UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER

April 1, 2026

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Complainant,	)	
v.	)	8 U.S.C. § 1324c Proceeding OCAHO Case No. 2025C00032
ADIBAHON JURAYEVA, Respondent.	)	

Appearances: James A. Harmony, Esq., for Complainant
Thomas Ragland, Esq., and Anahita Sami, Esq., for Respondent

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS – FINAL ORDER[1]

This case arises under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY[2]

On September 14, 2018, the Respondent filed a N-400, Application for Naturalization with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Compl. 2; Answer 1. Complainant alleges that Respondent submitted the application with knowledge (or reckless disregard of the fact) that the application was falsely made in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5). Compl. 2.

On March 3, 2020, USCIS denied Respondent's N-400 Application. Compl. Ex. J; Answer 3.

On August 25, 2023, Complainant served a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF). Compl. 9.

On September 19, 2023, Respondent timely requested a hearing. Compl. 16.

[1] *See* 28 C.F.R. § 68.52(c)(5).

[2] This section includes facts as they have been alleged in the Complaint. As is further explained below, the Court will treat facts as alleged as true in evaluating a Motion to Dismiss.

On February 24, 2025, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed its Complaint with the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Compl. Complainant alleges that the Respondent "filed an N-400 Application for Naturalization, with knowledge or reckless disregard of the fact that such application was falsely made in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5)." Compl. 2-3. The Complaint included the Notice of Intent to Fine Form (I-763) and Respondent's written request for a hearing. Compl. 9-17.

On March 25, 2025, Respondent filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief Can be Granted. Mot'n.

On April 4, 2025, Complainant filed an Opposition. Opp'n.

On May 5, 2025, Respondent filed a Reply. Reply.

On September 10, 2025, the Court notified parties of its invitation for amicus (Notice to Parties – Court to Invite Amicus Briefing on Issue Raised by Respondent (Statute of Limitations)).[3] The invitation was placed EOIR's public-facing website. *See* https://www.justice.gov/eoir/amicus-briefs . Notice.

On October 10, 2025, amici American Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers Association filed a brief in support of Respondent's position.[4] Amicus Br.

On January 5, 2026, the Court provided notice to the parties of the accepted Amicus Brief. The Court also served the Brief on the parties. Parties were provided an opportunity to submit supplemental filings for the Court's consideration (after receipt and review of the Amicus Brief). Neither party submitted any further briefings. The matter is ripe for resolution.

II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND AMICI

A. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Reply

In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argues the five-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, "begins to run when the alleged violation occurs." Mot'n 2 *citing United States v. Davila,* 7 OCAHO 936 (1997); *United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc.*, 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).

Respondent calculates the "clock" started on September 14, 2018, which the date Respondent filed her N-400 (Naturalization Application). Mot'n 3. According to Respondent, the Complaint should have been filed by September 14, 2023. Mot'n 3. Because the Complaint was well after September 2023 (filed instead on February 24, 2025), Respondent argues it should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Mot'n 4.

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[3] The Invitation presented the following issue: "What does the term 'action' in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 mean in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5) proceedings?" Notice.

[4] The Court thanks both the American Immigration Council and the American Immigration Lawyers Association for their helpful submission.

The Respondent also argues 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5) violations are not continuing in nature. Reply 1. Respondent analogizes the instant case with *United States v. Corrales-Hernandez,* 17 OCAHO no. 1454e (2023), which held that a § 1324c(a)(2) violation was not a continuing violation. Reply 5-6. "[T]he plain text [of section 1324c(a)(5)] describes a singular act— much like 'use' from [section 1324c(a)(2)] of a 'submitted' document (other similar words used 'file' or 'prepare') from [section 1324c(a)(5)] —which occurs at a fixed point in time." Reply 5.

According to Respondent, the "verbs 'prepare' and 'file' and moreover 'submitted' plainly describe conduct that occurs at a specific moment in time." Reply 6. Respondent asserts there is no clear congressional intent that the offense was meant to be a continuing violation. Reply 7 *citing Toussie v. United States*, 397 U.S 112 (1970). Respondent distinguishes the instant case from employment enforcement cases under § 1324a that involve an ongoing obligation. Reply 9.

B. Position of Amici

While Respondent focused on whether the "act" at issue is one discrete instance (vice a continuing activity), amici focused on the query presented by the Court in its Invitation -, specifically whether "an action, suit or proceeding" was initiated within 5 years of the claim first accruing. 28 U.S.C. § 2462.

Amici note the allegedly fraudulent N-400 was filed in September 2018, and five years elapsing from that date is September 2023. Amici argue the "action, suit or proceeding" language of the statute of limitations unequivocally means the Complaint (vice the NIF – which was filed within five years). Consistent with this interpretation, amici argue the "action, suit, or proceedings" occurred beyond the five-year point.[5] Amicus Br.

Amici rely on *United States v. Curran Eng'g Co., Inc.*, which states that an "action" refers to an adversarial adjudicative process before a judge (and thus it is a complaint filed with OCAHO, and not the service of the NIF that initiates the adjudicative process). 7 OCAHO 975, 874, 888 (1997). Amici highlighted *Capozzi v. U.S.*, 980 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1992), and *Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. FAA*, 144 F.4th 467, 480 (3d Cir. 2025) to support its argument that filing a complaint constitutes an action. Amicus Br. 3-4.

Amici further argue that a NIF is not analogous to a judicial complaint. Amicus Br. 5. Finally, Amici provide a policy-based or equity argument in favor of its interpretation, noting that if issuance of the NIF halted the running of the limitations period, the government could issue a NIF and then wait several years to file a complaint defeating the purpose of the statute of limitations. Amicus Br. 5-6.

C. Complainant's Position

Complainant takes the position the document fraud violation under 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5), is continuing. Opp'n. 4. Complainant maintains that under the test in *Toussie v. United States*, the explicit language of section 1324c(a)(5), and the clear intent of Congress demonstrate that the offense be treated as a continuing one. Opp'n 5-6, *citing* 397 U.S 112 (1970). Complainant argues Respondent had an ongoing duty to establish eligibility for the benefit and refrain from fraudulent misrepresentations; arguing *Corrales-Hernandez* is distinguishable:

> Unlike the violation of [8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(2)] discussed in *Corrales-Hernandez,* filing an application for immigration benefits under [8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5)] does create a continuing duty to establish eligibility and refrain from fraud. In the same way that an employer's duty to verify employment eligibility is a continuing duty in the [8 U.S.C. § 1324a] context, each day an applicant has a fraudulent application pending, he or she perpetuates that fraud. The continuing duty of an applicant for immigration benefits to establish eligibility for the benefit and refrain from fraudulent misrepresentations, shows Congress's clear intent to treat a violation of [8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5)] as a continuing offense.

Opp'n 7.

The Complainant argues (in the alternative) that the correct "start" date for the statute of limitations is March 3, 2020 (when USCIS denied the N-400 application), which would render either the NIF date or the Complaint filing date within the five-year window. Opp'n 5, 7.

Complainant declined its opportunity to address the issue identified in the Amicus Invitation (later addressed by amici) analyzing what constitutes "action, suit, or proceeding."

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss – Failure to State a Claim

An OCAHO Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 C.F.R. § 68.10(b). This rule is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).[6] *S. v. Discover Fin. Servs., LLC*, 12 OCAHO no. 1292, 7 (2016).

[6] This is the appropriate analysis when the issue brought via the motion is non-jurisdictional (which would trigger an analysis under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1)).

The five-year period for initiating proceedings is not jurisdictional but is a statute of limitations, subject to equitable tolling. *See S.E.C. v. Fowler*, 6 F.4th 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding § 2462 is non-jurisdictional); *see also FEC v. Williams*, 104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that § 2462 "is subject to equitable tolling").

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Complainant failed to timely file a complaint is best characterized as a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6). *See,* "In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must limit its analysis to the four corners of the complaint." *Udala v. New York State Dep't Educ.*, 4 OCAHO no. 633, 390, 394 (1994). The complainant's allegations of fact are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom are drawn in the complainant's favor. *Id.* "The [C]ourt may, however, consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference..." *Jarvis v. AK Steel*, 7 OCAHO no. 930, 113-14 (1997).

B. The Statute of Limitations at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 Applies to OCAHO Proceedings

In its Motion, Respondent argues the Complaint should be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Mot. 2-3.

OCAHO precedent has held that the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies in cases arising under 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. *See United States v. Corrales-Hernandez*, 17 OCAHO no. 1454e, 6 n.6 (2023). Moreover, federal courts have held generally that § 2462 should apply to administrative and judicial proceedings, including proceedings under the INA. *See 3M Co. v. Brower*, 17 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that section 2462 applies to administrative as well as judicial proceedings); *see also DLS Precision Fab LLC v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 867 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that "there is no reason why § 2462 should be applied any differently for claims under the INA").

Section 2462 of Title 28 provides that:

> Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.

28 U.S.C. § 2462.

C. An 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5) Violation Is Not a Continuing Violation.

Complainant takes the position alleged violation is "continuing," which is to say it began on a particular day and then continued on from that day until otherwise cured. On these facts then, Complainant asserts the preparation and filing of the N-400 application involved an ongoing series of related acts, which either continued on to present, or alternatively continued on until USCIS denied the application (in March 2020). Opp'n 3-7.

This position is, ultimately, inconsistent with the plain language of the statute as applied by OCAHO precedential case law (specifically *United States v. Corrales-Hernandez,* 17 OCAHO no.

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e.g., *Ruan v. United States Navy*, 8 OCAHO 1046, 723 (2000); *see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States*, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 n. 2 (9th Cir.1995).

1454e (2023) (CAHO)).[7] The "continuing violation" analysis under 1324c(a)(2) also applies to 1324c(a)(5). *See DLS Precision Fab LLC v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 867 F.3d at 1087.

In *Corrales-Hernandez*, the CAHO considered whether "the knowing use of a forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to obtain employment and complete the employment eligibility verification Form I-9 constitutes a 'continuing violation' for the duration of employment." *Corrales-Hernandez,* 17 OCAHO no. 1454e at 6.

To start, the CAHO examined the meaning of the word "use" in § 1324(a)(2), concluding it did not support the proposition a violation could be "continuing."[8] *Id*. at 8. Applying the CAHO's analytical rubric, the Court now concludes the terms "prepare" and "file" found in § 1324c(a)(5) similarly do not support the proposition a violation could be "continuing."

Like the subsection addressed in *Corrales-Hernandez*, the subsection at issue here (1324c(a)(5)), does not include the language of "to continue" (which is, by contrast found in a different section - 1324a(a)(2)).

Black's Law Dictionary defines file as: "deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record." Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The definition indicates a discrete act completed at the time of delivery. *See, e.g.,* 28 C.F.R. § 68.8(b) (stating that a pleading is deemed filed when received); *see also Corrales-Hernandez*, 17 OCAHO no. 1454e, at 8 (holding that "'use' is not a continuing concept but one that has a discrete end point").

Considering the ordinary usage or natural meaning of "file," the word is often used in the context of a deadline or date certain indicating a discrete end point and not an ongoing action. *See Wooden v. United States*, 595 U.S. 360, 367 (2022) (construing the meaning of a word through its usage by an ordinary person); *In re Tristar Esperanza Properties*, LLC, 782 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2015)

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[7] In *United States v. Corrales-Hernandez*, the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (CAHO) held that a violation under section 1324c(a)(2), for the "use" of a fraudulent document was not a continuing violation. 17 OCAHO no. 1454e (2023) (CAHO).

[8] The CAHO considered the lack of explicit language in the statute "indicating that 'use' should be treated as a continuing violation." *Id*. The CAHO also considered the ordinary or natural meaning of "use." *Id*. at 8-9. The CAHO applied the two alternative tests in *Toussie v. United States*, 397 U.S. 112 (1970), considering whether "the explicit language of the substantive . . . statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the [offense] involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." *Id*. at 9, (quoting *Toussie*, 397 U.S. at 115). The CAHO relied on analogous cases in the criminal context for support that use of a fraudulent document did not indicate a continuing offense. *Id*. at 9-11.

The CAHO reasoned that "once an individual demonstrates employment authorization and obtains employment through the use of a fraudulent document, there is generally no reason for any further 'active employment' of that document." *Corrales-Hernandez*, 17 OCAHO no. 1454e, at 12.

("The word 'arising' connotes, in ***ordinary usage***, something broader than causation...." (quoting *Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Cordova Airlines, Inc.,* 283 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir.1960)) (emphasis added); *United States v. Edgemont*, 17 OCAHO no. 1470b, 8 (2023) (CAHO) (relying on the ordinary usage of terms to define their meaning).

"File," the term at issue here is, perhaps, an even more definite term than "use," (the term analyzed in *Corrales-Hernandez*). Once a fraudulent application has been filed, that element of the offense has been met regardless of the use of the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5). Indeed, subsequent filings would constitute discrete events. *See Corrales-Hernandez*, 17 OCAHO no. 1454e, at 12, n. 11 (recognizing that "such later 'use' would constitute a separate, discrete violation, rather than a continuing one").

Further, the explicit language of the statute does not support a finding that "filing" could result in a continuing violation, nor does the nature of the offense indicate that Congress intended that it be a continuing one. *Toussie*, 397 U.S. at 115. Rather, a "continuing violation" is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill-effect from an original violation. *Ward v. Caulk,* 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.1981); *see also Corrales-Hernandez*, 17 OCAHO no, 1454e, at 7 (rejecting the Complainant's argument that "individuals who violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324c through the use of a fraudulent document would violate the law every day that they go to work").

Consistent with the approach outlined in *Corrales-Hernandez,* violations under § 1324c(a)(5) are not considered continuing in nature.

D. A Violation Accrues from the Time of Filing an Application or Other Document

In determining the correct "accrual" date[9] (i.e. when to start the clock for a statute of limitations analysis), it is helpful to consider first the enforcement statute language in tandem with the statute of limitations language. Section 1324c(a)(5) states:

> It is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly— (5) to prepare, file, or assist another in preparing or filing, any application for benefits under this chapter, or any document required under this chapter, or any document submitted in connection with such application or document, with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact that such application or document was falsely made or, in whole or in part, does not relate to the person on whose behalf it was or is being submitted

8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(5).

The statute of limitations focuses on starting the clock "within five years from the date when the claim first ***accrued***." 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (emphasis added).

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[9] 28 U.S.C. § 2462 requires "an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine" be "commenced ***within five years from the date when the claim first accrued***." (emphasis added).

Respondent argues for an accrual date based on the filing of the N-400 application (September 2018),[10] whereas Complainant argues for an accrual date based on the adjudication (and denial) of that same N-400 application (March 2020). The parties' arguments turn on the determination of when the claim first "accrued."

The Supreme Court of the United States has held, "that a claim accrues 'when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.'" *Gabelli v. SEC*, 568 U.S. 442, 448 (2013) (quoting *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)); *see also* Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining "accrue" as "[t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim or right").

In *Gabelli*, the Court concluded that government's claim against Mr. Gabelli accrued when he made fraudulent trades and not when the government later discovered the fraud. *Gabelli*, 568 U.S. at 448; *see also DLS Precision Fab LLC v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 867 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a claim first accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of a violation). At the time the trades were made, the government had an enforceable cause of action under the Investment Advisers Act, and the clock began to run. *Gabelli*, 568 U.S. at 448. The Court determined that an investigatory government agency was not entitled to the benefit of the "discovery" rule. *Id*. at 449-450.

This case is wholly analogous[11] to *Gabelli*, the Complainant here had a complete and present cause of action against the Respondent under 8 U.S.C. § 1324c when Respondent "filed" her N-400 application. Like the government enforcement agency in *Gabelli*, Complainant here is not entitled to a "discovery" rule – and even if it were, that date (ostensibly) would not be favorable to the Complainant's time calculation. In *Gabelli*, the government had to go find the fraud – here, the alleged fraud was mailed directly to the government, who declined to take ultimate action on it for the better part of two years. Consistent with binding Supreme Court caselaw, the Court here concludes the claim first "accrued" at the time the N-400 was filed (September 2018).

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[10] Respondent relies on *United States v. Davila*, 7 OCAHO 936 (1997); however *Davila* predates *Gabelli v. SEC*, 568 U.S. 442 (2013). To the extent that *Davila* remains consistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent, it remains good law. To the extent that it is no longer consistent with that authority, it is properly disregarded for the purposes of this case.

[11] To be sure, there is a Ninth Circuit case discussing triggering events under this statute of limitations (for a different federal agency); however, the structure of those proceedings (vice these) render that case to be of limited utility. *See FERC v. Vitol, Inc.*, 79 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2023). *See generally U.S. v. Curran Eng'g Co., Inc.*, 7 OCAHO 975, 874, 883 (1997) (holding that a claim under the Export Administration Act and a claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a proceedings "would accrue at different events because two different types of 'enforcement' claims are involved in each").

E. Filing a Complaint Constitutes an "action" under 28 U.S.C. § 2462.

The statute of limitations stops running with the commencement of "an action, suit or proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2462.

In this case, the NIF was issued on August 25, 2023 (within five years of the N-400 application); and the Complaint was filed on February 24, 2025 (more than five years after the application was filed). Stated more plainly, if service of the NIF commences the "action," then the government's claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Amici argue *United States v. Curran Eng'g Co., Inc.*, 7 OCAHO 975, 874 (1997) is controlling:

> "Action," "suit," and "proceeding" all generally refer to an adversarial, adjudicative process before a judge; it is the beginning of the adjudicative process that marks the commencement of proceedings for the purpose of section 2462. In the context of claims brought under [8 U.S.C. § 1324a], it is the filing of the complaint, not the issuance of the NIF, that initiates the adjudicative process.

Amicus Br. 3-7*, citing Curran Eng'g Co., Inc.*, at 888.

The Court in *Curran* determined that "action" indicates "a suit brought in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law." *Id*. at 888, (citing Black's Law Dictionary 243 (5th ed. 1979)); *see also* Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (Action "is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or decree.").

In *Curran*, the Court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that action, suit, or proceeding "implicate[s] some adversarial adjudication, be it administrative or judicial." *Capozzi v. U.S.*, 980 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court then reasoned that "action, suit, and proceedings" could not mean the unilateral issuance of a NIF. *Curran*, 7 OCAHO 975, 874, 888.[12] In *United States v. Ojeil and Ishk*, 7 OCAHO 984 (1998), the Court confirmed the holding in *Curran*.

> Precisely because the adjudicative role of OCAHO is not triggered unless and until INS files its complaint, it cannot be supposed that events prior to that filing and within the sole discretion of the enforcement agency/program manager comprise any part of the "action, suit or proceeding," the initiation of which brings closure to measurement of the § 2462 period of limitations.

Ojeil and Ishk, 7 OCAHO 984, 982 at 990.

OCAHO precedent also aligns squarely with Ninth Circuit precedent. *See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Williams*, 104 F.3d 237, 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an action was commenced for

[12] This position is consistent across OCAHO caselaw, including cases that arise under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. *See United States v. Dominguez*, 8 OCAHO 1000, 66 n.48 (1998); *see also* Amicus Br. 5, n.3.

§ 2462 purposes when the agency filed suit and not on an earlier date when it made a finding of probable cause).

And as a final point of analysis, OCAHO regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 68.6(c) confirm that filing by facsimile of a "complaint… toll[s] the running of a time limit."

An action, suit, or proceeding did not occur until the Complaint was filed with OCAHO.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds the violation is not continuing, and first accrued on September 14, 2018 when the Respondent filed a potentially fraudulent N-400 Application. Complainant filed an "action, suit, or proceeding" on February 24, 2025. The elapsed time between these dates is six years, five months, and eleven days, well beyond the five years allotted by the statute of limitations.

The Complaint is time-barred, and is thus, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.[13]

SO ORDERED.

Honorable Andrea R. Carroll-Tipton
Administrative Law Judge

[13] *See Hensel v. Oklahoma City Veterans Affairs Medical Ctr.*, 3 OCAHO 532, 1321, 1340 (1993) (holding that where Complainant could not establish an essential element of the claim, dismissal with prejudice was appropriate); *see also Zaji Obatala Zajradhara v. Hantang Entertainment Corp.*, 19 OCAHO 1557a 2024 (holding that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where amendment could not cure a defect).

Appeal Information

This order shall become the final agency order unless modified, vacated, or remanded by the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (CAHO) or the Attorney General.

Provisions governing administrative reviews by the CAHO are set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(7) and 28 C.F.R. pt. 68. Note in particular that a request for administrative review must be filed with the CAHO within ten (10) days of the date of this order, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 68.54(a)(1).

Provisions governing the Attorney General's review of this order, or any CAHO order modifying or vacating this order, are set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(7) and 28 C.F.R. pt. 68. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of a final order by the CAHO, or within sixty (60) days of the entry of an Administrative Law Judge's final order if the CAHO does not modify or vacate such order, the Attorney General may direct the CAHO to refer any final order to the Attorney General for review, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 68.55.

A petition to review the final agency order may be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit within forty-five (45) days after the date of the final agency order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(8) and 28 C.F.R. § 68.56.