drug production.
• The culmination of DEA’s participation in the CPOT initiative through 4th Quarter FY 2019 has led to 187 indictments, 146 arrests, and the extradition of 81 of the 257 CPOTs on the CPOT list between FY 2003 – FY 2019.

Data-driven Decision Making

In FY 2017, DEA implemented the Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP), an exploratory drug control strategy, to identify the biggest threats in each division and ensure that the field offices have the necessary resources allocated to mitigate those threats. DEA is making analytical tools available for investigative use, which has helped to better identify doctors and pharmacies of operational interest and understand the cause of the backlog for laboratory analysis. DEA believes that data analysis is a critical aspect of good decision making and will continue to find ways to incorporate it into identifying problems and finding solutions.

Additionally, DEA created the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM) that helps to align agent resources to offices based on the risk profile within their area of responsibility (AOR). The model utilizes 49 external and internal variables (e.g., drug deaths, violent crime, drug purity and seizures) determined to be the most important by DEA’s Special Agents in Charge within their domestic AOR’s. The model results are used to identify areas of increased activity while balancing areas in which perceived risks were shifting to make informed staffing decisions.
Furthermore, DEA created two derivative models to staff 100 additional agent positions in areas with Emerging Drug Trends (50 agents) and Heroin Enforcement Teams (50 agents). The results were utilized to identify and focus these additional agents to locations with the greatest impact to new and emerging trends.

**Special Operations Division**

DEA has relied on the implementation of strategies and the fostering of key partnerships over the course of its 45-year history. Established in 1994, the Special Operations Division (SOD) is a DEA-led, multi-agency operational coordination center with participation from 35 law enforcement agencies, including foreign participation from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Emphasis is placed on major drug trafficking and terrorist organizations financed by drug profits, which operate across jurisdictional boundaries on a regional, national, and international level.

On February 9, 2017, Executive Order 13773 on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to TCOs and Preventing International Trafficking was issued. In response to the executive order, the DOJ and other Federal partners are developing a government-wide TCO strategy. As part of the strategy, SOD is viewed as a leading DEA entity to address TCOs.

**DEA 360 Strategy**

In combating the heroin and prescription opioid epidemic, DEA recognizes that law enforcement action alone is not enough and has rolled out its 360 Strategy. This initiative involves coordinated law enforcement, diversion control, and community outreach efforts to tackle the cycle of violence and addiction generated by the link between drug cartels, violent gangs, and the growing problem of prescription opioid and heroin abuse in U.S. cities.

In 2016, DEA implemented its 360 Strategy in four U.S. cities: Louisville, KY; Milwaukee, WI; St. Louis, MO; and Pittsburgh, PA. In 2017, DEA expanded the strategy to another four cities: Dayton, OH; Albuquerque, NM; Charleston, WV; and Manchester, NH. In 2018, DEA again expanded this program to another six cities: Salt Lake City, UT; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Knoxville, TN; and Baltimore, MD. In 2019, DEA added six additional cities: New Orleans, LA; Cleveland, OH; Los Angeles, CA; New Bedford, MA; Flagstaff, AZ; and Tampa, FL. In 2020, DEA plans on going to four cities with three of the four locked in, in this order: Las Vegas, Columbus, OH, and Portland, ME. As part of the 360 Strategy, DEA has partnered with Discovery Education, a division of Discovery
Communications, to develop and distribute a prescription opioid and heroin education curriculum to middle and high school students, their teachers, and parents for Operation Prevention, with materials being deployed at no cost to schools nationwide.

Key Operation Prevention statistics, as of September 2019:

- More than 90,000 downloads of the lesson plans to educate more than 5,300,000 students.
- More than 1,900,000 students were educated through the Virtual Field Trips.
- More than 246,000 students were educated through the self-paced module.

Medication Disposal

Since 2010, DEA has held its National Drug “Take Back” Initiative (NTBI) to provide a convenient and safe option to dispose of unused, expired, and/or unwanted prescription drugs. The eighteenth and most recent National Drug Take Back Day was conducted on October 26, 2019. DEA collected more than 882,919 pounds (442 tons) of medications from more than 6,174 collection sites. As a result of the 18th National Take Back Day, DEA, in conjunction with its state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, has removed over 12 million pounds of medications from circulation.

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Diversion Control Program

DEA’s Diversion Control Division (DC) is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals while ensuring adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances and chemicals to meet legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial needs without creating an oversupply. The deployment of Tactical Diversion Squads (TDSs) is the primary method of criminal law enforcement in the DC. These TDSs incorporate the enforcement, investigative, and regulatory skill sets of DEA Special Agents, Diversion Investigators, other federal law enforcement, and state and local Task Force Officers. Through the 4th quarter FY 2019, DEA had 86 fully operational TDSs throughout the U.S., covering 44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Since their initial deployment, TDS groups have initiated an average of more than 1,500 cases per year and made an average of more than 2,100 arrests per year. In addition, DEA established two mobile TDS groups that can deploy quickly to “hot spots” in furtherance of the Diversion Control Program’s mission.
Office of National Security Intelligence

DEA shares intelligence as appropriate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to federal, state, local, and international partners. DEA is represented in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) through the Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI), which facilitates intelligence integration, coordination, and information sharing with other members of the IC and national security elements. ONSI ensures that national security information obtained by DEA during the execution of its worldwide drug law enforcement mission is expeditiously shared with both the national security and intelligence communities. On average, ONSI shares more than 5,000 such reports a year. These reports contain information on topics such as foreign intelligence, international organized crime, international drug trafficking organizations, and terrorism.

FY 2021 Budget Request

DEA’s FY 2021 budget request totals $3,594,401,000. This request includes $460,499,000 derived from the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA). For FY 2021 this total includes $254M for the HIDTA program, which is requested as a separate appropriation and administered by DEA in the President’s Budget. Additionally, DEA anticipates receiving an estimated $481,097,000 from other agencies via reimbursable agreements and sub allotment associated with Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) and Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) funding. DEA anticipates that $3.5 billion will support 9,943 positions and 9,095 FTE during FY 2021. The following table summarizes DEA’s FY 2015 to FY 2021 funding levels by source.

*High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program is proposed to transfer to the DEA in FY 2021.
Maintaining Current Services

Salaries and Expenses (S&E) Account: The $52,217,000 in base adjustments includes funding for a 3.1% pay raise, annualization of the FY 2020 pay raise, changes in compensable days, the employee compensation fund, retirement costs, rent and facilities costs, annualization of positions received in prior years, and expenses and charges for positions stationed outside of the U.S.

Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA): The -$4,951,000 in base adjustments includes funding for a 3.1% pay raise, annualization of the FY 2020 pay raise, changes in compensable days, the employee compensation fund, retirement costs, and expenses and charges for positions stationed outside of the U.S. Additionally, DEA proposes to achieve cost savings of $7,084,000 in non-personnel base resources from savings realized from increased efficiencies and reduced spending.

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA): In FY 2021, the Budget proposes to transfer management of the HIDTA program from ONDCP to the DEA to better facilitate coordination of the HIDTA Program grants with other drug enforcement assets.

Program Improvements

DEA’s FY 2021 program increases directly support several Presidential Executive Orders and Attorney General Priorities and will provide DEA resources to address capabilities gaps in lawful access, and exploitation of data, communications, and cyber investigations, as well as enable DEA to better target Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) responsible for trafficking dangerous drugs into the U.S. Enhancement requests include the following:

1. **Lawful Access and Data Exploitation:** $27,590,000 to address capability gaps in lawfully intercepting communications.
2. **King Air Replacement:** $9,197,000 to purchase one King Air 350 aircraft.
3. **Cyber Investigations and Digital Evidence:** $5,576,000 to enhance DEA’s ability to combat criminal enterprises operating on or through the Internet.
4. **Combating Transnational Criminal Organizations:** $22,284,000 to enhance vital agency programs and offices focused on targeting, disrupting, and dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs).
5. **Training Capacity Expansion:** $2,788,000 to enhance DEA’s ability to recruit, hire, and train DEA Special Agents.
6. **Diversion Control Program:** $15,404,000 to enhance Tactical Diversion Squads and other regulatory and enforcement support.
**Full Program Costs**

The following chart reflects all FY 2021 DEA resources including the S&E Account, Reimbursable resources, Sub-allotments, the DCFA, and HIDTA.

The activities and initiatives in each of DEA’s programs play a crucial role in accomplishing DEA’s overall strategy. Some programs, as well as management and administration costs, cross decision units. Both performance and resource tables within each decision unit justification define the total costs of achieving the strategies DEA will continue in FY 2021.
Performance Challenges

The following challenges have a direct impact on DEA’s ability to: identify threats and targets; initiate and sustain investigations; nominate and elevate those investigations to Priority Target (PTO) status; link those investigations to TCOs, CPOTs or Regional Priority Organization Targets (RPOTs); and, validate and affirm the successful Disruption or Dismantlement of those PTOs (CPOT-linked and Not CPOT-linked).

International Enforcement

- DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers overseas. As a result, DEA’s success is reliant upon host nation law enforcement cooperation to include intelligence sharing.
- Specific countries currently lack self-sustaining counter narcotics police institutions and effective criminal justice systems to adequately address counterdrug efforts.

Domestic Enforcement

- Continued high levels of heroin abuse continue to put a strain on DEA resources, particularly in terms of the need for additional enforcement, outreach and education efforts, inclusive of DEA’s 360 Strategy.
- The rapid pace of new technology, anonymous use of this technology, and the lack of authentication are challenges for law enforcement personnel as they investigate crimes and collect evidence.
- Increased use of the dark web and cryptocurrencies challenges DEA’s ability to identify and intercept the distribution of illegal narcotics, and affiliated money laundering. This challenge is not unique to DEA as it also hinders the enforcement efforts of federal, state and local Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), as well as investigations initiated by our foreign counterparts.

State and Local Assistance

- The Office of Training’s (TR) quarterly and overall projections were estimated under the assumption that TR’s Clandestine (Clan) Lab Training Unit would be staffed at full capacity as in previous years.

Diversion Control

- The proliferation of synthetic drugs requires additional analytical resources in order to accurately identify and schedule the compounds.
- Continued high levels of heroin abuse continue to put a strain on Department resources, particularly in terms of the need for additional outreach and education.
Environmental Accountability

DEA maintains and manages the internal Environmental Stewardship Awards Program, awarding two DEA facilities with the DEA Environmental Stewardship Award, one DEA facility with the Environmental Management System Award, and two individuals with the DEA Environmental Champion Award. DEA continued to promote the DEA Electronics Stewardship Awards program. 2019 was the fifth year for the Awards program. Three Platinum Awards were presented to DEA facilities across the country.

At the regional and national level, DEA offices also received awards. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded one DEA facility with three National Federal Green Challenge Awards. Southeast Laboratory received these awards in the Waste, Electronics, and Purchasing categories. EPA Region 9 awarded four Regional Federal Green Challenge awards to two DEA facilities. Southwest Laboratory received awards in the Water, Electronics, and Innovation categories, while Western Laboratory received an award in the Leadership category. Overall, seven DEA facilities were awarded with national Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) Purchaser Awards. In addition, DEA’s Energy Program Manager was presented with a 2019 Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) Federal Energy and Water Management Award for work on the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Solar Project.

In 2019, DEA saw its renewable energy purchases increase from 2.1% in 2017 and 3.4% in 2018 to 10.1% in 2019. The EPIC Solar project at the El Paso Intelligence Center is the biggest reason for this jump. The Year 1 Monitoring & Verification Report provided for the EPIC Solar project confirmed that the project produced 4.3 million kilowatt hours of renewable solar electricity during 2019. Additionally, the Western Laboratory joined the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) Energy Choice program, which provides the laboratory with electricity from offsite utility-owned solar photovoltaic arrays in Northern California. The laboratory joined the program in July 2019, and in the first three months received 435,000 kilowatt hours of renewable energy. Thus far, the program has resulted in no net costs to the laboratory. The GSA electricity contracts at Aviation Operations Center and South Central Laboratory also increased their renewable energy content from 15% to 20% in June 2019.

In 2019, DEA began its first Utility Energy Savings Contract (UESC) at the Southeast Laboratory in Miami, Florida. DEA followed an acquisition process to begin working with the partner utility, Florida Power & Light (FPL). FPL is in the process of submitting an Investment Grade Audit (IGA) to DEA with a list of potential Energy Conservation Measures (ECMs) with a qualifying payback within the lease term of the building.

The Southeast Laboratory achieved yet another 30% reduction in water use in 2019 compared to 2018. Since their historical high point in 2013, they have achieved a reduction of 91%. They have seen double digit percentage reductions every year since 2015. The largest water savings came when the laboratory improved its deionized water system in late 2016.
## II. Summary of Program Changes

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<td>Diversion Control Program</td>
<td>To target the individuals and organizations responsible for the illicit manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>48</td>
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III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language

Appropriations Language

**SALARIES AND EXPENSES**

For necessary expenses of the Drug Enforcement Administration, including not to exceed $70,000 to meet unforeseen emergencies of a confidential character pursuant to Section 530C of title 28 USC; and expenses for conducting drug education and training programs, including travel and related expenses for participants in such programs and the distribution of items of token value that promote the goals of such programs, [$2,279,153,000] $2,398,805,000; of which not to exceed $75,000,000 shall remain available until expended and not to exceed $90,000 shall be available for official reception and representation expenses. Provided, That, notwithstanding section 3672 of Public Law 106–310, up to $10,000,000 may be used to reimburse States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other public entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional consortia thereof for expenses incurred to clean up and safely dispose of substances associated with clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, conversion and extraction operations, tableting operations, or laboratories and processing operations for fentanyl and fentanyl related substances which may present a danger to public health or the environment.

**HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAM**

For necessary expenses of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, authorized by [21 U.S.C. 1706] the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, as amended through Public Law 115–271 ("the Act"), $254,000,000, to remain available until September 30, [2020] 2021, for drug control activities consistent with the approved strategy for each of the designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas ("HIDTAs"), of which not less than 51 percent shall be transferred to State and local entities for drug control activities and shall be obligated not later than 120 days after enactment of this Act: Provided, That up to 49 percent may be transferred to Federal agencies and departments in amounts determined by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, of which up to $2,700,000 may be used for auditing services and associated activities: Provided further, That, notwithstanding the requirements of Public Law 106–58, any unexpended funds obligated prior to fiscal year 2017 may be used for any other approved activities of that HIDTA, subject to reprogramming requirements: Provided further, That upon a determination that all or part of the funds so transferred from this appropriation are not necessary for the purposes provided herein, such amounts may be transferred back to this appropriation: Provided further, That section 707 of the Act shall be applied by substituting "Attorney General" for "Director" each place it appears: Provided further, That unexpended balances in the "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, Federal Drug Control Programs, Executive Office of the President" account may be transferred to this appropriation.
Analysis of Appropriations Language

- DEA is proposing to expand the use of state and local clandestine methamphetamine laboratory (meth lab) cleanup funding, transferred to DEA in FY 2018, to pay for the cleanup of other illicit hazardous environments, such as clandestine fentanyl labs and pill press operations. State and local agencies have requested DEA’s support for other illicit hazardous environments, however, the existing authorities governing the use of DEA’s State and Local cleanup funding only allow it to be used for clandestine methamphetamine laboratory cleanups. The proposed proviso will grant DEA the authority it needs to use these funds for this purpose and will not negatively impact DEA’s ability to support state and local meth lab cleanups.

Provided, That, notwithstanding section 3672 of Public Law 106-310, up to $10,000,000 may be used to reimburse States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other public entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional consortia thereof for expenses incurred to clean up and safely dispose of substances associated with clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, conversion and extraction operations, tableting operations, or laboratories and processing operations for fentanyl and fentanyl related substances which may present a danger to public health or the environment.
IV. Program Activity Justification

A. International Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Enforcement</th>
<th>Direct Pos.</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>813</td>
<td>$464,875</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020 Enacted</td>
<td>924</td>
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<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<td>2021 Program Increases</td>
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<td>2021 Request</td>
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<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
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<td><strong>$30,928</strong></td>
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</table>

* This table only displays DEA’s S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Enforcement Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
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<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<td>2021 Current Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Request</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-$431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table only displays DEA’s S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

1. Program Description

DEA has the primary responsibility of enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the U.S. Almost all cocaine and heroin, and most other dangerous drugs, to include synthetic opioids like fentanyl, are produced in source countries and smuggled into the U.S. For that reason, reducing the illicit drug availability in the U.S. requires an aggressive international counternarcotic approach. However, DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers operating overseas; therefore, host nation collaboration is vital. As such, DEA personnel deployed to foreign offices exchange valuable intelligence and conduct complex bilateral operations with host nation counterparts. DEA personnel also engage and assist their host nation counterparts during the development of new foreign legislation, treaties, and agreements designed to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, and the diversion of precursor chemicals.

DEA deploys its resources to the highest priority overseas locations to maximize the impact on the global narcotics trade. As of December 2019, DEA’s global footprint was organized into eight DEA foreign regions which include 90 offices in 67 countries (see Figure 1 on page 26). Of particular interest are the regions of Mexico and Central America. DEA maintains the largest U.S. federal law enforcement presence in Mexico with 11 offices and over 100 authorized
personnel. DEA places special emphasis on Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) as these organizations continue to dominate the trafficking of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, to a lesser extent, fentanyl. Additionally, Mexican TCOs are constantly looking to expand their U.S. presence, particularly in heroin markets.

Key programs and activities funded by the International Enforcement Decision Unit as well as relevant performance measures are discussed below.

**Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs)**

DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) program began in 1996 with a $20 million budget and four participating countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. During the past 24 years, the program has successfully vetted, trained, and mentored foreign law enforcement units capable of conducting investigations, developing networks of confidential sources, and gathering intelligence leads. DEA manages 15 SIUs with a combined staffing capacity of over 1,200 host nation law enforcement officials. These SIUs are currently located in the following countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand.

*In April 2019, members of the Thailand SIU participated in an enforcement operation resulting in the seizure of 348,000 methamphetamine pills (34.8 kilograms in weight) and 20 kilograms of methamphetamine "Ice."*
**Priority Targeting Program**

DEA personnel assigned to foreign offices focus their investigative efforts on Priority Target Organizations (PTOs). PTOs are TCOs that engage in the highest levels of drug trafficking and/or drug money laundering operations that impact international, national, regional, or local drug availability. DEA focuses its resources on PTOs with and without a direct connection to a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT). The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished through bilateral investigations with host nation counterparts as well as multi-agency coordination.

**International Training Program**

DEA’s International Training Program, with funding from the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the Department of Defense (DOD), serves as a model for a variety of international law enforcement training efforts. DEA’s International Training Program offers both in-country and regional training programs conducted by four mobile training teams. In-country programs are conducted for participants from a specific country; whereas, regional training is offered for participants from a number of countries sharing common drug trafficking issues. DEA continually develops new curricula and modifies courses in response to various factors to include evolving international narcotics trafficking routes, new technologies, and requests from host nation governments.

**Drug Flow Attack Strategy**

In order to disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and precursor chemicals into the U.S., DEA developed the Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) and its enforcement arm, *Operation All Inclusive*, in FY 2006. This strategy includes a specific focus on intelligence-driven enforcement, sequential operations, and predictive intelligence. The Southwest Border is an integral part of the DFAS as most illicit drugs smuggled into the U.S. enter through this border. Through the DFAS, DEA and other interagency components attack the operational vulnerabilities of TCOs to eliminate the source of a drug.
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Figure 1

DEA Foreign Offices

Legend:
- Regional Office
- Country Office
- Resident Office
- Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Office
- Taipei, Taiwan Narcotics Liaison Office
- Future Offices (5)
- DEA Presence – Not Included in Foreign Office Total (6)

90 Foreign Offices in 67 Countries

Revised 12-2019

DEA.GOV / OFFICE LOCATIONS
International Enforcement Decision Unit Performance Measures

Priority Targeting Program

DEA’s international investigative efforts focus primarily on CPOT-linked PTOs. The objective is to permanently dismantle these organizations so the source of the drug is eliminated.

The first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures displayed on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA’s flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

- PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

International Training

The effectiveness of DEA’s international enforcement efforts is also measured by the number of DEA-sponsored international training courses conducted and participants trained. The third drug enforcement-related output performance measure displayed on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of International Students Trained

Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied

DEA’s current long-term objective is to maximize the Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied) to meet the challenge of dismantling drug cartels so they are unable to reconstitute their operations with new leadership. Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA’s International, Domestic, and State and Local Decision Units.

The fourth drug enforcement-related outcome performance measure displayed on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)
## 2. Performance and Resources Tables

### Performance and Resources Table

**Decision Unit: International Enforcement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCES</th>
<th>Target FY 2019</th>
<th>Actual FY 2019</th>
<th>Target FY 2020</th>
<th>Current Services Adjustments and FY 2021 Program Changes</th>
<th>Requested (Total)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Active PTOs Linked to CPOTs</td>
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<td>85</td>
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<td>Active PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs</td>
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<td>369</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>275</td>
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<td><strong>Total Costs and FTE</strong> (reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>TYPE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PERFORMANCE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FY 2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>FY 2020</strong></td>
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<td>Program Activity</td>
<td>International Enforcement**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Measure: Output</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled</td>
<td>18/12</td>
<td>11/17</td>
<td>19/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Measure: Output</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled</td>
<td>105/54</td>
<td>70/51</td>
<td>107/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Measure: Output</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of International Students Trained</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Measure: Outcome</strong></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)</td>
<td>$3.3 Billion</td>
<td>$5.0 Billion</td>
<td>$4.0 Billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**See Performance/Resources Table 2 for footnotes.**

---

27
Data Definition: Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. Dismantlement means destroying the organization’s leadership, financial base and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.

Data Validation and Verification: PTARRS provides a means of electronically validating and verifying PTO data through the following approval chain:

- **Case Agent (SA)** - Through PTARRS, the Special Agent (SA) or Diversion Investigator (DI) begins the process by creating and proposing a PTO.
- **Group Supervisor (GS)** – The GS reviews the PTO proposed by the SA/DI and approves it or sends it back to the SA/DI for additional information/clarification.
- **Country Attache (CA)** - The CA reviews the PTO approved by the GS. If all of the necessary information included in the proposal meets the established criteria for a PTO, the CA approves the PTO.
- **Regional Director** - The Regional Director reviews the PTO approved by the CA and provides a case assessment for, or against, the nomination of the PTO. Once nominated by the Regional Director, PTARRS generates and saves a unique identification number for the nominated PTO.
- **Headquarters** - At Headquarters, PTOs nominated by the Regional Directors are assigned to the appropriate section within DEA’s Office of Foreign Operations (OF). Once assigned, the corresponding OF Staff Coordinator validates all information reported on the PTO nomination. The validation process includes a review of the PTO nomination for completeness, compliance with established criteria, and confirmation of all related case linkages, including links to CPOTs. Staff Coordinators coordinate with DEA’s Special Operations Division and Intelligence Division to ensure that available facts exist to support all case linkages. In the unlikely event the documentation submitted is insufficient to validate the reported links, the Staff Coordinator will coordinate with the submitting GS to obtain the required information.

Data Limitations: DEA is currently improving reporting systems that capture investigative work hours and cost data. DEA also has an ongoing initiative, the Managerial Cost Accounting project, that will eventually allow the agency to capture actual full costs of investigating, disrupting, and dismantling PTOs. All statistics are limited by inherent data problems between case files and enforcement outputs (e.g., arrest, seizure, and work hour data). The link between these files are impacted by inherent data problems such as text verses numbers. Through manipulation of these problems, DEA is able to link these data sets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Performance Measure</td>
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<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled¹</td>
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<td>16/19</td>
<td>16/13</td>
<td>20/11</td>
<td>18/12</td>
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<td>19/13</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled¹</td>
<td>105/78</td>
<td>90/76</td>
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<td>105/54</td>
<td>70/51</td>
<td>107/55</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of International Students Trained</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>OUTCOME Measure</td>
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<td>$5.1B</td>
<td>$3.3B</td>
<td>$5.0B</td>
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</table>

¹ PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).
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3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, DEA’s International Enforcement Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

*Output Performance Measure:* PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>13/11</td>
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<td>19/13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>21/14</td>
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</table>
**Output Performance Measure:** PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<td>98/49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>105/54</td>
<td>70/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>107/55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>109/56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019, DEA disrupted 11 and dismantled 17 PTOs linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 61 and 142 percent to target for each performance actual, respectively. DEA also disrupted 70 and dismantled 51 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 67 and 94 percent to target for each performance actual, respectively.

DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers overseas, so DEA's success is reliant upon host nation law enforcement cooperation for intelligence sharing and participation. Also, specific countries currently lack self-sustaining counter narcotics police institutions and effective criminal justice systems to adequately address counterdrug efforts. Despite these challenges, DEA personnel will continue to engage and assist their host nation counterparts during the development of new foreign legislation, treaties, and agreements designed to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, and the diversion of precursor...
chemicals. Additionally, DEA will continue to coordinate PTO investigations with its foreign and domestic counterparts to meet or exceed performance targets established for FY 2020 and FY 2021.

Starting in FY 2020, DEA will reinstate some of its previous performance reporting procedures which are the following: designating all OCDETF cases as PTO cases; identifying and tracking prior PTO CPOT linkages; and including PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (Category Ds). DEA has determined that actual performance has been underreported when this category of PTOs has been excluded.

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of International Students Trained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, DEA’s Office of International Training trained 2,490 foreign law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 108 percent above the performance target established for FY 2019. Overall performance for this effort is also contingent upon receiving an adequate level of reimbursable funding from the Departments of State and Defense. Accordingly, DEA will continue to offer both in-country and regional training programs in support of its global enforcement efforts to meet or exceed its performance targets in FY 2020 and FY 2021.

**Outcome Performance Measure:** Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>2019</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>$4.0 Billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA’s International and Domestic Decision Units. From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, DEA was responsible for denying approximately $5 billion in drug trafficking revenue. This represents approximately 152 percent to the performance target established for FY 2019. DEA will continue to conduct global enforcement operations to meet or exceed performance targets for FY 2020 and FY 2021.
b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

In FY 2021, DEA’s resources included in the International Enforcement Decision Unit will support the Attorney General’s strategic goals and objectives. DEA will also continue to pursue internal agency strategies, goals, and objectives. As such, DEA will provide interagency leadership in the effort to disrupt or dismantle TCOs through its flagship PTO and SIU programs as well as operational elements of the DFAS, and other agency initiatives.

In support of the Attorney General’s applicable priority areas and strategies, DEA will continue to coordinate intelligence worldwide contributing to the dismantlement of TCOs responsible for providing and smuggling cocaine, heroin, and most dangerous drugs to include synthetic opioids like fentanyl, into the U.S. This important work includes the coordination of intelligence on the cultivation and manufacture of illicit substances, the sale of precursor chemicals for illegal drug production, and the transportation routes of these drugs into the U.S. DEA also provides intelligence to assist the inter-agency community in determining future trends in drug trafficking and evaluating these trends to determine their long-term impact. In FY 2021, DEA’s personnel abroad will continue to work closely with their foreign and domestic counterparts to investigate leads and dismantle international drug trafficking organizations that target American citizens.

c. Agency Priority Goals

A discussion regarding DEA’s progress in support of FY 2020-2021 Agency Priority Goals to include quantifiable metrics is included in the Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit narrative.
B. Domestic Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Enforcement</th>
<th>Direct Pos.</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
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<td>2021 Program Increases</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$32,111</td>
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<td>2021 Program Offsets</td>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td>2021 Request</td>
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<td>5,381</td>
<td>$1,885,357</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
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<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>$88,611</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table only displays DEA's S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Enforcement Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>$258,281</td>
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<td>2020 Enacted</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>$257,257</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<td>- $5,796</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Current Services</td>
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<td>$251,461</td>
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<td>2021 Request</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>- $5,796</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*This table only displays DEA's S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

1. Program Description

In coordination with DEA’s foreign offices, DEA Domestic Field Divisions and offices create a seamless intelligence and investigative approach to disrupt and dismantle the drug trafficking organizations that pose the largest threat to the U.S. DEA uses an aggressive, multi-jurisdictional approach designed to focus federal resources on the disruption or dismantlement of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that control the illegal drug trade as well as the seizure of drug revenue associated with their criminal enterprises. DEA’s Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit comprises the majority of DEA’s investigative and support resources. As of July 2019, there were 23 Field Divisions, 47 District Offices, 111 Resident Offices and 58 Posts of Duty (see Figure 2 on page 43).

Key programs and activities funded by the Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit, as well as relevant performance measures, are discussed below.

Priority Targeting Program

DEA implemented its Priority Target Organization (PTO) program in April 2001 to allow Special Agents in Charge (SACs) to identify and address the most significant drug threats within their areas, whether they are international, national, regional, or local impact in scope. Under the
PTO program, DEA seeks to identify, disrupt, and dismantle those drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations having the most significant impact on drug availability within the U.S.

DEA Domestic Field Divisions, under the supervision of SACs, identify and target major drug threats within their areas of responsibility. Specifically, Domestic Field Divisions focus their investigative efforts on PTOs with a direct connection to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), which include the most significant international command and control organizations threatening the U.S. as identified by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) member agencies.

**Threat Enforcement Planning Process**

In FY 2017, DEA developed and introduced a new drug control strategy that shifts agency performance from a quantitative-based approach to a more, qualitative results oriented approach that focuses on outcomes. The strategy is called the Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP). The purpose of the TEPP is to proactively manage enforcement efforts and resources, while identifying goals and reporting effectiveness. Though still in its exploratory and deliberative phase, the FY 2018 TEPP identified four DEA-wide National Level Threats that are in alignment with the Departments FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan and the President’s Executive Orders:

- Transnational Criminal Organizations (organized crime/drug networks)
- Opioid Threats (e.g., Heroin, Fentanyl, controlled prescription drugs)
- Violent Domestic Drug Gangs (e.g., MS-13)
- Cyber Drug Threats

**State and Local Task Force Program**

DEA uses its task forces as a force multiplier in carrying out DEA’s mission through coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Task forces act as an extension of DEA’s traditional enforcement groups, focusing mainly on targeting significant, high-level TCOs.

DEA assigns state and local Task Force Officers (TFOs) primarily to task force groups within Domestic Field Divisions. DEA continuously monitors the task forces to ensure they remain efficient and effective. Through the 4th quarter of FY 2019, DEA led 292 state and local task forces. Moreover, these task forces consisted of an on-board strength of 2,409 Special Agents and 2,955 TFOs, all of whom are deputized with Title 21 authority and dedicated full-time to investigate major TCOs and address local trafficking problems.

TFOs provide local expertise that cannot be matched at the federal level. This expertise includes, but is not limited to: (1) geographical familiarity with respect to specific areas, businesses, or persons involved in trafficking activities; (2) enhanced intelligence regarding local or regional TCO hierarchical structures, co-conspirators, and their corporate or transactional behaviors; and (3) access to relationships with local residents cultivated and fostered through liaison with community and religious leaders, as well as various health, public,
and private service agencies therein. In addition, TFOs are well versed and practiced in the local judicial systems or smaller venues, and their support has been invaluable with respect to serving warrants and assisting with the identification and seizure of assets that may not have been identified solely by DEA.

The partnership with state and local personnel also allows DEA access to additional resources. TFOs allow for: (1) close alliances with state and local agencies; (2) the use of platforms for surveillance assets (pole cameras and, in many locations, radio systems and frequencies); (3) access to city facilities and equipment as well as events, meetings, and conferences with a criminal justice agenda; and, (4) access to local and state intelligence databases to include drug databases, gang information, and local identifiers of significant drug trafficking areas.

**Special Operations Division (SOD)**

The Special Operations Division’s (SOD) mission is to establish seamless law enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling major Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) by attacking their command and control networks. Special emphasis is placed on those transnational criminal and narcoterrorism organizations that operate across jurisdictional boundaries. Tools and the programs available at SOD are used to fully exploit federal law enforcement’s investigative authority under Title III of the U.S. Code. In this capacity, SOD actively supports multi-jurisdiction, multi-nation, and multi-agency investigations, while working jointly with federal, state and local agencies. SOD support consists of communication exploitation, counter network targeting, deconfliction and coordination of overlapping investigations. SOD ensures that tactical and strategic intelligence is shared between law enforcement agencies and provides analytical and financial case support to investigations that meet division and region priorities.

**SOD Office of Field Enforcement/Bilateral Investigations Unit (BIU)**

The SOD BIU is comprised of three geographically designated field enforcement groups: Western Hemisphere I; Western Hemisphere II; Europe, Asia Africa and the Middle East. The enforcement groups are responsible for investigating, infiltrating, indicting, and incarcerating the world’s most significant drug traffickers, narco-terrorists, and transnational criminal organizations that affect the U.S. The BIU enforcement groups also identify existing, emerging, and evolving threats within their areas of responsibility and develop investigative plans that support DEA’s strategic goals and objectives to address these threats. Each of the three enforcement groups control and direct confidential sources, propose sensitive activities, and work closely with DEA foreign offices and counterparts.

**Intelligence and Information Sharing**

DEA continues to operate a robust intelligence program producing priority strategic intelligence products focusing on current and future drug trafficking threats. Products include the annual publication of a National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), which provides policy makers, senior law enforcement leaders, and U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) managers with a comprehensive assessment of the significant national drug threats.
DEA’s Intelligence Program continues to produce a wide range of other finished intelligence products on new and emerging drug threats. During FY 2019, DEA published a total of 372 intelligence reports authored by DEA intelligence analysts assigned to domestic and foreign offices, and DEA Headquarters. DEA also disseminated over 4,000 Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) with a foreign nexus or national security implications to the IC, U.S. national security community, and other DEA stakeholders. The Intelligence Division increased the production and dissemination of unclassified DEA intelligence products in order to share with health care professionals, first responders, and academia via dea.gov. The Intelligence Division contributes to drug-related interagency assessments such as National Intelligence Estimates, Presidential Daily Briefs, and Intelligence Community Assessments or Memoranda.

DEA’s Intelligence Division provides dedicated analytical support to DEA investigations, programs, and operations worldwide. By collecting, collating, analyzing, and disseminating tactical, investigative, and strategic drug intelligence to federal, state, and local agencies, the Intelligence Program significantly impacts the drug threat facing the United States.

Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs

DEA’s Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs exemplify DEA’s efforts in intelligence-based policing, strategic analysis, and information sharing. The Heroin Signature Program (HSP), managed by the Intelligence Division, and the Cocaine Signature Program (CSP), managed by the Office of Forensic Sciences, were initiated in 1977 and 1998, respectively, as essential components of DEA’s ability to identify trends in heroin and cocaine trafficking and distribution in the U.S. Supported by scientific methodologies developed at DEA’s Special Testing and Research Laboratory (SFL1), the ongoing objectives of these signature programs are to (1) identify trends in heroin and cocaine trafficking and distribution in the U.S.; (2) identify the processing methods and geographic origins of the heroin and cocaine encountered in the U.S. drug market; and, (3) provide intelligence on wholesale purity and track transitions in heroin and cocaine smuggling patterns into the U.S.

Heroin Domestic Monitor Program

The Heroin Domestic Monitor Program (HDMP) has been one of the key drug indicator programs managed by the DEA Intelligence Division for almost 40 years. HDMP is a partnership between the Intelligence Division, DEA Laboratory System, and DEA Field offices.

HDMP provides federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, as well as drug policy makers and drug abuse researchers, with information regarding the nature of the domestic heroin problem at the retail (“street”) level. The data necessary for HDMP is currently obtained from existing retail-range evidentiary exhibits (investigative heroin purchases) made during the course of ongoing DEA investigations. Evidentiary purchases incorporate urban, suburban, and rural investigative activity and reflect the variety of heroin available at the retail level across the nation. The forensic analysis of these heroin exhibits provides science-based data on, most importantly, the geographic source origin of heroin, price and purity, adulterants and dilutants, use patterns, marketing practices, and availability.
The HDMP is the sole U.S. Government indicator program that provides scientific certainty of the geographic origin and purity of heroin available on the streets of the United States. Information derived through the HDMP has allowed DEA to aggressively target emerging heroin problems as well as develop strategies to counter them.

Office of Special Intelligence

Within the DEA Intelligence Division, personnel assigned to the Office of Special Intelligence work in an inter-agency environment that provides operational intelligence support and identification of investigative overlaps to the DEA Special Operations Division (SOD), DEA field offices, and other federal, state, local and tribal agencies, through the acquisition, management, analysis, and maintenance of data. With the support of DEA’s Office of Information Technology (ITC), the Office of Special Intelligence develops, operates, and maintains a wide variety of analytical tools in support of DEA’s mission. Staffed by experienced intelligence, data, and geospatial analysts, these intelligence professionals utilize their ability and tools to provide timely and meaningful analytical products drawing from multiple, large data sets.

Office of National Security Intelligence

The mission of the Office of National Security Intelligence is to share relevant and timely DEA law enforcement intelligence with the IC and to strengthen DEA’s membership in the interagency community through integration and liaison programs. The Information Requirements Management program meets DEA’s statutory requirement to share national security, terrorism, and transnational organized crime information with the IC, U.S. national security community, and other DEA stakeholders. The office also shares timely and high-value operational and strategic national security intelligence, which is acquired through DEA’s criminal and regulatory investigative activities. The Intelligence Integration program establishes and maintains relationships with IC partners and ensures DEA business interests and equities are represented during governance and business decisions made within the IC. The office integrates DEA into the IC through joint duty programs, liaison partnerships, and its participation in IC steering committees, governance boards, and working groups.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a U.S. Government, multiagency intelligence center led by DEA. EPIC is staffed by interagency partners working in a task force-like environment. EPIC’s mission is to support U.S. law enforcement through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on threats to the Nation and those criminal organizations responsible for illegal activities within the Western Hemisphere, having a particular emphasis on Mexico and the Southwest Border. While taking a hemispheric, all crimes, all threats view, EPIC’s primary focus is on criminal activity within the United States and support to our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.
Through its Watch Operations Unit, EPIC provides 24/7 immediate access to participating agencies’ databases for information such as warning and case deconfliction, expanding awareness of criminal activity and threats. EPIC provides real-time support to law enforcement operations through its Tactical Operations Section to include blue force tracking, pole camera monitoring and cell phone pings monitoring. The State and Local Programs Unit provides Operation Jetway/Pipeline training in the effective conduct of criminal interdiction of commercial aircraft, trains, hotels, motels, passenger and commercial motor vehicles on U.S. highways and roadways. DEA’s National License Plate Reader Program is a law enforcement tool used to assist with criminal investigations occurring on high-level drug and money trafficking corridors and other public roadways throughout the U.S. EPIC’s Research and Analysis Section provides research and case support to identify potentially forfeitable assets and emerging drug trends, with an emphasis on synthetic opioids and methamphetamine.

In addition to providing tactical intelligence support to federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, EPIC also provides unique assistance to international law enforcement entities, through direct interaction and exchange of information that furthers U.S. and foreign investigations. In addition, the program fosters communication and information exchange between the different foreign liaison officers assigned to EPIC. Because of its access to federal, state, local, tribal and international law enforcement entities, EPIC works to strengthen partnerships between organizations at all levels.

**State and Local Training**

In addition to DEA’s State and Local Assistance Programs, DEA’s Office of Training offers specialized training and professional development to state and local law enforcement officers in a variety of program areas:

- **Drug Law Enforcement School for Patrol Officers**: provides updated training to police officers to assist them in detecting drug-related crime in their communities.

- **Drug Enforcement Training Program**: offers instruction with a detailed program guide, student handouts, instructional aids, and suggested practical exercises.

- **Drug Task Force Supervisors School**: supports and supplies updated managerial training to supervisors and commanders assigned to multi-agency drug task forces.

- **Drug Unit Commanders Academy**: provides training in areas including tactical aspects of drug enforcement, operational planning, confidential source management, clandestine laboratory operations, and legal issues for management.
Figure 2
Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit Performance Measures

Priority Targeting Program

DEA’s domestic investigative efforts focus primarily on CPOT-linked targets. The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment of the same criminal organization is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished primarily via multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven, multi-regional efforts to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.

DEA’s first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA’s flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

- PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

Domestic Training

The effectiveness of DEA’s domestic enforcement efforts is also measured by the number of DEA-sponsored domestic training courses conducted and participants trained. The third drug enforcement-related output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained

Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied

DEA’s current long-term objective is to maximize the Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied) to meet the challenge of dismantling drug cartels so they are unable to reconstitute their operations with new leadership. Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA’s International and Domestic Decision Units.

The fourth drug enforcement-related outcome performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)
## Performance and Resources Tables

### Performance and Resources Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCES</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>Current Services Adjustments and FY 2021 Program Changes</th>
<th>FY 2021 Request</th>
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<td>524</td>
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<td><strong>Total Costs and FTE</strong>&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt; (reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)</td>
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<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
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<td><strong>FTE</strong></td>
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<td>70/41</td>
<td>98/65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105/70</td>
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<td>530/463</td>
<td>604/518</td>
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<td>614/530</td>
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<td>Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)</td>
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<td>††</td>
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**In FY 2018 and beginning in FY 2019, the Assets Forfeiture Fund and OCDETF reimbursable funding will transition to a sub allotment, respectively. This table only reflects reimbursable resources.**

†† This is an agency-wide outcome measure reflecting the activities across DEA’s decision units - See International Decision Unit Performance and Resources Table for performance data related to this measure.

1 Reflects active PTO investigations as of the end of the specified fiscal year.

2 This performance measure does not include PTOs associated with DEA's Diversion Control Program.

3 PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).

4 This performance activity and performance measure does not include State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement training.
### Priority Targeting Program

**Data Definition:** Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. **Disruption Pending Dismantlement** means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, but continuing towards the organization’s complete evisceration such that it is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. **Dismantlement** means destroying the organization’s leadership, financial base and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.

The first **CPOT List** was issued in September 2002, and is updated semi-annually. The List identifies the most significant international drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and those primarily responsible for America’s drug supply. Enforcement agencies are focused on identifying links among disparate domestic drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and on making connections to their ultimate sources of supply. Investigators continually work up and across the supply chain, with the goal of disrupting and dismantling the entire network controlled by or supporting a given CPOT organization. An organization is considered "linked" to a CPOT, if credible evidence exists (i.e., from corroborated confidential source information, phone tolls, Title III intercepts, financial records, or other similar investigative means) of a nexus between the primary target of the investigation and a CPOT target. The nexus need not be a direct connection to the CPOT, so long as a valid connection exists to a verified associate or component of the CPOT organization.

**Data Validation and Verification:** PTARRS provides a means of electronically validating and verifying PTO data through the following approval chain:

- **Case Agent** - Through PTARRS, the Special Agent (SA) or Diversion Investigator (DI) begins the process by creating and proposing a PTO.
- **Group Supervisor (GS)** – The GS reviews the PTO proposed by the SA/DI and approves it or sends it back to the SA/DI for additional information/clarification.
- **Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC)** - The ASAC reviews the PTO approved by the GS. If all of the necessary information included in the proposal meets the established criteria for a PTO, the ASAC approves the PTO.
- **Special Agent in Charge (SAC)** - The SAC reviews the PTO approved by the ASAC and provides a case assessment for, or against, the nomination of the PTO. Once nominated by the SAC, PTARRS generates and saves a unique identification number for the nominated PTO.
- **Headquarters** – At Headquarters, PTOs nominated by the SAC are assigned to the appropriate section within DEA's Office of Domestic Operations (OD). Once assigned, the corresponding OD Staff Coordinator validates all information reported on the PTO nomination. The validation process includes a review of the PTO nomination for completeness, compliance with established criteria, and confirmation of all related case linkages, including links to CPOTs. Staff Coordinators coordinate with DEA's Special Operations Division and Intelligence Division to ensure that available facts exist to support all case linkages. In the unlikely event the documentation submitted is insufficient to validate the reported links, the Staff Coordinator will coordinate with the submitting GS to obtain the required information.

**Data Limitations:** All statistics are limited by a lack of a relational link between case files and enforcement outputs (e.g. arrest, seizure, and work hour data). The link is inferred through data manipulation, but some areas are prone to error until all data systems are linked in a relational manner, and errors are prevented through data validation and referential integrity.

### State and Local Training

**Data Definition:** The DEA Training Academy receives quarterly training data from the field on training provided by Division Training Coordinators. The field data are combined with the data generated by the DEA Training Academy and reported quarterly based on the fiscal year.

**Data Validation and Verification:** Data are reviewed upon receipt, but only technical or unusual deviations are checked.
## PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

### Decision Unit: Domestic Enforcement

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled(^1)(^2)</td>
<td>169/132</td>
<td>173/141</td>
<td>108/66</td>
<td>77/49</td>
<td>93/62</td>
<td>70/41</td>
<td>98/65</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td><strong>Performance Measure</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled(^1)(^2)</td>
<td>846/743</td>
<td>887/841</td>
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<td>588/507</td>
<td>530/463</td>
<td>601/518</td>
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<td><strong>Performance Measure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained(^3)</td>
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<td>48,609</td>
<td>37,701</td>
<td>31,571</td>
<td>31,930</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)</td>
<td>‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡ ‡‡</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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\(^††\) This is an agency-wide outcome measure reflecting the activities across DEA's decision units - See International Decision Unit Performance and Resources Table for performance data related to this measure.

\(^1\) This measure does not include PTOs associated with DEA's Diversion Control Program.

\(^2\) PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). This measure excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).

\(^3\) This performance activity and performance measure does not include State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement training participants.
3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, DEA’s Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

*Output Performance Measure:* Domestic PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target: Total Disruption</th>
<th>Target: Total Dismantled</th>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>91/55</td>
<td>77/49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>93/62</td>
<td>70/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>98/65</td>
<td>105/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In FY 2017, DEA implemented the Threat Enforcement Planning Process, which changed its reporting methodology.*
**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, DEA disrupted 70 and dismantled 41 PTOs linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 75 and 66 percent to target, respectively for each of the aforementioned dispositions.

**Output Performance Measure:** PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>535/455</td>
<td>551/460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>588/507</td>
<td>530/463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>601/518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>614/530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, DEA disrupted 530 and dismantled 463 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 90 and 91 percent to target, respectively, for each of the aforementioned dispositions.

Since 2014, Domestic CPOT-linked and Not-linked PTO performance has been tempered in part due to declining number of Special Agents on-board, a net decrease of 316 Special Agents or 7.9 percent from FY 2014 to FY 2018. Over that same period, DEA reported a corresponding reduction in the number of PTO investigations opened (CPOT linked and Not linked). In response to emerging threats and related challenges to drug enforcement, DEA implemented its new strategy, the Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP) in 2017. As a result, in FY 2017 and FY 2018, overall Domestic PTO performance declined in successive fiscal years.
While it is generally challenging for DEA to consistently forecast annual performance, DEA leadership adjusted its targets for FY 2019 through FY 2021 to account for the drop in Special Agent work hours (staffing), and it amended TEPP’s implementation schedule to a more prudent timeline that is prioritized by specific threats and anticipated, community-based outcomes. The added benefit of this approach is that it will challenge TEPP’s feasibility and long term sustainability while accommodating its innovation with less risk to performance.

Because the number of Active Domestic PTOs Linked and Not Linked to CPOTs has exceeded its 4th Quarter targets, 1,166% and 196% to target, respectively, DEA anticipates that a significant number of its Active Domestic PTOs Linked and Not Linked to CPOT will be deposed in FY 2020 and FY 2021 and thereby contribute to the overall number of PTO dispositions (CPOT Linked and Not Linked) in furtherance of the FY 2020 and FY 2021 targeted goals.

Starting in FY 2020, DEA will reinstate some of its previous performance reporting procedures which are the following: designating all OCDETF cases as PTO cases; identifying and tracking prior PTO CPOT linkages; and including PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (Category Ds). DEA has determined that actual performance has been underreported when this category of PTOs has been excluded.

Despite the aforementioned challenges, DEA personnel will continue to prioritize investigative efforts to disrupt and dismantle OCDETF Targeted, CPOT-linked TCOs and address the illicit drug activity and violence attributed to these organizations despite constrained resources, and as such, DEA will work with OCDETF partner agencies to apprehend and prosecute the leaders, managers and supervisors of TCOs. Additionally, DEA will sustain or exceed its level of effort against drug trafficking networks in coordination with OCDETF and its partner agencies, federal and foreign counterparts, and state and local LEOs in the impacted communities.

Output Performance Measure: Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>32,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>31,930</td>
<td>24,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>31,930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>25,380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion: From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, DEA’s State and Local Law Enforcement Officer Training Program trained 24,509 federal, state and local law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 77 percent to target.

DEA has adjusted its targets for FY 2019 through FY 2021 due to the renovations at the Clan Lab Building, which began in 2019. DEA anticipates unpredictable class and venue disruptions while the building is being renovated. Finally, in recognition of the potential for disparate assessments of its targets and actuals, DEA will continue to utilize more robust analytical
methods that incorporates policy and operational decisions in concert with historical patterns to forecast its annual performance.

**Outcome Performance Measure:** Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)

**Discussion:** Please refer to the discussion on Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied included in the International Enforcement Decision Unit narrative.

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

**Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP)**

The TEPP seeks to refine and develop DEA’s drug control strategy and shift agency performance evaluation from a quantitative based approach to a more qualitative approach. It is anticipated that TEPP will facilitate the establishment of agency wide threat priorities, guide field enforcement strategies, and better inform the allocation of limited resources. In its exploratory phase, the TEPP identifies DEA-wide National Level Threats. Field offices, at the Division/Region level, identify threats in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) that fall under DEA-wide National Level Threats, and document their efforts to mitigate those threats through enforcement planning, operations, and initiatives. Thereafter, Field offices report on the status of those mitigation efforts to include goals achieved, strategies implemented, tactics deployed, and success attained pursuant to a unique, set of indices outlined pre-deployment.

Those initiatives focus on the following:

- Better alignment of strategic objectives to DEA-wide threats
- Consistent processes for the threat identification, mitigation plan development, and impact statement development
- Development of optimal methods to measure success and impact
- Effectively evaluate drug threat mitigation performance at Field Divisions/Regions
- Better alignment of resources based on the most critical threats

**Disrupt and dismantle Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs)**

The OCDETF Program, of which DEA is the leading participant, coordinates investigations targeting organizations on the CPOT list – the “Most Wanted” drug trafficking and money laundering organizations believed to be primarily responsible for the nation’s illicit drug supply. The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT organizations is accomplished primarily by multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven operations to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.
Deny drug revenue to TCOs to disrupt trafficking activities and reduce drug availability

With the goal to reduce drug availability, DEA is focused on drug trafficking activities and on the proceeds generated by the illegal drug industry. This money has a devastating effect on the American public and financial services industry, as well as other governments and societies around the world. DEA is addressing the threat that drug proceeds represent as a means of financing terrorist organizations. Due to the nature and scope of DEA’s investigations and its global presence, evidence and intelligence gleaned from its investigations often provide critical information on terrorist financing, which is immediately shared through established protocols with those agencies charged with counterterrorism responsibilities. DEA targets the flow of drug money back to sources of drug supply because these funds are destined to finance the next cycle of illegal drugs to be sent to the U.S. consumer market.

Provide educational resources through the Demand Reduction Program’s sponsorship of National Red Ribbon Week

National Red Ribbon Week is the most far-reaching and well-known drug prevention event in America. The National Family Partnership, which coordinates Red Ribbon activities nationally, estimates that over 80 million Americans participate in Red Ribbon events. During this period, events are held throughout the country and serve as prevention and educational resources for young children and their communities. National Red Ribbon Week also serves as a tribute to Special Agent Enrique Camarena, who was kidnapped and brutally tortured and murdered by drug traffickers in Mexico. This tragic event produced an immediate outpouring of grief, but over time has generated a sense of hope across America. This hope is being kept alive through the hard work of millions of Americans - particularly our young people - who participate in Red Ribbon events during the last week in October.

c. Agency Priority Goals

Under the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA) Modernization Act and OMB Circular A-11, Departments are required to identify a limited number of Agency Priority Goals (APGs) and define the strategies and means to achieve them. Consistent with the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan and the Attorney General’s FY 2021 Budget Guidance, the new APGs focus on the following areas:

- APG 1 - Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Attacks;
- APG 2 - Combat the Opioid Crisis;
- APG 3 - Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety; and
- APG 4 - Prevent and Prosecute Elder Fraud.

DEA contributes to DOJ’s Agency Priority Goal 2: Combat the Opioid Crisis as follows:

By September 30, 2021, and in conjunction with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, community leaders, public and private service organizations, philanthropic entities as well as key international partners, registrants, member of the pharmaceutical/chemical industry, DEA will continue to align its enforcement, regulatory and outreach efforts with DOJ’s APGs,
specifically APG-3, to aggressively combat the opioid crisis and reduce licit and illicit opioid overdoses by: (1) Disrupting and dismantling significant transnational drug trafficking organizations and their criminal networks; (2) Enforcing laws and regulations inclusive of the CSA to eliminate opioid-related health care fraud and diversion; and (3) Engaging the community and law enforcement through outreach, assistance, and training.

In combating the heroin and prescription opioid epidemic, DEA recognizes that law enforcement action alone is not enough and has rolled out its 360 Strategy. This new initiative involves coordinated law enforcement, diversion control, and community outreach efforts to tackle the cycle of violence and addiction generated by the link between drug cartels, violent gangs, and the growing problem of prescription opioid and heroin abuse in U.S. cities

DEA’s progress in support of the FY 2020-2021 APG across quantifiable metrics is ongoing and reported quarterly. The specific FY 2020-2021 APG-3 performance measures identified and their respective two-year (2) targets forecast through FY 2021, are characterized under DEA’s 360 Strategy as follows:

**360 – Enforcement**

DEA will increase the Percentage of Opioid-related PTO Dispositions by 3% over its FY 2019 performance (baseline). This metric reflects the results of activities scored to DEA’s International, Domestic, and Diversion Decision Units.

DEA will increase the Percentage of Opioid-related PTO Investigations Initiated by 3% over its FY 2019 performance (baseline). This metric reflects the results of activities scored to DEA’s International, Domestic, and Diversion Decision Units.

**360 – Enforcement and Regulatory**

DEA will increase the Number of Diversion Criminal Cases Initiated by 3% over its FY 2019 performance (baseline). This metric reflects the results of activities scored primarily to DEA’s Diversion and Domestic Decision Units.

**360 – Outreach**

DEA will increase the Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed by 5% over its FY 2019 performance (baseline). This metric reflects the outcome of activities scored primarily to DEA’s Diversion and Domestic Decision Units.

DEA will begin to report on the above mentioned performance measures in support of the APG-3 at the end of 1st quarter FY 2020 after the current reporting requirements under DOJ’s FY 2018-19 APG expires.
C. State and Local Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Local Assistance</th>
<th>Direct Pos.</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>$13,647</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>2021 Program Offsets</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Request</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>$13,761</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td><strong>$113</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* This table only displays DEA’s S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Local Assistance</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 Enacted</td>
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<td>2021 Request</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-$4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table only displays DEA’s S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

1. Program Description

DEA provides assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies through its State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training and Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Programs. DEA’s Salaries and Expenses Account funds the authorized positions associated with these programs. In FY 2021, DEA will have $10 million available in its base funding for the cleanup of hazardous clandestine methamphetamine labs discovered by state and local law enforcement. DEA may also use clean up funding for equipment, training, and technical assistance needed to initiate the hazardous waste container program in additional states.

**State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training**

DEA has consistently responded to the training needs of the U.S. law enforcement community and recognizes the value of sharing drug law enforcement techniques. DEA’s Office of Training’s Clandestine Laboratory Unit has developed programs to assist federal, state, and local officers in investigation, dismantling, and disposal of illicit clandestine laboratories. This training provides instruction in the safe dismantling and disposal of clandestine laboratories, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance, current trends in the manufacturing of illicit controlled substances, along with clandestine laboratory tactical
training. In addition to training Special Agents and state and local law enforcement personnel domestically, the Clandestine Laboratory Unit also provides First Responder/Awareness training and a First Responder/Awareness Train-the-Trainer Program to international law enforcement agencies.

**DEA Clandestine Laboratory Training**

**Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Program**

State and local personnel are often confronted with an extremely hazardous environment when called to the scene of clandestine laboratories. Clandestine laboratories, known as “small toxic labs,” are generally unaffiliated with large drug trafficking organizations and produce less than ten pounds of methamphetamine per production cycle. These labs are found in rural areas, tribal and federal lands, cities, and suburbs. Most often, state or local personnel first encounter these laboratories and must ensure that they are investigated, dismantled, and disposed of appropriately. DEA is in a unique position to assist state and local law enforcement with hazardous waste cleanups while maintaining a nationwide set of contracts.

Through the 4th quarter of FY 2019, DEA coordinated over 1,217 state and local methamphetamine lab cleanups. This total includes over 1,170 Container Program lab pickup and disposals, and another 47 on-site cleanups.

**State and Local Assistance Decision Unit Performance Measures**

**State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training**

The effectiveness of DEA’s state and local assistance efforts is measured by the number of DEA-sponsored clandestine laboratory trainings conducted and participants trained. The output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement
## 2. Performance and Resources Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCES</th>
<th>Target FY 2019</th>
<th>Actual FY 2019</th>
<th>Target FY 2020</th>
<th>Changes Current Services Adjustments and FY 2021 Program Changes FY 2021 Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Unit: State and Local Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCES</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workload: Varies by Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs and FTE</td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$000</td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$13,920</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$13,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>TYPE</td>
<td>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE</td>
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<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Activity</td>
<td>State and Local Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>$000</td>
<td>FTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$13,920</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Measure</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td># of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training

**Data Definition:** DEA’s Office of Training tracks the number of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and reports it quarterly based on the fiscal year.

**Data Validation and Verification:** Data are reviewed upon receipt. Technical or unusual deviations are verified.
### PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Unit: State and Local Assistance</td>
<td># of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, DEA’s State and Local Assistance Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

*Output Performance Measure:* Number of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, the Office of Training provided Clandestine Laboratory training to 1,087 state and local law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 121 percent to target. Since 1999, DEA has trained approximately 26,000 state and local law enforcement officers in identifying and processing clandestine laboratories. Due to the demand for clandestine laboratory training, DEA anticipates meeting the performance targets established for FY 2020 and FY 2021.

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

Over the past several years, DEA has continued to foster and implement a container-based cleanup program in response to evolving methods for the production and trafficking of methamphetamine throughout the United States. In light of the historical and persistent pattern of methamphetamine use/abuse, and in anticipation of potential, recurrent surges in methamphetamine morbidity and mortality in the future, DEA remains fully committed and supportive of this program. Through FY 2020, DEA plans to dedicate resources to the cleanup program in furtherance of its objectives to train and certify law enforcement officers on how to: remove gross contaminants from lab sites; secure and package the waste pursuant to state and federal laws and regulations; and, transport the waste to a secure container where it is stored until disposal. The container program provides a mechanism for state and local law enforcement to transport contaminants from labs (including mobile labs) and dumpsites to a secure container site in a safe and timely manner. The Container Program has resulted in significant cost savings in states that have operational container programs (a contractor cleanup averages $7,364 and a container cleanup averages $485).
As of the end of 4th Quarter FY 2019, there were 19 states with operational container programs: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.

State and local law enforcement officers are taught how to handle the environmental hazards encountered at clandestine laboratories, as well as the procedural differences between traditional drug investigations and clandestine laboratory investigations. DEA also ensures that state and local personnel receive familiarization training on the required protective equipment that must be worn when dismantling a clandestine laboratory. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) mandates that all federal, state, and local law enforcement officers receive at least 24 hours of hazardous chemical handling training prior to entering a clandestine drug laboratory.

c. Agency Priority Goals

A discussion regarding DEA’s progress in support of FY 2020-2021 Agency Priority Goals to include quantifiable metrics is included in the Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit narrative.
E. Diversion Control Fee Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversion Control Fee Account</th>
<th>Direct Pos.</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2020 Enacted</td>
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<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Current Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Program Increases</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>$15,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Program Offsets</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 Request</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>$460,499</td>
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<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,453</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dollars are in thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversion Control Fee Account</th>
<th>Estimate FTE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 Enacted</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$49,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Enacted</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>$49,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Current Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021 Request</td>
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<td><strong>Total Change 2020-2021</strong></td>
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<td><strong>-$1,116</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dollars are in thousands.

1. Program Description

DEA’s Diversion Control Program (DCP) is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals. In doing so, the DCP conducts and facilitates domestic investigations; supports international investigations with domestic connections; plans and allocates program resources; promulgates regulations; and conducts liaison with healthcare providers and industry, as well as federal, state, and local counterparts. All of the goals, strategies, and initiatives supported by the DCP are intended to establish and maintain strong standards of control; aid in detecting and preventing the diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals; enhance public safety by ensuring accountability; and improve qualitative reporting requirements within its network of compliance indicators.

DEA actively regulates more than 1.8 million individuals and companies registered with DEA to handle controlled substances or listed chemicals through a system of scheduling, quotas, recordkeeping, reporting, and security requirements. DEA uses criminal, civil, and administrative penalties against those who are involved in the diversion of licit controlled substances and listed chemicals, as well as individuals and/or organizations otherwise violating the CSA and its implementing regulations. By statute, registration fees must be set at a level that ensures the recovery of the full costs of operating the DCP.
Diversion Control Division Unit Performance Measures

Priority Targeting Program

DEA’s Diversion Control Division (DC) investigative efforts focus primarily on registrant violators of the CSA inclusive of non-registrant criminal enterprises involved in the diversion and trafficking of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and synthetics. Many of these violators and their criminal counterparts have been identified as PTOs (linked to CPOTs and not-linked to CPOTs). Historically, the vast majority of DC PTO dispositions were not-linked to CPOTs.

The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment of the same criminal organization is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished primarily via multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven, multi-regional efforts to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.

DC’s first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA’s flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

• PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
• PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

Number of Administrative Actions and Civil Penalties

The effectiveness of DC’s enforcement and regulatory efforts is also measured by the number of Administrative Actions and Civil Penalties levied. The third and fourth CSA-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table are the following:

• Number of Administrative Actions [levied]
• Number of Civil Penalties [levied]

Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)

The effectiveness of DC’s efforts to regulate, train, and disseminate critical, life-saving information to practitioners, industry professionals, other state and local regulatory officials, the general public, and other stakeholders in response to the Opioid Crisis and other emerging threats linked to the abuse of controlled substances is also measured by the number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall). This measure also captures and reports on the significant outreach activities conducted under DEA’s 360 Strategy. In support of DEA’s 360 Strategy, the fifth DC output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:
• Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)

**Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)**

The effectiveness of DC’s enforcement and regulatory efforts is also measured by the number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall). This measure directly reports on the degree and consistency of registrant compliance with the CSA. Violators are subject to a myriad of regulatory sanctions up to and inclusive of criminal prosecution. The sixth DC output performance measure on the Performance and Resource Table is the following:

• Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)
# Performance and Resources Tables

## Decision Unit: Diversion Control

### RESOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Requested (Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2019</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
<td>FY 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>FY 2021 Request</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Current Services Adjustments and FY 2021 Program Changes**

| Number of Criminal Case Initiations<sup>1</sup> | 1,725 | 1,850 | 1,750 | - | 1,775 |
| Active Diversion PTOs<sup>2</sup> | 485 | 889 | 490 | - | 495 |
| Number of Drug and Chemical New Applicants Processed (throughout the FY) | 132,000 | 138,259 | 139,000 | - | 146,000 |

**Total Costs and FTE**

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**PERFORMANCE**

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<td>1,782</td>
<td>$450,046</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>$10,453</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>$460,499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Performance Measure: Output

1. Number of Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted / Dismantled<sup>3</sup>
   - FY 2019: 0/0
   - FY 2020: 2/7
   - FY 2021 Request: 0/0

2. Number of Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted / Dismantled
   - FY 2019: 83/163
   - FY 2020: 77/151
   - FY 2021 Request: 85/167

3. Number of Administrative Actions
   - FY 2019: 2,025
   - FY 2020: 2,068
   - FY 2021 Request: 2,025

4. Number of Civil Penalties
   - FY 2019: 70
   - FY 2020: 79
   - FY 2021 Request: 70

5. Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)
   - FY 2019: 1,750
   - FY 2020: 3,125
   - FY 2021 Request: 3,700

6. Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)
   - FY 2019: 1,441
   - FY 2020: 1,329
   - FY 2021 Request: 1,357

---

<sup>1</sup> Criminal cases will be determined by the use of DEA's Case Status Subsystem (CAST) to obtain records with 2000 series Diversion case files and class codes 40/50. In addition, DEA case file records for non-2000 series non-general file with fee fundable GDEP drug codes are included.

<sup>2</sup> Reflects active PTO investigations as of the end of the specified fiscal year. As a participant in the PTO program, Diversion is required to report PTOs linked to CPOT and not linked to CPOT. However, given the nature of the Diversion program, CPOT linkages are a rare event.
Data Definitions:

Types of Registrants:
* Type A Registrants dispense controlled substances at the retail level. These include pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, practitioners, teaching institutions and mid-level practitioners (nurse practitioners, physician assistants, etc.).
* Type B Registrants manufacture and distribute controlled substances at the wholesale level. These include manufacturers, distributors, analytical labs, importers/exporters, researchers and narcotic treatment programs.
* Chemical Registrants manufacture and distribute chemicals at the wholesale and retail level. These include retail distributors, manufacturers, distributors, importers and exporters.
* Criminal Investigation on CSA/CDTA Registrants: All non-scheduled regulatory investigations of CSA/CDTA violations/violators. These include: Priority Target Organizations (PTOs); criminal investigations; and Drug Oriented Investigations (DOIs).

Sanction Categories:
* Administrative Actions/Civil Penalties: Consists of civil fines, administrative hearings, letters of admonition/MOU, suspension and restriction. Registrants usually retain the DEA Registration with restrictions and/or financial penalty. Registrants may be temporarily denied access to controlled substances/chemicals.
* Criminal: Consists of surrender for cause, revocation and denial. Registrants lose or forfeit the DEA Registration or are convicted of a drug offense. Registrants are permanently denied access to controlled substances/chemicals pending a reversal of circumstances.

Data Collection and Storage: During the reporting quarter, the Diversion field offices change the status of a registrant’s CSA2 Master record to reflect any Regulatory Investigative actions that are being conducted on the registrant. The reporting of the Regulatory action by each field office is available on a real-time basis through the reporting system within CSA2, as the investigative status change occurs. The Regulatory investigative actions that are collected in a real-time environment are as follows: letters of admonition/MOU, civil fines, administrative hearing, order to show cause, restricted record, suspension, surrender for cause, revocations, and applications denied. The CSA2 enables DEA to maintain all of the historical and investigative information on DEA registrants. It also serves as the final repository for a majority of punitive (i.e. sanctions) actions levied against CSA violators.

Data Validation and Verification: The Diversion Investigator and the field office Group Supervisor (GS) are tasked to ensure that timely and accurate reporting is accomplished as the registrants investigative status change occurs. Both GS and the Diversion Program Manager (DPM) have the ability to view the report of ingoing and completed Regulatory Investigation actions for their office/division at any time during the quarter or at the quarter’s end, since the actions are in real-time.

Data Limitations: The content of the quarterly reports is restricted to Regulatory Investigative action on controlled substance/chemical registrants and makes no mention of budgetary information. Timeliness is not considered a limitation since the data is collected as the change in the status of the investigation occurs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted &amp; Dismantled</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted &amp; Dismantled</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>185/248</td>
<td>193/270</td>
<td>138/209</td>
<td>78/148</td>
<td>83/163</td>
<td>77/151</td>
<td>85/167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Administrative Actions</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>2,301</td>
<td>2,299</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>2,025</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Civil Penalties</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>4,079</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,357</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>3,125</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Prior to FY 2010, the Diversion Control Program was not officially part of the DEA’s Priority Targeting Program. Beginning in FY 2010, with the creation of Tactical Diversion Squads in every domestic field division, the Diversion Control Program began focusing on the identification of PTOs and their eventual disruption and dismantlement.

2 PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).
3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022, DEA’s Diversion Control Division contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Administrative Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>2,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, Diversion Control levied 2,068 administrative actions. This represents approximately 102 percent to target. As such, DEA anticipates that Diversion Control will continue to meet its targets in FY 2020 and FY 2021.

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Civil Penalties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, Diversion Control levied 79 civil penalties. This represents approximately 113 percent to target. Although Diversion Investigators are engaging more with registrants during their scheduled investigations to correct minor regulatory violations instead of citing registrants with formal civil penalties, Diversion Control still anticipates that it will continue to meet its targets in FY 2020 and FY 2021.

**Output Performance Measure:** Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted and Dismantled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>0/0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Output Performance Measure:** Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted and Dismantled

- **2018 Target:** 129/195
- **2018 Actual:** 78/148
- **2019 Target:** 83/163
- **2019 Actual:** 77/151
- **2020 Target:** 85/167
- **2021 Target:** 87/170

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, Diversion Control disrupted 2 and dismantled 7 PTOs linked to a CPOT. Because CPOT-linked investigations are not the focus of the DCP, there may or may not be any disruptions or dismantlement of PTOs linked to CPOTs for Diversion in any given year. While this metric may be reported and included in aggregate CPOT counts, it is not targeted.

Through the 4th quarter FY 2019, Diversion disrupted 77 and dismantled 151 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 93 and 93 percent to target, respectively. DEA initiates criminal investigations on those suspected of criminal violations of the CSA. As a participant in the PTO program, Diversion PTOs can be criminal and/or regulatory. PTO investigations are administrative, civil, and criminal investigations that have a regional or national impact on a registrant’s ability to handle controlled substances. In 2019, Diversion adjusted its targets to align with the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. Through sustained efforts on intelligence sharing and investigative leads, Diversion anticipates that it will continue to meet its targets in FY 2020 and FY 2021.
**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)

- **2018 Target:** 2,775
- **2018 Actual:** 2,414
- **2019 Target:** 1,441
- **2019 Actual:** 1,329
- **2020 Target:** 1,357
- **2021 Target:** 1,729

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, Diversion Control completed 967 Scheduled Investigations. This represents approximately 92 percent to target. As such, through sustained efforts that capitalize on a cyclical schedule of inspections and audits as well as follow-up and targeted pursuits that are based on investigative leads, Diversion anticipates that it will meet its targets in FY 2020 and FY 2021.

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)

- **2018 Target:** 700
- **2018 Actual:** 1,977
- **2019 Target:** 1,750
- **2019 Actual:** 3,125
- **2020 Target:** 3,700
- **2021 Target:** 4,200

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, Diversion Control completed 2,377 outreach/public education events. This represents approximately 179 percent to target. The surge in outreach activities has been the result of actions taken in response to an ongoing directive by the Acting Administrator to educate the public, DEA registrants, and other Medical Professional Organizations on federal laws and regulations, and DEA’s role and responsibilities. Due to the severity of the fentanyl and heroin abuse epidemic and its ties to prescription abuse, and the fundamental necessity for a sustained effort by DCP to educate and inform the industry and general public, outreach far exceeded what was originally forecast by DEA.

Diversion Control recognizes that it exceeded the FY 2019 target, and after significant analysis and deliberation that accounts for the independent contributions of its Division-based Outreach Coordinators, Diversion has modified its FY 2020 and FY 2021 targets. However, moving forward, Diversion reserves the right to amend its FY 2021 target to allow for the potential incorporation of additional outreach categories currently administered by DEA’s Office of Congressional Affairs, Community Outreach and Prevention Support Section (CPO) in support of DEA’s 360 Strategy. Because Diversion and CPO outreach efforts have a shared mission involving complementary activities that often target similar audiences, DEA is exploring the opportunity to aggregate these statistics under one metric that more accurately reflects DEA’s overall performance across the vast number and types of outreach and public education events conducted.
Diversion’s decision to adjust its targets for FY 2020 and FY 2021 supports the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan. In addition, Diversion has reached out to its Division-based Outreach Coordinators to emphasize better planning, scheduling, monitoring and reporting procedures that track and account for the completion of outreach and educational events/activities in a manner commensurate with the proliferation of the Opioid epidemic in our communities. As such, Diversion anticipates improved forecasts and performance moving forward to meet its FY 2020 and FY 2021 targets.

b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

The DCP’s mission is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate sources while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply is available for legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs. The following strategies outline DEA’s plan to achieve this objective:

Tactical Diversion Squads (TDS)

The DCP conducts criminal enforcement activities primarily through Tactical Diversion Squads (TDSs). TDSs are comprised of many DEA specialties, including special agents and diversion investigators, as well as state and local law enforcement and regulatory personnel, who work together to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle those individuals or organizations involved in diversion schemes (e.g., pill mills, street level prescription drug trafficking organizations, prescription forgery rings, and doctor shopping). TDSs also develop sources of information and disseminate intelligence to appropriate elements for the development of leads and targets. The TDS provides support to a Diversion Group and/or Diversion Staff where law enforcement authority or activities are required (e.g., purchase of evidence/payment for information, conducting surveillance, conducting undercover operations, making arrests, and executing search/seizure warrants). TDSs also play an important role in addressing the growing problem of emerging synthetic designer drugs. TDS groups surreptitiously buy these substances which are analyzed and used to support DEA’s temporary and permanent scheduling actions.

Through the 4th quarter FY 2019, DEA had 86 fully operational TDSs throughout the U.S., covering 44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. The process of establishing additional TDSs is ongoing. DEA established two Mobile Diversion Teams (MDTs) that are currently deployed to various field divisions assisting with operations. MDTs provide a targeted focus on operations leading to the disruption of diversion schemes and the targeting of high-level traffickers in order to dismantle their organizations. The MDTs will significantly decrease the strain on resources that are redirected to support large investigations, allow rapid response to shifts in diversion trends, and create an agile resource capable of responding to changing mission requirements.

Scheduled Investigations

One of the primary functions of the DCP is to ensure that registrants are in compliance with the safeguards inherent in the CSA. This proactive approach is designed to identify and prevent the large scale diversion of controlled substances and listed chemicals into the illicit market. Registrant compliance is determined primarily through the conduct of pre-registration, scheduled, and complaint investigations. The DCP regulatory activities also have an inherent deterrent function: they are designed to ensure that those businesses and individuals registered
with DEA to handle controlled substances or listed chemicals have sufficient measures in place to prevent the diversion of these substances. These investigations also help registrants understand and comply with the CSA and identify those registrants who violate the CSA and implementing regulations. Pre-registration investigations reduce the possibility of registering unauthorized subjects, ensure that the means to prevent diversion are in place, and help determine whether registration is consistent with the public interest.

In a collaborative effort to direct manpower based on the needs of each division, four new modifications to the requirements of the scheduled work plan for FY 2019 were implemented. The intention was to create flexibility to focus on pharmaceutical and chemical diversion threats identified within each division that run parallel with DEA’s Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP). The modifications were implemented via memorandum “Modification of the Controlled Substance and Chemical Regulatory Work Plan” dated September 7, 2018, signed by Assistant Administrator John J. Martin. Researchers (Schedule I and Schedule II-V), pharmacies, and analytical laboratories, were temporarily suspended. Each division chose a time frame, between one to five years, to initiate a scheduled investigation for registrants with the following business activities: controlled substance manufacturers, distributors, reverse distributors, narcotic treatment programs, importers and exporters as well as chemical handler manufacturers, distributors, importers and exporters. Scheduled investigations are required to be completed on these registrants within five years of the last completed scheduled investigation. In addition to the scheduled investigations, a separate investigation is conducted annually on all renewal or modified applications of all Schedule I and II bulk manufacturers and all Schedule I and II importers.

A new Work Plan memo was issued on September 24, 2019 by former Acting Assistant Administrator William T. McDermott which rescinded the September 7, 2018 memo. This memo modified the existing scheduled work plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and allows each division the flexibility to specifically address the specific threats within their Area of Responsibility. The one new adjustment to the requirements of the scheduled work plan that will take effect in FY2020 is that each Diversion Group shall conduct at least 2 scheduled investigations on retail or central fill pharmacies.

**Fentanyl Scheduling**

In 2018, DEA placed all illicit fentanyl analogues not already regulated by the Controlled Substances Act into Schedule I—the category for substances with no currently accepted medical use. Anyone who possesses, imports, distributes, or manufactures any illicit fentanyl analogue will be subject to criminal prosecution in the same manner as for fentanyl and other controlled substances. This temporary scheduling order is effective for two years, with the possibility of a one-year extension, and will expire if a permanent scheduling proceeding is not completed. The temporary scheduling order is scheduled to expire in February 2020.

c. **Agency Priority Goals**

A discussion regarding DEA’s progress in support of FY 2020-2021 Agency Priority Goals to include quantifiable metrics is included in the Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit narrative.
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F. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas</th>
<th>Direct Pos.</th>
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<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments</td>
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<td>2021 Current Services</td>
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<td>2021 Request</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>$254,000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* In prior years, this program was included in the Office of National Drug Control Policy's budget. The FY 2021 request includes transferring the HIDTA Program from ONDCP to DEA. This table only reflects HIDTA account resources. Dollars are in thousands.

1. Program Description

In FY 2021, DEA anticipates assuming responsibility and oversight of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program from the Office of National Drug Council Policy. DEA currently participates in and coordinates with 29 HIDTAs. Transferring the administration of the program will provide several advantages. Under DEA leadership, the program will better leverage existing relationships between DEA and state, local, and tribal counterparts. HIDTA resources will continue to operate as a local-first program focused on combatting drug trafficking in areas where the threat is the greatest, which dovetails with DEA’s existing enforcement efforts. HIDTA strategies will continue to be developed by the regional HIDTAs. This action was intended to unify the nation’s premier federal, state, local, and tribal drug enforcement programs to more effectively combat the drug threat.

The HIDTA Program was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, to provide assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities operating in those areas most adversely affected by drug trafficking. The HIDTA Program provides resources to Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region to carry out activities that address the specific drug threats of that region.

The purpose of the HIDTA Program is to reduce drug trafficking and production in the United States by:

- Facilitating cooperation among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities;
- Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
- Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the design of effective enforcement strategies and operations; and,
• Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies that make the most of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in designated areas of the United States and in the Nation as a whole.

To qualify for consideration as a HIDTA, an area must meet the following criteria:

• The area is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution;
• State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem;
• Drug-related activities in the area are having a significant harmful impact in the area and in other areas of the country; and,
• A significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug related activities in the area.

There are currently 29 HIDTAs. HIDTA-designated counties are located in all 50 states, as well as in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The HIDTAs are currently overseen by Executive Boards to design and carry out activities that reflect the specific drug trafficking threats found in each HIDTA region. As currently structured, the HIDTA Executive Board can tailor its strategy and initiatives closely to local conditions and can respond quickly to changes in those conditions.

Among the types of activities funded by the HIDTA Program are: drug enforcement task forces comprised of multiple Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies designed to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations (DTOs); multi-agency intelligence centers that provide drug intelligence to HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies; initiatives to establish or improve interoperability of communications and information systems between and among law enforcement agencies; and, investments in technology infrastructure.
V. Program Increases by Item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Name:</th>
<th>Lawful Access and Data Exploitation</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Organizational Program:</td>
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Program Increase: Positions 6 Agents 6 FTE 3 Dollars $27,590,000

Description of Item

DEA’s request for $27.6 million and 6 special agents will enhance DEA’s ability to lawfully intercept communications and analyze evidentiary and communications data gathered during the course of criminal investigations. In particular, this funding will help DEA preserve law enforcement’s ability to conduct and support lawful electronic surveillance domestically and will enhance DEA’s efforts in support of foreign law enforcement counterparts overseas.

The requested resources will support the following:

- $13 million for communication interception and analysis resources
- $14.5 million and 6 positions (6 special agents) for SOD staffing support

Justification

DEA continues to prioritize its resources and staffing to disrupt and dismantle the “most wanted” drug trafficking and money laundering organizations believed to be responsible for the nation’s illicit drug supply. This includes the Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs) identified by DOJ, plus other Priority Target Organizations (PTOs) identified by DEA. DEA’s historical enforcement strategy targets the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in the United States, which today are Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). DEA also places a high priority on its efforts to prevent drug proceeds from ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations. To this end, DEA seeks the following resources:

Special Operations Division (SOD) Communication Intercept Resources - $13,000,000

DEA resources dedicated to the interception and analysis of both domestic and international drug trafficking communications will continue to play an important role in DEA’s enforcement efforts in FY 2021, as will large-scale, multi-agency enforcement operations. In this regard, the Special Operations Division (SOD) is the backbone of DEA’s investigative coordination and DEA’s communication interception efforts through SOD’s support of multi-jurisdiction, multi-nation, and multi-agency wire intercept investigations. This funding request will enable SOD to continue and also expand upon DEA’s historically successful efforts to investigate domestic and international narcotics trafficking organizations through wire communication intercepts.
**SOD - $14,590,000 and 6 positions (including 6 special agents)**

**SOD Contract Personnel and Training - $2.5 million**

This request includes $2,495,000 to ensure SOD’s support to DEA Field Division investigations and assist DEA’s foreign law enforcement counterparts overseas. DEA will utilize additional contractors to continue and expand the effectiveness of existing programs that have led to numerous arrests domestically and overseas and which have enabled DEA and DEA’s foreign law enforcement counterparts to make numerous currency, asset, and drug seizures around the world. This request for additional funding for contract personnel will be used to help DEA continue and increase SOD support to both domestic and international investigations and will enable DEA to train personnel as needed to support these critical law enforcement functions.

**SOD Telecommunications Interception Section - $7.7 million and 6 positions (including 6 special agents)**

This request of $7,678,000 would provide a staffing increase of six special agents at SOD as well as provide funding for additional T-III investigations, Pen Register orders, and Administrative Subpoena requests to support ongoing drug investigations.

**SOD Contractor Support - $4.4 million**

This request for funding will provide contractor support and needed architectural enhancements to computer software for DEA’s Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) compliant platform and software.

**Impact on Performance**

The various funding initiatives requested in this enhancement will directly support DEA’s ability to investigate cases both internationally, in concert with host nation counterparts, and domestically. The proposed additions and enhancements will allow DEA to build its cases and better identify drug distribution and money laundering cells, seize narcotics and narcotics proceeds, weapons, and other assets. Ultimately, these funding enhancements will lead to the arrest and conviction of even more foreign and domestically based narcotics traffickers.
### Funding

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Affected Crosscuts

Drugs, International Activities, Transnational Crime
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**Item Name:** King Air Replacement

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| Organizational Program: | Aviation Division |

| Program Increase: | Positions 0  Agt/Atty 0  FTE 0  Dollars $9,197,000 |

**Description of Item**

In the continuing effort to combat evolving and emerging drug threats around the globe directly impacting the United States, DEA’s aviation assets are utilized steadfastly in support of ongoing DEA investigations worldwide. As a result, DEA has identified the operational need to begin replacing existing foreign-deployed aircraft. Requested resources will support the following:

- $9.2 million for one King Air 350 aircraft.

**Justification**

DEA’s aviation assets, managed by the Aviation Division, support complex and active DEA global enforcement operations. The Aviation Division has approximately 125 special agent pilots and approximately 100 aircraft, 36 percent of the fleet are over 20 years old, and 8 percent are over 40 years old. The fleet is comprised of both single and twin-engine fixed-wing aircraft, single- and twin-engine helicopters, medium passenger aircraft, and jets. DEA has identified the need to begin replacing its domestic and foreign fleet and enhance existing aircraft to meet the investigative requirements of global operations. An aging fleet and outdated technology cannot meet the increased demand for the Aviation Division’s support in the field. In FY 2019, DEA began the initial stage of its domestic aircraft replacement effort with the aim of standardizing its surveillance fleet around a single fixed-wing and helicopter platform. DEA will continue this effort in future fiscal years if sufficient funds are available. DEA also believes the modernization of its foreign deployed air fleet is also critical to the ongoing viability of foreign operations.

Request includes $9,197,000 in non-personnel funding for one King Air 350 aircraft (including first-year modification costs). DEA has nine King Air 350 aircraft in its fleet that are used extensively in Latin America and the Caribbean. These aircraft play a crucial role in DEA’s investigations, allowing DEA to transport personnel and sensitive equipment securely in challenging and dangerous environments, such as the dense tropical forests of Colombia. Without the aircraft, DEA’s operations in Colombia would be severely hampered. On average, DEA’s King Air 350s fly approximately 350 flight hours per year, most of those transporting personnel and equipment over difficult and dangerous areas. Due to their extensive use these aircraft have significant wing damage; additionally, seven of the nine aircraft are between 20 and 28 years of age and have already flown over 10,000 hours.
Replacing aging aircraft will reduce maintenance costs and increase reliability. A recent internal study of DEA’s domestic surveillance fleet showed that older aircraft are 10 percent less available, fly 31 percent fewer mission hours, and cost 88 percent more per flight hour. DEA anticipates greater reliability and lower operational costs by updating its King Air fleet. The new King Air 350s would be utilized primarily in foreign countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Afghanistan. In foreign environments, these aircraft are typically used for transporting cargo, DEA personnel, and evidence as well as for surveillance activities. DEA also uses its King Air fleet for over water missions, where the redundancy of a twin engine aircraft is necessary for operational safety. DEA’s foreign missions also require the same redundancy.

**Impact on Performance**

This resource request principally supports DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation* and the Attorney General’s new FY 2020-FY 2021 targeted priority areas: *Combating the Opioid Crisis* and *Reducing Violent Crime and Promoting Public Safety*. DEA will also continue to pursue internal agency strategies, goals, and objectives. Key DEA International Enforcement performance measures will be used to track the progress of this resource increase; however, performance targets have not been adjusted at this time.
## Funding

### Base Funding

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### Affected Crosscuts

Drugs, International Activities, Transnational Crime
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**Item Name:** Cyber Investigations and Digital Evidence

Strategic Goal: 3
Strategic Objective: 3.2
Budget Decision Unit(s): Domestic Enforcement
Organizational Program: Domestic Field Offices, Office of Investigative Technology, Digital Evidence Lab

Program Increase: Positions 14 FTE: 7 Dollars: $5,576,000

**Description of Item**

DEA’s request includes $5.6 million and 14 positions for enhancing DEA’s ability to combat criminal enterprises operating on or through the Internet, with specific focus in the following areas:

- $3.3 million and 2 position for the Analytics Driven Targeting.
- $1 million and 10 positions for the creation of a Digital Evidence Field Coordination group.
- $1.3 million and 2 positions for Cyber Investigative Support.

**Justification**

DEA investigations corroborate the extensive use of advanced technology by online traffickers. DEA needs a cadre of experts who can provide technical support to field elements in the development of cyber solutions for investigations of cyber-enabled Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in furtherance of DEA’s mission. This is a growing requirement that will affect all DEA investigations.

The Dark Web is accessed for legitimate purposes or to conceal criminal or otherwise malicious activities. Drugs are estimated to account for around two-thirds of DarkNet market (DNM) activity, and almost any type of drug is accessible to buyers with basic technical understanding within a few clicks, including new psychoactive substances. One of the most notorious sites formerly located on the Dark Web, *The Silk Road*, was an online global bazaar for illicit services and contraband, mainly drugs. Vendors of these illegal substances were located in more than ten countries around the world, and contraband goods and services were provided to more than 100,000 buyers. The founder and administrator of “Silk Road” earned approximately $214 million U.S. currency (USC) over the lifetime of the online marketplace, according to Bitcoin transaction logs submitted as evidence in his trial.

The prevalence and complexity of digital evidence is significantly increasing. Investigators need to know what can be recovered and how to extract the relevant data. During the past 20 years, there has been an exponential increase in the prevalence of digital technology such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, wearable technology, cloud storage, interconnected household devices, external storage, video game consoles, and other devices that can hold evidence and may be seized during the execution of search warrant. As the amount of digital evidence available increases, the demand for forensic examinations of this evidence will also grow. The
time required to complete digital forensic examinations is dependent on processes, the number of devices and volume of data to be analyzed. There is no way to “work faster” without sufficient personnel who have the training and tools to complete the analyses.

DEA’s case load with a nexus to the internet is growing; however, limited cyber resources stunt investigative growth and force agents to rely on outside agencies for assistance to uncover the full scope of an internet investigation. The development ofDNMs and the drugs that are sold on them pose a significant threat to the health and security of citizens and communities across the U.S. The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance estimates there are between 100-150 fentanyl vendors currently operating on the dark web. To combat this, DEA is requesting additional funding to enhance its cyber related investigative capabilities and digital evidence collection in an effort to stay abreast of change, remain relevant, and provide efficient and effective operational assistance to the field.

Analytics Driven Targeting - $3,259,000 and 2 positions

To enhance DEA’s targeting capabilities and combat cyber threats, the DEA needs cybersecurity tools and subject matter experts (SMEs). The resources requested would have a significant impact on DEA’s operational support focusing on websites, emails and other Internet-related methods of communications.

In an effort to stay abreast of change, remain relevant, and provide efficient and effective operational assistance to the field, DEA is requesting non-personnel funding to support the acquisition of data exploitation tools and commercially available data sets to provide timely, meaningful, and accurate information to the field.

Funding will also support two Intelligence Research Specialists to be assigned to Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) cases. Utilizing information obtained through DEA’s Attorney General’s Exempted Operation (AGEO) program, DEA has the ability to exploit the information on individuals, corporations, and bank accounts, thereby focusing investigations on the most egregious TBML and third-party money launderers. A dedicated team will analyze potentially illicit transactions and follow the money through bank accounts, wire transactions, shell companies, and virtual currency transactions.

Digital Evidence Field Coordination & Training: $1,020,000 and 10 positions

To assist DEA investigators, digital examination and analysis support services are provided by its Digital Evident Lab. The lab provides on-site support, which includes evidence collection, evidence examination/analysis, court testimony services, and training on the proper handling of digital evidence to all DEA offices domestic and foreign, including DEA-sponsored task forces. In nearly every cyber case, there is a seizure of digital evidence and a need to have the evidence analyzed. While the laboratory continues to support these cases, there exists a need to have dedicated positions with advanced skills to address this requirement.

DEA is working on establishing a Digital Evidence Policy Guide for the agency. This document will establish policy and best practices for the handling of digital evidence. Once the policy is established, DEA will require a support structure to advance the program forward to address such items as field requests, tool identifications, software validations, and best practices.
will also need to be a component to train the field. The Digital Evidence Lab receives regular training requests for cell phone and computer forensic training to support the field.

Dedicated staff provided through this request will address the field’s needs with respect to the handling and processing of Digital Evidence. Additionally, positions will be dedicated to digital evidence training of the field. The computer forensic examiners will conduct regular training for field agents at the lab and on-site in the divisions. Ideally, the training staff would conduct 25+ training classes annually. Non-personnel costs include estimated travel for the positions.

**Cyber Investigative Support: $1,297,000 and 2 positions**

DEA’s Cyber Support Section serves as the center of expertise to support DEA’s growing need for technical guidance when conducting investigations in the cyber realm. The section’s key tasks are providing support to investigations, coordinating with other DEA stakeholders, providing training and outreach, developing and managing cyber capabilities, and maintaining strategic assessments of the latest cyber threats posed by TCOs.

Currently, law enforcement faces many challenges when it comes to DNMs. Many marketplaces and vendors utilize various techniques to keep their transactions secure, to include: requiring encryption messaging on the platforms, providing more payment options (e.g., accepting multiple virtual currencies), and providing a more secure platform to protect users during another law enforcement takedown.

Non-personnel funding would support the modernization of investigative capabilities, starting with the development of a “Virtual Range”, which would serve as a controlled testing environment for cyber tools before they’re implemented. DEA also requests funding to develop web scrapers (tools utilized to extract data from websites) and Artificial Intelligence powered “bots” (autonomous programs that can interact with computer systems) to glean more information on potential targets. In addition, DEA proposes to create and manage web storefronts that are properly backstopped to protect undercover operations. Finally, funding would develop the capability to ping sever locations when targeting online vendors and administrators, which is needed to facilitate arrests and the seizure of evidence.

DEA is requesting one position for special agent in-service cyber investigation and leadership curriculum development. The DEA Office of Training requires a position funding for agency-wide in-service Cyber Security training in support of cyber-related drug investigations. The growth of illicit drug sales through anonymous, online marketplaces is expanding globally. Traffickers are taking advantage of advanced technology, including encryption and virtual currencies, to sell illicit drugs in online forums that offer better security, higher quality products, and greater anonymity than traditional street-level retail markets. To address this threat, the DEA is developing a comprehensive approach to cyber investigations that will develop policies and operating procedures, enhance digital data collection and exploitation, and leverage federal and private information sharing. To be successful in this effort, DEA must develop, deliver, and maintain current cyber investigative training to its Special Agent workforce at both the journeymen and senior leadership levels.

DEA’s Investigative Technology Review Board (ITRB) is charged with steering DEA’s investigative technology strategy via the prioritization of investments. To better maximize ITRB’s effectiveness, DEA requires additional resources to facilitate the exchange of ideas.
between the field personnel using investigative technologies and the ITRB to strengthen DEA’s strategic and financial planning. To better meet this need, DEA is requesting one new position to serve as a full-time project manager to work directly with the ITRB and the field. This position will be highly skilled from both technical and project management perspectives. This expert will enable better alignment between DEA and new cyber related requirements that are associated with the newly created support section.

**Impact on Performance**

This proposal is in direct response to a January 2018 directive from the Deputy Attorney General to develop policies and procedures to safely and effectively conduct undercover operations against internet/darknet vendors, including operations involving the purchase of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl.

Similar to most forms of business, an ever-increasing portion of drug sales (licit and illicit) occur online. While DEA has tools to monitor these activities, additional cyber capabilities are critical to ensure that we can continue to effectively investigate these constantly-evolving operations. DEA needs a cadre of experts who can provide technical support to field elements in the development of cyber solutions for investigations of cyber-related Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in furtherance of DEA’s missions. The resources requested in this proposal would focus on the collection and analysis of evidence in support of Cyber/ Dark Web cases, to include encrypted Dark Web markets. Additionally, dedicated collection resources would allow for the retention of future investigative leads.

Additionally, no centralized, standard training program exists for newly hired Digital Forensic Examiners (DFEs). Development and delivery of a standardized Basic Digital Forensic Evidence Course would improve the quality and consistency of the newly hired DFEs and standardize routine operations across the system. Successful execution of this training program will allow DEA to hire and rapidly train DFEs in analytical policies and procedures, legal considerations, and basic evidence handling and analysis. Graduates will be prepared to conduct the following: on-site evidence acquisition support, Early Cases Assessment analysis, supplemental analysis, full analysis, mobile device analysis, basic diversion database acquisition and analysis, and basic digital evidence forensic techniques.
## Funding

### Base Funding

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<th>FTE</th>
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<th>FY 2023 Net Annualization (change from 2022) ($000)</th>
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**Affected Crosscuts**
- Drugs
- Cyber
- Opioids
**Item Name:** Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations

**Strategic Goal:** 3  
**Strategic Objective:** 3.2  
**Budget Decision Unit(s):** International and Domestic Enforcement

**Organizational Program:** Sensitive Investigative Unit Program, Judicial Wire Intercept Program, Aviation Division, Foreign Regions, Special Operations Division

**Program Increase:** Positions 13 Agt/Atty 11 FTE 7 Dollars $22,284,000

**Description of Item**

DEA’s request for $22,284,000 and 13 positions (including 11 special agents) will enhance vital agency programs and offices focused on targeting, disrupting, and dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) known for supplying illicit substances to distributors and users in the United States. Drug trafficking also has a connection to violent criminal and terrorist organizations, presenting a serious risk to public safety and U.S. national security. DEA has identified FY 2021 investments that will enhance DEA’s ability to target the highest priority TCOs. The requested resources will support the following:

- $7.8 million for the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program.
- $5 million for establishing and enhancing new Judicial Wire Intercept Programs (JWIP).
- $5.5 million for additional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
- $1.5 million for three special agent positions to enhance foreign offices in Mexico and Central America.
- $2.5 million for 10 positions (eight special agents) to expand the Special Operations Division’s Bilateral Investigations Units (BIU).

**Justification**

Today’s most significant drug trafficking organizations are violent TCOs that traffic drugs throughout the United States using established transportation routes and distribution networks. Mexican TCOs continue to dominate the trafficking of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, to a lesser extent, fentanyl, throughout the U.S. Also, Central America is home to some of the most prolific and dangerous TCOs and gangs. Of particular interest is the expanding influence of established Mexican drug cartels throughout Central America. Distribution cells operating in the U.S. have forged partnerships with Mexican TCOs, increasing the threat to the safety and security of American communities. Additionally, TCOs from South America and the Caribbean contribute to the domestic retail availability of heroin. For example, Venezuela is a major drug transshipment country for cocaine and heroin departing Colombia for the Caribbean, Central America, United States, Europe, and West Africa. Overall, distribution cells and the
Mexican and South American traffickers who supply them are the primary sources of most drugs to include heroin in the U.S.

TCOs are a serious criminal justice problem. They must be aggressively dismantled through arrests, prosecutions, and asset seizures, in the U.S. or overseas. DEA makes substantial contributions to this process within its legal authority and is requesting $22,284,000 to support foreign offices and programs as well as other domestic-based programs with a global reach.

**Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program - $7,779,000**

DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) program began in 1996 with a $20 million budget and the following participating countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. During the past 24 years, the program has successfully vetted, trained, and mentored foreign law enforcement units capable of conducting investigations, developing networks of confidential sources, and gathering intelligence leads. Today, DEA manages 15 SIUs with a combined authorized staffing capacity of over 1,200 host nation law enforcement officials. These SIUs are currently located in the following countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand.

Request includes $7,779,000 in non-personnel funding to fill unit vacancies and increase the staffing capacities of SIUs that DEA does not have the available funding to accomplish. This additional funding will be used to provide salary supplements for participating host nation counterparts, training, vetting requirements, and other operational expenses, such as the purchase of evidence and payments to sources of information for the expanded SIU groups. DEA does not plan to use these funds for substantive equipment purchases or the acquisition of vehicles. Additional resources for the SIU program will address specific operational gaps in the program’s ability to disrupt and dismantle TCOs worldwide.

In Colombia, cocaine production is at an all-time high; however, the SIU is currently 79 percent staffed and requires additional resources to fill member vacancies for handling an expansive investigative area of responsibility. Similarly in Peru, the SIU is also currently operating at 78 percent of their staffing capacity and experiencing difficulties responding to time-sensitive intelligence in various regions of the country. Fully staffed units in Colombia and Peru will increase counter narcotics operations, seizures, intelligence leads, and a wider network of confidential sources.

Request also supports increasing the authorized staffing capacities of SIUs in key strategic regions such as Central and South America. As planned, newly hired SIU members will supplement SIU enforcement groups and conduct operations throughout their countries targeting TCOs. Overall, the success of the SIU program to include fully staffing all SIUs, increases the likelihood that TCO members and affiliates are arrested and their drugs confiscated overseas prior to entering the United States.
Establishing and Enhancing Judicial Wire Intercept Programs (JWIPs) - $5,000,000

JWIP collection systems operate continuously 7 days a week, 24 hours a day and each system has an average life expectancy of approximately four years prior to a system refresh. Investigations that have included JWIP as a key element are responsible for nearly 90 percent of all foreign targets arrested. Also, unlike in the United States where the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires communications providers to deliver lawfully intercepted data in readable format (i.e. mediation), many foreign governments do not have similar laws; therefore, the DEA must incorporate mediation into its JWIP technology. DEA considers judicial wire intercept technology to be an effective tool for intercepting communications and is requesting $5,000,000 to establish a new JWIP in Central America and enhance an existing JWIP in the Caribbean.

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration- $5,549,000

ISR-equipped aircraft are an effective tool in foreign environments, providing the investigative capabilities of video surveillance and tracking of targeted individuals. The use of ISR technology has expanded to include ultra and very-high frequency communications and cellular intercepts. One King Air 350 is equipped with ISR and Over-the-Air (OTA) technologies and has been successfully used in locating and apprehending suspects in Paraguay, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. However, DEA currently cannot meet the current demand for ISR support in Central and South America. Additionally, as DEA expands its operations in Africa there is demand for similar assistance there, particularly in Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa. This additional aircraft will allow DEA to meet those needs as well.

DEA is requesting $5,549,000 in non-personnel funding to integrate Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) technology into an existing King Air 350 in its Aviation Division’s fleet. DEA has one ISR aircraft but has been unable to meet the demand for ISR support due to an increase in ISR requests received from offices in Central and South America. To date, the Aviation Division has turned down multiple missions and continually shortens and adjust other missions as only one aircraft is capable of conducting ISR missions. Funding will support equipment purchases, installation, and any necessary modification of the aircraft.
New Foreign Positions - $1,500,000 and 3 positions (three special agents)

DEA does not have the legal authority to unilaterally investigate and arrest drug traffickers operating overseas and operates in close cooperation with host nation governments to achieve to DEA’s international enforcement mission. DEA personnel assigned to foreign offices collaborate with host nation counterparts, conduct bilateral investigations, and share valuable intelligence. Additionally, DEA personnel meet with their foreign counterparts to assist in the development of new policies, legislation, treaties, and agreements designed to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, and the diversion of precursor chemicals. As of December 2019, DEA’s global footprint is divided into eight foreign regions with 90 offices in 67 countries5. Additionally, DEA has a personnel presence in Stuggart, Germany; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and, Manama, Bahrain.

DEA is requesting $1,500,000 in personnel funding for three special agents to enhance foreign offices located in Mexico and Central America. In these regions, an increase in agent personnel will enhance operational coordination with DEA’s foreign law enforcement counterparts through bilateral investigations, seizures of clandestine methamphetamine and heroin laboratories as well as developing new confidential sources in the region. As mentioned previously, Mexican TCOs continue to dominate the trafficking of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and some fentanyl throughout the United States. Central America is home to many dangerous TCOs and gangs. Of particular interest is the expanding influence of established Mexican drug cartels throughout Central America. Distribution cells operating in the United States have developed partnerships with Mexican TCOs, increasing the threat to the safety of American citizens and communities. Therefore, additional positions and associated funding is needed to initiate diplomatic and investigative measures to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States and world markets. If only a limited quantity of these drugs reach the United States, the proceeds sustain drug trafficking and terrorist organizations, while fueling the next round of drug production.

SOD Bilateral Investigations Units (BIU) - $2,456,000 and 10 positions (eight special agents)

Established in 1994, the SOD is a DEA-led, multi-agency operational coordination center with participation from 31 law enforcement agencies, including foreign participation from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Emphasis is placed on major drug trafficking and terrorist

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5 DEA’s eight foreign regions are the following: Mexico/Central America, Andean, Southern Cone, Caribbean, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Far East.
organizations financed by drug profits, which operate across jurisdictional boundaries on a regional, national, and international level. The mission of the SOD is to establish law enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling major TCOs by attacking their command and control networks. Special emphasis is placed on network targeting development, coordination, and ensuring that strategic intelligence is shared between law enforcement agencies.

DEA is requesting $2,456,000 in personnel funding, eight special agents, and two intelligence research specialists for expanding the SOD’s three BIUs. Each unit is comprised of agents and support personnel who deploy to foreign locations and conduct sensitive criminal investigations in coordination with DEA foreign offices and counterparts. As proposed, six agents and two intelligence analysts would be added to the Western Hemisphere BIUs. Two agents would be added to the Europe, Asia, Africa, and Middle East BIU. The additional positions will principally support ongoing investigations targeting Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based foreign terrorist group. During the past decade, Hezbollah has played a key role in the global drug trade including the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars. Operatives of Hezbollah act as middlemen in the global drug route from South America to West Africa, assisting with the movement of hundreds of tons of cocaine.

**Impact on Performance**

This resource request principally supports DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: _Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation_ and the Attorney General’s new FY 2020-FY 2021 targeted priority areas: _Combating the Opioid Crisis_ and _Reducing Violent Crime and Promoting Public Safety_. DEA will also continue to pursue internal agency strategies, goals, and objectives. Key DEA International Enforcement performance measures will be used to track the progress of this resource increase; however, performance targets have not been adjusted at this time.

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6 On February 9, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13776 – Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking. Within this EO, the President called for the SOD, among other centers, to be maximized in the coordination of efforts towards combating TCOs.
## Funding

### Base Funding

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## Affected Crosscuts

Drugs, International Activities, Transnational Crime
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Description of Item

DEA’s request provides $2,788,000 for additional DEA special agent training and recruitment resources. Funding will support the expansion of DEA’s Basic Agent Trainee (BAT) program as DEA has identified the need for additional classes beyond the current plan for FY 2021. The request also includes resources for all-inclusive recruitment marketing efforts to attract qualified candidates for DEA core series positions.

Justification

DEA is currently experiencing a higher level of special agent attrition than the agency has experienced in prior years. A large percentage of DEA’s special agent workforce is reaching mandatory retirement age while the agency continues to experience a limited amount of non-retirement related natural attrition. While DEA has made progress in onboarding higher levels of new special agents, the agency faces challenges due to the current pace of retirements. As a result, DEA seeks to fill every scheduled basic agent trainee class to maximum capacity.

Request includes $1,000,000 to support the expansion of DEA’s BAT program throughput in FY 2021 by adding one basic agent training class. The requested funding would also support some expenses for relocating other agent training courses to offsite locations to allow for more space for the BAT program. Additional funding would be used for the transportation of students and offsite lodging/meals as well as facility rentals.

DEA is also requesting $1,788,000 for recruitment advertising through various outlets such as printed brochures, promotional videos, career websites, broadcast, and social media for marketing DEA career opportunities. The agency’s mission requires a professional and motivated workforce with diverse skill sets. As such, DEA’s Human Resources Division will require additional resources for advertising to ensure a consistent message is shared with potential employees resulting in the recruitment and retention of highly qualified candidates.

Impact on Performance

As DEA is the United States’ primary federal drug law enforcement agency, any efforts that advances DEA’s ability to recruit, hire, and train qualified special agents and support personnel will also reinforce all efforts dedicated to reducing or eliminating the trafficking of illicit drugs throughout the United States including the proliferation of opioids. The requested resources will advance the strategic goal of reducing violent crime and promoting public safety, specifically DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation. Further, these increases support the Attorney
General’s new FY 2020-FY 2021 targeted priority areas: Combating the Opioid Crisis and Reducing Violent Crime and Promoting Public Safety.
**Funding**

**Base Funding**

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**Affected Crosscuts**

Drugs, Transnational Crime
**Description of Item**

In support of the Diversion Control Program (DCP) this request provides an increase of $15,404,000 and 92 positions (including 15 agents and 62 diversion investigators) to better identify, target, disrupt, and dismantle the individuals and organizations responsible for the illicit manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

**Justification**

**Increase Personnel Resources - $15,404,000 and 92 Positions (including 15 special agents and 62 diversion investigators)**

DEA is requesting $15,404,000 for 15 special agents to support new and existing Tactical Diversion Squads (TDSs); 4 attorneys for regulatory and litigation; 5 intelligence specialists for field support and document exploitation; 62 diversion investigators; 1 chemist for special testing and case exhibit analysis; and 5 investigative technology specialist/ professional administrative/technical clerical positions.

The DCP’s regulatory activities require diversion investigators to conduct education and outreach to ensure understanding and compliance with the CSA and applicable policies and regulations. This proactive approach is designed to identify and prevent large-scale diversion. Registrant compliance is determined primarily through the conduct of pre-registration, scheduled, and complaint investigations.

The DCP conducts criminal enforcement activities primarily through its Tactical Diversion Squads (TDSs). TDSs are comprised of agents, diversion investigators, and state and local counterparts such as state law enforcement and regulatory personnel. These groups combine varied resources and expertise in order to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle those individuals or organizations involved in diversion schemes. As of August 22, 2019, DEA has 86 TDSs and two Mobile Diversion Teams (MDTs).

The DCP must increase support to critical diversion operations; strengthen its enforcement capabilities and regulatory controls; and enhance its outreach program to educate registrants, industry, and communities. Increased personnel resources are required to address emerging diversion threats and to regulate and be responsive to a growing registrant population, currently over 1.8 million.
DEA’s DCP will be able to achieve this magnitude of hiring through quarterly vacancy announcements to create a viable candidate hiring pool and through streamlining the hiring practice through the granting of interim clearances. The requested positions are consistent with what is being planned as part of the developing new proposed fee rule.

**Impact on Performance**

Requested enhancements will support DEA’s expansion of regulatory and enforcement activities to effectively address the most significant threats to protect public health and safety. These program increases will also support DEA’s responsiveness and accountability to a growing registrant population while conducting relevant outreach and education events all with a skilled DEA workforce.
### Funding

**Base Funding**

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<th>Number of Positions Requested</th>
<th>FY 2021 Request ($000)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Invest. Series (1811)</td>
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<td>$253,975</td>
<td>$191,120</td>
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**Affected Crosscuts**

Drugs
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DEA Appendix A: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program Request

**FY 2021 BUDGET REQUEST**

The FY 2021 request for the HIDTA program is $254,000,000 which includes $251,300,000 for grants to state, local, and tribal agencies, and transfers to Federal agencies participating in the 29 HIDTAs and up to $2,700,000 to be used for auditing services and associated activities. 7

The HIDTA program plays a key role in helping keep communities safe and supports a policy designed to increase the impact of government dollars by leveraging place-conscious planning and place-based programming. It is a regionally and locally managed program tied to a national mission. It principally supports drug supply reduction by bringing together and providing assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the United States.

The attached request for each HIDTA includes:

- (A) **Threat Assessment**: justification for the proposed funding level; how a funding level was determined based on a current assessment of the drug trafficking threat in each HIDTA;
- (B) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**: how proposed funding levels will ensure that the goals and objectives of each such area will be achieved; and
- (C) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

Once a funding distribution has been approved, each HIDTA will present strategic initiatives to the DEA for addressing threats identified in their region.

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7 With the recent inclusion of the Alaska HIDTA in fiscal year 2018, the HIDTA program now includes 29 regional HIDTAs.
Alaska HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Alaska HIDTA (AK HIDTA) identifies heroin and methamphetamine as the top two drug threats in Alaska. This assessment is based on Federal, state, and local law enforcement drug seizure reporting. Alaska HIDTA assesses the drug threat in Alaska to be, primarily, methamphetamine smuggled from the Continental United States (CONUS). Law enforcement reports indicate that Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) import and distribute methamphetamine in larger quantities than any other illicit drug, with the majority of methamphetamine originating in Mexico. A secondary threat is heroin/opioids also smuggle from the CONUS. Tertiary threats include cocaine and prescription drugs.

The rise in demand for heroin as a drug of choice is likely due to its increasing availability and affordability in Alaska. Heroin is associated both directly and indirectly with increased violence and criminal activities, such as drug possession and sales, robbery, and prostitution.

Alaska serves as an importation state, with most drugs entering by mail, body couriers, or the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS). DTOs have employed drug mules from outside of Alaska to smuggle illegal substances into the state. There is no law enforcement presence on the AMHS, and vehicles and passengers are not routinely inspected before boarding the ferry, allowing drug traffickers and smugglers to exploit the region virtually undetected. Distribution of drugs from the regional hubs to the outlying villages is achieved primarily by an air carrier.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

AK HIDTA consists of enforcement, support, prosecution, and intelligence initiatives. The enforcement initiatives include the Southeast Alaska Cities Against Drugs Task Force, Fairbanks Area-wide Narcotics Task Force, and Southcentral Area-wide Narcotics Task Force, all comprised of Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.

The enforcement initiatives target significant DTOs through intelligence-led investigations with a focus on distribution, interdiction, financial activity, and drug-related violence within Alaska. The Investigative Support Center (ISC) provides support for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) in their efforts to identify, disrupt, and/or dismantle DTOs by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on the targets of investigations.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

AK HIDTA supports the Strategy by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or Money Laundering Organizations (MLOs), thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. This is accomplished through coordinated investigative efforts among federal, state, and local LEA. Additionally, all investigative efforts are supported with active intelligence gathering and
information sharing strategies to ensure that the most efficient and effective means are used to accomplish the mission.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine availability, specifically Mexican-produced crystal methamphetamine, is increasing throughout Alaska. Law enforcement reports indicate that DTOs import and distribute methamphetamine in larger quantities than any other illicit drug. There is very limited, if any, local production of methamphetamine. The primary means of importation is via parcels such as the United States Postal Service (USPS) and FedEx.
Appalachia HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The Appalachia HIDTA (AHIDTA) region faces substantial threats from the trafficking and abuse of heroin, prescription drugs, methamphetamine (“ice”), cocaine, and synthetic drugs like lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and drug-related violence. Over the past three years, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and fentanyl-analogs have become increasingly popular and are a highly credible threat to the region. AHIDTA is also a significant source of domestically-produced marijuana and is often an import destination for foreign-produced marijuana. In addition, high unemployment rates and low median household incomes directly affect socioeconomic conditions that significantly influence the drug-related activity in the region.

The majority of the AHIDTA region is located within a reasonable driving distance to metropolitan areas within the Midwest, eastern, and southeastern parts of the United States. Heroin, cocaine, pharmaceutical drugs, marijuana, and methamphetamine are commonly transported from areas such as Detroit, Michigan; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; neighboring parts of Indiana, North Carolina, Missouri, and Maryland. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for imported illicit drugs to have a point of origin within Mexico, destined for the AHIDTA region.

Nine major interstate systems span the AHIDTA region, allowing for ease of access by roadway into, throughout, and out of major cities known to be significant drug distribution points in the United States. Subsequently, transportation to and from the AHIDTA area is conducted primarily by a private and commercial vehicle, and parcel services companies and the USPS.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

AHIDTA measures success, in part, by its ability to facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among participating agencies at all levels. AHIDTA is instrumental in fostering cooperation and collaboration among federal, state, and local LEA. AHIDTA provides the support, resources, and coordination necessary to facilitate cooperation among its collaborative initiatives. In all, AHIDTA has fostered cooperative and productive working relationships among nearly 150 federal, state, and local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs while reducing the demand for drugs.

The AHIDTA Executive Board comprises 24 executives from federal, state, and local LEAs, The National Guard Counterdrug Program, and Federal and state prosecutors. The Executive Board develops and manages the AHIDTA strategy. The Board provides program oversight to 44 initiatives to include Enforcement, Overdose Response Strategy (ORS), Intelligence, Management and Coordination, Training, and Prevention and directs resources throughout the AHIDTA region to ensure outcomes are achieved based on the current and emerging drug threat. The Executive Board subcommittees provide policy guidance through
compartmentalized topics and information while serving as a forum for regional planning and coordination for all AHIDTA participating agencies.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy
AHIDTA supports the Strategy in several ways. Its task forces disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs that distribute heroin/Fentanyl, diverted prescription drugs, marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The task forces also reduce large-scale marijuana production and shipments of large amounts of marijuana to other areas of the country.

(1) Methamphetamine
AHIDTA continues to encounter an increasing methamphetamine threat. In the recent past, the threat primarily consisted of small, unsophisticated, one-step method laboratories; however, with the dramatic influx of high-quality methamphetamine (“ice”), this threat has nearly vanished. AHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking; however, task force initiatives will continue to investigate and prosecute DTOs, which traffic in the illicit drug.
Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The Atlanta-Carolina HIDTA (AC HIDTA) region is a major distribution center for DTOs, particularly Mexican DTOs (MDTOs) and their associated MLOs that supply the eastern United States. DTOs distribute illicit drugs from the AC HIDTA area of responsibility (AOR) to other major metropolitan areas, including Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio; Columbia, South Carolina; Gainesville, Orlando, and Pensacola, Florida; Indianapolis, Indiana; Knoxville, Tennessee; Louisville, Kentucky; and Norfolk, Virginia. The supply lines reach as far as Detroit, Michigan, and New York, New York. Utilizing a robust highway system, DTOs/MLOs transport/ship drugs from the Southwest Border (SWB) to transshipment/staging areas in or near the Atlanta metropolis for ultimate distribution east and northeast. Interstate 85 is the major artery for this distribution.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Utilizing strategic, tactical, and predictive intelligence, AC HIDTA has implemented a three-part geographical, functional, and operational focus on Command and Control elements of DTOs and MLOs operating within the AC HIDTA AOR. Established commingled federal, state, local, and tribal task force initiatives ensures collaborative cooperation and partnership with more than 150 participating agencies. Utilizing a robust training model, the AC HIDTA provided training to more than 525 LEA Georgia and the Carolinas.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish AC HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board dedicates investigative resources supporting initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and their related drug proceeds;
- increasing/enhancing communication, intelligence sharing and coordination among initiatives and all regional LEAs; and
- facilitate coordination between agency representatives from law enforcement, prevention, and treatment to meet and discuss ways to reduce the impact of drug abuse and provide expert advice regarding policy and legislative decisions through the AC HIDTA Prevention Initiative.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine continues to dominate the illicit drug market throughout the AC HIDTA AOR. The MDTOs manufacture, distribute, and transport methamphetamine throughout the AOR. This is substantiated by the tactical and strategic intelligence indicating that the MDTO’s
production of methamphetamine is hugely abundant, resulting in retail quantities of methamphetamine decreasing in price over the past year. Furthermore, investigations have determined that methamphetamine in solution is transported to the southeast and converted to methamphetamine hydrochloride (HCL) or crystalline methamphetamine “ice” form in local “conversation” laboratories. AC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Central Florida HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Heroin, fentanyl, and its analogs, cocaine, and methamphetamine continue to be the top drug threats in the Central Florida HIDTA (CFHIDTA) area. In 2018, CFHIDTA seized 39.85 kg of heroin (increase of 14.5 percent), 8.09 kg of fentanyl/analogs (increase of 103.3 percent), 692.3 kg of cocaine/crack (increase of 193.5 percent), and 125.02 kg of methamphetamine “ice” (decrease of 13.38 percent).

The number of overdose deaths within in the AOR for the top drug threats has increased as forecasted in the previous CFHIDTA Threat Assessment. Complete data for 2019 is not yet available. However, the most current data from the Florida Medical Examiner’s 2017 Annual Report shows that drug-caused overdose deaths in the Central Florida AOR increased for heroin by 18 percent; fentanyl caused deaths increased by 71 percent and a combination of fentanyl and its analogs killed 799 people, representing an increase of 94 percent. Of concern is the growing trend of fentanyl analogs, such as carfentanil and fluoro furanyl fentanyl. Specifically, Pinellas County recovered fluoro furanyl fentanyl for the first time, either by itself, mixed with heroin or mixed with cocaine. These incidents began in November 2018 and continue to occur. According to the Pinellas County HIDTA Task Force estimates that over a 5 month period there are as many as 50 overdose deaths that are attributed to these analogs.

Overdose Map (ODMAP) has led to more efficient and effective use of agency resources in responding to and investigating overdose incidents. Law enforcement and first responders widely use naloxone. Last year’s efforts to standardize reporting and data collection protocols for health officials and law enforcement to better capture relevant data on the use and effectiveness of naloxone have proven successful. Performance measures for response efforts are under development. Over the next year, CFHIDTA expects the footprint of ODMAP to expand significantly by certifying six agencies that operate in AOR to become Level 1 ODMAP users. This certification process is well underway.

The number of overdose deaths from controlled prescription drug use has dropped slightly in the CFHIDTA AOR, showing a 3 percent drop in 2017 from 2016. However, seizures increased 173 percent in 2018 from the prior year, showing availability is still a concern. Although legislation and law enforcement has focused on doctor shopping, illegal diversion, and prescription fraud, there is always an abundant supply of these drugs to meet user demand. Benzodiazepines are the leading prescription cause of overdose deaths in Florida in 2017.

New psychoactive substances (NPS), synthetic cannabinoids, and synthetic cathinone drugs also continue to be trafficked and abused. Significant seizures by the Hillsborough County HIDTA Task Force from a synthetic marijuana or “Spice” production lab in our AOR led to an increase in overall seizures of in that category by 421.5 percent. Adulteration of “Spice” and other synthetics with fentanyl or analogs are a growing concern as well.
Lastly, after the 2017 legalization of medical marijuana in Florida resulted in retail distribution centers throughout the AOR, the legalization of low-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (10%) smokeable medical marijuana in March 2019 is anticipated to lead to a growing market for Florida-sourced low-THC marijuana. Yet, until high potency marijuana becomes legalized in Florida, we believe the impact will be minimal on the demand for high-THC marijuana from California and other states. Until then, the potential for abusing current law remains a possibility due to the difficulty in detecting THC potency by law enforcement.

The relocation of thousands of residents from Puerto Rico after two devastating hurricanes in 2017 led to the DTOs operating in Puerto Rico to also transition to Central Florida. The DTOs dominance has steadily preserved itself in the mid-level to street distribution market for heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl in Orlando and parts of the Tampa Bay area. The Caribbean transshipment corridor remains a primary transportation route for cocaine trafficked by Puerto Rican DTOs (PRDTOS), particularly mail parcels.

In addition to PRDTOS, MDTOs continued to dominate the heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine markets coming in from the SWB by ground transportation. With methamphetamine/“ice”, Mexico continued to be the primary source area, and its low cost and high availability continued to displace local clandestine labs, as reflected in only 22 clandestine lab seizures in 2018. Atlanta and surrounding areas of Georgia also continued to be prevalent as a source area hub for Mexican-derived methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl and primarily transported via ground transportation throughout the AOR. The DTOs routinely partner with other regional or local DTOs in the transportation and distribution of narcotics, and we expect the influence of these DTOs to continue relative to the demand.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

CFHIDTA fosters cooperation and effective working relationships among all of the federal, state, and local agencies participating in the 13 law enforcement initiatives to achieve the overall mission. The agency-neutral approach permits inter-agency cooperation within the ISC for local and national assistance and threat-specific efforts. The sharing of information at quarterly intelligence meetings warrant collaboration and productive relationships that encourage the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable information. By providing training and the necessary resources to address DTOs and MLOs, LEA’s are better equipped to carry out the purpose and goals of CFHIDTA. Furthermore, a prevention initiative engages and assists community stakeholders in understanding the current drug threats and in developing strategies to reduce overdose deaths.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

CFHIDTA supports Strategy goals through Executive Board developed strategies to address and prioritize the drug threats in our region. The CFHIDTA management and coordination team coordinate and collaborates with public health and education to foster relationships with law enforcement. These efforts and developed strategies support the goal of reducing drug availability and crime by effectively dismantling and disrupting DTOs and MLOs impacting Central Florida and other areas of the United States.
(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, Mexico continued to be the primary source area of methamphetamine/“ice”. Low cost and high availability continued to displace local clandestine labs, as reflected in only 22 lab seizures in 2018. MDTOs continued to dominate methamphetamine distribution markets and routinely partner with other regional or local DTOs in transportation and distribution. Atlanta and surrounding areas of Georgia also continued to be prevalent as a source area hub for Mexican-derived methamphetamine and is primarily transported to Central Florida via ground transportation.
(A) Threat Assessment

The most serious drug threats for Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) are methamphetamine and marijuana, followed by heroin and opioid prescription drugs, cocaine, synthetics, and other drugs. Nationally, the 12-county region is a leading source of methamphetamine. The area was once known for an abundance of precursor-based methamphetamine labs. These labs are now all but nonexistent thanks to effective regulation of precursor chemicals and diligent enforcement. In 2018, initiatives dismantled two low-yield (less than 8 ounces) precursor-based methamphetamine labs. Methamphetamine encountered in the region is now smuggled into the United States from Mexico, either as a finished product or in liquid form that is converted into crystal methamphetamine or methamphetamine “ice” at clandestine labs. Through the third quarter of 2019, initiatives seized five such labs, including three capable of producing over 10 pounds of ice per month. During the same period, task forces seized more than 1,415 pounds of methamphetamine.

The region is infamous for high-grade marijuana, cultivated both indoors and outdoors. Industrial-scale outdoor marijuana cultivation takes place on public and tribal lands administered by the United States Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and several Native American tribes. Large-scale grows also occur on private property. Law enforcement agencies across the United States reported the seizure of 2,820,170 illegal marijuana plants under cultivation in 2018. Initiatives supported by the CVC HIDTA accounted for more than 1.3 million or more than 46% of the national total.

Noncitizens, many of whom are armed, frequently tend large marijuana cultivation sites. These plots can pose a serious danger to people using public lands for recreation, as well as those employed in forest-based occupations. Assaults and homicides occur in the grow sites, usually a consequence of crop theft. The environmental damage caused by marijuana cultivation is profound. Pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers used by the growers threaten water quality and wildlife, and clear-cutting and water diversion erode and disrupt the water table. In addition, growers abandon hundreds of miles of irrigation lines and tons of equipment and trash at grow sites.

A persistent threat in the CVC HIDTA AOR is the occurrence of THC extraction labs, most of which use volatile butane as a solvent to extract THC from marijuana plant material. These labs use the volatile solvent to produce a concentrated, highly potent cannabis product known as wax, shatter, budder, honey oil, or butane hash oil (BHO). The labs are usually not discovered until after they explode, often causing extensive property damage, horrific injuries, and even death. BHO lab accident victims account for more than 5% of patients admitted to the Central Valley’s two regional burn centers. In fact, the centers track BHO burn victim information as a discrete data category. From 2013 to 2018, the two regional burn centers treated 163 BHO burn victims at an average cost of $435,000 per patient. During the first three quarters of 2019, task forces encountered 24 THC extraction labs. The total number for 2018 was 47. Seizures of finished BHO have increased dramatically: form
2014-2017, CVC HIDTA initiatives seized a total of approximately 250 pounds of BHO. In 2018, the task forces seized nearly 3,180 pounds.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

CVC HIDTA applies a multiagency task force model to leverage diverse authorities, expertise, and resources to address DTOs. Approximately 158 federal, state, county, and municipal law enforcement members representing 48 agencies participate in CVC HIDTA initiatives. The task forces align according to region or drug type. However, there is flexibility in order to address the poly-drug nature of the DTOs in the area. A network of criminal intelligence analysts support task force efforts and some are embedded within initiatives and others working at the ISC.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish CVC HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board will allocate resources to initiatives with a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from the sale of drugs (CVC HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 62 DTOs and MLOs in 2018);
- improving investigative effectiveness by providing quality case support and predictive, actionable intelligence through the ISC and its subsystems; and
- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations through continued collaboration with the other California HIDTAs on a state-wide prevention initiative.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, CVC HIDTA’s initiatives dismantled two low-yield precursor-based methamphetamine labs. Methamphetamine encountered in the region is now smuggled into the United States from Mexico, either as finished product or in liquid form that is subsequently converted to ice at clandestine conversion labs. Through the third quarter of 2019, initiatives seized five such labs, including three capable of producing over 10 pounds of ice per month. During the same period, task forces seized more than 1,415 pounds of methamphetamine. CVC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Chicago HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Chicago’s geographic location, unique demographics, and MDTO presence, combined with its role as a principal national transportation hub and financial mecca, has resulted in Illinois being characterized as a non-traditional border state, particularly as it relates to illicit drug trafficking. The majority of illicit drugs reaching the United States are coming across the SWB, and a large portion is destined for the Chicago hub. Some drugs will be marketed locally, and the remainder will be transshipped elsewhere throughout the country. Within Chicago’s culturally diverse community, MDTOs have been able to establish and maintain local source-country connections, create a support system to mask illicit activity, and operate with relative anonymity. Illicit proceeds collected from drug sales are often staged in and around Chicago for bulk shipment or other distribution schemes back to the DTOs.

The distribution and use of heroin, fentanyl, and other fentanyl-laced drugs and associated overdose deaths are a significant threat in the region. Escalated demand for pharmaceuticals, synthetic cannabinoids, increased marijuana availability, and gang/drug-related violence are also areas of primary concern.

A continuing and expanding threat is the increased trafficking of illicit drugs and firearms on various social platforms and the dark web, often through cryptocurrencies.

Organized criminal street gangs are the principal retail distributors of illicit drugs in the Chicago HIDTA AOR. These gangs regularly engage in violent criminal activities to protect their drug supplies, distribution territories, and illegal drug proceeds. These criminal organizations are continuing their incursion into outlying areas and are becoming increasingly problematic for local law enforcement.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Chicago HIDTA reacts quickly to emerging narcotics threats by developing innovative multi-agency initiatives focused and adequately equipped to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the drug trafficking pipeline, from the local and regional to the international DTO level. Chicago HIDTA’s multi-jurisdictional task force initiatives are comprised of 69 local, state, and federal LEAs and capitalize on each agency’s specific expertise. The task force initiatives form a multi-pronged attack against Chicagoland’s diverse drug trafficking avenues to include internet, postal, highway, street corner, retail, wholesale, as well as regional and national drug trafficking and money laundering operations.

Chicago HIDTA’s multi-agency ISC provides actionable, detailed, and timely tactical and strategic intelligence and support to all Chicago HIDTA initiatives and LEAs in the AOR. All aspects of the Chicago HIDTA encourage neutral interagency collaboration through training, meetings, and co-locating of task forces. Chicago HIDTA conducts and sponsors joint training for task force initiative personnel, as well as non-task force narcotics
investigators across the region, and state, to foster a wider net of information sharing and collaboration.

The Chicago HIDTA’s strategy targets the complete cycle of the drug abuse epidemic by also addressing demand reduction through an innovative and heralded substance abuse prevention curriculum for students, developing and collaborating on a diversion program for eligible people with substance use disorders, and participating in the ORS.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy
To accomplish Chicago HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board allocates and focuses HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the related illicit proceeds;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives as well as all LEAs in Illinois and other regions that are impacted by the illegal drug trade emanating from the Chicago HIDTA AOR;
- addressing emerging drug distribution methods, such as via the internet and mail;
- originating local infrastructure innovations, such as LPRs and cameras on known DTO trafficking routes;
- providing in-depth case support to investigations from the local street corners to the cartel; and
- seeking ways to enhance its relationship with community organizations, educational institutions, and other organizations engaged in drug education, prevention, and treatment activities.

(1) Methamphetamine

With the high availability and low cost of other narcotics in Chicago, local demand for methamphetamine is relatively small, and the area remains a transshipment point for MDTOs. Methamphetamine accounted for less than two percent of drug seized in the Chicago HIDTA AOR. Chicago HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
**Gulf Coast HIDTA**

(A) **Threat Assessment**

Gulf Coast HIDTA (GC HIDTA) is a geographically diverse area consisting of 29 HIDTA-designated counties/parishes in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Methamphetamine, in both powder and methamphetamine “ice” forms, poses the greatest threat in the region. Law enforcement intelligence indicates that Mexico-based, poly-drug DTOs transport methamphetamine into the GC HIDTA region for distribution by local drug trafficking groups. Methamphetamine laboratories continue to decline across the region as availability of the less expensive and purer Mexico-produced methamphetamine remains high. Law enforcement, treatment and prevention professionals, and medical examiners in these areas have seen a troubling surge of fentanyl and acetyl-fentanyl. Many other areas across GC HIDTA that have not witnessed this kind of opioid use in the past are now experiencing it.

Fentanyl and other opioids are considered the second most serious threat. The opioid crisis has hard-hit areas such as Birmingham, Alabama, and Southeast Louisiana. Violent crime continues to affect the safety and quality of life of the citizens as high rates of drug-related murders and robberies continue to plague urban areas such as Memphis, Tennessee, and New Orleans, Louisiana.

(B) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

GC HIDTA promotes a productive working relationship among its law enforcement initiatives by designing and deploying an infrastructure that fosters information sharing and ensures a coordinated response to the drug threat. GC HIDTA fosters an environment in which participating federal, state, and local agencies can achieve the goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs by focusing on specific drug threat elements unique to their respective areas. Specifically, the GC HIDTA:

- has 35 enforcement initiatives that are strategically located with the primary goal to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs;
- operates an intelligence support network which gathers, analyzes and disseminates drug intelligence information throughout the AOR and beyond;
- offers officer safety and information sharing through a robust, nationally connected, deconfliction solution; and
- provides case support for all enforcement initiatives through the Intelligence Support Network.
(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

GC HIDTA will continue to support the goals of the *Strategy* by reducing illicit drug availability and its harmful consequences within its designated areas, creating and maintaining intelligence-driven task forces, and supporting infrastructure designed to target, disrupt, and eliminate DTOs impacting the region and beyond.

(1) Methamphetamine

According to the Gulf Coast HIDTA Drug Survey, respondents listed methamphetamine as the drug that contributed the most to violent crime, property crime, and law enforcement resources used. The majority of law enforcement respondents claimed a decrease in the number of methamphetamine production and conversion laboratories encountered. The decline is due to the idea that methamphetamine in the region is thought to originate from Mexico as drug cartels can produce vast quantities of the drug at a higher purity and lower cost than domestically-produced methamphetamine. GC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Hawaii HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The trafficking and use of methamphetamine “ice” and diverted pharmaceuticals, and the production and cultivation of marijuana pose the greatest illicit drug threats to Hawaii HIDTA (HI HIDTA). Methamphetamine is widely available throughout the AOR. Methamphetamine “ice” is produced in Mexico and primarily transported via California, Nevada, Arizona, and Washington. Transportation methods favored by DTOs shipping methamphetamine “ice” to the region include commercial parcel and postal services, and the use of human couriers traveling on commercial airline flights that conceal the drugs on their bodies or in carry-on baggage. Also, DTOs sometimes employ corrupt airline employees to ensure methamphetamine “ice” shipments circumvent airport security. DTOs also use private couriers to transport small amounts of methamphetamine to the state. Moreover, intelligence data indicate that DTOs use sea containers and vehicles aboard commercial shipping vessels to transport illicit drugs, including methamphetamine “ice”. Proceeds derived from the sale of methamphetamine “ice” are then mailed or carried by human couriers traveling on commercial airline flights or transferred via wire remitters.

Small groups of individuals who obtain pharmaceuticals from physicians and pharmacies typically coordinate the distribution of diverted pharmaceuticals in the AOR. Some DTOs solicit patients to get pharmaceutical drugs, in particular, opioids.

Marijuana flourishes agriculturally in Hawaii's tropical environment, sound water sources, and fertile soil. Marijuana is grown indoors and outdoors on public or private lands. Also, reporting indicates that marijuana concentrates are being produced and trafficked in the area. Most marijuana DTOs operating in Hawaii are not poly-drug in nature, distributing mainly marijuana, synthetic cannabinoids, and THC liquids for use in vaping devices. Hawaii's location also provides potential international and multi-state criminal groups with ample opportunity to traffic drugs to and from the area, due to its exceptionally high volume of international and domestic air and ocean traffic.

(D) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

HI HIDTA works diligently with mainland HIDTAs and law enforcement partners to curtail organized crime and DTOs throughout the Nation. The region's most significant drug threat is methamphetamine “ice”. HI HIDTA task forces are designed to counter the methamphetamine “ice” threat that infected Hawaii well before its devastating influence on mainland states with manufactured methamphetamine “ice” originating from nearby Asia, and Asian traffickers entered the densely populated Asian culture in Hawaii. Today, the region's supply of methamphetamine “ice” is solely from Mexican Cartel sources.

The HI HIDTA strategically incorporates independent task forces for each of the region's four island municipalities: City and County of Honolulu (Oahu), Hawaii County (Hilo and Kona), Kauai County, and Maui County (islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai). Each task force is capable of commingling whenever task force asset sharing is necessary and during joint-island interdiction operations. Also, the statewide drug interdiction task force is
responsible for investigations and canine drug screening at Hawaii's major airports, passenger terminals, and postal and parcel facilities. The HI HIDTA task forces are staffed with police criminal intelligence officers who facilitate intelligence sharing among the regions four municipalities and federal counterparts. The ISC provides investigative and analytical support to all task forces. An additional task force focuses on drug money laundering as part of the HI HIDTA strategy. The HI HIDTA must remain vigilant of the opioid epidemic that has devastated many of the mainland communities. As a result, HI HIDTA is a stakeholder in the multi-disciplinary Hawaii State Opioid Initiative.

(E) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish Hawaii HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives with a direct relationship to:

- disrupting DTO enterprises and the market and supply of illegal drugs through enforcement strategies dedicated to intercepting narcotics before and after being imported into Hawaii, and further eliminating and seizing the DTOs' profits and assets through specialized money laundering and financial investigative techniques, and analytical support;
- increasing intelligence sharing by continuing to invest heavily in a robust ISC;
- creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations; and
- working with community stakeholders to bring to light, analyze, and deliver an education/prevention message relating to the emerging trend of prescription drugs and pharmaceutical abuse.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is widely available throughout the HI HIDTA AOR. In 2018, task forces removed 176 kilograms of methamphetamine “ice” with a wholesale value estimated at $3.5 million. Initiatives did not dismantle any methamphetamine labs in 2018. HI HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
**Houston HIDTA**

(A) **Threat Assessment**

The threat from illicit drug trafficking and associated violence within the Houston HIDTA region remains high, in large part due to its proximity to the SWB, seaports, and national highway infrastructure. As a result, the region is one of the most significant distributions and transshipment areas for the variety of illegal drugs trafficked from Mexico into the United States. It is also a primary consolidation point for bulk cash smuggled back across the border. Therefore, Houston is one of the principal centers for drug activity in the country. Houston has experienced an increase in methamphetamine availability, heightening the threat level posed to the region and beyond. In addition to the imminent threat posed by the vast supply of illegal drugs moving through the area, drug-related violence continues to escalate, especially among the region’s gangs. Gangs within the Houston HIDTA continue to grow in strength and number. Their violence, often spurred by drug-related turf issues, is increasingly brutal, heightening the severity of the impact of the drug trade in the region.

(B) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

The Houston HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and productive working relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies that participate and/or operate in the Houston HIDTA region to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs. In addition to these efforts, Houston HIDTA will also continue to enhance its coordination with critical public safety and health partnerships for a more holistic approach to making a more significant impact on the Houston HIDTA area of response.

(C) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

To accomplish Houston HIDTA’s mission and objectives, the Houston Executive Board will allocate and focus the HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs;
- implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of agencies participating in the HIDTA;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEA; and
- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention and treatment organizations.

(1) **Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine continues to be the most prominent illicit drug threat in the region, a rising trend that shows no indication of a reversal. Use continues to rise in the region because it is
readily available at a decreasing cost. All the Houston HIDTA enforcement initiatives have targeted the DTOs distributing methamphetamine. The Methamphetamine Initiative Group (MIG), in particular, was formed in 2001 in response to the rise of clandestine methamphetamine laboratories throughout the Houston region. This initiative was the first of its kind in Texas and continues to be the premier support group that deals with dismantling clandestine labs. In 2018, the MIG disrupted or dismantled 4 DTOs, while seizing over $13.8 million in illicit drugs and dismantling three methamphetamine labs. Due to the highly successful “behind the counter” pseudoephedrine laws that were passed by the State of Texas several years ago, the number and scope of clandestine methamphetamine labs have dwindled dramatically in Texas. The adaptability of the MIG investigators to now target larger MDTOs that specialize in importing vast quantities of methamphetamine across the SWB has been very beneficial to Houston HIDTA. The MIG’s resources have also led to a significant increase in drug seizure values of over 700%.
Indiana HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The drug threat in the Indiana HIDTA has increased over the past year because of rising levels of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine availability due to the presence of DTOs in the area. DTOs operating in the HIDTA region have direct links to Chicago, Indianapolis, the Southwest Border, and Mexico. Criminal street gangs are the primary retail-distributors of drugs in the HIDTA AOR. Nine major interstate highways crossing through the Indiana HIDTA region make it a strategic area utilized by traffickers who transport drugs and money to and through the Indiana HIDTA region.

Critical issues identified in the Indiana HIDTA region are as follows:

- Fentanyl is ranked as the highest drug threat in the Indiana HIDTA region. The availability of fentanyl was moderate in early 2019 and has remained the same as last year. The departments outside of the AOR ranked fentanyl as third overall.

- In the Indiana HIDTA annual survey to law enforcement, heroin ranked as the second-highest drug threat in the AOR. Heroin availability remains high and has remained the same from last year throughout Lake, LaPorte, Marion, and Porter Counties. In the surveys, distributed to law enforcement departments/agencies within Indiana, but outside of our AOR, heroin also ranked as the second-highest drug threat.

- In 2018, methamphetamine availability was low and in early 2019 remained low in the Lake, LaPorte, and Porter County areas. In 2018, the Indiana HIDTA has seen substantial seizures, especially in Marion County (Indianapolis) of methamphetamine (148.013 kilograms), and methamphetamine “ice” (4.566 kilograms). Those departments outside of Lake, LaPorte, Marion, and Porter Counties ranked methamphetamine as the highest drug threat.

- According to law enforcement surveys, 33.3 % of the respondents said that cocaine/crack is readily available throughout the AOR and that availability remained the same over 2018. MDTOs continue to control the transportation and bulk sales of cocaine, which is being transported either from Chicago or directly from the southwest border to the Indiana HIDTA area for distribution or onward movement. Cocaine was also ranked fourth among departments outside of the Indiana HIDTA AOR.

- Local LEA in Lake, LaPorte, Marion, and Porter Counties report that the availability for controlled prescription drugs (CPD) is high and remained the same from 2018. Indiana HIDTA initiatives’ seizures reveal that Tramadol®, hydrocodone, (including Norco® and Vicodin®), oxycodone (including Oxycontin® and Percocet®), MDMA and alprazolam (including Xanax®) are the most diverted and abused CPDs in the HIDTA region. The Indiana surveys outside of AOR ranked CPDs sixth.
• Area law enforcement ranked synthetics as the sixth-highest drug threat in our area. The availability of synthetics is high and has remained the same over last year. Departments outside our AOR ranked synthetics as fifth overall.

• In the Indiana HIDTA survey, 65% of the respondents said that the availability of marijuana was high in the AOR. In the surveys from outside of the AOR, marijuana is listed in seventh place.

• Street gangs continue to expand into the HIDTA region. Gangs are involved in the trafficking of drugs and firearms throughout Indiana and neighboring states. Gang-related violence and influence are of significant concern for law enforcement agencies throughout the area.

(C) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

The Indiana HIDTA has 12 law enforcement initiatives and two intelligence initiatives tailored to address the specific needs of the AOR – drug trafficking, gangs, firearms, money laundering, and fugitive activities. Non-investigative initiatives are in management, support, and prevention. Indiana HIDTA works with 36 state and local jurisdictions, and seven federal agencies to bring a coordinated law enforcement effort to the region to address drug trafficking.

The purpose of the strategy is to provide strategic guidance and goals to the Indiana HIDTA participating agencies, as set forth by the Indiana HIDTA Executive Board. The Executive Board's strategy supports the two national HIDTA goals: disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and increasing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies.

The strategy focuses the Indiana HIDTA efforts on these goals through attacking the primary threats to Indiana of drug trafficking, the violence associated with the drug trade, and the organizations conducting drug trafficking. These goals are the underlying theme throughout the strategy.

(D) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

Indiana HIDTA Executive Board supports the goals of the Strategy by helping the two national goals: disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and increasing the efficiency of LEA. The Executive Board will allocate resources to initiatives that disrupt the market for illicit drugs and disrupt the financial activity of these organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine demand is increasing in the Indiana HIDTA AOR. In 2018, except Marion County, Indiana HIDTA had not seen large amounts within its AOR. In 2019, more departments are encountering methamphetamine and the availability is presently high throughout Indiana.
The Indiana HIDTA’s 2019 Drug Threat Assessment ranked methamphetamine as third highest in the AOR. The departments outside of the AOR ranked methamphetamine as the highest drug threat. Indiana HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Liberty Mid-Atlantic HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Liberty Mid-Atlantic HIDTA (LMA HIDTA) is located within the fifth-largest metropolitan area in the United States and is home to 2.7 million people within its nine-county region. Approximately 100 million additional people live within a one-day drive of the Philadelphia metropolitan area, a critical drug transshipment zone along the Interstate 95 northeast corridor in the Mid-Atlantic region. Also, LMA HIDTA is located within one of the most violent areas in the Nation, as Atlantic City (NJ), Camden (NJ), Chester (PA), and Wilmington (DE) remain high in rankings of the most violent cities per capita in the country. Philadelphia’s 2018 violent crime rate is nearly three times the national average; the homicide rate was 46% higher than the national average.

Heroin, fentanyl and fentanyl-related analogs, prescription drugs, cocaine, and marijuana are the principal drug threats to the LMA HIDTA region, with growing numbers of fatal and nonfatal overdose episodes attributed to fentanyl and poly-drug abuse. MDTOs with direct connections to cartel-level syndicates or cells remain the dominant heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and marijuana suppliers within the LMA HIDTA region. MDTOs have established the area as a central location to temporarily store large quantities of illicit drugs and cash proceeds transiting between the northeastern United States and the SWB region. MDTOs, allied with various other independent groups, are capable of distributing multi-kilogram quantities of high-purity South American- and Mexican-produced white heroin, kilogram quantities of fentanyl, hundred-kilogram quantities of cocaine, millions of dosage units of prescription drugs, and thousands of pounds of commercial-grade and high potency marijuana every month. Investigations and intelligence confirm that MDTOs are supplying bulk quantities (multi-kilogram) of crystal (“ice”) and liquid methamphetamine within the LMA HIDTA region in an attempt to increase demand among users. Methamphetamine distribution is rising, and the dark-net is becoming more common as a source for drug procurement.

Philadelphia is a commercial transportation hub. Drugs arrive in the region through various means, including private and commercial vehicles; commercial air, rail, and bus transit; and postal, commercial parcel; and ground, air, and maritime cargo shipments.

These same conveyances are also utilized to transport bulk currency to domestic consolidation points across the SWB to Mexico or through the Caribbean to Central and South America. Other money movement techniques used by traffickers in the LMA HIDTA region include bank deposit structuring to avoid Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, cash-based and money service businesses to wire proceeds, prepaid stored value cards, purchases of high-priced assets, and laundering through legitimate or front businesses.
Urban areas within the LMA HIDTA region consistently rank among the most dangerous and violent regions in the country, due in no small part to the impact of drug trafficking, distribution, and drug-related violent crime. Throughout the region, territorial violence is rampant within neighborhoods where distribution groups, as well as neighborhood-based and nationally connected street gangs, compete for control of profitable drug markets using violence and intimidation tactics. Various distribution groups exploit inner-city neighborhoods and suburban public housing developments to intimidate residents and competitors and protect profitable drug enterprises and markets. Law enforcement and public health professionals alike view heroin, fentanyl, and opioid abuse as the most significant concern in the LMA HIDTA region due to the continued availability of higher purity, low-priced heroin (and fentanyl mixtures) and its appeal to teenage and young adult users priced out of the prescription narcotics market. Compounding these factors, the emergence of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and opioid-like synthetic drugs in the regional drug market pose the likelihood of more deaths and hospitalizations, adding to the already alarming numbers of fatal and nonfatal overdose incidents.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

LMA HIDTA’s strategy supports the above goals, as well as the goals of the HIDTA program overall. Through information sharing, interdiction, investigation, and prevention initiatives, LMA HIDTA takes a comprehensive approach to thwart the use, flow, and distribution of drugs into its nine-county region. LMA HIDTA’s initiatives identify, disrupt, and dismantle DTOs and MLOs; locate and apprehend violent fugitives wanted in connection with drug offenses; gather intelligence linking drug traffickers to criminal organizations; and pursue opportunities for collaboration with public safety, public health, and non-governmental organizations to decrease demand for and harm from illegal substance abuse. The investigative and enforcement initiatives are structured to maximize the response to violent episodes in the most severely impacted areas to include Philadelphia, Atlantic City, Camden, Chester, Coatesville, and Wilmington, and pursue the region’s DTOs and MLOs that supply drugs to all the communities. LMA HIDTA’s support initiatives enhance the operating environments, professional skillsets, information-sharing capabilities, and intelligence assessments, and case support services that law enforcement initiatives rely upon to succeed.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

LMA HIDTA supports the Strategy thorough investigation that leads to the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs and MLOs. These efforts are achieved with domestic interdiction to accomplish the following:

- stop illegal drugs from reaching regional markets and denying drug proceeds from being expatriated to source countries;

- curtail the flow of prescription drugs of abuse through diversion investigations; and
• collect, coordinate, collate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence that relates to drug trafficking, violent drug gangs, and money laundering.

(1) Methamphetamine

MDTOs supply bulk quantities of crystal (“ice”) methamphetamine within the LMA HIDTA region to local and multi-state DTOs, as well as counterfeit prescription drugs containing methamphetamine in pill form. Methamphetamine arrives through various means, including private and commercial vehicles; commercial air, rail, and bus transit; and postal, commercial parcel, ground, air, and maritime cargo shipments. LMA HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking, as most of the DTOs investigated are poly-drug traffickers.
Los Angeles HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

MDTOs and criminal groups control the wholesale distribution of illicit drugs in the Los Angeles HIDTA (LA HIDTA) region. They supply illicit drugs to distributors within the region and distributors in most other significant drug markets throughout the country. Their influence is so profound that the LA HIDTA region has become one of the most significant illicit drug distribution centers in the United States for cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, marijuana, methamphetamine, MDMA, and phencyclidine (PCP). Additionally, MDTOs and criminal groups based in the LA HIDTA region are increasing their control over illicit drug distribution in many drug markets – most recently in East Coast drug markets long controlled by other trafficking groups – further enhancing the role of the region as a national drug distribution center. It is a staging area for MDTOs and some that have a national and/or international presence.

The geographic, cultural, social, and economic diversity and general affluence of the population within the four-county area (sixth-largest economy in the world with approximately 14% of the national gross domestic product (the largest in the United States)) have helped make LA HIDTA a massive market for drug abuse and distribution. At the same time, the highly developed transportation routes and the proximity to the SWB have made LA HIDTA a primary distribution, storage, and supply hub for illicit drugs destined for all the major metropolitan areas in the United States. Further, the vast rural and remote desert areas make LA HIDTA an ideal location for clandestine manufacturing of methamphetamine “ice”, although the majority of methamphetamine encountered in LA HIDTA is manufactured in Mexico.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

LA HIDTA’s strategy aligns the Intelligence Support System and task force initiatives to communicate effectively, coordinate and focus their respective intelligence and enforcement efforts to enhance the disruption and or dismantling of major DTOs and MLOs that, at their highest levels, operate in and through the regions primary geographical area to other parts of the country. The strategy provides a comprehensive, dynamic law enforcement/intelligence plan that combines and coordinates regional drug control efforts in areas where they can have the most significant impact on the threat. By executive board direction, LA HIDTA consists of seven major operational task forces comprising collocated federal, state, and local LEAs and three intelligence initiatives. It is their collective purpose to effectively and efficiently work within the strategy to identify and target the significant DTOs that operate at the higher levels of the illegal drug chain of command to measurably reduce drug trafficking and its impact in this and other areas of the country.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish LA HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:
• disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the major DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale in and through the Los Angeles region;

• increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all federal, state, and local LEAs [The primary mission of the Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse is to ensure officer safety and operational efficiency by providing a robust deconfliction capability serving the LA HIDTA region, case support, advanced technology, intelligence, and enhanced information sharing to all LEAs. Additionally, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center serves as one of the components of the national fusion center system, thus fostering better intelligence sharing between the HIDTA and DHS networks.]; and

• Creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations by coordinating with the California National Guard on a statewide prevention initiative.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, LA HIDTA initiatives only dismantled 2 “low level” methamphetamine powder labs, less than in 2017 total (5 labs). In 2018, the methamphetamine “ice” production in Mexico is the primary reason for the continued drop in local “powder” production. The production efforts lead to the proliferation of the drug in the region after being trafficked across the United States / Mexico border. However, in 2018, there were only a total of eight low level “power labs” reported in the State of California.

Additionally, in 2018, there were 18 methamphetamine “ice superlab” seizures reported nationwide. Enforcement elements in California seized 10 (56%) of the 18 seizures of cartel-related super methamphetamine “ice” conversion labs (10 pounds or more significant) reported nationwide. All 10 (100%) of the super methamphetamine “ice” conversion labs seized in California were from within the LA HIDTA.

The LA HIDTA demonstrated an 18% increase in 2018 (5,279.18 kilograms / 11,639 pounds / 5.8 tons) over 2017 (4,475 kilograms / 9,866 pounds / 5 tons) in methamphetamine / “ice” seizures. The LA HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Michigan HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Michigan HIDTA is located between significant drug markets in Chicago and New York City, shares an international border with Canada, and has three of the top 25 busiest commercial land ports in the United States. DTOs transport illicit drugs into and through the region from Chicago, New York, Atlanta, the SWB, and Canada. The Michigan HIDTA counties include major drug markets in Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Muskegon, Pontiac, Port Huron, and Saginaw. These markets serve as distribution centers for smaller markets within the region and neighboring states.

Heroin and fentanyl are significant drug threats in Michigan. Heroin is readily available, and its use continues to increase throughout most of Michigan. The presence of heroin containing fentanyl has significantly raised statewide concerns over the last several years. Fifty-two percent (118) of DTOs investigated by the Michigan HIDTA task forces in 2018 trafficked heroin. Also in 2018, initiatives seized more than 71 kilograms of heroin and 17 kilograms of fentanyl. The trend has continued and become more prevalent as regions have reported pure fentanyl sold as heroin. Over the last few years, heroin demand has surpassed cocaine, and some prescription opioid users have turned to heroin as a cheap alternative to prescription drugs. Moreover in 2018, preliminary data from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) indicates that there were 2,581 confirmed overdose deaths in Michigan. In 2018, 21,576 Michigan residents were admitted to treatment facilities for heroin use, a decrease from 22,082 in 2017.

The diversion of prescription drugs continues to be a significant threat to the state due to availability through multiple methods of acquisition. The means of acquiring illegal prescription drugs include prescription fraud activities, doctor shopping, pharmacy robberies, and fraudulent prescription call-ins to pharmacies, and visiting physicians who operate as DTOs. Illegally obtained pharmaceutical drugs from Detroit and the surrounding metropolitan area are subsequently distributed at higher costs to other states such as Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. The MDHHS reports 7,524 Michigan resident admissions for publicly-funded treatment for other opioid use, a category that includes prescription drugs in 2018, down from 8,629 residents in 2017.

Cocaine is a significant drug threat and is readily available across the State of Michigan. Availability in Michigan has increased since the previous reporting period. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Detroit Field Division (Michigan and Ohio) reports an increase in supply and demand for cocaine. More specifically, the DEA reports cocaine is readily available with all Michigan areas reporting stable availability while Detroit reports increased availability. Pricing for cocaine has slightly decreased from last reporting period but remains high, as a kilogram of cocaine ranges from $26,000 to $36,000. Although kilogram prices are decreasing slightly, cocaine seizures have increased, and cocaine-related deaths have also increased. Michigan HIDTA task forces seized roughly 431 kilograms of cocaine in 2018, compared to approximately 200 kilograms in 2017. Crack Cocaine in Michigan is a moderate drug threat and is readily
available. MDHHS data show there were 6,316 publicly-funded treatment admissions for cocaine use in 2018, up from 5,262 in 2017.

Mexican-produced crystal methamphetamine “ice” is a significant threat in Michigan, especially on the west side of the state. However, its availability is increasing throughout the state. Local production via the one-pot method produces small quantities for personal use or small-scale distribution and has decreased significantly over the past two years. Statewide, Michigan State Police responded to 2,607 total methamphetamine-related incidents in 2018, which is a 60% increase from last year’s reporting (1,625). Of those 2,607 methamphetamine-related incidents, 2,469 were attributed to delivery, possession, and use arrests, and 138 were assigned to lab and manufacturing arrests. During 2018, Michigan HIDTA task forces seized more than 51 kilograms of methamphetamine/“ice” up from 36 kilos in 2017. In FY 2018, the MDHHS reported 2,619 Michigan residents indicated methamphetamine as their primary drug of choice upon admission for treatment, a 53% increase from FY 2017 (1,710).

Marijuana continues to be the most commonly used and readily available drug in Michigan. Since the passing of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act in 2008, local marijuana production has steadily increased in demand and availability. The increased emphasis on homegrown cultivation has resulted in greater availability of high-quality marijuana produced throughout the state. According to the 2018 Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Report, there are 297,515 registered medical marijuana cardholders and 43,056 medical marijuana caregivers registered with the Medical Marijuana Program, (total 340,571) up from a total of 312,736 approved registrants in 2017. The Michigan Legislature has created the Medical Marijuana Facilities License Act that allows commercial sales of medical marijuana and provides a state regulatory structure to license and regulate medical marijuana growers, processors, provisioning centers, and safety compliance facilities. The Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act was passed by the voters of the State of Michigan on November 6, 2018. Effective December 6, 2018, marijuana became legal for anyone over 21 years old to grow, consume, and possess. Under the new law, a person may carry up to 2.5 ounces and store up to 10 ounces or grow up to 12 plants in their own home. The state has until December 6, 2019, to establish licenses and regulations for recreational marijuana dispensaries. Marijuana produced in Michigan is distributed to other states. Mexico remains the primary source of supply for low quality, high yield marijuana imported to Michigan. MDHHS data show there were 6,085 publicly funded treatment admissions for marijuana use in Michigan in 2018. In 2018, 4,173 kilograms of indoor-grown marijuana plants and 5,023 kilograms of processed marijuana were seized by Michigan HIDTA initiatives.

MDMA, moderately available in Michigan, is primarily trafficked into Michigan from Canada through the international border ports of entry (POEs) and shipped via parcel deliveries from China to sellers in the United States. Synthetic drugs are available in most parts of Michigan, with slight decreases noted in availability over the past year. Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw continue to be three of the more violent cities in the United States. These cities share similar characteristics that contribute to violent crime, including
high poverty rates, high unemployment rates, high narcotics usage, and reduction in local
law enforcement staffing. Drug-related violent crime continues to pose a significant
threat in these areas. Michigan HIDTA supports the Michigan State Police Secure Cities
Partnership, which provides enhanced, regionalized, data-driven law enforcement
services to the cities of Detroit, Pontiac, Saginaw, and Flint to reduce crime and improve
the quality of life in these areas. Michigan HIDTA initiatives continue to be integral
components of the Detroit One Violent Crime Reduction Initiative. This community and
law enforcement partnership, spearheaded by the United States Attorney’s Office
(USAO) for the Eastern District of Michigan and in cooperation with the Detroit Police
Department and Michigan HIDTA’s federal, state, and local partners, focuses on
identifying and arresting the worst offenders involved in violent firearms offenses in
Detroit.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Michigan HIDTA has adopted a three-tiered enforcement strategy. The initiatives target
street-level dealers threatening the community, mid-level dealers and priority targets, and
major DTOs and MLOs identified in the threat assessment.

Michigan HIDTA accomplishes its mission and addresses the threat in the region through
a united response from federal, state, local, and tribal partners, taking full advantage of
their knowledge, skills, and expertise. Through collocation, interagency cooperation, and
consolidation of strategic and tactical information, Michigan HIDTA fosters a
comprehensive response to illicit drug trafficking by bringing together all available law
enforcement resources. Cooperative working relationships have been developed over
many years by the Executive Board and Executive Director to ensure that enhanced
communication, collaboration, and information sharing support effective, intelligence-
driven investigations.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish the mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board
focuses HIDTA resources on:

- disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that manufacture, transport, and distribute
  illicit drugs and seizing the illicit proceeds from their sales;

- improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the HIDTA’s efforts by increasing
  intelligence sharing and coordination among HIDTA initiatives, law enforcement
  partners in Michigan, and law enforcement partners in other regions that are
  impacted by illegal drugs that originate or flow through the Michigan HIDTA; and

- enhancing relationships with organizations committed to drug education, prevention,
  and treatment, including community-based and educational institutions.
Mexican-produced crystal methamphetamine “ice” is a significant threat in Michigan, especially on the west side of the state. However, its availability is increasing throughout the state. Local production via the one-pot method produces small quantities for personal use or small-scale distribution and has decreased significantly over the past two years. Statewide, Michigan State Police responded to 2,607 total methamphetamine-related incidents in 2018, which is a 60% increase from last year’s reporting (1,625). Of those 2,607 methamphetamine-related incidents, 2,469 were attributed to delivery, possession, and use arrests, and 138 were assigned to lab and manufacturing arrests. During 2018, Michigan HIDTA task forces seized more than 51 kilograms of methamphetamine/“ice” up from 36 kilos in 2017. In 2018, the MDHHS reported 2,619 Michigan residents indicated methamphetamine as their primary drug of choice upon admission for treatment, a 53% increase from 2017 (1,710).
Midwest HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

A myriad of drugs are abused throughout the densely populated urban areas, user hubs, and rural territory within the region, and their presence threatens the life and property of the citizens, along with the social fabric of the communities. Cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana continue to be popular in all areas of the Midwest HIDTA region. So, too, the opioid epidemic, which has spread across the Nation, has not left the Midwest untouched. Heroin and fentanyl are prevalent across all communities in every state across the Midwest, fueled by the prescription opioid explosion. Drugs such as fentanyl, MDMA and GHB, and other dangerous synthetics are also consistently present in most urban areas. PCP appears to be readily available in the Kansas City metro area, with significant quantities interdicted between California and Kansas City. In the Midwest HIDTA region, Mexican traffickers continue to dominate wholesale drug distribution and transportation.

Competing gangs and other DTOs use violence to solidify and maintain their hold on drug trafficking within their area of influence. Cooperative local, state, and Federal law enforcement efforts throughout the region have had noteworthy success in identifying, targeting, and prosecuting active DTOs and gang members involved in violent drug-related activity. Drug trafficking trend analysis has long indicated that high-level DTOs have become established and entrenched in the Midwest, and many of these DTOs are poly-drug operations. As a result, task forces continue to initiate significant Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), Priority Transnational Organized Crime (PTO)-linked, Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT)-linked, Title III, and financial investigations. Usage of CPDs and opioid pain medications has also driven an increase in the number of heroin and/or fentanyl users as trafficking groups expand their markets. Heroin overdose deaths and emergency room episodes have also exponentially increased in many Midwest cities.

A significant and chronic problem in both suburban and rural areas of the AOR is methamphetamine abuse, along with its related violence and social costs. Methamphetamine/“ice” is highly sought after, and its popularity throughout the region contributes to the dominant presence of MDTOs in the Midwest. Mexican organizations transport methamphetamine into the region via well-established overland routes. Some reporting also indicates the smuggling of methamphetamine in solution into the region for local conversion.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

Midwest HIDTA has developed a cohesive and comprehensive regional program focused on reducing and disrupting the importation, distribution, and manufacturing of illegal drugs. The task forces maintain an aggressive posture toward enforcement activities. Midwest HIDTA has identified primary and secondary threat areas, defined drug importation and transportation corridors, and well known areas of local drug production. Investigators
conduct complex, in-depth, multijurisdictional OCDETF, PTO, CPOT, and other transnational criminal organization (TCO) investigations with an emphasis on dismantling the entire organization and reducing drug-related violence. Investigations target the highest level of DTOs and MLOs using undercover operations, innovative techniques, and surveillance of command and control communications. These investigations are intelligence-driven and conducted in a cooperative spirit among Federal, state, and local counterparts in a task force arrangement.

(E) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

Midwest HIDTA contains 71 designated counties in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Illinois. It has developed a cohesive and comprehensive regional program that is executed through 57 initiatives to reduce the production, transportation, distribution, and use of illegal narcotics, thereby disrupting the illicit drug market.

1. **Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine remains the principal drug threat across the entire Midwest region. MDTOs dominate all importation, wholesale distribution, and even mid-level sales across the region. Methamphetamine use and trafficking, driven by increasing drug availability, continues to grow throughout the Midwest. Moreover, although small-scale “mom-and-pop” methamphetamine labs still present a threat to communities, increasing numbers of MDTO methamphetamine conversion and re-crystallization laboratories pose a new primary threat to citizens and first-responders, alike. In 2018, the Midwest HIDTA initiatives seized over 1,921 kilograms of methamphetamine, with a wholesale value of nearly $38.9 million. Enforcement initiatives across the Midwest HIDTA continue to target the highest-level, priority target distributors and their links to CPOT sources in Mexico.
Nevada HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Methamphetamine, paralleled by the surge in heroin, is the most crucial target of all task forces in Nevada HIDTA (NV HIDTA). Examination of available intelligence trends, seizures, arrests, treatment admissions, drug death cases, investigative cases, and anecdotal information relating to the Nevada drug market concluded that methamphetamine remains a significant threat to the AOR. The high level of use, availability, lower cost, and the considerable number of people treated for addiction, and the probable relationship to other crimes has to lead to this conclusion.

Heroin produced in Mexico is the only heroin available within the NV HIDTA AOR. Marijuana continues to be the most frequently used and widely available illicit drug. However, changes in public opinion, prosecution requirements, and resources have pushed it to a lower-level priority threat in the community.

Illicit fentanyl is an emerging threat in the region. Task forces have reported several seizures of fentanyl confirmed through laboratory testing. Some of the seizures include multi-kilogram quantities of fentanyl hydrochloride. It is expected that other drugs, including CPDs, club drugs, synthetic drugs, and cocaine, will continue to cause grave concern within the NV HIDTA region

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NV HIDTA’s primary enforcement strategy is to incorporate the use of well trained, well equipped, and commingled intelligence-led law enforcement personnel assigned to task forces to reduce the drug threats and the crime drugs bring to the area. These task forces consist of law enforcement personnel from local, state, and Federal agencies whose mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle drug organizations, drug traffickers, criminal operations, gang crime, and MLOs with an emphasis on violent crime reduction.

Through this multiagency program, personnel becomes the force multiplier, thus enhancing information and resource sharing. NV HIDTA has consistently provided proven results with this time-tested process and rapidly adjusting strategies to meet the demands of changing threats and crime patterns. The extent of information sharing and interagency cooperation fostered through this approach strongly demonstrates that law enforcement personnel are working effectively and efficiently.

Task forces are comprised of investigators representing a wide variety of local, state, and federal LEAs, and each contributes unique authorities, perspectives, access to data and additional resources, and expertise. The operational strategy ensures that task forces and affiliated agencies deconflict cases and subjects, share information, work cooperatively as necessary to avoid duplication of effort, and maximize the use of resources.

The ISC is a critical component of the strategy. In addition to providing case support directly to ongoing investigations, the strategy tasked the ISC with conducting analyses of patterns
and trends in the drug market that are then used by NV HIDTA leadership to proactively
direct task force activities.

Monitoring and close coordination is a cornerstone of the NV HIDTA strategy. Regular task
force supervisor meetings, special task force, and Executive Board meetings are held to
ensure each initiative is faithfully pursuing the achievement of program goals.

(D) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

NV HIDTA supports the Strategy of Reducing the Availability of Illicit Drugs in the region
by dismantling or disrupting DTOs, Criminal Operations (COs), and/or MLOs, thereby
disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the NV HIDTA region and other areas of the
country. NV HIDTA investigators conduct complex, in-depth, multi-jurisdictional DTO
investigations with an emphasis on dismantling organizations and reducing drug-related
violence.

NV HIDTA supports preventing drug use before it starts as a fundamental community
strategy creating a comprehensive approach to drug control. NV HIDTA has deep
partnerships with community coalitions, organized prevention programs including drug
takebacks, supports the evidence-based strategy of Nevada established Drug-Free
Communities Program, public education, and citizen awareness.

NV HIDTA is a strong proponent of strategies to improve the response to overdoses,
including implementing the HIDTA ORS, training of law enforcement use of Naloxone.
Furthermore, NV HIDTA supports community treatment partners through education and
information sharing regarding drug trends and other useful information.

(1) Methamphetamine

The methamphetamine coming into the region is the biggest threat to Nevada. In 2018, NV
HIDTA initiatives seized 699 kilograms of methamphetamine, with a wholesale value of
approximately $14 million. NV HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address
methamphetamine trafficking.
New England HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

According to the 2019 New England High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (NE HIDTA) Drug Threat Assessment, the most significant drug threats to the New England Region include heroin, fentanyl, cocaine HCL, crack cocaine, controlled prescription drugs, and methamphetamine. The overall drug threat to the NE HIDTA increased in 2018 - primarily stemming from heroin and fentanyl. Increasingly, cocaine and fentanyl have become more interrelated, resulting in challenges for first responders.

According to the 2019 NE HIDTA Drug Threat Assessment, from 2015-2017, all six New England states experienced age-adjusted fatal opioid-related overdose rates that were above the national average. Overdoses continue to rise in Vermont and New Hampshire, while Maine experienced a notable decline in fatal overdoses over the past year. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island experienced a modest decrease in overdoses over the past year. While some states in New England see a minor decline or a lesser rate of change in fatal opioid-related overdoses, it is essential to note that this is likely a stabilization and not an actual decrease. This stabilization is typical of an epidemic curve.

During 2018, fentanyl contributed to over 75% of all opioid overdose fatalities in each New England state. Massachusetts had the highest percentage of positive fentanyl screens with 89%, while Vermont had the lowest with 75%. The impact on first responders is significant in terms of rescue/treatment approaches. Emblematic of these challenges, the amount of Naloxone/Narcan required to reverse fentanyl versus heroin overdose is a driving factor in the higher fentanyl-related death rate.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NE HIDTA has developed a strategy tailored to encourage interagency cooperation and operations coordination and remains committed to intelligence-led policing and information sharing. NE HIDTA provides an agency-neutral program to balance regional law enforcement efforts and coordinates a strategy to address the regional threat and national priorities. It continues to foster effective working relationships among six USAOs, nine federal LEAs, and scores of state and local LEAs. Taskforce initiatives are staffed with collocated Federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, and NE HIDTA coordinates the integration of all initiatives to ensure a unified effort in achieving its goals and objectives.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

In addition to supporting the Strategy by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs, NE HIDTA has implemented a collaborative partnership with prominent professionals in the education, prevention, and treatment aspects of the Strategy. Additionally, through continued cooperation with these partners, NE HIDTA has enhanced drug education and prevention initiatives by providing guidance and information to numerous state-sponsored prescription drug awareness programs and partnering with the New England Drug-Free Communities
(DFC) coalitions, the Massachusetts Prevention Alliance, and Boston University School of Medicine, and the Safe and Competent Opioid Prescribing Education of Pain training to provide prescribing physicians continuing medical education credits while creating awareness of the delicate balance of chronic pain management and risks associated with opioid prescribing.

1. Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine remains a relatively low threat and is, therefore, not specifically targeted by the NE HIDTA initiatives. Nevertheless, NE HIDTA will continue to monitor methamphetamine-related activities and potential threats. NE HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
New York/New Jersey HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

All significant drugs of abuse are readily available within the New York/New Jersey HIDTA (NY/NJ HIDTA) AOR, originating from both domestic and foreign sources of supply. The New York City (NYC) metropolitan area, which includes the five New York City counties and northern New Jersey, Long Island, and the lower Hudson Valley HIDTA counties, is an epicenter of diverse drug trafficking and money laundering activity, and one of the country’s largest drug consumption areas. NYC and surrounding areas serve as a hub for the importation and distribution of narcotics from and to many cities, states, and countries. Urban areas of New Jersey (such as Newark, Paterson, and Camden) also serve as supply hubs for much of the Northeast. Also, some traffickers outside of these metro areas are supplied by sources in Atlanta, Chicago, Arizona, or directly from foreign sources.

Heroin remains a primary drug threat within the NY/NJ HIDTA region. However, the continued rise in fentanyl seizures and overdose deaths attributed to the drug have intensified the threat posed by fentanyl and its analogs. This rise has led NY/NJ HIDTA’s law enforcement and public health partners to identify heroin and fentanyl as the leading threats within the region. Heroin and fentanyl are the greatest threat to the NY/NJ HIDTA region, followed by cocaine and crack cocaine and then controlled prescription drugs, methamphetamine, and lastly, marijuana. The identification of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs in combination with powder cocaine and other stimulants is an emerging threat that is of grave concern.

Heroin, fentanyl-laced heroin, pure fentanyl, and fentanyl analogs are responsible for the majority of overdose deaths in the region, and available data suggest rates of overdose continue to increase in many areas of New York and New Jersey. The price of heroin in the region continues to be relatively low, and purity is among the Nation’s highest. Seizures by law enforcement increasingly show the presence of fentanyl and its various analogs in the region, as well as in combination with stimulants such as cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. Organizations are also distributing fentanyl by itself, in powder or pill form, with the latter often imitating the look of brand name pharmaceutical oxycodone.

Cocaine seizures in the region increased consistently between 2015 and 2017; however, declined sharply in 2018. Although seizures within the region decreased, likely due to the focus on heroin and fentanyl threats, investigative reporting indicates that availability has increased. Crack remains a threat in the New York area and New Jersey’s urban areas with gangs controlling the street market.

Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in New York State is encountered on a much smaller scale in comparisons to other significant drugs like cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. Crystal methamphetamine has become a substantial threat in the southern tier counties of Central New York State. The overall outlook of current methamphetamine trafficking in NJ
shows an evolving threat concentrated in the southern region of the state, sourced from Mexico, and inherently pure.

Marijuana continues to be a drug of choice across the NY/NJ HIDTA region and originates from a variety of sources. The DEA has noted an increase in marijuana concentrates, oils, and extracts. Locally, New York Police Department reports an increase in both gummy and oil forms, the latter of which is heated via electronic devices to release vapors and subsequently inhaled. Marijuana is the second most in-demand drug across New Jersey and is easily accessible.

(B) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

NY/NJ HIDTA accomplishes its mission by promoting cooperation among agencies by creating collocated and commingled task forces, providing technological capabilities to enhance and expedite investigations, establishing lasting public health/public safety partnerships, and leveraging resources to ensure funds are used in the most efficient way possible.

(C) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

NY/NJ HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. NY/NJ HIDTA also facilitates the timely and accurate sharing of criminal and drug intelligence among agencies, enabling them to target regional and international drug and MLOs more effectively.

Furthermore, NY/NJ HIDTA will continue its prevention efforts by supporting community-based projects such as the Saturday Night Lights Initiative, which offers quality sports programs to inner-city youth and provides a fun, haven for otherwise at-risk kids. They learn about teamwork, gain self-confidence, and discover alternatives to drug use and crime. By stopping drug dependency and use before they begin, the Initiative hopes to lower the crime rate associated with illegal drug activities in these communities and also prevent kids from becoming involved in gangs and gun violence.

(1) **Methamphetamine**

Generally, methamphetamine is not the principal drug being trafficked by DTOs in the NY/NJ HIDTA region. NY/NJ HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
North Central HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Wisconsin, specifically the metropolitan areas of Milwaukee and Madison, serves as a midpoint and a destination area for drug trafficking operations. These urban areas sit along the I-90/I-94 corridor and are near the major drug markets of Minneapolis and Chicago. Because of these factors, North Central HIDTA is vulnerable to DTOs that establish their presence for drug trafficking activities.

Heroin, fentanyl, and other opioids continue to present the greatest threat to the Wisconsin portion of the AOR. Overdose deaths and other harmful effects, resulting from the use of various opioids, are increasing and continue to pose significant risks for the community. Closely associated with the heroin and fentanyl threat is the abuse of prescription medications, especially opioids such as oxycodone. Reports from law enforcement officials and substance abuse treatment providers demonstrate a continuing correlation between pharmaceutical abuse and heroin/fentanyl use. These potentially lethal opioid synthetics are increasing the risk to the area, including law enforcement and emergency services personnel that come in contact with these substances. During the past couple of years, the presence of methamphetamine across Wisconsin has dramatically increased. More significant wholesale amounts of methamphetamine from Mexico are being sourced from the areas of Chicago, Minneapolis, California, and the SWB. Southeastern Wisconsin, an area that has not traditionally experienced a large volume of methamphetamine activity, has seen law enforcement seizing wholesale quantities of methamphetamine on a more frequent basis.

In Minnesota, the primary illegal drug threat is methamphetamine. In 2018, enforcement initiatives, mainly in Minnesota, seized approximately 667 kilograms of methamphetamine. Seizures of large quantities of finished-product Mexican methamphetamine in and around the Minneapolis area emanate mostly from the SWB area and are sourced by Mexican-based cartels. Minneapolis is considered an upper Midwest methamphetamine distribution hub and transshipment point for the Mexican cartels. Task forces throughout Minnesota and Wisconsin reported an increase in wholesale-level quantities, with half of the responding agencies reporting seizing a pound or more during their investigations.

Marijuana continues to remain the most commonly used and abused the illicit drug in the North Central HIDTA region. The demand for higher potency marijuana products has remained high over the past several years and continues to present a severe issue. Much of this demand is met by sources and DTOs based on the west coast and Pacific Northwest, mainly from states that have legalized the recreational and/or medical use of marijuana and related products. Concerns continue associated with the distribution of high-grade marijuana and the violent criminal activity and firearms used by traffickers and drug abusers. Much of the violence can be traced to the massive profits associated with the distribution of this drug. Also, the demand and abuse of high-potency edibles, oils, and vaping products have dramatically increased, which has created a severe threat to the user community. There continues to be a steady increase in the availability of cocaine in the North Central HIDTA region, which is consistent with many intelligence reports relating such a trend to the
increased coca production in Colombia and elsewhere in South America. Law enforcement continues to report that violent criminal activities are often tied to cocaine distribution.

(C) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

The North Central HIDTA’s strategy is to foster cooperative and productive relationships among more than 100 federal, state, local, and tribal participating member agencies in Wisconsin and Minnesota to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing drug demand. Through enforcement initiatives working within the 14 designated counties in both Wisconsin (seven counties) and Minnesota (seven counties), the investigative emphasis is placed on targeting DTOs that pose the most significant threats—primarily those with ties to the Southwest and northern borders (multi-state and international in scope). Also, particular emphasis is placed on violent DTOs and drug traffickers that pose a significant risk to the community, especially those engaged in violent criminal acts, firearm offenses, and the trafficking of substantial quantities of opioids and/or methamphetamine in the region. In line with North Central HIDTA’s goals, initiatives work cooperatively and share information with other HIDTAs and LEAs throughout the country to further enhance active investigations. As described below, in addressing the threats that face the North Central HIDTA, the Executive Board directs and adjusts its strategy to reduce the most significant threats and create safer communities. The strategy moving forward is to continue to integrate any newly formed initiatives from the recently designated Minnesota counties to address the threats to their region, as well as coordinate intelligence and information sharing with this enhanced partnership.

The North Central HIDTA strategy also recognizes the need for strong demand reduction efforts in the community. The mission is to reduce violent crime through targeted law enforcement, community building, raising community awareness, and proactive engagement of youth in activities that increase positive social skills and behaviors and teach resistance to drugs, gangs, guns, and other criminal behavior.

(D) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

North Central HIDTA supports the **Strategy** by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. This is accomplished through coordinated investigative efforts among federal, state, and local LEAs. Also, all investigative efforts are supported with active intelligence gathering and information sharing strategies to ensure that the most efficient and effective means are used to accomplish the mission. The key to the **Strategy** is breaking the cycle of drug use, crime, delinquency, and incarceration. Part of the North Central HIDTA strategy is to support activities that emphasize community-based partnerships incorporating the efforts of prevention, prosecution, and enforcement to reduce the threats drugs can pose to the community. North Central HIDTA will continue to enhance and support its long-standing relationship with the HIDTA Safe & Sound Prevention Initiative, a community-based organization engaged in drug education and prevention activities.
In 2018, the North Central HIDTA used some of its funds in support of investigations involving organizations and individuals trafficking in methamphetamine. Enforcement initiatives, mainly in Minnesota, seized a total of over 666.5 kilograms of methamphetamine in 2018. Seizures of large quantities of finished-product Mexican methamphetamine in and around the Minneapolis area emanate mainly from the SWB and are sourced by Mexican-based cartels. Wisconsin is also now experiencing more significant amounts of finished-product methamphetamine in multi-kilogram quantities emanating from the Minneapolis area, the Chicago area, as well as other source areas.
North Florida HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Mexican-made crystal meth continues to be the top-ranked illicit drug in the region, based on its seizure of the market and a worsening death rate. More users are school age, professionals, and African-Americans. Fueled by plentiful supply and low prices, the region is poised for a potential rise in methamphetamine-related violence. It is closely followed by widely available and increasingly deadly cocaine powder. Subsequently ranked are heroin, marijuana, diverted pharmaceuticals, club drugs, crack, synthetic cannabinoids, and psychedelics.

Fentanyl, the most lethal drug, is not ranked due to its mixture in other drugs. While the metropolitan Jacksonville medical examiner district led the state in fentanyl deaths in 2017, the level subsided through 2018 and maybe rising again in early 2019. At least 22 cases in the region have been pursued to charge murder for fentanyl distribution, with at least one conviction.

The opioid death total increased to 1,247 for the region in 2017. However, preliminary data for 2018 indicates that there may have been a decline in overdose deaths. This is illustrated by both Narcan administration and fentanyl deaths dropping measurably.

Seized diverted pharmaceuticals increased by 38%, fueled mostly by steroids and non-opioids. Seizure amounts of benzodiazepines increased by 458%, and opioids, mostly codeine and new opioids like Nucynta, increased by 326%. Club drugs, mostly cathinone, MDMA, and GHB, have moved from party to street drugs and have increased regularly since 2012. They were typically powders mailed from China, as were the banned a-PVP. The area’s transport role, Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) seizures included 25% of the meth, 21% of the fentanyl, 12% of all marijuana, and 11% of cocaine. Parcel intercepts of 777 kilograms are estimated to be 10-25% of its potential due to constraints caused by the lack of resources and some agency procedures.

Region tendencies are reflected in the 50 DTOs added in 2018. African-Americans appear to lead 27 of those DTOs, and 22 are poly-drug. Fewer DTOs offer a single drug and 20 deal cocaine or crack, 18 heroin, 14 methamphetamines, and for the first time, the initiatives are investigating three fentanyl DTOs. DTOs offering cocaine is the most common. There is also a trend for solitary dealers who broker sales with others, but do not operate together.

North Florida HIDTA’s (NFHIDTA) Prosecutorial Initiative and the North Florida Opioid Heroin Task Force guided state legislation that supported House Bill 21. This Bill controls pill presses, promotes reduced opioid prescriptions, and allows for data sharing with other states and the Veterans Administration. The treatment programs - Project Save Lives in Duval and Amnesty in Marion County - combined to assist 229 users in recovery. The NF HIDTA has a good partnership and an excellent collaborative working relationship with both programs.
(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NFHIDTA employs strategic, tactical, geospatial, and operational intelligence and an enforcement strategy that focuses on investigative and interdiction efforts to address the command and control elements of DTOs and MLOs operating within the AOR. NFHIDTA fosters collaborative and cooperative partnerships among Federal, state, and local LEAs to achieve its long-term strategic goals. These goals include reducing and disrupting drug trafficking and availability of the illegal drug market, related drug-proceeds, drug-related violent crime, and overdose deaths. NFHIDTA’s short-term goal is to dismantle identified DTOs, MLOs, criminal groups, and gangs operating within its AOR through affecting arrests and seizures of drugs, assets, and weapons, and seek maximum penalties through prosecution. To maximize this effort, NFHIDTA facilitates cooperation and joint operations among 42 Federal, state, and local LEAs and 345 full-time and part-time personnel who participate in its initiatives.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

NFHIDTA supports the Strategy by giving participating initiatives the tools (training, case and event deconfliction, and analytical support) to efficiently and effectively disrupt the market for illegal drugs. NFHIDTA focuses on disrupting and dismantling DTOs, MLOs, and criminal organizations as well as apprehending drug-related and violence-prone fugitives, gang members, and weapons traffickers. NFHIDTA combines its efforts with other HIDTAs facing similar threats to affect criminal enterprises operating across multiple AORs. Furthermore, NFHIDTA seeks to reduce drug-related overdose deaths, including those caused by opioids, through collaborating and coordinating with various DFCs, prevention coalitions, treatment facilities, EMS, healthcare, health departments, medical examiners’ offices, education institutes, and various professional community members and as an active participant in the HIDTA Program’s Overdose Response Strategy. NFHIDTA enhances drug control and prevention efforts by implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of participating agencies and by increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among all initiatives, regional LEAs, first responders, prevention and treatment coalitions, and other HIDTAs.

(1) Methamphetamine

Over the years, methamphetamine has plagued our nation and continues to be a significant threat in the NFHIDTA, negatively impacting the community and the environment. Although methamphetamine production has declined as an import of crystal methamphetamine has increased, there is still local production, primarily via small, one-pot labs. The process of disposal of the product and equipment is hazardous, costly, time-consuming, and remains problematic. It requires exceptional and expensive training, which the NFHIDTA helps provide. In 2018, NFHIDTA task forces dismantled 18 methamphetamine labs. These labs were estimated to produce approximately $42,912 worth of methamphetamine. There was a noteworthy 60% increase in methamphetamine seized from 2017 (45.2 kilograms) to 2018 (72.2 kilograms), most of which was imported.
The Northern California HIDTA (NC HIDTA) AOR is saturated with both methamphetamine and marijuana, with methamphetamine posing the most serious overall threat in 2018. Also, coinciding with the prevalence of marijuana, illegal THC extraction laboratories have increased and remain a credible threat to the NC HIDTA AOR.

Methamphetamine is considered the most significant threat to the NC HIDTA AOR. This is due to the high availability combined with wide demand and low cost which places methamphetamine second only to marijuana in level of prevalence throughout the AOR. However, unlike marijuana, the severe health effects, highly addictive nature and violence often associated with the drug elevates methamphetamine to its position as the most significant drug threat to the AOR. Methamphetamine is generally smuggled by DTOs across the border from Mexico into Southern and Central California via privately owned vehicles, often suspended in a solution and then processed through conversion labs for delivery into the AOR. The form of methamphetamine most often intercepted within the AOR tends to be crystal (“ice”) methamphetamine.

Marijuana availability and use remain extremely high throughout the NC HIDTA AOR, likely because of prolific local marijuana cultivation and the importation of Mexican-grown marijuana. Marijuana and THC extracts are predominantly cultivated locally and produced within the NC HIDTA AOR. Marijuana is increasingly cultivated indoors within the NC HIDTA AOR. Indoor marijuana grows can range in size between a few dozen plants (often grown for personal use and use by close associates) to thousands of plants (intended for wholesale throughout Northern California). Indoor marijuana grows are commonly located in residential properties as well as in large commercial properties like warehouses. Instead of purchasing these properties, DTOs often rent them to facilitate their cultivation operations.

Illegal outdoor marijuana cultivation within the NC HIDTA AOR poses a serious threat to the environment, polluting and diverting water sources and poisoning wildlife. Illegal marijuana cultivators often establish illegal grow operations in remote locations and on public lands, including state and national parks. Illegal grow sites often divert water from streams, rivers, and other local water sources causing negative impacts on the environment, and the people who depend on the affected water sources. Scientists have identified 50 different toxicants at illegal outdoor marijuana cultivation sites in Northern California. Illicit cultivation on public lands also poses a safety risk for hikers, campers, and forest personnel. THC extraction labs are a significant public safety hazard in the NC HIDTA AOR. These labs use highly volatile solvents (i.e., ethanol, hexane, butane, and CO2) to extract cannabinoids and terpenes (concentrates) from marijuana plant material. Explosions and fires caused by THC extraction labs often result in serious and sometimes fatal injuries to producers, firefighters, law enforcement, and surrounding communities. The demand for THC extracts are increasing and driving increased numbers of THC extraction labs in the NC HIDTA AOR. Most THC extraction labs found within the AOR appear to be for personal use and can produce five to six grams per cycle of
extraction. More sophisticated labs developing THC extracts for large scale distribution is also increasing in prevalence in the NC HIDTA AOR.

Heroin is the second-highest ranked drug threat in the NC HIDTA AOR. While heroin is not as prevalent as methamphetamine or marijuana, demand for heroin continues to grow at a faster rate than other illicit drugs within the AOR. This is especially true in the NC HIDTA’s northern-most counties, such as Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, and Sonoma Counties. Their populations, demographics, and overdose rates closely resemble the eastern, similarly rural, U. S. states where heroin abuse is at epidemic levels and heroin is considered the greatest drug threat. Heroin availability, usage, and profitability continued to increase within the NC HIDTA AOR, according to treatment center data and HIDTA Survey and statistical seizure data.

Most of heroin within the NC HIDTA AOR during 2018 was Mexican black tar heroin; its transportation and distribution were dominated by MDTOs. Black tar heroin was the dominant form of heroin within the NC HIDTA AOR; brown powder heroin and light brown/tan powdered forms of heroin were also available, but to a lesser degree. Heroin is sometimes cut with baking soda, coca cola, fentanyl, and/or fentanyl analogues, which decreases the purity but increases profitability. Decreasing methamphetamine prices and increasing heroin availability likely led some DTOs to increase heroin distribution to maximize profits. Coinciding with heroin abuse, fentanyl is increasingly available in the NC HIDTA AOR, posing an increasing threat to the NC HIDTA AOR. Fentanyl, often mixed with heroin and other drugs, is trafficked into the NC HIDTA AOR using traditional trafficking methods. This activity is likely to increase as cartels turn to fentanyl because of its simple and clandestine production method, ease of transport, and profitability.

Cocaine availability is considered moderate in comparison to other drug threats, but seizures within the NC HIDTA AOR increased during 2018. Cocaine is less dominant than methamphetamine or heroin but continues to be abused in major urban centers and is often used recreationally in clubs or other party settings. Most of cocaine seized within the NC HIDTA AOR is Colombian. Money laundering activities are often synonymous with drug trafficking. NC HIDTA enforcement initiatives routinely conduct investigations of MLOs conducting illicit business in the NC HIDTA AOR. The MLOs employ extensive financial and money laundering operations that include laundering bulk cash narcotic sales revenue through legitimate financial institutions and businesses, trade-based money laundering, and layering through multiple transactions. The most common method of money laundering is the transport of bulk currency from the AOR to Mexico via privately owned vehicles.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

The NC HIDTA fosters a comprehensive response in addressing illicit drug activity by bringing together all available law enforcement resources in a cohesive strategy to address the problem. The NC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives focus on DTOs, MLOs, violent drug offenders, open-air drug markets, marijuana cultivation on public and private lands, and domestic drug movement. Newly emerging narco-terrorism trends are also monitored, and information is shared with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, FBI, JTTF,
DEA, the California State Threat Assessment System, the California DOJ, and other federal, state, local, and tribal LEA.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish NC HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

• disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs and MLOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale;

• increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs; and

• creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement, prevention organizations, and drug free communities in the NC HIDTA AOR.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine trafficking is primarily controlled by MDTOs that utilize California as a corridor to access Mexico and Canada and are willing to use violence and criminal acts to control turf and trade. Law enforcement in California is challenged by an uptick in the methamphetamine trade due to state and local law enforcement budget reductions and diminished capabilities to manage and seize methamphetamine labs and superlabs. In 2018, initiatives seized 512.5 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately.
Northwest HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Overall, illicit drug use continues to pose serious public health and safety threats to communities in the State of Washington. Public health reports point to opioids, namely heroin, as the most widely used illicit drug category. Opioid-related overdoses were higher in 2018 than in 2017 and accounted for 66 percent of all drug-related overdose deaths in King County. Overdose deaths associated with methamphetamine, as well as treatment admissions for methamphetamine, also increased in 2018, while cocaine use, overdose, and treatment rates remained relatively stable from 2014-2018.

Northwest HIDTA examined several sources to determine the most significant drug threats in the State of Washington. These sources included treatment and drug overdose data from the Washington Department of Health and other local, state, federal, and academic institutions engaged in public health research. Law enforcement seizure statistics, including Northwest HIDTA Initiative Performance Management Process reporting and Washington State Crime Laboratory reporting, were also examined. Finally, intelligence reporting by federal, state, and local agencies, and Northwest HIDTA initiatives’ responses to the Threat Assessment Survey (TAS) were used to assess the drug threat in general as well as how it relates to violence and property crime. Also, general trends in trafficking intelligence is collected by the ISC intelligence analysts while supporting criminal investigations.

- Northwest HIDTA assesses opioids to be the most significant single drug threat (based on a combination of factors including criminal justice and public health consequences) facing the State of Washington and its communities, followed closely by methamphetamine.

- Since 2017, heroin treatment admissions have surpassed those for alcohol in the State of Washington. A steady flow of heroin from Mexico continues to supply the state’s demand for the drug.

- Methamphetamine remains a severe drug threat in Washington, and methamphetamine-related deaths in King County are increasing.

- Drug overdose events increasingly involve multiple substances. These mixtures may occur in a single dose such as fentanyl tablets mixed with over the counter or pharmaceutical drugs and pressed to resemble legitimate controlled prescription drugs. They may also be revealed through toxicology screenings showing multiple substances, like heroin and methamphetamine, in an overdose victim’s body at the time of death that may or may not has been consumed independent of one another.

- Cocaine seizure data by Northwest HIDTA law enforcement initiatives over the past five years indicate large quantities of cocaine passing through Washington on its way to Canada.
• Hydrocodone and oxycodone are the most dispensed controlled prescription drugs given out (by volume) in Washington. Over the past five years, there has been a noticeable increase in orders for pharmaceutical stimulants commonly used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

• Every Northwest HIDTA law enforcement initiative reported activity by DTOs affiliated with Mexican TCOs. Two-thirds of Northwest HIDTA 2019 TAS respondents indicated they are currently investigating DTOs with links to the Sinaloa Cartel.

• MLOs identified in the region laundered proceeds mainly derived from the sale of opioids, methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine. Typical methods employed to transfer proceeds and mask origins are: funneling through restaurants and casinos, real estate purchases, internet-based pay systems, and bulk cash smuggling.

• Throughout 2018, the 10 Adult Felony Drug Court programs supported by Northwest HIDTA served 1,253 participants with a 54 percent graduation rate.

• Community-based substance abuse prevention programs supported by Northwest HIDTA provided 22 curriculum-based programs that served 11,668 citizens and organized or participated in 123 community events attended by 12,151 persons throughout the region in 2018.

• Northwest HIDTA, in collaboration with the Greater Spokane Substance Abuse Council, developed the Washington Meth Watch, Washington Marijuana Watch, and Washington Rx Watch curricula. Train-the-trainer program, 12 presenters were trained and in turn, provided six presentations to 233 attendees in 2018. Since its inception in 2002, the program has trained 1,138 presenters who have provided 1,393 presentations to 52,296 citizens.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

The primary elements of the Strategy are to increase collaboration and cooperation between LEA and public health, identify clear investigative priorities, conduct intelligence-driven investigations, and provide oversight and accountability.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

Each year, Northwest HIDTA’s Executive Board directs the development of a strategy that focuses its resources on identifying and addressing the most severe trafficking threats. Thus, Northwest HIDTA supports 20 distinctive task forces (referred to as “initiatives”) that operate throughout Washington State. Initiatives unite federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel and associated resources, with a common goal — disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs that are adversely impacting the region. Operating together enables LEA to allocate stretched resources more efficiently and effectively. Also, a by-product of this operating model is the marked increase in information and intelligence sharing.
Additionally, prevention and treatment initiatives disrupt the drug market and reduce the demand for illegal drugs by supporting community-based substance abuse prevention organizations. These groups are involved in school-based programming, community organizing and mobilization, educating the public on drug-related topics, mentoring and parenting programs, and vocational training. Northwest HIDTA also supports adult drug court programs throughout the region, reducing the number of persons seeking and using illegal drugs.

(1) Methamphetamine

Throughout 2018, Northwest HIDTA law enforcement initiatives dismantled one illicit laboratory responsible for producing methamphetamine. Also, approximately 749 kilograms of the drug were seized, representing a 53 percent increase over the previous year, with a wholesale value of over $15 million.
Ohio HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

Opioid trafficking, abuse, and overdoses will remain the most significant drug threat to the Ohio HIDTA AOR during 2019. The Ohio HIDTA AOR includes 21 counties in Ohio, Northern Kentucky (NKY), and Western Pennsylvania (WP). Crystal methamphetamine, or methamphetamine “ice”, and cocaine are rapidly moving to the forefront with increased seizures, reported use on the rise and overdoses continuing to grow throughout the Ohio HIDTA AOR. As with previous years’ Drug Threat Survey, marijuana continues to be the most consumed recreational drug.

In congruence with the past several years, all of the LEAs responding to the 2019 Ohio HIDTA Drug Threat Survey identified opioids provided by MDTOs as the greatest drug threat in their region. The AOR continues to deal with heroin, which has transformed into a hybrid opioid product. The majority of heroin in the Ohio HIDTA AOR cut with fentanyl, or straight fentanyl sold as heroin. Heroin and fentanyl seizures continue to increase, and the lethal combination of heroin and fentanyl remains a very deadly mixture bringing with it a high rate of unintentional overdose deaths in Ohio. On a positive note, the AOR experienced a decline in accidental overdose deaths for the first time since 2009. The rapid deployment and administration of Narcan Nasal Spray (Naloxone Hydrochloride), an opioid antagonist antidote, would appear to be contributing to the decrease in unintentional overdose deaths.

The resources necessary to address the heroin epidemic have veiled the increasing problem associated with other drugs. Methamphetamine “ice” is a prime example of this problem. The majority of the Ohio HIDTA 2019 Drug Threat Survey respondents highlighted the increased availability, use, and seizures of methamphetamine “ice” in their region. Historically, the Ohio HIDTA AOR was inundated with one-pot methamphetamine labs concentrated in the rural areas of the state, and although methamphetamine “ice” was being interdicted via the Ohio Highway Interdiction Initiative (OHII), rarely was the final destination slated for the Ohio HIDTA AOR. The seizure of 234 kilograms of methamphetamine “ice” in 2018 was a 72% increase over the previous six years combined.

For the past three years, most respondents to the yearly Ohio HIDTA Drug Threat Survey believed cocaine trafficking was still prevalent. Still, the case assignments generated did not necessarily support this notion. The seizure data might now substantiate this assumption as powder cocaine seizures increased from 574 kilograms in 2016 to 3,343 kilograms in 2018, an increase of 482%. In 2018, even though Ohio LEAs were heavily inundated with the heroin/fentanyl epidemic, powder cocaine seizures more than doubled from 2017. With the majority of LEAs resources being exhausted to fight the heroin/fentanyl epidemic these past few years, their perceptions of cocaine trafficking flourishing were entirely accurate. The widespread outbreak of heroin/fentanyl allowed the resurgence of cocaine and methamphetamine to expand rapidly.

Marijuana remained the number one recreational drug used in the AOR. Ohio legalized medical marijuana in 2016, and in 2018, the industry became operational. It is anticipated
that the presence of medical marijuana will lead to an even more significant amount of marijuana usage in the region. Increasing amounts of marijuana consumed in the AOR are coming from states that have legalized marijuana in the Western Region of the United States (U.S.). Nearly all of the respondents to the 2019 Ohio HIDTA Drug Threat Survey confirmed that bulk shipments of high-grade marijuana are being brought into Ohio from states that have legalized marijuana such as California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. Vaping, which is the use of a vape pen with BHO filled cartridges, has become the most common form of illegal use of marijuana in the AOR. The vape cartridges are consistently sold on the street with a 92 to 99% THC purity content.

The 2019 Ohio HIDTA Drug Threat Survey indicates a continued downward trend in the use and availability of prescription opioids in the AOR. The new formulation of abuse-deterrent prescription opioid tablets that use physical and chemical barriers or agonist/antagonist combinations to deter the manipulation and abuse has had a significant impact on the desire for these prescription opioids. Prescription opioid diversion remains a threat as the drug cartels have begun to shift their modus operandi. The drug cartels are acquiring their pill presses and using fentanyl to produce counterfeit pills such as OxyContin and Xanax. These fake pills are not only readily available in the AOR but can be found in nearly every state of the U.S.

Most respondents to the 2019 Ohio HIDTA Drug Threat Survey saw very little change or any new emerging drug threats in their areas of operation. The AOR continues to see limited use of synthetic drug products such as bath salts, K2, and Spice. Designer or club drugs like MDMA, LSD, and Anabolic Steroids can be found in limited quantities throughout the numerous campus communities in Ohio.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Ohio HIDTA’s strategy is to incorporate the use of collocated law enforcement personnel from local, state, and federal agencies to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle those DTOs/MLOs operating within the Ohio HIDTA AOR. These DTOs/MLOs are involved in the drug trafficking business within Ohio, NKY, and WPA, or they are utilizing the AOR to distribute and transport narcotics and facilitate the movement of ill-gotten gains from the drug trade in and outside of the region.

The 32 operational initiatives approved by the Ohio HIDTA Executive Board in Ohio, NKY, and WPA along with the services provided by the ISC, provide the basis of Ohio HIDTA and its ability to combat the narcotics trade in HIDTA-designated counties, as well as throughout Ohio, NKY, and WPA. The strategy is successful at bringing together 224 federal, state, and local agencies, comprising 1,069 agents, officers, analysts, and other staff members. The impact of the strategy is evident by the information reported by Ohio HIDTA in the Performance Management Process (PMP) database.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy
Ohio HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by facilitating information sharing in intelligence-led investigations, training, and coordination of drug trafficking control activities among federal, state, and local LEAs to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States. Ohio HIDTA also supports the *Strategy* in such areas as a pharmaceutical diversion, highway enforcement, parcel interdiction, and prevention awareness.

(1) **Methamphetamine**

The Ohio HIDTA initiatives report a shift in methamphetamine trends in recent years. Over the past three years, the majority of the Ohio HIDTA Threat Assessment Survey respondents highlighted the increase of seizures of methamphetamine “ice” in their region. Methamphetamine kilogram seizures had steadily increased from 80 kilograms in 2015 to 151 in 2016 to a record high of 245 kilograms in 2017. Ohio HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
(A) Threat Assessment

Methamphetamine availability and trafficking continue to occur at a high level in the Oregon-Idaho HIDTA (OI HIDTA) and remain the area’s most significant drug threat, followed by heroin, fentanyl, and synthetic opioids; controlled prescription drugs; illicit marijuana; cocaine; and other dangerous substances.

Methamphetamine is widely used and trafficked in the region with most indicators such as related seizures, deaths, arrests, and forensic samples that demonstrate continued expansion. Crystal methamphetamine, or “ice,” has increased in availability as MDTOs have escalated the importation of methamphetamine powder, liquid, and finished products from laboratories outside the region and from Mexico. Local production in Oregon has remained low due to state legislation eliminating the ability to obtain pseudoephedrine without a physician’s prescription.

Over the last six years, the drug threat environment has shifted in the HIDTA from primarily methamphetamine trafficking and abuse to a dual-threat that includes high availability and use of opioid-based drugs. Production of heroin in Mexico has expanded, leading to greater access to low-cost products, mainly black tar, in Oregon and Idaho. Also, high availability and misuse of prescription opioids have contributed to crossover abuse with heroin. For example, people who are addicted to prescription opioids have increasingly switched to heroin because it is easier to obtain, cheaper, and provides a more intense high than prescription opioids.

The market for synthetic opioid drugs has continued to evolve in the HIDTA. Fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other dangerous synthetic opioids have become more prevalent in the region since 2013, with higher availability closely paralleled by increased overdose deaths.

The threat posed by the non-medical use of pharmaceutical drugs, mostly painkillers, has grown in recent years and mirrors national trends. While some indicators, such as deaths and rates of prescribing, suggest a recent decline in misuse, availability and misuse remain at a high level in the HIDTA. The rise in misuse of prescription medications can be attributed to greater availability through increased sales of controlled prescription drugs, liberal prescribing of opioids by doctors, and ease of access to the drugs through family or friends.

Marijuana use, cultivation, and trafficking are pervasive in the HIDTA. Oregon’s Medical Marijuana Act and recreational marijuana, which allow for specified quantities of marijuana to be grown, continue to be exploited for profit. Also, illicit manufacture and distribution of cannabis extracts, such as hash oil and marijuana wax, continue to increase in the region and have led to a higher number of extraction labs in Oregon. Since 2013, more than 30 production-related fires and explosions have been reported in the state. Idaho marijuana laws remain rigorous, with all possession, manufacture, and sale of the drug strictly prohibited.
Cocaine availability and use remain low in the HIDTA. However, some indicators, such as related seizures, deaths, and rates of use, point to elevated availability and are likely tied to increased production in Colombia, the main source country for the United States. Cocaine use is most prevalent in the Portland Metropolitan area, but is available to a limited degree in other areas of the HIDTA.

Other dangerous drugs such as MDMA, DMT (dimethyltryptamine), LSD, synthetic cathinone, synthetic cannabinoids, and psilocybin remain available in the HIDTA. These substances are obtained from a variety of sources, including local production, retail outlets, the internet, and through cross-border trafficking of product.

During 2018, participating agencies within the OI HIDTA identified 58 DTOs with foreign and domestic connections that were actively operating in the HIDTA; 13 new DTOs were identified between January 1 and April 17, 2019.

Consistent with national trends, International DTOs, specifically, trafficking organizations connected to Mexico, either directly or through associated trafficking and distribution cells, represent the greatest criminal drug threat in Oregon and Idaho. Mexican criminal organizations continue to maintain the most considerable influence on the illicit drug market in the United States, using established transportation and distribution infrastructure to move products, primarily methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, into the country.

Multi-state DTOs represent the second-highest criminal drug threat to the OI HIDTA. Multi-state DTOs identified in 2018 were mainly involved in the transportation and distribution of crystal methamphetamine, heroin, polydrugs, and interstate trafficking of marijuana.

Criminal organizations that operate locally are the OI HIDTA’s third serious DTO threat, the majority of which were involved in trafficking and distribution of crystal methamphetamine and polydrugs, mostly varying combinations of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. One local DTO was engaged in the production and transport of THC liquid. Other criminal groups, such as criminal street gangs and local independent dealers, also transport and distribute drugs, but to a lesser extent.

Drug trafficking groups in the OI HIDTA also engage in money laundering activities -- the legitimization of illegally obtained proceeds. OI HIDTA task forces identified three MLOs in 2018. Bulk cash smuggling, money service businesses, cash-intensive businesses, and bank structuring remain primary methods of transferring drug revenues into, through, and out of the HIDTA.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives
OI HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and productive working relationships among the 13 Federal agencies, 7 state agencies, 51 local agencies, 2 tribal agencies, and the USAOs in the District of Oregon and District of Idaho to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs and reducing the demand for, and availability of, illegal drugs.
(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy
To accomplish OI HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the Strategy, the Executive Board will allocate and focus the OI HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale (In 2018, OI HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 55 DTOs);
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs; and
- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, the OI HIDTA initiatives seized over 810 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately $16.4 million and dismantled one clandestine laboratory. OI HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
**Puerto Rico and United States Virgin Islands HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands HIDTA (PR/USVI HIDTA) AOR is highly vulnerable to drug trafficking because of its position in the Caribbean and established transshipment zone of illicit drugs from South America through the U.S. territories (Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands) to the CONUS. In recent years, more significant amounts of drugs have been available for transport through the supply chain as more security has been implemented along the SWB of the CONUS in direct response to the drug threat and human trafficking threat. As a result, South American cartels have been trafficking more frequent and larger drug shipments through the Caribbean. Drug trafficking remains a significant threat to PR, USVI, and CONUS. Consequently, violent crimes, unlawful financial activities, and drug abuse continue to deteriorate communities within the AOR. In 2019, the identification of Fentanyl being trafficked through the area increased, thereby causing a more significant number of overdoses.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

PR/USVI HIDTA’s strategy focuses on regional threats and includes prevention as part of its plan to assist in the reduction of illegal activities and violent crimes. PR/USVI HIDTA, through cooperation and effective relationships established with federal, Commonwealth, and local agencies, has joint task forces positioned throughout the region to counter drug trafficking and related criminal activity.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

PR/USVI HIDTA fully supports the Strategy by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs with an emphasis on violent organizations and conducting interdiction of drug shipments. PR/USVI HIDTA also helps strengthen the local law enforcement establishment through training, material support, and sound inter-operational strategies.

1. Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is not considered a primary drug threat in the PR/USVI HIDTA region, although methamphetamine and methamphetamine “ice” have been increasing in popularity in Puerto Rico. This year again, reports indicate that most the methamphetamine and methamphetamine “ice” are trafficked from the CONUS via parcel and shipping services. PR/USVI HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking. As a result of recent seizures, investigative methods may initiate treating the same.
(A) **Threat Assessment**

Methamphetamine distribution and use is the most significant overall drug threat, and marijuana is the most widely available and used illicit drug in the Rocky Mountain HIDTA (RM HIDTA) region. MDTOs are the principal suppliers of wholesale quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin to the region from locations along the SWB, while West Coast-based DTOs supply high potency marijuana and MDMA to the region from sources in Canada. These DTOs exploit RM HIDTA’s centralized location and extensive transportation infrastructure to distribute wholesale quantities of methamphetamine “ice”, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Interstate highways I-15, I-25, I-70, I-80, I-90, and I-94 transect the AOR, and DTOs use these major routes to transport illicit drugs from California, Arizona, and Texas to markets in Denver, Colorado, and significant Midwest cities such as Omaha, Nebraska; Kansas City, Missouri; and Chicago, Illinois. Similar to other areas of the country, prescription drug abuse has increased significantly in the region, particularly in areas such as Salt Lake City, Utah, and Denver, Colorado, as illustrated by the number of opioid prescriptions issued and overdose deaths when compared to prior years.

(B) **Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

RM HIDTA has a strong management team that stresses cooperation and collaboration among initiatives to address current drug threats at federal, state, and local levels, while impacting the availability and use of all drugs throughout the Nation.

The Executive Board’s ongoing efforts are dedicated to facilitating coordination and cooperation among 10 Federal agencies and 124 state and local agencies that partner to reduce drug availability by eliminating or disrupting DTOs and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts within the RM HIDTA region. The Board’s efforts help achieve common goals and respond to current drug threats effectively and efficiently. Initiatives facilitate collaboration, coordination, and information sharing among all task forces and drug units both within and outside the RM HIDTA region.

RM HIDTA’s strategy is supported by an extensive training program, an intelligence initiative, aggressive enforcement initiatives, and a criminal interdiction program. Enforcement initiatives focus on targeting and trying to dismantle or disrupt major DTOs. Criminal interdiction initiatives have been established in Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Montana to address DTOs that transport illicit drugs into and through the region. A drug prevention initiative has also been added to the strategy. Enforcement initiatives, coupled with drug prevention, give RM HIDTA multiple tools to address drug trafficking and use.

(C) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

RM HIDTA supports the Strategy by targeting, investigating, and dismantling or disrupting deeply entrenched and extensively networked DTOs in Colorado, Utah, Montana, and
Wyoming (including DTOs that are international, multistate, or local in scope); MLOs; and
drug trafficking gangs. In doing so, initiatives disrupt the market for illicit drugs and reduce
the quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, MDMA, and opioids supplied to the
area and other United States drug markets in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast.

(1) Methamphetamine

The vast majority of the DTOs and gangs investigated by the RM HIDTA initiatives are poly-
drug in nature. In 2018, task forces and the Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network seized
over 1,070 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of over $30 million. During
the same timeframe, task forces seized 6 clandestine methamphetamine labs. RM HIDTA does
not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
South Florida HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The South Florida HIDTA (SFHIDTA) AOR is one of the primary drug trafficking and money laundering areas in the United States. South Florida has a diverse population of approximately 6.7 million residents with ties to Latin America, the Bahamas, and other Caribbean countries. As a gateway to the United States, the area offers optimal transportation connections to and from drug source countries and key transits zones. Other distinguishing features include vibrant tourism, international banking, and global trade industries – all of which assist in the flow of illicit drugs from source countries and key transit zones into the United States and facilitate money laundering activity.

Cocaine DTOs continue to represent the largest segment of drug-specific DTOs operating in the AOR, exploiting South Florida’s coastal juxtaposition to the Caribbean by using a variety of maritime conveyances such as freighters, cruise ships, go-fast vessels, and sailboats to transport wholesale quantities of cocaine into the region.

Colombian and Caribbean nationals largely comprise cocaine DTOs and work in concert with multi-ethnic, local, poly-drug DTOs to supply state, regional, and national cocaine markets. South Florida cocaine DTOs are mostly independent, though they may associate with the major Colombian and Mexican cocaine cartels that include the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s Pacific Cartel, Los Urabeños, and Sinaloa Cartels. Most of the cocaine that arrives in the SFHIDTA AOR transits the Caribbean corridor via maritime conveyances. The territorial scope of SFHIDTA drug activity also extends to major cities throughout the state of Florida, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, Kansas, Missouri, Tennessee, and most notably Georgia, New York, Illinois, California, and Texas.

SFHIDTA views cocaine, heroin, and opioids as primary drug threats. Secondary drug threats include CPDs, marijuana, NPSs, and methamphetamine. Cocaine continues its reign as the most readily available of all illicit drugs in South Florida. The historic revival of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia has amplified the amount of cocaine flowing into South Florida via the Caribbean by South American and Dominican/Caribbean DTOs during the last two years. Cocaine seizures by the SFHIDTA initiatives have exceeded the benchmark set in 2007 when coca production and cocaine cultivation were at a high for two consecutive years. Seizure activity represents a fraction of the cocaine smuggling activity that is occurring within the region under the radar, primarily due to the limited availability of dedicated maritime and intelligence resources at pivotal transshipment points.

The AOR continues to be the epicenter of cocaine-related deaths, outpacing all other drugs in the region and the entire state of Florida. The devastation caused by the increased availability of cocaine and poly-drug abuse in which cocaine and opioids/fentanyl are a particularly toxic combination are largely contributing to escalating mortality rates.

The scourge of the nationwide opioid crisis continues to permeate South Florida, mostly due to illicitly manufactured fentanyl and its analogs masquerading as heroin and sometimes
prescription opioids sold by unscrupulous street distributors seeking to increase profits. Fentanyl-related deaths dramatically increased in South Florida, surpassing those of heroin that were predominant in 2015. A growing number of cyber criminals are exploiting the anonymity and convenience offered by the dark web and cryptocurrencies and are importing these comparatively inexpensive, deadly substances into the region from China and Mexico via parcel delivery. Because of these innovations, street level distributors are making inroads into traditional drug markets such as cocaine and methamphetamine and expanding the scope of South Florida’s drug addicted subculture. This ominous threat is an ongoing challenge for the SFHIDTA initiatives that continue to pursue progressive cyber-investigative strategies.

While the perceived danger of marijuana by the public is diminishing in scope due to the legalization movement, SFHIDTA views marijuana and its variants (BHO, wax, edibles, etc.) as a significant threat to the region. The high level of diversion from states where it is legal, along with the prevalence of illegal marijuana grow house operations and the health and safety hazards they pose to consumers, are a key concern to the SFHIDTA AOR.

NPS remain prevalent in the SFHIDTA AOR despite diplomatic efforts to ban NPSs by the Chinese government. The synthetic cathinone, N-Ethylpentylone, is the newest NPS to enter the drug market and ranked fifth in the top ten list of drug submissions for the SFHIDTA region. Chinese labs continue to circumvent laws by creating new NPS immune to the ban.

Methamphetamine is becoming a more prevalent threat to the region, evidenced by higher than normal availability, seizure activity, and reported consumption trends. A sharp increase in methamphetamine deaths involving a fentanyl-type substance is one of the snowball effects of poly-substance abuse patterns involving the proliferating class of poisonous opioids.

Street level gangs operate in the SFHIDTA communities with an assortment of criminal activity and violent crime linked to drug trafficking, including the wholesale and retail distribution of illicit drugs, homicides and shootings, armed burglaries, home invasions, automobile theft, and ID fraud. In addition, the region is a primary hub for domestic and international money laundering, particularly at the integration phase where illicit dollars enter the financial world under the guise of clean money used for any purpose. Aside from bulk cash smuggling activity, DTOs use a spectrum of money laundering schemes to exploit the South Florida trade-based economy. The exploitation of the Black Market Peso Exchange, however, is the preferred method of money laundering for South Florida, along with the use of cryptocurrency to repatriate illicit drug proceeds to Colombian sources of supply.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

SFHIDTA fosters cooperative and effective working relationships among federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that contribute over 700 collocated full-time personnel who share the common goal to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs through long-term, multiagency investigations and operations. The SFHIDTA strategy comprises 33 initiatives that exploit the collective expertise of federal, state, and local agencies to target multiple regional drug threats identified in the SFHIDTA threat assessment.
The expansion of multi-HIDTA approaches to identify, disrupt, and dismantle traditional and emerging threats are key aspects of SFHIDTA’s short- and long-term strategy. SFHIDTA has made significant progress in addressing the region’s primary threats and will continue to intensify its response to the escalating cocaine trafficking surge, the opioid crisis, and more recently, an increase in the atypical availability of methamphetamine.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

The SFHIDTA supports the Strategy by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs and MLOs, thereby disrupting the illicit drug market. Further, SFHIDTA enhances drug control efforts by implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of agencies participating in the HIDTA and by increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs. The SFHIDTA also seeks to strengthen the relationship between law enforcement and prevention and treatment organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

Although indicators of methamphetamine are relatively low when compared with other drugs in southeast Florida, TAS data and anecdotal reporting suggests there is an uptick of Mexican methamphetamine trafficked in the region, evidenced by higher than normal availability, seizure activity, and drug-related overdose deaths. The SFHIDTA initiatives seized 71.73 kilograms in 2018. This is an increase of 111 percent from the 33.95 kilograms of methamphetamine seized in 2017. The Florida Medical Examiner’s reports shows, in 2018, there were 1056 methamphetamine-related deaths in the State of Florida. This is a 246 percent increase compared to the 305 deaths reported in 2015. The highest number of deaths in South Florida were in Miami-Dade County and the second highest in Palm Beach County. According to the DEA National Forensic Laboratory Information System, Miami-Dade County represents 50% of the region’s methamphetamine submissions, followed by Broward County with 33%. SFHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Southwest Border HIDTA – Arizona Region

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – Arizona (SWB HIDTA/AZ) region is a significant arrival zone for multi-ton quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine entering the United States from Mexico. Sharing more than 370 miles of border with Mexico, most of which is uninhabited desert and mountains, the southern border of Arizona presents a variety of challenges for LEAs in their efforts to stem the tide of both illegal drugs and proceeds.

The Sinaloa Cartel presents the primary operational threat to Arizona, possessing vast resources to distribute, transport, and smuggle large amounts of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into and through Arizona. Sinaloa exploits well-established routes into Arizona and has perfected smuggling methods to supply drug distribution networks located throughout the United States. The Mexican state of Sonora is home to central drug trafficking plazas controlled by Sinaloa that are used for offloading, stashing, and staging drugs, money, and weapons. Furthermore, Sinaloa’s influence in Arizona is growing stronger as it continues to gain control of additional drug trafficking corridors and routes in Sonora, Mexico, and neighboring Baja California, Mexico.

Drug seizures indicate that Arizona is a significant drug trafficking corridor and distribution hub for DTOs. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement in the region proactively target the transportation and distribution cells of these DTOs to disrupt the flow of drugs through and from Arizona, thereby directly impacting drug markets throughout the United States. Drug seizures indicate that DTOs are increasing heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine smuggling from Mexico into the region.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/AZ uses an intelligence-driven, threat-focused strategy to target the most significant DTOs and MLOs affecting Arizona. SWB HIDTA/AZ is organized into four initiative functions – enforcement (interdiction, investigation, fugitive arrests, and prosecution); intelligence (coordination, deconfliction, targeting, investigative case support, and threat assessment); support (training); and management. SWB HIDTA/AZ coordinates and supports the efforts of 631 full-time and 179 part-time participants from 73 federal, state, local, and tribal agencies.

SWB HIDTA/AZ supports the National Drug Control Strategy by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs, thereby disrupting the flow of illicit drugs to drug markets in Arizona and the United States. Specifically, SWB HIDTA/AZ:

- facilitates a coordinated threat-focused, intelligence-led strategy against the most significant DTOs and MLOs affecting Arizona and the United States;
- collects, analyzes, and disseminates actionable intelligence, enabling HIDTA initiatives to identify and investigate current and emerging drug threats; and
• enhances tribal, regional, local, and cross-border demand reduction efforts by working with established community coalitions.

(D) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

SWB HIDTA/AZ supports the Strategy by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. Specifically, SWB HIDTA/AZ:

• facilitates a coordinated threat-focused, initiative-led strategy against the most significant DTOs impacting Arizona;

• collects, analyzes, and disseminates actionable intelligence enabling the SWB HIDTA/AZ initiatives to identify and investigate current and emerging drug threats; and

• enhances tribal, regional, local, and cross-border demand reduction efforts by working with established community coalitions.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is the drug most frequently associated with property and violent crime. The SWB HIDTA/AZ initiatives reported a high level of methamphetamine availability in their respective jurisdictions. The high degree of methamphetamine availability in Arizona is correlated to increased methamphetamine production in Mexico by the Sinaloa Cartel and other MDTOs. In 2018, 4,199 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized in the SWB HIDTA/AZ region. SWB HIDTA/AZ does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
**Southwest Border HIDTA – New Mexico Region**

(A) **Threat Assessment**

Southwest Border HIDTA – New Mexico region (SWB HIDTA/NM) is a prime transportation corridor for illegal drugs coming from Mexico into the United States. It is also a common corridor for drugs passing from California and Arizona to the Midwest and beyond. With five international POEs, commercial transportation through the state, and a vast network of interstate highways and local roads, New Mexico provides many options for moving illicit drugs. But it also has a drug problem of its own. Overdose death rates remain high and new threats, like fentanyl, increase the challenge.

The state’s proximity to Mexico, its topography along the sparsely populated 180-mile border, its limited law enforcement presence between U.S. POEs, the lack of communications infrastructure and its transportation infrastructure makes it a significant smuggling corridor and a major trafficking corridor for illicit drugs destined for the AOR, but primarily to many other U.S. drug markets. Weapons and bulk cash are smuggled back into Mexico, primarily through vehicles utilizing hidden compartments. The sparsely populated international border between New Mexico and Mexico, along the three POEs, represents a high-risk area that presents many challenges to law enforcement; as a result, it is continually exploited by DTOs.

(B) **Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives**

SWB HIDTA/NM’s integrated systems approach uses coordination and criminal intelligence and information sharing to synchronize the efforts of enforcement, prosecution, and support initiatives. The number of participating agencies includes 17 tribal, 37 local, 12 state, and 11 Federal LEAs. Twenty initiatives include 12 multi-jurisdictional law enforcement initiatives, 1 statewide interdiction initiative, 1 prosecution initiative consisting of 8 sub-initiatives, 1 management and coordination initiative, 1 investigative support initiative, 1 information sharing initiative, 1 prevention initiative, 1 forensic support and 1 training initiative. The support initiatives focus on supporting other initiatives by enhancing their operational capacity. Enforcement initiatives focus efforts to reduce the smuggling and transshipment/distribution of illicit drugs, including the diversion of controlled prescription drugs, into and through New Mexico and the transshipment of bulk cash and weapons back across the SWB. SWB HIDTA/NM emphasizes the development of CPOTs, Regional Priority Organization Targets (RPOT), and OCDETF-level cases initiated through interdiction and investigative efforts. Additionally, SWB HIDTA/NM is also focusing on coordinating drug enforcement efforts on Native American lands. Currently, the Indian Country HIDTA Drug Task Force works joint operations with the tribal police departments of Acoma, Isleta, Jemez, Jicarilla Apache, Laguna, Navajo Nation, Ohkay Owingeh, Pojoaque, Ramah Navajo, Santa Ana, Santa Clara, Southern Ute, Taos, Tesuque, Ysleta del Sur, Zia and Zuni.

(C) **Support of the National Drug Control Strategy**

SWB HIDTA/NM supports the *Strategy* by incorporating its key elements into its own strategy, including:
• outlining a plan to disrupt/dismantle DTOs/MLOs and reduce the smuggling, transshipment, and distribution of illicit drugs into and through New Mexico;
• supporting a prevention component to reduce illicit drug abuse, including pharmaceutical drug abuse and diversion (All funding assigned to the prevention initiative is focused on the successful completion of these efforts. This is part of a border-wide prevention effort which includes the other four regions of the SWB HIDTA.); and
• partnering with tribal LEAs to target illegal drug activities within or impacting Indian Country.

(1) Methamphetamine

A decrease in methamphetamine laboratory seizures is attributed to the readily available Mexican-produced methamphetamine in New Mexico and throughout the Southwest. In 2018, the SWB HIDTA/NM HIDTA seized and destroyed one clandestine methamphetamine lab. SWB HIDTA/NM does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Southwest Border HIDTA - San Diego Imperial Region

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA– San Diego and Imperial Counties region (SWB HIDTA/SDI) are national distribution centers for illicit drugs entering the United States from Mexico and Central and South America, including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. In 2018, SWB SDI HIDTA removed over 182,296 kilograms of drugs valued at over $2.1 billion and proceeds worth over $12.0 million from the profit sheets of DTOs, MLOs, and TCOs. Initiatives focused efforts on major DTOs and investigated 160 DTOs, resulting in 83 open OCDETF cases. Thirty-eight DTOs were linked to CPOT- or RPOT-level organizations, and 138 DTOs were international in scope. In 2018, investigations continued to indicate that traffickers operating within the region continue to supply significant markets in almost every state throughout the United States.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/SDI assists in the coordination of joint operational and supporting initiatives to disrupt and dismantle the most significant DTOs, MLOs, TCOs, and their associated transportation and distribution organizations. SWB SDI HIDTA also emphasizes efforts against methamphetamine manufacturing, precursor chemical supply, and illicit use through innovative enforcement operations and demand reduction programs using a multiagency, joint concept of services. Initiatives continue to foster cooperative and productive working relationships among approximately 700 federal, state, and local full-time and part-time personnel from almost every LEA in the region. These agencies voluntarily participate in HIDTA initiatives to disrupt and dismantle DTOs, reduce drug demand, and make communities safer.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

SWB HIDTA/SDI supports the Strategy by dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs/TCOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs, specifically by:

- fostering long-term investigations targeting high-level DTOs/MLO’s/TCO’s that impact the two counties of the region, as well as other parts of the country;

- promulgating and participating as an active partner in the combined ISC/Fusion Center with all intelligence and information gathering units operating from a single site; and

- supporting and implementing a balanced approach to reducing drug abuse by funding and integrating where possible a robust Drug Demand Reduction (prevention) initiative, which fosters the interface between community anti-drug coalitions and HIDTA enforcement initiatives and partner agencies.
(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, as a result of methamphetamine manufacturing in Mexico and trafficking the drug to the United States by Mexican drug cartels, SWB HIDTA/SDI has seen an increase in methamphetamine use and seizures. In 2010, methamphetamine seizures totaled 2,560 kilograms and had steadily risen every year. In 2017 seizures totaling 6,554 kilograms of methamphetamine were reported. However, in 2018, methamphetamine seizures increased substantially to 36,127 kilograms. The SWB HIDTA/SDI rarely encounters a fully operational domestic methamphetamine lab. This lack of encounters is continuing to be validated by the increase in seizures at the California POEs, and by the SWB HIDTA/SDI initiatives domestic and international investigations. SWB HIDTA/SDI does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Southwest Border HIDTA - South Texas Region

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA- South Texas Region (SWB HIDTA/STX) is a significant transshipment corridor for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, other illegal drugs, and human trafficking. Although marijuana is more significant by weight, the primary and most perilous threats are methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin/synthetic opioids and the organizations that distribute them. These same routes are utilized to repatriate illicit proceeds back to Mexico. SWB HIDTA/STX consists of 15 counties, 13 of which sit along the SWB. These counties represent 50% of the Texas-Mexico border. Seventeen of the 25 POEs along the Texas-Mexico border are within the SWB HIDTA/STX. POEs, coupled with the regional interstate highways, make the AOR one of the most strategically important drug and illicit proceeds smuggling corridors in use by both domestic DTO/MLOs and Mexican DTO/MLOs. Despite the low population in some areas, the region greatly influences drug trafficking and availability at the national level. Gang activity associated with the Gulf Cartel, Zetas, and other DTO/MLOs and cartels continues to be a threat in the area.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

Federal, state, and local LEAs combine their efforts with multi-jurisdictional, collocated/commingled drug task forces and intelligence/investigative support initiatives. These intelligence-driven drug task forces pursue coordinated efforts to reduce the smuggling, transshipment, and distribution of drugs into and through Texas. In focusing on the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs/MLOs and by following the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, SWB HIDTA/STX employs intelligence-driven investigations and interdiction activities targeted at drug transshipments and money laundering, including extensive systematic follow-up investigations involving intelligence analysis, information sharing, and an aggressive prosecution structure. SWB HIDTA/STX initiatives are organized seamlessly into four types:

- Enforcement (interdiction, investigation, and prosecution)
- Intelligence/Investigative Support and Information Sharing
- Support/Training
- Management and Coordination

Through an intensive initiative and task force review and inspection process, along with statistical information gathered through the HIDTA PMP system, the Executive Committee holds initiatives accountable for their productivity.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

SWB HIDTA/STX will focus on dismantling and disrupting DTOs and MLOs active within its AOR to reduce the availability of drugs. SWB HIDTA/STX is committed to continuing
interdiction efforts seizing illegal narcotics, as well as disrupting the illegal southbound flow of weapons and currency intended for drug cartels. SWB HIDTA/STX also supports the Strategy through the exchange of intelligence and information among LEAs. SWB HIDTA/STX will continue to foster partnerships in furtherance of drug prevention programs with LEAs, young people, educational institutions and the public.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, 6,048 kilograms of methamphetamine was seized in the SWB HIDTA/STX AOR. Indicating a 38% increase from 2017. The reported methamphetamine seizure weight of 6,048 kilograms also includes 2,806 kilograms of methamphetamine in solution. SWB HIDTA/STX does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Southwest Border HIDTA – West Texas Region

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – West Texas region (SWB HIDTA/WTX) comprises 12 counties and over 520 miles of the United States border with Mexico. El Paso, Texas sits on the Rio Grande River adjacent to Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, representing the two largest cities situated on the Texas-Mexico border. El Paso, the most populous city in West Texas, lies at the intersection of three states (Texas, New Mexico, and Chihuahua). El Paso also sits along Interstate Highway 10 that connects to Interstate Highways 20 and 25. DEA’s 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment indicates that Mexican TCOs employ intermediaries who oversee shipments across the SWB and facilitate sales to a wholesale and mid-level client. These intermediaries can take the form of criminal street gangs, many of which have known ties to Mexican cartels.

SWB HIDTA/WTX’s main concern continues to be that the region is a transshipment and distribution hub for narcotics from Mexico into the United States. All other concerns are derived from this reality. Based upon drug seizure quantities, marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin rank as the greatest drug threats to the AOR.

There is reporting of an increasing amount of narcotics-related violence in Ciudad Juarez. This violence may be connected to the production and distribution of methamphetamine by some organizations and the resistance to methamphetamine by other organizations. While high-profile arrests and dismantlement and disruption operations have occurred, the flow of narcotics into the United States via the SWB HIDTA/WTX corridor has remained near constant.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/WTX continues to foster cooperative and productive working relationships among 1 USAO, 11 Federal agencies, 7 state agencies, and 16 local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and securing the SWB HIDTA/WTX 12-county area of the SWB by preventing multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from reaching their intended market.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

SWB HIDTA/WTX supports the Strategy by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. As the keystone region for the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, SWB HIDTA/WTX will support all efforts to contain and reduce the impact of DTOs on the region and will continue to:

• provide a broad range of drug intelligence/information to all participating and non-participating LEAs that it could potentially impact (i.e. - information regarding levels of violence south of the border that might have a spillover effect is shared with all task forces, particularly along the border counties);
• work with the area’s prevention partners to foster prevention coalitions; and
• use its training capabilities to provide drugged driving recognition expert training using the curriculum prepared by the Department of Transportation.

(1) **Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine use remains at increased levels of availability throughout the West Texas area. Agencies report no methamphetamine labs being discovered over the year. However, the smuggling and localized selling of methamphetamine from Mexico is a common trend throughout the region. SWB HIDTA/WTX does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Texoma HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The overall drug trafficking threat to the Texoma HIDTA region remains stable. Law enforcement and intelligence data indicate methamphetamine continues to pose the most significant drug threat to the region, as North Texas, the Texas Panhandle, and Oklahoma are flooded with cheap, high-purity methamphetamine. Currently, most all methamphetamine is produced in Mexico and transported to the region by MDTOs. Prescription drugs, heroin, synthetic cannabinoids, cocaine/crack cocaine, and marijuana also pose a significant threat to communities throughout the Texoma HIDTA region. In particular, the increased flow of cocaine into the region and signs of growing distribution of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl and fentanyl-laced drugs, are the most significant emerging trends facing the region.

Both the Dallas-Fort Worth and Oklahoma City metropolitan areas continue to serve as crucial command and control distribution points for drug loads sent to the region by MDTOs. These DTOs continue to dominate the wholesale trafficking of most significant drug types encountered in the region, sending large shipments of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to the Texoma HIDTA AOR, either for local distribution or as a transshipment point for loads destined to the Midwest and Eastern United States. DTOs and MLOs continue to funnel large sums of drug proceeds through the area, remitting the money to Mexico in bulk cash form as well as through large numbers of wire transfers and other money laundering techniques.

Outside of the threats posed by MDTOs, the diversion of controlled pharmaceutical drugs (from both medical facilities and pharmacies), production and distribution of synthetic opioids by independent DTOs (who often obtain controlled substances from foreign-based sources of supply via the Dark Web), and sale of smokeable synthetic cannabinoids from retail establishments, all pose a significant public health and public safety threat in the region. Additionally, independent DTOs have formed in the Texoma HIDTA region that specializes in the distribution of high-grade marijuana, generally obtained from Western states with legalized forms of the drug. These controlled substances are often just as destructive as other “hard-core” drugs and negatively impact the quality of life and safety of communities throughout Texas and Oklahoma.

In addition to MDTOs, many local organizations, including several street and prison-based gangs, are involved in the distribution of drugs at the retail level. Currently, several street gangs are operating in the Texoma HIDTA region, to include subsets of traditional gangs with a professed allegiance to national or regional gangs (i.e., “Bloods,” “Crips,” “Surenos,” etc.). Similarly, there are prison-based gangs involved in coordinating the street-level distribution of methamphetamine, as well as several hybrid gangs, which function in a looser sense and are more apt to create alliances with traditional rivals, to make money. All of these groups are to blame for rising levels of violent criminal activity in major metropolitan areas in the region, including drug-related shootings and homicides, aggravated assaults, thefts, armed robberies, burglaries, and fraud. In many areas of the Texoma HIDTA region, gangs have elevated their
distribution activities to the mid-level distribution of multiple pounds of controlled substances, particularly methamphetamine.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives:

The Texoma HIDTA Executive Board ensures that the program functions within the mission of the National HIDTA Program. The Executive Board provides the four subcommittees – Budget, Intelligence, DHE, and Initiative Review – effectively carry out their stated functions. These actions work towards increasing the efficiencies and effectiveness of Texoma HIDTA. The Executive Board directs staff on developing practical plans to meet the objectives outlined in this strategy. The Executive Board maintains interaction through Executive Board meetings, HIDTA subcommittees, and regional meetings such as the North Texas Crime Commission and the North Texas Police Chiefs Association.

The Executive Board continually evaluates the Texoma HIDTA’s 28 initiatives to ensure adherence to the ONDCP Program & Policy Guidelines and the regional HIDTA mission and vision. The Executive Board also determines if new initiatives should be implemented to address Texoma HIDTA’s regional drug threats.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

Texoma HIDTA supports the Strategy by identifying, investigating, and dismantling/disrupting DTOs that use the Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas Panhandle, East Texas and Oklahoma areas to transport, store, and distribute illicit drugs throughout the United States and MLOs that smuggle drug proceeds into Mexico. The Texoma HIDTA initiatives reduce the amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and opioids supplied to the area and other national drug markets in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast, as well as interdicting the illicit proceeds related to the drug trafficking activities.

(1) Methamphetamine

The vast majority of the DTOs investigated by the Texoma HIDTA initiatives are multi-drug organizations. Between 2016 and October 2019, initiative seizures of methamphetamine increased from 888 kilograms to over 1,999 kilograms. Although the increase has been the most dramatic in the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex, law enforcement in Oklahoma and the West Texas/Panhandle areas have also seen significant improvements in methamphetamine seizures over the last several years. Texoma HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
Washington/Baltimore HIDTA

(A) Threat Assessment

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA (W/B HIDTA) was designated by the Director of the ONDCP in 1994. The W/B HIDTA, unlike the first areas established as HIDTAs, was not a major gateway for illegal drugs into the United States. However, the region was a significant drug consumption market, especially for heroin and drugs associated with street violence, i.e., crack cocaine and PCP. It was this combination of significant drug consumption and widespread drug-related violence that led to the designation of the Washington/Baltimore area as a HIDTA.

In the years since the initial designation, the drug threat has evolved, and the W/B HIDTA has expanded. The primary drug threats in the W/B HIDTA region are heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and diverted prescription narcotics. Heroin has historically been a significant problem in the Baltimore area but, along with fentanyl and other opioids, has now become a significant problem in all regions of the W/B HIDTA – from Western Maryland to the Eastern Shore, from the Tidewater area in Virginia to the Shenandoah Valley, and throughout the Eastern Panhandle of West Virginia. Powder cocaine, the second long-established drug threat in the W/B HIDTA area, remains a significant problem throughout the region, and PCP is still a significant contributor to crime and violence in the District of Columbia and the immediate Maryland suburbs.

The W/B HIDTA region has also become a significant hub and transshipment point for drugs from the Southwest Border and the southeast United States. Interstate 95 in the eastern part of the HIDTA region, I-81 in the western part, and I-70 in the northern part have become major routes for moving heroin, cocaine, and other substances to Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the Northeast United States. The W/B HIDTA region is no longer merely a drug consumption area.

Several factors combine to make the W/B HIDTA region a fertile environment for drug trafficking. The region is relatively affluent and not as susceptible as the rest of the country to the fluctuations of the national economy due to the stability of government jobs and government-related industries. There is a well-developed transportation infrastructure connecting the six distinct major population centers (Baltimore, the District of Columbia, Northern Virginia, Richmond, Roanoke, and the Tidewater Region of Virginia) that enable traffickers to transport even large quantities of illegal drugs efficiently. Drug Traffickers and gang members can use the more than 200 banks that operate in the region to launder their ill-gotten gains. The increasingly diverse ethnic and racial makeup of the population enables Mexican, Colombian, Dominican, Salvadoran, Korean, and Vietnamese criminal groups and gangs to operate more smoothly.

By substantial margins, Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials responding to the W/B HIDTA Threat Assessment Survey identified heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and prescription narcotics as the primary drug threats in their communities. In all four cases, at least 75 percent of the respondents said the substance caused significant or moderate harm, and no more than
13 percent reported minor damage. In the cases of heroin and fentanyl, 100 percent of the respondents said the drug caused significant harm. Except for fentanyl, these drugs have been long-standing significant threats in the W/B HIDTA area.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

W/B HIDTA believes that coordination among LEAs at all levels is key to disrupting the drug market in the AOR. Consequently, since its designation in 1994, W/B HIDTA has fostered cooperative and productive working relationships among federal, state, and local criminal justice organizations, including LEA and drug treatment and prevention organizations. Currently, W/B HIDTA has 127 participating agencies. Information and intelligence sharing is required for all participating agencies and has become standard practice. The Gang Intelligence System, which identifies suspected members of criminal gangs, and Case Explorer, a case management system, are available to all agencies in the W/B HIDTA area and form the central elements of information sharing among those agencies.

In 2016, the W/B HIDTA developed ODMAP, a system that provides near real-time suspected overdose surveillance data across jurisdictions to support public safety and public health efforts in mobilizing an immediate response to a sudden increase or spike in overdose events. It links first responders and relevant record management systems to a mapping tool that tracks overdoses to stimulate real-time response and strategic analysis across jurisdictions. ODMAP presents a rare public health and safety opportunity with the ability to respond to a crisis as it is occurring. By combining the data in ODMAP with collaborative partnerships that span different agencies, localities can develop and deploy a real-time plan to reduce both fatal and non-fatal overdoses.

As of October 2019, more than 173,000 overdoses have been entered into the ODMAP system by almost 20,000 users in more than 2,600 agencies in 48 states.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

W/B HIDTA supports the Strategy in several ways. Fundamentally, it contributes to the disruption of domestic drug trafficking and production by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs. W/B HIDTA also provides significant support to the demand side of the Strategy by funding 12 treatment initiatives and seven prevention initiatives designed to help break the cycle of drug use, crime, delinquency, and incarceration.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2018, W/B HIDTA’s initiatives seized 38 kilograms of methamphetamine. Initiative investigations also led to the dismantlement of 7 DTOs and the disruption of one other DTO, the dismantlement of 2 laboratories producing methamphetamine, and the identification of 2 laboratory dumpsites. W/B HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.
National HIDTA Assistance Center

(A) Administrative Support Program and Coordination of National Programs

The National HIDTA Assistance Center (NHAC), located in Miami, Florida, provides critical contracted financial services that assist ONDCP in the administration of the HIDTA program, including a desk audit of each request for reimbursement submitted by the regional HIDTAs. The center also hosts the HIDTA Financial Management System (FMS) (a database used for budgeting and grant administration for all state and local awards) and the Clearance Management System (a database used to manage security clearances for the HIDTA program). The NHAC provides HIDTA-related training to the entire program and technology support through its HIDTA Resource Management System, a national HIDTA library and collaboration work space.

The NHAC addresses the need to continuously improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all the designated HIDTAs through seven distinct initiatives – Management and Coordination Unit, Training Unit, Media and Technology Unit, Financial Assistance Unit, National Marijuana Initiative (NMI), Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE), and National Emerging Threat Initiative (NETI).

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives:

The NHAC’s mission and vision are defined by its key stakeholders, ONDCP, and the 29 regional HIDTA programs. The NHAC provides consistent, indispensable services that meet the needs of the HIDTA program. The NHAC’s core services include tracking all grant activity for ONDCP; developing and delivering HIDTA-specific training; organizing national conferences and meetings; and serving as facilitator for three initiatives (NMI, NETI, and DHE). Through these services, the NHAC supports the strategies of all HIDTA regions as they respond to the unique threats facing their respective areas of responsibility.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

The NHAC proudly supports the Strategy by providing indirect service to the HIDTA program. The NHAC does not maintain a direct law enforcement function, but it supports disrupting the illicit drug market by improving the capabilities of the HIDTA supervisors and assisting with the electronic connectivity and fiscal accountability of all HIDTA offices. Thus, the unique strategy focuses on the business practices required to most efficiently coordinate the overall program.