Preface

Purpose
This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme.

It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis of COI; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below.

Analysis
This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general:

- A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm
- A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
- A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
- Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and
- If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Country of origin information
The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note.

All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date in the country information section. Any event taking place or report/article published after this date is not included.

All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available, and is from generally reliable sources. Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion.
Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information, and
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources.

Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, so that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided of the issues relevant to this note.

Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source, however, is not an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a brief footnote; full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

    Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
    Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
    5th Floor
    Globe House
    89 Eccleston Square
    London, SW1V 1PN
    Email: chiefinspector@ic inspector.gov.uk

Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of the gov.uk website.
## Contents

### Analysis

1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 6
   1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................................... 6
   1.2 Points to note ........................................................................................................... 6

2. Consideration of issues ............................................................................................ 6
   2.1 Credibility ............................................................................................................... 6
   2.2 Refugee convention reason ...................................................................................... 6
   2.3 Humanitarian Protection .......................................................................................... 7
   2.4 Exclusion .................................................................................................................. 7
   2.5 Assessment of risk ................................................................................................... 7
   2.6 Internal relocation .................................................................................................. 12
   2.7 Certification .......................................................................................................... 13

### Country information

3. Background ............................................................................................................... 14

4. Pro-government forces ........................................................................................... 15
   4.1 Government and international sponsors ................................................................ 15
   4.2 State armed groups (army and police) ................................................................... 17
      i. Overview ............................................................................................................... 17
      ii. Police .................................................................................................................. 19
      iii. Army ................................................................................................................ 20

4.3 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ....................................................... 23

4.4 Alleged human rights abuses by government/AMISOM forces ............................... 26

4.5 United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) ............................................. 28

4.6 UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ........................................................................ 28

5. Al Shabaab and other groups .................................................................................. 29
   5.1 Al Shabaab .............................................................................................................. 29

5.2 Other non-state armed groups ................................................................................ 30

6. Security situation ...................................................................................................... 30
   6.1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 30
   6.2 Situation in Mogadishu ........................................................................................... 34
   6.3 Al Shabaab attacks ................................................................................................. 36
   6.4 Clan violence .......................................................................................................... 39
   6.5 Impact on vulnerable groups .................................................................................. 41
      i. Women and children ............................................................................................. 41
      ii. Humanitarian workers ........................................................................................ 42

7. Humanitarian situation ............................................................................................. 43
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Drought / flood</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Eviction of IDPs</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Freedom of movement</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Returns</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Return of diaspora</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Maps and information resources</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sources cited</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sources consulted but not cited</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Version control</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in south and central Somalia is so severe as to make removal a breach of Articles 15(a) and 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 (the Qualification Directive (QD)) / Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and/or

1.1.2 That the security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that removal would be in breach of Article 15(c) (serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence) of the QD.

1.2 Points to note

1.2.1 This note looks at claims based on the general security and humanitarian situation in south and central Somalia. For claims involving targeted risks from Al Shabaab, see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab.

2. Consideration of issues

2.1 Credibility

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

2.2 Refugee convention reason

2.2.1 A state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. However, decision makers must first consider if the person faces persecution or serious harm for a Refugee Convention reason, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.2.2 Claims on the basis of the general humanitarian and/or security situation in south and central Somalia would not generally be considered to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
2.2.3 However, a return to an area under the control of Al Shabaab is unlikely to be feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area. It is also, in general, unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history (AMM and others, para 603).

2.2.4 Such persons may be at real risk of persecution by Al Shabaab because of actual or imputed religious or political opinion, and therefore a potential refugee convention defined reason (for information on Al Shabaab’s areas of control and persons targeted by the group, see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3 Humanitarian Protection

2.3.1 Where the person qualifies under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to go on to assess the need for Humanitarian Protection. It is only if the person does not qualify under the Refugee Convention that decision makers need to assess the need for protection firstly under Articles 15(a) and 15(b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

2.4 Exclusion

2.4.1 All sides of the conflict including Al Shabaab, government security forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have been responsible for serious human rights abuses (see Pro-government forces and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.4.2 Al Shabaab was proscribed by the UK government as an international terrorist group in March 2010.

2.4.3 If there are serious reasons for considering that the person has been involved with Al Shabaab or committed abuses with the government security forces or AMISOM, decision makers must consider whether any of the exclusion clauses is applicable.

2.4.4 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and the Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave.

2.5 Assessment of risk

2.5.1 At present it is only possible to remove nationals of Somalia to Mogadishu or, in some cases, to Puntland or Somaliland for those formerly resident and having clan connections in those areas. Therefore, unless the person can be removed to Somaliland or Puntland, the first consideration is whether the person would be at risk on return to Mogadishu.

2.5.2 If so, decision makers must whether they can reasonably be expected to relocate to another area in Somalia. That will, in part, depend on whether the
person can get to that area safely and, if so, the general security and humanitarian situation there.

a. Humanitarian situation: Mogadishu

2.5.3 The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of K.A.B. v. Sweden - 886/11 - Chamber Judgment [2013] ECHR 814 (05 September 2013), having considered the case on 2 July 2013, found that there is no general Article 3 risk in Mogadishu.

2.5.4 In the country guidance case of MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), heard 10, 11, 12, 13, 25 February and 9 September 2014, the Upper Tribunal held that a person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans (or groups) may have little to offer (para 407(f)).

2.5.5 The Tribunal also held that the significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assist with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members (para 407(g)). (See also the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): majority clans and minority groups).

2.5.6 The humanitarian situation in Mogadishu has continued to improve since KAB and MOJ were heard in 2013 and 2014 respectively (see Pro-government forces, Security situation, Humanitarian situation and return of diaspora to Somalia).

2.5.7 If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, decision makers need to undertake a careful assessment of all of the person’s circumstances.

2.5.8 The UT in MOJ and Others stated that these considerations will include, but are not limited to, the person’s:

- circumstances in Mogadishu before departure
- length of absence from Mogadishu
- family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu
- access to financial resources
- prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment
- availability of remittances from abroad
- means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom
- why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an
appellant to secure financial support on return (para 407 (h))

2.5.9 The Tribunal went on to clarify:

‘Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the economic boom, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away’ (para 407(h)).

‘It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will also not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms’ (para 408).

For guidance on Articles 2 and 3 ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.

b. Humanitarian situation: Outside Mogadishu

2.5.10 The country guidance case of AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) (28 November 2011), heard 13 to 21 June and 15 July 2011, found that there is no generalised risk of Article 3 / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD harm as a result of armed conflict in south and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu (paragraph 597). However, each case will need to be considered on its individual circumstances.

2.5.11 Since AMM was promulgated, the security situation, although volatile, has generally improved across the country and there continues to be no generalised risk of a breach of Article 3 as a result of the conflict (see Security situation, Humanitarian situation, and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.12 However, ongoing drought in 2017 lead to food insecurity and an increase in internally displaced people (IDPs). Famine was averted largely due to international aid; as of July 2018 fewer people are in need of humanitarian assistance than at the beginning of 2018. But above average rainfall and flooding in the April – June rainy season have affected people in south and central areas of Somalia, resulting in an increase in waterborne diseases such as cholera, an increase in IDPs and economic damage. There remain difficulties in delivery of aid to parts of the central and southern regions by humanitarian agencies due to insecurity, illegal checkpoints and extortion. Conditions in IDP camps have been affected by flooding, with basic facilities such as shelter and latrines destroyed. Humanitarian conditions remain poor for many people in these areas, but conditions vary from place to place. Each case must be considered on its own merits however, conditions generally do not breach Article 3 (see Humanitarian situation.)

2.5.13 For general guidance on consideration of Article 3 ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD, see Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.
c. Security situation: Mogadishu

2.5.14 Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive applies only to civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants, and not those who are party to the conflict. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

2.5.15 In the country guidance case of MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), the Tribunal held that ‘Generally, a person who is “an ordinary civilian” (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive’ (para 407(a)) and that ‘there has been significant and durable change in the security situation in Mogadishu following Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from the city in August 2011 and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city’ (para 407(b)).

2.5.16 Overall security in Mogadishu in 2017 saw modest improvements with less frequent assassinations and car bombings, although conflict levels remained high and the situation volatile. Al Shabaab continued to mount attacks in Mogadishu, including in October 2017; the detonation of an improvised explosive device which killed over 500 people and injured over 300, constituting a substantial proportion of the documented fatalities and injuries during the year. The target of the attack is unclear but may have been government and AMISOM buildings. The Federal Government responded to the attack by declaring new military campaigns against Al Shabaab and additional AMISOM forces. The number of targeted assassinations by Al Shabaab continued to increase in the period from December 2017 to April 2018. However, sources indicate that Al Shabaab regard only certain people as ‘legitimate targets’ and most civilians are not seen as such (see Al Shabaab, Security situation and country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.17 The general security situation across the country, including in Mogadishu, while continuing to be volatile, has improved since MOJ was promulgated, allowing some who have fled the country and diaspora to return to Mogadishu (see Security situation, Freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.18 Therefore, there are not strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from MOJ & Ors. In general, an ordinary civilian is unlikely to be at risk of harm that would breach Article 15(c). However each case must be considered on its individual circumstances.

2.5.19 Even where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.

2.5.20 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.
d. Security situation: Outside Mogadishu

2.5.21 The Tribunal in AMM and others also found that fighting in southern and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu was both sporadic and localised, and was not such as to place every person in that part of the country at real risk of harm that breaches Article 15(c) (paragraph 597).

2.5.22 The security situation throughout Somalia remains volatile. Most urban areas are now held by the Somali authorities with assistance from AMISOM. Al Shabaab is unable to hold areas if AMISOM decides to seize and maintain control of them, but if lack of resources should force AMISOM to withdraw, Al Shabaab will, in most cases, immediately seize the vacated areas and take retribution against the local population. Al Shabaab remains a potent threat however, it has limited resources and sources consider it unlikely that it would be able to take major cities such as Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa and Belet Weyne (see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.23 Al Shabaab controls most rural areas in south and central Somalia and although it is not militarily present everywhere, it 'rules' these areas through fear and intimidation (see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.24 Al Shabaab continues with its asymmetric warfare outside of Mogadishu, but this tends to be in the form of targeted attacks against government security forces and AMISOM, particularly along supply routes, and generally civilians will not be directly targeted (see Al Shabaab attacks).

2.5.25 Clan violence continues to occur but this is usually in the form of localised disputes leading to targeted assassinations, not generalised violence (see Security situation).

2.5.26 The security situation has in general improved since AMM and others was promulgated in 2011 (see Security situation, maps and information resources and country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.5.27 Therefore the evidence does not provide strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from existing country guidance caselaw.

2.5.28 Although there is no general Article 15(c) risk in southern and central Somalia outside Mogadishu, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. However, it is unlikely that, in general, most people would be at risk of harm that would breach Article 15(c).

2.5.29 The general security situation is not such as to place every person at real risk of harm that breaches Article 15(c). If it is accepted, on the individual facts and circumstances of the case, that the person is at risk of harm in breach of Article 15(c), then that person would not be able to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities.

2.5.30 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.
2.6 Internal relocation

2.6.1 Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person, referring to the country information (see Security situation, maps and information resources, freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

a. Mogadishu

2.6.2 The Upper Tribunal in MOJ and Others held that:

‘... the evidence indicates clearly that it is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution. On the other hand, relocation in Mogadishu for a person of a minority clan with no former links to the city, no access to funds and no other form of clan, family or social support is unlikely to be realistic as, in the absence of means to establish a home and some form of ongoing financial support, there will be a real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards’ (paras 424 and 425).

2.6.3 The security and humanitarian situation has improved since AMM and the caselaw remains applicable. Ordinary civilians returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence, including those from other parts of Somalia who had not previously lived there, depending on their circumstances, will in general face no real risk of a breach under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD and, may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk.

2.6.4 In relation to a person from a minority clan (or group), in the circumstances as outlined above, the evidence does not support a departure from existing country guidance caselaw.

b. Outside Mogadishu

2.6.5 If a person cannot remain in Mogadishu, decision makers must establish whether that person could reasonably return elsewhere in Somalia.

2.6.6 In AMM and others, the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation to an area controlled by Al Shabaab is not feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area and is in general unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history (paras 598-601) (see also security situation, freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.6.7 For areas of south and central Somalia which are not under the control of Al Shabaab, in AMM and others the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation is in general unlikely to be an option if the place of proposed relocation is stricken by famine or near famine. In addition, family and/or clan connections may have an important part to play in determining the reasonableness of a proposed place of relocation. Travel by land across southern and central
Somalia to a home area or proposed place of relocation may well, in general, pose real risks of serious harm, not only from Al Shabaab checkpoints but also as a result of the, then, present famine conditions. Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence (paras 603-605) (see also Freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia: Women Fearing Gender-based Violence).

2.6.8 Although some areas of south and central Somalia are facing serious humanitarian conditions, including the repercussions of previous droughts and subsequent flooding in Shebelle Valley and Baidoa town, this is not country wide and internal relocation may be a reasonable option, after consideration of the individual facts and circumstances (see Drought / flood and Internally Displaced Persons.)

2.6.9 If a person is not able to remain in Mogadishu, relocation to another part of south and central Somalia which is not controlled by Al Shabaab may be reasonable in some cases where the person has family and / or clan connections.

2.6.10 Relocation to an area controlled by Al Shabaab will not generally be reasonable.

2.6.11 Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of serious harm.

2.6.12 For further general guidance on internal relocation and the factors to be considered, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.7 Certification

2.7.1 Where a claim is refused on the basis that the person is ‘an ordinary civilian’ (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence and fears the general security and/or humanitarian situation, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

2.7.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
3. Background

3.1.1 A regularly updated background to the situation in Somalia is provided in the BBC Country Profile of Somalia¹.

3.1.2 The European Asylum Support Office (EASO)'s Country of Origin Information report, South and Central Somalia Country overview², dated August 2014, cited various sources and provided a country overview.


3.1.3 A BBC Map⁸, updated February 2018, showed the areas of influence and control by various groups in Somalia:

---

¹ BBC News, Somalia Country Profile, 4 January 2018, [url]
² EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information report 2014, [url]
³ Reliefweb, Somalia, [url]
⁴ Reliefweb, Somalia, [url]
⁵ Ecoli.net, Somalia: Maps, [url]
⁶ Ecoli.net, Somalia: Maps, [url]
⁷ Live Universal Awareness Map, Somalia, [url]
⁸ BBC News, Who are Somalia’s al-Shabab?, map updated February 2018, [url]
4. Pro-government forces

4.1 Government and international sponsors

4.1.1 Government and international sponsors at the international London Somalia Conference held in May 2017 agreed a ‘New Partnership for Somalia for Peace, Stability and Security. A paper from the conference, ‘A Framework for Mutual Accountability and Accelerated Progress’, gave details of the security measures the Somali Government and international community committed to work to together to achieve:

‘1. Political agreement between the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] and the FMS [Federal Member States] on a national security architecture defining the sizes, distributions and compositions of regional and federal forces and providing clarity on command and control and resourcing responsibilities.

‘2. Recognising the interdependence of security, politics and development, a Security Pact between Somalia and the international community setting out a shared vision for a comprehensive approach to security, with clear milestones including for security sector reform and implementation of the national security architecture, and the establishment of civilian oversight of all security sector institutions.

‘3. A conditions-based transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali-led security institutions and forces that are affordable, accountable, acceptable and able and that are managed in line with broader systems for public financial management, oversight and accountability.

‘4. Increased coordination and effectiveness of military and non-military interventions, including on countering violent extremism and early recovery and extension of state authority, resulting in increased success in defeating terrorist and insurgent groups, particularly Al Shabaab.

‘5. Establishment of coordination mechanisms for better coordinated, more transparent and predictable international support to federal and regional components of the national security architecture accelerating security sector reform.\(^9\)

4.1.2 Since the framework was agreed in May 2017, the UN Security council noted, in a statement by the President of the Security Council on 2 June 2018, that there has been ‘progress on developing a conditions-based transition plan, with clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Somali security institutions’ \(^10\).

4.1.3 The UN Security Council in their ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ published on 2 May 2018 noted that the transition planning process has focused on four areas since December 2017:

\(^9\) London Conference Somalia, New Partnership for Somalia (Table 2 – security p.9), May 2017, [url](https://example.com)

\(^10\) UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 7 June 2018, [url](https://example.com)
‘...the operational handover of locations from AMISOM to the Somali security forces; institutional capacity-building; the implementation of the national security architecture; and the alignment of supporting activities, such as initiatives regarding stabilization, local governance and preventing and countering violent extremism, with locations to be handed over by AMISOM.’¹¹

4.1.4 At the UN Security Council meeting on 15 May 2018 in a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Michael Keating noted:

‘A measure of progress is that the security transition plan was adopted by Somalia’s Council of Ministers on 19 April [2018]. The plan is designed to build Somali operational and institutional capacity not only for the armed forces, but also in areas of the most basic security concern to the population, including justice, accountable local governance, freedom of movement and provision of services. The plan was endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Committee on 30 April [2018] and welcomed by all partners at the high-level security meeting held in Brussels on 2 May [2018]. The imperative now is to implement it. Critical will be ensuring national ownership and leadership of the plan through the National Security Council structures under Somali leadership.’¹²

4.1.5 Jane’s, in the Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia updated 5 June 2018, noted the international groups involved in the training of Somali soldiers:

‘Training has been conducted by Ethiopian, Ugandan, and Kenyan troops to a limited extent, mostly outside Somalia. A number of other African countries have offered to train TFG forces, including South Africa and Tanzania.

‘EUTM-Somalia [EU Training Mission-Somalia] was launched in April 2010; in December 2016 its mandate was extended until 31 December 2018. Its core training team and support staff of 150 members is drawn from 11 EU countries (Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom) and Serbia.

‘The EUTM is keen to emphasise that it is creating units that cut across the clan divisions that plague Somalia. This, it says, is aimed at creating a truly national army to replace the various clan militias that fight the al-Shabaab Islamist militant group on behalf of the country's weak TFG.

‘Since 2010, EUTM Somalia has contributed to the training of approximately 3,600 Somali soldiers with a focus on the training of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Junior Officers, specialists, and trainers. Most recently, in mid-August 2016 a number of officers, junior officers and privates completed a five-month training under the auspice of the EUTM. EUTM is currently in the midst of a phased transfer to Somalia after improvements in the security environment there.

‘However, without basic housing and equipment for Somalia's soldiers the EU's military training mission will fail to achieve its long-term objectives,

¹¹ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 57), url
¹² UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018 (page 3), url
according to one of the former commanders of the mission. EUTM-Somalia hopes to receive in 2015 around EUR2.5 million (USD2.9 million) from the EU’s funds for development and humanitarian aid, which could be used for the soldiers’ non-lethal supplies such as uniforms and housing. The mission was granted a budget of EUR23 million for 2017 and 2018 in December 2016.

‘The UAE and Turkey have also opened training camps in Somalia in 2015 and 2017 respectively.’

4.1.6 On the Forces Network website in an article entitled What Are British Troops Doing In Somalia? published 13 November 2017 it stated: ‘[…] the UK has around 85 military personnel stationed here across a range of missions. Some work with African Union peacekeepers while others directly train Somalia’s Army.’

4.2 State armed groups (army and police)

i. Overview

4.2.1 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights, covering 2017, and published 20 April 2018 (USSD report 2017) summarised the remit and structure of the police and army:

‘The provisional federal constitution states that the armed forces are responsible for assuring the country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and that the national federal and state police are responsible for protecting lives, property, peace, and security […]

‘The Ministry of Defense is responsible for controlling the armed forces. Police forces fall under a mix of local and regional administrations and the government. The national police force remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Security, while regional authorities maintained police forces under their areas’ interior or security ministries.’

4.2.2 The EASO Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security situation covering events from 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, (EASO report 2017) using a variety of sources, noted several problems which hindered the operational capability of the Somali security forces. These included irregular payment of police and army staff, the presence of clan alliances, Al Shabab infiltration, problems of ‘corruption, mismanagement and financial constraints’ and unclear responsibilities and competences between the federal and regional state-level security forces.

4.2.3 The Security Pact, adopted by the Federal Republic of Somalia and 42 International partners on 11 May 2017, gave details of Somalia’s political agreement on security reached on 16 April 2017:

‘These recommendations take into account and build on the existing

13 Jane’s, Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Training), updated 5 June 2018, url [subscription]
14 Forces Network, What Are British Troops Doing In Somalia?, 13 November 2017, url
15 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, url
16 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.1) url
The Somali National Army will consist of:
1. Somali Ground Forces
2. Somali Air Force
3. Somali Maritime Forces/Navy

Key Tasks/Responsibilities:
- Safeguarding National Unity/Sovereignty of the country
- Safeguarding and defending the borders of the country
- Defending against external threats and any internal threats that endanger the stability of the country

Figures/Numbers of the SNA and Police Force

Recognizing the challenges of Somali budget and revenue generation, we recommend that:

1. The Somali National Army (SNA) shall number at least 18,000, excluding the Special Forces (Danab), Air force and Navy. This work shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

2. The training of these forces shall take place within Somalia, with a unified Somali doctrine, in order to revive national training institutions, which shall be reequipped and resupplied.

3. The SNA shall fall under the Ministry of Defence, and the Minister for Defence shall prepare and assign budgetary allocations in consultation with the Minister for Finance.

4. The Somali police force shall number 32,000, divided into Federal Police and State Police as per the New Policing Model. This expanded figure shall include the Coastguard, as well as Darwish. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

5. The Coastguard will be built and strengthened at the federal level, and the coastguard police at the FMS-level. Their roles and responsibilities will be established later. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

Distribution and Composition

6. The existing SNA sectors shall be redrawn to align with FMS boundaries to reflect the political developments in the country/federal system. This task shall be completed within three (3) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

7. The SNA forces, numbering at least 18,000, shall be distributed across existing SNA sectors (12th, 21st, 43rd, 49th, 48th, 54th, 26th and 60th). The subsequent distribution of the SNA forces (numbering at least 18,000) across the FMS boundary-aligned sectors, shall be determined based on military and geographic need. SNA and FMS leadership will participate in any necessary redistribution of forces. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.
‘8. 500 Danab Special Forces shall be established in each SNA sector, with input from the FMS, reporting to the Danab Brigade HQ in Baledogle. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

‘9. The distribution of the 32,000 police, between Federal and State-level, and the question of how many of these should be Darwish, is yet to be determined. But it is agreed that there should be a fair and equitable distribution, based on needs.

‘10. The Darwish elements of the State-Level Police shall be a reserve force that can be activated as deemed necessary. They shall work with the SNA forces in times of national crisis.

‘11. The existing regional forces will therefore become part of SNA or be part of State Police. This task shall be completed within three (3) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

‘12. Those armed personnel who do not meet the requirements for inclusion in any security forces will require comprehensive demobilization and reintegration programmes. Given Somalia’s limited resources and the need to reduce security forces substantially, a DDR and rehabilitation programme will be instrumental to mitigate the risk of extremist groups recruiting former security forces personnel. This task shall be completed within twelve (12) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

‘13. The National Integration Commission shall be a crucial component for ensuring the realization of Somali national security forces, which represent each FMS and the whole country. This task shall be completed within thirty (30) days, starting from 1 June 2017.‘

ii. Police

4.2.4 The EASO Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security situation (EASO report 2017) covering events from 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, using a variety of sources looked at the police force in Somalia. The report noted it was difficult to establish the number of Somali police officers in South/Central Somalia however provided estimates of figures per regional state.

4.2.5 The same report noted:

‘The functioning of the Somali police is seen as problematic, especially regarding corruption, favouritism, lack of impartiality, and human rights violations. Police are seen by the population as a repressive rather than a protecting force. However, this picture is changing in several big cities (such as Jowhar, Kismayo and Belet Weyne), where police forces are locally recruited and gain the confidence of the local population. This may provide them with more relevant intelligence about AS [Al Shabaab], and makes it more difficult for AS to keep their activities secret.’

4.2.6 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights, covering 2017, and published 20 April 2018 (USSD report 2017) noted:

17 London Conference Somalia, Security Pact (page 5-6), 11 May 2017, url
18 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.1.1) url
19 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.1.1) url
Police were generally ineffective and lacked sufficient equipment and training. In Mogadishu, for example, police lacked sufficient vehicles to transfer prisoners from cells to courts or to medical facilities. There were reports of police engaging in corrupt practices [...].

The FGS regularly relied on NISA forces to perform police work, often calling on them to arrest and detain civilians without warrants [...].

‘The federal police force maintained its presence in all 17 districts of the capital.’

4.2.7 The UN Security Council, in the letter dated 5 July 2018 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, noted in relation to the police’s capabilities:

‘Although progress is being made in the implementation of the country’s new policing model, an operational readiness assessment determined that the Somali police force was almost entirely stationed in Mogadishu, and it also revealed serious gaps with regard to human resources, infrastructure, equipment and logistics. Many of the officers have reached retirement age, and several units are not operational. The assessment did not cover the emerging State police services or the regional forces that are to be integrated into the Darwish militarized police.’

iii. Army

4.2.8 The EASO report 2017 noted, in relation to the Somali National Army (SNA):

‘According to the Somali government, quoted by the UN SEMG [UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea], nearly 22,000 troops are registered, of whom more than a quarter are stationed in or on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

‘However, the UN SEMG notes that neither the Somali government nor the UN Monitoring Group is able to provide ‘accurate information on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of either national security forces or regional and militia forces’. A military strategic expert interviewed by BFA/SEM [The Austrian Federal Office for Foreign and Asylum Documentation and The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration] estimates the SNA in South/Central Somalia (from the Kenyan borders to Dhuusamarreeb) at 16 000-18 000 troops’.

4.2.9 The USSD report 2017 summarised the situation with the SNA:

‘The Ministry of Defense’s control over the army remained tenuous but improved somewhat with the support of international partners. At year’s end, the army consisted of 11,000 to 14,000 soldiers, according to estimates by international organizations. The bulk of forces were located in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle Regions, as well as in the ISWA and IJA. The Ministry of Defense exerted some control over forces in the greater Mogadishu area, extending as far south as Lower Shabelle Region, west to Baidoa, Bay Region, and north to Jowhar, Middle Shabelle Region. Army

20 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, url
21 UNSC, Secretary-General letter to the President of the Security Council (p4), 5 July 2018, url
22 EASO, EASO report 2017 (para 2.2.2.2), December 2017, url
forces and progovernment militia sometimes operated alongside AMISOM in areas where AMISOM was deployed.'

4.2.10 Jane’s noted in their Sentinel Security Assessment, updated 5 June 2018:

‘The Somali National Alliance (SNA) is an armed force comprised of around 10,000 militia fighters loyal to those warlords and clan leaders that participated in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Discipline is poor and membership fluid as militias enlist and leave with the participation of their leaders in the transitional government.

‘Progress has been slow, but the current president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who was elected in February 2017 may be in a better position to unify the army […]

‘In April 2017, new plans for the Somali National Army were introduced by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. According to them, the army would number 18,000 troops excluding the Special Forces, air force, and navy, and fall under the Ministry of Defence. The plan was for the existing forces to become part of the Army or the State Police by September 2017, with those forces that did not meet the requirements for inclusion the security forces to undergo a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme by June 2018. As of October 2017, there is little to suggest the integration process has been finalised.’

4.2.11 Jane’s gave detail on the composition of the army:

‘The army consists of five different elements. The largest element consists of forces from the Majerteen sub-clan of which Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (who served as president of Somalia from 2004 until 2008) is a member. The second largest element consists of Marehan clansmen, many from the former Juba Valley Alliance. The third largest element consists of Rahanweyn clansmen, formerly of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army. The fourth largest element is the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, fighters of the warlord Muhammad Dheere, and from the close sub-clans of a previous prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi. The final component is forces under the head of national police, Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid, coming from the Saad sub-clan of the Hawiye clan.’

4.2.12 The same report also noted:

‘Government troops are not thought to receive their pay frequently. AMISOM has started monitoring payment of salaries from September 2011. Things may improve to a certain extent under the new Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, commonly known as 'Farmaajo'. Soldiers stationed close to the presidency - who had been without pay for nine months - told Jane's in February 2017 that Farmaajo's earlier tenure had been one of the few periods in recent history when they had been paid on time and in full.

‘Soldiers are generally poorly trained and equipped and not in control in most parts of the country[…] Desertion and refusal to take orders are reported to

---

23 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, [url]
24 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Exec Summary), updated 5 June 2018, [url] [subscription]
25 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Organisation), updated 5 June 2018, [url] [subscription]
be widespread problems across all TFG/SNA military formations, even among more senior officers.\textsuperscript{26}

4.2.13 The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted, in a report published on 20 October 2017 (ICG report 2017), in reference to infighting within the security services that:

'The Somali army and other branches of the security services have been under considerable recent strain. Rising factionalism and clan tensions triggered skirmishes in September, when a Somali army unit and elements of the newly-established Mogadishu Stabilisation Unit engaged in a firefight that left six soldiers dead. Such clashes often involve competition for control of turf, checkpoints and other sources of revenue. They undermine morale and cohesion in the security forces, erode the military’s effectiveness and make it more likely that troops or factions collude with the enemy. The defence and army chiefs recent resignations, as well as the army’s retreat from parts of the Shabelle Valley, may have been related to such problems.'\textsuperscript{27}

4.2.14 The UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020, published in December 2017 noted:

'Security forces are often re-hatted clan militias rather than formally integrated members of the Somali National Army (SNA). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major obstacle to the ability of the state to ensure security and protect civilians. A lack of oversight and accountability of security forces raises concerns regarding impunity for human rights violations, including against children, and undermines the people’s trust in state security institutions.'\textsuperscript{28}

4.2.15 The UN Security Council, in the letter dated 5 July 2018 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, noted in relation to the SNA’s capabilities:

'In order to assess the baseline capacity of Somali security forces, and in response to the Council’s request in resolution 2372 (2017) to that effect, the Federal Government, with the participation of AMISOM, the United Nations and international partners, led an operational readiness assessment of the Somali National Army in 2018. The assessment concluded that, as currently manned, trained and equipped, the Somali National Army is a fragile force with extremely weak command and control and military capabilities.

‘Despite multiple training processes in recent years, the Somali National Army lacks a common doctrine and training standards; is extremely poorly equipped and not sustained; and has little to no infrastructure, including medical services at the battalion and brigade levels. In many areas, the Somali National Army is static and wholly defensive in nature, limited to occupying ground, and without the ability to hold newly recovered areas or prevent Al-Shabaab from retaking territory. On 29 May 2018, the Chief of the

\textsuperscript{26} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Personnel), updated 5 June 2018, [url] subscription
\textsuperscript{27} ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath … (section 3), 20 October 2017, [url]
\textsuperscript{28} UN, UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020 (page 15), December 2017, [url]
Defence Forces of Somalia endorsed the assessment findings in a memorandum to the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.\(^{29}\)

4.2.16 For more details on the armed services and police see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

4.3 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

4.3.1 The AMISOM website provides detail of the aim, remit and composition of AMISOM\(^{30}\).

4.3.2 **UN Security Resolution 2297 (2016)**, adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016, gave full details of AMISOM’s current mandate. This resolution authorised the Member States of the African Union [AU] to maintain the deployment of AMISOM up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel\(^{31}\). Resolution 2431 (2018) aimed to reduce that number to 20,626 by 28 February 2019\(^ {32}\).

4.3.3 On 30 July 2018, the UN Security council extended the time frame for AMISOM’s mandate, under resolution 2431 (2018), until 31 May 2019.\(^ {33}\)

4.3.4 The UN Security Council, in the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 5 July 2018 noted that there had been the first drawdown of 1,000 AMISOM military personnel in December 2017\(^ {34}\).

4.3.5 The military component of AMISOM is deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia:

- Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle.
- Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba.
- Sector 3 comprising Bay and Bakool as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3) comes under Ethiopian command.
- Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud
- Burundian forces are in charge of Sector 5 which covers the Middle Shabelle region\(^ {35}\).

4.3.6 The AMISOM website described the mandate and composition of the AMISOM police component:

‘The AMISOM Police component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advice the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into

\(^{29}\) UNSC, Letter from the Sec-Gen to the President of the Security Council (p4), 5 July 2018, [url](#)

\(^{30}\) AMISOM, About Amisom, (undated), [url](#)

\(^{31}\) UN Security Council, Resolution 2297 (2016), [url](#)

\(^{32}\) UN Press,Resolution 2431 (2018), 30 July 2018, [url](#)

\(^{33}\) UN Press, Resolution 2431 (2018), 30 July 2018, [url](#)

\(^{34}\) UNSC, Letter from the Sec-Gen to the President of the Security Council (p13), 5 July 2018, [url](#)

\(^{35}\) AMISOM, Home – AMISOM Military Component (undated), [url](#)
a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict international standards [...]  

‘AMISOM Police has deployed three Formed Police Units (FPU) in Somalia. [...] 

‘The component [...] has police officers comprising of Individual Police Officers (IPO) from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia as well as Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Nigeria, Uganda and Sierra Leone.’ 

4.3.7 The USSD report 2017 noted: 

‘AMISOM-formed police units complemented local and FGS policing efforts in Mogadishu. These police officers provided mentoring and advisory support on basic police duties, respect for human rights, crime prevention strategies, community policing, and search procedures. More than 300 AMISOM police officers worked alongside the formed units to provide training to national police.’ 

4.3.8 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia updated 5 June 2018 noted: 

‘A concerted regional effort for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) currently has around 22,000 troops; its size should be reduced to 20,600 by 30 October 2018 according to the mandate approved by the UN in late August 2017[...]. 

‘AMISOM efforts to take back the country has seen encouraging success. This has included largely ejecting Al-Shabaab fighters from Mogadishu and other regions. In late September 2012, Kenyan forces attached to AMISOM succeeded in recapturing the strategic port city of Kismaayo, one of the last remaining Al-Shabaab strongholds. 

‘However, the situation remains less than ideal. Al-Shabaab has a presence in all six AMISOM sectors, although it does not have the capacity to hold territory. The extremist group has returned to hit-and-run tactics, striking AMISOM bases in the country and inflicting heavy losses on the underpowered and logistically stretched force. 

‘In its current form, the Somali Army is unlikely to successfully face the threat from the Al-Shabaab without concerted assistance from AMISOM and other regional players, making the eventual withdrawal of the intervention force a potential trigger for a wider resumption of violence. In 2018, AMISOM is set to begin a gradual withdrawal of troops that ends in 2020.’ 

4.3.9 The same report noted: ‘As of mid-August 2017, SNA troops were still operating alongside AMISOM forces in central and southern Somalia to find and engage remaining pockets of insurgents.’ 

4.3.10 At the UN Security Council meeting on 15 May 2018 there was a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM),

---

36 AMISOM, Home – AMISOM Police (undated), url  
37 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, url  
38 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Exec Summary), updated 5 June 2018, url [subscription]  
39 Jane’s, Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Deployment), updated 5 June 2018, url [subscription]
Michael Keating noted the contribution made by AMISOM and the changes needed to enable successful withdrawal of AMISOM forces:

‘AMISOM continues to play an indispensable role, at great human cost, in protecting population centres, main supply routes and Somalia’s overall political progress [...] Suffice it to say that a successful security transition will require not just deep reform of the Somalia security forces, but also [...] transformation of AMISOM, whether relating to more flexible joint operations and combat mentoring, greater emphasis on policing, adequate enablers and force multipliers or stronger accountability systems, whether for assets or relating to human rights. More flexible operational support by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia will also be required, together with predictable financing.’

4.3.11 Jane’s in the Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia updated 5 June 2018 noted in relation to the effectiveness of AMISOM:

‘[...] while some AMISOM has shown some progress, it remains plagued by issues such as ineffective central command, a lack of co-ordination between contributing nations, and overstretched logistics. Moreover, in early 2017 Burundi threatened to withdraw its forces from AMISOM over delays in troop payments. While the issue was eventually resolved, it showed how vulnerable the security situation in Somalia was to other geopolitical issues [...]’

4.3.12 At a UN Security Council meeting on 7 June 2018, in a statement by the President of the Security Council, noted they:

‘welcome[d] recent progress on developing a conditions-based transition plan with clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Somali security institutions, as endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 30 April 2018 and by international partners at the Somalia Security High-Level Meeting in Brussels on 2 May 2018.

“The Security Council commends the Federal Government of Somalia, together with the Federal Member States, AMISOM, the police- and troop-contributing countries, and international partners, for their collaborative approach to developing this plan, and calls for its effective implementation, starting with Phase One, with full participation from all relevant stakeholders. The Security Council underlines the need to ensure resourcing for the transition plan. “The Security Council further recalls the critical importance of accelerating the implementation of the national security architecture agreement to provide the foundation for a successful transition. The Security Council urges the Federal Government and Federal Member States to prioritise efforts in this regard, including by integrating and providing federal support to regional forces, as agreed by Somalia’s National Security Council.

“The Security Council calls on international partners to support the transition and the implementation of the architecture, and to coordinate security

40 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018 (page 3), url
41 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Somalia (Deployment), updated 5 June 2018, url [subscription]
assistance in line with the existing Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) structures.

“The Security Council notes that AMISOM’s role in enabling the transition to Somali-led security will be critical.”

4.4 Alleged human rights abuses by government/AMISOM forces

4.4.1 The EASO report 2017 noted: ‘The Somali army does not have a good reputation among the population […] it is accused of human rights violations such as rape, robbery, illegal checkpoints with extortion, corruption, and arbitrary use of weapons.’

4.4.2 The USSD report 2017 noted ‘Government security forces and allied militias, other persons wearing uniforms, regional security forces, […] committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.’

4.4.3 The same report noted that ‘Government forces, allied militias, men wearing uniforms, and AMISOM troops used excessive force, including torture, and raped women and girls, including IDPs. While the army arrested some security force members accused of such abuse, impunity was the norm and that ‘Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control of security forces. Security forces abused civilians and often failed to prevent or respond to societal violence. Although authorities sometimes used military courts to try individuals believed to be responsible for abuse, they generally did not investigate abuse by police, army, or militia members; a culture of impunity was widespread.’

4.4.4 Human Rights Watch in their World Report 2018 – Somalia, covering events in 2017, noted:

‘Security forces unlawfully killed and wounded civilians during infighting over land, control of roadblocks, disarmament operations, and aid distribution. On June 9, at least 13 civilians were killed and 20 injured when fighting broke out between government forces at an aid distribution site in Baidoa.

‘Civilians were targeted or faced indiscriminate attack during fighting over resources and political positions and control between clan militia and regional forces, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Hiraan, and Galguduud.

‘The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS), which operate without legal authority, arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals without charge or access to legal counsel and family visits. On several occasions, intelligence agents tortured and ill-treated alleged terrorism suspects to extract confessions or provide information.

42 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 7 June 2018, url
43 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.2.2) url
44 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1a), 20 April 2018, url
45 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1g), 20 April 2018, url
46 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
Military courts continue to try a broad range of cases, [...] in proceedings falling far short of international fair trial standards [...] According to UNSOM, AMISOM and other foreign forces were responsible for a significant number of civilian casualties during ground operations against Al-Shabab and in airstrikes. On September 26, an alleged Kenyan air force jet struck the village of Taraka in Somalia’s Gedo region recently recaptured by Al-Shabab, wounding 4 civilians and killing 20 camels.

Accountability for abuses by security forces was almost non-existent.

Measures at the disposal of troop-contributing countries to improve accountability have not been sufficiently used. AMISOM investigated the unlawful killings of 14 civilians by Ethiopian forces in July 2016 in a village in the Bay region, but never released the findings nor offered compensation to the affected families.

4.4.5 In the December 2017 report by the Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia covering the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, it noted:

The majority of the civilian casualties resulted from indiscriminate fire from AMISOM troops when their convoys were attacked by IEDs, landmines, or grenades. Other violations include extrajudicial killings, ill-treatment during detention, and sexual assault. Two gang rapes, one attempted rape, and six cases of severe beatings were attributed to AMISOM Ethiopian forces, and five cases of ill-treatment, including one death in custody, were attributed to AMISOM Djiboutian forces.

4.4.6 The same report stated:

AMISOM has conducted preliminary investigations into alleged violations and, where it concluded that there was a prima facie case, established boards of inquiry to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law as recommended in the HRDDP framework. However, these measures remain insufficient. Identifying dedicated investigators to participate in a board of inquiry is difficult, as officers with relevant expertise from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), other than those implicated, are often engaged in operations. Moreover, due to the limited feedback from AMISOM on actions it has taken in the framework of preliminary investigations and boards of inquiries, UNSOM cannot fully assess the reliability of AMISOM investigations.

[...] prompt and transparent investigations or prosecution of alleged international human rights law or humanitarian law violations by all TCC/PCC has been insufficient. AMISOM has also not communicated to the UN outcomes of any investigations or prosecutions carried out by TCCs. Ensuring the protection of victims and witnesses of international humanitarian and human rights law violations against reprisals also

47 HRW, World report 2018 (Abuses by Government and Allied Forces), 18 January 2018, url
48 HRPG and UNSOM, Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation ... (para 28), December 2017, url
represents a concern as AMISOM has yet to put in place clear measures in that regard.\textsuperscript{49}

4.4.7 The UN Security Council in their Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia published on 2 May 2018 noted: ‘The AMISOM-UNSOM-UNSOS technical working group set up to implement the human rights due diligence policy resumed its monthly meetings and discussed options for stepping up efforts with regard to accountability for violations, including the proposal that AMISOM respond to allegation letters within 90 days.’\textsuperscript{50}

See Impact on vulnerable groups i.Women and children

4.5 United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)

4.5.1 The UNSOS website defined its mandate:


‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 2245 decides that UNSOS will be responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.’\textsuperscript{51}

4.5.2 The UN Security Council in their ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ published on 2 May 2018:

‘As at 1 January [2018], UNSOS was supporting up to 21,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel in accordance with resolution 2372 (2017). Between 26 March and 17 April, AMISOM, aided by UNSOS, deployed a formed police unit of 150 personnel from Sierra Leone to Kismaayo. In addition, UNSOS continued to provide non-lethal support to the 10,900 Somali troops in 20 locations who are in joint operations with AMISOM, as authorized by the Security Council.’\textsuperscript{52}

4.6 UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

4.6.1 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) provided detail of the remit of UNMAS in Somalia on their website:

‘The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides explosive threat mitigation support to AMISOM by training and mentoring the troops in Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Improvised Explosive Device disposal, advising on operational planning processes, and the use of specialized equipment and services, including explosive detection dogs. UNMAS also provides advice, training and equipment to the Somali Police to develop their

\textsuperscript{49} HRPG and UNSOM, Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation … (paras 3; 31-32), December 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{50} UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 60), \url{url}
\textsuperscript{51} UNSOS, Mandate (undated), \url{url}
\textsuperscript{52} UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (4b para 40), \url{url}
bomb disposal capabilities across Somalia, while also supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in weapons and ammunition management. Moreover, UNMAS coordinates humanitarian mine action activities, such as the survey of dangerous areas, clearance and risk education. Since 2015, UNMAS has supported the development of civilian-led clearance efforts along the Somali border with Ethiopia.\(^\text{53}\)

4.6.2 The UN Security Council in their Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia published on 2 May 2018:

‘The Mine Action Service helped the Somalia Explosive Management Authority to finalize a multi-year national mine action plan, which was launched on 15 February during the twenty-first International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and United Nations Advisers in Geneva. The strategy focuses on protection, youth employment, job skills and stability. Moreover, the Service continued to train and equip the federal and state police forces in explosive ordnance disposal. Teams trained by the Service safely destroyed 158 items of explosive remnants of war and conducted post-blast investigations at 28 sites where improvised explosive devices had been deployed.

‘During the reporting period, the Mine Action Service deployed community liaison officers to 41 recovered districts across the southern and central regions to deliver risk education messages to local communities about explosive hazards and to promote group discussions on the root causes of violent extremism, which could help with the design of mitigation responses. The liaison officers facilitated 250 group discussion sessions, attended by 3,038 individuals of different backgrounds[...]'\(^\text{54}\)

5. Al Shabaab and other groups

5.1 Al Shabaab

5.1.1 For more detail about Al Shabaab, including its formation, aims, current operation, areas of influence, tactics and targets, see the Country Policy and Information and Note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

5.1.2 The BBC described Al Shabaab as having emerged of the radical youth wing of Somalia’s now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled Mogadishu in 2006, before being forced out by Ethiopian forces. ‘There are numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help Al-Shabaab, from neighbouring countries, as well as the US and Europe. It is banned as a terrorist group by both the US and the UK and is believed to have between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.’\(^\text{55}\)

5.1.3 At a UN Security Council meeting on 7 June 2018, in a statement by the President of the Security Council, noted ‘The Security Council expresses serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by Al-Shabaab’. \(^\text{56}\)

53 UNSOM, Rule of Law and Security, undated, url
54 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (4b para 51-2), url
55 BBC News, Who are Somalia’s al-Shabaab? 22 December 2017 url
56 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 7 June 2018, url
5.1.4 For a general overview of the command structure and organisation of Al Shabaab see the 2016 EASO COI Report Somalia Security Situation.\(^{57}\)

5.2 Other non-state armed groups

5.2.1 ACLED noted in the Summary of Political Violence and Protest Somalia, published 9 January 2018:

‘In 2016 alone, 150 unique armed groups were active in Somalia, a small decrease from 2014, but almost three times as many as were active in 2010. The majority of this increase is due to a spike in armed clan militias; over 100 of which are active in 2017. Political militias also proliferated, with many possessing a more ambitious agenda and broader geographic scope than armed clan militias. Approximately, 15 of these groups are currently active, such as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ).’\(^{58}\)

5.2.2 Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa [ASWJ] is a pro-government militia that has significantly contributed to the relative security in the areas under its control in the past.\(^{59}\) However, the EASO report 2017 noted that ‘the relationship of ASWJ with the Somali federal government is currently unclear […] ASWJ has lost its previous strength and may not get back to the same level of importance ascribed to it in past years.’\(^{60}\)

5.2.3 ACLED noted in the Conflict Trends report September 2017 that:

‘Unidentified armed groups (UAGs) also continue to be very active in Somalia. Thus far this year they have been second only to Al Shabaab. UAGs’ activity against civilians, including remote violence against civilians, is particularly high. It is very likely that UAGs may be carrying out violence on behalf of others, such as Al Shabaab.’\(^{61}\)

6. Security situation

6.1 Overview

6.1.1 For more detail on the security situation see the Country Policy and Information and Note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

6.1.2 The EASO Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security situation (EASO report 2017) covering events from 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, compiled using a variety of sources provided an overview of the security situation in Somalia:

‘The general security situation in Somalia is mainly determined by several factors. The main factor is the long-term armed conflict between the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and anti-government elements or insurgents, the main being Al-Shabaab (AS). The other factors are: intra- and inter-clan violence, private

---

\(^{57}\) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (pages 19-22) \url{url}

\(^{58}\) ACLED, Summary of Political Violence and Protest Somalia (webpage), 9 January 2018, \url{url}

\(^{59}\) EASO, EASO report 2016, February 2016 (p.22), \url{url}

\(^{60}\) EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.3.3 ) \url{url}

\(^{61}\) ACLED, Conflict Trends report (page 8-9), September 2017,\url{url}
militias and criminals. These factors are often inter-linked and hard to distinguish. Other factors influencing the security situation are the insecurity on the roads, drought, flooding and land disputes. Several sources consider the situation in Somalia to be a non-international armed conflict.\(^6^2\)

6.1.3 The USSD 2017 report summarised the security situation for the twelve months of 2017: ‘The most significant human rights issues included killings of civilians by security forces, clan militias, and unknown assailants, but the terrorist group al-Shabaab committed the majority of severe human rights abuses, particularly terrorist attacks on civilians and targeted assassinations.’\(^6^3\)

6.1.4 The same report stated: ‘Conflict during the year involving the government, militias, AMISOM, and al-Shabaab resulted in death, injury, and displacement of civilians. State and federal forces killed civilians and committed sexual and gender-based violence, especially in and around Lower Shabelle. Clan-based political violence involved revenge killings and attacks on civilian settlements.’\(^6^4\)

6.1.5 The EASO report 2017 provided a geographical overview of the security situation in a map showing the areas of influence within Somalia as at July 2017. This was taken from the BFA/SEM which compiled the map from a variety of sources. It noted however, it is not possible to give a complete and comprehensive picture of the situation\(^6^5\).

62 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 2.2.3.3) [url](#)
63 USSD, USSD report 2017 (Executive Summary), 20 April 2018, [url](#)
64 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, [url](#)
65 EASO, EASO report 2017, December 2017 (para 3.1) [url](#)
6.1.6 In a joint report between the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia entitled Protection of Civilians in Somalia 2016-2017, it noted from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, a total of 4,585 civilian casualties were recorded. Of those reported casualties, 60 percent were attributed to Al Shabaab, 13 per cent to militia, 11 percent to state actors, 4 percent to AMISOM and 12 percent to unknown or unidentified actors66.

6.1.7 The Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Somalia, published 22 February 2018 noted that: ‘The peacekeeping forces AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia) withdrew from key locations in Somalia throughout the year, after which al-Shabaab regained control over towns in conflict areas, including in El Buur, Bardere and Lego, located in southern and central Somalia.’67

6.1.8 The Center on International Cooperation published a report in April 2018, written by Michael Keating, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and Sagal Abshir, which noted:

‘[…] the security situation in Somalia remains dire. Somali authorities and AMISOM are still striving to maintain control of key towns around the country, and struggling to extend control over the vast rural areas and road networks connecting towns and villages in the south and central regions. In more than half of the country, government officials and international actors are strictly limited to small areas in the main cities guarded by AMISOM; key ports and airports are secured by AMISOM. Somali security institutions continue to be weak and fragmented despite years of capacity building efforts by both Somali and international actors, and Al-Shabaab continues to be devastatingly resilient, as evidenced by an October 2017 Mogadishu truck bomb that killed over 500 people.’68

6.1.9 The UN Security Council in the Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia published on 2 May 2018, noted that the overall security situation remained volatile69.

6.1.10 The following map, compiled by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) on 18 June 2018, contains information on the number of reported incidents with at least one fatality according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) covering 201770:

---

66 OHCHR and UNSOM, Protection of Civilians in Somalia 2016-2017 (para 4 and 6), 10 Dec 2017, url
68 The Center on International Cooperation, The Politics of Security in Somalia, April 22018, url
69 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (2b para 11), url
70 ACCORD, Somalia Year 2017, 18 June 2018, url
6.1.11 The same report noted the development of conflict incidents from 2008 to 2017 in the following graph\textsuperscript{71}:

6.1.12 Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in their report Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2017 noted:

‘The number of security personnel killed or injured as a result of explosive violence in Somalia was comparable to figures for 2016 – 652 in 2017, up from 588 in 2016. However, the number of civilians killed or injured almost doubled from 826 to 1,582.

‘[…] On 14 October 2017, a huge blast caused by a truck bombing in Mogadishu saw Al-Shabaab fulfil their promise and add to the continuing tragedy that is the fragmented state of Somalia. The number of dead in the

\textsuperscript{71} ACCORD, Somalia Year 2017, 18 June 2018, url
devastating twin bombing in the Somali capital is estimated to be 587 (just one fewer than the total number of those killed or injured in 2016).\textsuperscript{72}

6.1.13 The UN Security Council in their ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ published on 2 May 2018 stated the following in relation to the response to Al Shabaab:

‘Air strikes, including by the United States Air Force, have become an integral component of the offensive against Al-Shabaab strongholds and hideouts in southern and central Somalia […] The air strikes were concentrated in southerly central and southern regions, largely owing to the high level of Al-Shabaab activity there. Twenty air strikes were carried out in the first quarter of 2018, compared with none in the same period in 2017. Since April 2017, air strikes have continued unabated and increased in number; 24 such strikes were carried out in the last quarter of 2017.’\textsuperscript{73}

6.1.14 UNSOM issue monthly updates on human rights and protection.\textsuperscript{74} At the time of writing, the mostly recently available edition covering events in July 2018 recorded that:

‘There were 133 civilian casualties recorded in July, a 177 per cent increase from the low number of casualties in June, but in line with casualties reported in the previous five months. Most of the casualties (104) were recorded in Mogadishu, the majority (67) caused by complex attacks, shelling and attacks using explosives attributed to Al Shabaab (AS). AS was responsible for 65 per cent of the total number of casualties.’\textsuperscript{75}

6.2 Situation in Mogadishu

6.2.1 The EASO report 2017, using a variety of sources, noted the situation in Mogadishu:

‘Mogadishu is “to some extent” under the control of AMISOM and the federal government of Somalia and its administration is relatively present and active. The AMISOM presence has to a certain extent a deterrence effect on AS, and makes it more difficult (but not impossible) for AS to enter the city. AS has no military camps in Mogadishu but the city is under constant threat by AS. Mogadishu is infiltrated by AS, ‘including Mogadishu International Airport and Villa Somalia [the presidential residence and seat of the government]’, according to DIS/DRC [Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council] sources. AS has the capacity to target people and conduct complex attacks inside Mogadishu on a regular basis.

‘Several sources added that although AS does not have a military presence in Mogadishu, the group does collect taxes and deliver verdicts. According to a DIS/DRC source, ‘there are certain neighbourhoods where the government has little or no presence and during the night half of Mogadishu is not

\textsuperscript{72} AOAV, The Burden of Harm Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2017 (page 14), url
\textsuperscript{73} UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (2b para 14), url
\textsuperscript{74} UNSOM, monthly updates, url
\textsuperscript{75} UNSOM, Human Rights And Protection Group bulletin, July 2018 url
controlled by the government’. The outskirts of the city are presumably controlled by AS during night […]

‘Security forces in Mogadishu consist of the Somali Police Force (SPF), AMISOM police and army, Somali National Army (SNA) and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The SPF functions significantly better than several years ago and is present in every district in Mogadishu, according to BFA/SEM [The Austrian Federal Office for Foreign and Asylum Documentation and The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration] sources. AMISOM police regularly conducts patrols and collaborates with the SPF. AMISOM has a battalion from Uganda and one from Burundi, military staff and approximately 300 police officers. Finally, the UN Guard Unit is based in Mogadishu to protect UN institutions. The SNA also has bases at critical points in the city, staff permanent checkpoints and patrols in all districts. NISA with its special Gashaan unit is responsible for anti-terror operations; it also carries out targeted campaigns, for example against the AS Amniyad. However, the various security forces in Mogadishu are not big enough to guarantee a sufficient presence in every part of the town. The forces are also vulnerable for infiltration by AS, according to a BFA/SEM source.

‘[…] As Mogadishu is home to a large number of potential AS targets (government/international community-related persons), the largest number of targeted attacks take place in the capital.

‘For the civilian population in Mogadishu, who is normally not a target, the main risk is to be ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time’, say DIS/DRC sources. Other sources added: ‘Mogadishu has been the scene of several attacks with a number of civilian casualties but terror attacks against e.g. market places with no presence of high value targets are deemed unusual’. AS kills on average 20 people per month in the capital, said International Crisis Group in Nairobi, interviewed by BFA/SEM. Although such attacks are primarily targeting government related persons or buildings, a BFA/SEM source indicated that when a hotel is attacked, it can be assumed that the owner did not pay the required taxes to AS. In addition to AS attacks, politically motivated clan violence and criminal acts are also contributing to the level of violence in Mogadishu. Land disputes are also increasingly leading to violent incidents. In this regard it is noted that not all attacks and killings in Mogadishu are really the work of AS. In some instances AS has been held responsible while the attacks had been carried out on behalf of business owners, according to a BFA/SEM source.‘

6.2.2 In a joint report between the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia entitled Protection of Civilians in Somalia 2016-2017, it noted from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, a total of 4,585 civilian casualties were recorded, with 2,265 of those in Banaadir which included the 500 people killed and several hundred seriously injured in the 14 October 2017 truck explosion in Mogadishu.77
6.2.3 The ICG report 2017 noted that:

‘The government’s efforts to secure Mogadishu largely involve mopping up illicit weapons, reigning in clan militias and putting up barriers on arterial roads into the city. But these measures are not enough. Corrupt, unpaid soldiers and discontented clans on the city’s peripheries enable Al-Shabaab operatives to infiltrate. The organisation’s elite Amniyat (intelligence) cells for years have been active in the city, penetrating state security structures, gathering intelligence and assassinating government officials and informants.’

6.2.4 The same report went on to note that until the truck bombings in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu on 14 October 2017:

‘[… ] Mogadishu’s overall security this year had seen gradual if modest improvements. Assassinations and car bombings have been less frequent and deadly than in past years (of which 2016 was the deadliest) and Somali security forces have foiled several attempted vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise attacks. Better training, vehicle checks and patrols on major urban roads have almost certainly helped. But the endemic wrangles between official security forces appear to have allowed insurgents an opening to mount a major attack.’

For more information on the 14 October 2017 attack see Al Shabaab attacks

6.2.5 The UN Security Council in their ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ published on 2 May 2018:

‘In January 2018, a Mogadishu security enhancement plan was adopted by the United Nations and the Federal Government, both of which appointed focal points to ensure maximum security at the international airport. The plan, which would be funded partly by the United Nations and international partners, consists of five layers of security involving all actors concerned with the area’s security.’

For more information on the security situation in Mogadishu see Al Shabaab attacks

Back to Contents

6.3 Al Shabaab attacks

6.3.1 ACLED in the Conflict Trends report published November 2017 noted:

‘Conflict levels in Somalia remain extremely high. The al Shabaab insurgency continues to be the driving force of violence, accounting for 49% of October’s activity. Though this figure is down 4% from September, Mogadishu’s Hodan District saw the deadliest single attack of the county’s history on 14 October, accounting for approximately 400 fatalities. Additional high fatality attacks occurred in the following weeks, most notably in the Xamar Weyne District on 28 October. In both instances al Shabaab targeted hotels in high profile areas of the city. These attacks may be a tactical watershed for the group; both were likely seen as successful and each

78 ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath … (section 2), 20 October 2017, url
79 ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath … (section 3), 20 October 2017, url
80 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 70), url
achieved heavy notice in western media. Military reaction to the attacks has been considerable. The Federal Government declared new offensives against al Shabaab and the Ethiopian contingent of AMISOM added 1,000 soldiers and 50 vehicles to the force on 1 November.  

6.3.2 The ICG report 2017 noted:
‘Al-Shabaab recently recaptured several areas in the Shabelle Valley, including the town of Bariire, only 45km outside Mogadishu and on a major route to the capital. Those areas fell to the movement after government forces pulled out early this month, in protest that some had not received salaries for three months. Averting attacks in Mogadishu is ever harder when surrounding districts revert back to Al-Shabaab control or when communities, incensed by government corruption and dysfunction or by civilian deaths during counter-terrorism operations, provide the movement tacit backing.’  

6.3.3 The UN Security Council in their ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ covering major developments in Somalia from 21 December 2017 to 24 April 2018, published on 2 May 2018 noted:
‘In Mogadishu, following a brief lull in January [2018], when mostly small improvised explosive device attacks and targeted assassinations were reported, an estimated 18 people died and 20 were injured on 23 February [2018] in twin suicide car bombings. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, which bore the hallmarks of that group’s method over the past two years of carrying out smaller attacks followed by a larger assault […]’  

6.3.4 The same report noted that, ‘The number of targeted assassinations claimed by Al-Shabaab continued to increase.’  

6.3.5 The briefing paper from the House of Commons Library, Somalia: March 2018 update, noted:
‘After a relative lull at the end of 2017, since January 2018 there have been further major al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu. For example, on 22 March a car bomb killed at least people near a hotel. On 25 March, two more car bombs killed six people. This appears to suggest that, despite President Farmajo’s promises when taking office (see below), not much progress has so far been made in weakening al-Shabaab. All the evidence suggests that al-Shabaab continues to have success in infiltrating the capital and other urban areas.’  

6.3.6 Speaking at the UN Security Council meeting on Tuesday, 15 May 2018, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Francisco Madeira noted: ‘The reality of the current threat landscape across Somalia is that Al-Shabaab has gradually increased its military capacity and

---

81 ACLED, Conflict Trends report (page 2), November 2017, url
82 ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath … (section 2), 20 October2017, url
83 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 11), url
84 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 11), url
85 House of Commons Library, Somalia: March 2018 update (p12), 27 March 2018, url
resilience, resulting in widespread attacks using IEDs as the weapon of choice.\footnote{UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018, url.}

6.3.7 At the same meeting there was a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Michael Keating who noted:  
'Insecurity remains a constant concern. Despite increasing pressure on the group, including an increase in air strikes, Al-Shabaab has continued to demonstrate its ability to execute deadly terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets, including AMISOM, notably through the use of improvised explosive devices. The factors that breed terrorism, including youth unemployment, corruption, a sense of injustice and unresolved conflicts, cannot be left until later. The truly formidable challenge facing Somalia and its AU and other partners is simultaneously to fight the insurgency and reform the security sector.’\footnote{UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018 (page 3), url}

6.3.8 In the ACLED Regional Overview – Africa 9 July 2018 it noted ‘Al Shabaab continued its heavy activity in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle and Lower Jubbada regions.’\footnote{ACLED, Regional Overview – Africa, 9 July 2018, url}

6.3.9 The UN Security Council’s July 2018 Forecast stated:

‘The armed group Al-Shabaab continues to be a potent threat […]. On 6 June, for example, at least eight people, including two members of the Hirshabelle State parliament, were killed when Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a convoy near Mogadishu. On the same day, five police officers patrolling the Kenyan border were killed when their vehicle hit an improvised explosive device. A US soldier advising Somali and AMISOM forces was killed in an Al-Shabaab mortar attack in Jubaland on 8 June.’\footnote{UN Security Council, July 2018 Monthly Forecast, 28 June 2018, url}

i. 14 October 2017, Mogadishu

6.3.10 The Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in their report from December 2017 Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia covering the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, noted:

‘While Al Shabaab usually claimed responsibility for attacks against Government forces and other military targets such as checkpoints and training camps, and other locations including hotels, restaurants and markets frequented by officials, it is not always clear that they did in fact carry out the attacks that they claimed. […] in some instances, Al Shabaab has declined to claim responsibility for operations that may significantly damage its public image among the Somali population. For example, the group has not claimed the attack of 14 October, when two VBIEDs exploded in a populated and urban area of Hodan and Wadajir Districts, in Mogadishu, causing at least 512 dead and 316 injured, according to a committee established by the FGS, and destroying hotels, restaurants and NGO and private offices. This was the deadliest terrorist attack in Somalia to date, and while Al Shabaab
6.3.11 On 14 October 2017 twin truck bombings occurred in Mogadishu. International Crisis Group (ICG) described it as Somalia’s worst terror attack and AlJazeera noted it was the ‘deadliest attack in the country’s history.’ Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in their report Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2017, stated it was the worst incident recorded by AOAV globally in 2017.

6.3.12 ICG noted ‘Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency, was almost certainly behind the attack, but has not claimed responsibility. Al-Shabaab has been fighting the government since 2007.[…] The targets of the attack are unclear, though may have been government buildings and the base of African Union forces fighting Al-Shabaab.’

6.3.13 The Amnesty International Report 2017/18 noted: ‘Attacks on civilians by al-Shabaab intensified over the year; the most serious took place at a hotel in Mogadishu, the capital, on 14 October in which, according to the government, over 512 people were killed.’ See also the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab.

6.4 Clan violence

6.4.1 The USSD 2017 report noted:

‘Clan-based political violence involved revenge killings and attacks on civilian settlements. Clashes between clan-based forces and with al-Shabaab in […] the Galmudug, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, Baidoa, and Hiiraan Regions, also resulted in deaths. According to the United Nations, killings by clan militias increased compared with previous years, likely as a result of increased tensions following flawed state formation processes.

‘For example, in April at least three persons were killed in clashes in Middle Shabelle when a dominant clan reportedly attempted to take over disputed land by force.’

6.4.2 The Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in their report from December 2017 Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia covering the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, noted:

90 UNSOM HRPG, Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia (para 55), December 2017, url
91 ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s Worst Terror Attack, 20 October 2017, url
92 AlJazeera, Mogadishu bombing death toll rises to 358, 20 October 2017, url
93 AOAV, The Burden of Harm Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2017 (page 28), url
94 ICG, Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s Worst Terror Attack, 20 October 2017, url
96 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, url
‘A significant number of the civilian casualties recorded were attributed to clan militia engaged in conflicts in the context of a non-international armed conflict, in areas where federal or state security forces were largely absent. The main trigger of clan conflicts are disputes over land and resources, compounded by an ongoing cycle of retaliation. The drought has intensified clan conflict due to competition over resources, and these conflicts are exploited by anti-government elements to further destabilize areas, diminish prospects for lasting peace and weaken civilian protection.’

6.4.3 The same report stated:

‘The clan dynamic is complex and most clans have their own militias, which have no basis in Somali law and do not operate within formal structures. Conflicts between clans are widespread and relate to the broader non-international armed conflict, and are particularly predominant in regions where FGS or state authorities are weak or non-existent. Historical grievances, political marginalization, land disputes, and access to resources are significant conflict drivers that are often resolved with violence, and these conflicts are exploited by Al Shabaab. Clan militias engage in targeted killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of civilian property.

‘Clan dynamics are extremely fluid and subject to changes in migration patterns, political processes and displacement. Alliances between clans and support for Al Shabaab is often opportunistic and can change suddenly. Few (if any) clans are aligned with one party to the conflict, although SNA forces often include elements of clan militias. This can affect the chain of command within the force and amplify the clan-related conflicts. In 2014, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) reported allegations of the “active involvement of senior SNA officers and soldiers in clan violence [and] leakages of SNA arms to clan-based militias.” Other violations documented by “rogue” SNA or clan-based militia among SNA soldiers included “extortion, armed robberies, torture and arrest of locals accused of supporting Al Shabaab”. The SEMG 2014 and 2015 reports highlighted that “the political and military leadership of the federal system was also usurped to advance clan interests with the deployment of FGS security forces and assets in clan fighting.”

6.4.4 ACLED noted in the Conflict Trends report September 2017 that:

‘While Al Shabaab of Somalia falls high on the list of most lethal conflict actors against civilians in Somalia, they do not top the list. A number of clan militias – specifically, the Habar Gedir Clan Militia, Jejele Clan Militia, and Darood-Marehan Sub-Clan Militia – have been more lethal toward civilians this year, meaning that more civilians are reportedly killed as a result of each of their attacks. While the rate of violence against civilians carried out by clan militias has remained relatively constant over time, the lethality of this violence has been increasing.

98 HRPG and UNSOM, Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia (para 51-52), December 2017, url
‘[…] the lethality of violence by diverse clan militias has been on the rise, attesting to the sustained security risk and threat to civilian vulnerability that they constitute. In fact, the majority of new conflict actors in Somalia during the past year are clan militias, active in a variety of areas.’

6.5 Impact on vulnerable groups

6.5.1 The USSD 2017 report noted: ‘IDPs and members of marginalized clans and groups suffered disproportionately from gender-based violence. 100

6.5.2 The UNOCHA 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, published on 26 July 2018, in a foreword by the Humanitarian Coordinator noted:

‘Of particular concern is the situation of conflict-affected populations, including those in hard-to-reach areas and/or displaced and marginalised populations. These groups face an elevated risk of violations due to exploitative and abusive structures faced by many – especially protracted – displaced communities. These violations include pervasive gender-based violence (GBV), child rights violations – child recruitment and early marriage for example -, and forced eviction.’ 101

i. Women and children

The UN noted in their UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020, published in December 2017, ‘The protracted conflict in Somalia continues to produce widespread sexual violence. Internally displaced persons, in particular women and girls, and members of minority clans remain the most marginalised and vulnerable.’ 102

6.5.3 The Amnesty International Report 2017/18 noted, ‘Sexual and gender-based violence continued to be widespread although it was under-reported. The Integrated Management System of Somalia, a government agency, documented […] at least 400 cases [of gender-based violence against displaced women and girls] in south-central Somalia.’ 103

6.5.4 At the UN Security Council meeting on 15 May 2018 there was a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Michael Keating noted:

‘The situation of children affected by armed conflict remains dire, with a marked increase in abductions and the recruitment and the use of children. Impunity for sexual violence continues to be of great concern.’ 104

6.5.5 UNOCHA’s 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, published on 26 July 2018, in a foreword by the Humanitarian Coordinator noted:

99 ACLED, Conflict Trends report (page 8-9), September 2017, url
100 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 6), 20 April 2018, url
102 UN, UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020 (page 15), December 2017, url
103 Amnesty, Amnesty report 2017/2018 (Women’s Rights), 22 February 2018, url
104 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018 (page 3), url
‘Of particular concern is the situation of conflict-affected populations, including those in hard-to-reach areas and/or displaced and marginalised populations. These groups face an elevated risk of violations due to exploitative and abusive structures faced by many – especially protracted – displaced communities. These violations include pervasive gender-based violence (GBV), child rights violations – child recruitment and early marriage for example -, and forced eviction.\textsuperscript{105}

For further information on the situation for women in Somalia see country policy and information note on Somalia: Women fearing gender-based violence

ii. Humanitarian workers

6.5.6 The USSD 2017 report noted: ‘Attacks against humanitarian workers and assets impeded the delivery of aid to vulnerable populations.’\textsuperscript{106}

6.5.7 The same report stated: ‘International aid organizations evacuated their staff or halted food distribution and other aid-related activities in al-Shabaab-controlled areas due to killings, extortion, threats, harassment, expulsions, and prohibitions by al-Shabaab.’\textsuperscript{107}

6.5.8 And further noted:

‘Humanitarian workers regularly faced checkpoints, roadblocks, extortion, carjacking, and bureaucratic obstacles.

‘Humanitarian organizations faced rising levels of violence during the first half of the year, compared with the same period in 2016. The upsurge was mainly attributed to an increase in targeted attacks on humanitarian organizations by nonstate armed actors and increased violence at aid distribution sites. Between January and June, more than 90 violent incidents impacted humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets, leading to the deaths of four humanitarian workers, injury to nine, arrests and temporary detention of six, and abduction of 13. Seven humanitarian workers were expelled from Somalia by authorities in the first half of the year.’\textsuperscript{108}

6.5.9 The website for the International NGO Safety Organisation (which is undated but parts have been updated as recently as June 2018) noted:

‘Somalia remains one of most dangerous countries in the world for aid workers. Critical indicators have not improved in the last year, with 11 aid workers killed. Arrests and brief abductions also remain frequent (almost all affecting national staff). Delivery of aid continues to be a risky business, with frequent riots during distributions that have led to the shooting and killing of some beneficiaries. Throughout 2014, there have been signs of increased political confrontation and shrinking humanitarian space with aid workers targeted as a means of delivering political statements. While access may be growing in some areas, security constraints remain in force.’\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} UNOCHA, 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, foreword p.35, 26 July 2018, url
\textsuperscript{106} USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
\textsuperscript{107} USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.g), 20 April 2018, url
\textsuperscript{108} USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
\textsuperscript{109} INSO, website undated, url
6.5.10 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted in the 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan that ‘[t]he working environment for humanitarian staff remains challenging and high-risk in spite of strong Government efforts to create a conducive climate of convergence and cooperation.’

7. Humanitarian situation

7.1 Overview

7.1.1 The UN summarised the humanitarian situation in their UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020, published in December 2017: ‘The humanitarian situation remains precarious for much of the population. Somalia experiences major rapid and slow onset climate-induced shocks on a 2 to 5-year cycle, with flooding, cyclones and particularly drought as the main causal factors.’

7.1.2 The same report noted: ‘With more than half of its population in need of assistance, at the time of writing, Somalia faces a serious threat of famine due to an extended drought. Around 6.2 million people face acute food insecurity and there are rising levels of acute malnutrition, particularly among pregnant women and children under five years of age. It is estimated that more than 700,000 individuals have left their homes with thousands having sought refuge in neighbouring countries. In addition, an estimated 1.1 million live in protracted displacement with a similar number having been displaced across Somalia’s borders within the region.’

7.1.3 The USSD report 2017 noted: ‘While government and regional authorities were more involved in the recent famine prevention and drought response than in prior years, their capacity to respond remained extremely limited. Violence broke out during several government-sponsored aid distributions during the year, leading to 34 deaths and 42 injuries.’

7.1.4 The UN Security Council report ‘The situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’, published 24 January 2018 stated: ‘Although famine was averted in 2017 thanks to national leadership, collective humanitarian action and historic levels of donor support, food security needs are nearly double the five-year average, and an estimated 6.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Malnutrition reached emergency levels in many locations and is expected to increase. Drought and conflict have displaced more than 2 million people within the country — up to a million of them in the last 12 months — including many children and more than 80,000 pregnant women.’

---

110 UNOCHA, 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, foreword, 17 December 2017, url
111 UN, UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020 (page 15), December 2017, url
112 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
113 UN Security Council, The situation in Somalia report, 24 January 2018, url
7.1.5 The UN Security Council in their Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia published on 2 May 2018 reported some improvement in the humanitarian situation, largely due to humanitarian aid, however noted that, ‘the needs remain great’.  

7.1.6 The same report stated:

‘A massive scale-up of famine prevention efforts and better-than-expected deyr season (September to November) rains in 2017 helped to reduce the risk of famine, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Some 5.4 million people, down from a peak of 6.2 million, are still in need of assistance, while the number of people in urgent need of life-saving assistance has dropped from 3.2 million to 2.7 million. Half a million people are in integrated phase classification 4 (“Emergency”). More than half of those in need are children.

‘Malnutrition rates are at serious levels and among the highest in the world […] With continuing drought conditions, the situation remains extremely fragile and far from returning to levels prior to the crisis in 2017.’

7.1.7 At the UN Security Council meeting on 15 May 2018 there was a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Michael Keating who noted:

‘The humanitarian situation is not as bad as it was a year ago, but by any global measure it remains very grave. The gu rains and flooding have affected more than 718,000 people in the central and southern regions of Somalia. The consequences of the floods include large-scale population displacement, economic damage and diseases, including cholera.’

7.1.8 At the UN Security Council meeting on 15 May 2018, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Francisco Madeira noted the efforts of AMISOM forces with regard to flooded areas:

‘As we speak, AMISOM soldiers are valiantly supporting and assisting the populations of Beledweyne, on the margins of the Shabelle River, who have been flooded out and have had to abandon their homes as a result. They are doing that with immense sacrifice in the middle of a shortage of means of transportation and resources to support the population. But they are receiving profound support from the President of HirShabelle.’

7.1.9 UNOCHA’s 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, published on 26 July 2018, in a foreword by the Humanitarian Coordinator noted:

‘Despite some improvements, food security remains dire. The positive impacts of collective efforts from Somali authorities, national and international partners, and the diaspora, which successfully averted a famine in Somalia last year, are still being felt. Sustained food security assistance...’

114 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 83), url
115 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 64), url
116 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 15 May 2018 (page 3), url
programmes reached an average of 1.8 million people per month between February-April 2018, having reached 3.1 million people in total in 2017. This timely scaled-up response, and the favourable conditions brought about by the Gu rains, have had a relatively positive impact on livestock conditions, water/pasture availability, bumping the downward trend which has emerged during the last two years. The number of people who require urgent lifesaving assistance (IPC [The integrated food security phase classification] phases 3 and 4) has decreased by 22 per cent, from 3.3 million in the first quarter of the year9, to 2.5 million in May10, according to the post-Jilaal assessment released in May 2018. However, in total, more than 5.4 million people (IPC 2, 3 and 4) – around 43 per cent of the population – still need humanitarian assistance in Somalia.118

7.1.10 The UN Security Council in their Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia published on 2 May 2018 noted the following in relation to freedom of movement and the delivery of aid:

‘Humanitarian agencies continue to encounter difficulties on most roads in southern and central Somalia and in some parts of Bari and the disputed Sool region in the north, mainly because of insecurity, illegal checkpoints and extortion. State authorities conducted operations to remove unauthorized checkpoints but armed actors responded by shifting to non-static checkpoints. Al-Shabaab roadblocks in parts of HirShabelle, Jubaland and South-West State continued to constrain the passage of relief supplies and essential commercial goods, thereby driving up costs. In some locations, such as Diinsoor and Waajid in South-West State, Garbahaarrey in Jubaland and Buulobarde in HirShabelle, humanitarian organizations remain forced by the roadblocks to airlift assistance instead of using more affordable and sustainable ground transportation.’119

7.1.11 Human Rights Watch (HRW) in their World Report 2018 (HRW report 2018), covering events of 2017 noted: ‘Humanitarian agencies faced serious challenges in accessing vulnerable populations due to insecurity, restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict, and targeted attacks on aid workers. Foreign counterterrorism legislation, notably US law that could interpret forms of aid as material support for terrorism, also hindered foreign assistance.’120

7.1.12 The USSD report 2017 stated:

‘Armed groups, particularly al-Shabaab but also government forces and militia, deliberately restricted the passage of relief supplies and other items indispensable to the survival of the civilian population as well as access by humanitarian organizations, particularly in the southern and central regions.

‘There was also an increase in the number of violent armed incidents associated with relief aid distributions. By the end of August, nearly 30 incidents accounted for the deaths of 32 civilians and injury to 38 others, with

118 UNOCHA, 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, foreword p.6, 26 July 2018, url
119 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (para 67), url
120 HRW, World report 2018 (Displaced Persons and Access to Humanitarian Assistance), 18 January 2018, url
the majority associated with food distribution conducted by local authorities.'

7.2 Drought / flood

7.2.1 The Amnesty report 2017/2018 noted in relation to the drought in 2017:

‘There was an unprecedented drought that led to a significant increase in the numbers of internally displaced people, estimated to be 943,000 by the end of the year. Over 3 million people experienced emergency levels of food insecurity. Malnutrition reached emergency levels in the southern and central regions, primarily among displaced populations, but also among those directly affected by the protracted conflict. In August, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 388,000 children were malnourished and 87,000 were in need of life-saving support.’

7.2.2 The British Red Cross (BRC) reported on the assistance they provided in relation to the 2017 drought: ‘At the onset of the drought in Somalia, the ICRC assisted over 2.5 million persons of which 1.3 were assisted with financial, food, essential households, and livestock treatment. Over 480,000 people received medical assistance and more than 700,000 people received clean water and better sanitation.’

7.2.3 The Telegraph, in an article published on 30 April 2018, reported on the areas affected by flooding in Somalia:

‘The Somali prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire, appealed for international humanitarian intervention after two of the largest rivers in the centre of the country – the Shebelle and the Juba – burst their banks, sending floodwaters coursing through riverside towns and villages.

‘More than 100,000 people were forced to flee Beledweyne, a town in the Shebelle Valley 206 miles north of the capital Mogadishu, over the weekend, local officials said.

‘Hundreds of thousands more, including 174,000 in the town of Baidoa, are struggling to survive in partially flooded homes. But it is in some of the country’s makeshift camps, where up to 2m Somalis fleeing fighting in one of the world’s most fragile states, where concern is highest.

‘“Our staff on the ground have seen the elderly, women and children struggling to survive while their flimsy shelters are knee-high full of stagnant water,” said Victor Moses, Somalia country director for the Norwegian Refugee Council, a charity.

‘“With limited access to proper toilets and clean water, it’s a ticking time bomb for disease outbreaks like cholera and malaria.”’

---

121 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, [url](url)
122 Amnesty, Amnesty report 2017/2018 (Economic, social and cultural rights), 22 February 2018, [url](url)
123 BRC, Somalia: Assisting people affected by conflict and drought in 2017, 5 February 2018, [url](url)
124 The Telegraph, Cholera epidemic fears in Somalia …, 30 April 2018, [url](url)
7.2.4 The UNOCHA in the Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia 2 June – 5 July 2018 noted the situation in June / July 2018:

‘Gu rainy season ends, but needs remain high. The record levels of rainfall seen during the April – June Gu rainy season have ushered in hopes of the substantial replenishment of water resources, and the restoration of cropland and livestock numbers across many areas of Somalia. The latest food security outlook by the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) reports that food security will improve significantly in many of the areas worst-affected by the 2016/17 drought, as a result of improvements in seasonal performance supported by large-scale humanitarian assistance. However, the magnitude and intensity of the rains, coupled with the subsequent flooding, has aggravated vulnerabilities. Vulnerable communities, still recovering from the adverse effects of protracted drought, are among those who have been most severely affected by flooding.

‘The flooding affected 830,000 people in southern and central areas of Somalia. Of these, nearly 300,000 were temporarily displaced […]

‘Despite above average rainfall, a food insecurity crisis remains with an estimated 5.4 million people in need of assistance across the country, due to the lingering effects of drought, conflict and marginalization. Malnutrition cases and disease outbreaks have continued to surge. More than a million children are projected to be malnourished by the end of the year. Some 5,239 AWD/cholera, 6,778 malaria and 6,311 measles cases have been reported in the first half of 2018 alone. Thankfully, the number of AWD/cholera and measles cases reported is much lower than in 2017, when 71,663 cases of AWD/cholera and 12,336 cases of measles were reported. Humanitarian partners have attributed this to an increase in immunization campaigns in 2017 and 2018.’

7.2.5 On 11 July 2018, in a press release, the European Commission announced:

‘The European Union has released €89.5 million in humanitarian assistance to Somalia and Djibouti, as millions are grappling with the consequences of prolonged extreme weather conditions.

‘The funding comes ahead of the Somalia Partnership Forum co-hosted by the European Union taking place next week over 16-17 July.

"The devastating effects of two years of drought and the recent intense flooding are taking their toll on the livelihood of millions of people in Somalia," said Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides. "Our aid will target the most vulnerable and provide life-saving support to those affected by climatic shocks and internal conflict."

‘Out of the aid package, €89 million in emergency assistance will be channelled in Somalia to reach communities displaced by severe drought, focussing on the prevention and treatment of malnutrition, water supply and livestock protection, as well as health measures against epidemics.’

---

126 European Commission,Press release EU steps up humanitarian aid in Somalia with €89.5 million, url
7.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

7.3.1 The USSD report 2017 stated: "Worsening drought and continuing conflict during the year led to a sharp increase in internal displacement. Somalia was home to more than 1.1 million IDPs prior to 2017, and internal displacement increased by 916,000 persons between January and July [2017], according to UNHCR.

7.3.2 " [...] Increased reports of sexual and gender-based violence accompanied increased displacement, including reports of incidents committed by various armed groups and security personnel. Women and children living in IDP settlements were particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men, including government soldiers and militia members. Gatekeepers in control of some IDP camps reportedly forced girls and women to provide sex in exchange for food and services within the camps."\(^{127}\)

7.3.3 The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC) noted in their March 2018 report Somalia: Somaliland, including government structure, security, and presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Somalia (2016-March 2018), (IRBC report 2018), based on a range of sources:

"The Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) dataset on internal migration network, a project led by the UNHRC and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) that "identifies and reports on displacements and return trends of populations in Somalia," indicates that, from January 2016 up to January 2018, there have been 266,039 newly registered IDPs in Somaliland, including [...] 23,206 IDPs who came from regions of Somalia other than Somaliland (PRMN 31 Jan. 2018). The same source indicates that, of those 23,206 newly arrived IDPs, approximately 99 percent of them were displaced for reasons related to drought, around 0.4 percent were for reasons related to conflicts or insecurity, while approximately 1 percent were displaced for "other" reasons (PRMN 31 Jan. 2018)."\(^{128}\)

7.3.4 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in their report on Somalia, outlined some of the reasons for internal displacement:

"Insecurity, weak governance and extremely low levels of socio-economic development make the population of Somalia highly fragile and vulnerable to recurrent shocks, both human-made and natural. The drivers and impacts of displacement and the obstacles to durable solutions are complex and intertwined. Conflict and violence, slow and sudden-onset natural and environmental hazards, food and livelihood insecurity, weak governance and underdevelopment have all played a significant part in past and current displacement in the country."\(^{129}\)

7.3.5 In the same report, IDMC noted the conditions in IDP camps:

"The majority of IDPs settle in informal and unplanned settlements where conditions are very poor and forced eviction is a common threat, and where

\(^{127}\) USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
\(^{128}\) IRBC, Somalia: Somaliland, including government structure, security, and presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Somalia (2016-March 2018), (section 3) 23 March 2018, url
\(^{129}\) IDMC, Somalia, undated (Overview), url
the newly displaced join people whose displacement has become protracted. Many are displaced multiple times. IDP communities are often marginalised and discriminated against because they often belong to minorities or are separated from the protection of their clans.\textsuperscript{130}

‘The highest poverty levels in Somalia are found in IDP settlements (71 per cent), and IDPs displaced under near-famine conditions are in acute need of humanitarian assistance and protection, including: access to food, water and sanitation, life-saving health services, shelter and basic services such as education; mitigation of further exposure to violence and the impact of natural hazards; and support for livelihood recovery. Many women displaced by conflict and famine have been subjected to violence and abuse both inside and outside IDP camps, while many children have dropped out of school.’\textsuperscript{131}

7.3.6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in their Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017 report, published 25 June 2018 noted: ‘Some 2.1 million people were internally displaced in Somalia at the end of 2017, making this the fifth largest IDP population. The IDP population increased by some 569,300 due to new displacements.’\textsuperscript{132}

7.3.7 UNOCHA’s 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, published on 26 July 2018, in a foreword by the Humanitarian Coordinator noted:

‘The displacement crisis has also reached historic levels. There are over 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently in Somalia, as confirmed by the specialists of the Protection Return and Monitoring Network (PRMN) and the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in May 2018, with most having been driven to displacement by conflict or climate change. This figure represents an increase of one million when compared to January 2017. In the last three months alone, almost 290,000 people have left their homes due to flooding.[…]

‘Overcrowded settlements, the subsequent increased risk of disease outbreaks due, overburdened health services, violence against women and girls, family separation and exploitation are some of the consequences.’\textsuperscript{133}

7.3.8 The HRW report 2018 noted the following regarding female IDPs:

‘Internally displaced women and girls remain at particular risk of sexual and gender-based violence by armed men, including government soldiers and militia members, and civilians. According to the UN, incidents of reported sexual violence around displacement settlements increased in 2017.’\textsuperscript{134}

7.3.9 The Amnesty report 2017/2018 stated: ‘The drought led to more women being separated from their families, which put them at greater risk of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly because they were perceived as lacking “male protection”’\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{130} IDMC, Somalia, undated (Patterns of Displacement), url
\textsuperscript{131} IDMC, Somalia, undated (Impact), url
\textsuperscript{132} UNHCR, Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017 report, 25 June 2018 (page 34), url
\textsuperscript{133} UNOCHA, 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised, foreword p.4 and 9, 26 July 2018, url
\textsuperscript{134} HRW, World report 2018 (Sexual Violence), 18 January 2018, url
\textsuperscript{135} Amnesty, Amnesty report 2017/2018 (Women’s Rights), 22 February 2018, url
7.3.10 ‘In July 2018 the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted that ‘An underdeveloped regulatory framework, a weak protective environment and a lack of awareness of their rights have hampered access to justice for internally displaced persons.’\(^{136}\)

7.3.11 A Joint Partner Assessment published in April 2018 looking at drought and protection concerns in IDP sites concluded that:

‘- Displacement must be understood as a protection concern in itself, with IDPs currently being some of the most vulnerable populations in Somalia and Somaliland.’

‘- Hotspot areas of insecurity for women and girls included latrines, shelters and water points within the sites.

‘- The most commonly identified area where men and boys were reported to experience insecurity was outside of the site.

‘- The poor quality of shelters was raised as a key security concern in both focus group discussions (FGDs) and the household survey. FGD respondents indicated that temporary shelter materials (plastic sheeting/cloth etc.) are easily torn or ripped making households vulnerable to theft or intrusion, an issue compounded by a lack of lockable doors.

‘- In addition to the external threats that temporary shelters are vulnerable to, the reported lack of internal separations in shelters raise additional protection concerns relating to lack of privacy.’

‘- Extremely limited services were reportedly available for survivors of SGBV, which is further compounded by the social stigma attached to victims of rape which prevents many from accessing services where they are available.

‘- In a reflection of the lack of formal legal services, community or camp leaders usually resolve disputes, including issues relating to SGBV, rather than any formal justice system. These systems are often biased against the victim.

‘- Fifteen percent (15%) of all assessed households indicated that delivery of humanitarian assistance had caused conflict or violence in the community, most commonly during food distributions.

‘- Widows, the elderly, and physically and mentally disabled people were reported to be more likely to be excluded from humanitarian assistance. Within this, women were reportedly more likely to be excluded than men.’\(^{137}\)

7.3.12 Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster and REACH published a document, Detailed Site Assessment Severity of needs in IDP-hosting districts Somalia, September 2017 - March 2018 which used a ‘grid pattern approach’ to assess the severity of needs in IDP-hosting districts across South & Central Somalia. This focused on indicators such as protection, food security, health/nutrition, WASH, shelter/NFI, education and site priority.\(^{138}\) For further information see the published grid here.

\(^{137}\) REACH, Drought and Protection Concerns in IDP Sites (pages 2 & 3), April 2018, url
\(^{138}\) CCCM/REACH, Severity of needs in IDP-hosting districts: Sept 2017 to March 2018, April 2018, url
7.3.13 For further information on the situation for women in Somalia see country policy and information note on Somalia: Women fearing gender-based violence

7.4 Eviction of IDPs

7.4.1 The IDMC report on Somalia noted that ‘Most forced evictions of IDPs take place without warning, and alternative land or housing is rarely provided, pushing those affected toward remote districts where livelihoods are a struggle.’

7.4.2 The USSD 2017 report noted:

‘In addition, forceful evictions of IDPs continued in Somalia, including more than 5,000 evictions from IDP settlements in Baidoa, with government providing negligible protection and assistance to IDPs and sometimes actively participating in their displacement. Private persons with claims to land and government authorities, for example, regularly pursued the forceful eviction of IDPs in Mogadishu.’

7.4.3 In a Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on 2 January 2018 it was noted that:

‘The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Peter de Clercq, expressed deep concern yesterday over reports of the unannounced destruction of settlements for internally displaced persons, along with humanitarian infrastructure in K13, in the Kahda District of Banadir, in Mogadishu. Over 23 settlements, housing over 4,000 internally-displaced person households, were destroyed. Personal property and livelihoods have been lost as people were not given time to collect their belongings before the destruction started. An assessment was carried out today to establish the immediate needs of the displaced and where the people have settled. Some partners have already started providing assistance, such as clean water. Additional response activities, including provision of temporary sanitation facilities and distribution of hygiene kits, are in the pipeline. Throughout Somalia, more than 2 million people are displaced due to drought and conflict, including one million newly displaced in 2017 alone. Displaced people constitute one-third of the 6.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.’

7.4.4 The HRW report Somalia: Thousands Homeless as Settlements Razed, published on 28 January 2018 noted:

‘Somali security forces using bulldozers have demolished dozens of informal settlements in Mogadishu since late December 2017, leaving thousands homeless. Human Rights Watch analyzed satellite imagery that shows that between December 29 and January 19, 2018, approximately 3,000 shelters were dismantled or destroyed using heavy machinery.’

139 IDMC, Somalia, undated (Impact), url
140 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d), 20 April 2018, url
141 UN, Daily Press Briefing, url
On January 17, the federal minister for planning, investment and development, Gamal Hassan, responded to growing criticism from aid organizations and announced the government would investigate the evictions.

[...] The authorities failed to provide adequate notification and compensation to the communities facing eviction, and did not provide viable relocation or local integration options required by international law, Human Rights Watch said.142

7.4.5 The UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, published on 2 May 2018:

‘Evictions continued, in particular in Mogadishu and Baidoa... Overall, 200,280 individuals were evicted in 2017, 154,000 (77 per cent) of them in Mogadishu, which hosts nearly 626,000 internally displaced persons. The mass eviction that took place on 29 and 30 December 2017 accounted for 23 per cent of the year’s total and was the worst single incident of mass eviction in 2017. Humanitarian workers continue to engage with the authorities to seek long-term solutions.’143

7.4.6 UNOCHA in the 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan - revised noted a record number of evictions registered in Somalia in 2018 (to date) and noted that ‘Mogadishu has historically been the city worst affected by evictions, while over 25,000 IDPs have been evicted every month this year. The capital also witnessed the evictions of 123,000 individuals in 2015, 143,500 in 2016 and almost 154,000 in 2017. As of May, in Mogadishu, over 127,000 people lost their homes in 2018.’144

7.4.7 In July 2018, the UN Independent Expert reported to the UN Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted that:

‘Forced evictions multiply the protection and displacement crises affecting Somalia. The displaced are unable to have access to or assert their basic rights, mainly due to a power imbalance between them and the evicting parties. The displaced have settled on private and government land, for which they do not have lasting tenure or security guarantees. In Mogadishu, the growing demand for private and public land since the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab has increased difficulties for internally displaced and urban poor populations to find land where there is no risk of eviction.’145

7.4.8 The August 2018 report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) noted:

‘Last year’s drought and conflict, plus flooding this April [2018], led to a massive migration to urban areas. But the shelter situation was already critical, with limited public land available to establish new settlements. Many people who ended up as squatters on public or private land have been evicted in Mogadishu due to a building boom. Displaced families who occupy dilapidated public buildings also risk being forcefully evicted, as many are

142 HRW, Somalia: Thousands Homeless as Settlements Razed, 28 January 2018, url
143 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 2 May 2018 (4b para 65), url
144 UNOCHA, 2018 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan – revised (pages 8 -9), 26 July 2018, url
being rebuilt. Most evictions are done without due process, including without prior notice.’

‘Over 204,000 people were evicted between January and July [2018], almost double the 122,000 evicted over the same period last year, according to the Housing Land Property Sub-Cluster of Somalia. This surpassed the total evicted for all of 2017.’

8. Freedom of movement

8.1 General

8.1.1 Article 21 in the Provisional Constitution of Somalia states that ‘every person lawfully residing within the territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia has the right to freedom of movement, freedom to choose their residence, and freedom to leave the country’.

8.1.2 The USSD report 2017 stated: ‘Checkpoints operated by government forces, allied groups, armed militias, clan factions, and al-Shabaab inhibited movement and exposed citizens to looting, extortion, harassment, and violence. Roadblocks manned by armed actors and attacks on humanitarian personnel severely restricted movement and the delivery of aid in southern and central sectors of the country.’

8.1.3 The Logistics Cluster in its Somalia - Access Constraints Map, as of 7 June 2018, showed the road system and gave details of accessibility.

For detailed information on freedom of movement see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

8.2 Returns

8.2.1 The Somali Federal Government Policy Paper on Returnees to Somalia (undated) stated the position on returning failed asylum seekers:

‘Somalia is willing to accept rejected asylum seekers and others below mentioned categories of returnees through a strict case-by-case policy. Somalia will reject the repatriation of any category of persons who may pose an actual or potential risk to Somali national security and stability in all its forms.

‘However, in certain circumstances, the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia is willing to work with partner nations on the return of a select group of returnees who satisfy the conditions below:

• Any candidate for repatriation to Somalia must prove that he/she is a Somali national and that he/she originate from within the borders of the Federal Republic of Somalia;

NRC, Troubling trend sees evictions in Somalia double, 28 August 2018, url
The Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution (page 5), 1 August 2012, url
USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 1.d), 20 April 2018, url
Logistic Cluster, Somalia - Access Constraints Map, 7 June 2018, url
• There must be a risk assessment of every candidate for repatriation by the country they are being deported from and by the relevant Somali government authorities.

• All returnees must have a fixed address in an accessible part of Somalia;

• Returnees in need of psychological and mental health support cannot be returned to Somalia at present;

• Somalia will not accept the repatriation of certain categories of offenders including radicalized people, sexual predators, and certain violent criminals.

• All returnees with a criminal background must have completed their sentences in their host countries before arriving in Somalia;

• Host governments wishing to return offenders must disclose a full criminal background check to the relevant Somali authorities before a decision can be made.'  

8.2.2 The USSD report 2017 noted:

‘Somalis and citizens from other countries fleeing the conflict in Yemen sought refuge in Somalia. While flows from Yemen declined since August 2015, approximately 38,200 individuals fled to Somalia from Yemen since March 2015. This included more than 32,300 Somali nationals, approximately 5,500 Yemeni refugees, and more than 300 migrants of other nationalities.

‘Somali returnees […] from marginalized clans suffered discrimination, since they often lacked powerful clan connections and protection.’  

8.2.3 The UNHCR, in the Somalia situation 2017 Supplementary Appeal January – December 2017 report noted: ‘The escalation of conflict in Yemen, where there are more than 255,000 Somali refugees, has also triggered the return of some 30,600 Somalis since 2015.’  

8.2.4 The Amnesty report 2017/18 noted:

‘On 9 February, the High Court in Kenya declared that the Kenyan government’s 2016 directive to close Dadaab refugee camp in Garissa County was unconstitutional and in violation of Kenya’s obligations under international and national law (see Kenya entry). The majority of refugees housed at the camp were from Somalia. From January to November 2017, according to UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, approximately 32,500 Somali refugees were voluntarily repatriated from Kenya to Kismayo, Baidoa, Mogadishu, Luuq, and Afmadow in south-central Somalia under the Tripartite Agreement between Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR. By the end of the year, there were 229,592 Somalis registered as refugees in Dadaab refugee camp. However, Kenya continued not to register new arrivals from Somalia.’

150 Somali Federal Government, Policy Paper on Returnees to Somalia, undated, url
151 USSD, USSD report 2017 (section 2.d and 6), 20 April 2018, url
152 UNHCR, Somalia situation 2017 (page 40), May 2017, url
8.2.5 The UNHCR noted in the Somalia situation 2017 Supplementary Appeal January – December 2017:

‘Close to 61,000 Somalis have returned from Kenya since 2014, including 20,900 in the first three months of 2017. In addition to the challenges related to security and the overall level of development in the country, there are specific immediate challenges in ensuring the successful reintegration of the returnee population. A significant number of extremely vulnerable Somali nationals remain socially marginalized and economically destitute. The majority of Somali refugees have returned to Kismayo in Lower Juba, and Baidoa in Bay. The reception capacity in these areas require additional support especially in the sectors of health, WASH, and education.’\textsuperscript{154}

8.2.6 UNHCR Somalia posted the following on their Twitter account on the 10 July 2018: ‘Today, 341 Somali @Refugees voluntarily returned from #Dadaab, Kenya; first road convoy since March 2018. [...] Government & partners provided assistance at Dhobley border waystation in #Somalia. Since 2014, UNHCR has supported 81,111 Somali refugees returning from Kenya.’\textsuperscript{155}

8.3 Return of diaspora

8.3.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation for the Federal Republic of Somalia website stated ‘Somalia welcomes and supports Somalis around the world that want to return back home keeping in mind the interest of Somalia’s national security. The Federal Government understands the importance of the Diaspora coming back and investing in their country. A country is built on sacrifices, and Somalia is significantly improving by Diasporas returning and sacrificing for their nation.’\textsuperscript{156}

8.3.2 A 2015 paper by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) looked at the return of the diaspora to Somalia. The paper was prefaced with a brief summary overview:

- ‘Diaspora return for business is appreciated in Somalia, but constitutes a small portion of returns
- Those who return voluntarily from Norway and the USA, return with citizenship and resources, including education
- Many diaspora Somalis lead transnational lives compatible with business – with families working and living in multiple countries
- Some diaspora business brings new services and products to Somalia – including taxis, dry cleaners, gyms and law firms
- Support for diaspora businesses with investment funds is important; building on collaborations between local and diaspora entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{157}

8.3.3 The Guardian article The young Somalis recreating Mogadishu’s prewar splendour, published 23 May 2018 noted ‘[…] Somalis who fled violence and

\textsuperscript{154} UNHCR, Somalia situation 2017 (page 40), May 2017, url\textsuperscript{155} UNHCR Somalia, Twitter, 10 July 2018, url\textsuperscript{156} Federal Rep. of Somalia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Co-operation website (undated), url\textsuperscript{157} PRIO, Back in Business? Diaspora Return to Somalia, May 2015, url
drought in past decades continue to arrive home from around the world. In recent years China and the US have re-established diplomatic posts in Somalia, while the UK constructed an embassy in Mogadishu, all preludes to what the country hopes will be a return of foreign investment – and a ramping up of reconstruction.”

8.3.4 The Heritage Institute report Youth Migration in Somalia, Causes, Consequences and Possible Remedies, published April 2018 noted:

‘In the past seven years, many Somalis returned home, mainly from Europe and the United States. The visibility of the returnees in the public and business sectors has been increasing every year. In October 2013, the Somali Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Department of Diaspora Affairs […]

‘The engagement and influence of diaspora in Somalia can be seen at the highest levels of government. At the federal level, the president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, the prime minister Hassan Kheyre and the speaker of parliament’s lower house Mohamed Sheikh Osman Jawari are all dual nationals who have returned […]

‘While the diaspora experience, knowledge and investment are all crucial in rebuilding Somalia, the lack of employment opportunities for locals compared with returnees has encouraged a number of educated youth to migrate.’

9. Maps and information resources

9.1.1 The following sources contain current and regularly updated maps and resources on the conflict and humanitarian situation:

- For the UN Security Council’s regular reports on developments in Somalia including maps and other information regarding territorial control within Somalia, see: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/)
- **UN Map of Somalia December 2011**
- The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also provides regular updates on the situation on the ground including maps showing territorial control, see: [http://amisom-au.org/](http://amisom-au.org/)
- **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Reliefweb, Somalia country page** contains regularly updated maps and resources on the humanitarian and security situation in Somalia
- Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) contains information, statistics and analysis of security developments in Somalia, see: [https://www.acleddata.com/](https://www.acleddata.com/)

---


Terms of Reference

A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of what the CPIN seeks to cover. They form the basis for the country information section. The Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Team uses some standardised ToRs, depending on the subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.

For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- Security situation
  - General overview
  - Actors of violence
  - Control of territory
  - Nature of the violence
  - Level of violence and number of casualties
  - Profile of casualties and targets
  - Impact on vulnerable groups (Women and children, the elderly, disabled persons, health workers, humanitarian workers).
  - Impact on daily life

- Humanitarian situation
  - Food security
  - Water, sanitation and hygiene
  - Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
  - Commercial and humanitarian access
  - Evictions

- Freedom of movement
  - Major infrastructure (roads, rail etc.)
  - Roadblocks/checkpoints
  - Ports and airports
  - Return of refugees / IDPs / diaspora
  - Maps and Resources

Back to Contents
Bibliography

Sources cited


BBC News,


Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Somalia: Somaliland, including government structure, security, and presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Somalia (2016-March 2018)’, 23 March 2018
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5ad453514.html. Last accessed: 25 July 2018


Human Rights Watch,


Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM),


The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,


Sources consulted but not cited


Version control

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version 4.0
- valid from 25 September 2018

Changes from last version of this note

Updated country information and analysis.

Back to Contents