Country Information and Guidance
South and Central Somalia: Fear of Al-Shabaab

Version 1.0
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Preface

This document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country Information

The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please e-mail us.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.

IAGCI may be contacted at:

Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration,
5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN.

Email: chiefinspectorukba@ic inspector.gsi.gov.uk

Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/
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1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by members of Al-Shabaab because of a person’s actual or perceived opposition to the group.

1.2 Point to note

1.2.1 This guidance looks at targeted risk from Al-Shabaab as opposed to a generalised risk of indiscriminate violence under 15(c) or Article 3. For such claims see Country Information and Guidance Somalia: Security and humanitarian situation in South and Central Somalia, December 2014.

2. Consideration of Issues

2.1 Credibility

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see sections 4 and 5 of the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

2.2 Assessment of risk

2.2.1 Al-Shabaab advocates a strict interpretation of Islamic law for Somalia and against the Western influence on Africa. Since the end of 2006 it has sought to discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia. The group is composed of Somali recruits as well as a number of foreign fighters (see Al-Shabaab: background).

2.2.2 Since 2011, Al-Shabaab’s military capacity has been considerably reduced due to the efforts of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) and Somali government forces as well as internal division within Al-Shabaab. Consequently Al-Shabaab has retreated to the countryside having lost control of its urban strongholds, including Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo. Al-Shabaab, however, still controls a number of rural areas and supply routes between towns (see Al-Shabaab: areas of influence and Freedom of movement and access to goods and services).
2.2.3 Al-Shabaab’s reduced capacity has limited it to, in the main, using guerrilla tactics and asymmetrical attacks in areas controlled by the government / AMISOM.

2.2.4 Al-Shabaab has targeted persons and/or institutions representing the international community and the Somalia government or those perceived to be supportive of the government / international community, including members of the security forces, parliamentarians, government officials, state employees, humanitarian aid workers, UN staff, NGO employees, journalists and those believed to be spying for the government. Indications are that Al-Shabaab does not prioritize low level targets, such as local staff from international or national NGOs, but if no preferred high profile targets such as AMISOM or the UN is available, they may go for an available low profile target instead. However in general people without a government or international profile are unlikely to be at targeted risk.

Suicide bombing of hotels used by the government or the international community has become a favoured method of attack, but the group has also targeted persons in drive-by shootings and assassinations (see Al-Shabaab: tactics and Al-Shabaab targets).

2.2.5 Persons who live in an urban environment controlled by the government and/or AMISON who are not connected to or supportive of (or perceived to be) the government or international community are unlikely to be of interest to Al-Shabaab (see Al-Shabaab targets).

2.2.6 In assessing whether a person is at risk, decision makers should take into account the following factors:

- the particular profile of the person, including, where relevant, previous personal security arrangements, their professional role, whether or not the organisation they work for, or with, is domestic/international and its perceived relationship with the government
- the extent to which they and their activities are known by Al-Shabaab and are perceived to support the government/international forces
- whether the person has been previously threatened/harassed by Al-Shabaab

2.2.7 For consideration of whether or not there is a general risk from indiscriminate violence and/or humanitarian conditions see Country Information and Guidance Somalia: Security and humanitarian situation in South and Central Somalia, December 2014.

2.2.8 For further guidance on assessing risk, see section 6 of the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.3 Protection

2.3.1 In areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, no effective state protection will be available.
2.3.2 In Mogadishu and other urban areas controlled by the government and its allies, the authorities may be willing to offer protection but they are unlikely to be able to offer effective protection given the structural weaknesses in the security forces, including a lack of resources, training and adequate equipment, weak command and control structures together with corruption and official impunity for serious abuses. The judiciary remains underfunded, understaffed, inadequately trained, ineffective, and subject to threats, political influence, and corruption. However some persons, such as senior members of the government and military may have access to resources to provide protection. A decision maker’s assessment of whether a person who demonstrates a real risk of persecution or serious harm from Al Shabaab would be able to access protection must be carefully considered on the facts of the case (see Protection).

2.3.3 For further guidance on assessing the availability or not of state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.4 Internal relocation

2.4.1 Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person.

2.4.2 As the profile of those people who may be at risk from Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu and other urban areas is likely to be high it is unlikely that internal relocation to other areas of south and central Somalia would be a viable option because Al-Shabaab may still be able to reach them. However those with a low profile or who are not associated with the government or an international organisation or where the risk is only local should be able to internally relocate. The person’s profile will be important and the criteria listed in 2.2.6 will need to be taken into account when assessing this.

2.4.3 Those without a high profile who live in rural areas under Al-Shabaab influence should be able to internally relocate to an urban area where Al-Shabaab does not have influence, as long as it would not be unduly harsh to expect them to do so.

2.4.4 For further guidance and country information see Country Information and Guidance Somalia: Security and humanitarian situation in South and Central Somalia, December 2014

2.4.5 For further guidance on considering internal relocation, see section 8.2 of the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status

2.5 Certification

2.5.1 Where a claim falls to be refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2.5.2 For further information on certification, see the Appeals Instruction on Non-Suspensive Appeals: Certification Under Section 94 of the NIA Act 2002.

3. Policy summary

3.1.1 Simply living in an urban area in South and Central Somalia does not in itself give rise to the risk of persecution or serious harm from Al-Shabaab. (For more details on general security see Country Information and Guidance Somalia: Security and humanitarian situation in South and Central Somalia, December 2014)

3.1.2 A person who is a high profile member of an institution representing the international community or the Somalia government may face a risk of serious harm from Al-Shabaab depending on their individual circumstances.

3.1.3 A person who is a supporter of, or perceived to be a supporter of the Somalia government may also be at risk of harm, but this will depend on their profile and individual circumstances.

3.1.4 Relevant factors in assessing any such risk are the particular profile of the individual, the nature of the threat, whether the person has been previously threatened/harassed, how far the risk would extend, the nature of any personal security arrangements and whether the person has ceased to engage in the activities that have brought them to the attention of Al-Shabaab.

3.1.5 Consideration should also be given to what protection is available for them from the Somalia government forces, police and AMISON.

3.1.6 If a person can demonstrate that because of their high profile and the nature of the threat they will face a risk of persecution or serious harm from Al-Shabaab on return to South and Central Somalia then it is unlikely that internal relocation would be an option, although each case must be considered on its individual circumstances.
Country Information

Updated 15 March 2016

4. Background to Al-Shabaab

4.1 Formation

4.1.1 The United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: al-Shabaab, published 19 June 2015, noted:

'Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 18, 2008, al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have undertaken a violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the series of transitional Somali governments. In 2014, the group continued to fight to discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia.

'Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In September 2014, former al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed and replaced by Ahmed Diriye.

'The group is composed of Somali recruits as well as a number of foreign fighters. Since 2011, al-Shabaab has seen its military capacity reduced due to the efforts of the AU (African Union) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces against al-Shabaab; and clashes, some violent, within the group itself.'


4.1.2 Global Security, in an undated report, noted that Al-Shabaab also has different names:

'Al-Shabaab (Also known as: Al-Shabaab Al-Islaam, Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Al-Shabaab Al-Jihaad, Al-Shabab, Ash-shabaab, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Harakat Shabab Al-Mujahidin, Harakatul Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, Hizbul Shabaab, Hisb’ul Shabaab, HSM, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujaahidiin Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement, Shabaab, MYM, The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations, The Unity of Islamic Youth, The Youth, Young Mujahideen Movement, Young Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, Youth Wing) was the militant wing of the former Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Union (ICU), that had taken over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006.'

4.2 Aims

4.2.1 Al-Shabaab’s objective is the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia, based on Islamic law and the elimination of foreign ‘infidel’ influence.  

4.3 Current Operation

4.3.1 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, stated in its 2015 Armed Conflict Database (Somalia Conflict Summary) that:

‘The combined forces [of AMISOM], along with the troops of Somalia’s first formal government in 21 years and pro-government militias such as Ras Kamboni, have made significant territorial advances against al-Shabaab, which has conserved its fighting strength through tactical withdrawals. The Islamist militant group has begun a reversion to guerrilla tactics in Somalia and Kenya in response to its losses.’

4.3.2 Annex 5.1 of the letter of 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security council noted:

‘The successful elimination of several prominent leaders appears to have done little to dent Al-Shabaab’s commitment and capacity to destabilize the region. Al-Shabaab’s shift of tactics, including the return to conventional attacks on military targets — both AMISOM and the Somali National Army — is cause for deep concern, particularly given the cuts to the AMISOM budget and ongoing challenges of Somali National Army troop payments. Al-Shabaab maintains an ability to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit weaknesses in the security and governance architecture. In the face of allied advances against the towns and villages it holds, the group can withdraw, blockade essential supplies from reaching the “liberated” populations, and simply wait until the security presence is sufficiently weakened or demoralized before striking again.’

4.3.3 The House of Commons Briefing Paper 7298, Somalia: September 2015 update, published 9 September 2015 stated:

‘In early 2015, Al-Shabaab was reported to have launched an “internal reconciliation process” between those strongly committed to global jihad and those more interested in restricting its agenda to Somalia and the regional neighbourhood. The process was reportedly only partially successful. There has been growing speculation about Al-Shabaab links with Islamic State/Daesh.

‘AMISOM announced at the beginning of 2015 that this would be [the] year when Al-Shabaab was finally defeated. However, there are worries that it has lost steam and become overstretched. Meanwhile, the capacity of the

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Somali National Army to hold territory handed over to it by AMISOM remains limited.\(^6\)

**4.3.4 Data provided by the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) for January to November 2015 gave details of all security incidents recorded and reported by INSO in Somalia.** It included conflict and criminal related incidents; serious (e.g. bombings) and non-serious events (e.g. demonstrations); and both security improving (e.g. arrests/seizures) and security-deteriorating incidents (e.g. attacks). This shows that of 4243 recorded incidents Al-Shabaab was responsible for 775, Somali National Armed Forces 809, AMISON 311, clan 270 and “other” 2078.

![Gross Incident Rate](chart)

**4.4 Areas of Influence**

**4.4.1 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Somalia, updated 13 October 2015, noted that since 2011, the Somali government has significantly increased the size of territory under its control in southern and central Somalia, thanks to an AMISOM-led offensive that has succeeded in pushing out Al-Shabaab from most of its urban strongholds.** This includes cities such as Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo, forcing Al-Shabaab to retreat into the countryside.\(^8\)

**4.4.2 The Danish Immigration Service’s report of its Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 2-12 May 2015 (DIS 2015 report) (section 1) looked at areas of influence of Al-Shabaab and towns under control of AMISOM/Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF).** The report noted that such information should not be considered in any way exhaustive and


\(^8\) Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Somalia, updated 13 October 2015. Subscription only.
will continuously be subject to change. The report is composite of many sources and details of those quoted are contained within the report.

‘Several towns in S/C Somalia have a presence of AMISOM/SNAF and other armed actors following recent offensives in 2014. However, compared by sheer mileage, the majority of the surface of S/C Somalia is still controlled by AlShabaab, especially the rural areas between towns with AMISOM/SNAF presence.

‘As of May 2015, a number of sources considered that AlShabaab was no longer in control in several towns in S/C Somalia with AMISOM/SNAF presence. However, while AlShabaab was no longer in control of any of these towns’ administrative zones, it retained the capability to carry out asymmetric warfare through guerrilla style attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne IEDs, as well as targeted assassinations against prominent individuals.

‘Further, the same sources emphasized that AMISOM/SNAF forces and AlShabaab continue to engage in recurrent battles, armed confrontations and violent attacks over territory within the immediate outskirts of a city, with surrounding villages changing hands intermittently in response to retreats and regroupings from both sides.

‘Information provided by several of the consulted sources suggested that as of May 2015 AMISOM/SNAF had a presence in the following towns in S/C Somalia: Mogadishu (Banadir), Luuq (Gedo), Doolow (Gedo), Kismayo (Lower Juba), Baidoa (Bay), Belet Weyne (Hiraan), Dhuusamarreeb (Galgaduud), Ceel Buur (Galgaduud), Qoryooley (Lower Shabelle), and Baraawe (Lower Shabelle).

‘Information suggesting that as of May 2015, the towns of Xudur (Bakool), Dhobley (Lower Juba) and Jowhar (Middle Shabelle) had AMISOM/SNAF presence was provided by one source each...

‘According to UNHCR Somalia, AlShabaab is present in much of the territory of S/C Somalia, including in those areas in the control of AMISOM/SNAF. In this regard, AlShabaab often maintains presence at the outskirts of many towns and in village communities where AMISOM/SNAF and Somali government structures exist in S/C Somalia. Some cities with AMISOM/SNAF presence could be described as islands in AlShabaab territory. Therefore many towns with AMISOM/SNAF presence are still difficult to access by road since AlShabaab is often present in the surrounding areas and has established both fixed and ad hoc checkpoints on the main supply routes (MSR).’


‘Despite military gains by AMISOM troops working in collaboration with the national forces, Al-Shabaab remains in control of some rural areas and supply routes. In areas under its control, Al-Shabaab has maintained its ban

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against operations by most humanitarian agencies. This denial of access to vulnerable populations along with the threats and attacks levelled against them by Al-Shabaab has made it virtually impossible for humanitarian organizations to reach vulnerable populations and exacerbates an already dire humanitarian situation.’

4.5 Tactics

4.5.1 Reporting on the bombing, in September 2015, of an Ugandan military base in lower Shabele which killed fifty soldiers, a report by the Jamestown Foundation stated:

‘There is also a risk of reading too much into the heavy casualties apparently inflicted by the latest attack, which seems more likely to indicate that while the group remains capable of mounting deadly attacks when circumstances permit, it is not necessarily making a longer-term comeback. In addition, such high-profile attacks are now relatively rare, and the group’s attacks are more commonly conducted against soft targets as shown, for instance, by the group’s (recent) killing of an off-duty female government official… The attack also does not materially alter the fact al-Shabaab currently controls only limited amounts of Somalia, having been driven out of all its major urban centers in the country during the last several years.’

4.5.2 The Royal African Society’s ‘African Arguments’ posted ‘Al-Shabaab has changed its tactics. AMISOM must do so too’ on 9 September 2015:

‘…In fact, what al-Shabaab has done during these various AMISOM offensives is retreat, without putting up much of a fight, into remote areas and towns still under its control. The group has typically saved its energy for later asymmetrical actions.

‘Many have tended to see al-Shabaab’s withdrawals as signs of weakness and defeat. But the reality is that the takeover of towns by AMISOM and Somali forces has often overstretched the peacekeepers, whilst freeing militants from their previous administrative responsibilities. This has allowed the group to concentrate on destabilising the captured towns…

‘The problem for AMISOM in Somalia is that holding cities is not the key to controlling the countryside. Rather, it is holding the countryside – where al-Shabaab enjoys popularity – that is the key to the cities.

‘In fact, al-Shabaab militants often regroup in rural areas in between AMISOM offensives and are effective in fighting back by advancing in broad lines, lengthening the battlefield. This enables the fighters to find

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weaknesses in its AMISOM defences, concentrate its forces at that more fragile point, and use its mobility to conduct surprise attacks.’

4.5.3 Annex 5.1 of the letter of 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security council noted:

‘Al-Shabaab continues to carry out frequent complex attacks within Mogadishu, typically employing a combination of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices followed by the deployment of suicide gunmen. During the current mandate, Al-Shabaab has displayed a preference for targeting hotels, especially those frequented by Federal Government of Somalia and foreign government officials. The most notable of those hotel attacks include: Jazeera Hotel (26 July 2015); 51 Makka al-Mukarama (27 March 2015); Central Hotel (20 February 2015); and SYL Hotel (22 January 2015).’

5. Al-Shabaab targets

5.1.1 The United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, (para 1g), published 25 June 2015, noted:

‘Al-Shabaab continued to kill civilians. This included politically motivated killings that targeted civilians affiliated with the government and attacks on humanitarians, NGO employees, UN staff, and diplomatic missions. Al-Shabaab often used suicide attacks, mortar attacks, and improvised explosive devices. It also killed prominent peace activists, community leaders, clan elders, and their family members for their roles in peace building, and it beheaded persons accused of spying for and collaborating with Somali national forces and affiliated militias.’

5.1.2 Sources within the DIS 2015 report stated that ‘The main targets for Al-Shabaab attacks are persons or institutions representing the international community, the Somalia government and its supporters or perceived supporters, including but not limited to AMISOM, the UN, representatives of the Somali government and international NGOs.’ The report also identified: ‘AMISOM, UN, NGOs, representatives of the Somali Police and the District commissioners, other state employees and representatives of the government’ as targets for Al Shabaab. Section 2.1 of Fact Finding

15 The Danish Immigration Service’s report of its Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 2-12 May 2015 http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E7BE9811-3CA0-4F86-
Mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 2-12 May 2015 gave more detail. The report is composite of many sources and details of those quoted are contained within the report:

‘UNHCR Somalia gave the example of Mogadishu where a high number of security incidents continue to take place, including targeted killings of journalists, judiciary, government officials and others.

‘However, one source stated that international NGOs are not targeted per se, but could be considered an alternative target for AlShabaab. It was explained that if AlShabaab is looking for a target and if there is no UN or AMISOM target at hand, then the international organizations could be the next in line.

‘Another source explained that there have not been reported many attacks against international or national NGOs. It was added that many national NGOs pay a tax to AlShabaab.

‘Some sources stated that AlShabaab currently seems to aim for spectacular attacks against high value targets, such as AMISOM, the government and the UN. Reference was made to recent attacks in 2014 and 2015 on Villa Somalia, hotels in Mogadishu where high ranking politicians and government officials congregate, on the UN in Garowe in April 2015, as well as the attack on the UN and AMISOM areas of Mogadishu International airport in December 2014.

‘In addition, one source mentioned representatives from educational institutions, persons believed to be collaborating with or spying for the government, people who refuse to pay tax to AlShabaab or business people refusing to pay money demanded by AlShabaab.

‘One source had heard of AlShabaab infiltrating and assassinating village elders inside the villages surrounding the towns with AMISOM/SNAF presence.

‘Two sources stated that local NGOs may be targeted by AlShabaab if they are perceived to be working for the UN. However, there have not been many documented cases of AlShabaab attacks on local Somalis working for the UN but it cannot be ruled out that it happens. Therefore the local Somali UN staff fear Al Shabaab and they take care not to be associated with the UN, as do their families in order to avoid being targeted.

‘One source explained that local staff of International organizations often report receiving threats on their phones, which they assumed were from AlShabaab. Further, AlShabaab reportedly has killed humanitarian workers doing data collection in S/C Somalia.

‘Another source explained that AlShabaab is cautious when it comes to targeting local people with no or a very limited relation to AMISOM, the government, UN or NGOs, such as tea sellers or tailors. If such people were systematically killed it would make AlShabaab extremely unpopular and turn the local Somalis in the area against AlShabaab. Therefore, the preferred target is international staff from AMISOM, UN or the NGOs.
‘One source stated that AlShabaab do not prioritize low level targets, such as local staff from international or national NGOs, but if no preferred high profile targets such as AMISOM or the UN is available, they will go for an available low profile target instead.

‘Several sources agreed that civilians are not directly targeted by AlShabaab. However, ordinary civilians are often killed, as a consequence of AlShabaab’s attacks on their targets in often populated areas with the use of IEDs, suicide bombs and hand grenades.’

5.1.3 The BBC news, reporting on an attack on a hotel in November 2015 which killed 15 people, quoted an Al-Shabaab member explaining why they target hotels in Mogadishu:

‘“We have been after the apostate general since August 2011 because he commanded the operation that forced us out of Mogadishu. We consider as legitimate targets five, six or seven hotels in the capital, I forget the exact number. They know who they are because they provide lodging for members of the apostate government, certain members of the diaspora, foreigners and other infidels.”’

5.1.4 The BBC report continued:

‘Like many other insurgent groups, al-Shabab often conducts double suicide attacks, waiting for the emergency services and onlookers to gather at the scene before sending in another vehicle to ensure maximum casualties.

‘Then it sends in the foot soldiers, to occupy the building, usually until all of them are killed by the security forces, and sent, they believe, on their way to Jannah (paradise) as martyrs.’


‘On 10 July 2015, a complex attack on two hotels resulted in the deaths of 11 civilians, with more than 20 injured. On 26 July 2015, a truck was detonated in front of the Jazeera Palace Hotel and killed 15 people. A number of parliamentarians and politicians have been targeted by Al-Shabaab using improvised explosive devices or in drive-by shootings. The Independent Expert has also received several reports of extrajudicial executions of civilians by Al-Shabaab, who often accused them of collaborating with, or spying for, the Government or AMISOM. The civilians are often executed within a few hours after the conviction and sentence has been pronounced by an Al-Shabaab court. Executions are often conducted in public.’

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5.1.6 The UN Human Rights Council report added, referring to attacks by Al-Shabaab: ‘According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attacks and threats against humanitarian personnel have increased and 60 incidents (deaths, injuries, abductions, arrests and detentions) involving humanitarians were recorded in the first five months of 2015.’

5.1.7 The House of Commons Briefing Paper 7298, Somalia: September 2015 update, published 9 September 2015 stated:

‘In recent months, Al-Shabaab has launched a ‘Ramadan offensive’, confirming that it is far from defeated. On 26 June it launched a major attack on AMISOM’s base at Leego, in which well over 50 AMISOM personnel, mainly from Burundi, were reportedly killed. This was the biggest assault on AMISOM since 2011. A week earlier, Al-Shabaab had killed dozens of Ethiopian soldiers attached to AMISOM. Other attacks were less successful but analysts saw the Leego attack as evidence of improved intelligence-gathering and weakness in AMISOM’s command and control systems. In July, there was a wave of bomb attacks in Mogadishu, which caused a considerable number of fatalities.

‘Al-Shabaab attacks continued during August and on 1 September it claimed that it had over-run an AMISOM base in Janaale, 50 miles south of Mogadishu. Soon after, AMISOM announced that it had retaken the base. However, it later emerged that at least 12 (it could be as many as 50) Ugandan soldiers had been killed in the attack. Al-Shabaab also claims that it is holding some Ugandan soldiers as captives.

‘AMISOM has had some successes too. In July, the capital of Gedo region, Bardhere, fell to it. Kenyan soldiers also reportedly killed dozens of Al-Shabaab fighters in Gedo at the beginning of September; military operations in the Lower Shabelle region have recently resumed.’

5.1.8 Annex 5.1 of the letter of 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security council noted:

‘The number and complexity of armed actors in Somalia, some allied loosely against Al-Shabaab, produced a profusion of command with varying control and very little accountability, thus undermining the protection of civilians. The almost complete impunity enjoyed by those forces, save in the rare context of inter-clan negotiations or a small number of prosecutions of Somali National Army and AMISOM personnel, created a fertile ground for them to continue.

‘As both the fight against Al-Shabaab and the group’s grip on populations still under its control intensified, violations against civilians rose, with both sides using weapons and tactics that resulted in large civilian and military deaths.’

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casualties. Meanwhile, other non-State actors used armed violence to assert themselves within the expanding federal architecture. Al-Shabaab used, and in turn was sometimes leveraged by, those actors, for mutual benefit.’

5.1.9 Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessments noted in January 2016 that:

‘Although areas under Al-Shabaab control have reduced, the group is still able to attack military targets in the south and central regions, capitalising on the local population’s frustration with foreign forces. The group has also expanded its operations north into Galmudug and Puntland, leading to an increase in attacks against military and international assets… Attacks in and around Mogadishu on individuals or groups associated with the government are likely to intensify. Al-Shabaab has increasingly targeted Mogadishu hotels popular with government officials throughout 2014-15, claiming several victims, most recently in July and November 2015 targeting the Jazeera Palace and Sahafi Hotels respectively.

‘… Al-Shabaab asymmetric attacks on government, military, and Western targets are highly likely to continue.

‘… Al-Shabaab will likely target high-profile government sites, military posts, and infrastructure assets using rifles, mortars, and IEDs, including VBIEDs. Political assassinations are also highly likely in Mogadishu, particularly while officials are in transit, underlined by the killing of several lawmakers in 2015. Over the last year, the group’s target set has expanded to include Turkish, Qatari, and UN assets and personnel. Government and Western personnel and aid workers are especially vulnerable while travelling; road ambushes and kidnappings are especially likely in Benadir region. Vehicles suspected of carrying African Union or UN officials are regularly targeted with roadside IEDs.

‘Airports are also likely to be targeted given their importance to military supply routes.’

6. Freedom of movement and access to goods and services

6.1.1 Sources within the DIS 2015 report (section 4) stated:

‘Moving by road is a challenge and a complex task for ordinary citizens in S/C (South/Central) Somalia. Armed clashes, poor infrastructure, checkpoints by Al Shabaab, government forces and other armed actors are risks for those travelling.

‘At such checkpoints travellers are reported to risk being exposed to a number of incidents with varying degrees of scope and intensity. Those
include but are not limited to robbery, extortion, questioning, harassment, physical abuse including sexual violence and detention.

‘Somalis do travel by road in S/C Somalia but each time they would carefully weigh the purpose of their travel against the risks involved. The risks involved are great and ordinary Somalis would only travel when they do not have other options, e.g. during health emergencies or food insecurities.

‘According to one source, Al Shabaab has no interest in hindering people in leaving Al Shabaab controlled areas for medical assistance elsewhere. Denial of access to treatment of persons in serious medical conditions could undermine Al Shabaab’s control in an area.’ [See report for details of sources quoted].

6.1.2 The United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, published 25 June 2015, however noted that:

‘Checkpoints operated by government forces, allied groups, armed militias, clan factions, and al-Shabaab (see section 1.g.) inhibited movement and exposed citizens to looting, extortion, harassment, and violence.’ The source also stated that: ‘The [UN] monitoring group [on Somalia and Eritrea] reported that al-Shabaab severely restricted medical care, including by restricting travel to other areas for medical care, destroying medication provided by humanitarian agencies, and, prior to the March [2014] AMISOM and SNA offensive, closing medical clinics.’

6.1.3 The same United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, also noted that: ‘Al-Shabaab blocked critical transportation routes to prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance to areas liberated by AMISOM in the southern and central regions.’

6.1.4 Sources in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the DIS Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 2-12 May 2015 noted that travelling between AlShabaab controlled areas and areas with AMISOM/SNAF presence is considered to be extremely dangerous and challenging due the many AlShabaab checkpoints. The sources quoted stated:

‘People do travel from AlShabaab controlled areas to areas with AMISOM/SNAF presence. However, it depends on the individual’s relationship with AlShabaab and how those individuals weigh the risks involved against the purpose of the trip.

‘One source explained that any person leaving AlShabaab controlled areas would be questioned about the purpose, destination and duration of their travel.

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'If a person decides to permanently leave an area controlled by AlShabaab and relocate to areas with AMISOM/SNAF presence, the person would build a false story about the reason for leaving in order not to raise suspicion from AlShabaab.

'If AlShabaab found out that the person was giving false information he could be killed.

'Likewise, every time people return to an AlShabaab controlled area they risk being accused of spying and collaborating with the government which could lead to execution, severe beatings and detention.'\(^{27}\)

6.1.5 Sources within the same report also noted that particular groups at risk when travelling from AlShabaab controlled areas to areas with AMISOM/SNAF presence could include but are not limited to youths, in particular young men, women and government supporters or those perceived as such. The sources quoted stated:

‘Youth in particular are at risk when travelling to and from AlShabaab controlled areas as they are targeted to join AlShabaab or militias.

‘The risk facing Somalis from abroad returning to an AlShabaab controlled area depends on the profile of the person returning. There is a concern that AlShabaab might target intellectuals, human rights activists, business people and those potentially looking as possible future government leaders or those supporting or sympathizing with the government or perceived to do so. Ordinary Somalis would not be targets as such, but they could be followed and spied upon by AlShabaab.’\(^{28}\)


‘Al-Shabaab has maintained its ban against operations by most humanitarian agencies. This denial of access to vulnerable populations along with the threats and attacks levelled against them by Al-Shabaab has made it virtually impossible for humanitarian organizations to reach vulnerable populations and exacerbates an already dire humanitarian situation.’\(^{29}\)

6.1.7 The UN Human Rights Council report added: ‘According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attacks and threats against humanitarian personnel have increased and 60 incidents (deaths, injuries, abductions, arrests and detentions) involving humanitarians were recorded in the first five months of 2015.’\(^{30}\)


6.1.8 Annex 5.1 of the letter of 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security council noted:

‘Humanitarian access remained extremely fragile, particularly as Al-Shabaab blockaded key towns and supply routes. Efforts by competing authorities to co-opt and extract benefits from humanitarian operations compromised not just the viability of operations but also the ability to work safely across different zones of control…’

‘Access by civilian populations to essential goods and services continued to be a battleground in the conflict between the FGS and its partners and Al-Shabaab.

‘Al-Shabaab actively obstructed access both inside and outside of its shrinking territory, driven by both ideological and strategic objectives, conducting attacks on humanitarian workers and operations but also on private entities providing basic necessities and services. In areas where it remained the predominant authority it ensured a hostile environment for humanitarian operations, banning certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies, restricting freedom of movement, and forcing the confinement of the civilian population. In some instances, individuals and their families were punished for accessing humanitarian assistance outside of Al-Shabaab controlled territory. In others, threats by Al-Shabaab to prospective beneficiaries of assistance resulted in the postponement of distributions.

‘In many instances where it had officially ceded territory, Al-Shabaab continued to make its presence felt, creating a climate of fear which dissuaded humanitarian operations…

‘The most significant obstruction to both humanitarian and basic livelihood activities, however, was Al-Shabaab’s violent enforcement of economic blockades on towns and key access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Lower Shabelle, involving the killing of civilians and livestock, and the burning of vehicles.’

7. Protection

7.1.1 Aljazeera reported in 2013 that:

‘The pace of development has been matched by the growth of a fleet of private, armed security officers who now stand guard outside hotels and restaurants.

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African Union forces still patrol the city, but are devolving many of their tasks to the Somali National Police. At the same time, AMISOM are training the Somali National Army (SNA), who are now taking a more prominent role in combat operations outside of the city, as well as maintaining security in the capital.  

7.1.2 The United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 (para 1d), published 25 June 2015, stated:

“The provisional federal constitution states the armed forces are responsible for assuring the country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and that the national federal and state police are responsible for protecting lives and property and peace and security. Police were generally ineffective. AMISOM and the SNA worked to maintain order in areas of the southern and central regions. Some towns and rural areas in the southern and central regions remained under the control of al-Shabaab and affiliated militias. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for controlling the armed forces. Police forces fall under a mix of regional administrations and the government. The national police force remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Security, while Somaliland, the IJA, and Puntland maintained police forces in their areas of control, with their respective police forces falling under their areas’ interior ministries.

‘Civilian authorities generally did not maintain effective control of security forces. Security forces abused civilians and often failed to prevent or respond to societal violence. Authorities rarely investigated abuse by police, army, or militia members, and a culture of impunity remained a problem. Authorities used military courts to try individuals believed to be responsible for abuses, when such trials occurred. The government established ad hoc official commissions to investigate alleged abuses by federal military forces and allied militias in the Lower Shabelle region. The outcome of the investigation remained unknown.

‘The Ministry of Defense’s control over the army remained tenuous but somewhat improved with the support of international partners. At year’s end the army consisted of approximately 18,000 soldiers, with the bulk of the forces located in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle, as well as the Bay, Bakool, and Gedo regions. The Ministry of Defense exerted stronger control over those forces located in the greater Mogadishu area, extending as far south as Merca, Lower Shabelle region, and west to Baidoa, Bay region, and north to Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region. SNA forces consisted of seven independent brigades. Army forces and pro-government militia operated alongside AMISOM in the areas where AMISOM forces deployed.

‘Two separate police forces operated in Mogadishu, one under the control of the central government and the other under the Benadir regional administration. The federal police force maintained its presence in all 17 districts of Mogadishu. Police officers in Mogadishu often owed their positions largely to clan and familial links rather than to government

32 Aljazeera, In Pictures: Mogadishu boosts security, 19 April 2013
authorities. Two AMISOM-formed police units composed of 140 officers each complemented Benadir and federal government policing efforts in Mogadishu. These police officers provided mentoring and advisory support on basic police duties, respect for human rights, crime prevention strategies, community policing, and search procedures. More than 300 individual AMISOM police officers worked alongside the formed units to provide training to the national police.’

7.1.3 Jamestown Foundation, Al-Shabaab Attack on Peacekeepers Cannot Hide Groups’ Disarray, 3 September 2015, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 18, noted:

‘…AMISON and its Somali and international partners continue to undertake projects intended to build up the capacity of the Somali security services, which should in time reduce al-Shabaab’s operational freedom further. For instance, on August 22 [2015], AMISOM announced the training of 200 additional Somali police who will be deployed to towns in the country’s southwest, which largely lacks any formal law enforcement presence. In other regions, AMISOM has launched community policing initiatives, although these are likely to take time to bear fruit.’

7.1.4 Somalia Current (an online newspaper) reported in September 2015 that Japan had donated 56 vehicles armoured with wire mesh to the Somalia Police Force. It noted that ‘The vehicles would be used to patrol the streets of major towns as well as respond to distress calls when residents call for help.’

7.1.5 A January 2016 update by the UN Secretary General noted:

Army

‘On 9 September, in an official statement, the President committed to substantive security sector reform, including timely and adequate pay by electronic means, an audit of the sector, the establishment of an interim procurement board, the transfer to a unified biometric registration system and the implementation of a national threat assessment.

‘…By the end of the reporting period, a total of 19,800 Somali national army and 6,748 Somali police force personnel were biometrically registered in the human resources system.

Police

‘The development of the Heegan (Readiness) Plan was completed by the end of October, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2232 (2015). The Plan seeks to establish basic policing services across Somalia.’

It envisages a police service of 12,874 personnel, based on a federal policing model...From 27 to 29 September, the Somali police force, supported by UNSOM and AMISOM, held its first workshop in Mogadishu on a new policing model for Somalia, attended by representatives from all existing interim regional administrations.

‘The Juba police training camp opened in Kismaayo on 23 October. In addition, 200 recruits graduated from a programme funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and implemented with the support of AMISOM police in Baidoa. On 11 November, stipend payments to the Somali police force recommenced, with a total of $4.3 million paid to 5,200 officers to cover eight months of arrears.’

7.1.6 Foreign Affairs published an article on June 23, 2015 and noted that:

‘AMISOM nominally numbers 22,000 soldiers from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. It could and should be much more efficient in its fight against al Shabab. But it is not clear how many soldiers are actually on the ground at any one point. The capacity and training of the AMISOM deployments varies widely across the countries. Some of the forces, such as those from Burundi, do not speak English and have little training overall. Many of these militaries were built during their country’s own political revolutions and have had little deployment or battle experience since. Very few of the deployed troops have had any counterinsurgency training and they lack logistics, medevac, and intelligence and reconnaissance support. AMISOM was to be equipped with ten helicopters, with Uganda promising to provide four and the other United Nations member states the rest. Three, however, crashed into Mt. Kenya as they were flying from Uganda to Somalia, and Uganda is now in dispute with the international community over who will pay for the destroyed aircraft....’

‘Another major official combatant in the war is Somalia’s own forces, consisting of the army, police, and militarized intelligence service. They have not been able to provide stabilization operations on their own because, as still mostly a collection of disparate militias, they lack the capacity. They remain beholden to clans and powerbrokers, and lack both a national ethos and training. When pressure rises, they mostly fall apart or return to militia behavior. Underpaid and often not paid for months, they frequently resort to selling their equipment to obtain some income. They are also notoriously infiltrated by al Shabab.’

7.1.7 The International Crisis Group noted in a report dated December 2015 that:

‘Though AMISOM, and particularly the individual troop contributing countries, have and will continue to attack the group’s strongholds, in particular in Middle Juba and Bakool, the lack of effective coordination and cooperation between AMISOM contingents, and between AMISOM and the Somali

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National Army (SNA) has stalled progress, which is unlikely to be resolved in the short term.\textsuperscript{38}


Version Control and Contacts

Contacts
If you have any questions about the guidance and your line manager or senior caseworker cannot help you or you think that the guidance has factual errors then email the Country Policy and Information Team.

If you notice any formatting errors in this guidance (broken links, spelling mistakes and so on) or have any comments about the layout or navigability of the guidance then you can email the Guidance, Rules and Forms Team.

Clearance
Below is information on when this version of the guidance was cleared:

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