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Sudan: Country Report

Country Report on Darfur

January 2019 (COI between 1 September 2017 and 2 December 2018)

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Explanatory Note

This report presents country of origin information (COI) on Darfur between 1st September 2017 and 2nd December 2018 on issues identified by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to be of relevance in refugee status determination for Sudanese nationals. This report is an update of the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017.

UNOCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' covering the first half of January 2018 noted that "Humanitarian partners do not have access to SLA-AW [Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid] controlled areas in Darfur" and can therefore not verify reports of fighting.¹ Similarly, Amnesty International reported in June 2018 that "In Darfur, there were no NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in many parts of Jebel Marra, with the exception of some very limited assistance in the government-controlled towns on the plains surrounding the area".²

IRIN news noted in April 2018 that:

Information on how UNAMID's downsizing affects security and aid operations remains scarce. It could limit access for UN agencies, whose security rules mandate that all personnel travel in Darfur under UNAMID armed escort. "UN security rules in Darfur are restricting UN access," said one Darfur-based aid worker, who preferred to remain anonymous.

"There's almost no one on the ground to monitor developments," said Maddy Crowther, co-executive director at Waging Peace, an NGO that focuses on human rights. "Changes are happening in the dark. For example, UNAMID has closed down various team sites, but instead of these being handed over to civilian bodies, there are reports that they've been taken over by the [government's paramilitary] Rapid Support Forces in some cases".³

In September 2018 a Sudanese journalist Shammal Al-Nur was reported as stating to Al Jazeera "Today, the government claims categorically that there's no longer a crisis in Darfur and they want to control what news sees the light from this conflict zone. Journalists are not allowed to go there and Sudanese reporters are prohibited from discussing the security situation. For the media in Sudan, the crisis in Darfur is the pivotal issue that our news outlets refrain from tackling".⁴

See also information included in section 3.3. Freedom of movement specifically [3.3.1 Freedom of movement in Darfur](#) and [3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur](#).

The COI presented is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain, nor is it determinative of any individual human rights or asylum claim. All sources are publicly available and a direct hyperlink has been provided.

A list of sources and databases consulted is also provided in this report, to enable users to conduct further research and to conduct source assessments. Research focused on **events** from 1 September until 2nd December 2018 with special focus on sources published in 2018 where applicable. Only annual reports covering the situation in 2017 have been included. All sources were accessed in December 2018 and January 2019.

¹ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Bulletin, 1-14 January 2018](#), 18 January 2018, p. 2

² Amnesty International, [Sudan: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 124th Session 8 October-2 November 2018](#), 11 September 2018, 3.1 Restricted Humanitarian Assistance, p. 9

³ IRIN, [Six months after US sanctions lifted, promised aid access in Sudan remains limited](#), 11 April 2018

⁴ Al Jazeera, [Radio Dabanga: Is Darfur losing its media lifeline?](#), 2 September 2018

The following reports which post-date the cut-off point have been included given that they address issues of relevance addressed in this report:

- ❖ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [*Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019*](#), December 2018
- ❖ Sudan Tribune, [*Sudan, armed groups agree to resume talks for peace in Darfur*](#), 6 December 2018
- ❖ ACLED, [*REGIONAL OVERVIEW – AFRICA 4 DECEMBER 2018*](#), 4 December 2018
- ❖ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [*Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019*](#), December 2018
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Militiamen torch mosque, intimidate returnees in North Darfur*](#), 4 December 2018
- ❖ Committee to Protect Journalists, [*Sudan must stop trying to censor newspapers, websites*](#), 21 December 2018
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Prominent Lawyer Imprisoned in East Darfur, 22 held in El Gezira*](#), 26 December 2018
- ❖ Reporters Without Borders (RSF), [*RSF decries alarming new crackdown on Sudan's media*](#), 28 December 2018
- ❖ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [*Sudan: Killing of peaceful protesters and a wave of arbitrary arrests and detention by Sudanese authorities, 14-24 December 2018*](#), 31 December 2018

This document is intended to be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to in this report can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. **This report is not a substitute for individualised case-specific research and therefore this document should not be submitted in isolation as evidence to refugee decision-making authorities.** Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, the authors accept no responsibility for any errors included in this report.

Sources and databases consulted

Not all of the sources listed here have been consulted for each issue addressed in the report. Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About Us' tab of a source's website.

Databases

[Asylos's Research Notes](#)

[EASO COI Portal](#)

[European Country of Origin Information Network \(ECOI\)](#)

[Relief Web](#)

[UNHCR Refworld](#)

News

[African Arguments](#) [Sudan pages]

[All Africa](#)

[Al Jazeera](#)

[The East African](#)

[Inter Press Service](#)

[IRIN news](#) [Sudan pages]

[Radio Dabanga](#)

[Reuters Africa](#) [Sudan pages]

[Sudan Tribune](#)

Sources

[28 too Many](#) [FGM]

[76 Crimes](#) [LGBT]

[Aegis Trust](#)

[African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies \(ACJPS\)](#)

[Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

[African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\)](#)

[African Studies Centre Leiden](#)

[Aidsmap](#)

[AIDSPortal](#)

[Amnesty International](#) [Sudan pages]

[Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit \(ATLEU\)](#)

[Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project \(ACLED\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Article 19](#) [Freedom of expression and information]

[Assessment Capacities Project \(ACAPS\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Association for the Prevention of Torture](#)

[Atlantic Council](#)

[Atlas of Torture](#)

[Avert](#) [HIV/AIDS]

[Brookings Institution](#)

[Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies](#) [Sudan pages]

[Care International](#)

[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)

[Centre for Security Governance](#)

[Centre for Strategic and International Studies](#)

[Child Rights International Network](#) [Sudan pages]
[Child Soldiers International](#)
[Child Soldiers World Index](#)
[CHR Michelsen Institute](#) [Sudan pages]
[CIA World Factbook](#) [Sudan pages]
[Combatting Terrorism Center](#)
[Committee to Protect Journalists](#) [Sudan pages]
[Death Penalty Worldwide \(Cornell Law School\)](#)
[Doctors Without Borders](#)
[The Economist Intelligence Unit](#) [Sudan pages]
[EASO's List of sources in its report 'Researching the situation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons \(LGBT\) in countries of origin'](#)
[Edge Media Network](#) [LGBT]
[Eldis](#)
[Enough Project](#)
[Equal Rights Trust](#)
[Eric Reeves, Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy](#)
[European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)
[Foreign Affairs \(published by Council on Foreign Relations\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2018](#) [Sudan pages]
[Fund for Peace – Fragile States Index 2018](#)
[Gay Star News](#)
[Global Aids Program Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation](#)
[Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack](#) [Sudan pages]
[The Global Forum on MSM and HIV](#)
[Global Fund for Peace](#)
[Global Gayz](#)
[GlobalSecurity.org](#)
[Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict \(GSDRC\)](#)
[Hands off Cain](#)
[Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research](#)
[Hot Peach Pages](#) [DV]
[Humanitarian Response](#) [Sudan pages]
[Hudson Institute](#)
[Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust](#) [Sudan pages]
[Human Rights Watch](#) [Sudan pages]
[Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan/Small Arms Survey](#)
[Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada](#)
[Institute for Economics & Peace – Global Peace Index 2018](#)
[Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa](#)
[Institute for the Study of War](#)
[Institute for War and Peace Reporting](#)
[Inter-African Committees on Traditional Practices](#)
[Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre \(IDMC\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[International Bar Association](#)
[International Centre for Prison Studies](#)
[International Commission of Jurists](#)
[International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)
[International Crisis Group](#) [Sudan pages]
[International Federation for Human Rights](#) [Africa pages]
[International Federation of Journalists](#)

[International Freedom of Expression Exchange](#)
[International Institute for Strategic Studies](#)
[International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans and Intersex Association \(ILGA\)](#)
[International Organization for Migration \(IOM\)](#)
[International Organization for Migration Sudan Mission](#)
[International Refugee Rights Initiative](#)
[International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims](#)
[International Rescue Committee](#)
[IPI Global Observatory](#)
[Jamestown Foundation](#)
[Kaleidoscope Trust \[LGBT\]](#)
[Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor](#)
[Long War Journal](#)
[Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Minority Rights Group International](#)
[Minorities at Risk Project](#)
[National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism \(START\) – Global Terrorism Database \(GTD\)](#)
[Oakland Institute](#)
[OECD’s Social Institutions & Gender Index](#)
[Open Society Foundations](#)
[Orchid Project \[FGM\]](#)
[Organization for Refuge, Asylum & Migration \(ORAM\)](#)
[Out Right Action International \[LGBT\]](#)
[Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\)](#)
[Oxfam](#)
[Peace Women](#)
[Penal Reform International](#)
[Physicians for Human Rights](#)
[Pink News \[LGBT\]](#)
[Refugees International](#)
[Reporters Without Borders](#)
[Rift Valley Institute](#)
[Right to Education](#)
[Saferworld](#)
[Save the Children](#)
[Sexual Rights Initiative \[LGBT\]](#)
[Small Arms Survey](#)
[SOGICA’s Database](#)
[Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa](#)
[Sudan Consortium](#)
[Sudan Democracy First Group](#)
[Sudan Social Development Organisation](#)
[Stop FGM Now](#)
[Their World](#)
[Transparency International](#)
[UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office \[Annual Human Rights Report 2017\]](#)
[United Nations AIDS \[UNAIDS\]](#)
[United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur \(UNAMID\)](#)
[United Nations Children’s Fund \(UNICEF\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[United Nations Committee Against Torture](#)

[United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women](#)
[United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child](#)
[United Nations Development Programme \(UNDP\)](#)
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)
[United Nations Human Rights Council](#)
[United Nations Human Settlements Programme \(UNHABITAT\)](#)
[United Nations News Centre](#)
[United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights \(OHCHR\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[United Nations Population Fund \(UNPFPA\)](#)
[United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime \(UNODC\)](#)
[United Nations Secretary General](#)
[United Nations Women](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences](#)
[United Nations World Food Programme \(WFP\)](#)
[United States Institute of Peace](#)
[United States Congressional Research Service](#)
[United States Department of State \[Annual human rights report; annual religious report; annual labour report; annual trafficking report; annual terrorism report\]](#)
[Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation](#)
[Uppsala Universitet – UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia](#)
[Waging Peace](#)
[Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[Women Living Under Muslim Laws](#)
[Women News Network \(WNN\)](#)
[Women's Refugee Commission](#)
[Women Under Siege Project](#)
[World Bank \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Health Organisation \(WHO\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Organisation Against Torture](#)
[World Prison Brief](#)

List of Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacity Project
ACJPS	African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGM/C	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
GoS	Government of Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MI	Military Intelligence
NCP	National Congress Party
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
RRC	Return and Reconstruction Commission
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SLM-AW	Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur
SLM-MM	Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawie
SLM-TC	SLM Transitional Council
SPLA-N	Sudan People's Liberation Army-North
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRCS	Sudanese Red Crescent Society
SRF	Sudan Revolutionary Forces
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. Security situation in Darfur since Sept 2017

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 described the conflict in Darfur in 2017 as “highly violent”.⁵

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), in 2017 “there were no major new offensives between the conflict parties, but the country still faced regular incidents of violence”.⁶

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s annual report for 2017 considered that “Although the impact of conflict on civilians continued to diminish, government and government-affiliated forces continued to violate and abuse human rights with impunity in conflict-affected areas”.⁷

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 recorded that:

Analysis of armed violence reporting for Darfur during 2017 reveals a significant reduction of civilian casualties from previous years, following the cessation of Operation Decisive Summer, no reported offensive military overflights and increased efforts by the Government of the Sudan to improve internal security in Darfur.⁸

The same source noted with regards to armed violence monitoring in Darfur that:

The Panel has conducted detailed research into open-source reporting on armed violence in Darfur throughout 2017 in order to identify trends and analyse the impact on the civilian population. The data have been collated from a variety of publicly available sources such as traditional media, social media and humanitarian and academic reporting. The data have been corroborated, where possible, with additional reporting by United Nations agencies and information gathered in the Panel’s field visits.

Trend analysis from open-source reporting provides a general understanding of the conflict dynamics. However, it does not yield actual incident or casualty totals. For reporting purposes, the Panel has divided the reported incidents of violence into the following categories:

- (a) Military (15 per cent) — armed violence involving SAF and Darfurian rebel groups;
- (b) Militia (39 per cent) — armed violence perpetrated by militia groups;
- (c) Intercommunal (20 per cent) — armed violence between communities;
- (d) Criminal (20 per cent) — armed violence by individuals or organized crime gangs;
- (e) Unexploded ordnance (6 per cent) — incidents involving explosive remnants of war and unintended explosions in munitions sites. [...]

As shown in figure VIII, military operations accounted for almost 28 per cent of all reported casualties (killed and injured). The May incursions [...] were the major cause of reported casualties attributed to military operations. Intercommunal incidents, while only half as frequent as militia-related incidents (see figure VII), resulted in a significantly higher number of casualties. One incident of intercommunal violence can be prolonged over several days or weeks, with retaliatory armed violence between the two sides, until mediation or resolutions can be achieved. [...]

Militia violence often takes the form of intimidation, robbery or rape of internally displaced persons, as well as acts of carjacking or abduction, but the casualties are often in single figures for each

⁵ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Highly violent conflicts in 2017*, p. 13

⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan: Global Report on Internal Displacement \(GRID 2018\)](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018], p. 2

⁷ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report: Sudan](#), Updated 5 October 2018

⁸ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 82

incident. Armed criminal incidents are common in towns and displaced person camps and also generally produce small numbers of casualties per incident. The reported number of such incidents varied little from 2013 to 2017. [...]

The number of incidents of armed violence reported in 2017 varies widely among the states. The states with the highest levels of reported armed violence are North and Central Darfur, followed by South, West and East Darfur.⁹

The report illustrated these trends in the following figures, based on reporting by various media sources up to 31 October¹⁰:

Figure VI
Reported incidents of armed violence in Darfur in 2017




Figure VII
Breakdown of casualties in Darfur by month in 2017



⁹ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 82-88

¹⁰ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, p. 24-5

Figure VIII
Breakdown of casualties by incident type in 2017





Figure IX
Breakdown of incidents of armed violence in 2017 by state



The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies documented that during the reporting period of 20 May 2017 to November 2017, “numerous developments contributing to the deterioration of security took place in Darfur”.¹¹ The same source further described:

In a political move aimed at creating an impression of Government control and defusing tensions in Darfur, Khartoum announced a campaign in August 2017 under Presidential Decree No. 419 (2017) to collect weapons and legitimize the ownership of smuggled vehicles in the States of Darfur and Kordofan. Before the campaign began, the Vice-President, Hassabo Mohamed Abdelrahman, and the tribal militia leader and commander of the Border Guard Forces, Abdullah Musa Hilal traded barbs indicating strained relations between Khartoum and the militias. Subsequently, Hilal refused to collect his militia’s weapons or to integrate his forces into the Rapid Support Forces led by Muhammad Hamdan Dalgo (“Hemeidti”). [...] In the second stage of the weapons collection campaign, Rapid Support Forces militia and military equipment were scaled up on the ground in Darfur.¹²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 provided the following conflict analysis:

¹¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Militia Chaos in Darfur: What’s Next?* October 2018, Introduction p. 3

¹² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Militia Chaos in Darfur: What’s Next?* October 2018, Introduction p. 3

While the reporting period did not witness any armed clashes between the forces of the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur armed groups, the initiation of the mandatory stage of the weapons collection campaign across Darfur and its launch in the camps for internally displaced persons created new dynamics. In addition, the start of the migration season continues to generate violence among communities, although at lower levels than in previous years. No tangible progress was noted in the Darfur political process, nor in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.¹³

The Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed the conflict thus:

[...] following its military victory against the rebel movements, the Government of the Sudan is firmly consolidating its control and State authority across Darfur, except for small pockets in the Jebel Marra area. Notably, the deployment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur in the context of the weapons collection campaign has increased the Government's capability to respond swiftly to security challenges, while creating new dynamics. On the political front, the constitutional review process continues in a measured way on the basis of the outcome of the national dialogue. However, the people of Darfur have not yet fully benefited from the political and the legislative provisions stipulated in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as its implementation remains lacking, despite the inclusion of the Doha Document in the Constitution.¹⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

The overall security situation has remained stable. While the dry season is coming to mid-point, no major clashes have taken place between the forces of the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur armed groups; the weapons collection campaign proceeded in the Jebel Marra area, while encountering resistance from the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) elements; tensions increased in some internally displaced persons camps in Central Darfur. The period also witnessed fewer incidents of intercommunal conflicts, banditry and criminality, human rights abuses and cases of harassment, in particular of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. The overall humanitarian situation remained largely unchanged, despite the new displacement of several hundred persons from eastern Jebel Marra, as a result of fighting between two SLA/AW factions. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel-led peace process in Darfur remained stalled, and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur has been constrained by the lack of capacity and resources, for which the Government is seeking external assistance.¹⁵

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 provided the following conflict analysis:

The security situation in Darfur has remained relatively stable, following military gains by the Government of the Sudan against the rebel movements since 2016 and a decrease in large-scale intercommunal clashes as of mid-2015, leading to the consolidation of State authority across Darfur, except for small pockets in the Jebel Marra area. Overall, the situation in Darfur has evolved significantly from the height of the conflict in the late 2000s, when the situation was marked by an

¹³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraph 2

¹⁴ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 4

¹⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 2

armed conflict between Government forces and non-State actors. Today, conditions are better described as those of lawlessness and criminality, aggravated by a protracted humanitarian crisis, continued human rights violations and the lack of development. On the political front, the Darfur peace process remains incomplete, and implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur requires new impetus. There have been, however, encouraging developments regarding the constitutional review based on the outcome of the national dialogue.[...] Improvements in the overall security situation in Darfur have created the conditions for UNAMID to prepare its exit after more than 10 years in the Sudan. The military successes of the Government against the rebel movements have visibly changed the landscape, despite the failed incursion of two rebel groups from Libya and South Sudan in May and June 2017 to establish a foothold in Darfur, and for the second dry season in a row no major operation has taken place. The weapons collection campaign, initiated in August 2017, has strengthened the control of the Government over the territory and created the conditions for the extension of State authority across Darfur. In the light of that, the presence of the African Union and the United Nations needs to adapt so as to serve the current needs of the population of Darfur. It is in that spirit that we propose a reconfiguration of our presence to deploy peacekeeping where it is still needed and to increase early recovery and development efforts to address root causes of conflict and consolidate and sustain peace.¹⁶

However the same source also detailed that “while the security situation is much improved and the Government has been successful in consolidating authority across most of Darfur, the underlying conflict drivers, including land and resource distribution, remain largely unaddressed. Until a comprehensive solution to those difficult issues is reached, the possibility of a relapse into conflict cannot be entirely discounted”.¹⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

The security situation remains generally stable with the dry season coming to an end. Intermittent and low-scale skirmishes have taken place in the Jebel Marra area between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW). Government forces have also clashed with militias. Although intercommunal violence has decreased significantly, disputes over land ownership continue. The stalemate in the Darfur peace process persists while international pressure on the armed movements increases. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remains constrained. [...]

While encouraged by the positive developments in terms of security, I am concerned that they are not matched by commensurate progress in the peace process and implementation of the Doha Document.¹⁸

In response to this UNAMID report Human Rights Watch argued that “The latest report of UNAMID, the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission, calls the situation in Darfur ‘generally stable’ with some ‘low scale skirmishes.’ With such a gloss-over assessment from peacekeepers, there’s a real risk the dire protection needs of civilians will be ignored or forgotten”.¹⁹ The same source further noted that:

¹⁶ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 3 and 68

¹⁷ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 3

¹⁸ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraphs 2 and 49

¹⁹ Human Rights Watch, [*Latest Sudanese Attacks on Darfur Show Protection Needs*](#), 10 May 2018

In April the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies reported that between mid-March and mid-April [2018] government forces, including the notoriously abusive Rapid Support Forces, attacked dozens of locations burning at least 12 villages to the ground, killing at least 23 civilians and displacing about 15,000 people into the mountains.

A sheikh from Jebel Marra described to me one of these attacks: “They burned huts and looted and searched for people.” He said 16 civilians including two children were killed in the attacks he witnessed.

UN-AU peacekeepers and other international actors do not know the full scale of the death toll and destruction being wrought on civilians in Jebel Marra – or across Darfur – because they are largely absent. Sudan has restricted access and the peacekeeping mission has been under pressure to quickly downsize. While Jebel Marra was recognized as a trouble area over a year ago, construction on a temporary operating base for UNAMID is only just beginning and peacekeepers still face access problems.

As the recent Jebel Marra attacks remind us, and Human Rights Watch warned last year, areas without peacekeepers heighten the risk that civilians will be unprotected from government violence and abuses. The mission’s reporting confirms that widespread rights violations, including sexual violence, are committed across Darfur with impunity.²⁰

A May 2018 Small Arms Survey report noted that “The stalling of the peace process and the government attempts at forcible civilian disarmament without a peace deal (while disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) remain incomplete even for the limited DDPD caseload) have tangible consequences for domestic and regional peace and stability, not just in Darfur and the Two Areas, but also in neighbouring Libya”.²¹ The same source further explained that:

Sudanese government actions in Darfur risk undermining the prospects of reaching a meaningful, comprehensive peace agreement. The DDPD remains largely irrelevant, since none of the signatories, with the partial exception of JEM-Dabajo, had substantial military capabilities on the ground. The government’s counter-insurgency approach to disarmament in Darfur is further eroding combatants’ confidence not only in its willingness to negotiate with groups that have not signed the DDPD, but even to implement the stalled security arrangements of the (already severely limited) agreement itself. According to one DDPD signatory group, some of its personnel awaiting DDR near Nyala have been detained by the RSF since October 2017 as part of the forcible disarmament phase and remain in detention, which is not an outcome that any conventional DDR process would envisage.²²

A June 2018 IPI Global Observatory article contented that “In Darfur, UN peacekeepers appear focused on containing risks to civilians and mitigating a continuing humanitarian crisis, while comprehensive, sustainable peace across the warring factions seems beyond reach”.²³

In July 2018 the UN Security Council “extended the mandate of the joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping operation in Sudan’s Darfur until the end of June next year [2019], but reduced the number of troops deployed in the field with an eye towards the mission’s eventual exit”.²⁴ A UN news article further explained:

²⁰ Human Rights Watch, [Latest Sudanese Attacks on Darfur Show Protection Needs](#), 10 May 2018

²¹ Small Arms Survey, [Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality](#), May 2018, A ‘new normal’ for Sudan’s periphery conflicts? p.37

²² Small Arms Survey, [Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality](#), May 2018, A ‘new normal’ for Sudan’s periphery conflicts? p.37

²³ IPI Global Observatory, [Political Solutions Must Drive the Design and Implementation of Peace Operations](#), 20 June 2018

²⁴ UN, [Security Council downsizes AU-UN mission in Darfur, eyeing eventual exit](#), 13 July 2018

The decision was unanimous as 15 Council members determined that although the security situation has improved in Darfur, the long-running conflict there remains a threat to international peace and stability.

By the terms of the resolution, the Council will cut the troop strength of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) from the current 8,735 to 4,050 personnel, while maintain its police strength at the current level of 2,500 personnel.

In the resolution, the Council took note of the recommendations in the Special UN-AU report issued earlier this year, with a view towards the mission's exit on 30 June 2020, drawing down fully by December 2020, provided there is no significant change in the security situation in Darfur.²⁵

Prior to the UN Security Council vote Human Rights Watch argued that "The United Nations Security Council should ensure that its peacekeeping mission in Sudan's Darfur region continues to conduct human rights monitoring and public reporting in all of Darfur".²⁶ It further detailed that:

The Security Council is expected to approve drastic cuts in the mission, including closing 14 UNAMID team sites and a plan for withdrawal in two years. The African Union Peace and Security Council has already approved the plan. The plan under discussion would limit the mission's area of operation to 13 sites around Jebel Marra, the mountainous area where government forces have repeatedly attacked civilians while engaging in operations against rebel groups.

"The UN's proposed cuts would effectively end the peacekeeping mission's core human rights and protection role in most of Darfur, which would be a mistake" said Mausi Segun, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "The Security Council needs to ensure that UNAMID will continue monitoring and reporting publicly on abuses throughout Darfur or it will share responsibility for pushing Darfur off the world's agenda."

A special report on June 1 by the chairperson of the African Union Commission and the UN secretary-general outlines the plan to downsize the peacekeeping mission. Outside the new operational area, the mission would primarily support other UN agencies in development and humanitarian activities. The UNAMID peacekeepers would no longer carry out regular patrols across the region, which humanitarian agencies have often relied on for security.

The report acknowledges the reconfiguration "would no longer allow UNAMID to continue the monitoring, verification and reporting of protection of civilians' issues outside the greater Jebel Marra area," and that the other UN agencies have "limited scope to monitor, raise, and address protection concerns."

On June 12, the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed concerns about the proposed reduction in the mission's area of operation. It said that the drawdown should be guided by the situation on the ground so as not to "create a security vacuum and expose civilian populations." It also said that the mission should continue to cover "the whole geographic Darfur," since it is mandated to protect civilians from imminent threat across the region.²⁷

In September 2018 the Sudan Tribune noted that a delegation of UK parliamentarians warned against the ongoing downsizing of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur region "'Withdrawing too quickly without a clear plan puts the progress made in Darfur at risk. Any further cuts must reflect genuine improvements on the ground, as well as assurances that the UN Country Team will have the resources and support necessary to fill the gaps,' said MP Drew. [...] 'The conflict in Darfur has changed, but instability and insecurity remain,' he said".²⁸

ACLED's September 2018 summary of the situation in Sudan in general is that "Despite a reduction in clashes between government and rebel groups in early 2017, civilians in areas with insurgencies remain at risk. Inter-communal violence between communities fighting for resources also played a

²⁵ UN, [Security Council downsizes AU-UN mission in Darfur, eyeing eventual exit](#), 13 July 2018

²⁶ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: UN's Planned Cuts to Darfur Mission Risk Rights Protection](#), 18 June 2018

²⁷ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: UN's Planned Cuts to Darfur Mission Risk Rights Protection](#), 18 June 2018

²⁸ Sudan Tribune, [UNAMID quick withdrawal puts Darfur at risk, say UK lawmakers](#), 20 September 2018

significant role in Sudan's conflict landscape since 2011, and civilians have increasingly voiced their opposition to government policies through protests".²⁹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 considered that:

The security situation in Darfur remained relatively stable, with the exception of intermittent clashes that continued between Government forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) mainly in the western and southern Jebel Marra area. While incidents of intercommunal conflict remained low, there was a marginal increase in the number of fatalities from the clashes, as compared with the previous reporting period. Disputes between herders and farmers, in particular internally displaced persons and returnees, over land and resources persisted. The Darfur peace process remained stalled, and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur continued to be slow, despite ongoing efforts to revitalize the process.³⁰

1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 explained that the war in Darfur over "autonomy and resources, such as water and land rights as well as control over gold mines" between various armed groups organised under the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the government continued into its 15th consecutive year.³¹ The same source further noted that:

The SRF, an alliance between various Sudanese and mainly ethnic African armed groups, fought their perceived oppression by the mainly ethnic Arabic government. The alliance comprises the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and its two main factions, led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) and Minni Minnawie (SLM-MM), the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gibril Ibrahim (JEM) as well as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM/A-N), primarily active in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

The government deployed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary forces, namely the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). These militiamen were mainly recruited from nomadic Arab groups. SLM-AW was weakened by military setbacks and internal splitting. Clashes were limited primarily to the mountainous region of Jebel Marra, stretching along South and Central Darfur, and mostly involved the SLM-MM and the SLM-TC, led by Nimir Abdelrahman. The SLM Transitional Council (TC), a splinter group of SLM-AW, joined the SLM-MM in clashes with government forces.³²

A May 2018 Small Arms Survey report provided the following background on the RSF:

Since 2013 the government has substantially transferred its counter-insurgency operations from SAF to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by former 'janjawid' commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemeti'. Although formally integrated into SAF by the 2017 RSF Act, in practice the RSF remains semi-autonomous under Hemeti's command, and constitutes the largest and best-equipped government-backed militia of the entire Darfur conflict. UNAMID has agreed to work in 'a collaborative way in order to advance the weapons collection campaign' that the RSF is currently leading, despite the mission's mandate to protect civilians and mediate conflicts in Darfur—both of

²⁹ ACLED, [Sudan Dashboard](#), 1 September 2018

³⁰ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraph 2

³¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, p14, .73

³² Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Darfur)*, p.100

which are arguably negatively affected by the forcible disarmament campaign. Ironically, the redeployment to Darfur of several thousand RSF personnel together with their weapons and armour in late 2017 to support the weapons collection campaign in itself constitutes one of the largest ever increases in militia-held weapons and militia personnel in Darfur, and is a clear violation of the UN arms embargo (Sudan Tribune, 2017a; UNSC, 2017e, paras. 78–81).

In short: the government's maintenance of unilateral cessations of hostilities during 2017, particularly in the Two Areas, where rebel-held areas are much larger and more geographically contiguous than in Darfur, is no small diplomatic achievement. But this has arguably been made possible by the government first securing its military position through its 2016 offensives and by dramatically increasing the size of its militia forces both before and during the sanctions-easing process.³³

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies documented with regards to the weapon collection campaign in Darfur that:

On 13 October 2017, an RSF contingent consisting of 400 military Land cruiser vehicles arrived in Fashir, North Darfur State, from South and North Kordofan States for a mission to collect weapons. The Governor of North Darfur, Abdulwahid Ibrahim, stated that the force's sole mission was to collect arms by force. The force was deployed because Hemeidti refused to engage in the weapons collection campaign.

On 21 September 2017, in an armed clash on the Libya-Sudan border, the RSF killed 17 people, injured 3, arrested 6 and seized 6 Land cruiser vehicles from a group loyal to Musa Hilal. The RSF announced that the group is a human trafficking organization. However, a reliable source of the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies has said that the group works in the gold trade in the Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle.

On 26 October 2017, the RSF moved to the town of Kabkabiya in North Darfur where they rounded up and burned motorcycles which belonged to people believed to be loyal to Musa Hilal's Border Guard Forces alleging that they were being used to disrupt peace.³⁴

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that "There have been several reports of armed clashes between Government forces and armed groups as a result of attempts to disarm communities. The use of RSF to enforce disarmament is likely to result in an increase in armed clashes between the Government and Darfur communities".³⁵

The same source provided the following figure depicting armed clashes between government forces and rebel opposition movements³⁶:

³³ Small Arms Survey, [Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality](#), May 2018, *Did the sanctions-easing process drive change in Sudan's conflicts?* p.30

³⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Militia Chaos in Darfur: What's Next?](#) October 2018, *Weapon collection campaign in Darfur* p. 19

³⁵ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 98

³⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, p. 23

Figure IV
Reported armed clashes between SAF and Darfurian rebel groups, 2013–2017





Figure V
Reported offensive air attacks in Darfur, 2013–2017



The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed the fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups thus:

No major confrontations have been reported between the Government of the Sudan and Darfur rebel groups since 1 July. [...]

According to UNAMID, reported clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces/Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and a suspected dormant cell of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Birkat Saira area, 25 km east of Saraf Omra, on 22 November in the context of the weapons collection campaign, resulted in the capture of 16 rebels and the disbanding of some 130 JEM elements. Clashes were also reported at Mijelid village, 46 km north-east of Shaeria, on 29 November between Government armed forces and an unidentified armed group suspected of coming from South Sudan, without any reported casualties. Neither SLA/MM nor the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril) have a significant armed presence in Darfur or the Sudan.

The area of operations of SLA/AW in Darfur continues to be limited to pockets of Jebel Marra and its effectiveness is reduced by further fragmentations, infighting or involvement in acts of banditry. [...]

No engagement has been reported between Government armed forces and SLA/AW since the clashes of 10 June in the village of Thur, 15 km south of Nertiti, triggered by an alleged theft of livestock belonging to the Nawaybah clan of Northern Rizeigat by SLA/AW. On 21 October, clashes were recorded between SLA/AW elements loyal to the movement and a splinter group, in Feina village, northeast of Kass, which was the fifth incident of this nature since April 2017. Furthermore, in early

November, SLA/AW elements stole Ereigat/Rizeigat cattle, creating tensions in the area around Thur, and on 22 November, suspected SLA/AW elements fired at a commercial truck near Golo, Central Darfur, killing one civilian and injuring six civilians.

While there is no agreement on a permanent ceasefire, the Government and the armed groups continue to extend temporary cessations of hostilities. In October, the Government extended its unilateral cessation of hostilities until 31 December 2017. In a joint declaration on 30 November, SLA/MM, JEM/Gibril and SLM/TC extended their unilateral cessation of hostilities for two months, from 30 November 2017 to 31 January 2018.³⁷

The same source analysed the weapons collection campaign and impact on security thus:

In the Government's efforts to consolidate control and to expand its authority across Darfur, two factors are playing a key role, both contributing to new dynamics as regards security, namely, the deployment of a sizeable contingent of RSF and the conduct of a weapons collection campaign. The former has de facto put in motion a consolidation process of the militia groups under the umbrella of RSF, while the latter is reportedly creating conditions to further improve security in Darfur beyond the state capitals, while reshaping the political landscape. [...]

In the past three months, RSF has increasingly asserted itself as an undisputed security force in Darfur, particularly through its central role in the weapons collection campaign. On 23 October, RSF pursued the Savanna militia group out of Kutum town in North Darfur, and on 30 October, clashed with them in Shaeria in East Darfur. On 10 November, after clashes in the west of Korma town, they captured the leader of the group, Abdallah Rizkallah, along with nine other members. Likewise, following the public refusal of Musa Hilal to integrate his border guard units with RSF in August, clashes took place on 21 September on the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border between RSF and the border guards, which resulted in the killing of 17 of the border guard elements, who were accused of human trafficking and illegal migration, as well as two RSF troops. On 26 November, RSF units were reportedly ambushed by Musa Hilal border guards while transporting some criminal elements from Saraf Omra to Kabkabiyah, North Darfur. In response to the ensuing fighting, which resulted in the killing of 14 RSF, including one of their senior commanders, and nine militia, RSF arrested Musa Hilal, his three sons and members of his militia in his stronghold of Misteriya (30 km south-west of Kabkabiyah) and transported them to Khartoum. Given Hilal's profile as tribal leader of the Mahamid clan of the Northern Rizeigat, head of the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC) and former Janjaweed leader, the event has sent a strong message to other militia groups in Darfur.³⁸

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 provided the following conflict analysis:

The armed groups of the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril) remained largely inactive in Darfur, while the area of operations of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) continued to be limited to pockets of the Jebel Marra amid reports of further fragmentations and involvement in acts of banditry. UNAMID reported clashes between a suspected dormant cell of JEM and Sudanese Armed Forces/Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Birkat Saira area, 25 km east of Saraf Omra, on 22 November, in the context of the weapons collection campaign, which resulted in the capture of 16 rebels. A clash also took place in Feina, north-east of Kass, on 21 October, when SLA/AW reportedly encroached an area controlled by a splinter group. [...]

³⁷ UN Secretary-General, [*Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 4

³⁸ UN Secretary-General, [*Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraphs 10 and 12

The initiation of the second phase of the mandatory collection of weapons as of mid-October has de facto strengthened the control of RSF over the security situation in Darfur, while expanding the scope of the campaign to the camps for internally displaced persons. In this context, Government forces defeated the Savanna militia group, composed mainly of Southern Rizeigat, after clashes in Kutum, North Darfur, on 23 October, then in Shearia, East Darfur, on 30 October, and finally in Korma area, North Darfur, on 10 November, where they captured its leader, Abdallah Rizkallah, and nine militia. On 26 November, 14 RSF and nine border guards were killed, following a reported ambush against RSF by the border guard units under the command of Musa Hilal. RSF eventually arrested Musa Hilal in his stronghold of Misteriya, North Darfur, and transferred him to Khartoum.³⁹

The US State Department on Sudan's Human Rights Practices in 2017 noted that:

On November 25-26, fighting in North Darfur State between the RSF and tribal members loyal to Musa Hilal, a Rizeigat tribal leader and former Janjaweed militia commander, resulted in several deaths, including some RSF soldiers. A report from a credible source that government forces killed 193 persons, including 34 women and 39 children, during the clashes could not be verified by year's end, as the government impeded UNAMID's access to the location following the clashes. The deadly clashes reportedly resulted from a government-run weapons collection campaign in the area, which Hilal opposed.⁴⁰

In a January 2018 Bulletin UNOCHA reported that "Over 600 people (129 families)—mostly women and children—fled East Jebel Marra some 130 km to Nyala town, in South Darfur, since mid-December 2017, where they were received at Otash IDP camp, the government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) reported in a letter to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). [...] The new IDPs reported to the group they fled their homes in the Deribat area following internal fighting among the non-signatory Sudan People's Liberation Army - Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) factions, which started in November 2017. This fighting reportedly resulted in the killing and injury of civilians, destruction of houses, and looting of community assets. Humanitarian partners do not have access to SLA-AW controlled areas in Darfur and cannot verify these reports".⁴¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

The armed groups of the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and Justice and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril) continued to remain largely inactive in Darfur, while the area of operations of SLA/AW continued to be limited to pockets of the Jebel Marra. On 18 January, UNAMID reported clashes between the Rapid Support Force (RSF) and SLA/AW in Kurmul village, north-east of Golo and near Kati village, 15 km southeast of Golo, in the Jebel Marra, during a weapons collection campaign in the area.

Reportedly, one RSF officer was reported killed and another injured. On 24 January, RSF clashed in the border village of Kalabah, some 250 km south of Ed Daein, with a group believed to be JEM/Gibril, which entered from South Sudan. RSF reportedly incurred three fatalities. Nonetheless, the rebel movements JEM, SLA/MM and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Transitional Council (SLM/TC) issued a joint statement on 3 February extending their unilateral cessation of hostilities until 30 April, following a presidential decree on 4 January extending the Government's own unilateral ceasefire for three months until the end of March.⁴²

³⁹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 5-7

⁴⁰ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 1 g

⁴¹ UNOCHA, Humanitarian [Bulletin Sudan Issue 01: 1-14 January 2018](#), 18 January 2018

⁴² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 3

A further report from the same source covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

While the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM-Gibril) remained largely inactive in Darfur, the Sudanese military progressively conducted small-scale operations in areas previously controlled by SLA-AW in the Jebel Marra area. The level of reported casualties and the low intensity of clashes indicate that there were no large-scale confrontations. On 10 March, SLA-AW elements attacked a Sudanese military camp in Jawa, approximately 7 km south-west of Deribat, and the following day ambushed a military convoy near Bumuye, about 8 km north-east of Deribat. The two clashes reportedly left five soldiers and three SLA-AW fighters dead and several civilians injured. In response, the Sudanese military deployed between 17 and 19 March in a search operation in the Layba, Feina and Funguli areas in East Jebel Marra, where they were attacked by SLA-AW on 21 and 22 March. Reports on the number of casualties conflict but the Sudanese military repelled the attacks and captured one SLA-AW commander. Three civilians were killed. On 26 March, intermittent exchanges of fire between the Sudanese military, supported by the Border Guards, and SLA-AW reportedly continued in Gubbo, Gur Lambung and Gulobei, south-east of Jebel Marra. As a result, some displaced persons moved to Kidingir. On 28 March, clashes also took place in Sabun and Khormaley, east of Jebel Marra. The number of casualties is unknown and an unspecified number of local residents fled to the mountains seeking safety. Clashes also took place in Katur, East Jebel Marra, on 1 April, resulting in one person killed, one injured and 73 houses burned down. There are also reports of militias carrying out attacks on 4 April in the Feina area, where some 16 villages were destroyed and civilians killed. The arrival of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the same day put a stop to the attacks. [...]

Government forces strengthened their control over other areas in Darfur. On 1 March, RSF captured the commander of Sudan Liberation Army-Historical Leadership (SLA-Historical Leadership), Suleiman Marjane, along with two other fighters in a vehicle with four assault rifles, near the Jebel Isa area in North Darfur. In the same area, on 20 March, RSF personnel captured suspected JEM-Gibril elements coming from Libya. Furthermore, on 19 March, the President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, extended the unilateral ceasefire announced by the Government in all areas of operations until 30 June 2018. [...]

Tensions persist in the area around Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, following the stand-off between RSF and Northern Rizeigat militiamen, who joined forces with Musa Hilal in November 2017. On 27 February, RSF elements clashed with militiamen in Misteriya, 30 km south-west of the UNAMID team site in Kabkabiyah. One woman was killed and ten civilians were injured in the shooting incident as they attempted to protect a local leader. RSF informed UNAMID that the incident took place while it was implementing a weapons collection campaign.⁴³

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented a number of attacks between 9 March and 2 April 2018 “perpetrated against civilian targets in East Jebel Marra in South Darfur state by the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and other government sponsored militias. The attacks took place in the villages of: Feina, Dalo, Dawa , Dolda , Libei, Sawani ,Rakoona, Fouli, Duwa, and Kidineer. At least 15,000 civilians have been displaced to the neighbouring mountains in each area. In the areas of Jawa, Seena , Feina , Dawa Sawani and Rakoona at least 23 civilians were killed and tens seriously injured, 12 villages were set on fire and burnt to the ground. The attacks were precipitated by fighting in Eastern Jebel Marra between the government forces and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid (SLA-AW)”⁴⁴

ACLED reported that in early April 2018, “the government resumed a military campaign against remaining insurgents of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Abdul Wahid al-Nur Faction) in

⁴³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraphs 3, 5 and 6

⁴⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Attacks by Sudanese government forces on civilians in Jebel Marra in South Darfur](#), 18 April 2018

Darfur's East Jebel Marra, combining ground and aerial attacks against the militants with violent raids on villages in the area by its supporting militia, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The militants reportedly started to set up new bases in Malam and Umm Elgora in South Darfur after the state forces recovered territory in these attacks".⁴⁵ The same source documented in a further bulletin that:

In Sudan, an attack by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction (SLM-AW) on camel herders in Tawa, around Jebel Marra on April 18th, led to a series of retaliatory attacks by the Sudanese state forces. The government's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) clashed with the SLM-AW for three consecutive days between April 21st-23rd and attacked dozens of villages in the area, burning down and pillaging properties, and forcing the displacement of tens of thousands of people. Later that week, government forces also clashed with a relatively inactive breakaway faction of SLM-AW, the SLM-Transitional Council.⁴⁶

Radio Dabanga reported on 23 April 2018 that "At least 30,000 people fled their homes during attacks by large groups of militiamen on 13 villages in northern Jebel Marra. [...] After plundering the villages, the attackers set the houses on fire. The newly displaced are in dire need of aid, the SLM-AW stated. [...] the rebel movement reported fierce fighting between its combatants and government forces in the area of Jaldo in northern Jebel Marra".⁴⁷

A May 2018 Small Arms Survey report noted with regards to forcible disarmament campaigns that:

In Darfur, the government continues to reverse the conventional sequence of armed conflict resolution, skipping over a comprehensive peace agreement and the disarmament and demobilization of most combatants, and is instead pressing ahead with the return of displaced populations and civilian disarmament, first voluntarily and then forcibly from October 2017. In most post-conflict settings civilian disarmament and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) rely on consent, including from previous armed opposition groups, and the reassertion of the state's monopoly on violence after the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement. In Darfur's case these operations are replacing—and in some cases reproducing—the counter-insurgency operations that the sanctions were supposed to end. The reinforcement of RSF personnel in El Fasher in early November 2017 for forcible disarmament activities presaged targeted RSF operations in late November in North Darfur against former Border Guard Forces members loyal to Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdallah, the most influential of Khartoum's armed opponents among the Rizeigat (and the major Rizeigat rival to the RSF's functional leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemeti').

This use of a disarmament campaign for counter-insurgency operations may well extend to other targets. In December 2017 the wali (governor) of Central Darfur, Jafar Abdelhakim Ishag, reportedly threatened to expand the RSF-led forcible disarmament campaign to SLA-AW-controlled areas of Jebel Marra, claiming that such measures would not fall under the purview of the government's cessation of hostilities (Sudan Tribune, 2017b). Sure enough, since mid-January 2018 the disarmament campaign has provided one of the official justifications for RSF forces to engage militarily with SLA-AW forces east of Golo, precipitating renewed population displacement (UNSC, 2018). So far the campaign's forcible phase has not precipitated widespread armed violence elsewhere.

Nonetheless, UNAMID's operational reconfiguration and drawdown would make it difficult for it to respond to a new major government offensive outside central Darfur. It also does not appear to have constrained recent RSF engagements within central Darfur, which have taken place around Deribat, and between Golo and Rockero—in precisely the newly accessible areas supposed to be the new focus of UNAMID's peacekeeping efforts. Meanwhile, UNAMID's political rapprochement with the Sudanese government—by declaring that areas of North and South Darfur do not need peacekeepers

⁴⁵ ACLED, [REGIONAL OVERVIEW – AFRICA 9 APRIL 2018](#), 9 April 2018

⁴⁶ ACLED, [REGIONAL OVERVIEW – AFRICA 30 APRIL 2018](#), 30 April 2018

⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen plunder, burn 13 villages in Darfur's Jebel Marra](#), 23 April 2018

and lending public support to the RSF-led disarmament campaign—effectively reinforces Sudanese officials’ assertions that militia-led military operations, either under the disarmament campaign banner or in dedicated operations against Darfurian armed group incursions, are consistent with a cessation of hostilities.⁴⁸

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 provided the following security analysis on fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups:

No major armed confrontations have taken place between the Government of the Sudan and Darfur rebel groups since 1 July 2017, except for small-scale clashes in eastern Jebel Marra from March to May 2018. The Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC) (a splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW)) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have been unable to maintain a sustained presence in Darfur or elsewhere in the Sudan, despite being involved in minor clashes described in the assessment of phase one of the reconfiguration of UNAMID (S/2018/12). In its letter dated 28 December 2017 (S/2017/1125), the Panel of Experts on the Sudan confirmed the involvement of those groups in mercenary and other illegal activities in neighbouring Libya and South Sudan. Recent reports indicate that SLA/MM is currently not capable of launching offensive operations against Government forces in Darfur, and that JEM is under significant pressure to leave South Sudan, as it is militarily weakened and fragmented. [...]

The limited area and scale of the clashes observed in eastern Jebel Marra since early March 2018 testify to the fact that, while the small groups associated with SLA/AW continue to have some operational capabilities, they are largely contained.⁴⁹

Radio Dabanga reported in mid-May 2018 that “Thousands of civilians have reportedly been newly displaced from villages in southern Jebel Marra as fighting broke out between government forces, allied militias and armed rebels in the area of Kass [...]. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the fighting in the Jebel Marra mountains in South Darfur has pushed ‘thousands of civilians to flee to Kara, Kabu, Kor, Saboun El Fagur, Girlanjabang, Wagle, Karoo, Wrangla and Daruna.’ Their numbers add to the reported 11,500 displaced people who have fled from the fighting in northern Jebel Marra at the end of April. [...] People in Kass have described the situation to Radio Dabanga as “very difficult”. They recounted that the Sudanese army had mobilised more than 1,500 troops and Rapid Support Forces [RSF], backed by other troops that arrived from Zalingei in an attempt to launch new attacks on the holdout armed Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW) in Jebel Marra.”⁵⁰

According to a further Radio Dabanga article of 24 May 2018:

Fierce battles raged yesterday between government forces including the main Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW) at Kobo area in southern Jebel Marra. Waleed Abakar, the military spokesman for the SLM-AW told Radio Dabanga from the field that the movement’s forces managed to counter the attack by the government forces and militia. Abakar said the counter attack led to the withdrawal of the RSF, leaving their dead and

⁴⁸ Small Arms Survey, [Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality](#), May 2018, *Did the sanctions-easing process drive change in Sudan’s conflicts?* p.31-33

⁴⁹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 4-5

⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Thousands newly displaced by Jebel Marra fighting](#), 15 May 2018

weapons behind. [...] As reported by Radio Dabanga yesterday, the Sudanese Air Force bombed areas in Jebel Marra on Tuesday, according to the SLM-AW.

Abakar told Radio Dabanga that on Tuesday the Sudanese Air Force dropped bombs at areas of the Turung Tawra and Tugut Turti in southern Jebel Marra.

He said the aerial bombardment caused great losses and forced residents to flee to the valleys and mountain foothills.

During their withdrawal, militiamen burned the entire Jonglei village, Abakar reports.⁵¹

In mid-June Radio Dabanga documented that “The Sudan Liberation Movement Abdelwahid faction (SLM-AW) claim to have killed 89 members of the main government Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia during a second day of attacks by government forces on the areas controlled by the movement south and west of Darfur’s Jebel Marra. [...] Waleed Mohamed Abakar, the SLM-AW military spokesman, [...] alleges that the RSF burned six villages in south Jebel Marra including Saboun El Fagor, Koya, Tara, Tringel, Trabrah and Jonglei after their defeat in the battle”.⁵²

Ahead of the June 2018 UN Security Council vote to draw down UNAMID, Amnesty International released satellite and photo imagery showing “extensive damage caused by ongoing attacks on villages” in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur over the previous three months.⁵³ Amnesty International further stated that “since March 2018, renewed fighting in Jebel Marra area between the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has led to the further displacement of hundreds of thousands who face dire humanitarian and human rights crises inside Jebel Marra. Only a small number of the displaced, about 5000 people, managed to reach the IDP camps in South Darfur”.⁵⁴ The same source further described that:

Between March and May 2018, Sudanese government forces carried out land attacks in East-South Jebel Marra area. The attacks took place in the areas where SLA/AW maintained a significant presence. The SLA/AW has been reluctant to sign any peace deal with the government of Sudan since the war in Darfur started in 2003. The last large-scale government military operation against SLA/AW was in 2016.²¹ In 2016, Amnesty International’s report (“Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air” Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur) documented a catalogue of possible crimes under international law and other serious human rights violations committed by Sudanese government forces, including wilful killings of civilians and the destruction of civilian property and the possible use of chemical weapons in Jebel Marra. In 2018, the Sudanese armed forces repeated the same pattern of violations that was documented in 2016, including looting, burning of villages and killing of civilians. These acts amount to war crimes.⁵⁵

Reporting on 21 June 2018 UNAMID stated that “The African Union - United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is deeply concerned with the current fighting between the Government of Sudan forces and Sudan Liberation Army elements of Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) in eastern Jebel Marra, South Darfur. [...] Intensified fighting this month, characterized by the burning of villages in eastern Jebel Marra has had grave humanitarian consequences, with hundreds of civilians being newly

⁵¹ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Fierce clashes between RSF and SLM-AW in Jebel Marra](#), 24 May 2018

⁵² Radio Dabanga, [Darfur rebels: ‘Retreating militiamen’ burn six villages in ongoing Jebel Marra battle](#), 14 June 2018

⁵³ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018

⁵⁴ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018, p.1

⁵⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018, p.3

displaced. Attempts by UNAMID to verify the situation on the ground have been blocked, with Government forces denying Mission personnel access to the areas of conflict”.⁵⁶

At the end of June 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) under the command of Abdelwahid El Nur “repelled a new attack launched by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the rebels’ sites at Buli and Aja in northern Jebel Marra on Thursday morning”, according to spokesman Walid Mohamed Abakar. Abakar claimed that the battle resulted in the killing of 79 RSF troops that arrived from Kabkabiya, as well as the destruction of nine Land Cruisers and seizing various weapons”.⁵⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 considered that:

Sporadic clashes continued during the reporting period as Government forces kept up pressure on SLA-AW in an effort to eliminate its remaining elements in the Jebel Marra. At the same time, the onset of the rainy season slowed the advance of Government forces, with SLA-AW using this to conduct some counter-attacks. The Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM-Gibril) remained inactive in Darfur.

On 12 July the Government extended its unilateral ceasefire until 31 December 2018, with SLA-MM, JEM-Gibril and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council (SLM-TC) extending their ceasefire on 8 August until 7 November 2018. SLA-AW also declared a three-month unilateral ceasefire from 20 September to 18 December 2018 to allow unhindered humanitarian access to the areas affected by landslides in the Jebel Marra.

Clashes were recorded along the Tarantara-Gur Lumbung axis in southern Jebel Marra, where fighting has occurred since March. From 13 to 16 June, Government forces resumed attacks on SLA-AW positions in the area, with clashes lasting for several days and leaving 16 soldiers and three SLA-AW fighters dead. Reports were received of villages being burned, civilians being injured and killed, as well as people being displaced to nearby areas, which could be only partially verified.

Another set of clashes took place in the areas around Golo, Central Darfur, where the continuing presence of SLA-AW elements prompted the Government to deploy additional troops on 9 July. On 19 July, SLA-AW ambushed government forces near Deba Nyra, north of Golo, killing 4 soldiers and injuring 10. On 26 July, the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked a SLA-AW position in Komi village, east of Golo, arresting suspected SLA-AW informants and subsequently firing artillery south and south-east of Golo on 30 July and 2 August. On 30 July, SLA-AW attacked government forces in Wadi Toro, Karo and Mara villages, south-east of Golo, as well as the Sudanese Armed Forces checkpoint at Sabanga on 7 August.

Elsewhere in the Jebel Marra, on 28 June, Government forces attacked Boulay, the main SLA-AW stronghold in northern Jebel Marra, taking control of the area by early July. Unconfirmed reports were received of Rapid Support Forces attacking and looting Kebe, South Darfur, on 27 July, allegedly targeting local support for the rebels. Five Fur civilians were reportedly killed, among them one woman, and four were injured, including one woman and two children, and an unknown number of civilians were displaced into the surrounding villages. In western Jebel Marra on 29 and 30 July, SLA-AW attacked Golol, which had recently been captured by Government forces, but was unable to regain this strategic location. On 1 August, unverified reports were received of Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces soldiers targeting local support for SLA-AW by assaulting residents of Tarantara, Kawara, Kaiya and Kuilla villages in southern Jebel Marra, which were taken by Government forces in May and June. On 26 August, the Government clashed once again with SLA-AW, in the Gubbo area of southern Jebel Marra, leaving one soldier and two SLA-AW fighters dead and one civilian injured. From 16 to 18 September, another encounter in Gubbo reportedly left 16 Rapid Support Forces soldiers and 6 SLA-AW dead, as well as 37 Rapid Support Forces and 5 SLA-AW

⁵⁶ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [*UNAMID deplores humanitarian impact of ongoing military confrontation in Jebel Marra*](#), 21 June 2018

⁵⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*Darfur rebels claim repelling military attack in Jebel Marra*](#), 29 June 2018

injured. Civilians displaced to Kass reported that 10 civilians had been killed in the incident. From 20 to 21 September, Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly attacked SLA-AW positions in Sabun Fag, Gur Lumbung, Kuilla and Amrain South Darfur, with three SLA-AW members killed and one injured.⁵⁸

At the end of August 2018 Radio Dabanga noted that “Members of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly stormed the police station in Tabit, North Darfur, to retrieve camels that were seized following damage to farms”.⁵⁹

On 16 October 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that:

Southern Jebel Marra witnessed clashes between government and rebel forces, the Sudan Liberation Movement reported yesterday. Reportedly two civilians have been killed by military shelling. The armed movement of Abdel Wahid El Nur (SLM-AW) said in a statement that a man and a woman were killed and three others were wounded in heavy military shelling near Wadi Tremel village, in south Jebel Marra on Sunday. Military spokesman Walid Mohamed Abakar said that the government’s army forces stationed at Kara shelled Wadi Tremel. Abakar pointed to the reason that “Tremel is under control of the movement”.⁶⁰

In November 2018 three armed groups in Darfur, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnwi (SLM-MM) and Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council (SLM-TC), “extended the unilateral cessation of hostilities for three months, and called for the resumption of talks to reach a political solution to the conflict based on the African Union-brokered roadmap agreement”.⁶¹ ACAPS reported that despite this, “intermittent clashes continue, especially between government forces and SLA-AW, mainly in the western and southern Jebel Marra area”.⁶²

Radio Dabanga reported that on 12 November 2018, “At least five civilians were reportedly killed by government troops and dozens were injured in an attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on civilians at the weekly Deribat market in East Jebel Marra, South Darfur”.⁶³ On the 15 November 2018, “Two children were killed and another was wounded in shelling by government forces stationed in Deribat area in East Jebel Marra, South Darfur”.⁶⁴

Later that month “A displaced woman farmer was killed on Sunday when an aircraft of the Sudanese Air Force launched a bombardment on the areas east of Nierteti in Central Darfur. Farmers reported that the air force bombed the areas near Kutrum, three kilometres east of Nierteti, killing a displaced woman who had returned to the area for farming. They said the air force also bombed the villages of Kuweila, Berbera, Beringo, and Kody in Jebel Marra, however there are no reports of casualties”.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 3-6

⁵⁹ Radio Dabanga, [RSF storm police station to retrieve camels](#), 28 August 2018

⁶⁰ Radio Dabanga, [‘Villagers killed by shelling in Darfur’s Jebel Marra’: Rebels](#), 16 October 2018

⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, [Darfur armed groups extend unilateral ceasefire for three months](#), 9 November 2018

⁶² ACAPS, [Sudan Crisis Analysis](#), last updated 19 November 2018

⁶³ Radio Dabanga, [RSF ‘reprisal attack’ on South Darfur market – civilians killed, beaten, robbed](#), 14 November 2018

⁶⁴ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur children die in Jebel Marra shelling](#), 15 November 2018

⁶⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Civilian dies in Central Darfur air strafing](#), 20 November 2018

The same source recorded that on 24 November 2018, “The Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdelwahid El Nur leadership (SLM-AW) has announced the alleged killing of 18 members of the government Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in an attack led by government forces in the area of Feina in south-eastern Jebel Marra in Darfur”.⁶⁶ The same source further noted:

Abdelgader Gadoura, commander-in-chief of the SLM-AW, reported that “the attack was carried out by 400 troops backed up by 18 armoured vehicles with long-range bombers.”

According to Gadoura, although the SLM-AW has declared a ceasefire, the regime has continued to breach the agreement. He said that SLM-AW fighters responded to the attack, confirming that they are sure that 18 RSF militiamen were killed and 18 others wounded.

The announcement added that more than 40 people had been taken to Kass and Nyala hospitals. An unarmed civilian was allegedly wounded in the leg during the attack and taken to hospital in the liberated territories. [...]

Fighting also erupted between the SLM-AW forces and RSF troops in southern Jebel Marra on Saturday, near the villages of Sina, Karo, and Sobun El Fagur. This resulted in the death of one civilian while two others were injured.⁶⁷

On 25th November 2018 Radio Dabanga documented that “an RSF force abducted more than 21 people, including a boy of 14, from east of Kalinga, purportedly in response to theft of camels by armed men. [...] Witnesses from Kayalu near Sarafaya said that the detainees showed signs of torture and hunger”.⁶⁸ Shortly afterwards the “Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdelwahid claimed that the Rapid Support Forces destroyed agricultural fields in Jebel Marra, following reports of clashes between the rebel forces and Sudan’s paramilitary forces”.⁶⁹

ACLED reported in early December 2018 that, intermittent clashes between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) branch of the military and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Abdul Wahid al-Nur Faction) (SLA-AW) continue in southern Jebel Marra. Fighting between the government and SLA-AW escalated in 2018 to pressure the group into joining the national peace process, but whilst contained geographically, the group maintains important operational capabilities. Last week, SLA-AW claimed to have repulsed a 400 men-strong RSF attack on their positions in the Feina area, leaving 18 RSF soldiers killed and another 18 wounded. They also accused the RSF of burning farmlands in the area in retaliation, a practice commonly observed in previous RSF anti-insurgent campaigns. Further fighting is anticipated in the next months as the RSF Commander early November vowed to “crush” the rebels by February 2019”.⁷⁰

Also in early December 2018, the Sudan Tribune noted that “Sudanese government and two armed groups in Darfur region signed Thursday a pre-negotiation agreement paving the way for the resumption of peace talks in Qatar next year. The signing of the declaration of principles with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnwi (SLM-MM) took place in Berlin after two years of informal talks facilitated by the German foreign ministry with the support of the Berghof Foundation”.⁷¹

1.2 Inter-communal and militia clashes

⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [‘18 RSF militia killed’ in attacks on Darfur’s Jebel Marra](#), 26 November 2018

⁶⁷ Radio Dabanga, [‘18 RSF militia killed’ in attacks on Darfur’s Jebel Marra](#), 26 November 2018

⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [‘RSF holding abducted civilians in Darfur valley’](#), 25 November 2018

⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Rebels in Darfur accuse paramilitaries of arson](#), 27 November 2018

⁷⁰ ACLED, [REGIONAL OVERVIEW – AFRICA 4 DECEMBER 2018](#), 4 December 2018

⁷¹ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan, armed groups agree to resume talks for peace in Darfur](#), 6 December 2018

This section provides an overview of inter-communal violence and clashes between militia or attacks by militia on civilians (although not clashes involving the RSF which are addressed in the preceding section]. It should be read against the Darfur state-specific COI presented further below in [section 2.3 Conflict between tribes since September 2017](#) as well as section [2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia](#).

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources, especially cattle and arable land, but also over water rights and access to gold mines, between various tribes, continued on the level of a limited war. Fighting mainly took place along ethnic lines, but also between farmers and cattle herders. Inter-communal clashes decreased in number, particularly due to the more effective involvement of traditional and local administrations and the impact of security measures implemented by state authorities, including the expedient deployment of security forces, the establishment of buffer zones in hot spots and a disarmament campaign which started in July. However, casualties increased in number with a total of at least 348 in 2017.

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.⁷²

The Sudan Humanitarian Fund's annual report covering 2017 noted that in 2017 "Localised armed violence in many cases replaced the formerly warring militias. Such localised armed violence, which takes place most frequently between sedentary farmers and pastoral communities, and the many nomadic communities remained only partially resolved with the establishment of several animal migration corridors for the benefit of pastoralist communities, and to preserve agricultural fields".⁷³

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that:

Incidents of intercommunal armed violence appear to have declined significantly in 2017 (see figure X), which is likely to be a result, in part, of efforts by the Government of the Sudan to contain and mediate tribal disputes. [...]

Another major source of armed violence in Darfur is the numerous armed militias who routinely attack civilians, internally displaced persons and security forces. While the rule of law is still absent in many parts of Darfur owing to the remoteness of certain communities, Government authorities have indicated an increase in the deployment of police in and around the main towns, as well as an increase in the numbers of military units deployed in rural areas to support internal security operations. Open-source reporting also suggests a reduction of militia armed violence in 2017. However, this does necessarily reflect the reality on the ground.⁷⁴

The same source provided the following figures⁷⁵:

⁷² Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

⁷³ Sudan Humanitarian Fund, [Annual Report 2017](#), 2 May 2018, *Long term displacement and livelihoods*, p. 8

⁷⁴ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 96-98

⁷⁵ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, p.24

Figure X
Incidents of intercommunal armed violence, 2013–2017





Figure XI
Reported incidents of militia armed violence, 2013–2017



The same source further explained that:



Several armed militia groups — mostly of Arab ethnicity and commonly referred to as “Janjaweed” — continue to operate in Darfur, posing a threat to the rule of law and the security of civilians in several areas of the five Darfur states. This is in contravention of article 67/399 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which stipulated that the Government had to disarm all armed militia groups.

In particular, militia groups have a strong presence in North Darfur, where they control large swathes of territory, including in the districts of Kutum, Tawila, Korma, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobayi. These groups are organized along tribal lines and hard to control. [...]

According to several sources, the government security forces have well established relations with several local militias leaders and have mobilized some militias as proxies during military operations against the rebels. The participation of these militia groups in operations is usually coordinated by officials of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Military Intelligence or the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), depending on the operational needs. Moreover, according to different sources, the militias sometimes act with and are integrated into official paramilitary units such as RSF and the Border Guards, themselves constituted mostly of former Arab militiamen. When required by security forces or NISS, the militias participate in RSF operations and commit most of the abuses against civilians, such as the looting of villages and livestock, rapes and torching of homes. According


to sources, there is an understanding that the militias will loot the villages as soon as the operation they are participating in ends.⁷⁶

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project (ACLED) provided the following infographics and analysis of Darfur's armed non-state groups in February 2018⁷⁷:



⁷⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 20-22

⁷⁷ Kishi, Roudabeh. (15 February 2018). [10 HIDDEN CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: #4 DARFUR AND ITS ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS](#), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)



The Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 reported with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

Intercommunal conflicts over land and natural resources remain one of the main sources of violence in Darfur, but since mid-2015, the number of such conflicts has continued to decrease significantly. There were three intercommunal clashes, resulting in 45 fatalities, for the period from 15 October to 15 December, compared to eight clashes, resulting in 19 fatalities, reported between 15 August and 15 October, and 10 clashes, with 74 fatalities, for the period from 6 June to 15 August 2017. The overall decline is attributed to the joint efforts of the state governments, Government armed forces and the Sudanese police forces at the local level, as well as UNAMID support for the mediation efforts and, more recently, to the weapons collection campaign, which has visibly limited access to small arms among civilians.⁷⁸

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

The start of seasonal migration in October was marked by a higher number of fatalities and an increase in criminality, notably in North and West Darfur. During the period under review, three intercommunal clashes occurred, resulting in 45 fatalities, compared with eight clashes, resulting in 19 fatalities, reported during the previous period. All the clashes were attributable to disputes over livestock, criminality and revenge attacks. Some farming communities requested protection from RSF to prevent potential clashes with migrating herders.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 18

⁷⁹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraph 8

In November 2017 the Enough Project reported that “In response to the latest tensions in Darfur, the Sudanese government is deploying the RSF to ‘pacify’ people in a Darfur tribal and social landscape that has been torn apart by the Sudan government’s own divide-and-rule policies”.⁸⁰ The same source further explained that:

Such policies involve selectively rewarding certain tribes in Darfur for their loyalty to the regime by allocating to them the modern local government units that loosely overlap with traditional historic dars (the Darfuri name designating tribal homelands). The Sudanese government has armed certain tribes in its desperation to contain the Darfur armed movements. Major tribes have therefore acquired territorial and military power, while exercising the state’s administrative and fiscal powers. The end result of these practices is that Darfur today resembles a de facto militarized, ethnic-based system of local government. The larger tribes allied with the government have acquired a sense of tribal sovereignty. As a result, “border” disputes became major drivers of intercommunal violence [...]. The centuries-old traditions that regulate social relations and support the peaceful coexistence among major tribes and minority tribes living on their “dars” have kept the peace among Darfur’s many communities for generations. Occasional disputes over resources and land used to be contained and regulated through traditional conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms that are akin in many ways to today’s concepts and practices of transitional justice. Tribal peace conferences in Darfur include phases of fact-finding by traditional elder mediators from neutral tribes, acknowledgement of responsibility in triggering a clash, and compensation based on the Islamic Sharia legal system of blood money for lives lost, injuries sustained, and property looted or destroyed. The current Sudanese government has, however, manipulated these mechanisms for political and security purposes and profoundly disrupted the effectiveness of these systems. Instead of maintaining the tradition of government neutrality in tribal disputes, and instead of participating as an observer and guarantor of agreements reached in tribal peace conferences as successive post-independence governments have done, the current regime has instead armed some tribes against others. SAF’s paramilitaries, such as the Border Guard Forces, the Central Reserve Police, and the Rapid Support Forces have joined in tribal disputes in which their own groups were involved, using government-issued arms and munitions in these conflicts with total impunity as they are granted immunity by the national laws.⁸¹

The US State Department on Sudan’s Human Rights Practices in 2017 noted that:

In the internal conflict areas of Darfur and the Two Areas, security forces, paramilitary forces, and rebel groups continued to commit killings, rape, and torture of civilians. Local militias maintained substantial influence due to widespread impunity. There were reports of both progovernment and antigovernment militias looting, raping, and killing civilians. Intercommunal violence spawned from land tenure and resource scarcity resulted in high death tolls, particularly in East, South, and North Darfur. Between January and October, there were 34 reports of intercommunal clashes, up from 24 in 2016. Abduction was also seen as a lucrative business by both militias and various tribes in Darfur. In Abyei tribal conflict between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya was at the root of most human rights abuses. Reports were difficult to verify due to restricted access. In October the government launched a disarmament campaign beginning with a voluntary disarmament phase and then a forced disarmament phase. There were no known investigations of or prosecutions related to human rights abuses.⁸²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

⁸⁰ Enough Project, [Ominous Threats Descending on Darfur](#), November 2017 p.5

⁸¹ Enough Project, [Ominous Threats Descending on Darfur](#), November 2017 p.5 -6

⁸² US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 1 g

During the reporting period, the number of intercommunal conflicts over land, livestock thefts and farm destructions decreased, and fatalities also decreased to 11 from 45 during the previous reporting period. Several tribal reconciliation initiatives also took place. Most local communities, including internally displaced persons, attributed this trend to the ongoing weapons collection campaign and more resolute intervention from the Government to prevent an escalation of tensions among communities.⁸³

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma'aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides; and among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.

Interventions by the Government and reconciliation efforts by the native administration, supported by UNAMID, have mitigated the escalation of intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. In the case of the clashes between the southern Rizeigat and the Ma'aliya in East Darfur, the Governor intervened by arresting native administration leaders accused of inciting the communities, and deployed the Rapid Support Forces in late July 2017 to disarm the tribal fighters. In the wake of the clashes between the Zaghawa from Chad and nomadic tribes in West Darfur in early 2018, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force intervened effectively to pacify the security situation and the local authorities mediated a solution.⁸⁴

According to the UNOCHA 2018 Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview published in March 2018, "In many parts of Darfur, inter-communal conflict is another main cause of insecurity and recurrently causes displacement. Such localised armed violence takes place most frequently between sedentary-farming and nomadic-pastoral communities, as well as between nomadic communities, clashing over access to, use of, and management of resources, especially land".⁸⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Following an incident on 12 March, in which SLA-AW rustled camels from Nawaiba nomads, the latter exchanged fire with the armed group and the following day burned down the village of Durgo, from where the population reportedly fled to Boori, Dar al-Salam and Golo. Three civilians were reportedly killed in those incidents and two Nawaiba tribesmen were also reportedly killed by SLA-AW cadres in the village on 17 March. [...]

The number of intercommunal clashes decreased significantly during the reporting period, with two clashes reported. On 12 February, Zaghawa herders from Chad clashed with Misseriya nomads over cattle rustling in the village of Milaibiday, 20 km north-east of Masteri, West Darfur. The incident resulted in nine fatalities among the Sudanese nomads. On 8 April, the Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa communities clashed over a cattle theft incident in the Kirkir area, 85 km north-west of El Geneina,

⁸³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 7

⁸⁴ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11-12

⁸⁵ UNOCHA, [2018 Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), 13 March 2018, Humanitarian Impact p.7

resulting in one fatality on each side. On both occasions, the government of West Darfur intervened through the deployment of the Sudan-Chad Joint Forces to create a buffer between the two groups. Intercommunal violence has decreased mainly owing to interventions by the Government, the native administration, UNAMID and the United Nations country team. Local communities consider that the weapons collection campaign has contributed considerably to the mitigation of intercommunal violence, although concerns remain that the nomadic groups have not been equally disarmed.⁸⁶

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan considered in August 2018 that “Several armed militia groups, mostly of Arab ethnicity, continued to pose a threat to civilians in several areas across Darfur”.⁸⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to militia clashes that:

Attacks against civilians by nomad militiamen in and around Jebel Marra continued alongside the fighting between government forces and SLA-AW. The Northern Rizeigat nomads reportedly continued to harass internally displaced persons and farmers in the Thur area of western Jebel Marra. Incidents were reported of a group of farmers being assaulted and robbed by nomads on horseback south-east of Nertiti on 27 August and of militiamen and Rapid Support Forces personnel assaulting an internally displaced person in Thur on 5 September for alleged support for SLA-AW. At the same time, militias were accused of having participated in attacks by government forces targeting local villagers perceived to be SLA-AW supporters.⁸⁸

The same source recorded with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

The number of incidents of intercommunal violence remained low, with fewer occurrences as compared with the previous reporting period. There were six reported intercommunal clashes over land and livestock theft, which resulted in 18 fatalities, compared with eight clashes and 20 fatalities from 16 February to 10 June 2018, as covered in S/2018/389 and S/2018/612. The concerted engagement of State authorities, local leaders and security apparatus contributed to minimizing the escalation of potential security situations.

Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, the reporting period saw an increase in tensions between herders and farmers over land and resources, especially in West Darfur, affecting internally displaced persons and returnees in particular, and deterring further returns. On 17 June, a group of Beni Halba clashed with Zaghawa returnees over a land dispute in the Kurti farming area, north-west of El Geneina, leaving at least 10 people wounded. Government forces intervened to restore calm. On 25 July, Fallata and Salamat armed men clashed near Nadeif and Dangol villages, west of Buram, leading to the death of two Fallata and three Salamat men. Government forces were deployed to Nadeif to prevent an escalation of violence but another Salamat man was killed two days later. On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with **Fur** farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were reports of internally displaced persons being prevented

⁸⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 4, 6 and 7

⁸⁷ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 9

⁸⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 3-6

from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur.⁸⁹

In mid-September 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that ‘Disputes between herders and farmers occur more often this time of year, as herders let their cattle graze on farmlands that have not yet been harvested, causing friction between the groups. Tensions over land and pastures have often caused clashes between farmers in the region of Jebel Marra and militant herders who want to use their farms as pasture. This has also been the case for returning displaced people looking to farm in their area of origin’.⁹⁰

1.3 Safe/blocked routes

See the below section [3.3 Freedom of movement](#) which addresses the following topics:

[3.3.1 Freedom of movement in Darfur](#)

[3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur](#)

[3.3.3 Ability for Darfuris to relocate and integrate into areas outside Darfur](#)

2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia

2.1 Arab ethnic groups

Please note that these sections only present COI published from the consulted sources during the reporting period for this report, 1 September 2017 - 2 December 2018. For a historical overview, please consult the previous edition of this report published by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD):

❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, *2.1 Arab ethnic groups*

2.1.1 Rizeigat

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.⁹¹

The same source further described that “The Rizeigat and Ma'aliya tribes clashed most frequently in 2017” and “In Central Darfur, clashes between the tribes Misseriya, Rizeigat, and Salamat were predominant”.⁹²

⁸⁹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, *Paragraphs 8-9*

⁹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Farmers, firewood collectors attacked in South Darfur](#), 18 September 2018

⁹¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

⁹² Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101-102

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

The Border Guards were created in 2003, when the Government tried to provide a formal status to proxy Darfurian Arab tribal militias. Its members are principally Darfurian Arabs from the Mahamid branch of the Rezeigat tribe (Musa Hilal's branch). While their administrative status is not entirely clear, they reportedly respond, at least on paper, to Military Intelligence. RSF was created in 2013, when the Government was facing a spike in rebel activity in Darfur and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (the Two Areas). The Government was seeking to regain control of increasingly restive Arab militias in Darfur and establish a new paramilitary unit distinct from the unreliable Musa Hilal. The RSF troops reportedly number between 30,000 and 40,000. The vast majority of them are from Darfurian Arab tribes; the first batch was made up mostly of kinsmen of "Hemmeti" from the Mahariya branch of the Rezeigat. [...]

In late September, at the Libyan border, RSF personnel intercepted and killed 17 of Hilal's men, whom the Government alleged were "human traffickers" In early November, localized clashes between the force of Abdellah Razikalla "Savanna", a Musa Hilal associate, and RSF resulted in the capture of "Savanna" near Kabkabiya, in North Darfur.⁹³

The same source further noted that "The Rezeigat Arab militias in North Darfur have been funding themselves through illegal levies on artisanal gold mining activities, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies, cattle rustling and facilitating the smuggling of drugs and migrants across Darfur borders".⁹⁴

Radio Dabanga explained that:

After government forces managed to contain fierce clashes between the Maaliya and Rizeigat in East Darfur's Muhajiriya in mid-July [2017], the authorities opted for an unprecedented detention campaign against dozens of leaders from both tribes.

On July 31, a special East Darfur court sentenced 22 Rizeigat and Maaliya omdas and 73 other tribesmen to prison terms between three to six months. They were imprisoned in Khartoum and Port Sudan to prevent attempts by their fellow tribesmen to release them.⁹⁵

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies documented in an October 2018 report with regards to arbitrary arrests of tribal leaders under the state of emergency that:

On 29 July 2017, the Governor of East Darfur State, Mr Anas Umar decided under the state of emergency to imprison 124 tribal leaders of the Ma'aliya and Rizeigat for six months, subject to renewal. The detainees were sent to Kober prison in Khartoum North and Port Sudan in Red Sea State. Because the decision was taken under the state of emergency regulation, Governor Anas Umar or his appointed representative pursuant to the regulation have the power to grant access to visitors, doctors and legal representatives. Although Umar has not given reasons for his decision, a reliable source stated that the imprisonments were made against the backdrop of the events in the Kilaki Abu Salama area on 21 and 23 July 2017. The Ma'aliya and Rizeigat have been in armed conflict since 2002 following the announcement in 1997 of an administrative division for the Ma'aliya which would be known as Greater Adilah Province and would be divided into the administrative units of Adilah, Kilaki Abu Salamah and Abu Karinka. The Ma'aliya are based across the States of East Darfur and West

⁹³ UN, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 25-26

⁹⁴ UN, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 177

⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [*Darfur tribes sign accord in Khartoum*](#), 29 November 2018

Kordofan while the Rizeigat are in East Darfur and their historic capital is Daein. There have been 21 instances of conflict between the two. Yusuf Sa'id Taknah points out that the history of conflict between the two tribes goes back to 1966.

Members of the Ma'aliya and Rizeigat have been imprisoned at length. The heads of civil administration of the two tribes who are aged above 60 years have been detained for transfer to the prisons of Port Sudan in Red Sea State and Kober in Khartoum State under a state of emergency, this violates their fundamental rights. Transfer to other governorates is akin to exile. The power lies with the person who issued the detention order, something that leads to denial of doctors' calls and family visits.⁹⁶

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed the weapons collection campaign and impact on security thus:

The recent deployment of RSF to Darfur in the context of the weapons collection campaign has initiated a process of bringing the different militia groups under its effective control and authority. Although total figures of deployment are not made public, except for the announced arrival of 10,000 RSF in North Darfur, UNAMID estimates that some 18,000 RSF have been deployed across the five Darfur states. Given past RSF involvement in counter-insurgency operations and reports of arbitrary arrests, harassment and rape associated with its elements, as well as the fact that most of its units are recruited from the Arab Rizeigat tribe, several communities of internally displaced persons remain apprehensive regarding its presence and intentions.⁹⁷

The same source further noted:

A number of conflicts persist, as the issues at their origin remain unaddressed in a sustainable manner. The conflict between the Zaghawa and the Rizeigat in West Darfur over cattle and camels flared up again between 16 and 19 October, resulting in the killing of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat. It was brought under control with the intervention of the Sudan-Chad joint border forces and the state government with the assistance of UNAMID. [...]

In North Darfur, tensions between the Northern Rizeigat and Beni Hussein over the control of the Jebel Amir goldmines remain latent, as the grievances of the latter have not been addressed.⁹⁸

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

Government forces defeated the Savanna militia group, composed mainly of Southern Rizeigat, after clashes in Kutum, North Darfur, on 23 October, then in Shearia, East Darfur, on 30 October, and finally in Korma area, North Darfur, on 10 November, where they captured its leader, Abdallah Rizkallah, and nine militia. [...]

In October, following clashes between the Ma'aliya and the Rizeigat in East Darfur, the Sudanese Armed Forces were withdrawn and replaced by RSF in the buffer zone between the two groups. [...]

In West Darfur, subclans of the Rizeigat (Awlad Id, Awlad Zaid and Ereigat) clashed with the Zaghawa on 17 October in Hatam village (25 km south-east of Kulbus town), over the ownership of camels, which resulted in the deaths of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat.[...]

⁹⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Militia Chaos in Darfur: What's Next?* October 2018, *Arbitrary arrests of tribal leaders under the state of emergency* p. 14

⁹⁷ UN Secretary-General, *Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 4 January 2018, Paragraph 11

⁹⁸ UN Secretary-General, *Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 4 January 2018, Paragraph 19

On 25 October, the crop protection committee in Khazan Jadid, East Darfur, reported rising tensions between farmers and herders in the western areas due to large numbers of the Baggara and the Abbala migrating north to south. [...]

On 30 October, the Government released nine Rizeigat and four Ma'aliya leaders who were arrested in July following intercommunal fighting and other criminal activities.⁹⁹

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

In East Darfur, to replace the buffer zone committee between the Ma'aliva and the Rizeigat that was dissolved in November 2017, the Wali established a joint mechanism on 7 January to regulate agricultural activities and tackle cattle rustling. The mechanism is composed of 14 members with equal representation from both tribes. [...] On 27 and 28 January, the Vice-President visited Adilla and Abu Karinka, for a reconciliatory meeting between the Ma'aliva and the Rizeigat, and made a commitment to implement several development projects related to health, education and infrastructure in the area.¹⁰⁰

An additional report covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Tensions persist in the area around Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, following the stand-off between RSF and Northern Rizeigat militiamen, who joined forces with Musa Hilal in November 2017. On 27 February, RSF elements clashed with militiamen in Misteriya, 30 km south-west of the UNAMID team site in Kabkabiyah. One woman was killed and ten civilians were injured in the shooting incident as they attempted to protect a local leader. RSF informed UNAMID that the incident took place while it was implementing a weapons collection campaign.¹⁰¹

Radio Dabanga reported in early April 2018 that "Zaghawa tribal leaders have called on the North Darfur authorities to halt the current settlement process in Kornoi in El Sareif Beni Hussein locality".¹⁰² The same source further noted that:

Eight Zaghawa Native Administration leaders, North Darfur MPs and members of the Zaghawa Shura Council, handed a memorandum to the Governor of North Darfur, Abdelwahid Yousef [...].

They called on the state and federal governments "to intervene to immediately stop the aggression and the settlement" of Rizeigat tribesmen in the area of Zurug near Kornoi.

"The ongoing settlement process will definitely create strife among the people in the area," the Zaghawa leaders warned.

They said that a group of Mahariya tribesmen, a northern Rizeigat clan of camel herders, led by Juma Delgo, have earlier attempted to violently occupy Zaghawa hawakeer (traditionally owned lands) in the area.

Arbitration that took place after clashes in 1962, 1968, 1992, and 1994 "turned out in favour of the Zaghawa living in the area," the memo stated.¹⁰³

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that:

⁹⁹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 7-11

¹⁰⁰ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 9

¹⁰¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 6

¹⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur](#), 8 April 2018

¹⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur](#), 8 April 2018

In North Darfur, the northern Rizeigat militias associated with the Border Guards remain a challenge for the Beni Hussein in Sereif and Saraf Omra, due to their stake in gold mining. In South Darfur, [...] militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass. [...]

In East Darfur, militias of the southern Rizeigat and Ma'aliya tribes are heavily involved in the conflict over land and resources in the areas north of Ed Daein. Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur. [...]

Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur. Finally, in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik.¹⁰⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to militia clashes that:

Attacks against civilians by nomad militiamen in and around Jebel Marra continued alongside the fighting between government forces and SLA-AW. The Northern Rizeigat nomads reportedly continued to harass internally displaced persons and farmers in the Thur area of western Jebel Marra.¹⁰⁵

Radio Dabanga reported in late November 2018 that “Nazirs (chieftains) of the Rizeigat and Maaliya tribes signed a declaration of peaceful coexistence at the Presidential Palace in Khartoum [...] in the presence of Vice-President Dr Osman Kibir, patron of the agreement”.¹⁰⁶

2.1.2 Beni Hussayn

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.¹⁰⁷

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 recorded that:

¹⁰⁴ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹⁰⁵ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 3-7

¹⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [*Darfur tribes sign accord in Khartoum*](#), 29 November 2018

¹⁰⁷ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [*Conflict Barometer 2017*](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

In North Darfur, tensions between the Northern Rizeigat and Beni Hussein over the control of the Jebel Amir goldmines remain latent, as the grievances of the latter have not been addressed.¹⁰⁸

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that “In North Darfur, the northern Rizeigat militias associated with the Border Guards remain a challenge for the Beni Hussein in Sereif and Saraf Omra, due to their stake in gold mining”.¹⁰⁹

2.1.3 Ma’aliya

Radio Dabanga explained that:

After government forces managed to contain fierce clashes between the Maaliya and Rizeigat in East Darfur’s Muhajiriya in mid-July [2017], the authorities opted for an unprecedented detention campaign against dozens of leaders from both tribes.¹¹⁰

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies documented with regards to arbitrary arrests of tribal leaders under the state of emergency that:

On 29 July 2017, the Governor of East Darfur State, Mr Anas Umar decided under the state of emergency to imprison 124 tribal leaders of the Ma’aliya and Rizeigat for six months, subject to renewal. The detainees were sent to Kober prison in Khartoum North and Port Sudan in Red Sea State. Because the decision was taken under the state of emergency regulation, Governor Anas Umar or his appointed representative pursuant to the regulation have the power to grant access to visitors, doctors and legal representatives. Although Umar has not given reasons for his decision, a reliable source stated that the imprisonments were made against the backdrop of the events in the Kilaki Abu Salama area on 21 and 23 July 2017. The Ma’aliya and Rizeigat have been in armed conflict since 2002 following the announcement in 1997 of an administrative division for the Ma’aliya which would be known as Greater Adilah Province and would be divided into the administrative units of Adilah, Kilaki Abu Salamah and Abu Karinka. The Ma’aliya are based across the States of East Darfur and West Kordofan while the Rizeigat are in East Darfur and their historic capital is Daein. There have been 21 instances of conflict between the two. Yusuf Sa’id Taknah points out that the history of conflict between the two tribes goes back to 1966.

Members of the Ma’aliya and Rizeigat have been imprisoned at length. The heads of civil administration of the two tribes who are aged above 60 years have been detained for transfer to the prisons of Port Sudan in Red Sea State and Kober in Khartoum State under a state of emergency, this violates their fundamental rights. Transfer to other governorates is akin to exile. The power lies with the person who issued the detention order, something that leads to denial of doctors’ calls and family visits.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 19

¹⁰⁹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹¹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur tribes sign accord in Khartoum](#), 29 November 2018

¹¹¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Militia Chaos in Darfur: What’s Next?](#) October 2018, *Arbitrary arrests of tribal leaders under the state of emergency* p. 14

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded that “The Rizeigat and Ma’aliya tribes clashed most frequently in 2017”.¹¹²

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 recorded that:

Recent reporting on forced disarmament includes an account of a significant armed clash between RSF and a Ma’alia tribal group resulting in 21 deaths in Kilkil, East Darfur.¹¹³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

In October, following clashes between the Ma’aliya and the Rizeigat in East Darfur, the Sudanese Armed Forces were withdrawn and replaced by RSF in the buffer zone between the two groups. [...] On 30 October, the Government released nine Rizeigat and four Ma’aliya leaders who were arrested in July following intercommunal fighting and other criminal activities.¹¹⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

On 19 December 2017, UNAMID conducted a sensitization campaign in Abu Karinka, East Darfur, to reinforce the implementation of an agreement signed between the Berti and the Ma’aliya in April 2017, following violent conflict triggered by the destruction of a farm in Nair area (41 km east of Abu Karinka). No violent incidents have occurred between the two communities since the agreement was signed and displaced families from Nair area have returned to their villages.¹¹⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

In East Darfur, to replace the buffer zone committee between the Ma’aliya and the Rizeigat that was dissolved in November 2017, the Wali established a joint mechanism on 7 January to regulate agricultural activities and tackle cattle rustling. The mechanism is composed of 14 members with equal representation from both tribes. [...] On 27 and 28 January, the Vice-President visited Adilla and Abu Karinka, for a reconciliatory meeting between the Ma’aliya and the Rizeigat, and made a commitment to implement several development projects related to health, education and infrastructure in the area.¹¹⁶

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in April 2018 that 60 members from the Ma’alia tribe in East Darfur state were detained and were being held at Kober prison in Khartoum and Port Sudan Prison in Red Sea State.¹¹⁷ No further information as to the reason behind this wave of arrests has been provided by this source.

¹¹² Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

¹¹³ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 102

¹¹⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 8-9

¹¹⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 44

¹¹⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 9

¹¹⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan should charge or release remaining 248 individuals in prolonged detention](#), 16 April 2018

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that, “In East Darfur, militias of the southern Rizeigat and Ma’aliya tribes are heavily involved in the conflict over land and resources in the areas north of Ed Daein. Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur”.¹¹⁸ The same source further noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma’aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides; and among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.

Interventions by the Government and reconciliation efforts by the native administration, supported by UNAMID, have mitigated the escalation of intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. In the case of the clashes between the southern Rizeigat and the Ma’aliya in East Darfur, the Governor intervened by arresting native administration leaders accused of inciting the communities, and deployed the Rapid Support Forces in late July 2017 to disarm the tribal fighters.¹¹⁹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to mediation of intercommunal conflict that:

In East Darfur, the Deputy Nazir of the Ma’aliya informed UNAMID of a meeting between the Vice-President of the Sudan, Hassabo Mohammed Abdul Rahman, and Ma’aliya and Rizeigat leaders in Ed Daein on 24 July to discuss the resumption of the reconciliation process. Leaders expressed their willingness to resolve ongoing land issues. UNAMID continued to engage the leadership of both groups to encourage a peaceful resolution.¹²⁰

Radio Dabanga reported in late November 2018 that “Nazirs (chieftains) of the Rizeigat and Maaliya tribes signed a declaration of peaceful coexistence at the Presidential Palace in Khartoum [...] in the presence of Vice-President Dr Osman Kibir, patron of the agreement”.¹²¹

2.1.4 Beni Halba

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

Tensions increased in two camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, notably Hasahisa and the Hamidiya camps, near Zalingei. Following a quarrel between members of the Fur internally displaced persons and of the Beni Halba host community in December 2017, the internally displaced

¹¹⁸ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹¹⁹ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11-12

¹²⁰ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraph 46

¹²¹ Radio Dabanga, [*Darfur tribes sign accord in Khartoum*](#), 29 November 2018

persons prevented all Beni Halba from entering the Hasahisa market. On 20 January the two groups engaged in a violent confrontation, which resulted in four internally displaced persons and one Beni Halba being killed and 38 persons being injured.

In a separate incident, on 22 January, two internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp were assaulted by a group of men while conducting livelihood activities outside the camp, and on 31 January there were clashes between internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp and the Beni Halba, who prevented them from collecting wood in Boronka area (10 km from the camp). Sudan Police created a buffer zone in Hasahisa camp, arrested three suspects and are working with the community leaders towards a reconciliation initiative.¹²²

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes [...] among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.[...]

In Central Darfur, in March 2018, a joint committee of Fur leaders, the native administration and members of the peaceful coexistence committees arbitrated disputes over land between internally displaced persons and Kozam, Beni Halba and Salamat settlers, agreeing that the settlers would not cultivate new crops without the permission of the landowners.¹²³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to mediation of intercommunal conflict that:

The number of incidents of intercommunal violence remained low, with fewer occurrences as compared with the previous reporting period. There were six reported intercommunal clashes over land and livestock theft, which resulted in 18 fatalities, compared with eight clashes and 20 fatalities from 16 February to 10 June 2018, as covered in S/2018/389 and S/2018/612. The concerted engagement of State authorities, local leaders and security apparatus contributed to minimizing the escalation of potential security situations.

Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, the reporting period saw an increase in tensions between herders and farmers over land and resources, especially in West Darfur, affecting internally displaced persons and returnees in particular, and deterring further returns. On 17 June, a group of Beni Halba clashed with Zaghawa returnees over a land dispute in the Kurti farming area, north-west of El Geneina, leaving at least 10 people wounded. Government forces intervened to restore calm. On 25 July, Fallata and Salamat armed men clashed near Nadeif and Dangol villages, west of Buram, leading to the death of two Fallata and three Salamat men. Government forces were deployed to Nadeif to prevent an escalation of violence but another Salamat man was killed two days later. On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with Fur farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were reports of internally displaced persons being prevented

¹²² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 14

¹²³ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11 and 20

from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur.¹²⁴

2.1.5 Misseriya

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.¹²⁵

Furthermore, “In Central Darfur, clashes between the tribes Misseriya, Rizeigat, and Salamat were predominant”.¹²⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

The number of intercommunal clashes decreased significantly during the reporting period, with two clashes reported. On 12 February, Zaghawa herders from Chad clashed with Misseriya nomads over cattle rustling in the village of Milaibiday, 20 km north-east of Masteri, West Darfur. The incident resulted in nine fatalities among the Sudanese nomads. On 8 April, the Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa communities clashed over a cattle theft incident in the Kirkir area, 85 km north-west of El Geneina, resulting in one fatality on each side. On both occasions, the government of West Darfur intervened through the deployment of the Sudan-Chad Joint Forces to create a buffer between the two groups.¹²⁷

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that “In South Darfur, [...] militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass”.¹²⁸ Furthermore, “in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik”.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 8-9

¹²⁵ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry), p.101

¹²⁶ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry), p.101-102

¹²⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 4, 6 and 7

¹²⁸ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹²⁹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

2.1.6 Ta'aisha

No information was found amongst the sources consulted in the time frame of this report. For historical information please consult:

- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 2.1.6 Ta'aisha

2.1.7 Salamat

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan,¹³⁰

The same source further noted that “in Central Darfur, clashes between the tribes Misseriya, Rizeigat, and Salamat were predominant”.¹³¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

On 29 October, the Salamat and the Habbaniya held a forum on peaceful coexistence in Buram, South Darfur, where they signed a reconciliation agreement, following the cessation of hostilities agreement of 12 May 2017. On 2 November, the state government facilitated exchange visits for the Habbaniya to Nadeif and the Salamat to Buram, as a confidence-building measure.¹³²

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with that:

In South Darfur, the Salamat and the Fallata clashed on 24 October over cattle rustling in the Dejj area (55 km west of Graid) in which four Fallata, including two women, and five Salamat men were killed. [...] In South Darfur, on 27 October, a group of armed nomads attacked Fallata and Fur returnees in Funguli village, 54 km northwest of the team site at Menawashei, in East Jebel Marra locality, killing five and injuring several others.¹³³

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes [...]

¹³⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

¹³¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101-102

¹³² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraph 11

¹³³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraphs 9-10

among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.[...]

In Central Darfur, in March 2018, a joint committee of Fur leaders, the native administration and members of the peaceful coexistence committees arbitrated disputes over land between internally displaced persons and Khozam, Beni Halba and Salamat settlers, agreeing that the settlers would not cultivate new crops without the permission of the landowners.¹³⁴

The same source further noted, “In East Darfur, [...] Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur”.¹³⁵

Radio Dabanga reported in June 2018 that “A Reconciliation and Social Peace Conference between leaders of the Falata and Masalit tribes will begin in Gireida in South Darfur next week. The Governor of South Darfur Adam El Faki, called on the Gireida community to cooperate and support voluntary repatriation, reconciliation and security issues. [...] The Falata tribe also signed a reconciliation agreement with the Salamat this year”.¹³⁶

The October 2018 report from the same source recorded with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

On 25 July, Fallata and Salamat armed men clashed near Nadeif and Dangol villages, west of Buram, leading to the death of two Fallata and three Salamat men. Government forces were deployed to Nadeif to prevent an escalation of violence but another Salamat man was killed two days later.¹³⁷

2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups

Please note that these sections only present COI published from the consulted sources during the reporting period for this report, 1 September 2017- 2 December 2018. For a historical overview please consult the previous edition of this report published by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD):

❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups

2.2.1 Berti

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habbaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni

¹³⁴ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11 and 20

¹³⁵ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Reconciliation conference aims to ease tribal tensions in South Darfur](#), 21 June 2018

¹³⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 8-9

Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.¹³⁸

Radio Dabanga reported in November 2017 that “the house of King Yasser Hussein Ahmadi, leader of the Berti tribe in North Darfur, was stormed and searched by members of the Rapid Support Forces”.¹³⁹ No further information as to the reasons behind such an operation by the RSF was provided in the article.

The UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report conducted in August 2018 and published in November 2018 for which they interviewed the King of the Berti and a political scientist who is a governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan who noted with regards to the situation of the Berti that:

1.2 Non-Arab Darfuri groups in Darfur

[...] 1.2.2 The political scientist added that he had ‘... spoken to Berti elders, some of whom thought they were Arabs, linked with Yemen or the Nile peoples, near Dongola. The Tunjur have a similar claim of having their origin in the old Nubian Sudan along the Nile. However, they are generally classified as non-Arabs. Historically the Berti kingdom preceded the Fur’s. Most of the Berti live in north North Darfur, around Omkaddada and Millit – they are a large group. Since 2004 they have been at the “frontline” [of the conflict].’

1.2.3 The King of the Berti, however, claimed that the Berti are the second largest non-Arab Darfuri group in Darfur, with a population of 2-3 million lead by 24 ‘umda’ (mayors’) in North and South Darfur. [...]2. Darfur

[...] 2.2 Security and political situation

[...] 2.2.18 However, the King of the Berti observed, with regard to the Berti that they: ‘... are noted by their neutrality in the civil conflict in Darfur. They were not with the janjaweed nor with the government or the rebels; they stayed out of fighting. But that doesn’t mean they are not affected by the situation. There was an inter-tribal conflict with the Ziadiya (Arab tribe) between 2012 and 2015. Calmed down now as government is stricter, law and order generally better. The government has had a weapons collection campaign for the last 1.5years. To demonstrate their commitment [to peace] the Berti gave up their weapons.’

2.2.19 The political scientist noted in regard to the Berti:

‘There is an Arab group, the Mahameed (part of the government militias), who have given the Berti a hard time. However, the Mahameed have split. One militia, led by Musa Hilal, opposes the government. Musa Hilal is now in prison, waiting to go to a military court in Khartoum. But the other half of the Mahameed militias have been absorbed into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Musa Hilal’s cousin. So still militia but now part of the formal security apparatus – the army is not happy. However, the militias still conduct themselves as if they are still militias. They make up 90% of the Sudanese forces in Yemen. ‘The militias / RSF are also being used in the campaign to control migration out of Sudan.’ [...]

3. Non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum

[...] 3.2.15 The King of the Berti (KB) observed:

‘Darfuri Arabs experience less discrimination: they speak Arabic (as compared to other languages spoken by non-Arab Darfuri groups [although Berti also only speak Arabic]). The experience of Berti is not particularly different from other Darfuri tribes... KB would not say that there is discrimination compared to other Darfuri tribes but difficulties in accessing health and education (which are problems for all tribes). One area where there is discrimination is that the Berti are not incorporated into the regular security forces – police, army, RSF – across Sudan. Representation in these groups

¹³⁸ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

¹³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur tribe leader’s house damaged](#), 28 November 2017

may help improve relationships with them. 'When asked if the Berti had problems with the police / security services, KB said no – Berti are generally considered a peaceful tribe.'¹⁴⁰

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

On 19 December 2017, UNAMID conducted a sensitization campaign in Abu Karinka, East Darfur, to reinforce the implementation of an agreement signed between the Berti and the Ma'aliva in April 2017, following violent conflict triggered by the destruction of a farm in Nair area (41 km east of Abu Karinka). No violent incidents have occurred between the two communities since the agreement was signed and displaced families from Nair area have returned to their villages.¹⁴¹

2.2.2 Fur

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 explained that:

While SLA/MM is one of the three main historical Darfuri rebel groups (with JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW)), SLA/TC is a more recent and lesser-known group. It is a splinter group from SLA/AW, formed in 2015 by prominent SLA/AW figures who were unhappy with Abdul Wahid's leadership and strategy. The group, mostly composed of ethnic Fur, aims to reunite various SLA/AW groupings under its leadership and push out Abdul Wahid in order to re-energize SLA/AW, formerly a more powerful, visible movement. By May 2017, SLA/TC was mostly located in South Sudan, where its then-Chair Nimir Abdel-Rahman, its then-General Commander Mohamed Adam Abdelsalam "Tarrada" and Saleh Abdulrahman, the deputy of "Tarrada", were based with about 30 vehicles. The group also has a presence in Libya. Since its formation, SLA/TC has been working closely with SLA/MM.¹⁴²

The Minority Rights Group International's 'People under Threat 2018' report ranked Sudan fifth in the world and listed the Fur amongst the groups affected.¹⁴³

Amnesty International documented that "President Omar al-Bashir visit to Darfur started on 19 September 2017. The official reason of the tour was to launch new health and education projects in Darfur. The news of the President's visit has sparked protests since 19 September in and around Kalma IDP camp for the displaced near the South Darfur capital of Nyala ahead of the planned visit. Representatives of the IDPs rejected President Bashir's announced visit Kamla camp. Kamla camp's residents, mainly from the Fur ethnic group, are perceived as supporting the SLA/AW armed group".¹⁴⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported that "In South Darfur, on 27 October [2017], a group of armed nomads attacked

¹⁴⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, p. 14, 36 and 44

¹⁴¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 44

¹⁴² UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 15

¹⁴³ Minority Rights Group International, [Peoples under Threat 2018](#), 13 June 2018, p.5

¹⁴⁴ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018

Fallata and Fur returnees in Funguli village, 54 km northwest of the team site at Menawashei, in East Jebel Marra locality, killing five and injuring several others”.¹⁴⁵

The report from the same source covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

On 11 January, during the weapons collection in North and Straha internally displaced persons camps, Central Darfur, RSF reportedly arrested 8 Fur and 20 Arab sheikhs in order to gather information about persons in possession of weapons and the hiding places for weapons and motorcycles. [...] Tensions increased in two camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, notably Hasahisa and the Hamidiya camps, near Zalingei. Following a quarrel between members of the Fur internally displaced persons and of the Beni Halba host community in December 2017, the internally displaced persons prevented all Beni Halba from entering the Hasahisa market. On 20 January the two groups engaged in a violent confrontation, which resulted in four internally displaced persons and one Beni Halba being killed and 38 persons being injured. In a separate incident, on 22 January, two internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp were assaulted by a group of men while conducting livelihood activities outside the camp, and on 31 January there were clashes between internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp and the Beni Halba, who prevented them from collecting wood in Boronka area (10 km from the camp). Sudan Police created a buffer zone in Hasahisa camp, arrested three suspects, and are working with the community leaders towards a reconciliation initiative.¹⁴⁶

A further report covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that “Two internally displaced Fur people from Sortony were killed in separate incidents in February, allegedly by nomads”.¹⁴⁷

In April 2018 it was reported by UNOCHA that massive displacement in Rokereo town took place “following attacks on the Fur tribes by Arab Nomads on 18 April 2018. These attacks on the Fur tribes were triggered by an attack that was allegedly carried out by a group of armed non-State actors on 17 April 2018 in Jurtolo village [...] where over 150 heads of camels belonging to the Arab nomads were rustled, 2 Arab nomads and 1 SLA/AW element killed. In retaliation to the attack and after failing to recover their animals, the Arab nomads attacked 13 villages (Tawo, Togama, Molmal, Lugo, Aru, Sangara, Kawa, Spopenga, Salanga, Kormi, Healt Hassan Abdalla, Healt Haja Medina and Dongla -all in GoS controlled areas) in North Jebel Marra locality, looting and burning houses to the ground”.¹⁴⁸

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that “In South Darfur, [...] militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass”.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, “In East Darfur,

¹⁴⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraph 10

¹⁴⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraphs 6, 10 and 14

¹⁴⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 27

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Children's Fund World Food Programme/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/International Organization for Migration, [Rokero Assessment – 25-29 April 2018](#), April 2018, Background, p. 1

¹⁴⁹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

[...] Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur”.¹⁵⁰

A report from the UN Secretary-General on the UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 considered that:

Elsewhere in the Jebel Marra, on 28 June, Government forces attacked Boulay, the main SLA-AW stronghold in northern Jebel Marra, taking control of the area by early July. Unconfirmed reports were received of Rapid Support Forces attacking and looting Kebe, South Darfur, on 27 July, allegedly targeting local support for the rebels. Five Fur civilians were reportedly killed, among them one woman, and four were injured, including one woman and two children, and an unknown number of civilians were displaced into the surrounding villages.[...]

On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with Fur farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were reports of internally displaced persons being prevented from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur.¹⁵¹

A university professor from Darfur interviewed for the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report published in November 2018 noted with regards to problems obtaining ID cards and numbers that “for the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa, these are border groups and linked to the rebel groups therefore face more difficulties, it will be a longer process”.¹⁵²

2.2.3 Masalit

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.¹⁵³

The Minority Rights Group International’s ‘People under Threat 2018’ report ranked Sudan fifth in the world and listed the Massalit amongst the groups affected.¹⁵⁴

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

¹⁵⁰ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹⁵¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 3-6 and 8-9

¹⁵² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, A university professor from Darfur p.116

¹⁵³ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry), p.101

¹⁵⁴ Minority Rights Group International, [Peoples under Threat 2018](#), 13 June 2018, p.5

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma'aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides; and among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.¹⁵⁵

The same report considered that “In South Darfur, Fallata militias often attack Masalit communities over land ownership around Graidā”.¹⁵⁶ It further recorded that:

In South Darfur, in May 2016, the Governor issued a decree restoring the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees to the lands and houses they had left behind in February 2003, and issued land ownership certificates for returnees in some areas. Despite that, in January 2018, the Fallata denied Masalit returnees access to land, and the internally displaced persons returned to the camp in Graidā to avoid conflict.¹⁵⁷

A further report from the same source noted with regards to mediation of intercommunal conflict that:

South Darfur on 9 July, the Masalit and the Fallata signed a peace agreement in Bulbul Tembisco in the presence of the Wali of South Darfur, with logistical and technical support from UNAMID. However, the land issue was not addressed. The communities agreed to allow the resolution of land issues to be led by the state authorities.¹⁵⁸

A university professor from Darfur interviewed for the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report published in November 2018 noted with regards to problems obtaining ID cards and numbers that “for the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa, these are border groups and linked to the rebel groups therefore face more difficulties, it will be a longer process”.¹⁵⁹

2.2.4 Zaghawa/Beri

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded with regards to inter-communal rivalries in Sudan that:

Inter- and intra-tribal fighting involved members of the Rizeigat, its sections, Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa, Ma'aliyan, its subclan Agarba, Salamat, Habaniya, Misseriya, Gimir, Hamar, Kababish, Massalit, Beni

¹⁵⁵ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 11

¹⁵⁶ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

¹⁵⁷ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 21

¹⁵⁸ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 9, 29 and 31

¹⁵⁹ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, A university professor from Darfur p.116

Hussein, Berti, Fellata, Huttiya, and Tunjur. As in previous years, most incidents of inter-communal violence took place in the region of Darfur, with some but fewer in Kordofan.¹⁶⁰

The Minority Rights Group International's 'People under Threat 2018' report ranked Sudan fifth in the world and listed the Zaghawa amongst the groups affected.¹⁶¹

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 recorded that:

A number of conflicts persist, as the issues at their origin remain unaddressed in a sustainable manner. The conflict between the Zaghawa and the Rizeigat in West Darfur over cattle and camels flared up again between 16 and 19 October, resulting in the killing of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat. It was brought under control with the intervention of the Sudan-Chad joint border forces and the state government with the assistance of UNAMID.¹⁶²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

In West Darfur, subclans of the Rizeigat (Awlad Id, Awlad Zaid and Ereigat) clashed with the Zaghawa on 17 October in Hatam village (25 km south-east of Kulbus town), over the ownership of camels, which resulted in the deaths of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat. The Sudan-Chad joint border forces were deployed to contain the violence.¹⁶³

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that "In South Darfur, [...] militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass".¹⁶⁴ The same source further reported that:

In West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik. [...]

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes [...] ; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides. [...]

¹⁶⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Inter-communal rivalry)*, p.101

¹⁶¹ Minority Rights Group International, [Peoples under Threat 2018](#), 13 June 2018, p.5

¹⁶² UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 19

¹⁶³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 8-9

¹⁶⁴ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

In the wake of the clashes between the Zaghawa from Chad and nomadic tribes in West Darfur in early 2018, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force intervened effectively to pacify the security situation and the local authorities mediated a solution.¹⁶⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

The number of intercommunal clashes decreased significantly during the reporting period, with two clashes reported. On 12 February, Zaghawa herders from Chad clashed with Misseriya nomads over cattle rustling in the village of Milaibiday, 20 km north-east of Masteri, West Darfur. The incident resulted in nine fatalities among the Sudanese nomads. On 8 April, the Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa communities clashed over a cattle theft incident in the Kirkir area, 85 km north-west of El Geneina, resulting in one fatality on each side. On both occasions, the government of West Darfur intervened through the deployment of the Sudan-Chad Joint Forces to create a buffer between the two groups.¹⁶⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

On 23 January, the Birgid and the Zaghawa, in a ceremony attended by Vice -President Hassabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman, signed a peace agreement in Shearia town, recommending the restitution of Zaghawa properties in Shearia, including shops and houses, allocation of farm lands to Zaghawa returnees and the formation of a mechanism to sustain the return process and the implementation of development programmes, in coordination with the United Nations.¹⁶⁷

Amnesty International documented that “in March [2018], about 400 people, mainly from Zaghawa ethnic group, from El Neem IDP camp in East Darfur, attempted to return to their village of origin, Alareid, about 37 km north of El Daein. Upon arrival, they found their village occupied by new settlers who attacked them, resulting in serious injury of two. The IDPs were forced to return back to El Daien camp where they have been displaced since 2007”.¹⁶⁸

Radio Dabanga reporting on the same early April 2018 incident noted above documented that “Zaghawa tribal leaders have called on the North Darfur authorities to halt the current settlement process in Kornoi in El Sareif Beni Hussein locality”.¹⁶⁹ The same source further noted that:

Eight Zaghawa Native Administration leaders, North Darfur MPs and members of the Zaghawa Shura Council, handed a memorandum to the Governor of North Darfur, Abdelwahid Yousef [...] . They called on the state and federal governments “to intervene to immediately stop the aggression and the settlement” of Rizeigat tribesmen in the area of Zurug near Kornoi. “The ongoing settlement process will definitely create strife among the people in the area,” the Zaghawa leaders warned.

¹⁶⁵ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 7, 11 and 12

¹⁶⁶ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 4, 6 and 7

¹⁶⁷ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 9

¹⁶⁸ Amnesty International, [*Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur*](#), 29 June 2018

¹⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [*Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur*](#), 8 April 2018

They said that a group of Mahariya tribesmen, a northern Rizeigat clan of camel herders, led by Juma Delgo, have earlier attempted to violently occupy Zaghawa hawakeer (traditionally owned lands) in the area.

Arbitration that took place after clashes in 1962, 1968, 1992, and 1994 “turned out in favour of the Zaghawa living in the area,” the memo stated.¹⁷⁰

On 12 April 2018 Radio Dabanga noted that “The Member of Parliament of Kornoi and Um Baru constituency Minawi Digeish reported that [...] a group of Arab herders opened fire on Zaghawa tribe members who were drawing water from a well at Abujidad area. Four of the villagers were taken in serious condition to Kornoi hospital. He said the attackers prevented the residents from taking water from the well and threatened to kill anyone who comes to the area”.¹⁷¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, the reporting period saw an increase in tensions between herders and farmers over land and resources, especially in West Darfur, affecting internally displaced persons and returnees in particular, and deterring further returns. On 17 June, a group of Beni Halba clashed with Zaghawa returnees over a land dispute in the Kurti farming area, north-west of El Geneina, leaving at least 10 people wounded. Government forces intervened to restore calm.¹⁷²

A university professor from Darfur interviewed for the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report published in November 2018 noted with regards to problems obtaining ID cards and numbers that “for the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa, these are border groups and linked to the rebel groups therefore face more difficulties, it will be a longer process”.¹⁷³

2.3 Conflict between tribes since September 2017

For an analysis of general security trends across the five states see [1. Security situation in Darfur since Sept 2017](#) and for an overview of intercommunal conflict see [1.2 Inter-communal clashes](#).

For information specific to particular tribes, see the relevant sections contained within [2.1 Arab ethnic groups](#) and [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#).

Information in the following subsections is divided by the five federal states of Darfur. For a useful map of the administrative regions of these five states, see:

- ❖ United Nations Development Programme et al, [Developing DARFUR: A Recovery & Reconstruction Strategy](#), 7 April 2013, p.77

¹⁷⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur](#), 8 April 2018

¹⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [Water shortage sparks herder attack at North Darfur well](#), 12 April 2018

¹⁷² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 9 and 28

¹⁷³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, A university professor from Darfur p.116

2.3.1 North Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in North Darfur, see 5. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, [5.1 Security](#) and 6. *Returnees*, [6.1 Security](#).

According to the U.S. State Department report on Human Rights Practices covering events in 2017 “Intercommunal violence spawned from land tenure and resource scarcity resulted in high death tolls, particularly in East, South, and North Darfur”.¹⁷⁴ The same source further noted that:

All states in Darfur were under varying states of emergency. Between January 1 and November 10, UNAMID police received 1,737 reports of criminality and banditry, which included 1,029 persons killed. This represented an 8.1-percent decrease in crime from 2016. Police confirmed 1,146 of these cases and made 179 related arrests. North Darfur had the highest crime rate, while South Darfur had the only crime rate that increased from 2016. The attacks included rape, armed robbery, abduction, ambush, livestock theft, assault/harassment, arson, and burglary and were allegedly carried out primarily by Arab militias, but government forces, unknown assailants, and rebel elements also carried out attacks. [...] Largely unregulated artisanal gold-mining activities continued in all of the Darfur states, although it was a lesser source of tension between communities than in previous years. Claims to land rights continued to be mostly ethnic and tribal in nature. Clashes sometimes resulted from conflicts over land rights, mineral ownership, and use of gold-mining areas, particularly in the Jebel Amer area in North Darfur. Observers believed those clashes resulted in deaths and displacement.¹⁷⁵

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

In particular, militia groups have a strong presence in North Darfur, where they control large swathes of territory, including in the districts of Kutum, Tawila, Korma, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobayi. These groups are organized along tribal lines and hard to control. Annex V provides details on the most prominent militias of North Darfur. [...]

In early November, localized clashes between the force of Abdellah Razikalla “Savanna”, a Musa Hilal associate, and RSF resulted in the capture of “Savanna” near Kabkabiya, in North Darfur. [...]

The Rezeigat Arab militias in North Darfur have been funding themselves through illegal levies on artisanal gold mining activities, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies, cattle rustling and facilitating the smuggling of drugs and migrants across Darfur borders.¹⁷⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

In North Darfur, following the killing of two Mahariya on 18 October, the kinsmen of the deceased traced the perpetrators to Umm La’ota village (9 km north-west of Kabkabiya town), where two Mahariya and two Tama were killed during the ensuing clashes. The authorities, in collaboration with RSF, managed to contain the situation. [...]

The annual migration of nomadic herders, which usually coincides with the harvest season, was marked by an increase in criminality in the areas of El Fasher, Kabkabiya, Kutum and Tawilah in North Darfur as well as El Geneina and Masteri in West Darfur, increasing tensions between farmers

¹⁷⁴ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, *Executive summary*

¹⁷⁵ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, 1.g, *Other Conflict-related Abuse*:

¹⁷⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 21, 28 and 177

and herders. [...] There were also reports of armed nomads destroying farms in Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, on 29 October.¹⁷⁷

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Tensions persist in the area around Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, following the stand-off between RSF and Northern Rizeigat militiamen, who joined forces with Musa Hilal in November 2017. On 27 February, RSF elements clashed with militiamen in Misteriya, 30 km south-west of the UNAMID team site in Kabkabiyah. One woman was killed and ten civilians were injured in the shooting incident as they attempted to protect a local leader. RSF informed UNAMID that the incident took place while it was implementing a weapons collection campaign.¹⁷⁸

Radio Dabanga reported in early April 2018 that “Zaghawa tribal leaders have called on the North Darfur authorities to halt the current settlement process in Kornoi in El Sareif Beni Hussein locality”.¹⁷⁹ The same source further noted that:

Eight Zaghawa Native Administration leaders, North Darfur MPs and members of the Zaghawa Shura Council, handed a memorandum to the Governor of North Darfur, Abdelwahid Yousef [...] . They called on the state and federal governments “to intervene to immediately stop the aggression and the settlement” of Rizeigat tribesmen in the area of Zurug near Kornoi. “The ongoing settlement process will definitely create strife among the people in the area,” the Zaghawa leaders warned. They said that a group of Mahariya tribesmen, a northern Rizeigat clan of camel herders, led by Juma Delgo, have earlier attempted to violently occupy Zaghawa hawakeer (traditionally owned lands) in the area.¹⁸⁰

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that “In North Darfur, the northern Rizeigat militias associated with the Border Guards remain a challenge for the Beni Hussein in Sereif and Saraf Omra, due to their stake in gold mining”.¹⁸¹ The same source noted with regards to UNAMID’s withdrawal in the state that:

In North Darfur, UNAMID withdrew from six team sites, namely Um Kaddadah, Mellit, Al-Malihah, Tine, Zamzam and Abu Shouk camp. In all locations the security situation was stable and the withdrawal of UNAMID has not had, for the time being, a negative impact. In Um Kaddadah, the local authorities raised concerns about the lack of land registry, as well as concerns about the lack of water, seeds and fertilizer. In Mellit, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the absence of Sudanese police forces inside the camps and outside Mellit town, while locals raised concerns about the lack of medicine and water. Plans for the return of internally displaced persons are being hampered by the lack of basic services and protection concerns, including the establishment of police presences in the areas of return. In Al-Malihah, the Rapid Support Forces are heavily present to ensure the control of the border with Libya and to prevent the infiltration of armed rebel groups. In Tine, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force is providing effective security, which is creating conducive conditions for the expected return of up to 20,000 Sudanese refugees from Chad. In

¹⁷⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraphs 9-10

¹⁷⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 6

¹⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur](#), 8 April 2018

¹⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Zaghawa warn for tribal clashes in western North Darfur](#), 8 April 2018

¹⁸¹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

Zamzam, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the low presence of Sudanese police forces and the occupation of their lands by new settlers, while in Abu Shouk camp concerns were raised regarding the lack of access to food, water and health services.¹⁸²

In early April 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “Two people were shot dead and five others wounded in an attack by armed herders near Dubo El Omda in North Darfur’s Tawila locality [...] Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a villager reported that a group of armed herders riding in a Land Cruiser and others on motorcycles, camels and horses, stormed the area of Barkorou, 15 kilometres west of Dubo El Omda, in what is locally known as eastern Jebel Marra. “They indiscriminately opened fire on the people in the area”.¹⁸³

In mid-May 2018 Radio Dabanga recorded that “Two herders were seriously wounded in a cattle theft in Tawila locality in North Darfur. [...] Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a relative of one of the victims reported that Eisa Omar and Abdelrahman Yagoub were hit by bullets in a cattle theft the area of Katur. “A group of gunmen on camels and others on motorcycles shot them while they were grazing their cattle,” he said. ‘They took their donkeys and a number of cows, and fled’”.¹⁸⁴

In early June 2018 Radio Dabanga recorded that “a group of militant herders severely beat a number of farmers at Dubo El Madrasa in Tawila locality [...]. ‘The janjaweed told us that if we would return to our farms they would kill us,’ one of the farmers told this station”.¹⁸⁵ According to Radio Dabanga reporting in mid-July, “two farmers were wounded in a herders’ attack on their farm in Tawila locality in North Darfur”.¹⁸⁶

Amnesty International reported in June 2018 that:

According to information received by Amnesty International, between July 2017 and May 2018, incidents of unlawful killings, abduction, sexual violence, looting and arbitrary detention persisted in Darfur. For example, Amnesty recorded 244 incidents of unlawful killings in different parts of Darfur, allegedly committed by pro-government militias from August 2017 to April 2018. Approximately 75 percent of the incidents that led to a loss of life took place in North Darfur and Jebel Marra Area. The pro-government militias especially the Rapid Support Force have allegedly committed most of these crimes, such as deliberate killing of civilians, looting of villages and livestock, rapes and torching of homes.¹⁸⁷

The same source further noted that “Amnesty International received information that at least four of the former UNAMID team sites in North Darfur are currently occupied by the RSF or Sudan’s Police Forces. RSF in particular has been implicated in serious crimes in the past”.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, paragraph 30

¹⁸³ Radio Dabanga, *Attack by armed herders in North Darfur leaves two dead*, 1 April 2018

¹⁸⁴ Radio Dabanga, *Two wounded in North Darfur cattle rustling*, 13 May 2018

¹⁸⁵ Radio Dabanga, *Herders attack villagers in South and North Darfur*, 9 June 2018

¹⁸⁶ Radio Dabanga, *Camel herders shoot farmers in North Darfur*, 16 July 2018

¹⁸⁷ Amnesty International, *Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur*, 29 June 2018, p.2

¹⁸⁸ Amnesty International, *Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur*, 29 June 2018, p.2

At the end of July Radio Dabanga reported that “A villager was killed in a raid on Tamra village in North Darfur’s Tawila locality. [...] Fleeing villagers told Radio Dabanga that a group of unknown gunmen riding on camels and horses attacked Tamra, north of Dubo El Omda”.¹⁸⁹

In early August Radio Dabanga documented that “A woman farmer has died and four others injured in an attack by armed herders on farms south of Tabit in Tawila locality in North Darfur. [...] Farmers told Radio Dabanga that the attack was carried out by 12 armed herders on camels after they let their livestock graze on the farms south of Tabit. Witnesses said that when the women farmers tried to drive the livestock from their farms, the herders opened fire”.¹⁹⁰ Reporting on a further incident in the same reporting period the source detailed that “A group of gunmen abducted a 45-year-old farmer near Dubo El Omda in Tawila locality. [...] Tensions over land and pastures have often caused clashes between farmers in the region of Jebel Marra and militant herders who want to use their farms as pasture. Displaced returning to their area of origin complain about new settlers who occupy their villages”.¹⁹¹

At the end of August 2018 Radio Dabanga noted that “displaced farmer Abdalkarim Abdalmajid Suleiman was shot dead by a herder in Kutum locality in North Darfur. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that one of the herders opened fire on Abdalkarim while he was tilling his farm east of Fata Borno camp and instantly killed him. The motive for the attack is not immediately known, however farmers and herders frequently clash in Darfur over the rights to land and grazing”.¹⁹²

On 11 September 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “Two herders were killed in North Darfur and two were arrested in a clash between a government force, after the herders had attacked a police vehicle”.¹⁹³ The same source further documented that:

Earlier this month armed herders opened fire and seriously wounded five people at Kurfla area, 5 km west of Tabit, as they returned from farming. On August 7 herders attacked a group of farmers south of Tabit when they tried to drive away the herders’ livestock, upon which they opened fire. This resulted in the killing of a woman.

Tensions over land and pastures have often caused clashes between farmers in the region of Jebel Marra and militant herders who want to use their farms as pasture. This has also been the case for returning displaced people looking to farm in their area of origin. Farmers speaking to Radio Dabanga have often expressed their desire for more protection and security in order to make the farming season succeed.

Disputes between herders and farmers occur more often this time of year, as herders let their cattle graze on farmlands that have not yet been harvested, causing friction between the groups.¹⁹⁴

In late September 2018 Radio Dabanga documented that “A farmer was killed and another abducted after they confronted armed herders grazing livestock on their farms at Um Baji south of Tabit [...]. Local leaders have called for a military force to be stationed at Gallab to protect the farms. [...] Residents of Kulgi, Bobai Sijlli and Sousou areas have complained that the herders are trespassing on their farms with their camels and cows at night”.¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Attack on North Darfur village leaves one dead](#), 22 July 2018

¹⁹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Woman dies, four injured as herders attack North Darfur farms](#), 8 August 2018

¹⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Farmer abducted in Tawila, North Darfur](#), 6 August 2018

¹⁹² Radio Dabanga, [Murder in North Darfur, man drowns in valley flood](#), 29 August 2018

¹⁹³ Radio Dabanga, [Herders killed, arrested by North Darfur police](#), 11 September 2018

¹⁹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Herders killed, arrested by North Darfur police](#), 11 September 2018

¹⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Farmers killed, abducted by herders in North Darfur](#), 27 September 2018

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 considered that:

In North Darfur, the main protection issues identified included harassment of farmers and land occupation reportedly attributed to armed nomads or other unidentified armed men. Community leaders expressed concerns over increased tensions between farmers and herders during the harvest season due to crop destruction by livestock. UNAMID continued to urge community elders to engage constructively with nomad leaders on ways to address the issue of crop destruction and to work together towards the promotion of dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Access restrictions continued to hamper UNAMID monitoring and reporting efforts, making it difficult to independently verify incidents in the conflict areas of the Jebel Marra, including human rights-related incidents and allegations by internally displaced persons against Government security forces.¹⁹⁶

In mid-October Radio Dabanga recorded that “Three people including a policeman were wounded in separate incidents in Tabit in North Darfur [...]. In the first incident, herders driving a Land Cruiser and others riding camels attacked Tabit police station. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that a constable was wounded when armed herders raided Tabit police station. The Tabit police were holding livestock that was seized after being driven onto farms in the area and causing extensive damage. The herders forced the limited police presence to take cover while they released the seized animals from the corral and fled. In the Jebein area west of Tabit, Maryam Eisa was severely beaten by herders when she tried to drive camels and livestock from her farm. Both of Eisa’s arms were broken in the attack. In south of Jebel Marra, unknown gunmen attacked Yousef Mohamed while he was on his way back from Kali Koten area after shopping, shot him ,and seriously wounded him. They then robbed him of his possessions and the donkey he was riding”.¹⁹⁷

Radio Dabanga reported at the end of October 2018 that “A number of farmers were injured in an attack by herders in Tawila locality in North Darfur. [...] Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the herders trespassed with their camels and cows, resulting in a confrontation where the herders opened fire on the farmers. This also led to the destruction of large areas of millet, sorghum, sesame, groundnuts, watermelon and okra estimated at thousands of Sudanese Pounds. They explained that they had filed several complaints to the authorities, without finding any response”.¹⁹⁸

Also at the end of October 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “A man has died of gunshot wounds in Muzbad in North Darfur [...] after members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) government militia opened fire on angry civilians following an alleged rape attempt by one of the RSF troops”.¹⁹⁹ During the same period the source also documented that “Two people were shot dead and two others were wounded in an attack by militiamen riding camels and horses at Dandi area near Rakuna in East Jebel Marra locality in South Darfur on Friday morning. Intervention by combatants of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) netted five suspects”.²⁰⁰

Radio Dabanga reported that on 26 November 2018, “Three farmers were attacked by herders who drove their livestock onto their farms in Tawila locality. [...] The witnesses said that the injured women were taken to Tabit health centre after they reported the incident to the police. Pastoralists

¹⁹⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraph 27

¹⁹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Policeman wounded as herders raid North Darfur station](#), 15 October 2018

¹⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Farmers attacked in North Darfur’s Tawila](#), 23 October 2018

¹⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur rape attempt: One dead as RSF fire on angry residents](#), 29 October 2018

²⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sheikh \(60\) among dead in South Darfur livestock raid](#), 29 October 2018

with cattle herds have caused significant losses to the fields of sorghum, sesame, watermelon and groundnuts in the current agricultural season, farmers in Tawila reported in October”.²⁰¹

The same source recorded that on 28 November 2018, “the representatives of pastoralists and farmers in the villages of Nimra, Humeida and Sauda in the return areas of Dubo El Omda administrative unit in Tawila and El Waha localities in North Darfur signed a document for settling disputes between farmers and herders over land and water sources in those areas”.²⁰²

2.3.2 East Darfur

For information on attacks returnee communities in East Darfur, see 6. *Returnees*, [6.1 Security](#).

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed conflict trends in the areas from which the mission has withdrawn as follows:

The security situation in the area of the Muhajiriyah team site, in East Darfur, has remained calm, mainly as a result of the measures taken by the Government security institutions, including the deployment of troops in the buffer zone to curb the protracted intercommunal clashes between the Southern Rizeigat and the Ma’aliya.

The mediation efforts of native administrations, with the support of UNAMID, have also contributed to the reduction of tensions. From being a mobility corridor for the armed movements in the past, Muhajiriyah is currently under the tight control of Government forces. The deployment of Sudanese police in remote locations has contributed to a 60 per cent reduction in criminality in the state. East Darfur currently provides shelter to more than 80,000 South Sudanese refugees, who are assisted by humanitarian actors.²⁰³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

In October, following clashes between the Ma’aliya and the Rizeigat in East Darfur, the Sudanese Armed Forces were withdrawn and replaced by RSF in the buffer zone between the two groups. [...]

On 25 October, the crop protection committee in Khazan Jadid, East Darfur, reported rising tensions between farmers and herders in the western areas due to large numbers of the Baggara and the Abbala migrating north to south.²⁰⁴

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with regards to intercommunal conflicts that:

In East Darfur, to replace the buffer zone committee between the Ma ‘aliva and the Rizeigat that was dissolved in November 2017, the Wali established a joint mechanism on 7 January to regulate

²⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Herders attack farmers in Tawila locality](#), 27 November 2018

²⁰² Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur herders, farmers sign land and water agreement](#), 28 November 2018

²⁰³ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraph 20

²⁰⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 8-10

agricultural activities and tackle cattle rustling. The mechanism is composed of 14 members with equal representation from both tribes. On 23 January, the Birgid and the Zaghawa, in a ceremony attended by Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman, signed a peace agreement in Shearia town, recommending the restitution of Zaghawa properties in Shearia, including shops and houses, allocation of farm lands to Zaghawa returnees and the formation of a mechanism to sustain the return process and the implementation of development programmes, in coordination with the United Nations. On 27 and 28 January, the Vice-President visited Adilla and Abu Karinka, for a reconciliatory meeting between the Ma'aliya and the Rizeigat, and made a commitment to implement several development projects related to health, education and infrastructure in the area.²⁰⁵

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that "In East Darfur, militias of the southern Rizeigat and Ma'aliya tribes are heavily involved in the conflict over land and resources in the areas north of Ed Daein. Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur".²⁰⁶ The same source further noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma'aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides [...].

In East Darfur, the closure of the Muhajiriyah team site did not affect security, but community leaders requested more food, shelter, seeds, farming tools and medical care.²⁰⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to mediation of intercommunal conflict that:

In East Darfur, the Deputy Nazir of the Ma'aliya informed UNAMID of a meeting between the Vice-President of the Sudan, Hassabo Mohammed Abdul Rahman, and Ma'aliya and Rizeigat leaders in Ed Daein on 24 July to discuss the resumption of the reconciliation process. Leaders expressed their willingness to resolve ongoing land issues. UNAMID continued to engage the leadership of both groups to encourage a peaceful resolution.²⁰⁸

2.3.3 South Darfur

For information on conflict between government forces and armed rebel movements in Jebel Marra, see section [1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements.](#)

²⁰⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 9

²⁰⁶ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

²⁰⁷ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11-12 and 32

²⁰⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraph 46

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in South Darfur, see 5. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, [5.1 Security](#) and 6. *Returnees*, [6.1 Security](#).

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded that:

Between September 28 and October 2, militiamen conducted five raids on villages in Jebel Marra, killing ten civilians, injuring 13, torching houses, and stealing property. In East Jebel Marra, South Darfur, militiamen attacked and robbed villagers on October 27, wounding five and stealing belongings as well as about 1,000 cattle. In October, the government started disarmament campaigns in Darfur and Kordofan. 12,500 RSF fighters were deployed to collect weapons from civilians through raids in conflict-prone areas. Most armed rebel groups rejected the disarmament process, triggering new tensions.²⁰⁹

According to the U.S. State Department report on Human Rights Practices covering events in 2017 “Intercommunal violence spawned from land tenure and resource scarcity resulted in high death tolls, particularly in East, South, and North Darfur”.²¹⁰ The same source further noted that:

All states in Darfur were under varying states of emergency. Between January 1 and November 10, UNAMID police received 1,737 reports of criminality and banditry, which included 1,029 persons killed. This represented an 8.1-percent decrease in crime from 2016. Police confirmed 1,146 of these cases and made 179 related arrests. North Darfur had the highest crime rate, while South Darfur had the only crime rate that increased from 2016. The attacks included rape, armed robbery, abduction, ambush, livestock theft, assault/harassment, arson, and burglary and were allegedly carried out primarily by Arab militias, but government forces, unknown assailants, and rebel elements also carried out attacks.²¹¹

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed conflict trends in the areas from which the mission has withdrawn thus:

The areas around the Edd al-Fursan and Tulus team sites, in South Darfur, have not been prone to armed conflict or intercommunal violence, except for the seasonal clashes between the Fallata and the nomad communities during the migration/farming season. The Government has launched several reconciliation initiatives between the tribes in the area, including in Shataya, where the conflict started in 2003. The departure of the mission from those areas, however, poses challenges for the monitoring of cross-border activities along the borders with the Central African Republic and South Sudan.²¹²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

Communal tensions were reported in West, North and South Darfur. [...]

²⁰⁹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Darfur)*, p.100

²¹⁰ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, *Executive summary*

²¹¹ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, 1.g, *Other Conflict-related Abuse*:

²¹² UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, *Paragraph 21*

In South Darfur, the Salamat and the Fallata clashed on 24 October over cattle rustling in the Dejjaj area (55 km west of Gairida) in which four Fallata, including two women, and five Salamat men were killed. [...] In South Darfur, on 27 October, a group of armed nomads attacked Fallata and Fur returnees in Funguli village, 54 km northwest of the team site at Menawashei, in East Jebel Marra locality, killing five and injuring several others.²¹³

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with that:

In South Darfur, clashes took place between the Mahadi and the Birgid in Hash area, 50 km north-east of Gairida, on 17 December, which resulted in one fatality on each side. During 2017, the two communities had disputes over land ownership on the border between Gairida and Yasin localities. On 18 December, Government forces were deployed to contain the situation and RSF was mandated to disarm the feuding parties. On 21 December, the Sudan Police Force arrested four umdas (local tribal leaders) and seven youths from the Mahadi community for their involvement in the incident, and the community leaders are working with the local government towards resolving the dispute.²¹⁴

The same source detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

The Government of the Sudan continued its implementation of the compulsory phase of the weapons collection campaign, including in internally displaced persons camps, and recently moved into the Jebel Marra areas under the control of SLA/AW. Some progress has been registered by Darfur state officials since the beginning of the campaign in August last year. [...]

On 20 December, the South Darfur joint weapons collection committee reported that the total number of weapons collected voluntarily in the state was 8,000, including 1,373 collected from the Popular Defence Forces. The committee further reported that, consequently, the crime rate in South Darfur decreased by 24 per cent, while the incidence of major crimes such as murder, armed robbery and rape decreased by 35 per cent over the period of the collection campaign.

According to the mission's assessment, the campaign appears to have constrained various armed militia and criminals from freely using their weapons, thus contributing to an improved overall security situation, especially in North and South Darfur.²¹⁵

A further report covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Following an incident on 12 March, in which SLA-AW rustled camels from Nawaiba nomads, the latter exchanged fire with the armed group and the following day burned down the village of Durgo, from where the population reportedly fled to Boori, Dar al-Salam and Golo. Three civilians were reportedly killed in those incidents and two Nawaiba tribesmen were also reportedly killed by SLA-AW cadres in the village on 17 March.²¹⁶

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that "In South Darfur, Fallata militias often attack Masalit communities over land ownership around Gairida, and militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass. In addition, during the recent clashes in eastern

²¹³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraph 9

²¹⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 8

²¹⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraphs 4-5

²¹⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 4

Jebel Marra, militias were responsible for the destruction of several villages and the displacement of the population in the area”.²¹⁷ The same source further noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes [...] among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water. [...]

In South Darfur, the closures of Tulus and Edd al-Fursan have also not had, for the time being, a negative impact on the security situation. In Tulus, a number of refugees from the Central African Republic arrived, while in Edd al-Fursan the weapons collection campaign contributed to the absence of clashes between farmers and herders. Some community leaders raised concerns about the Rapid Support Forces harassing the local communities. International NGOs reported unhindered access to the target communities. In Tulus and Edd al-Fursan, there were specific requests for tools to enhance agricultural production.²¹⁸

According to Radio Dabanga reporting in early June 2018, “About 13 armed herders riding on camels and wearing military uniforms ambushed a group of people who were on their way to a water well in the area of Sawani, 10 kilometres north of El Malam. ““They beat us with their rifle butts and whips [...] one of the victims told Radio Dabanga”.²¹⁹

Radio Dabanga reported in mid-June 2018 that “At least 17 people were injured in a clash that erupted between displaced farmers and residents of Deshisha village in South Darfur”.²²⁰ The same source further elucidated:

Speaking to Radio Dabanga, an eyewitness reported from Deshisha in eastern Bielel locality that the farmers came from Kalma camp for the displaced

“They intended to cultivate the land they left when they had to flee,” he explained. “Yet a group of villagers did not like this, and went out to chase them from the farms on Saturday morning.

“A huge fight broke out, in which they attacked each other with knives and other white arms. More than 17 people were injured. Some of them seriously. They had to be taken to the Nyala Teaching Hospital for treatment.” Police forces, under the supervision of the locality commissioner, intervened.²²¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

On 25 July, Fallata and Salamat armed men clashed near Nadeif and Dangol villages, west of Buram, leading to the death of two Fallata and three Salamat men. Government forces were deployed to Nadeif to prevent an escalation of violence but another Salamat man was killed two days later. On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with Fur farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were

²¹⁷ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

²¹⁸ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11 and 31

²¹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [*Herders attack villagers in South and North Darfur*](#), 9 June 2018

²²⁰ Radio Dabanga, [*Clash between displaced farmers, villagers in South Darfur leaves 17 injured*](#), 18 June 2018

²²¹ Radio Dabanga, [*Clash between displaced farmers, villagers in South Darfur leaves 17 injured*](#), 18 June 2018

reports of internally displaced persons being prevented from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur. [...]

Displaced persons in camps in Central, East and South Darfur expressed concerns for their security and reported being intimidated by the presence of armed persons in the camps. [...]

In South Darfur, the team visited Digras return village on 16 July, following reports of an attack, which had caused the death of the Umda (traditional chief) and his wife. Returnees reported seven incidents during the previous four months, including cases of assault, intimidation, land occupancy and vandalism. The mission continued to advocate with them to create conditions for effective returns and peaceful coexistence between communities.²²²

The same source reported with regards to mediation of intercommunal conflict that:

South Darfur on 9 July, the Masalit and the Fallata signed a peace agreement in Bulbul Tembisco in the presence of the Wali of South Darfur, with logistical and technical support from UNAMID. However, the land issue was not addressed. The communities agreed to allow the resolution of land issues to be led by the state authorities.²²³

At the end of July 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “Four people, including a child, were killed in a militia raid on the village of Kibe in South Sudan’s East Jebel Marra locality. [...] Speaking to Radio Dabanga, fleeing villagers reported that a group of militiamen riding vehicles mounted with machine guns, and others on camels and horses stormed Kibe”.²²⁴ A further article from the same reporting period indicated that “Since last week, militiamen are assaulting farmers in several parts of Central Darfur’s Mukjar locality”.²²⁵

At the end of August 2018 Radio Dabanga noted that:

Four people were killed and others were injured in an attack by gunmen on Guba village in Eastern Jebel Marra, who reportedly also stole property and cattle before burning the village. One of the women whose husband was killed in the attack told Radio Dabanga that gunmen driving two vehicles and others on camels and horses attacked the village before Eid El Adha and killed Adam Suleiman Ahmed, Musa Omar Ahmed, Mukhtar Arja Rajab, and Dowelbait Ali Mohamed. The stole money, property, and livestock, while the villagers were forcibly displaced to Mershing camp in South Darfur. More than 180 families who have been displaced from Eastern Jebel Marra because of attacks by herders have reached camp Mershing.

One of the camp sheikhs told Radio Dabanga that the families, consisting of about 500 people, mostly children and women, arrived in batches at the camp three weeks ago.

Those fleeing reported that they had been attacked by herders and appealed to the authorities and organisations to provide them with assistance.²²⁶

In mid-September 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that ‘Disputes between herders and farmers occur more often this time of year, as herders let their cattle graze on farmlands that have not yet been harvested, causing friction between the groups. Tensions over land and pastures have often caused clashes between farmers in the region of Jebel Marra and militant herders who want to use their farms as pasture. This has also been the case for returning displaced people looking to farm in their area of origin’.²²⁷ The same source further noted that “Militiamen shot and abducted two farmers in

²²² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 9, 10 and 29

²²³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 9 and 29

²²⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Four dead in attack on South Darfur village](#), 29 July 2018

²²⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Repeated attacks on farmers in Mukjar, South Darfur](#), 23 July 2018

²²⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Four dead, South Darfur village torched in pre-Eid raid](#), 27 August 2018

²²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Farmers, firewood collectors attacked in South Darfur](#), 18 September 2018

southern Jebel Marra [...]. Three firewood abductors in Mershing were attacked and robbed of their carts. [...] Also [...], a number of herders held three displaced people from Selo camp in Mershing area, and demanded SDG 15,000 for the release of their possessions”.²²⁸

According to Radio Dabanga reporting on 19 November 2018, “Two policemen have died in pursuit of herders after a shooting on the farms of Zuroug village, five kilometres west of Gireida in South Darfur [...]. Farmers told Radio Dabanga that the incident occurred after seven armed herders allegedly trespassed with their livestock on the farms. When the farmers tried to drive the livestock off, the herders opened fire on them, wounding farmer Ahmed Goaja. The farmers fled to the police station to report the incident and seek protection”.²²⁹

Radio Dabanga reported on 20 November 2018 that “armed herders reportedly attacked a number of women in Mershing locality in South Darfur and caused them injuries. Two of them are in serious condition. [...] Mershing farmers have complained of early grazing by herders”.²³⁰

2.3.4 Central Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in Central Darfur, see 5. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, [5.1 Security](#) and 6. *Returnees*, [6.1 Security](#).

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

Tensions increased in two camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, notably Hasahisa and the Hamidiya camps, near Zalingei. Following a quarrel between members of the Fur internally displaced persons and of the Beni Halba host community in December 2017, the internally displaced persons prevented all Beni Halba from entering the Hasahisa market. On 20 January the two groups engaged in a violent confrontation, which resulted in four internally displaced persons and one Beni Halba being killed and 38 persons being injured. In a separate incident, on 22 January, two internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp were assaulted by a group of men while conducting livelihood activities outside the camp, and on 31 January there were clashes between internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp and the Beni Halba, who prevented them from collecting wood in Boronka area (10 km from the camp). Sudan Police created a buffer zone in Hasahisa camp, arrested three suspects, and are working with the community leaders towards a reconciliation initiative.²³¹

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 considered that “Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur”.²³²

²²⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Farmers, firewood collectors attacked in South Darfur](#), 18 September 2018

²²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Two policemen die in South Darfur farm violence](#), 19 November 2018

²³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Women attacked by herders in South Darfur farm conflict](#), 20 November 2018

²³¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, Paragraph 14

²³² UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan noted that “In May 2018, in Central Darfur, clashes between armed Arab groups and internally displaced persons in camps in Zalingei and Garsila reportedly resulted in multiple deaths among the displaced community”.²³³

In mid-July 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “People living in the area of Turr in Central Darfur’s Nierteti locality are suffering from militia attacks for more than a week. An activist reported to Radio Dabanga from Turr, that members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s main militia, began attacking the residents of the area about eight days ago. [...] ‘The assaults began with the return of the RSF from the battles in Jebel Marra,’ the source explained. ‘The militiamen raid houses, beat-up the inhabitants, and take away every that has some value’”.²³⁴

2.3.5 West Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in West Darfur, see 5. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, [5.1 Security](#) and 6. *Returnees*, [6.1 Security](#).

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 recorded that:

A number of conflicts persist, as the issues at their origin remain unaddressed in a sustainable manner. The conflict between the Zaghawa and the Rizeigat in West Darfur over cattle and camels flared up again between 16 and 19 October, resulting in the killing of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat. It was brought under control with the intervention of the Sudan-Chad joint border forces and the state government with the assistance of UNAMID. [...]

No reports of belligerent activities or intercommunal clashes have been received from the areas around the Foro Burunga and Habila team sites, in West Darfur. While in the past, insecurity in those areas was related to the proliferation of small arms and criminal activities, the recent weapons collection campaign and the robust deployment of the Government forces have resulted in improved security. The joint Sudan-Chad patrols along the border have had a visible deterrent effect on criminal activities and the circulation of small weapons in the area.²³⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

The start of seasonal migration in October was marked by a higher number of fatalities and an increase in criminality, notably in North and West Darfur. During the period under review, three intercommunal clashes occurred, resulting in 45 fatalities, compared with eight clashes, resulting in 19 fatalities, reported during the previous period. All the clashes were attributable to disputes over livestock, criminality and revenge attacks. Some farming communities requested protection from RSF to prevent potential clashes with migrating herders. [...]

In West Darfur, subclans of the Rizeigat (Awlad Id, Awlad Zaid and Ereigat) clashed with the Zaghawa on 17 October in Hatam village (25 km south-east of Kulbus town), over the ownership of camels,

²³³ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 14

²³⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Repeated militia assaults in Central Darfur’s Nierteti](#), 16 July 2018

²³⁵ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, Paragraphs 19 and 22

which resulted in the deaths of 16 Zaghawa and 11 Rizeigat. The Sudan-Chad joint border forces were deployed to contain the violence. [...]

The annual migration of nomadic herders, which usually coincides with the harvest season, was marked by an increase in criminality in the areas of El Fasher, Kabkabiyah, Kutum and Tawilah in North Darfur as well as El Geneina and Masteri in West Darfur, increasing tensions between farmers and herders.²³⁶

A report from the same source covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

The number of intercommunal clashes decreased significantly during the reporting period, with two clashes reported. On 12 February, Zaghawa herders from Chad clashed with Misseriya nomads over cattle rustling in the village of Milaibiday, 20 km north-east of Masteri, West Darfur. The incident resulted in nine fatalities among the Sudanese nomads. On 8 April, the Awlad Zaid and Zaghawa communities clashed over a cattle theft incident in the Kirkir area, 85 km north-west of El Geneina, resulting in one fatality on each side. On both occasions, the government of West Darfur intervened through the deployment of the Sudan-Chad Joint Forces to create a buffer between the two groups. Intercommunal violence has decreased mainly owing to interventions by the Government, the native administration, UNAMID and the United Nations country team. Local communities consider that the weapons collection campaign has contributed considerably to the mitigation of intercommunal violence, although concerns remain that the nomadic groups have not been equally disarmed.²³⁷

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that “in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik”.²³⁸ The same source further noted that:

Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes [...] ; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides [...].

In West Darfur, the closure of the Habila and Foro Burunga team sites did not have an adverse impact on security. However, in both locations, the number of Sudanese police force personnel remained the same despite plans to deploy additional police officers.²³⁹

At the beginning of June 2018 Radio Dabanga recorded that “Gunmen shot and wounded seven farmers in Kereinik locality in West Darfur. [...] The coordinator of the camps for displaced people in West Darfur, Adam Rujal, told Radio Dabanga that armed herdsmen attacked a group of farmers in Jebel Ari. “There were ten armed men on camels and horses. They claimed that the land where the farmers had started plowing is their property.” The quarrel resulted in the gunmen shooting the

²³⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, Paragraphs 8-9

²³⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, Paragraph 7

²³⁸ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 7

²³⁹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraphs 11-12 and 32

farmers. Five of them were seriously injured, and taken to El Geneina hospital. Two others sustained minor injuries”.²⁴⁰

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, the reporting period saw an increase in tensions between herders and farmers over land and resources, especially in West Darfur, affecting internally displaced persons and returnees in particular, and deterring further returns. On 17 June, a group of Beni Halba clashed with Zaghawa returnees over a land dispute in the Kurti farming area, north-west of El Geneina, leaving at least 10 people wounded. Government forces intervened to restore calm. On 25 July, Fallata and Salamat armed men clashed near Nadeif and Dangol villages, west of Buram, leading to the death of two Fallata and three Salamat men. Government forces were deployed to Nadeif to prevent an escalation of violence but another Salamat man was killed two days later. On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with Fur farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were reports of internally displaced persons being prevented from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur. [...]

In West Darfur, teams were informed of similar protection challenges. In Nuri village area, the community reported an increased presence of armed settlers harassing and intimidating internally displaced persons from Sisi camp. UNAMID has raised the issue with authorities.²⁴¹

At the end of June 2018 Radio Dabanga recorded that “A number of witnesses told Radio Dabanga that [...] herders prevented farmers of Hamida from farming their lands. The herders beat them and expelled them from the lands. The farmers filed a complaint to the Hamida police station. Police arrived at the farms to intervene and ordered the herders to leave. On Tuesday evening the herders attacked Hamida police station and severely wounded two policemen, who were taken to El Geneina for treatment”.²⁴²

According to the UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin covering 8 October to 4 November 2018, “There has been a decline in the number of farm-related incidents in West Darfur— including land disputes and crop destruction—following new measures introduced by the West Darfur State government, according to reports from the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)”.²⁴³ The same source further noted that:

Since the beginning of the rainy season in June 2018, the number of farm related incidents has reduced significantly. 27 incidents were reported in June, which dropped to 16 in July; eight in August; six in September; and nine in October. October marks the beginning of the harvest season when farm destruction incidents are usually high.

The new measures include setting 15 January as the date for animal release—which is after the harvest; the provision of veterinary services in the northern part of the state to help keep pastoralists and their animals in that area until 15 January; and the construction of Hafeers (dams) in different areas to ensure both farmers and pastoralists have enough water. These new measures in addition to

²⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [‘Armed herders shot seven farmers’: West Darfur camp leader](#), 1 June 2018

²⁴¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraphs 9 and 28

²⁴² Radio Dabanga, [Herders attack police station in West Darfur](#), 30 June 2018

²⁴³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 18: 8 October to 4 November 2018](#), 22 November 2018, p.2

the security measures the state government has previously imposed (weapons collection; the ban on carrying weapons; the ban on using motor-bikes; and the ban on wearing the traditional face mask) have also contributed to reducing these incidents.²⁴⁴

Radio Dabanga reported at the end of October 2018 that:

Gunmen killed a policeman in Foro Baranga in West Darfur on Sunday. In a separate event, farmers in the area have complained about problems with herders who trespass their farms.

Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that a group of gunmen stormed the police station in Darmuga in Foro Baranga locality on Sunday night. They shot policeman Mohamed Hussein and killed him on the spot. The attackers, reportedly armed herders, stole the weapons and ammunition in the police station and fled.

The incident resembles the raid of a police station in Tabit, North Darfur, this month. Armed herders stormed the station to release the livestock that was seized after being driven onto farms in the area and causing extensive damage.

The farmers of Rasel Fil village in Foro Baranga locality have complained about being beaten by herders who forcibly trespass their farms with their cattle and camels.

“The herders’ livestock have destroyed large areas of our crops, estimated at thousands of Pounds,” one of the farmers told this station.²⁴⁵

2.3.6 Village defence committees

No information was found on this topic amongst the sources consult in the reporting period for this report. For a historical overview see the previous edition of this report:

- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 2.3.6 *Village defence committees*

2.3.7 Blood feuds and state protection

According to the 2017 U.S. State Department report on Human Rights Practices, “UNAMID reported that abduction remained a lucrative coercive method adopted by various tribes in Darfur to obtain the payment of diya (“blood money” ransom) claimed from other communities”.²⁴⁶

In March 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that:

Members of the main government Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia arrested two people from Kabkabiya and took them to Sarf Umra in North Darfur [...].

Witnesses and sources told Radio Dabanga that the rapid support militia forces led by Abu Shouk arrested Hassan Eisa, nicknamed Hassan Shamasi, and one of his relatives because of their demand for ‘blood money’ for their relative. He was killed at the gate of Umlaota, west of Kabkabiya during a recent attack by militiamen led by Abdallah Ganga, that also led to the death of two more people and the burning part of the village.

The sources told Radio Dabanga that the arrest of the two was only to prevent them from demanding the payment of the blood money.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 18: 8 October to 4 November 2018](#), 22 November 2018, p.2

²⁴⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Gunmen kill West Darfur policeman, farms damaged](#), 30 October 2018

²⁴⁶ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, 1.b, *Abductions*

²⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan Armed Forces raid Darfur market: eight held, six injured](#), 13 March 2018

The summary of the October 2018 UN Human Rights Committee meeting to review the situation of civil and political rights in Sudan noted the following reply by Mahmoud Abaker Dugdug, State Minister of Justice of Sudan, “As for the death penalty, there were cultural differences about its use. Many countries like Sudan had retained the capital punishment, with legal safeguards for its use. In Sudan, amnesty could be granted. The use of the death penalty was linked with the right of retribution of the family of the victims”.²⁴⁸

For information on communal conflicts, see [1.2 Inter-communal and militia clashes](#).

2.3.8 Possibility for a Darfuri to move to another village/region and being identified/found by non-state actors from their previous place of residence

No information was found on this topic amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report. For a historical overview see the previous edition of this report:

- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), [Darfur - COI Compilation](#), September 2017, *2.3.8 Possibility for a Darfuri to move to another village/region and being identified/found by none-state actors from their previous place of residence*

2.4 Treatment of Arab ethnic groups

This section provides a very brief overview from the consulted sources in the time frame for this report. For further information on Arab ethnic groups and their treatment, see the particular ethnic groups addressed in the following section of this report: [2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia](#) as well as section [2.3 Conflict between tribes since September 2017](#).

As explained by Dr Enrico Ille, a freelance German social and cultural anthropologist with a Dr. phil. degree of the University of Halle, Germany, cited in an UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report published in November 2018 it should be noted that:

[...] it has been a frequent assessment of social and political studies of conflicts in Darfur that their categorization as ethnic conflict, and even more its assessment through a dichotomy (Arab / non-Arab) is highly problematic and inaccurate. Conflict dynamics always existed on different levels: from localized quarrels (e.g. family feuds) to supra-regional politics (e.g. aftermath of Libyan pan Arab military mobilization); from small-scale natural resource scarcity (e.g. co-used water wells) to geopolitically relevant natural wealth (e.g. oil fields in southern Darfur). How individuals are positioning and are seen positioned towards these different aspects of different conflicts cannot be read off one marker of identification. Accordingly, how someone is involved and affected cannot be put down to one factor, for example race or ethnic identity.²⁴⁹

According to a January 2018 Radio Dabanga report, “The North Darfur authorities have ordered the withdrawal of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces from Saraf Omra locality”. Reportedly, according to sources, “the visit coincided with reports about the distribution of military ranks and

²⁴⁸ UN Human Rights Committee Meeting Summary, [Human Rights Committee reviews the situation of civil and political rights in Sudan](#), 10 October 2018

²⁴⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Dr Enrico Ille p.125

weapons to members of Arab tribes in these places, and the demarcation of land for each of these tribes, where model villages are said to be built”.²⁵⁰

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that with regards to significant challenges persisting in combating impunity for sexual violence that:

First, sexual violence remains a sensitive subject for local authorities, who frequently downplay its prevalence and deny its occurrence. In addition, underreporting — owing, among other reasons, to fear of reprisals, harassment and social stigma — remains a key concern. When incidents are reported, lack of follow-up and inadequate response by police and judicial authorities represent significant challenges, in particular when the perpetrators are alleged to be armed actors or of Arab ethnicity.²⁵¹

2.5 Treatment of non-Arab ethnic groups

This section provides a very brief overview from the consulted sources in the time frame for this report. For further information on non-Arab ethnic groups and their treatment, see the particular ethnic groups addressed in the following section of this report: [2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia](#) as well as section [2.3 Conflict between tribes since September 2017](#).

As explained by Dr Enrico Ille, a freelance German social and cultural anthropologist with a Dr. phil. degree of the University of Halle, Germany cited in an UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission report published in November 2018 it should be noted that:

[...] it has been a frequent assessment of social and political studies of conflicts in Darfur that their categorization as ethnic conflict, and even more its assessment through a dichotomy (Arab / non-Arab) is highly problematic and inaccurate. Conflict dynamics always existed on different levels: from localized quarrels (e.g. family feuds) to supra-regional politics (e.g. aftermath of Libyan pan Arab military mobilization); from small-scale natural resource scarcity (e.g. co-used water wells) to geopolitically relevant natural wealth (e.g. oil fields in southern Darfur). How individuals are positioning and are seen positioned towards these different aspects of different conflicts cannot be read off one marker of identification. Accordingly, how someone is involved and affected cannot be put down to one factor, for example race or ethnic identity.²⁵²

2.5.1 Treatment by state actors

For further information, see [2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia](#), [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#) and [1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements](#).

According to the 2017 U.S. State Department report on Human Rights Practices, “All states in Darfur were under varying states of emergency. Between January 1 and November 10, UNAMID police received 1,737 reports of criminality and banditry, which included 1,029 persons killed. This

²⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Rapid Support Forces pull out from Darfur’s Saraf Omra](#), 8 January 2018

²⁵¹ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 122

²⁵² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan: Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Dr Enrico Ille p.125

represented an 8.1-percent decrease in crime from 2016. Police confirmed 1,146 of these cases and made 179 related arrests. North Darfur had the highest crime rate, while South Darfur had the only crime rate that increased from 2016. The attacks included rape, armed robbery, abduction, ambush, livestock theft, assault/harassment, arson, and burglary and were allegedly carried out primarily by Arab militias, but government forces, unknown assailants, and rebel elements also carried out attacks”.²⁵³

Freedom House’s recorded that “The government stands accused of attempting to change the ethnic composition of Sudan through its response to an insurgency led by marginalized non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur. Tactics include the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians as recently as 2016 and terror campaigns against civilians conducted by a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces, under the authority of the NISS”.²⁵⁴

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 explained that:

The SRF, an alliance between various Sudanese and mainly ethnic African armed groups, fought their perceived oppression by the mainly ethnic Arabic government. The alliance comprises the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and its two main factions, led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) and Minni Minnawie (SLM-MM), the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gibril Ibrahim (JEM) as well as the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM/A-N), primarily active in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

The government deployed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary forces, namely the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). These militiamen were mainly recruited from nomadic Arab groups. SLM-AW was weakened by military setbacks and internal splitting. Clashes were limited primarily to the mountainous region of Jebel Marra, stretching along South and Central Darfur, and mostly involved the SLM-MM and the SLM-TC, led by Nimir Abdelrahman. The SLM Transitional Council (TC), a splinter group of SLM-AW, joined the SLM-MM in clashes with government forces.²⁵⁵

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that “During the reporting period, a major security development on the ground in Darfur has been the escalation of tensions between Musa Hilal, the most notorious Darfurian Arab militia leader, and the Government. In particular, the arms collection campaign and the Government’s intention to integrate the Border Guards into RSF has been contentious”. The same source further explained that:

While both are paramilitary units made up mostly of Darfurian Arab militiamen, the Border Guards and RSF have different backgrounds and entertain a rivalry. The Border Guards were created in 2003, when the Government tried to provide a formal status to proxy Darfurian Arab tribal militias. Its members are principally Darfurian Arabs from the Mahamid branch of the Rezeigat tribe (Musa Hilal’s branch). While their administrative status is not entirely clear, they reportedly respond, at least on paper, to Military Intelligence.

RSF was created in 2013, when the Government was facing a spike in rebel activity in Darfur and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (the Two Areas). The Government was seeking to regain control of increasingly restive Arab militias in Darfur and establish a new paramilitary unit distinct from the unreliable Musa Hilal. The RSF troops reportedly number between 30,000 and 40,000. The vast majority of them are from Darfurian Arab tribes; the first batch was made up mostly of kinsmen

²⁵³ U.S. State Department, [2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, 1.g, *Other Conflict-related Abuse*

²⁵⁴ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2018 – Sudan](#), January 2018

²⁵⁵ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Darfur)*, p.100

of “Hemmeti” from the Mahariya branch of the Rezeigat [...]. However, recruitment has recently been extended to Darfurian African tribes (including rebel defectors) and to areas outside Darfur, such as Southern Kordofan. Initially placed under NISS, RSF has been part of SAF since January 2017, while maintaining a distinct status.

Musa Hilal, the de facto commander of the Border Guards, has refused the integration of the Border Guards into RSF. Hilal feels that the Government, by incorporating his Border Guards into RSF and placing them under the leadership of his rival, Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemmeti”, is trying to clip his wings because he has become autonomous and critical of Khartoum. The disagreement on the status of the Border Guards is also fuelled by personal rivalries between Musa Hilal, on one side, and Vice-President Hassabo and “Hemmeti” (both Mahariya and close associates), on the other, over access to the central Government and leadership of the Darfurian Arab community. These rivalries are also related to issues of tribal status and egos. As a tribal leader from an influential family, Hilal considers that he should be recognized by the Government as a more important figure than “Hemmeti” and Hassabo, who are not endowed with any traditional leadership position.

Mediations by some Darfurian Arab politicians and religious leaders have failed to resolve the deadlock between Musa Hilal and the Government, and security tensions between the two sides have steadily increased. In late September, at the Libyan border, RSF personnel intercepted and killed 17 of Hilal’s men, whom the Government alleged were “human traffickers”. In early November, localized clashes between the force of Abdellah Razikalla “Savanna”, a Musa Hilal associate, and RSF resulted in the capture of “Savanna” near Kabkabiya, in North Darfur.²⁵⁶

2.5.2 Treatment by non-state actors

For further information on non-Arab ethnic groups, see: *2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia*, [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#) and [2.3 Conflict between tribes since September 2017](#).

According to Minority Rights Group International, “2017 marked the 15th year of the war in Darfur between the mainly ethnic Arab government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance between mostly ethnic African armed groups. Principally in Darfur, the conflict between various tribes has continued despite repeated ceasefires as the underlying issues – in particular, conflicts over cattle and arable land – have not been resolved. As a result, violence along ethnic lines, and between farmers and cattle herders, continues to occur and has resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties”.²⁵⁷

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that:

Several armed militia groups — mostly of Arab ethnicity and commonly referred to as “Janjaweed” — continue to operate in Darfur, posing a threat to the rule of law and the security of civilians in several areas of the five Darfur states. This is in contravention of article 67/399 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which stipulated that the Government had to disarm all armed militia groups.

In particular, militia groups have a strong presence in North Darfur, where they control large swathes of territory, including in the districts of Kutum, Tawila, Korma, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobayi. These groups are organized along tribal lines and hard to control. [...]

According to several sources, the government security forces have well established relations with several local militias leaders and have mobilized some militias as proxies during military operations against the rebels. The participation of these militia groups in operations is usually coordinated by officials of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Military Intelligence or the National Intelligence and

²⁵⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 24-8

²⁵⁷ Minority Rights Group International, [Peoples under Threat 2018](#), 13 June 2018, p.6

Security Service (NISS), depending on the operational needs. Moreover, according to different sources, the militias sometimes act with and are integrated into official paramilitary units such as RSF and the Border Guards, themselves constituted mostly of former Arab militiamen. When required by security forces or NISS, the militias participate in RSF operations and commit most of the abuses against civilians, such as the looting of villages and livestock, rapes and torching of homes. According to sources, there is an understanding that the militias will loot the villages as soon as the operation they are participating in ends.²⁵⁸

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan considered in August 2018 that “Several armed militia groups, mostly of Arab ethnicity, continued to pose a threat to civilians in several areas across Darfur”.²⁵⁹ However it should be noted that this point was contested in the State’s response to this report which stated that:

In most of its observations and findings, the draft report relied on information that is clearly not based on credible evidence. At the same time, the Independent Expert underestimated the information and data provided by the Government during his visit to the country or totally excluded it. The draft report also depends on anonymous reports and information without references for accuracy and impartiality. Further, the draft report does is not free from ethnic classification of people of the same country whose constitution and law prohibit racial discrimination, which is contrary to the duty of moderation and discretion required by paragraph 12 (b) of the Rules of Conduct for the Special Procedures.

An example of this is paragraph 9 (page 4 of the draft report), which described the vast majority of “armed militias attacking civilians in Darfur” as being of Arab ethnicity.²⁶⁰

3. Civil and Political Rights

For reference to the general situation in Sudan between 2 April 2016 and 3 September 2018 on the issues listed below see the below sections of the following report:

ARC, [Sudan: Country Report – an update, The situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile](#), 15 October 2018:

- Rule of law
- Access to justice
- The death penalty
- Detention conditions and torture in detention
- Freedom of expression, association, and assembly
- Political opposition parties and activists
- Lawyers as political opposition members and activists
- Freedom of the Media
- Treatment of critical journalists, citizen-journalists, bloggers, etc.
- Civil society organizations and civil society activists, including women’s rights activists
- Demonstrators, protestors and persons speaking out

²⁵⁸ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraphs 20-22

²⁵⁹ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 9

²⁶⁰ UN Human Rights Council, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: Comments by the State](#), 19 September 2018, paragraph 6

Given the level of restriction placed on civil and political rights it is advised to read the below sub-sections 3.1 – 3.2.5 together as some of the information and specific profiles are inter-related.

3.1 Freedom of expression, association, and assembly

Contextual information covering Sudan as a whole

In advance of the 39th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 31 organisations submitted in September 2018 a briefing stating that:

Sudanese authorities have also continued to restrict basic freedoms of assembly and association through violent crackdowns on peaceful protesters and other restrictions on civil society organizations and on independent voices. Authorities have harassed journalists, human rights defenders and opposition party members, including through arbitrary and prolonged detention, sometimes in unknown locations, without charge and access to their families and lawyers.²⁶¹

The November 2018 Human Rights Committee report on the measures taken to implement the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights noted that with regards to the practice of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances in Sudan in general:

The Committee remains concerned at reported cases of arbitrary and secret detention in which persons have been held by agents of the State, in particular the National Intelligence and Security Service, at unofficial places of detention that are not subject to oversight, including judicial oversight. It further reiterates its concern (CCPR/C/SDN/CO/4, para. 18) about the fact that the legal regime governing arrest and detention in the State party is not compatible with article 9 of the Covenant, in particular the fact that, under the Criminal Procedure Code, a custody period of up to two weeks is contemplated before the suspect is formally charged (art. 79). Furthermore, under the National Security Act (art. 51), suspects may be detained for up to four and a half months without judicial oversight (arts. 2, 6–7, 9–10 and 16). [...]

The Committee is concerned about reports of arrests of journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, peaceful protesters and members of the opposition by the National Intelligence and Security Service, and detained incommunicado in unacknowledged places of detention, which amount to occurrences of enforced disappearances. In this respect, the Committee expresses concern about the fact that 176 cases remain unresolved and pending before the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (arts. 2, 6–7, 9 and 16).²⁶²

The Committee further noted its concern:

about allegations that police and security officers use excessive force to disperse demonstrations. This reportedly happened, for example, during crackdowns on anti-austerity protests in January 2018, when live ammunition, rubber bullets and tear gas were reportedly used against demonstrators, resulting in the death and injury of several protesters.²⁶³

The Committee to Protect Journalists similarly reported at the end of December 2018 that following anti-government/anti-austerity protests, “Internet service in Sudan, including access to social media websites, was disrupted [...] according to Access Now and NetBlocks, two organizations that track

²⁶¹ Human Rights Watch et al, [Addressing the Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Sudan](#), 4 September 2018

²⁶² UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018, paras 41 and 43

²⁶³ UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018, para. 47

internet shutdowns [...] the local press freedom group Sudanese Journalists Network said on Twitter that the Sudanese National Intelligence Services ordered the owners of printing presses not to print newspapers before consulting NISS on their content”.²⁶⁴

3.1.1 Treatment of Darfuris who demonstrate or protest against the government

See also information included in section [3.2.1 Treatment of members of political opposition parties, as well as \(perceived\) supporters of such parties, political activists, students, and lawyers who are perceived to oppose the government](#) under the sub-heading ‘Students’.

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented that in the IDP camp Kalmah in South Darfur four IDPs were killed and 29 were injured in September 2017 when shots were fired by government forces against peaceful demonstrators carrying signs that opposed the visit to the camp by the Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir.²⁶⁵ Radio Dabanga reported a few days later that Sudanese security forces conducted “search and arrest operations against individuals suspected of playing a role in organising the public protests” and that “free movement and inflow of products to the camps” were prevented.²⁶⁶ The same source further noted that the death toll following the initial protest reached nine and that over 30 were injured.²⁶⁷

In early January 2018 a secondary school student was killed in El Geneina when government forces opened fire on demonstrators protesting against the 300% price increases in Sudan since the beginning of the year, reported Radio Dabanga.²⁶⁸

According to Radio Dabanga in Kass, South Darfur, “military intelligence arrested four people in Nama [in January 2018] and handed them over to the office of the security service the same day. The arrests followed a protest in Nama, against the army’s construction of water toilets. Demonstrators claimed that digging such toilets would contaminate the area and thus harm human and animal health”.²⁶⁹ The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan considered that between January and March 2018 at least 200 people were arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), the “majority of arrests took place on 16 and 17 January 2018 during demonstrations called by political opposition parties supporting the protests”.²⁷⁰

Reporting further in January 2018 Radio Dabanga stated that “eight to fifteen teachers” were arrested on charges of “inciting demonstrations against the high bread prices in El Geneina”, West Darfur, four of whom were released a few days later.²⁷¹

²⁶⁴ Committee to Protect Journalists, [Sudan must stop trying to censor newspapers, websites](#), 21 December 2018

²⁶⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Militia Chaos in Darfur: What’s Next?](#), October 2018, Extrajudicial killings p. 16

²⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Security blocks movement in Kalma camp: Darfur Documentation Centre](#), 26 September 2017

²⁶⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Security blocks movement in Kalma camp: Darfur Documentation Centre](#), 26 September 2017

²⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri student killed in Sudan protests against price hikes](#), 8 January 2018

²⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Released Darfur detainees ‘forced to report daily’](#), 16 January 2018

²⁷⁰ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, paras. 10-11

²⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur NISS releases protesting teachers](#), 11 January 2018

According to reporting from Radio Dabanga in March 2018, residents of Teitel in Mellit locality in North Darfur were “beaten and assaulted by police and militiamen when they protested the redistribution of their land for development”.²⁷²

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan considered in August 2018 that:

From January to March 2018, several peaceful demonstrations took place in Khartoum and Darfur to protest against high inflation and austerity measures in the country’s 2018 budget, which has resulted in rising prices of essential commodities. Reports refer to an excessive and disproportionate use of force by Sudanese security forces to disperse the demonstrations, including the use of lethal force and tear gas, leaving one person dead and several injured in the Darfur city of El Geneina.²⁷³

In its submission to the Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the UN Human Rights Council, Amnesty International urged the UN Human Rights Council members to adopt a resolution at its 39th session to ensure that the Sudanese government is held accountable for “excessive use of force against protesters, which caused civilian deaths during crackdowns including in 2018 in El Geneina, West Darfur and Zalingei, Central Darfur”.²⁷⁴ Regarding the crackdown in El Geneina, the ACJPS reported that following a protest of hundreds of secondary school students to condemn the increase of the price of bread in January 2018, government forces fired live ammunition onto the crowd to disperse them, killing one student and injuring six others.²⁷⁵

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2018 five secondary school students were arrested in Abu Matariq, East Darfur, whilst “staging a demonstration in protest against the shortage of teachers, the high tuition fees, and the lack of textbooks”.²⁷⁶

Radio Dabanga reported at the end of December 2018 on the imprisonment in Darfur of “prominent lawyer Mohamed Bagan and activist Abubakar Jabreldar for three months in accordance with the State of Emergency measures” in place due to the increased protests across Sudan.²⁷⁷

At the end of December 2018 the ACJPS published a list of arrested and detained individuals, including “opposition political party leaders, students, advocates, doctors, journalists and human rights activists for their participation or suspected involvement” in the anti-austerity protests which erupted in December 2018 throughout Sudan.²⁷⁸ Listed below are those individuals who have been arrested in one of the Darfur States on 22nd December 2018 whilst protesting:

Abdulmajd Hassan, (m), was arrested from Aldine market, East Darfur state [...]
Abakar Suliman, (m), correspondent of Al-Intebaha newspaper, was arrested from Aldine market of Eastern Darfur state [...]

²⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Arrests, fines after North Darfur land protest](#), 18 March 2018

²⁷³ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 10

²⁷⁴ Amnesty International, [Addressing the serious human rights and humanitarian situation in Sudan](#), 4 September 2018, p. 4

²⁷⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudanese forces fire live ammunition at student protesters killing one student and injuring six others in El Geneina, West Darfur](#), 8 January 2018

²⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Almost no teachers in East Darfur’s Bahr El Arab](#), 3 August 2018

²⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Prominent lawyer imprisoned in East Darfur, 22 held in El Gezira](#), 26 December 2018

²⁷⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Killing of peaceful protesters and a wave of arbitrary arrests and detention by Sudanese authorities, 14-24 December 2018](#), 31 December 2018

Issa Mohamed Manzoul, a teacher, was arrested from Aldine market of Eastern Darfur state [...] Musab Abdulmajid, (m), an official with UNAMID was arrested in El Geneina, West Darfur state”.²⁷⁹

The same source further highlighted its concern “about the physical and psychological well-being of the individuals who remain in detention, including those held incommunicado and are at risk of torture”.²⁸⁰

3.1.2 Treatment of critical journalists, citizen-journalists, bloggers, etc.

General information covering Sudan as a whole

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s annual report for 2017 stated that “Sudan continues to be ranked 174th out of 180 countries cited in the World Press Freedom Index. [...] Arbitrary arrests and the summoning of political activists and journalists continued throughout the year, with multiple reports of torture and ill- treatment by the Sudanese authorities of these detainees”.²⁸¹

In advance of the 39th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 31 organisations submitted a letter in September 2018 that stated:

Our organizations are concerned about the suppression of peaceful protests by government security forces with unlawful use of excessive force, attacks on the media and impermissible restrictions on access to information, targeting of various civil society actors including human rights defenders, activists, journalists, bloggers and other dissenting voices with threats, intimidation, harassment, arbitrary detention and trumped-up criminal prosecutions, other restrictions on independent civil society, use of torture and other ill-treatment by national security officials, and on-going violations in the conflict areas of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. [...]

Restrictions on the media continue, especially during protests. The national security agency has continued to apply post-print censorship to daily newspapers and prohibit chief editors from publishing on issues deemed controversial or critical of the ruling party.²⁸²

The November 2018 Human Rights Committee report on the on the measures taken to implement the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights noted that with regards to the practice of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances in Sudan in general:

The Committee is concerned about reports of increased restrictions imposed upon the civic space in Sudan, through the arrests of journalists, human rights defenders and political activists, closure and confiscation of newspapers, and travel bans on journalists and the revocation of their licences by the Press and Press Printed Materials National Council, which is under the direct supervision of the President of the Republic. The Committee is concerned, inter alia, about the confiscation of the entire print runs of eight Sudanese newspapers in January 2018, on account of their critical coverage of the increase in the price of bread and the ensuing social unrest. The Committee is further concerned about reports of restrictions on public meetings, including a number of instances in 2018 during

²⁷⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Killing of peaceful protesters and a wave of arbitrary arrests and detention by Sudanese authorities, 14-24 December 2018](#), 31 December 2018, pages 6/7

²⁸⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: Killing of peaceful protesters and a wave of arbitrary arrests and detention by Sudanese authorities, 14-24 December 2018](#), 31 December 2018, p. 1

²⁸¹ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report: Sudan](#), Updated 5 October 2018

²⁸² Human Rights Watch et al, [Addressing the Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Sudan](#), 4 September 2018

which the National Intelligence and Security Service prevented public gatherings of political parties (arts. 9, 19, 21–22 and 25).²⁸³

At the end of November 2018 Radio Dabanga reported on the detention of Omar Juma, a Darfuri journalist and member of the Darfur Journalists Association, without any explanation following his arrest by the NISS in Omdurman.²⁸⁴

Demonstrating the extent the Sudanese authorities go to silence critical journalists, Amnesty International stated that Salma Altigani, a UK-based Sudanese journalist had told them that “I was banned [by NISS] from writing for *Akhbar Al Watan* newspaper and *Albaath Alsudani* newspaper [in Sudan on 25 July [2018]]. Two months ago, I wrote an article about the genocide in Jebel Marra, Darfur for a Gulf country newspaper and the Sudanese ambassador in that country requested the newspaper to stop publishing my articles, and they informed me that I can't write for them anymore”.²⁸⁵

Reporters Without Borders stated that it is “alarmed by a new crackdown on the Sudanese media, which has included arrests, attacks on journalists, publications bans and Internet cuts”.²⁸⁶ The same source further noted that the NISS has “done everything possible to prevent journalists from covering the protests, in which 19 people have been killed in clashes with the security forces, according to the authorities – and at least 37, according to Amnesty International”.²⁸⁷

No specific information was located on the treatment of critical Darfuri journalists, citizen-journalists, bloggers etc. in Darfur amongst the sources consulted within the time-frame set for this particular report.

3.2 Political opposition parties and activists

3.2.1 Treatment of members of political opposition parties, as well as (perceived) supporters of such parties, political activists, students, and lawyers who are perceived to oppose the government

Members of political opposition parties/(perceived) supporters of such parties/political activists

According to the U.S. Department of State’s annual report covering 2017 “Government authorities detained Darfuri [...] political opponents throughout the year, often reportedly subjecting them to torture”.²⁸⁸ The report does not clarify whether the detention and torture occurred in Darfur.

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that between August and December 2017, 290 officers from the Border Guard Forces, including Mr. Musa Hilal, leader of the

²⁸³ UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018, para. 45

²⁸⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur journalists condemn detention of reporter](#), 30 November 2018

²⁸⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Relentless harassment, intimidation and censorship of journalists must end](#), 2 November 2018

²⁸⁶ Reporters Without Borders (RSF), [RSF decries alarming new crackdown on Sudan’s media](#), 28 December 2018

²⁸⁷ Reporters Without Borders (RSF), [RSF decries alarming new crackdown on Sudan’s media](#), 28 December 2018

²⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, section 1., e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Border Guard Forces, “former Janjaweed leader and now leader of the political body, the Awakening (El Sahaw) Revolutionary Council”, were arrested and “held in incommunicado detention” until their hearing in front of a military court in May 2018.²⁸⁹ They were detained during a Government-led campaign intended to disarm and collect firearms from civilians in Darfur but as noted by ACJPS, was also aimed at “silencing Hilal and suppressing further confrontation between Hilal and the regime”.²⁹⁰

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan considered in August 2018 that:

From January to March 2018, several peaceful demonstrations took place in Khartoum and Darfur to protest against high inflation and austerity measures in the country’s 2018 budget, which has resulted in rising prices of essential commodities.

Reports refer to an excessive and disproportionate use of force by Sudanese security forces to disperse the demonstrations, including the use of lethal force and tear gas, leaving one person dead and several injured in the Darfur city of El Geneina. It is estimated that the National Intelligence and Security Service arrested at least 200 people throughout the country. The majority of arrests took place on 16 and 17 January 2018 during demonstrations called by political opposition parties supporting the protests.

It is also reported that dozens of prominent political activists, human rights defenders and journalists were arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Service from their homes or offices and held incommunicado or taken to undisclosed locations. Some of the detainees were transferred from Khartoum to Darfur. On a positive note, most detainees were released in April 2018, prior to the Independent Expert’s visit to the Sudan.²⁹¹

Amnesty International reported in April 2018 on the release without charge of 56 opposition party members and human rights defenders, including Salih Mahmoud Osman, a human rights defender and Vice-Chairperson of the Darfur Bar Association, in April 2018 following their arrest and detention by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) in connection with protests condemning the rise in the cost of food and medicine in Sudan at the beginning of January 2018.²⁹² The report does not clarify whether the arrest and release occurred in Darfur.

Students

The U.S. Department of State noted in its annual report covering 2017 that “Government authorities detained members of the Darfur Students Association during the year. Upon release numerous students showed visible signs of severe physical abuse and reported they had been tortured”.²⁹³ The report did not specify the location of where these detentions took place.

Radio Dabanga reported the arrest of two university students of the University of Zalingei, Central Darfur, in September 2018 following their attendance of the “public speech held by students of the United Popular Front (UPF), the students’ faction of the rebel movement of Abdelwahid El Nur”.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: 290 officers from Border Guard Forces, a paramilitary force, reportedly under incommunicado detention](#), 22 May 2018

²⁹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Sudan: 290 officers from Border Guard Forces, a paramilitary force, reportedly under incommunicado detention](#), 22 May 2018

²⁹¹ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, paras. 10-12

²⁹² Amnesty International, [Urgent Action: More than fifty critics released without charge](#), 18 April 2018

²⁹³ U.S. Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, section 1., c. *Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*

²⁹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur students daily summoned to security office](#), 6 October 2017

The same source noted that two weeks later the same students were still being “summoned to the security’s office” on a daily basis.²⁹⁵

Covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 explained that:

During the reporting period, the Panel received reports of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests of university students from Darfur by Government authorities. Benefitting from tuition exemptions and admission quotas, many Darfurian students, including the children of internally displaced persons, have chosen to pursue higher education in universities across the country. These students frequently face different forms of discrimination and violence. Many are suspected of being affiliated with the Darfurian rebel movements and put under surveillance. Those who engage in political activism and speak publicly about the conflict in Darfur are often repressed by NISS and the police. Others are subjected to arrests and prolonged detention, as well as mistreatment and torture in detention, in particular in NISS custody [...]

Owing to the frequent targeting by security forces and the perceived lack of opportunities in the Sudan, many Darfurian university students have chosen to leave the country.²⁹⁶

Again the report did not specify the location of where the excessive use of force/arbitrary arrests occurred.

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

On 7 January [2018], students took to the streets in El Geneina, West Darfur, damaging some facilities, including the headquarters of the ruling National Congress Party. They were subsequently forcefully dispersed by the Sudan Police and RSF [Rapid Support Forces], resulting in the killing of a high school student and five other casualties, including a police officer. On 16 and 17 January [2018], additional protests were organized in Khartoum and, on 31 January, similar demonstrations took place in Khartoum and other cities, including Zalingei, Central Darfur.²⁹⁷

Radio Dabanga reported that during the month of August 2018 members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had detained dozens of secondary school students in North Darfur and reportedly shaved their heads.²⁹⁸ Earlier in October 2017 members of the RSF militiamen had shaved a girl’s head “when she was taking livestock for grazing in Kutum, North Darfur, after they discovered she belonged to the Mahameed clan”.²⁹⁹

In September 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “agents of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) arrested four” additional students, following the earlier arrest of 11 students, at the University of El Geneina, West Darfur, who “were reportedly beaten and detained” following their protests after the stabbing of a woman student in El Zahra dormitory and against the deterioration of basic services in the boarding houses of the university reported Radio Dabanga.³⁰⁰

The Sudan Democracy First Group published in September 2018 a report documenting the discrimination faced by Darfuri students in Sudanese Universities throughout the country. Whilst not

²⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur students daily summoned to security office](#), 6 October 2017

²⁹⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paras. 116-117

²⁹⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, para. 17

²⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen shave heads of North Darfur school students](#), 31 August 2018

²⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen shave heads of North Darfur school students](#), 31 August 2018

³⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan security agents detain four more West Darfur students](#), 19 September 2018

specifically mentioning universities in Darfur, it does provide useful information on the overall treatment of Darfuri students across Sudanese Universities. See Sudan Democracy First Group, *Tales of the Tombstones: The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities*, September 2018

Lawyers

No specific information was located on the treatment of lawyers in Darfur who are perceived to oppose the government amongst the sources consulted within the time-frame set for this particular report.

3.2.2 Treatment of family members of (perceived) political opponents

In November 2017 former janjaweed leader and chairman of the Revolutionary Awakening Council, Musa Hilal, was arrested together with his sons, brothers, entourage, and senior members of the Council's leadership reported Radio Dabanga.³⁰¹

No additional incidents were found on this topic amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report. For a historical overview see the previous edition of this report:

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD), *Darfur COI Compilation, September 2017, 3.2.2 Treatment of family members of (perceived) political opponents*

3.2.3 Treatment of individuals (perceived to be) associated with or supportive of armed opposition groups

See also information included in the section dealing with the security situation of IDPs at [5.1 Security](#).

According to the U.S. Department of State's annual report covering 2017 "there were reports of individuals detained due to their actual or assumed support of antigovernment forces, such as [...] Darfur rebel movements" and further stated that "Government forces abused persons detained in connection with armed conflict as well as IDPs suspected of having links to rebel groups".³⁰²

In November 2017 former janjaweed leader and chairman of the Revolutionary Awakening Council, Musa Hilal, was arrested together with his sons, brothers, entourage, and senior members of the Council's leadership reported Radio Dabanga.³⁰³ Later that month family members of the Prince of the Alad Eid in Central Darfur have accused the NISS of "torturing the prince to death", who was one of those arrested alongside Musa Hilal.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Musa Hilal, Revolutionary Awakening Council leadership arrested in Darfur](#), 27 November 2017

³⁰² U.S. Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, section 1., d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention and 1.g.

³⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Musa Hilal, Revolutionary Awakening Council leadership arrested in Darfur](#), 27 November 2017

³⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur prince 'dies of torture' in Khartoum](#), 29 November 2017

In January 2018 two people were detained by agents of the Military Intelligence in Tur, Central Darfur on suspicion of aiding a local rebel group.³⁰⁵ During the same month 25 people were detained in Nierteti, Central Darfur, by Sudanese Military Intelligence officers without providing a reason but forced ten of these after their release “to pledge not to leave Nierteti and report to the security offices daily.”³⁰⁶ According to Radio Dabanga one of the detainees was “beaten severely” because he had a “photograph on his phone of Amin El Toro, a [sic] ex-rebel leader”.³⁰⁷

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in April 2018 about the reported “torture and custodial death” of Mr. Mosa Mohamed Salih, member of the Fur tribe and arrested in East Jebel Marra, South Darfur, who was “reportedly accused of sharing military information with the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdel Wahid (SLM-AW). Reliable information received indicates that Mr. Mosa was reportedly tortured by members of the Rapid Support Force to confess to his affiliation with the SLA-AW”.³⁰⁸

In April 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that a list of 292 political detainees from Darfur had been published, which were not included in the presidential pardon list, and which included mostly individuals arrested in North Darfur because of their “allegiance to the detained Musa Hilal, former Janjaweed leader and chairman of the Revolutionary Awakening Council who was arrested in November 2017”.³⁰⁹

Also in April, the same source documented the death of a man from South Darfur’s East Jebel Marra intercepted by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and beaten and “poured with hot water” when he denied knowledge about rebel commanders in the area.³¹⁰ According to the same source the killing of the men “occurred days after the death of Sheikh Mousa Simbi (80), in a similar incident at the Libei government forces’ base in East Jebel Marra”.³¹¹

In June 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that a “military force raided the area of Jamira”, north of Kass, South Darfur, “in search of men accused of collaborating with the armed movements”, detaining a man and denying his family “visit access who expressed concern he might be subjected to torture or ill treatment”.³¹²

According to a political scientist, interviewed as part of the UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August 2018, “The government sees every young person as a threat in the area, as a potential rebel since they are the main rebel recruitment constituency. 20 years of displacement has contributed to a high level of political awareness and activism which is seen as a threat by the state so young people are closely monitored and harassed in Darfur”.³¹³

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2018 on the arrest of Musa Hilal associates, the former Janjaweed detained leader.³¹⁴

³⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese held in Darfur, Kordofan for alleged links with rebel groups](#), 22 January 2018

³⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Released Darfur detainees ‘forced to report daily’](#), 16 January 2018

³⁰⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Released Darfur detainees ‘forced to report daily’](#), 16 January 2018

³⁰⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Urgent call for investigation into the custodial death of civilian whilst under SAF/RSF detention in East Jebel Marra, South Darfur](#), 24 April 2018

³⁰⁹ Radio Dabanga, [292 political detainees still in Sudan prisons: activists](#), 17 April 2018

³¹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Another elderly man ‘tortured to death’ in South Darfur](#), 16 April 2018

³¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Another elderly man ‘tortured to death’ in South Darfur](#), 16 April 2018

³¹² Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur woman shot, man abducted, 27 June 2018](#)

³¹³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 2.3.1

³¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [‘Musa Hilal associates’ arrested in North Darfur](#), 15 August 2018

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported with regards to militia clashes that:

Attacks against civilians by nomad militiamen in and around Jebel Marra continued alongside the fighting between government forces and SLA-AW. The Northern Rizeigat nomads reportedly continued to harass internally displaced persons and farmers in the Thur area of western Jebel Marra. Incidents were reported of a group of farmers being assaulted and robbed by nomads on horseback south-east of Nertiti on 27 August [2018] and of militiamen and Rapid Support Forces personnel assaulting an internally displaced person in Thur on 5 September [2018] for alleged support for SLA-AW. At the same time, militias were accused of having participated in attacks by government forces targeting local villagers perceived to be SLA-AW supporters.³¹⁵

Radio Dabanga noted in November 2018 that 21 residents of Sortony IDP camp in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, were “still detained” following their arrest by Rapid Support Force (RSF) militiamen in October 2018 accusing them of “being affiliated with the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Abdelwahid El Nur”.³¹⁶ The detainees include “three teachers and five secondary school students”, who according to the source have not been formally charged or brought to trial as of November 2018.³¹⁷

3.2.4 Information about other (profiles of) individuals who are perceived to be opposed to the government

Vocal critics of the current government

Matar Younis Ali Hussein, teacher and Imam at the Mosque of Zalingei in Central Darfur state was arrested in April 2018 for “criticizing the Sudanese government’s inhumane practices in Darfur such as unlawful killings, abductions, looting and torching of villages, sexual violence, attack on IDPs and arbitrary detention” and charged with “allegedly ‘undermining the constitutional system’ and ‘waging war against the state’, both of which carry the death penalty or life imprisonment. He was also charged with espionage”.³¹⁸ He was released and the charges against him dismissed in July 2018.³¹⁹

Arrests as part of the weapons collection campaign

The Governor of North Darfur reported in November 2017 about the arrest of more than 130 people suspected of several violations, including criminal records, drugs, weapons, unlicensed vehicles, or previous crimes as cited by Radio Dabanga.³²⁰

Radio Dabanga reported in December 2017 a group of elders of the native administration of Saraf Omra locality, North Darfur, have been detained as part of the current weapons collection campaign as they were complaining that “there is discrimination in the collection of weapons”.³²¹

³¹⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, paras. 3-6

³¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [21 Darfur displaced now detained for four months without trial](#), 18 November 2018

³¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [21 Darfur displaced now detained for four months without trial](#), 18 November 2018

³¹⁸ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Freedom for teacher who faced execution for criticizing government](#), 26 July 2018

³¹⁹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Freedom for teacher who faced execution for criticizing government](#), 26 July 2018

³²⁰ Radio Dabanga, [130 arrests, 7,830 weapons seized in North Darfur arms collection](#), 22 November 2017

In January 2018 soldiers searching for weapons in Central Darfur's town of Nierteti "beat" 14 people during the raid and arrested five people including two sheikhs.³²²

Critics of local militiamen/tribesmen/herders

In May 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that an Imam from West Darfur was arrested "following a speech about a nearby disputed area. He called upon people to not abandon the land which they were forced to leave".³²³

Radio Dabanga reported in November 2018 on the detention of two North Darfur villagers following their complaint of herders driving livestock onto their lands.³²⁴

Darfuris living in other parts of Sudan having to return to Darfur for e.g. to obtain supporting documentation

According to a university professor interviewed as part of the UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August 2018, "if someone had to return to Darfur for evidence to support an application for an ID card 'it may be assumed by the state in Darfur that they are an activist even more so if the person is young and a graduate, and therefore perceived as a security risk. Some choose not to go back and forego the national ID number'.³²⁵

3.2.5 Treatment of civil society organisations and civil society activists, including women's rights activists, humanitarian workers as well as peacekeepers

Radio Dabanga reported in November 2017 about the arrest of a female civil servant, who worked for the Department of Collection in Gireida, for "leaking information about corrupt practices in the re-planning of the Abuja market" in South Darfur despite the fact that "in principle, the criminal law protects civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resource from retaliation".³²⁶

Covering the period 13 March to 17 November 2017, the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 explained that:

There have been a limited number of incidents of attacks against United Nations and humanitarian personnel during the reporting period. A number of carjacking incidents involving vehicles belonging to United Nations entities and international non-governmental organizations have been recorded since March, in particular in Nyala, South Darfur.³²⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

³²¹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur elders detained by RSF in arms collection campaign](#), 22 December 2017

³²² Radio Dabanga, [Violent Central Darfur weapons search continues](#), 12 January 2018

³²³ Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur Imam arrested for speech on disputed land](#), 8 May 2018

³²⁴ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur villagers detained after complaint about herders](#), 7 November 2018

³²⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 4.4.9

³²⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Woman arrested for leaking info about Darfur market corruption](#), 21 November 2017

³²⁷ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, para. 128

A total of 35 criminal incidents targeting United Nations and humanitarian personnel were reported, compared to 23 in the previous reporting period. Of those incidents, 27 involved attempted intrusions into UNAMID premises (26 at Nyala “super camp”, South Darfur, and one at Ed Daein “super camp”, East Darfur), resulting in the theft of valuables and cash belonging to a UNAMID police officer and an attempted robbery at the asset container in Nyala Super Camp. On 14 November [2017], in Kutum, North Darfur, a Swiss national working with the Children’s Nutrition Hospital in El Fasher, who was kidnapped on 7 October, was released unharmed after 38 days in captivity.³²⁸

The following report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

A total of 26 criminal incidents targeting United Nations and humanitarian personnel were reported, compared with 25 in the previous reporting period. The incidents included a gunshot fired by an unidentified person at an observation tower at Nyala “super camp”, South Darfur, on 27 December [2017], in which no injury was reported. Other incidents included a case of robbery and 15 cases of premises intrusion/theft/break-in/attempted theft, mostly in Nyala.

On 21 December [2017], the National Intelligence and Security Services arrested and detained a UNAMID national staff member at the airport in El Geneina, West Darfur. The staff member was released the same day without any charges, and the National Intelligence and Security Services gave no reason for the arrest. On 2 January [2018], at Zalingei market, Central Darfur, Sudan Police personnel assaulted and arrested a UNAMID national staff member over an alleged traffic violation by a member of his family. He was released the same day after a brief hospitalization. On 8 January [2018], in El Geneina, West Darfur, a UNAMID national staff member was arrested and detained by National Intelligence and Security Services personnel over allegations of involvement in a violent anti-government demonstration. The staff member was released on the same day without charges.³²⁹

The ACJPS reported that in March 2018 the chairperson of the Darfur Bar Association, Mr. Mohamed Abdalla Eldouma, was banned from travelling to Cairo, Egypt, from Khartoum Airport and his passport confiscated by the NISS.³³⁰ The previous month he had been released from custody after spending a month in detention for his participation in a protest in Omdurman in January 2018.³³¹

Covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 the subsequent report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID described that:

During the reporting period, 29 criminal incidents targeting United Nations and humanitarian personnel were reported, compared with 26 in the previous reporting period. On 24 February [2018], an RSF member physically assaulted and injured a UNAMID national staff member inside the RSF base in Mellit, North Darfur. The staff member had been detained because he had waved at a speeding RSF driver to slow down while crossing the road. Upon release after about three hours in detention, the injured staff member was treated in hospital in Mellit and, later, at the UNAMID level II hospital in El Fasher.³³²

³²⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, para. 22

³²⁹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, paras. 24-25

³³⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [More detainees released as Sudanese authorities continue to target individuals with travel bans, arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention](#), 4 April 2018

³³¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [More detainees released as Sudanese authorities continue to target individuals with travel bans, arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention](#), 4 April 2018

³³² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, para. 21

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

During the reporting period, UNAMID was not the target of any armed groups or entities in Darfur. However, banditry and criminal activities remain a prominent feature of the security situation in Darfur owing to several factors, including the deterioration of economic conditions, the conflict over natural resources and the presence of weapons among citizens. From July 2017 to 15 May 2018, 184 criminal incidents affected United Nations personnel, facilities and operations, including 63 cases of theft/break-in/burglary/intrusion, 36 attempts of theft, 5 carjackings, 11 cases of robbery/road banditry, 7 shootings and 33 cases of stone-throwing.³³³

Amnesty International reported in April 2018 on the release without charge of “56 opposition party members and human rights defenders”, including Salih Mahmoud Osman, a human rights defender and Vice-Chairperson of the Darfur Bar Association, in April 2018 following their “arbitrary” arrest and detention “by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) in connection with protests condemning the rise in the cost of food and medicine in Sudan at the beginning of January” [2018].³³⁴

In early May 2018 human rights activist, Khattab Seifeldin, has been detained by the “authorities in Nyala”, South Darfur, following his arrest by the military intelligence force at the end of April, which Radio Dabanga reported was because of “his organisation of a project for the reading for change”.³³⁵ According to another activist interviewed by Radio Dabanga “Since the day of his arrest, no one has been allowed to visit him and nor are his exact whereabouts known, whether in Nyala or the security service, nor has he been brought to trial”.³³⁶

In May 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that South Darfur human rights activist, Adam Suleiman, has been transferred to a hospital in a coma as a result of “alleged torture and severe beating by security services” during his arrest from the local market.³³⁷ No further information was included regarding the reasons for his arrest.

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan documented in his August 2018 report covering the period from September 2017 to June 2018 that:

The Independent Expert received reports of incidents of harassment, arrests and prolonged detention targeting representatives of civil society organizations, without affording them or their families access to legal representation. For instance, most arrests and detentions occurred in Khartoum and Darfur in the framework of peaceful demonstrations that had taken place to protest against high inflation and austerity measures in the country’s 2018 budget [...]. Of particular concern is the treatment of female activists during these arrests. Miass Safi was arrested together with three other activists at her home on 20 February [2018]. The members of the group were released on 24 and 25 February, despite the fact that, according to their lawyers, the prosecutor had earlier refused to sign the documents needed to secure their release on bail [...]

In this context, the Independent Expert welcomed the decision to release other human rights defenders and political activists who had been arrested in connection with the demonstrations

³³³ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, para. 34

³³⁴ Amnesty International, [*Urgent Action: More than fifty critics released without charge*](#), 18 April 2018

³³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [*Human rights activist detained incommunicado in South Darfur*](#), 3 May 2018

³³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [*Human rights activist detained incommunicado in South Darfur*](#), 3 May 2018

³³⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*South Darfur human rights activist detained, beaten senseless*](#), 20 May 2018

against austerity measures in the country's 2018 budget, and encouraged the authorities to ensure that all those still arbitrarily detained were released and to refrain from such detentions in the future. He received assurances from the relevant Sudanese authorities that those who had been released would not be rearrested, charged or prosecuted further.³³⁸

In June 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that the head of a youth project to aid the poor in East Darfur was arrested most likely due to the fact that members of the ruling National Congress Party in Adila locality wanted to "control the project within their party line and do not allow any independent civil initiative".³³⁹

Radio Dabanga reported that in July 2018 security officers detained an anti-gold mining activist in South Darfur and summoned four community leaders to their offices.³⁴⁰

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 recorded that:

A total of 60 criminal incidents targeting the United Nations and humanitarian personnel were recorded during the reporting period, 46 of which were incidents of intrusion, break-in and theft inside United Nations premises. On 16 July [2018], a UNAMID military personnel was shot and injured by an unidentified armed perpetrator attempting to enter the UNAMID Community Policing Centre in the Salam internally displaced persons camp in South Darfur. On 19 July [2018], Sudanese Armed Forces personnel reportedly assaulted and injured three national staff of the International Medical Corps at Golo Hospital in Central Darfur over an alleged delay in attending to injured Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers. On 5 August [2018], six unidentified perpetrators attempted to stab a member of UNAMID police personnel on patrol at Otash internally displaced persons camp in South Darfur. On 14 September [2018], eight perpetrators fired shots at an observation tower at Nyala "super camp" after attempting to enter the premises. On 12 September [2018], a national staff member of the international non-governmental organization Triangle Generation Humanitarian was abducted, assaulted, robbed and later released by SLA-AW elements in Golo in Central Darfur.³⁴¹

3.2.6 Attacks on schools and teachers

The 2018 Global Education to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) report which has the reporting period of January 2013 to December 2017 noted that:

Aerial bombings by government forces damaged and destroyed dozens of schools during the reporting period. The Darfur region and Southern Kordofan state were most heavily affected by these attacks. Attacks in Darfur were reported at similar rates to those found in Education under Attack 2014, and those in Southern Kordofan were reported at rates similar to the years 2011 and 2012. GCPEA found no reports of attacks on schools in 2017, possibly due in part to the government's 2016 ceasefire in Darfur and the ceasefire between the government and the SPLM-N, which was active in Southern Kordofan, Abyei, and Blue Nile states.³⁴²

³³⁸ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, paras. 23-26

³³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Humanitarian project leader arrested in East Darfur](#), 18 June 2018

³⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Activist detained in South Darfur](#), 22 July 2018

³⁴¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para.21

³⁴² Global Education to Protect Education from Attack, [Education Under Attack 2018](#), 11 May 2018, Sudan p.219

By contrast, the May 2018 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Children and armed conflict covering the period from January to December 2017 recorded with regards to grave violations in Darfur that:

A total of eight attacks on schools (4) and hospitals (4) were verified and attributed to unidentified armed elements (5), RSF (2) and SLA/PD (1). Attacks on schools and hospitals involved the abduction and rape of two teachers, physical damage to schools and the looting of medical material. In addition, the United Nations verified the military use of four schools by RSF (3) and SAF (1). The school used by SAF in Laiba, East Jebel Marra, remained occupied at the time of writing.³⁴³

Radio Dabanga reported that in April 2018 “Members of the paramilitary Border Guards abducted six people from Turr in South Darfur’s Kass locality on Saturday. They demand a ransom of SDG 1,500,000. Multiple sources told Radio Dabanga that elements of the Border Guards on camels and horses kidnapped Muhyeldin Ibrahim, headmaster of the Turr School, Mohamed Adam, school janitor, Feisal Ishag, Ahmed Yousef, Abdeljabbar Abulgasim and Abdelnashir Yousef near Turr, and took them to an unknown destination”.³⁴⁴

The Global Education to Protect Education from Attack noted that “Violence in Darfur continued to affect students occasionally in 2017, with at least two incidents that year, according to media sources”.³⁴⁵ It detailed the following incidents:

Chadian forces reportedly kidnapped a student from a Quran school in Sirba locality, West Darfur, on October 29, 2017, taking him in the direction of the Chadian border. A witness told the media that the motivation for the attack was unclear.

On November 10, 2017, unidentified gunmen stormed a teacher dormitory at a school in Muglad town, Central Darfur, killing two teachers. The motive for the attack was unknown.³⁴⁶

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that “A low percentage of children in Darfur have safe access to basic education, and its primary health-care services are characterized by low coverage, the inadequate provision of essential services and limited accessibility. In addition, certain practices raise serious protection concerns, specifically with regard to the security of women and girls, who are subjected to gender-based and sexual violence”.³⁴⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

There were 44 incidents of grave violations affecting 80 children (34 boys; 46 girls) documented by UNAMID during the reporting period, as verified by the country task force on monitoring and reporting. A total of 29 children were killed (13 girls; 16 boys); 20 children were maimed (6 girls; 14

³⁴³ UN Secretary-General, [Children and armed conflict](#), 16 May 2018, paragraph 172

³⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Border Guards kidnap six people in South Darfur](#), 23 April 2018

³⁴⁵ Global Education to Protect Education from Attack, [Education Under Attack 2018](#), 11 May 2018, Sudan p.221

³⁴⁶ Global Education to Protect Education from Attack, [Education Under Attack 2018](#), 11 May 2018, Sudan p.221

³⁴⁷ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, paragraph 27

boys); 4 boys were abducted; 22 girls were raped; and 13 schools were affected in Jebel Marra, including 7 schools that were looted and 6 others destroyed.³⁴⁸

At the end of October 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “in Mershing locality, a teacher has died defending two schoolgirls on their farm. Callers told Radio Dabanga that the teacher at the Jurof secondary school was gunned-down during an attempt to stop men intent on attacking two of his pupils as they tended their farm. The perpetrators fled the scene after the murder”.³⁴⁹

3.3 Freedom of movement

3.3.1 Freedom of movement in Darfur

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

The freedom of movement of civilians has also improved, mainly as a result of the government-led weapons collection campaign.³⁵⁰

The UNAMID Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, noted in its briefing to the UN Security Council of March 2018 that “we continue to face challenges in accessing Golo [West Darfur] through Kabkabiya [North Darfur] and one of our engineering contingents is providing assistance in improving the condition of the road”.³⁵¹ When traveling to the area in May 2018 the UNAMID Joint Special Representative commended the “Chinese and Pakistani engineering companies for setting up the base and improving the road between Kabkabiya and Golo, which has eased movement and significantly reduced travel time between these locations, thereby facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance”.³⁵²

In an article published in May 2018 focusing on the situation of the over 23,000 IDPs displaced in the village of Sortoni, North Darfur, fleeing fighting in Jebel Marra over two years ago Doctors Without Borders noted that “Until recently, armed gangs preyed on travellers on the road to Kabkabiya Hospital [North Darfur], the closest referral hospital where surgery is available. Robberies, kidnappings and killings were a regular occurrence. It is now possible to reach the hospital unmolested in just under two hours, a journey that was previously never guaranteed to be completed. This was unimaginable four years ago when I [a field worker for MSF] was last posted to Darfur”.³⁵³

According to Siddig Yousef from the Communist Party and Sudanese Solidarity Committee, interviewed as part of the UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August

³⁴⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, Paragraph 13

³⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Two die in South Darfur shootings](#), 22 October 2018

³⁵⁰ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, para. 26

³⁵¹ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [Briefing on UNAMID to the United Nations Security Council by Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, UNAMID Joint Special Representative](#), 14 March 2018, para. 3

³⁵² United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID JSR visits Golo and expresses concern over reports of recent clashes and displacement in Jebel Marra](#), 20 May 2018

³⁵³ Doctors Without Borders, [Sudan: "Violence is never far away" for People Stranded in North Darfur's Sortoni Camp](#), 24 May 2018

2018, “Parts of Darfur remain unsafe to travel in”.³⁵⁴ A political scientist also interviewed for the mission stated that “there continue to be check points throughout Darfur, with the Arab militias controlling the areas outside the towns and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. There is no regular army presence outside of the main towns of El Fasher, Geneina and Nyala, ‘The government sees every young person as a threat in the area, as a potential rebel since they are the main rebel recruitment constituency”.³⁵⁵ A human rights defender interviewed from the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) noted that “the number of checkpoints appears appears to have declined, the human rights defender observing: ‘Checkpoints have reduced since the conflict ended in Darfur – checkpoints are now government-run, not run by militia. The HRD gave the example of the road between El Fasher and Nyala in Darfur: during the war there were 15 checkpoints, now 3”.³⁵⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that “Accessing some areas in Jebel Marra remained a challenge owing to insecurity, compounded by heavy rains which made most roads impassable”.³⁵⁷

At the end of October 2018 UNAMID reported the inauguration of the “rehabilitated [...] road that links Golo to Nertiti in Central Darfur, as part of the Mission’s continued efforts to support local communities and improve infrastructure in the Darfur region” and further reported that “The Mission is also rehabilitating the road from Golo to Rockero in the same area”.³⁵⁸

3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017 recorded that “According to UNAMID officials, the operating environment for the mission significantly improved compared to previous years. Notwithstanding, government troops occasionally hindered UNAMID peacekeepers to enter conflict-affected areas”.³⁵⁹

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

During the reporting period, humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in Darfur improved significantly. The humanitarian guidelines adopted by the Humanitarian Aid Commission of the Sudan in December 2016 are being implemented, and in most areas, humanitarian personnel are required to notify the authorities 48 hours prior to deploying to the field. Humanitarian agencies and Government authorities have been working to ensure consistent implementation of these directives in all Darfur states at both the central and local levels.

While access to the Jebel Marra region is not as difficult as in previous years, humanitarian agencies have not yet secured unfettered access to the region. The agencies’ activities in the region continue to be conducted under tight government oversight. During the reporting period, access has been

³⁵⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 4.4.10

³⁵⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 4.4.10

³⁵⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 4.4.11

³⁵⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 20

³⁵⁸ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [Nertiti – Golo road officially opened](#), 23 October 2018

³⁵⁹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [Conflict Barometer 2017](#), February 2018, *Sudan (Darfur)*, p.100

gained to previously inaccessible areas in Jebel Marra, such as Golo, Rokero and, most recently, Deribat.

As a result, humanitarian agencies have been able to scale up their response to communities in need in the region. In meetings with the Panel, Government authorities explained that restrictions on access to Jebel Marra are due to the presence of and sporadic clashes with SLA/AW. Areas under the control of SLA/AW remain largely inaccessible.³⁶⁰

The International Crisis Group reported in September 2017 that:

With rebel groups weakened and driven almost entirely out of the country, the government has been less concerned about the presence of aid organisations, and the possible diversion of assistance, and thus more open to humanitarian access. Relief workers report better, although not complete, access to Darfur's Jebel Marra region, now mostly held by government forces. They note, too, improvements in their interactions with the government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), particularly with respect to travel notifications in non-conflict areas (generally granted within one day), visas and technical agreements (more readily approved). That said, improvements are far from comprehensive. African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) personnel still face visa delays and officials continue to obstruct the entry of supplies into the country.³⁶¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

Humanitarian access continued to improve in Darfur, although the implementation of the Government's directives and procedures for humanitarian action remained inconsistent. Some delays were reported in processing interstate travel notifications and humanitarian partners continue to work with the Government at both the federal and state level to further improve this process. The humanitarian community in South Darfur continued to advocate for access to additional locations in East Jebel Marra, including areas outside of Government control. Plans to access parts of East Jebel Marra are also contingent on a security risk assessment.³⁶²

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2017 "Humanitarian actors had limited access to most conflict affected areas in Darfur [...] although access to some previously inaccessible areas of the Jebel Marra in Central Darfur was granted".³⁶³

The U.S. Department of State stated in its annual report covering 2017 that "Humanitarian access improved for UN and NGO staff considerably during the year, particularly access to East Darfur. There were still incidents of restrictions on UN and NGO travel to North Darfur and East Jebel Marra, primarily due to insecurity".³⁶⁴ The same source further specified that "certain parts of Darfur, including rebel-held areas in Jebel Marra, largely remained cut off from humanitarian access. During the year UNAMID also substantially reduced its presence in Darfur due to budgetary constraints and government requests".³⁶⁵ It also noted that:

³⁶⁰ UN, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, paras. 107-8

³⁶¹ International Crisis Group, [*A New Roadmap to Make U.S. Sudan Sanctions Relief Work*](#), 29 September 2017, B. Darfur, p.4

³⁶² UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 27 December 2017, para. 23

³⁶³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [*Sudan: Global Report on Internal Displacement \(GRID 2018\)*](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018], p. 2

³⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, [*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan*](#), 20 April 2018, section 1., g. *Abuses in Internal Conflict*

³⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, [*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan*](#), 20 April 2018, section 1., g. *Abuses in Internal Conflict*

During the year the government indefinitely delayed visas to UNAMID's human rights section personnel more frequently than to other UNAMID sections. International observers alleged UNAMID's human rights section was targeted to curtail human rights reporting on the Darfur conflict. As of October [2017], 14 of the 15 visas requested in January by UNAMID's human rights section remained pending.

In addition, by year's end [2017] the government had not approved an important UN Security Council-mandated operating base for UNAMID in the Darfuri town of Golo, in an area affected by severe malnutrition and conflict, impeding UNAMID's ability to facilitate humanitarian access. There were also other bureaucratic impediments, including delays in the government's approval of UNAMID flight schedules, prohibition of flights between UNAMID team sites in different sectors, and limits on when UNAMID could conduct flights. The government also continued to prevent dozens of shipping containers carrying humanitarian supplies and UNAMID equipment from being delivered. In addition access limitations remained in place for UNAMID human rights reporting and verifications of sexual and gender-based abuses.³⁶⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

Humanitarian access continued to improve across Darfur. There were, however, two incidents of access restriction during the reporting period, in North and South Darfur respectively. In West Darfur, reports indicate increased disruptions by the National Intelligence and Security Services to the activities of humanitarian non-governmental organizations. These include delays in the issuance of permission to carry out assessments, the processing of travel notifications, the purchase of fuel and interference in bidding processes. The humanitarian community continued to advocate for access to locations in the Jebel Marra, such as Boldong, Kutrum and Kwila, which remain inaccessible to the United Nations and partners, while United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights to Golo and Rockero continue.³⁶⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Humanitarian access continues to improve in Darfur. In the northern Jebel Marra area in Central Darfur, humanitarian actors were able to gain access to villages around Rockero to conduct an inter-agency assessment from 14 to 21 February. Despite those improvements, the Government continued to deny the humanitarian community access to locations in other parts of Jebel Marra, such as Boldong and Kutrum in Central Darfur and Suni, Jawa, Feina, Gurlang Bang, Tarantawra, Sabun El Fagor and Kara in South Darfur. [...]

UNAMID recorded three clearance denials by military intelligence, resulting in the cancellation of six sorties. In a positive development, the Wali of Central Darfur approved regular flights from Zalingei to Golo. However, the Government continued to deny the mission's request for direct flights between team sites in different sectors and permission to use El Obeid airport for flight-planning purposes as an alternative airport for UNAMID aircraft. In relation to the recent fighting in East Jebel Marra, movement to Feina was restricted on three occasions, on 25 March, 3 April and 9 April. Access to Katur was denied on 4 April but later allowed on 9 April. There was also one case of restriction of movement in East Darfur on 22 February.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, section 5., *Government Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights*

³⁶⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, paras.

26

³⁶⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, para. 22

Covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018, the June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur reported that:

Over the past two years the number of access restrictions experienced by the mission has decreased significantly. There were nine cases of restrictions from 1 July to 31 December 2017, and four cases from 1 January to 31 March 2018. In April and May 2018, there were three cases of denials of access registered in the Jebel Marra area as clashes with rebel groups continued. Restrictions on direct flights between team sites continued as the Government insisted that flights be routed through state capitals.³⁶⁹

A May 2018 Small Arms Survey, providing a summary of humanitarian access throughout Sudan noted that “As late as July 2017 all of East Jebel Marra locality remained blocked to humanitarian actors; and at the time of writing [May 2018] Khartoum continues to deny both UNAMID and humanitarians access to SLA-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)-held areas of East Jebel Marra and the Rokoro locality, citing insecurity as the reason”.³⁷⁰

The same source further reported that “So while access has increased significantly in Darfur, for both UN agencies and some non-UN international NGOs, some areas described as ‘open’ by the UN Country Team and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) are still not accessible to all humanitarian actors. For example, as of late 2017 humanitarian protection officials were still excluded from newly accessible areas in the Nierteti, Rokoro and East Jebel Marra localities, despite guarantees in the 2016 HAC directives that humanitarian organizations may ‘determine the most appropriate field teams and staffing . . . based on technical and operational concerns . . . across all sectors, including protection’ (HAC, 2016)”.³⁷¹

It further clarifies difficulties in recording access restrictions finding that “Non-humanitarian actors supporting or monitoring humanitarian activities enjoy even less access. The Sudanese government has granted just one visa in the last two years to UNAMID’s human rights section, resulting in nearly half of its posts being vacant and some of UNAMID’s Darfur human rights monitors being based instead in Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, UNAMID’s ability to deploy permanently to the newly ‘opened’ areas of Jebel Marra remained without final authorization throughout 2017, raising concerns about access in practice even in officially open areas, particularly when humanitarian air access remains reliant on UNAMID ground security”.³⁷²

In early May 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that the SLM-MM [Sudan Liberation Movement lead by Minni Minnawi], the JEM [Justice and Equality Movement], and the SLM-TC [Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council] have declared an immediate unilateral cessation of hostilities in order to provide amongst others “unhindered humanitarian access to war-affected populations”.³⁷³

³⁶⁹ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, para. 35

³⁷⁰ Small Arms Survey, [*Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality*](#), May 2018, *Did the sanctions-easing process drive change in Sudan’s conflicts?*, pages 31/32

³⁷¹ Small Arms Survey, [*Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality*](#), May 2018, *Did the sanctions-easing process drive change in Sudan’s conflicts?*, pages 32/33

³⁷² Small Arms Survey, [*Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality*](#), May 2018, *Did the sanctions-easing process drive change in Sudan’s conflicts?*, p. 33

³⁷³ Radio Dabanga, [*Darfur armed groups declare immediate humanitarian ceasefire*](#), 7 May 2018

This ceasefire agreement was extended in August 2018 by a further three months³⁷⁴ and again in November 2018 for a further three-months till end of February 2019.³⁷⁵ In September 2018, the SLM-AW [Sudan Liberation Movement-led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur] also declared a three-month unilateral ceasefire to allow humanitarian access to civilians in landslide-affected areas in Jebel Marra following torrential rains and landslides in the region.³⁷⁶

USAID reported in its May 2018 fact sheet on fuel shortages and high inflation impacting on the distribution of food supplies:

Fuel shortages, currency depreciation, and high inflation levels resulting from the current economic crisis in Sudan have increased transportation costs and food prices, negatively affecting USAID partner operations. USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP) reports that fuel shortages in South Darfur's Nyala town disrupted emergency food assistance distributions during early April, with WFP distributing only 90 metric tons (MT) of food commodities to approximately 19,500 people—6 percent of planned beneficiaries. In addition, a USAID/OFDA partner reports that the organization's drivers have waited up to nine hours to purchase fuel at prices as much as five times the official price; in some program areas, fuel prices are reportedly up to nine times the official price.³⁷⁷

Reporting in June 2018 on recent fighting in Jebel Marra, UNAMID reported that "Attempts by UNAMID to verify the situation on the ground have been blocked, with Government forces denying Mission personnel access to the areas of conflict".³⁷⁸ According to the same source in an article published in August 2018 recurrent "access denials to East Jebel Marra seem to continue – an issue that UNAMID Joint Special Representative raised during his two-day visit to South Darfur, during which he met leaders at the state and local levels and discussed access challenges affecting the Mission's operations in parts of East Jebel Marra".³⁷⁹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 recorded that:

The Government of the Sudan denied access for UNAMID patrols on 18 occasions, mostly citing security reasons. In most cases, the patrols were prevented from verifying reports of conflict in the Jebel Marra area. Access denials were mostly confined to conflict areas in eastern and southern Jebel Marra, with UNAMID verification patrols denied access to the Feina, Gur Lumbung, Kebe, Leiba and Narglah areas. Verification patrols to Golol in western Jebel Marra were repeatedly denied access, on 6, 19 and 29 July.

UNAMID did not record any flight denials during the reporting period. The Government has not yet approved the mission's request for direct flights between team sites in different sectors.

The mission leadership engaged the Government of the Sudan and local authorities during the reporting period to address the issue of access denials. UNAMID sent a series of notes verbales to the Government requesting its intervention, and the African Union-Joint Special Representative for Darfur held meetings with local and national authorities.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁴ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan renews adherence to unilateral ceasefire until end of year](#), 21 October 2018

³⁷⁵ Sudan Tribune, [Darfur armed groups extend unilateral ceasefire for three months](#), 9 November 2018

³⁷⁶ Sudan Tribune, [Darfur rebels declare three-month ceasefire to rescue landslides victims in Jebel Marra](#), 19 September 2018

³⁷⁷ USAID, [Sudan – Complex Emergency](#), May 2018, *Insecurity, Displacement, and Humanitarian Access*, p. 2

³⁷⁸ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID deplores humanitarian impact of ongoing military confrontation in Jebel Marra](#), 21 June 2018

³⁷⁹ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID calls for improved access to conflict-affected part of east Jebel Marra](#), 29 August 2018

³⁸⁰ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, paras. 22-24

The same report further documented the use of UNAMID escorts for humanitarian partners:

UNAMID uniformed personnel provided 255 round-trip escorts for humanitarian partners in support of the delivery and monitoring of humanitarian assistance, as well as inter-agency verification assessments and operational activities. In addition, UNAMID continued to provide daily escorts to partners for watertrucking from Kube to the Sortony internally displaced persons gathering site, as well as regular armed escorts for humanitarian supplies between Sortony and Kabkabiyah in North Darfur. UNAMID also provided security for the warehouses and assets of humanitarian agencies. Escorts were provided for humanitarian partners in July to undertake needs assessments in Belle el-Sereif, Leiba, and Mershing, eastern Jebel Marra, where the most critical needs were identified as health, protection and the provision of water, sanitation and hygiene services.³⁸¹

UN World Food Programme (WFP) reported in its August 2018 'Country Brief' that it was having "Difficulties in securing escorts from the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the police are also causing delays in food transportation and distribution in North and East Darfur".³⁸²

UN OCHA's 'Darfur Humanitarian Overview' noted that in September 2018 the SLA-AW [Sudan Liberation Army –Abdul Wahid] announced a three-month unilateral ceasefire to "facilitate access and relief aid to a landslide-affected area in East Jebel Marra".³⁸³

3.3.3 Ability for Darfuris to relocate and integrate into areas outside Darfur

Note that information included in this section does not address the security and human rights situation of Darfuris outside of Darfur. Topics such as the security situation, incidents of arbitrary arrests, detention, and forced recruitment, access to justice, freedom of movement and living conditions for Darfuris living in Khartoum and Omdurman have been addressed in the following report, which includes information between 19th August 2015 to 9th July 2018: ARC's [Sudan: Query Response, The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update](#) of September 2018.

In addition, the UK fact-finding mission report, based on a mission conducted in August 2018 to Khartoum, includes synopsis and the full transcripts of the interviewees for the following relevant sections:

- 3. Non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum,
 - 3.1 Human rights-generally
 - 3.2 Discrimination
 - 3.3 Arrest and detention-general
 - Treatment in detention
 - Treatment of family members
 - 'Ghost houses'
 - Arrest warrants and the death penalty
 - Demonstrations and arrests: January 2018
 - Profiles and specific groups (e.g. students).
 - 3.5 Socio-economic rights
 - General
 - Employment

³⁸¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 20

³⁸² World Food Programme (WFP), [WFP Sudan Country Brief](#), August 2018, p. 2

³⁸³ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

- *Healthcare*
 - 3.6 Access to ID numbers and cards
 - 4.3 Obtaining passports, ID numbers and cards

See. UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, last updated in December 2018, “no organisations have information on IDPs living in or around Khartoum”.³⁸⁴

Limited additional information was found on this topic amongst the sources consult in the reporting period for this report. For a historical overview see the previous edition of this report:

- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 3.3.3 *Ability for Darfuris to relocate and integrate into areas outside Darfur*

4. Forced recruitment and conscription

4.1 Incidents of forced recruitment by state and non-state actors

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

According to various sources, in recent years there has been an increase in the recruitment of Darfurians by rebel groups operating in Libya. Typically, fixers working for these rebel groups lure Darfurians to Libya to work as mercenaries with offers of financial compensation, and with promises of later assisting them in their passage across the Mediterranean, if they wish to continue their journey. According to various sources, many young Darfurians consider working as a mercenary in Libya to be less risky than attempting the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean, and more profitable than working as an illegal migrant in Europe. The Panel has received credible reports of such recruitment taking place in different communities in South and North Darfur. It has also received reliable information about recruitment by the rebel groups in other regions of the Sudan. For example, a confidential source noted an increase in recruitment in Darfurian farming communities in Gezira State, a region south-east of Khartoum, between February and May 2016, and again between February and May 2017.³⁸⁵

The same source noted with regards to other recruitment tactics by rebel groups in Darfur:

SLA/AW solicits contributions from the internally displaced persons camps as a means of financing. Some Fur communities have been providing financial support to SLA/AW for many years. Among other means, the group uses a series of videos and audios released by Abdul Wahid to communicate its demands. For example, the Panel is in possession of a video recording in which Abdul Wahid: (a) demands that each camp pay large sums of money to ensure the liberation of Darfur; (b) asks internally displaced persons and refugees to send their sons and daughters to SLA/AW camps, both in

³⁸⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan: Global Report on Internal Displacement \(GRID 2018\)](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018], p. 4

³⁸⁵ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 139

the Sudan and outside; and (c) threatens the internally displaced persons with “destruction” if they do not pay (see annex XXII).³⁸⁶

4.2 Recruitment and use of children by government forces and armed groups

Background information general to Sudan

The Child Soldiers World Index, published in February 2018, states that Sudan ratified the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) on 26 July 2015. The Index notes that the minimum age for conscription is 18 and the minimum voluntary enlistment age is “18 in law, lower in practice”. The Index records that state armed forces do not have guidelines on how to approach child soldiers during deployment.³⁸⁷ The Index notes that the following apply in Sudan:

Reports of state armed forces using children in hostilities - Yes
Armed forces listed in 2017 by the UN for child recruitment and use - Yes
Reports of non-state armed groups using children in hostilities - Yes
Any of these armed groups listed in 2017 by the UN for child recruitment and use. - Yes³⁸⁸

The Index stated that “The UN has listed Government armed forces in Sudan as persistent perpetrators of child recruitment and use since 2006. The UN reported in 2017 that it had received allegations of recruitment and use of children between twelve and seventeen years old by government armed forces, but no cases could be verified”.³⁸⁹

The periodic report submitted by the government of Sudan to the UN Human Rights Committee in October 2017 details legislative provisions against military recruitment of children:

Article 43 of the 2010 Children’s Act prohibits the recruitment and employment of children in the armed forces or in armed groups, or their involvement in hostilities. All laws relating to the military, such as the 2007 Armed Forces Act, the 2008 Police Act and the 2013 National Service Act state that recruits must not be less than 18 years of age.³⁹⁰

In November 2017, the Chair of the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict issued the following statement:

The delegation commended the measures taken to ensure that no children are recruited within the armed forces, and the access provided to the UN for monitoring and verification, including to military bases, training facilities and recruitment units. Furthermore, the delegation was very pleased by the commitment of the Government to continue and institutionalize the measures established under the Action Plan to prevent any recruitment of children into its forces.

The delegation stressed that SAF should continue to pave the way for all security forces to prevent recruitment and use of children among its forces, especially in supporting the establishment of Child Protection Units in all of the security forces (PDF, RSF and NISS) as well as institutionalizing command orders and trainings on Child Protection in all security forces. [...]

³⁸⁶ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 171

³⁸⁷ Child Soldiers International, [Child Soldiers World Index](#), 21 February 2018

³⁸⁸ Child Soldiers International, [Child Soldiers World Index](#), 21 February 2018

³⁸⁹ Child Soldiers International, [Child Soldiers World Index](#), 21 February 2018

³⁹⁰ Government of Sudan (Author), published by UN Human Rights Committee, [Fifth periodic report submitted by the Sudan under article 40 of the Covenant, due in 2017 \[7 September 2017\] \[CCPR/C/SDN/5\]](#), 11 October 2017, paragraph 71

The delegation also encouraged the non-state armed groups to end and prevent all violations against children, including the recruitment and use of children, and to allow humanitarian access.³⁹¹

The US State Department on Sudan's Human Rights Practices in 2017 stated that:

The law prohibits the recruitment of children and provides criminal penalties for perpetrators. Allegations persisted, however, that armed movements, government forces, and government-aligned militias had child soldiers within their ranks. Allegations also persisted that antigovernment rebel groups used children. Unlike in prior years, the government reportedly stopped its support to the South Sudan opposition group, Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition, which was widely reported to recruit and use child soldiers. The United Nations verified the government worked closely with UNICEF to implement its action plan to prevent the recruitment and use of children by government security forces. Many children lacked documents verifying their age. Children's rights organizations believed armed groups exploited this lack of documentation to recruit or retain children. Due to problems of access, particularly in conflict zones, reports of child soldiers were limited and often difficult to verify. Sources confirmed the capture of multiple children by the government during an armed offensive of the SLM-Minni Minawi faction in Darfur in May. UNAMID reported that concerted efforts to curb the recruitment of child soldiers in Darfur had led to significant progress, but the potential use of children in ethnic clashes remained a major concern. Representatives of armed groups reported they did not actively recruit child soldiers. They did not, however, prevent children who volunteered from joining their movements. The armed groups stated the children were stationed primarily in training camps and were not used in combat.³⁹²

UNICEF's Situation Report of in April 2018 outlined that:

A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) supported by UNICEF on the release and handover of children associated with armed groups was endorsed by the Government of Sudan in addition to a manual on complaint mechanisms in Government judicial and security institutions for the public to report on child recruitment by armed forces/groups.³⁹³

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict issued the following statement in February 2018:

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict expressed her satisfaction at the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict signed in March 2016 by the Government of Sudan, but noted that more needs to be done to ensure that all children in Sudan are and continue to be protected from violence.³⁹⁴

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict noted in August 2018 that:

There have been no verified reports of the recruitment and use of children by the Government of the Sudan since 2015. During her visit to the Sudan in early 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict witnessed commendable progress in the implementation of the Government's action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of

³⁹¹ The Government of Sweden, [*Statement by the Chair of the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Olof Skoog, on the mission of the Working Group to the Sudan*](#), 29 November 2017

³⁹² US State Department, [*Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan*](#), 20 April 2018, Section 1.g

³⁹³ UNICEF, [*Humanitarian Situation Report April 2018*](#), April 2018

³⁹⁴ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, [*SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict Calls on All Parties to Conflict to Strengthen Efforts to Protect Children in Sudan*](#), 26 February 2018

children and the initiation of a process to create a national plan of prevention of violations against children. Furthermore, the Government took efforts to demilitarize schools and hospitals and the initiation of an awareness-raising campaign to prevent violations against children. With the publication of this report, the Sudan Armed Forces have been delisted from the annexes by the Secretary-General and the Action Plan following full implementation of provisions included in the Action Plan. [...]

Both SLA/MM and the Justice and Equality Movement are urged to expedite their implementation plans to end and prevent child recruitment, in particular by facilitating verification missions by the United Nations.³⁹⁵

On 12 October 2018, the UN Secretary General provided the following update:

Following the Government's completion of the March 2016 action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, its security forces were delisted from the annexes of the Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict. This important achievement reflects the commitment made by the Government of the Sudan to prevent and end violations against children by its security forces and to build national protection systems for children. However, three non-signatory movements, JEM-Gibril, SLA-AW and SLA-MM, remain listed in the report of the Secretary General.³⁹⁶

Darfur-specific information

In December 2017, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan noted to the Security Council that "The Panel has continued to monitor violations and serious abuses against children, and received several reports of recruitment and use of children by Darfurian rebel groups".³⁹⁷ The Panel further outlined that:

The Panel is encouraged by the progress made by Government authorities, in particular SAF and the police, in implementing the action plan for the protection of children from violations in conflict, adopted in March 2016. Its implementation has included issuing command orders to troops, adopting disciplinary measures for breaches of those orders and putting in place basic protocols for screening children and conducting age assessment verifications. SAF has also provided regular access to the United Nations for monitoring and verification of its barracks and has been vigilant to ensure that minors are screened out when former rebel fighters are integrated into the army. Despite the progress noted, measures are required to ensure the implementation of the action plan by NISS and RSF so that these forces do not use or recruit children.

Additionally, the Panel notes the Government of the Sudan has been conducting public awareness campaigns to address the issue of children with guns in Darfur. Specific measures are, however, needed to ensure that militias and armed tribal groups do not recruit children. During the current mandate, the Panel received reports of recruitment and use of children by rebel groups.³⁹⁸

The US State Department's June 2018 Trafficking report covering the period April 2017 to March 2018 noted that "Article 14 of the Sudan Armed Forces Act of 2007 criminalized recruiting children younger than 18 years old by members of the armed forces, enslaving civilians, or coercing civilians

³⁹⁵ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, [Sudan](#), 15 August 2018

³⁹⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, *Paragraph 37*

³⁹⁷ UN Secretary Council, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, *Summary*

³⁹⁸ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, *paragraphs 124-126*

into prostitution, and prescribed penalties between three years imprisonment and death”.³⁹⁹ The report further stated that:

As reported over the past five years, Sudan is a transit, source, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, sex trafficking and child soldiering. [...] Sudanese law prohibits the recruitment of children as combatants and provides criminal penalties for perpetrators; however, children remained vulnerable to recruitment and use as combatants and in support roles by non-governmental armed groups and militias, primarily in Sudan's conflict zones of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. An international organization reported that the non-governmental Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi, Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid, and Sudan Liberation Army-Popular Defense may have recruited and used child soldiers, and verification was ongoing at the end of the reporting period.⁴⁰⁰

A report by the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict covering the year 2017 stated that the Sudanese Government in “close cooperation with the United Nations resulted in the full implementation of the action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children. A process of building on the action plan in order to develop a national plan for prevention has since been initiated”.⁴⁰¹ Regarding grave violations in Darfur, the report noted that:

The United Nations documented the recruitment and use of 24 children, of which one case, involving the recruitment of a 14-year-old boy by SLA/AW, was verified. In addition, 22 children were detained by the Government for their alleged association with armed groups, for periods lasting between three weeks and five months. All children have been released from detention. [...] Nine incidents of abduction, affecting 10 boys and 3 girls, were verified, all of which were attributed to unidentified armed elements. [...] I am encouraged by the access provided for joint United Nations-Government monitoring and verification missions to barracks and training centres of the armed forces, the issuance of command orders and directives to all Government forces to prevent child recruitment and the release of all children previously detained. There have been no verified reports of the recruitment and use of children by the Government of the Sudan since 2015.⁴⁰²

The US State Department’s June 2018 Trafficking report further commented on progress made in this area noting that “The government made key achievements during the reporting period; therefore Sudan was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included [...] improving screening processes to prevent government armed forces’ recruitment of child soldiers [...]”.⁴⁰³ The report further stated that:

During the reporting year, the NCCW [National Council for Child Welfare] and the Ministry for Social Welfare increased efforts to prevent the use of child soldiers within the SAF and its auxiliaries through the implementation of the National Action Plan to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict. In 2017, the government strengthened its age assessment and screening processes, established disciplinary procedures for those caught engaging in child recruitment, and increased awareness raising campaigns across the military, down to the unit level. The government also coordinated with international organizations to conduct monitoring and verification visits in eight conflict states and through the headquarters of its paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and facilitated the release of 21 child soldiers from non-governmental armed forces in the Darfur region. The NCCW

³⁹⁹ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Prosecution*

⁴⁰⁰ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Trafficking Profile*

⁴⁰¹ UN General Assembly Security Council, [Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General](#), Seventy second session, 16 May 2018, *paragraph 10*

⁴⁰² UN General Assembly Security Council, [Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General](#), Seventy second session, 16 May 2018, *paragraphs 169, 177 and 179*

⁴⁰³ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Tier 2 Watchlist*

also reported partnering with international organizations to provide temporary shelter and services to [...] 21 child soldiers. Shortcomings remained in the reintegration process following the release of child soldiers due to coordination challenges within government agencies and between the government and social services. International organizations noted that the lack of a centralized process led child soldiers to be treated as prisoners of war and held in prolonged detention.⁴⁰⁴

On 22 February 2018, UNAMID reported that:

UNAMID successfully intervened and secured release of 18 minors detained in Shallah Federal Prison after they were found to be working as child soldiers. They were moved from Shallah Federal Prison to the Juvenile Reformatory in North Darfur due to our interventions and were subsequently released to their families.⁴⁰⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

During the reporting period, UNAMID trained 855 personnel (52 women and 803 men), comprising 224 civilian police, 625 military personnel and 6 civilian, on Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict, national and international instruments for protecting children, the impact of armed conflict on children and the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse against children in peacekeeping operations. [...] Furthermore, UNAMID rolled out a campaign entitled “No child soldiers protect Darfur”, aimed at ending and preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed forces and militias.⁴⁰⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported the government of Sudan’s progress and the de-listing of its security forces:

Following the Government’s completion of the March 2016 action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, its security forces were delisted from the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict.

This important achievement reflects the commitment made by the Government of the Sudan to prevent and end violations against children by its security forces and to build national protection systems for children. However, three non-signatory movements, JEM-Gibril, SLA-AW and SLA-MM, remain listed in the report of the Secretary General.⁴⁰⁷

A delegation of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which visited North Darfur in May 2018 and specifically Zamzam camp learned that Children at the camp lack adequate education, support their families through difficult physical labor and fetching water from long distances, and are vulnerable to being recruited into armed forces. Security services have reportedly bribed individuals to recruit youth and bring them out of the camp”.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁴ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Protection*

⁴⁰⁵ UNAMID, [Near Verbatim Opening Remarks by UNAMID Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Mamabolo, at a press conference held in Khartoum](#), 22 February 2018

⁴⁰⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, *Paragraph 36*

⁴⁰⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, *Paragraph 37*

⁴⁰⁸ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, [Country Update: Sudan](#), June 2018, *Conflict, Youth, and Vulnerability*, p. 2

5. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Information on the possibility for humanitarian actors to access areas in need in Darfur can be found in sub-section [3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur](#).

For the human rights situation of IDPs in Darfur between 2014 and 2016 as documented by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur (UNAMID) see their joint report: OHCHR/UNAMID, [The Human Rights Situation of Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur, 2014-2016](#), 21 November 2017

IDP estimates – all Darfur states

As of 31 December 2017 the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that the total number of IDPs in Sudan were 2,072,000 people, of which 17,000 were newly displaced due to ‘conflict and violence’ in 2017 alone.⁴⁰⁹ The source clarified that its displacement estimates are based on “on IDP registration data, covering the 5 states of Darfur and South and West Kordofan, as well as data from the Humanitarian Aid Commission for Blue Nile state, which is not covered by other organisations. The figures are likely to be an underestimate, as not all areas can be accessed for registration of IDPs. New displacement data comes from registered new arrivals in Darfur and South Kordofan, primarily linked with small-scale tribal clashes”.⁴¹⁰

UN OCHA reported that in the first nine months of 2017 “Due to unilateral ceasefires by the Government of Sudan and most armed groups, there has been significantly less conflict related displacement in Darfur” than during the same period in previous years.⁴¹¹ Sudan Humanitarian Fund’s annual report covering 2017 noted that the year “saw relatively low numbers of IDP displacement in Sudan compared to 2016 in which at least 158,600 were newly displaced. In 2017, only about 9,700 people were newly displaced in Darfur. An additional 7,000 people were reportedly displaced in Darfur, but this number is not verified”.⁴¹²

According to the Government of Sudan and as reported by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), “the number of IDPs across Sudan has reduced from 2.3 million last year [2017] to about 1.9 million in May 2018, most of whom are protracted IDPs in Darfur”.⁴¹³

The United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, noted in his briefing to the UN Security Council in May 2018 that:

According to the revised figures of humanitarian actors, in Darfur, some 1.6 million displaced people are registered as living in approximately 60 camps. For unregistered IDPs – that is, displaced people living in rural settlements and urban areas – estimates vary considerably, especially as there is no systematic registration of displacement outside of camps. Nevertheless, the United Nations

⁴⁰⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan: Country Information](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018]

⁴¹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan: Country Information](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018]

⁴¹¹ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2017

⁴¹² Sudan Humanitarian Fund, [Annual Report 2017](#), 2 May 2018, *Displacement*, p. 17

⁴¹³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2018 to January 2019](#), 30 June 2018, *National Overview, Conflict and South Sudanese refugees*, p. 4

humanitarian agencies and partners estimate that an additional 500,000 displaced people live in host communities and settlements in Darfur.⁴¹⁴

UNOCHA provided the following statistics in its 'Humanitarian Snapshot of July 2018:

- Number of IDPs: Two million
- Number of IDPs in camps in Darfur states: 1.6 million
- Newly displaced in Darfur in 2018: 15,000 (compared to 10,000 in 2017 and 152,000 in 2016).⁴¹⁵

The same source noted in its October 'Humanitarian Overview' that "All the new displacement in Darfur in 2018 was in and from Jebel Marra".⁴¹⁶

The European Commission's Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) issued a map in mid-October 2018 which showed the number of refugees, IDPs and malnutrition per state in Sudan, which can be accessed [here](#).⁴¹⁷

UNAMID's Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Mamabolo stated during a press briefing that whilst security has improved in most parts of Darfur, the region is still witnessing "fresh waves of displacement" particularly in various localities in Jebel Marra in both South and Central Darfur.⁴¹⁸

IDP estimates – Jebel Marra

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) reported that since February 2018 "Skirmishes between SAF and Sudan Liberation Army – Abdel Wahid faction (SLA-AW) in pockets of Jebel Marra since February 2018 and the tribal conflict between nomads and sedentary farming communities in Western Jebel Marra displaced about 11,500 people to Rokero town and nearby Jemeza villages. In addition, 8,900 people have been displaced in parts of East and South Jebel Marra in South Darfur in April and May 2018. So far, the IOM registered and verified 2,279 new IDPs from East Jebel Marra in Marshang locality in South Darfur. Marshang IDPs were from Rabkona, Suwannee and Feina villages in East Jebel Marra. Humanitarian agencies reported the arrival of 3,645 new IDPs from East Jebel Marra in Otash camp near Nyala town, the capital of South Darfur. Meanwhile, an unknown number of people reportedly went to hide in mountainous areas. It is also reported that fierce clashes between SAF and SLM-AW occurred in Glolo area in western Jebel Marra in Central Darfur State during the second week of June 2018, forcing thousands of civilians to flee their home villages".⁴¹⁹

In April 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that an estimated 50,000 people displaced by recent fighting between government troops and rebels in Jebel Marra reportedly took refuge in mountain caves in the Libei area.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁴ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [Briefing on UNAMID to the United Nations Security Council by Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, UNAMID Joint Special Representative](#), 10 May 2018, para. 5

⁴¹⁵ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot](#), July 2018

⁴¹⁶ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁴¹⁷ European Commission, Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), [Sudan: Refugees, IDPs and Malnutrition](#), 11 October 2018

⁴¹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Mamabolo: 'Fresh waves of displacement in Darfur's Jebel Marra' as Unamid withdraws](#), 2 December 2018

⁴¹⁹ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2018 to January 2019](#), 30 June 2018, *National Overview, Conflict and South Sudanese refugees*, p. 4

⁴²⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: 50k civilians taking refuge in Jebel Marra caves](#), 5 April 2018

A report by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) noted that since May 2018 in Kass, South Darfur, “an estimated 2,150 people were newly displaced from parts of Jebel Marra because of ongoing armed conflict [...] The new IDPs—the majority women and children—have taken refuge in Kass IDP camps, including Erli, Abdulgabar, Al-Battery, Kass Kabir, and Al-Nahda area of Kass town [...] Community leaders report that more people were displaced but are stranded due to insecurity, and blocked routes to safe areas” reported UN OCHA.⁴²¹

A camp sheikh from Mershing IDP camp in South Darfur told Radio Dabanga that “the number of families who arrived in the camp since the month of Ramadan in May [2018] until last Sunday [early July 2018] reached 450 families, most of them fled from the areas of Rabkona, Sawani, Gena and Libei”.⁴²²

With regards to IDP patterns between September 2017 to 1st October 2018, UN OCHA reported that in July 2018 alone about 900 new IDPs had arrived in Golo, Central Darfur, from East Jebel Marra.⁴²³

As of October 2018 UNOCHA provided the following IDP statistics in its ‘Humanitarian Overview’ on Darfur:

- First half of 2018: some 15,000 people have been newly displaced, compared to 10,000 in 2017 and 152,000 in 2016
- All new displacement in 2018 was in and from Jebel Marra.⁴²⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

The International Organization for Migration registered 11,026 internally displaced persons in South Darfur who had fled fighting between government forces and SLA-AW in eastern Jebel Marra, while 3,010 internally displaced persons were registered in Central Darfur. Verification is ongoing for approximately 5,600 people who reportedly arrived in Golo, (central Jebel Marra), Nertiti, Karo and Thur (western Jebel Marra) and Deribat (eastern Jebel Marra), due to the fighting in the area. This includes some 1,100 people displaced in mid-June into the Golo area, where local authorities have since identified land for relocation. Since January, approximately 14,026 people verified by humanitarian actors have been displaced into various camps and settlements in and around Jebel Marra in South and Central Darfur. In Leiba, eastern Jebel Marra, verification was ongoing for 1,600 newly arrived people.⁴²⁵

According to a report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), “As of November 2018, an estimated 75,000-100,000 people are displaced in Jebel Marra, though this number is unverified given limited access to the area”.⁴²⁶

UNAMID’s Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Mamabolo stated during a press briefing that whilst security has improved in most parts of Darfur, the region is still witnessing “fresh waves of

⁴²¹ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 11-24 June 2018, June 2018, Inter-agency mission identifies new IDPs](#), p. 2

⁴²² Radio Dabanga, [Jebel Marra fighting swells South Darfur camps with new displaced](#), 8 July 2018

⁴²³ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁴²⁴ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁴²⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 20

⁴²⁶ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019](#), December 2018, *IDPs and conflict-affected households in Jebel Marra area of Darfur (Figure 6)*, p. 8

displacement” witnessing in Jebel Marra: “Approximately 16,000 people have been displaced into various camps and settlements in various localities in Jebel Marra in both South and Central Darfur, which represents an increase of 4,000 people since September 2018”.⁴²⁷

5.1 Security

Note that security incidents listed in this section should be seen as illustrative and not exhaustive of the number and type of attacks occurring against IDPs.

Location non-specified, but within Darfur

The U.S. Department of State stated in its annual report covering 2017 that “There were numerous reports of abuse committed by government security forces, rebels, and armed groups against IDPs in Darfur, including rapes and beatings”.⁴²⁸

Sudan Humanitarian Fund’s annual report covering 2017 noted that in 2017 “As the war in Darfur recedes, millions of people in displacement camps began to show signs of restlessness, resulting in a marked increase in cases of inter-communal violence and petty crime both in camps and in host communities”.⁴²⁹

The Minority Rights Group International’s ‘People under Threat 2018’ report contended that “The government in Sudan continues its violent repression and violations of basic civil and political rights. Government forces and paramilitaries continue to attack civilians, particularly IDPs”.⁴³⁰

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

the presence of armed men and armed militiamen in and around internally displaced persons camps continues to pose a major security threat to civilians. Incidents of physical assault, harassment, rape, robbery and intimidation have been routinely reported, for example, during the current year’s [2017] farming season. Internally displaced persons are also subjected to excessive demands for compensation in intercommunal disputes, kidnapping-for-ransom and illegal taxes by armed elements. In particular, clashes between armed Arab groups and remnants of SLA/AW and splinter groups in different localities negatively affect the lives of the internally displaced [...] The poor security situation negatively affects the right to freedom of movement of internally displaced persons.⁴³¹

With regards to the ‘armed elements’ the report clarified that:

In the areas controlled by SLA/AW in Jebel Marra, members of the group reportedly receive food from the internally displaced persons camps; collect taxes from merchants; collect taxes and fuel from the vehicles passing through their area; and beat and/or impose fines on anyone who refuses to

⁴²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Mamabolo: ‘Fresh waves of displacement in Darfur’s Jebel Marra’ as Unamid withdraws](#), 2 December 2018

⁴²⁸ U.S. Department of State, [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, section 2., d. Freedom of Movement

⁴²⁹ Sudan Humanitarian Fund, [Annual Report 2017](#), 2 May 2018, *Long term displacement and livelihoods*, p. 8

⁴³⁰ Minority Rights Group International, [Peoples under Threat 2018](#), 13 June 2018, p.5

⁴³¹ UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, para. 110

abide by their directions. The armed group has reportedly set up collection points in some internally displaced persons camps.⁴³²

The same source further noted with regards to the government's announcement of plans to enter IDP camps to search for weapons that it "gave rise to tensions".⁴³³

Covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017, the January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur noted that:

There has been no progress in the negotiations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights with the Government of the Sudan on a possible technical cooperation programme. In the meantime, the mission has finalized plans for the conduct of night patrols in the 47 camps for internally displaced persons, which were identified as a protection priority during the mapping of settlements of internally displaced persons in Darfur. It is crucial, however, to enhance the capacity of the state authorities and other local actors to effectively carry out the functions relating to the protection of civilians, especially internally displaced persons, and the promotion of human rights. [...] Kalma is one of the seven team sites that will be required to be handed over to formed police units during phase two. As a result of the disarmament campaign, the security situation in Kalma camp, a highly politicized stronghold of SLA/AW, has again deteriorated, after a couple of years of relative calm. As noted above, the Government approached UNAMID for support with the disarmament of the camp. It is therefore recommended that the handover of the site to the formed police units be completed towards the end of phase two of the reconfiguration, by which time the weapons collection campaign would have been completed.⁴³⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

Communities of internally displaced persons were also subject to security related incidents in Darfur. They were the target of 123 criminal incidents, which led to eight fatalities. Other civilians were affected by 208 crime-related incidents, resulting in 42 fatalities, including cases of murder (32), armed robbery (22), attempted robbery (2), assault/harassment (60), burglary/break-in (3), looting (1), abduction (7), shooting (52), threat of violence (3), livestock theft (12), arson (1) and other crimes (13). In the previous reporting period, internally displaced persons were affected by 45 criminal incidents, resulting in six fatalities, and other civilians were affected by 73 criminal incidents, resulting in 10 fatalities.⁴³⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

The overall human rights situation in Darfur remained volatile. UNAMID documented cases of violations of the right to life, arbitrary arrests and detention and sexual and gender-based violence

⁴³² UN, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, paras. 171 and 173

⁴³³ UN, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, para. 112

⁴³⁴ UN Secretary-General, [*Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 4 January 2018, paras. 37, and 52

⁴³⁵ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 27 December 2017, para.14

and conflict-related sexual violence. Internally displaced and other vulnerable persons continued to face harassment while conducting their daily livelihood activities. [...] Internally displaced persons were targeted in 68 criminal incidents, which led to five fatalities.⁴³⁶

UN OCHA reported in its 'Humanitarian Dashboard' covering January to March 2018 that "Protection structures in displaced and returnee communities are weakened by movements and destitution in Darfur, SK and BN, affecting some 300,000 vulnerable IDPs, returnees or host communities".⁴³⁷

The United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, noted in its briefing to the UN Security Council of March 2018 that "instability in some traditionally restive IDP camps such as Kalma, Hassa Hissa and Hamadiya [have been witnessed] These clashes are mainly fueled by traditional and longstanding unresolved socioeconomic and political issues that have been the root causes of Darfur's conflict landscape over the year".⁴³⁸ The same source further noted that "Despite the relative stability, concerns persist, nonetheless that due to insecurity and land occupation issues, many IDPs are not able to return to their areas of origin".⁴³⁹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Internally displaced persons were targeted in 88 crime -related incidents, which led to seven fatalities. Other civilians were affected by 144 crime-related incidents resulting in 46 fatalities, including cases of murder (21), armed robbery (16), attempted robbery (2), assault and harassment (42), burglary and break-in (8), abduction (4), arson (4), shooting (25), attack or ambush (1), threat of violence (2), livestock theft (18) and other (1). In the previous reporting period, internally displaced persons and other civilians were affected by 68 and 92 crime -related incidents respectively, resulting in the deaths of 5 internally displaced persons and 17 other civilians. [...]

Across Darfur, there was an overall decrease during the reporting period in the number of incidents relating to the protection of civilians, including the harassment of internally displaced persons and members of other vulnerable groups during livelihood activities and with regard to access to farmland. The freedom of movement of civilians has also improved, mainly as a result of the government-led weapons collection campaign. However, the persistence of cases of harassment and intimidation of internally displaced persons during their livelihood activities, such as the collection of firewood and grass, and the occupation of villages by armed groups and nomads continue to be sources of concern.

UNAMID integrated field protection teams conducted 84 missions in North (46), Central (1), South (5) and West (32) Darfur. In North Darfur, they visited locations in Umm Barru, Korma, Sortony and Tawilah, where, although the situation was found to be calm, internally displaced persons expressed concern about the activities of Sudan Liberation Army-Peace and Development (SLA-PD) elements and nomads in the Sortony area. Two internally displaced Fur people from Sortony were killed in separate incidents in February, allegedly by nomads.

In Central, South and West Darfur, the teams were informed of similar protection challenges, mainly in the vicinity of internally displaced persons villages and camps.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 22 February 2018, para. 10](#)
⁴³⁷ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Dashboard, Jan – Mar 2018, 31](#) March 2018, p. 3

⁴³⁸ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [Briefing on UNAMID to the United Nations Security Council by Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, UNAMID Joint Special Representative, 14](#) March 2018, para. 6

⁴³⁹ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [Briefing on UNAMID to the United Nations Security Council by Jeremiah N. Mamabolo, UNAMID Joint Special Representative, 14](#) March 2018, para. 9

⁴⁴⁰ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 25](#) April 2018, paras. 10 and 26-28

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported with regards to the weapons collection campaign that “some communities of internally displaced persons believe that the campaign targets specific communities”.⁴⁴¹ The same source further noted that:

Security has been negatively affected by the limited presence and capacity of law enforcement and rule of law institutions outside the main population centres. Although there is a steady increase in the number of cases resolved by rural courts, which are at the forefront of addressing land disputes, their geographical reach remains limited. In addition, the limited presence and capacity of the Sudanese police forces in rural areas leave returnees, internally displaced persons, women and children particularly vulnerable, including to sexual violence. [...]

Land and natural resources remain at the heart of intercommunal conflicts and constitute the key to durable solutions for internally displaced persons. Taking into account the impacts of climate change and desertification in Darfur, accountable and effective land management is also a key factor for stability in Darfur in the long run. Those issues pre-date the conflict in Darfur, which exacerbated a system already under pressure from a dysfunctional legal framework, the environment and contentious political decisions. The war resulted in significant displacements whereby mainly Fur and Masalit tribes lost their fertile lands to several Arab nomadic tribes and, in search of pasture and livelihood, joined the counterinsurgency. Political will and long-term interventions are required regarding those issues.⁴⁴²

Furthermore:

The presence of Sudanese police forces and the judiciary remains limited in Korma [North Darfur], Sereif [South Darfur] and Saraf [North Darfur] Omra [all IDP camps], where militia elements are increasingly turning to criminality. Communities have raised concerns that the formed police units are not engaged sufficiently in outreach and patrolling, particularly in Saraf Omra. It was noted during the review mission that the current formed police unit strength of 140 officers is insufficient to adequately cover camp security and perform mandated tasks, and that the support provided by the units to the activities of individual police officers is very limited.⁴⁴³

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan described in his August 2018 report covering the period from September 2017 to June 2018 among the main human rights challenges that “In Darfur, the Independent Expert noted that the root causes of the conflict were still largely unaddressed. In addition, land occupation and violence targeting internally displaced persons, including sexual violence against displaced girls and women, continued to hinder their return to their areas of origin”.⁴⁴⁴ Furthermore:

Although the disarmament exercise has helped to improve the security situation in some areas of Darfur, the continued presence of armed men and militias threatening the lives, livelihoods and

⁴⁴¹ UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, para. 8

⁴⁴² UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, paras. 9 & 17

⁴⁴³ UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, para. 33

⁴⁴⁴ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, *Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*, 13 August 2018, para. 21

peaceful existence of internally displaced persons leaves many of them preferring to remain in camps with relative security. Internally displaced persons face many challenges within the camps, including lack of adequate food, safe drinking water and adequate health care. Internally displaced persons remain heavily dependent on the services and support of UNAMID and humanitarian agencies for their security, well-being and humanitarian needs. While such services are limited due to security and other challenges, they nonetheless offer critical lifelines for displaced communities. Internally displaced persons regularly express concern over the occupation of their villages and farmlands by armed militias, which has had a negative impact on their right to food security and prospects for return. In some instances, violence, including killings, sexual violence and abduction, was reported to have prompted the forcible eviction of internally displaced persons from the lands to which they had returned. Root causes of the conflict, including discrimination and access to land and livelihoods, remain a major challenge for the longterm stability of Darfur.⁴⁴⁵

The same source further detailed:

For most of the reporting period, the security situation remained relatively stable in Darfur. However, since March 2018 there has been a notable increase in clashes in Jebel Marra, particularly fighting in east Jebel Marra between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid. A series of clashes led to reports of at least 7,300 civilians displaced and the destruction of villages. More than 3,000 new arrivals of internally displaced persons were reported in Otash camp, outside Nyala. Reports indicated that there were also new arrivals of internally displaced in Marshang, Belle El Serief and Kass; these figures are pending verification. Access to many of the affected areas had not been granted to UNAMID or humanitarian actors, which led to temporary disruptions in humanitarian programming in the area.

In addition, in April 2018, at least 11,000 people in north Jebel Marra were displaced to Rokero due to clashes involving armed militias. In May 2018, in Central Darfur, clashes between armed Arab groups and internally displaced persons in camps in Zalingei and Garsila reportedly resulted in multiple deaths among the displaced community. In November 2017, internal fighting was also reported among Sudan

Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid factions, which reportedly resulted in the killing and injury of civilians, destruction of houses and looting of community assets.⁴⁴⁶

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 considered that:

The security situation continued to improve across Darfur outside the Jebel Marra area during the reporting period, aided by the deployment of Government security forces associated with the arms collection campaign, as well as efforts by the Government and UNAMID to promote the peaceful resolution of intercommunal disputes. Nevertheless, there were mounting concerns over farm destructions, land occupation, livestock theft and, generally, over harassment, attacks against internally displaced persons and criminality. Displaced persons in camps in Central, East and South Darfur expressed concerns for their security and reported being intimidated by the presence of armed persons in the camps. Weaknesses in the rule of law institutions in Darfur continue to be exploited by criminals, posing a significant challenge to the security of persons and property.

The overall human rights situation in Darfur remained fragile. Attacks against civilians, in particular against internally displaced persons, including women and children, continued, albeit on a slightly lesser scale, in an environment of impunity.[...]

Sexual and gender-based violence remained a serious concern and restricted women's freedom of movement in areas of return, as well as around internally displaced persons camps, where venturing outside the camps for farming, firewood or water exposes them to risk.[...]

⁴⁴⁵ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 49

⁴⁴⁶ UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 13 August 2018, para. 13-14

The reporting period witnessed a moderate decrease in crime against internally displaced persons as compared with the previous. They were targeted in 181 crime -related incidents, which led to 27 fatalities. Other civilians were affected by 376 crime-related incidents, resulting in 61 fatalities, including cases of murder (46), armed robbery (41), attempted robbery (10), assault/harassment (124), burglary/break-in (25), looting (1), abduction (8), arson (2), shooting (73), attack/ambush (7), threat (7), others (14), and livestock theft (18). In the previous three-month period, internally displaced persons and other civilians were affected by 180 and 325 crime -related incidents, respectively, resulting in the deaths of 34 internally displaced persons and 91 other civilians.[...] In West Darfur, teams were informed of similar protection challenges. In Nuri village area, the community reported an increased presence of armed settlers harassing and intimidating internally displaced persons from Sisi camp. UNAMID has raised the issue with authorities.⁴⁴⁷

The same source reported with regards to militia clashes that:

The Northern Rizeigat nomads reportedly continued to harass internally displaced persons and farmers in the Thur area of western Jebel Marra. Incidents were reported of a group of farmers being assaulted and robbed by nomads on horseback south-east of Nertiti on 27 August and of militiamen and Rapid Support Forces personnel assaulting an internally displaced person in Thur on 5 September for alleged support for SLA-AW.⁴⁴⁸

North Darfur

Radio Dabanga reported in October 2017 that armed men shot, killed and stole money, property and a donkey from a displaced man from Bata Borno IDP camp in North Darfur's Kutum locality as he was working on a farm east of the camp.⁴⁴⁹

In November 2017 the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations told the UN Security Council that "intercommunal violence also persisted, citing continuing tensions involving internally displaced persons, the Arab community, and the Sudan Liberation Army/Popular Defence (SLA/PD) in Sortony, north Darfur" and specifically mentioned that in early November 2017 "African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) had prevented a group of armed Arabs from entering the internally displaced persons site, she said, adding that on 10 November, the mission had intercepted a group of Arab nomads firing randomly on the outskirts of Sortony".⁴⁵⁰

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

Criminal elements associated with the Sudan Liberation Army/Peace and Development [sic] (SLA/PD) continued to harass the internally displaced persons community in Sortony, while provoking clashes with the nomadic tribes in the area.

Following the theft, on 6 January, of 14 cattle by SLA/PD from the nomads in the area tensions rose between the nomads and internally displaced persons in Sortony gathering site, where SLA/PD took

⁴⁴⁷ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 12](#) October 2018, paras. 10-, 11, 12, 14 and 28

⁴⁴⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 7

⁴⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Ambulance driver, displaced man killed in North Darfur](#), 6 October 2017

⁴⁵⁰ UN Security Council, [Nearly One Third of Darfur's People Still Displaced, Despite Drop in Violence, Assistant Secretary-General Tells Security Council](#), 15 November 2017

shelter. Government security personnel intervened on 23 January to arrest those responsible and to collect weapons in the camp, which proceeded without incident.⁴⁵¹

The report further detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

The leaders of Abu Shouk camp in El Fasher stated that, following the weapons collection campaign in parts of North Darfur, the security situation had improved and some internally displaced persons returned seasonally to their places of origin in Jebel Si in Kabkabiya locality, in Tila, Hillet Fuocca, Lumbati, Jabalen and Tangarara villages in Korma locality, and Kofod village in El Fasher rural area.⁴⁵²

In mid-February 2018 a 15-year old boy was “shot dead and his body mutilated by militiamen near the Sortony IDP camp” whilst the boy and his friends were collecting firewood.⁴⁵³

In early May 2018 Radio Dabanga reported about an attack by militiamen against a number of IDPs and “threats raised against them should they want to return to the area west of Tabit in North Darfur”.⁴⁵⁴

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) published an article in May 2018 focusing on the village of Sortoni, North Darfur, which hosts over 23,000 IDPs who fled fighting in Jebel Marra over two years ago and who are “still reluctant to return home despite the difficulties of life in the displaced people’s camps”.⁴⁵⁵ The same article noted further that “Violence is never far away, as armed tribal groups live close to the camp and frequently come into conflict with the displaced people over grazing rights. We hear of women and children who have been attacked, beaten, sexually assaulted and sometimes even kidnapped, while searching for grass, wood or water outside the camp. It is not uncommon for men to be captured and killed”.⁴⁵⁶

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

In North Darfur [...] In Mellit, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the absence of Sudanese police forces inside the camps and outside Mellit town, while locals raised concerns about the lack of medicine and water.. In Zamzam, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the low presence of Sudanese police forces and the occupation of their lands by new settlers, while in Abu Shouk camp concerns were raised regarding the lack of access to food, water and health services.⁴⁵⁷

Radio Dabanga reported in November 2018 about the launch of the dismantling of Abu Shou, El Salam and Zamzam IDP camps in North Darfur into “fully serviced residential districts”, giving IDPs the option to “return [to their areas of origin], resettle [to other areas] or integrate [in their current

⁴⁵¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, paras. 14 and 15

⁴⁵² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, para. 6

⁴⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Boy killed as militiamen shoot at children in North Darfur](#), 19 February 2018

⁴⁵⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen attack group of returnees in Tawila, North Darfur](#), 11 May 2018

⁴⁵⁵ Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), [Sudan: Dreams of returning home remain distant for displaced in Darfur](#), 18 May 2018

⁴⁵⁶ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018

⁴⁵⁷ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 33

host communities]”.⁴⁵⁸ According to the article the governor announced that families “wishing to settle in the new plans would be granted a 300 square metre piece of land with an ownership certificate, this along with giving new names to the new housing schemes, linking them to an internal water network and providing services that would suit the population socially and environmentally”.⁴⁵⁹ According to earlier plans the first phase would include the resettlement of 45,000 families – meaning at least 135,000 people.⁴⁶⁰

South Darfur

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) documented that “four IDPs were killed and 29 injured” in Kalmah camp in South Darfur in September 2017 when “integrated Government forces fired gunshots on demonstrators”, protesting against Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir’s visit to South Darfur.⁴⁶¹ UNAMID reported three deaths and 26 injured⁴⁶², whilst Amnesty International reported five deaths and 33 injured.⁴⁶³

Radio Dabanga reported in October 2017 that “Three displaced women from Gireida [IDP] camp who were out on the fields came under attack by gunmen”, sustaining deep injuries, a broken leg and hand.⁴⁶⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

the Government is reasserting control over the camps for internally displaced persons, including settlements that, to date, had been considered out of their reach. On 2 November, in an apparent show of force, its security forces entered parts of the Kalma camp in South Darfur, with dozens of gun trucks and anti-personnel carriers. Subsequently, the Joint Special Representative held two meetings with the Second Vice-President of the Sudan and with the Governor of South Darfur, on 9 and 14 November, which resulted in the establishment of a trilateral committee composed of the internally displaced persons, the state government and UNAMID, to oversee the collection of weapons in Kalma camp as of 10 December. No incidents have been reported to date.⁴⁶⁵

It was reported that in March 2018 a number of IDPs were injured in an attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the Gireida camp when they stormed the camp looking for three wanted individuals.⁴⁶⁶

Radio Dabanga reported in April 2018 with regards to South Darfur’s Kalma IDP camp’s announcement of its closure within two weeks, the “arrest of seven of the leaders of the displaced people of the camp given their objection to this proposed move”.⁴⁶⁷ During the same month three

⁴⁵⁸ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur Govt, RSF launch camp dismantling](#), 6 November 2018

⁴⁵⁹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur Govt, RSF launch camp dismantling](#), 6 November 2018

⁴⁶⁰ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur approves plan to resettle 45,000 displaced families](#), 16 October 2018

⁴⁶¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Militia Chaos in Darfur: What’s Next?](#), October 2018, *Extrajudicial killings* p. 16

⁴⁶² United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID calls for restraint in clashes between government forces and internally displaced at Kalma camp, South Darfur](#), 22 September 2017

⁴⁶³ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 124th Session 8 October-2 November 2018](#), 11 September 2018, 7.1 Displacement in Sudan, p. 21

⁴⁶⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Ambulance driver, displaced man killed in North Darfur](#), 6 October 2017

⁴⁶⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, para. 6

⁴⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Govt. militia beat, rob residents of South Darfur camp](#), 4 March 2018

⁴⁶⁷ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur Wali determined to dismantle Kalma camp](#), 26 April 2018

children were “wounded” when three Janjaweed “intercepted and beat them whilst they were out collecting firewood”.⁴⁶⁸

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

As at 31 May 2018, the handover from the military to formed police units was completed at six team sites, and the final handover, at Kalma [South Darfur], is scheduled for June 2018, as planned. Since the handover of those sites, no threats of a military nature have been observed.

Radio Dabanga reported in June 2018 that at least 17 people were “injured in a clash that erupted between displaced farmers”, returning to their land for cultivation, and residents of Deshisha village in South Darfur.⁴⁶⁹ During the same month “Government forces formed a cordon around Turr in Kass locality, South [...] and conducted large-scale house-to-house searches, beating and humiliating the residents. At least 10 displaced people were arrested from their homes during the search”.⁴⁷⁰

Radio Dabanga reported that in early September 2018, in two separate incidents two IDP women from Otash camp in Nyala, South Darfur, were stabbed by militiamen.⁴⁷¹

In mid-September 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “a number of herders held three displaced people from Selo camp in Mershing area, and demanded SDG 15,000 for the release of their possessions. One of the sheikhs in the South Darfur camp told Radio Dabanga that a number of herders seized the three camp residents when they were west of the camp collecting firewood. “The three victims were released on Monday, but the herders demand SDG15,000 for their carts”.⁴⁷²

Central Darfur

In September 2017 Radio Dabanga documented that “two teachers and eight people were abducted [...] houses torched [...] and property from the camp residents stolen” in an attack by militiamen on the IDP camp Bindisi, which according to “Unverified reports [...] might be related to a retaliation attack, following the discovery of the body of a 12-year-old girl near the camp” earlier that week.⁴⁷³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

In several camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, namely, North and Straina camps in Nertiti area, and Hasahisa, Hamidiya Khamsa and Dagayeg in the Zalingei area, and surrounding areas comprising of Orokom Fatnakaral and Tamar Boljimail villages, the communities expressed concern about the involvement of RSF in the disarmament campaign and requested UNAMID presence during the conduct of the exercise.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Gunmen assault three children in Central Darfur](#), 16 April 2018

⁴⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Clash between displaced farmers, villagers in South Darfur leaves 17 injured](#), 18 June 2018

⁴⁷⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Arrests as government forces besiege Turr in Darfur's Jebel Marra](#), 24 June 2018

⁴⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur sheikh slain in armed robbery](#), 3 September 2018

⁴⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Farmers, firewood collectors attacked in South Darfur](#), 18 September 2018

⁴⁷³ Radio Dabanga, [Two teachers killed in raid in Central Darfur](#), 29 September 2017

⁴⁷⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, para. 7

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported in December 2017 of the “gang rape of a 16-year old girl and a woman, both belonging to the Fur ethnic group and residing in the IDP camp in Nertiti town”, Central Darfur state, by Janjaweed militia men.⁴⁷⁵

In January 2018 ACJPS reported that five IDPs were killed and 26 others sustained gunshot wounds following the “opening of live ammunition against a group of protesters at Hasahisa IDP camp in Zalingi [Zalingei], Central Darfur, by joint forces of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)”.⁴⁷⁶ According to reporting by Radio Dabanga on the same incident, four people were killed and 44 others injured.⁴⁷⁷ The same source further explained that the protest took place demonstrating against the “rampant insecurity in the area” following the raiding of the Hasahisa camp market by a group of militiamen.⁴⁷⁸

Amnesty International, in its submission to the UN Human Rights Committee, highlighted the following two specific attacks on IDP camps in Central Darfur in January 2018:

In January 2018, RSF soldiers entered Nertiti camp in Central Darfur and arrested and arrested [sic] six IDP leaders. In the same month, Hasahisa IDP camp in Zalingei was attacked by RSF and one person was killed and five were injured.⁴⁷⁹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

As the campaign moved into internally displaced persons camps, internally displaced persons were reported to have been either physically assaulted or harassed on a number of occasions by RSF during the weapons collection. On 10 January, at the Thur internally displaced persons camp, Central Darfur, RSF reportedly arrested four internally displaced persons. On 11 January, during the weapons collection in North and Straha internally displaced persons camps, Central Darfur, RSF reportedly arrested 8 Fur and 20 Arab sheikhs in order to gather information about persons in possession of weapons and the hiding places for weapons and motorcycles. While local leaders in Nertiti locality, Central Darfur, expressed support for the weapons collections campaign, they stressed that it should be inclusive in order to also ensure the disarmament of nomadic communities.⁴⁸⁰

Furthermore:

Tensions increased in two camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, notably Hasahisa and the Hamidiya camps, near Zalingei. Following a quarrel between members of the Fur internally displaced persons and of the Beni Halba host community in December 2017, the internally displaced persons prevented all Beni Halba from entering the Hasahisa market. On 20 January the two groups engaged in a violent confrontation, which resulted in four internally displaced persons and one Beni Halba being killed and 38 persons being injured. In a separate incident, on 22 January, two internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp were assaulted by a group of men while conducting livelihood activities outside the camp, and on 31 January there were clashes between internally displaced persons from Hamidiya camp and the Beni Halba, who prevented them from collecting wood in

⁴⁷⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [*Government allied militia gang rape a 16-year-old girl and a woman in Nertiti, Central Darfur State*](#), 19 December 2017

⁴⁷⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [*Five IDPs killed as SAF and RSF use live ammunition to disperse a protest in Central Darfur*](#), 24 January 2018

⁴⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*‘Four shot dead in Central Darfur camp protests’: Coordinator*](#), 22 January 2018

⁴⁷⁸ Radio Dabanga, [*‘Four shot dead in Central Darfur camp protests’: Coordinator*](#), 22 January 2018

⁴⁷⁹ Amnesty International, [*Sudan: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 124th Session 8 October-2 November 2018*](#), 11 September 2018, 7.1 Displacement in Sudan, p. 21

⁴⁸⁰ UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 22 February 2018, para. 6

Boronka area (10 km from the camp). Sudan Police created a buffer zone in Hasahisa camp, arrested three suspects, and are working with the community leaders towards a reconciliation initiative.⁴⁸¹

The report further detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

Sudan Police sources reported that, in Otash internally displaced persons camp, Nyala, South Darfur, internally displaced persons' leaders handed over 821 weapons during the voluntary phase of the campaign. In the Kalma internally displaced persons camp in South Darfur, the agreement reached between the Government of the Sudan and the leadership of the camp, facilitated by UNAMID, continued to hold.⁴⁸²

UNAMID reported in May 2018 on attacks against three different IDP camps - Khamsa Dagaig, Ardayba and Jedda [all Central Darfur] - resulting in a number of civilian fatalities and injuries among IDPs.⁴⁸³ Sudan Tribune reporting on the attack on three IDPs in Ardiba [spelled Ardayba in previous sentence] camp, which killed them all, also stated that a "second attack had taken place killing a displaced woman and wounding several others residing in a camp in Zalingei" earlier in the month.⁴⁸⁴ Amnesty International, in its submission to the UN Human Rights Committee, provided the following additional information with regards to these attacks on the three IDP camps:

On 21 May 2018, five members of the RSF on board a pick-up truck mounted with machine-guns attacked an [sic] Khamsa Dagaig IDP camp in Central Darfur's city of Zalingei using live ammunition. A 22-year-old woman was shot in the head and later died at the hospital. Ten displaced people, including children, were injured in their head, neck, arms and legs. On 22 May 2018, armed tribal militia attacked Ardayba and Jedda IDP camps in the city of Garsila, in central Darfur State. The same camps were attacked again the following morning and five people were killed and many more wounded.⁴⁸⁵

Radio Dabanga reported in June 2018 that a leader of one of the camps for displaced people in northern Nierteti in Central Darfur was "shot dead" by three unidentified gunmen.⁴⁸⁶

Two IDP men were "shot dead by unknown gunmen on their way back to their IDP camp in Zalingei", Central Darfur at the end of August 2018.⁴⁸⁷ Earlier in the month a "displaced man and his wife were shot dead" and "robbed by gunmen near the village where they cultivate land before returning" to Hasahisa IDP camp.⁴⁸⁸

In September 2018 the same source published an article stating that supposedly drunk members of the Sudanese army "opened fire and wounded people", as well as "robbed two people of their money", in the IDP camp of Turr in Central Darfur.⁴⁸⁹ During the same month "herders shot and wounded a 13-year old IDP girl of Nierteti camp whilst she was out gathering firewood with three

⁴⁸¹ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, para. 13

⁴⁸² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, para. 5

⁴⁸³ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID deeply concerned about recent attacks on IDP camps in Central Darfur](#), 24 May 2018

⁴⁸⁴ Sudan Tribune, [More 3 IDPs killed in Central Darfur: rebels](#), 23 May 2018

⁴⁸⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 124th Session 8 October-2 November 2018](#), 11 September 2018, 7.1 Displacement in Sudan, p. 21

⁴⁸⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur camp leader murdered](#), 22 June 2018

⁴⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Gunmen attack three people in Darfur, two killed](#), 31 August 2018

⁴⁸⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Couple killed in attack on Central Darfur village](#), 6 August 2018

⁴⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Gunmen attack and rob displaced, farmer in Central Darfur](#), 28 September 2018

other girls”.⁴⁹⁰ Earlier in the month members of the military intelligence arrested three IDPs from Turr camp and took them to an unknown location according to Radio Dabanga.⁴⁹¹

In November 2018 a displaced woman farmer was “killed when an aircraft of the Sudanese Air Force launched a bombardment of the areas east of Nierteti” in Central Darfur reported Radio Dabanga.⁴⁹²

West Darfur

An IDP of the Kendebbe camp in West Darfur was killed and robbed by an unknown gunman on his return from praying at the local mosque.⁴⁹³

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that “in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farms around El Geneina and in Kuraynik”.⁴⁹⁴

Radio Dabanga reported that in October 2018 a group of herders “bound and beat” a number of IDPs from Murnei camp in West Darfur whilst they were collecting firewood, causing serious injuries to four of them.⁴⁹⁵

Enforced return

Early September 2017 President Omar al-Bashir reportedly said that “it was time to shut camps hosting millions of displaced people from the conflict in Darfur as the war in the region had ended”, alleging further that the IDP camps had become “business ventures for foreign aid groups”.⁴⁹⁶

A May 2018 Small Arms Survey report noted that:

In Darfur, the government continues to reverse the conventional sequence of armed conflict resolution, skipping over a comprehensive peace agreement and the disarmament and demobilization of most combatants, and is instead pressing ahead with the return of displaced populations and civilian disarmament, first voluntarily and then forcibly from October 2017. In most post-conflict settings civilian disarmament and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) rely on consent, including from previous armed opposition groups, and the reassertion of the state’s monopoly on violence after the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement. In Darfur’s case these operations are replacing—and in some cases reproducing—the counter-insurgency operations that the sanctions were supposed to end. [...]

State-level authorities appear to envisage the disarmament campaign as a precursor to dismantling Darfur’s IDP camps. This threat was dramatized in early November 2017, when RSF forces and members of other government security agencies with over 100 vehicles surrounded and threatened to enter Darfur’s largest IDP camp, Kalma in South Darfur, to search for weapons as part of the

⁴⁹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur Girl shot by herders](#), 24 September 2018

⁴⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Farmers attacked, displaced men arrested](#), 21 September 2018

⁴⁹² Radio Dabanga, [Civilian dies in Central Darfur air strafing](#), 20 November 2018

⁴⁹³ Radio Dabanga, [Man bayoneted to death in Darfur, others injured in clash with RSF militia](#), 18 February 2018

⁴⁹⁴ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 7

⁴⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Herders bind, beat displaced wood gatherers in West Darfur](#), 18 October 2018

⁴⁹⁶ News24, [Sudan’s Bashir says time to empty camps of Darfur displaced](#), 6 November 2017

forcible disarmament campaign, and in response to the deaths of two government personnel during violence between camp residents and Sudanese security forces on the occasion of President Bashir's visit to South Darfur. This incursion was defused, and indeed Darfur's IDP camps (including Kalma) have experienced previous threats from state governors to disarm residents and relocate or remove camp infrastructure, notably in 2010. Nonetheless, international humanitarian and civilian protection officials fear that the disarmament campaign may become a justification—if not a violent instrument—for accelerating IDP returns and dismantling the camps, an acceleration that the government and UNAMID leadership wish to see in spite of the low levels of voluntary returns. The latter is unsurprising in the absence of any resolution of the key obstacles to the IDPs' return such as disputes over land ownership and expropriation, and a basic lack of confidence in the ethnicized militias that the Sudanese government is using as state security providers.⁴⁹⁷

In March 2018 in North Darfur's Abu Shouk IDP camp IDPs strongly condemned "attempts by the North Darfur government to forcibly dismantle and re-plan" the camp "for enforce[d] return under the pretext of voluntary repatriation".⁴⁹⁸

In East Darfur the displaced people of camp Neem set a package of conditions for voluntary return in March 2018 including "providing security and services. They also demand that their farms and residential lands be returned to them in full".⁴⁹⁹

Radio Dabanga reported in April 2018 that with regards to South Darfur's Kalma IDP camp:

The Wali of South Darfur Adam El Faki has announced his determination to dismantle Kalma camp for displaced people, one of the largest camps in Darfur and evacuate the displaced within two weeks as part of Al Bashir's voluntary return plan and eliminate the camps in the region by the end of the year. The governor said in a speech to a group of returnees to a village in South Darfur, we are going to dismantle camp Kalma within one or two weeks. He added: "People have better leave the camp which we will empty within a week since voluntary return project is the president's plan. He emphasised that by the end of the year 2018 there will be "no camps, food aid, relief, or organisations".⁵⁰⁰

In June 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that the government of Sudan had reportedly "no plans to forcibly evict the displaced from the camps in Darfur" but instead gave Darfuri IDPs living in camps three options: "Return to their villages of origin, resettlement in another area as desired by the displaced, or integration into the host community".⁵⁰¹

In July 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that President Omar Al Bashir "has directed the government of South Darfur to promote voluntary return by providing services to the returnees to ensure their stability".⁵⁰²

Radio Dabanga similarly reported in November 2018 about the launch of the dismantling of Abu Shou, El Salam and Zamzam IDP camps in North Darfur into "fully serviced residential districts", giving IDPs the option to "return [to their areas of origin], resettle [to other areas] or integrate [in

⁴⁹⁷ Small Arms Survey, [Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and reality](#), May 2018, A 'new normal' for Sudan's periphery conflicts? p.36-9

⁴⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur displaced reject Abu Shouk camp re-planning](#), 29 March 2018

⁴⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [East Darfur displaced set strict conditions for return after attack, 18](#) March 2018

⁵⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur Wali determined to dismantle Kalma camp](#), 26 April 2018

⁵⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan govt. denies policy of forced eviction from Darfur camps](#), 11 June 2018

⁵⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Al Bashir: 'Promote voluntary return in South Darfur'](#), 31 July 2018

their current host communities]”.⁵⁰³ According to the article the governor announced that families “wishing to settle in the new plans would be granted a 300 square metre piece of land with an ownership certificate, this along with giving new names to the new housing schemes, linking them to an internal water network and providing services that would suit the population socially and environmentally”.⁵⁰⁴

In early November the North Darfur state government and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched the dismantling of the IDP camps of Abu Shouk, Zamzam and El Salam in El Fasher locality, granting residents “a 300 square metre piece of land with an ownership certificate or voluntarily return to their home areas” reported Radio Dabanga.⁵⁰⁵

5.2 Access to basic services

Number of people in need of humanitarian assistance

UN OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian Snapshot’ noted that of the 5.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan as of 1 December 2018, 2 million were IDPs.⁵⁰⁶ The same source noted in its ‘Darfur Humanitarian Overview’ that 3.14 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur as of 1 October 2018 and provided the following breakdown:

- 1.76 million people in protracted displacement
- 780,000 vulnerable residents
- 300,000 refugees
- 295, 710 returnees.⁵⁰⁷

In its ‘2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview’, published in February 2018, UN OCHA stated that “Darfur remains an epicentre of large-scale protracted displacement and most IDPs are unable to meet their basic needs independently. While the number of people displaced in 2017 has been limited, new needs have emerged in areas that have opened up to humanitarian workers, especially in Jebel Marra [...]”.⁵⁰⁸ The same report further noted that “Refugees living in protracted situations in Darfur and eastern Sudan remain largely dependent on humanitarian assistance, with a very small amount having access to livelihood opportunities”.⁵⁰⁹

In September 2017 a rapid inter-agency assessment took place in East Jebel Marra – “the first time in several years” according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) – finding that “more than 100,000 people living in 46 villages continue to be displaced, face significant difficulty accessing land for cultivation, and remain dispossessed of productive assets lost during displacement in 2016. This population includes approximately 62,000 people from the host community, 42,000 protracted IDPs and 1,000 returnees”.⁵¹⁰ Reporting on the same assessment USAID noted that the

⁵⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur Govt, RSF launch camp dismantling](#), 6 November 2018

⁵⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur Govt, RSF launch camp dismantling](#), 6 November 2018

⁵⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur: ‘150,000’ people returned, camps renamed to towns](#), 30 November 2018

⁵⁰⁶ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot](#), 1 December 2018

⁵⁰⁷ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁵⁰⁸ UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, *Part I: Humanitarian Needs & Key Figures*, p. 5

⁵⁰⁹ UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, *Part I: Humanitarian Impact*, p. 10

⁵¹⁰ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security Outlook, October 2017 to May 2018, 1](#) October 2017, p. 4

team “identified critical gaps in health and nutrition assistance, with only one functioning health center in the area and more than 19,000 children requiring nutrition support”.⁵¹¹

Access to basic services (general overview)

Following an inter-agency mission by UNICEF and WHO to Deribat area, East Jebel Marra locality, in September 2017 it was found that 105,000 people living in 46 villages were in need of assistance of which 42,000 were protracted IDPs and 1,000 returnees.⁵¹² Specifically it was found that that 7,140 IDP children and 163 returnee children were in need of nutrition services, that there was a lack of health and nutrition services, high levels of poverty and high cost of healthcare.⁵¹³

Covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017, the January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur recorded that:

While the security situation has visibly improved, the humanitarian indicators illustrate a continuing emergency situation, with 2.7 million people displaced, of whom 2.1 million are in need of assistance across Darfur, and more than half a million children face severe acute malnutrition. Approximately 1.6 million displaced people live in a range of camps and settlements in close proximity to urban or peri-urban centres, with many of them displaced since 2003 and, for multiple reasons, unable or unwilling to return to their places of origin [...]

In the above context, the humanitarian community is facing two main challenges. The first concerns the large proportions of people affected by displacement and other vulnerable residents who are facing a situation where humanitarian assistance cannot meet their chronic and long-term needs, which remain largely unaddressed owing to limited investment in human resources and physical infrastructure. As part of a broader durable solutions strategy for Darfur, consideration needs to be given to a pragmatic, longer-term approach that provides assistance to those long-term displaced persons located in urban or peri-urban areas in Darfur. The second challenge relates to the depletion of natural resources in the context of desertification and continued population growth, paired with persistent pockets of insecurity and weak institutions, which are unable to change the status quo. The situation calls for appropriate interventions so as to break the cycle of poverty and instability and offer the population longer-term, pragmatic solutions.⁵¹⁴

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

While access to food has improved among internally displaced persons and poor households in Jebel Marra, limited agricultural labour opportunities and low asset holdings will continue to limit household productive capacity. The most affected households will continue to face acute food insecurity (phase 3 — crisis, according to the Classification) between October 2017 and January 2018. Developments in South Sudan continue to have an impact on the humanitarian situation in Darfur. As of 15 December, nearly 192,826 South Sudanese were hosted across the Darfur states. About 17 per cent of the refugees live in two East Darfur refugee camps managed by UNHCR and Government counterparts, while the majority are sharing resources with host communities and internally displaced persons in over 30 locations. Although host communities have largely welcomed the

⁵¹¹ USAID, [Sudan – Complex Emergency](#), 30 September 2017, *Darfur*, p. 2

⁵¹² UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 11-24 September](#), September 2017, 105,000 people in the Deribat area, East Jebel Marra locality, need assistance, p. 1

⁵¹³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 11-24 September](#), September 2017, 105,000 people in the Deribat area, East Jebel Marra locality, need assistance, p. 1

⁵¹⁴ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, paras. 47 & 49

refugees and peacefully co-exist with them, basic services and natural resources are overstretched in most areas and this needs to be addressed so as to avert possible conflicts over resources.⁵¹⁵

In January 2018 the UN Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in a briefing to the UN Security Council told them that “Thus far, the humanitarian indicators illustrate a continuing emergency situation”.⁵¹⁶ As a result the UN Security Council found that “Despite improvements in the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, continued challenges remain [...] underlining the need for sustainable solutions for the region’s 2.7 million internally displaced persons”.⁵¹⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed with regards to the impact of the weapons collection campaign that:

On 2 January, some 129 families from East Jebel Marra locality arrived in Otash internally displaced persons camp near Nyala, South Darfur, fleeing infighting between Gadora and Zanoon SLA/AW factions. The infighting reportedly started in November over control of checkpoints and tax collection from farmers selling their products in Deribat, Kidingeer and Kara. [...] Land access restrictions, limited agricultural labour opportunities and low asset holdings resulting from the impact of the prevailing insecurity conditions in parts of Jebel Marra continue to limit household productive capacity. Recent increases in commodity prices, such as that of wheat, have negatively affected food security, in particular among vulnerable populations.⁵¹⁸

Amnesty International reported that “Between March and May 2018, government forces and pro-government militias, especially the Rapid Support Force, attacked and burned villages in south-east Jebel Marra during military operations against the Sudan Liberation Army Al-Waahid (SLA/AW)” resulting in the displacement of between 12,000 and 20,000 people who are currently living in the Jebel Marra Mountains “in extreme hardship and with no access to humanitarian assistance”.⁵¹⁹

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that “Although no major displacement has taken place during the past two years, durable and pragmatic solutions need to be found to enable the settlement of almost 2 million internally displaced persons”.⁵²⁰ Furthermore:

The Sudan has faced two major overlapping humanitarian challenges since 2003: one triggered by the impact of the conflict, which has led to large-scale population displacement; and another due to climate conditions, which has contributed to food insecurity and malnutrition. Many communities continue to lack access to services and support. Humanitarian assistance to the Sudan has declined over the years, and Darfur remains the most affected region. The implementation of the

⁵¹⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, paras. 19-20

⁵¹⁶ UN News, [Darfur: Displacement slows but returns remain difficult, warns UN peacekeeping chief](#), 10 January 2018

⁵¹⁷ UN News, [Security Council stresses need of ‘sustainable solutions’ for millions of displaced in Darfur](#), 31 January 2018

⁵¹⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, paras. 21 & 2

⁵¹⁹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur](#), 29 June 2018

⁵²⁰ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 69

humanitarian response plan for the Sudan developed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat (see www.unocha.org/sudan) faces serious funding challenges, and at the time of writing was 23 per cent funded.

In Darfur there are 159 humanitarian entities, including 14 United Nations agencies and other international organizations, 39 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 106 national NGOs [...].

Since 2016, improvements in the security situation have led to a shift towards early recovery and peacebuilding. Recovery and development efforts are hampered by low confidence in governance and rule of law institutions, the destruction of infrastructure, limited livelihoods and employment opportunities, the erosion of social cohesion and community stability, unresolved land ownership, the unsustainable management of natural resources and poor access to basic social services. As a result, many conflict-affected people are still dependent on humanitarian assistance. Climate change is having severe consequences in the form of land degradation and desertification and competition over land and water, which is further aggravated by poor management and low institutional capacities to mitigate risks.⁵²¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Clashes between the Sudanese military and SLA-AW in East Jebel Marra on 10 and 11 March reportedly led to the displacement of some people from Feina, who gathered in the Goroland, Bani, Korenga, Tima and Golo areas. As a result of the fighting, some humanitarian activities, in particular relating to the delivery of water, hygiene and sanitation, and food security and livelihood packages, have been suspended temporarily in Deribat, Kidingir, Jawa, Belle Sereif and Layba.⁵²²

Doctors Without Borders head of mission in Sudan, Elmounzer Ag Jiddou, explained in a May 2018 article the daily challenges faced by residents in the Sortoni IDP camp in North Darfur:

Living in Sortoni is unimaginable for most. It is a bleak, congested place with over 23,000 people living packed together. Food rations provided by the World Food Program have been reduced to only two staples and the quantity has been slashed. The supply of water is limited.

Violence is never far away, as armed tribal groups live close to the camp and frequently come into conflict with the IDPs over [cattle] grazing rights. We hear of women and children who have been attacked, beaten, sexually assaulted, and sometimes even kidnapped while searching for grass, wood, or water outside the camp. It is not uncommon for men to be captured and killed [...]

The lack of clean water often forces families to search for alternative sources. The 7.5 liters per day provided to each person is not enough for cooking, cleaning, and for their animals. Often they risk going to stagnant pools of contaminated water, which can cause sickness like acute diarrhea.

Most people in the camp are women and children. Many of the men died during the years of fighting or are elsewhere trying to scrape together a small income to support their families. In some very difficult situations both parents have died and a young child, sometimes no older than 11 or 12, is given the responsibility to raise his or her siblings. The psychological pressure on them can be immense.⁵²³

Reporting in June 2018 UNAMID stated that “Intensified fighting this month, characterized by the burning of villages in eastern Jebel Marra has had grave humanitarian consequences, with hundreds of civilians being newly displaced” local reports indicating that some 900 people have found refuge

⁵²¹ UN, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 1 June 2018, paras. 23, 24 & 26

⁵²² UN Secretary-General, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 25 April 2018, para.18

⁵²³ Doctors Without Borders, [*Sudan: "Violence is never far away" for People Stranded in North Darfur's Sortoni Camp*](#), 24 May 2018

at a school in Golo town”.⁵²⁴ UNOCHA noted with regards to these newly displaced that they were living in overcrowded conditions without access to sanitation facilities. Moreover, “Finding alternative accommodation for the IDPs is of the utmost importance, given that 1,100 students are enrolled to begin lessons in October at the school”.⁵²⁵ Radio Dabanga reported in July 2018 that the displaced people in Libel in East Jebel Marra called for better provision of humanitarian assistance and the permanent presence of UNAMID peacekeeping mission due to ongoing fighting in the region.⁵²⁶

The leader of the Kassab IDP camp in Kutum, North Darfur told Radio Dabanga that “the displaced people in Darfur live in difficult humanitarian and health conditions, pointing to a lack of employment opportunities, rise of prices, and prevention of displaced farmers from land cultivation or fetching firewood”.⁵²⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

[...] an inter-agency assessment undertaken in Thur, in western Jebel Marra, suggested that food, shelter and non-food items were the most urgent needs. In Belle el-Sereif, medical services were insufficient, and water and sanitation conditions were poor. In Leiba and Mershing, in eastern Jebel Marra, health facilities and equipment were found to be lacking. While humanitarian partners were able to undertake inter-agency assessments in some areas, insecurity prevented visits to others affected by ongoing armed clashes.⁵²⁸

Radio Dabanga reported in November 2018 that community leaders in Nyala’s Otash camp in South Darfur have documented that 284 people, mostly elderly and children, have died in the past three months due to disease and lack of food.⁵²⁹

Access to housing

The ‘2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview’, published in February 2018, by UN OCHA stated that “In Darfur, some 1.6 million displaced people are registered as living in camps. For unregistered IDPs – that is, displaced people living in rural settlements and urban areas – estimates vary considerably, especially as there is no systematic registration of displacement outside of camps”.⁵³⁰ The same source further noted that “Some 95,000 returnees or vulnerable protracted IDP families in rural areas in Darfur will require more durable transitional shelter assistance together with some income generation/livelihood training for self-reliance. Additionally, some 125,000 people who remain in need in other areas in East Jebel Marra, West Jebel Marra and South Kordofan will need ES/NFI [Emergency Shelter/Non-Food Items] assistance for protection”.⁵³¹

⁵²⁴ United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), [UNAMID deplores humanitarian impact of ongoing military confrontation in Jebel Marra](#), 21 June 2018

⁵²⁵ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 25 June – 15 July 2018](#), July 2018, Newly displaced persons in Golo, Central Jebel Marra locality, Central Darfur, p. 2

⁵²⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Jebel Marra displaced demand aid, help from UNAMID](#), 13 July 2018

⁵²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan defence ministry ordered to protect returnees in Darfur](#), 17 July 2018

⁵²⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 20

⁵²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [‘More than 200 people’ dead from disease, starvation in South Darfur camp](#), 13 November 2018

⁵³⁰ UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, Part I: Humanitarian Needs & Key Figures, p. 5

⁵³¹ UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, Part II: Emergency Shelter/Non-Food Items, p. 19

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

The onset of heavy rains in other parts of West, South, Central and North Darfu resulted in civilian displacement and destruction of homes and assets. In August alone, heavy rains destroyed many structures in North Darfur, including in Zam camp, where about 2,300 people in one school and the local market were affected.⁵³²

Access to food & water

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) reported that in December 2017 “In conflict affected areas of Darfur [...] access to land for cultivation by Internally Displaced People (IDPS) continued to be below normal levels due to insecurity, displacement far away from farms, and lack of seeds and tools”.⁵³³

The Darfur Displaced and Refugees Association complained in December 2017 that “little food aid has reached the displaced camps in Darfur for more than four months. The Association has warned of the consequences of this and its impact on the displaced people in the light of the failure of the agricultural season” in 2017.⁵³⁴

The '2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview', published in February 2018, by UN OCHA stated that:

Population displacement in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is one of the major drivers of food insecurity, undernutrition, and livelihoods impoverishment. This is reflected in disruption of food production and food systems, destruction of crops and livestock, loss of assets and income, erosion of household livelihood asset holdings, limited household access to income earning opportunities, and restricted trade flows. Displacement also puts pressure on host communities to share limited resources, causing further deterioration of food security and increased vulnerability of both groups. The majority of displaced and host communities are not able to meet their food and livelihood security needs and mostly engage in non-reversible coping strategies.⁵³⁵

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 February to 15 April 2018 described that:

Food insecurity continues to be a major source of concern, in particular in North Darfur. The situation has been compounded by poor rainfall in 2017, which resulted in shortages of pasture and water for livestock and a poor harvest. Based on the latest Famine Early Warning System Network outlook, parts of North Darfur, as well as internally displaced person camps in Jebel Marra, are likely to face a situation of crisis (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification level 3) until September. During the peak of the lean season (June–September), internally displaced persons in Jebel Marra could face a situation of emergency (level 4) food insecurity. The situation is further compounded by the austerity measures recently imposed by the Government, which have resulted in significant price increases (up to 47 per cent in January) for staple foods such as wheat and sorghum. In February, the retail price of sorghum rose by more than 15 per cent in seven states. The highest increases, of at 34, 25 and 16 per cent, respectively, were recorded in East, West and North Darfur. Recent assessments indicate that about 98 per cent of displaced households do not have sufficient income to afford the food that they

⁵³² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 19

⁵³³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security Outlook Update](#), December 2017, *Current Situation, Seasonal progress*, p. 2

⁵³⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Short rations deepen food shortage in Darfur camps](#), 20 December 2017

⁵³⁵ UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, *Part II: Food Security & Livelihoods*, p. 20

need. The macroeconomic trend could result in more price rises and further reduce the ability of poor households to pay for food.⁵³⁶

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

With regard to food security, the Famine Early Warning System Network has reported very poor pastoral and agricultural seasons in North Darfur, which could result in increased need for food assistance and agriculture and livestock-based livelihood support until mid-2018. In addition, the current economic crisis and recent fuel shortages have a negative impact on agriculture and are pushing more people into food insecurity. Restricted access to land, limited agricultural labour opportunities and low asset holdings resulting from insecurity in Jebel Marra continue to limit household production.⁵³⁷

The World Food Programme (WFP) reported that food security between May 2017 and May 2018 deteriorated amongst IDPs and refugees in Darfur – “Among IDPs, 72.2 percent of households were classified as food insecure, which represents a 13.1 percent increase from the same time last year”.⁵³⁸ The same source further noted that “Displaced populations in South Darfur and East Darfur were most severely affected by food insecurity, with the proportion of food insecure households at the state-level found to be 87.0 percent and 74.9 percent, respectively”.⁵³⁹ With special reference to the five states that make up Darfur, the report found [emphasis added]:

North Darfur: experienced an overall deterioration in food security relative to May 2017 which saw the proportion of food insecure households increase across all five clusters. The largest change observed was among IDPs in El Fasher, Zamzam, and Abou Shouk, where the level of food insecurity increased from 55 percent to 88 percent compared to the same time last year.⁵⁴⁰

South Darfur: The food security situation for displaced persons in South Darfur in May 2018 was found to be among the worst in Sudan. Overall, food insecurity increased in all clusters, except for IDPs in Gereida where a 10 percent improvement was observed. The largest deterioration in food security was observed in Otash and Deriege cluster, where the proportion of food insecure households went from 23 percent to 95 percent.⁵⁴¹

East Darfur: Access to food was found to be somewhat better among IDPs in East Darfur, with 55 percent of households in Elneim being classified as food insecure and 33 percent having poor food consumption. In the mixed population of Muhajiria and Selea cluster 38 percent of households were found to be food insecure -- the lowest in the state -- though this represents a substantial increase since May 2017, when the level of food insecurity stood at 9 percent.⁵⁴²

West Darfur: In West Darfur’s two IDP clusters, 62 percent of households were found to be food insecure. This represents a modest improvement from the level observed in May 2017, and is largely a result of the good harvest in the 2017/2018 agricultural season, which provided the IDP population with diversified income sources, in addition to bolstering food consumption.⁵⁴³

Central Darfur: The food security outlook in Central Darfur was mixed, with two clusters reporting a decrease in the level of food insecurity relative to May 2017, and one cluster reporting an increase. In

⁵³⁶ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 25 April 2018, para. 19

⁵³⁷ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 25

⁵³⁸ World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *Highlights for Darfur*, p. 1

⁵³⁹ World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *Highlights for Darfur*, p. 1

⁵⁴⁰ World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *North Darfur*, p. 3

⁵⁴¹ World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *South Darfur*, p. 3

⁵⁴² World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *East Darfur*, p. 4

⁵⁴³ World Food Programme, [Food Security Monitoring: Sudan](#), May 2018, *West Darfur*, p. 6

Garsila, Um Dokhon, and Mukjar cluster, 59 percent of households in the sample were found to be food insecure, which represents a 13 percent rise from May 2017. The level of food insecurity fell by a small amount for IDPs in Nertiti, and Hameedia cluster, which recorded an 8 percent decrease, as well as among the mixed population of Garsila and Um Kheir cluster, where a 10 percent decrease was observed. The decline in the level of food insecurity in Garsila and Um Kheir cluster was matched by a corresponding decrease in the proportion of households exhibiting poor food consumption, which fell from 26 percent in May 2017 to 3 percent in May 2018.⁵⁴⁴

In an article published in May 2018 where Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) focused on the situation of the over 23,000 IDPs displaced in the village of Sortoni, North Darfur, following fleeing fighting in Jebel Marra over two years ago the organization highlighted that “Food rations provided by the World Food Programme have been reduced to only two staples and the quantity has been slashed. The supply of water is limited [...] The lack of clean water often forces families to search for alternative sources. The 7.5 litres per day provided to each person is not enough for cooking, cleaning and for their animals. Often they risk going to stagnant pools of contaminated water which can cause illnesses like acute diarrhoea or jaundice”.⁵⁴⁵

A delegation of UNAMID that visited Zamzam IDP camp in El Fasher in June 2018 was informed by the representative of the displaced communities that the World Food Programme (WFP) had “cut food rations in the camp: from 280,000 to 47,000 people. “This, in combination with the rise of prices in Sudan, has resulted in higher rates of malnourishment among children and elderly people”.⁵⁴⁶ During the same month Radio Dabanga reported that the camps in El Fasher, Zamzam, Abu Shouk, and El Salam in El Fasher locality witnessed “a severe water shortage because of the crisis in fuel supply in Sudan. Displaced people are forced to wait for hours to get water to the camp”.⁵⁴⁷

According to Radio Dabanga reporting displaced people in Kalma camp, South Darfur, have complained of severe drinking water shortages caused by deferred maintenance resulting in a spike of prices for water during the month of June 2018.⁵⁴⁸ A month later residents of Kalma camp organised a sit-in in protest against the growing lack of food in the camp with the chairman of the Darfur Displaced General Coordination telling Radio Dabanga that “The number of residents of Kalma camp is about 200,000 people, of which 163,000 used to receive monthly food rations [...] After the re-inventory of the WFP [in August 2017], the number of eligible camp residents was reduced to 39,551”.⁵⁴⁹

With regards to food insecurity, FEWS NET reported that between June and September 2018 “poor households in North Darfur [...] and IDPs in Jebel Marra will be in Crisis (IPC [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification] Phase 3 [out of five])”.⁵⁵⁰ Without specifying the impact it might have on IDPs, the World Food Programme noted in its ‘Country Brief’ it published in November 2018 that the food insecurity in North and South Darfur (IPC 3 – Crisis) “will likely persist until the end of 2018”.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁴ World Food Programme, *Food Security Monitoring: Sudan*, May 2018, *West Darfur*, p. 7

⁵⁴⁵ Amnesty International, *Sudan: Downsized UN mission not an option amid ongoing attacks in Darfur*, 29 June 2018

⁵⁴⁶ Radio Dabanga, *Unamid, US Embassy discuss safety in Darfur’s Zamzam camp*, 1 June 2018

⁵⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, *Water shortages in North Darfur camps, Red Sea state*, 1 June 2018

⁵⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, *Water shortage as Kalma camp pumps are ‘badly maintained’*, 29 June 2018

⁵⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, *South Darfur: Kalma camp displaced protest lack of food*, 23 July 2018


⁵⁵⁰ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), *Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2018 to January 2019*, 30 June 2018, *Key Messages*, p. 1

⁵⁵¹ World Food Programme (WFP), *WFP Sudan Country Brief*, November 2018, p. 1

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

Food insecurity continued to be of concern, with the economic crisis and government austerity measures leading to basic food items such as bread being in limited supply in Darfur. This was compounded by the impact of severe dry weather that began at the end of 2017 in North Darfur, and parts of East, West and South Darfur. People living in these states were classified as being in “crisis” (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification phase 3) until September 2018. Initial results of the mid-season assessment indicate that average to above-average rainfall will likely improve the harvest. High inflation has also affected the capacity of service providers and impacted coping mechanisms for internally displaced persons.⁵⁵²

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network published the following map of Sudan illustrating the ‘Acute Food Insecurity Phase’ between July and September 2018 across the states⁵⁵³:



⁵⁵² UN Secretary-General, *African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 12 October 2018, para. 18

⁵⁵³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), *Fuel shortages and high prices negatively impact cropping season*, July 2018

IPC 2.0 Acute Food Insecurity Phase

1: Minimal 2: Stressed 3: Crisis 4: Emergency 5: Famine □ Concentration of displaced people

! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance

Food security outcomes for displaced populations would likely be at least one phase worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance.

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

According to a report by FEWS NET in December 2018, “The 2018/19 rainy season was generally favorable in most parts of Darfur; however, the prevailing insecurity and armed clashes, in particular between May and June 2018, displaced households away from farms and restricted other households’ access to farms, contributing to lower production during the 2018/19 agricultural season”.⁵⁵⁴ The same source further noted that:

IDPs and conflict-affected people in Jebel Mara continue facing very limited access to their normal income sources such as production, sale of fruits and vegetables, sale of livestock, and petty trade due to the prevailing insecurity which is causing displacement, and restricting population movement and trading activities. As of November 2018, most IDPs have missed cultivation while access to agricultural labor, collection and sales of forest products remained limited due to the continued insecurity situation. As of November 2018, majority of IDPs and conflict-affected people in Jebel Mara maintains level of income far below the cost of their household’s essential requirements. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely.⁵⁵⁵

The same source predicted that between December 2018 and May 2019 more poor households are “expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes within North Darfur [...] and northern South Darfur states” and that overall in Jebel Marra area of Darfur “many will continue to rely on markets to access food, as well as wild foods. Low purchasing power throughout the projection period will result in lower than normal food access. Furthermore, continued conflict is expected to at times force households to flee their homesteads and current sources of food and income. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected throughout the projection period in the absence of humanitarian food assistance, with most relying on the consumption of some cereal production, wild foods, and market purchases”.⁵⁵⁶

Access to healthcare

In April 2018 the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ Concluding Observations expressed concern over “The limited support provided for persons with disabilities who are internally displaced, refugees or asylum seekers”.⁵⁵⁷

The World Health Organisation (WHO) and its health partners in Sudan have launched a 1-year project to rehabilitate and equip 5 health clinics and support 4 others in East Jebel Marra, South

⁵⁵⁴ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019](#), December 2018, *IDPs and conflict-affected households in Jebel Marra area of Darfur (Figure 6)*, p. 8

⁵⁵⁵ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019](#), December 2018, *IDPs and conflict-affected households in Jebel Marra area of Darfur (Figure 6)*, p. 8

⁵⁵⁶ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security outlook, December 2018 to May 2019](#), December 2018, *National Overview*, p. 6 and, *IDPs and conflict-affected households in Jebel Marra area of Darfur (Figure 6)*, p. 10

⁵⁵⁷ UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, [Concluding observations on the initial report of the Sudan*](#), 10 April 2018, para. 21 (b)

Darfur, in a bid to improve health services for 242,000 displaced people in an area “which has had limited access to health services for more than 10 years”.⁵⁵⁸

Access to employment & livelihood opportunities

According to Salih Osman from the Darfur Bar Association, interviewed as part of the UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August 2018, “In any IDP camp [in Darfur] youth unemployment is near 90%. People can go out of the camps during the day for menial jobs, e.g. construction, selling things on the roadside”.⁵⁵⁹

Access to education

The September 2017 UNOCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ noted that only “38 per cent of the 2017 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan” was funded affecting amongst others the “education of thousands of IDP and other vulnerable Sudanese children. At least 60 per cent of the 1.6 million people living in IDP camps in Darfur are children and the education sector is only 8.1 per cent funded”.⁵⁶⁰

Radio Dabanga specifically reported on Kassab IDP camp in North Darfur’s Kutum locality, where “residents complained about a worsening educational environment” with only “two basic schools in the camp for 4,570 registered students”, besides one secondary school. A parent at the school complained about the “very small” number of teachers “compared to the number of students”, the classrooms being made out of straw “not providing any protection” from rains or heat, and “high tuition fees”.⁵⁶¹

According to the ‘2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview’, published in February 2018, by UN OCHA, “the majority of children in need of emergency education are in IDP camps, mainly in Darfur” with the needs assessment of 30 IDP camps showing that “56 per cent of school age children lack access to education”.⁵⁶²

A delegation of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which visited North Darfur in May 2018 and specifically Zamzam IDP camp learned that children at the camp “lack adequate education, support their families through difficult physical labor and fetching water from long distances, and are vulnerable to being recruited into armed forces”.⁵⁶³

6. Returnees

Number of returnees

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) “A total of about 3,800 people were registered as having returned to their places of origin in Darfur in 2017 by IOM, for livelihood

⁵⁵⁸ World Health Organization (WHO), [News](#), 10 October 2018

⁵⁵⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 2.3.3

⁵⁶⁰ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 11-24 September](#), September 2017, Only 38 per cent of the 2017 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan is funded, p. 4

⁵⁶¹ Radio Dabanga, [Just two basic schools for 4,500+ students in North Darfur camp](#), 17 September 2017

⁵⁶² UN OCHA, [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), February 2018, Part II. Education, p. 18

⁵⁶³ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, [Country Update: Sudan](#), June 2018, Conflict, Youth, and Vulnerability, p. 2

reasons, for example to tend to crops or for fishing. These cases do not count as full, durable returns, and are therefore placed in the provisional solutions category”.⁵⁶⁴

UNHCR reported in December 2017 that after a decade of displacement in the Central African Republic (CAR), “nearly 1,500 Sudanese refugees are set to return voluntarily to their home village in Dafag, South Darfur”.⁵⁶⁵ According to the same source “To help the returnees re-establish their homes and livelihoods, they will have access to land, and UNHCR and COR [Sudanese Government’s Commission of Refugees] will provide them with return packages. UNHCR will also work with government authorities and other partners to enhance service provision in the return area”.⁵⁶⁶

Covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017, the January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur recorded that:

Approximately 533,000 persons have returned voluntarily to their places of origin across the Sudan since 2003, and UNHCR began the repatriation of Sudanese refugees from the Central African Republic on 12 December. Nevertheless, the lack of security, basic services and sustainable livelihoods in return areas, as well as issues related to land ownership have become major impediments to return, as stressed in meetings the assessment team had with representatives of internally displaced persons.⁵⁶⁷

In December 2017 the Sudan Tribune specifically referred to “dozens of displaced families”, more than 1046 families, who returned voluntarily from North Darfur to Al-Wihda County in South Darfur state with the County Commissioner appealing to foreign and national aid groups to “move urgently to meet the demands of the returnees in order to encourage them to permanently settle in their villages”.⁵⁶⁸

With regards to voluntary return patterns in December 2017 and January 2018, UN OCHA reported that:

- December 2017: 1,500 people voluntarily return from CAR [Central African Republic] to their home villages in Dafag, South Darfur
- January 2018: 12,500 IDPs voluntarily return to Turba village, near El Malam town in Alwehda locality (South Darfur) from North Darfur.⁵⁶⁹ [Note: UN OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ covering the first half of January 2018 noted that about ‘2,500 people were assisted to return to Turba village’.⁵⁷⁰]

Covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018, the June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur reported that “Some 625,000 people have returned to their places of

⁵⁶⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan: Global Report on Internal Displacement \(GRID 2018\)](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2018], p. 7

⁵⁶⁵ UNHCR, [Nearly 1,500 Sudanese Refugees Set to Return to South Darfur](#), 12 December 2017

⁵⁶⁶ UNHCR, [Nearly 1,500 Sudanese Refugees Set to Return to South Darfur](#), 12 December 2017

⁵⁶⁷ UN Secretary-General, [Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 4 January 2018, para. 47

⁵⁶⁸ Sudan Tribune, [Hundreds of IDPs return to South Darfur: official](#), 23 December 2017

⁵⁶⁹ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁵⁷⁰ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Bulletin, 1-14 January 2018](#), 18 January 2018

origin since 2003, including 301,000 civilians, approximately 197,000 internally displaced returnees and 104,000 refugee returnees between the beginning of 2015 and October 2017”.⁵⁷¹

UNOCHA noted in its ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ covering the period 30 April to 13 May 2018 that “There are some 300,000 refugees from Sudan living in refugee camps in Chad. Voluntary repatriation started in March, and 20,000 refugees are anticipated to return to their places of origin in Darfur in 2018”.⁵⁷² In a subsequent issue of the ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ it was stated that in early June 2018 some 180 people who had been living as refugees in Chad officially returned to their place of origin, Tina, a border town in North Darfur.⁵⁷³ According to the same source “UNHCR has assisted a total of 353 refugee returns to Darfur from Chad. The refugee returnees received return packages containing essential items such as shelter tarpaulins, jerry cans and cooking utensils, and cash assistance. Food assistance for three months has also been provided by the World Food Programme (WFP)”.⁵⁷⁴

According to an update from the Government of Sudan and as reported by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) in June 2018, “The government reported the return of about 386,000 people in Sudan since last year [2017], mainly in Darfur. Government officials in East Darfur state reported 5,382 households, 1,291 households and 331 households have returned to Yassin, Shiariya and Asalaya localities since the beginning of this year respectively. The IDPs returned from Kalma and Otash camps in South Darfur State as well as Zam Zam camp in North Darfur State. A lack of basic services and infrastructure in addition to insecurity in some areas continues to prevent the return of displaced people to their areas of origin”.⁵⁷⁵

The Sudan Tribune reported in August 2018 that “85,600 IDPs have returned to their original villages in Korma and El-Fasher”, North Darfur, whilst in Central Darfur State some “26,595 IDP families have returned as part of the voluntary return programme”.⁵⁷⁶

In November 2018 Radio Dabanga noted that the Governor El Sharif Samouh of North Darfur reportedly told state parliament that “152,797 displaced people had returned to their villages of origin in North Darfur, leaving 327,031 in IDP camps within the state”.⁵⁷⁷

6.1 Security

Note that security incidents listed in this section should be seen as illustrative and not exhaustive of the number and type of attacks occurring against returnees.

Location non-specified, but within Darfur

⁵⁷¹ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 24

⁵⁷² UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 30 April – 13 May 2018](#), May 2018, *Humanitarian chief calls for aid to 7.1 million p. 2*

⁵⁷³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 28 May – 10 June 2018](#), June 2018, *Voluntary repatriation to Sudan continues, p. 1*

⁵⁷⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 28 May – 10 June 2018](#), June 2018, *Voluntary repatriation to Sudan continues, p. 1*

⁵⁷⁵ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2018 to January 2019](#), 30 June 2018, *National Overview, Conflict and South Sudanese refugees, p. 4*

⁵⁷⁶ Sudan Tribune, [85,600 IDPs return to original villages, Say North Darfur authorities](#), 31 August 2018

⁵⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur: ‘150,000’ people returned, camps renamed to towns](#), 30 November 2018

The U.S. Department of State noted in its annual report covering 2017 that “Although the government made public statements encouraging the return of IDPs to their homes and the closure of camps in Darfur since ‘peace’ had come to Darfur, IDPs expressed reluctance to return due to lack of security and justice in their areas of origin or elsewhere”.⁵⁷⁸

The January 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July to 22 December 2017 analysed the weapons collection campaign and impact on security thus:

Despite the overall decrease in the number of acts of banditry and criminality, the police force and the rule of law institutions have limited capacity in remote locations and areas of return for the internally displaced communities.⁵⁷⁹

UN OCHA reported in its ‘Humanitarian Dashboard’ covering January to March 2018 that “Protection structures in displaced and returnee communities are weakened by movements and destitution in Darfur, SK and BN, affecting some 300,000 vulnerable IDPs, returnees or host communities”.⁵⁸⁰

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

Security has been negatively affected by the limited presence and capacity of law enforcement and rule of law institutions outside the main population centres. Although there is a steady increase in the number of cases resolved by rural courts, which are at the forefront of addressing land disputes, their geographical reach remains limited. In addition, the limited presence and capacity of the Sudanese police forces in rural areas leave returnees, internally displaced persons, women and children particularly vulnerable, including to sexual violence.⁵⁸¹

The same source explained: “Despite the capture of two notorious militia leaders, Abdallah Rizkallah and Musa Hilal, in November 2017 [...] militia groups of particular communities continue to hamper the return of internally displaced persons over land and natural resources, with long-term implications for stability”.⁵⁸²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

On 9 August, a group of nomads clashed with Fur farmers at Hebry village, near Feina in eastern Jebel Marra. Four people were killed, an unconfirmed number were injured and over 100 head of livestock were stolen. Villagers fled to the mountains, with a number seeking refuge at the Hashaba internally displaced persons camp. Communities expressed concern that incidents of harassment could increase

⁵⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Sudan*, 20 April 2018, section 1., g. *Abuses in Internal Conflict*

⁵⁷⁹ UN Secretary-General, *Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of phase one of the reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 4 January 2018, para. 4

⁵⁸⁰ UN OCHA, *Sudan: Humanitarian Dashboard, Jan – Mar 2018*, 31 March 2018, p. 3

⁵⁸¹ UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, para. 9

⁵⁸² UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, paras. 4-5

during the harvest season if appropriate measures were not taken to mitigate them, and there were reports of internally displaced persons being prevented from returning to their villages of origin to prepare for the farming season in West, South and East Darfur.⁵⁸³

North Darfur

In April 2018 two returnees were wounded “in a shooting in Turbo village in North Darfur’s Tawila locality by unidentified militiamen” after which they “stole seven horses and carts belonging to residents”.⁵⁸⁴

Radio Dabanga reported in May 2018 that “250 displaced families returning from refugee camps in Chad were forced to return to IDP camps in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, after mediation attempts with new settlers in their home villages in Sabarna area failed”.⁵⁸⁵

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

In North Darfur, [...] In Um Kaddadah, the local authorities raised concerns about the lack of land registry, as well as concerns about the lack of water, seeds and fertilizer. [...] Plans for the return of internally displaced persons are being hampered by the lack of basic services and protection concerns, including the establishment of police presences in the areas of return. In Al-Malihah, the Rapid Support Forces are heavily present to ensure the control of the border with Libya and to prevent the infiltration of armed rebel groups.⁵⁸⁶

Radio Dabanga reported that in June 2018 “at least 19 returnees were wounded, eight of them seriously, following their return from the IDP camps to cultivate their lands, when armed militants fired on them in the Tuma area of Kutum locality in North Darfur”.⁵⁸⁷ Two women were also “seriously injured in a militia attack on farmers returning voluntarily to Kutum in North Darfur” and “received death threats by the militia commander should they insist on farming” reported the same source.⁵⁸⁸ In the same month as well about “2,000 fruit trees were found cut [...] allegedly done to prevent displaced landowners from returning” to Kutum reported Radio Dabanga.⁵⁸⁹

In July 2018 additional displaced farmers were “attacked by militant herders in Kabkabiya in North Darfur who prevented them from cultivating their lands”.⁵⁹⁰ The same source stated that “The displaced in the camps say the insecurity is caused by roaming militiamen and the abundance of weapons as well as the danger of running into militant Arab tribesmen and migrants from Chad, Mali, and Niger who settled in their home areas”.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 9

⁵⁸⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Two injured in militia attack on North Darfur returnee village](#), 2 April 2018

⁵⁸⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Dozens of displaced families forced back to camps in North Darfur](#), 30 May 2018

⁵⁸⁶ UN, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 1 June 2018, para. 30

⁵⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, [19 returnees wounded in North Darfur shooting](#), 20 June 2018

⁵⁸⁸ Radio Dabanga, [New attack against returnees to Kutum, North Darfur](#), 21 June 2018

⁵⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Repeated attacks on farmers in North Darfur](#), 15 July 2018

⁵⁹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Repeated attacks on farmers in North Darfur](#), 15 July 2018

⁵⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Repeated attacks on farmers in North Darfur](#), 15 July 2018

According to a UK DfID official, interviewed as part of the UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August 2018, “returnees have been systematically targeted by people who occupy their lands who may have had historical allegiance to ruling elites. Returnees rarely have protection from formal security and justice institutions; perpetrators often act with impunity”.⁵⁹² Similarly, Salih Osman from the Darfur Bar Association noted that:

Darfuri people cannot return to their regions in Darfur as the villages have been destroyed and the absence of security— several areas are in the control of the Janjaweed, including some of the larger cities in Darfur. People returning to the region are either killed on the way or when they get there. There is no efficient regular army, no efficient police, only NISS, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which includes many former Janjaweed members, and the remaining Janjaweed. The Courts don’t have the power to bring these perpetrators to justice – they have impunity provided by laws including the NISS Act. The state of emergency allows for the government to violate rights, including prevention of freedom of movement [...].⁵⁹³

According to a political scientist interviewed for the fact-finding mission “The Arab militias control areas outside of camps and towns. No regular army presence outside the main towns – Al Fasher, Geneina and Nyala – the militia control other areas. The militias are well armed. They have political groups (RSF and others) - there are 20 significant militia groups: the RSF are the largest, then the Border Guards are the next biggest. They are violent, brutal – no accountability. It is dangerous for non-Arab Darfuris (and UNAMID) outside camps and towns”.⁵⁹⁴

Radio Dabanga reported that in December 2018 “militiamen torched a mosque” which returnees were building in a village in Kutum locality in North Darfur, and “intimidated them, in disapproval against their return to their home areas”.⁵⁹⁵

East Darfur

IRIN documented in April 2018 that “A few weeks ago, a group of 400 Darfuris trying to return to East Darfur reported being assaulted”.⁵⁹⁶ Reporting on this particular event, Radio Dabanga reported that “400 displaced people returned to the village [of Areit village in Asalaya locality in East Darfur] [...] according to voluntary repatriation programmes, but the settlers in the village refused their return, assaulted them and injured Adam Yousef and Ahmad Omar Adam who were taken to the state capital Ed Daein for treatment”.⁵⁹⁷

A delegation of UNAMID that visited Zamzam IDP camp in El Fasher [North Darfur] in June 2018 was informed by its residents that they refused to return voluntarily “seen the lack of security and the reported disruption in their home villages by new settlers”.⁵⁹⁸ According to these residents “people had tried to return to their areas of origin in Muhajiriya in East Darfur recently”, but had subsequently decided to return to the IDP camp because “other people had settled in the area”.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 2.2.8

⁵⁹³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 2.2.10

⁵⁹⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 2.2.11

⁵⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen torch mosque, intimidate returnees in North Darfur](#), 4 December 2018

⁵⁹⁶ IRIN, [Six months after US sanctions lifted, promised aid access in Sudan remains limited](#), 11 April 2018

⁵⁹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [New settlers assault, drive-off East Darfur returnees](#), 15 March 2018

⁵⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Unamid, US Embassy discuss safety in Darfur’s Zamzam camp](#), 1 June 2018

⁵⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Unamid, US Embassy discuss safety in Darfur’s Zamzam camp](#), 1 June 2018

South Darfur

In January 2018 members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “prevented dozens of formerly displaced South Darfur villagers to flee again and detained four village sheikhs who protested their action reported” Radio Dabanga. At the end of 2017 about “300 people had returned from the Shangil Tobaya IDP camp to their home area of El Mala in northern South Darfur only to find militiamen and other gunmen still roaming the area” according to the same source.⁶⁰⁰

Radio Dabanga reported that in February 2018 in South Darfur “militiamen ambushed displaced people who had returned to Marla village in Bielel [...] In response, the state authorities arrested 14 tribal leaders from the area”.⁶⁰¹

Radio Dabanga reported that in April 2018 unidentified gunmen “killed four returnees and wounded six others in an attack on a village in South Darfur”, whilst earlier in the month “a community leader sustained bullet wounds in an attack on voluntary returnee in Gireida locality in South Darfur”.⁶⁰²

Residents of Kalma camp in Nyala, South Darfur, briefed a US government delegation in April 2018 about the reasons why they couldn’t return to their areas of origin and according to Radio Dabanga stated that “only a small number of people returned to their areas last year and early this year [...] But they soon returned to the camp because of the aggression they met from militiamen and new settlers [...] ‘We explained the American visitors that apart from the insecurity still caused by the many militiamen in the region, the presence of new, armed settlers is preventing the displaced to return to their villages. The new settlers, consisting of Arab herders from Darfur or migrants from Chad or Niger, are occupying our lands with the support of the authorities,’ the camp leader said. ‘These settlers assault anyone who tries to return to their village’”.⁶⁰³

In early May 2018 recent returnees to the area of Abujabra were attacked by unidentified gunmen and wounded, whilst two other people went missing.⁶⁰⁴

According to Radio Dabanga at least “nine returnees have been killed since the start of the current agricultural season in Gireida in South Darfur” it reported in June 2018.⁶⁰⁵ Early June at least “nine returnees were killed and five others wounded in a shooting” by unidentified gunmen at the market of Hijeir Tongo, South Darfur, which according to the head of the sheikhs in the Darfur displaced camps was preceded “by similar crimes by killing all the displaced who had returned to their villages from displaced people camps in the presence of Unamid and government forces”.⁶⁰⁶

In July 2018 a “woman and two people were injured by masked gunmen at an IDP voluntary return village in Digraiss, South Darfur”, where since April 2018 “2,200 IDPs have returned to”.⁶⁰⁷

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

⁶⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur returnees forced to remain in insecure area](#), 1 January 2018

⁶⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Again voluntary returnees killed in South Darfur](#), 22 April 2018

⁶⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Again voluntary returnees killed in South Darfur](#), 22 April 2018

⁶⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur displaced: ‘We cannot return as long as our land is occupied’](#), 9 April 2018

⁶⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Displaced people attacked, killed in South Darfur](#), 4 May 2018

⁶⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Nine Darfur returnees killed this agricultural season](#), 27 June 2018

⁶⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [9+ dead in South Darfur village market attack](#), 6 June 2018

⁶⁰⁷ Sudan Tribune, [One woman killed at IDPs voluntary return village in S. Darfur](#), 13 July 2018

In South Darfur, the team visited Digraisi return village on 16 July, following reports of an attack, which had caused the death of the Umda (traditional chief) and his wife. Returnees reported seven incidents during the previous four months, including cases of assault, intimidation, land occupancy and vandalism. The mission continued to advocate with them to create conditions for effective returns and peaceful coexistence between communities.⁶⁰⁸

Reporting on the same incident, Sudan Tribune stated that following the killing of the leader of Digraisi village, Gibril Ahmed Ali, and his wife and the injury of his two of his sons at their home, the “South Darfur government has tightened security measures around the voluntary return villages”.⁶⁰⁹

Central Darfur

In March 2018 returnees were beaten and humiliated by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militiamen during an arms collection exercise in Central Darfur state reported Sudan Tribune.⁶¹⁰

Sudan Tribune reported in August 2018 on the killing of two farmers and injuring of one more at a voluntary return village, Kambo Di by six unidentified gunmen.⁶¹¹

West Darfur

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 explained that:

Sexual violence also affects the possibility of return of civilians to their places of origin. For example, in For Baranga, West Darfur, a Darfuri family — which had formerly been living in Chad as refugees — returned to Chad after a family member was gang-raped, fearing further attacks by the perpetrators.⁴² These cases highlight the need for enhanced security and basic services in areas of origin to facilitate the return of those displaced by the conflict.⁶¹²

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 reported that:

Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, the reporting period saw an increase in tensions between herders and farmers over land and resources, especially in West Darfur, affecting internally displaced persons and returnees in particular, and deterring further returns. On 17 June, a group of Beni Halba clashed with Zaghawa returnees over a land dispute in the Kurti farming area, north-west of El Geneina, leaving at least 10 people wounded. Government forces intervened to restore calm.⁶¹³

6.1.1 Treatment of Darfuri individuals upon arrival to Khartoum Airport and after, including those in possession of Al-Umma Party ID cards

⁶⁰⁸ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 8

⁶⁰⁹ Sudan Tribune, [South Darfur tightens security around voluntary return villages](#), 22 July 2018

⁶¹⁰ Sudan Tribune, [IDPs call to investigate beating of Central Darfur returnees during weapons collection exercise](#), 11 March 2018

⁶¹¹ Sudan Tribune, [Two farmers killed at voluntary return village in Central Darfur](#), 6 August 2018

⁶¹² UN, [Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 28 December 2017, para. 120

⁶¹³ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, para. 9

Sudanese in general

Waging Peace noted that in December 2017 it was reported that “several individuals deported to Sudan from Belgium alleged they had been tortured” following Sudanese officials from the NISS being invited by the Belgian Federal Secretary Of State responsible for Asylum and Migration for an identification mission.⁶¹⁴ The testimonies obtained by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and seen by Waging Peace, refer to nine Sudanese who have been detained upon arrival at the airport and interrogated for several days “then being released on family guarantee or personal security, which obliges them not to engage in any political activities, or possibly leave the country, and gives the police the right to detain them at any time. A few describe physical torture (being beaten with a stick) or emotional torture. One testimony is from a gentleman from the north of Sudan. He credits the fact that he is not from one of the more marginalised areas (Darfur or the Nuba Mountains) with his relatively benign treatment”.⁶¹⁵

With regards to treatment of Sudanese returnees from European states, not specifying whether these were Darfuri or not, a range of interlocutors interviewed for a UK fact-finding mission to Khartoum, conducted between 10-17 August 2018, expressed their opinions whose full transcript and synopsis of the interviews can be found in the report’s section 6.3 *Treatment of returnees*: UK Home Office, *Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*, November 2018, paras. 6.3.1 – 6.3.22

Darfuri individuals

A joint submission by the Centre for Human Rights Law, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, University of London, the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), and Waging Peace (WP) to the UN Human Rights Committee documented that in June 2018 “a United States (US) citizen named Bishara Gomatallah (originally from Darfur) who was not a returned asylum seeker, filmed himself being detained and ill-treated on arrival at KIA [Khartoum International Airport], after trying to track down missing luggage at the airport. There are also concerns that a colleague of Mr Gomatallah who also worked at Trident Seafoods in the US, Abdullah Yacoub, might have been killed after he had sustained injuries during days-long interrogation and torture, in a separate incident involving a trip to the Darfur region”.⁶¹⁶

According to Amnesty International, in August 2018 “two members of the Darfur Bar Association were briefly detained and their passports confiscated in the Khartoum airport upon their return to Sudan after they accompanied the Secretary General of the DBA, Abdelrahman Elgasim, to the US to accept an award from the American Lawyers’ Association for his work on behalf of human rights in Darfur”.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ Waging Peace, *Recommendations for returns and readmission discussions at 5th round of Strategic Dialogue*, April 2018, *Fate of returnees*, p. 2

⁶¹⁵ Waging Peace, *Recommendations for returns and readmission discussions at 5th round of Strategic Dialogue*, April 2018, *Fate of returnees*, p. 3. For additional information on this particular incident in Belgium see also Amnesty International, *Belgium: Returns to Sudan violated principle of non-refoulement*, 30 January 2018

⁶¹⁶ Centre for Human Rights Law, SOAS, University of London/ International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI)/Waging Peace (WP), *Sudan’s compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the context of mixed migration from, and to Sudan 124th session of the Human Rights Committee - Review of Sudan’s State Party report*, September 2018, 2.2. *Treatment of forced and voluntary returnees to Sudan*, p. 5

⁶¹⁷ Amnesty International, *Addressing the serious human rights and humanitarian situation in Sudan*, 4 September 2018, p. 2

The Second Secretary Political at the British Embassy in Khartoum, interviewed for the UK fact-finding mission, conducted in August 2018, noted when asked whether it would be possible for “a Darfuri who had not previously lived in Khartoum, who returned from Europe to Sudan, to integrate into Khartoum, PS thought so. Unless they were suspected of having ties to rebel groups, in which case the Government would want to investigate them and take further action. PS [Second Secretary Political] noted that most Sudanese look to go to Khartoum to improve their prospects, there are greater opportunities”.⁶¹⁸

6.2 Access to documentation

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For historical information see: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), [Darfur - COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 2.3.8 *Possibility for a Darfuri to move to another village/region and being identified/found by none-state actors from their previous place of residence*.

6.3 Access to basic services

Sudan Humanitarian Fund’s annual report covering 2017 noted that in 2017 “a push towards voluntary returns to areas of origin exposed both the displaced and host communities to competition for scarce resources, leading to further economic hardship and uncertainty about the future”.⁶¹⁹

According to the Sudan State’s report submitted in September 2017 as part of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a key priority for the Sudanese government is to encourage “voluntary repatriation, to which end it has built voluntary return villages. As a first step, 85 such villages have been constructed in the 5 provinces of Darfur”.⁶²⁰

According to the UNOCHA Bulletin of October 2017:

In Central Darfur State, the Government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) informed aid organisations that a Return and Reconstruction Commission (RRC) has been established in the state by a presidential decree. The RRC will oversee voluntary returns and durable solutions, provision of services to returnees and conducting intention surveys in IDP camps. The RRC commissioner will coordinate with the Recovery Return and Reintegration (RRR) Sector and other humanitarian partners to avoid duplication of activities. In addition to the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS)—which is funded by Qatar and implemented by the UN and partners—RRC reported that the Government of Saudi Arabia has committed to build 60 model villages in Darfur next year. The RRC will share their plans for returns and durable solutions with humanitarian partners and line ministries once they are finalised.⁶²¹

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 15 October until 15 December 2017 noted that:

⁶¹⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, para. 6.3.11

⁶¹⁹ Sudan Humanitarian Fund, [Annual Report 2017](#), 2 May 2018, *Long term displacement and livelihoods*, p. 8

⁶²⁰ Government of Sudan, [Fifth periodic report submitted by the Sudan under article 40 of the Covenant, due in 2017](#), 11 October 2017, *Internally displaced persons*, para. 29

⁶²¹ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 9-22 October 2017](#), October 2017, *Central Darfur State established Return and Reconstruction Commission*, p. 3

In addition to ensuring security and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, UNAMID also supported voluntary returns. In Shataya locality, South Darfur, where state authorities and native administration have reportedly negotiated the return of 97 per cent of land to the legal owners, with the assistance of the office of the Prosecutor, UNAMID, through its quick-impact and community stabilization projects, has supported the establishment of security and rule of law institutions and the provision of some public services in that locality, with the construction and rehabilitation of a police station, local court, prosecutor's office, secondary school and water pumps. On 24 November, the Joint Special Representative handed over those facilities to South Darfur authorities and the beneficiaries.⁶²²

A joint mission in Umm Dukhun Locality, Central Darfur conducted during the last quarter of 2017 to assess the ongoing return and reintegration in Um Dukhun locality found that:

- The total number of returnees reported to the above villages [Um Dukhun town, Zalingei, Garsila, Nyla Markondi, and Forobanga, Dambar] are 17,871. The return is spontaneous and movements are on-going and expected to continue in 2017-2018.
- Since their return, returnees have been facing lack of availability and access to basic services, such as weak water supply infrastructure, poor health and nutrition conditions and lack of sustainable health and nutrition services as well as a lack of education facilities and trained staff. Returnees have also lost their assets and lack income-generating and other livelihood opportunities necessary for effective recovery, return and reintegration (especially affecting women and youth). Settlements are scattered within the locality which poses a further challenge for the provision of services.
- Housing situation is currently precarious due to a lack of building materials or funds to purchase them for returnees to establish and/or rehabilitate their destroyed or abandoned shelters. The lack of critical communal infrastructure, such as women and youth centers is considered a big obstacle for women to better organize as they do not have a common space to meet, discuss or receive training or pursue collective livelihoods activities.
- There remains an urgent need for peacebuilding and reconciliation related interventions to reduce tension among communities and engage them in trust and confidence building activities.⁶²³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 16 December 2017 until 15 February 2018 detailed that:

Massalit leaders have also reported returns in the areas around Gaida, South Darfur, following the weapons collection campaign in the locality, but they complained about the lack of basic services and infrastructure, and requested decisive measures on land dispute issues. [...]

As at the end of December 2017, nearly 1,500 people returned after 10 years from the Central African Republic to Dafag, Radom Locality, South Darfur, with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Basic services in health, water sanitation and hygiene and education, together with the clearance of unexploded ordnance, are among their most immediate needs.

The population in Jebel Marra region remained the most vulnerable in terms of food security and livelihoods, followed by returnees in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur. [...]

The mission was also informed that the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission of West Darfur is mapping areas for the permanent return of internally displaced persons, and in this context

⁶²² UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017, para. 32

⁶²³ Recovery, Return & Reintegration (RRR) sector, [Mission Report: Joint Missions in Umm Dukhun Locality, Central Darfur, Quarter 4, 2017](#), December 2017, *Summary of Mission Findings*, p. 5

20 development projects are planned for eight localities in the state, including the construction of health centres, schools and police stations.⁶²⁴

UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Snapshot' noted that of the 5.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan as of 1 December 2018, 300,000 were returnees.⁶²⁵ The same source noted in its 'Darfur Humanitarian Overview' that during the first half of 2018, "About 386,000 people have returned to their areas of origin in Sudan since 2015, mainly in Darfur".⁶²⁶ It also reported that out of the 3.14 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur, 295,710 were returnees.⁶²⁷

UNOCHA reported in February 2018 that following the return of nearly 1,500 Sudanese refugees from the Central African Republic to South Darfur's Safag village in El Radom locality, the following key concerns have been noted for both returnees and host communities alike: Limited access to water, health, sanitation, and education facilities".⁶²⁸ For more detailed findings by the inter-agency assessment mission to Dafag, see the following report: Recovery, Return & Reintegration (RRR) Sector, [Mission Report: Rapid Joint-Assessment Mission to Dafag, Randoom Locality, South Darfur](#), January 2018.

The Voluntary Repatriation and Reconstruction Commission in Darfur announced that it will conduct a comprehensive survey into voluntary return in all five states in April 2018, to identify the basic needs of the returnees Radio Dabanga reported.⁶²⁹ No further information about the mission or the final report could be found amongst the sources consulted.

Access to food and livelihoods

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) together with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) reported that they have provided humanitarian assistance to 3,300 families in North Darfur many of whom were returnees "who had been displaced for over a decade, only for them to return and find their villages largely destroyed and homes completely broken down. Their living conditions were dire, compounded by an acute shortage of food, water, and essential households items".⁶³⁰

6.4 Reintegration

Sudan Humanitarian Fund's annual report covering 2017 noted that in 2017 "many of the displaced return to lands which had been occupied in their absence by other communities, militias or agribusinesses. Addressing the issue of land tenure and the management of resources will be pivotal in consolidating peace and in providing an exit strategy from Sudan's protracted humanitarian crises to one of nation-building and economic development".⁶³¹

⁶²⁴ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 22 February 2018, para. 43

⁶²⁵ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot](#), 1 December 2018

⁶²⁶ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁶²⁷ UN OCHA, [Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview](#), 1 October 2018

⁶²⁸ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin: Sudan, 12-25 February 2018](#), February 2018, *Working with communities to inform response in South Darfur return village*, p. 4

⁶²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Voluntary return commission to question Darfur returnees](#), 3 April 2018

⁶³⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, [Sudan: ICRC provides food and household items to over 3,000 families in Darfur](#), 29 October 2018

⁶³¹ Sudan Humanitarian Fund, [Annual Report 2017](#), 2 May 2018, *Long term displacement and livelihoods*, p. 8

The June 2018 Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN on the strategic review of UNAMID in Darfur covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018 reported that:

The right of return and the restitution of property is stipulated in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (art. 52, para. 260). The Property Claims and Restitution Committee of the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, part of the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office as of January 2017, has made some progress, but has suspended its work owing to a lack of funds. In addition, the Doha Document provides for the establishment a land database and a land commission mandated to develop recommendations for state legislatures and serve as an arbitration forum on disputes related to land rights [...]

In North Darfur, the Governor directed local commissioners to collaborate with the native administration and the Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities to register individual lands, and settlers have also been notified to leave occupied plots of land to enable returns. However, recently some 176 households from the Sortony internally displaced persons site, who had voluntarily returned to their areas of origin, were subsequently forced out by the current occupants [...]

In South Darfur, in May 2016, the Governor issued a decree restoring the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees to the lands and houses they had left behind in February 2003, and issued land ownership certificates for returnees in some areas. Despite that, in January 2018, the Fallata denied Masalit returnees access to land, and the internally displaced persons returned to the camp in Gaida to avoid conflict [...]

In East Darfur, the state government amended the Land Acquisition Act of 1930 by adding a restitution policy to provide an opportunity to reclaim and formalize land ownership rights through the courts. In support of that policy, the state government has established two committees to verify proof of land ownership and registration and to conduct a sensitization campaign on the state government's return strategy.⁶³²

The Sudan Tribune reported in June 2018 that the government of West Darfur State had distributed 600 residential plots to the IDPs in El-Geniena locality as part of its commitment to assist in the voluntary return and integration of IDPs.⁶³³

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID covering the period from 11 June until 3 October 2018 observed that “the lack of a comprehensive solution continues to result in disputes over land ownership between internally displaced persons and herders who have occupied vacated lands. The issue remains a barrier to the return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin and an obstacle to peace”.⁶³⁴ The same source further noted:

The implementation of the Doha Document continued at a slow pace. The Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission in Central Darfur visited all localities in the state except for Golo and Rockero, assessing the situation, including needs. In South Darfur, the Commission conducted field surveys in 180 out of 232 villages to verify areas of voluntary return and identified 17 villages requiring immediate response. The Darfur Land Commission is in the process of establishing information and data centres in the five Darfur states and Khartoum, equipped with information on land use and suitability, water resources and socioeconomic conditions, among other things. The Commission has already received some of the database equipment for these centres through funding from UNDP, with the expectation that the rest of the equipment will be installed and its staff trained by December 2018 [...]

⁶³² UN, *Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 1 June 2018, paras., 18, 19, 21 & 22

⁶³³ Sudan Tribune, *West Darfur hands over 600 residential plots to IDPs: minister*, 22 June 2018

⁶³⁴ UN Secretary-General, *African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 12 October 2018, para. 59

Comprehensive implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in particular in areas relating to compensation and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, land and other natural resources, remains crucial. It is regrettable, however, that the residual Darfur Regional Authority commissions are yet to become fully functional. The progress of their deployment has been constrained by lack of resources, both human and financial.⁶³⁵

7. Women

7.1 Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)

Background information general to Sudan

UNFPA's State of World Population 2017 report, published in October 2017, noted that in Sudan:

82% of adolescent girls aged 15 to 19 years have undergone FGM.

The practice of FGM is slowly changing. Fewer adolescents have undergone FGM than previous generations, 82% of girls 15-19 compared to 92% of women age 45-49. [...]

More than half of girls and women in Sudan aged 15-49 support the end of FGM. There is no evidence of change in girls' and women's attitudes towards FGM [...].⁶³⁶

Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) reported in December 2017 that Sudan "legally prohibits the 'most severe form' of FGM, and yet the prevalence of this kind is close to 85% (rising to 90% for all 'types' of FGM). This is because the law is rarely enforced. The unreliability of government legislation with regards to this major human rights issue has made alternative strategies essential, one innovative example of which was pioneered in Sudan".⁶³⁷

Regarding the implementation of the law and any prosecutions resulting from it, 28 Too Many reported in their July 2018 report that:

In the absence of national legislation on FGM, there are no reported cases of arrests or court proceedings. There is also no evidence of the Criminal Act (1991) being used to prosecute perpetrators of FGM. It has not been possible to establish if any prosecutions have taken place within the four states that have attempted to criminalise FGM.⁶³⁸

28 Too Many's July 2018 report noted the various government FGM strategies:

Various government departments and professional bodies are responsible for implementing the national campaign to end FGM in Sudan, including the Ministries of Welfare and Social Services, Health, Guidance and Endowment and the Medical Council. The National Council for Child Welfare is the government authority that co-ordinates work in collaboration with the UNFPA UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (UNJP), which has been working in Sudan since 2008. The National Strategy to Combat Female Genital Mutilation 2008–2018 was launched as a partnership between government and civil-society organisations to address the 6 religious, health, social and cultural aspects of FGM. At state level there are also local government departments, councils and steering committees for anti-FGM-advocacy work.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁵ UN Secretary-General, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 12 October 2018, paras. 42 and 61

⁶³⁶ UNFPA, [State of World Population 2017](#), October 2017

⁶³⁷ HART, [Female Genital Mutilation on the Rise](#), 19 December 2017

⁶³⁸ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

⁶³⁹ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

A November 2018 report by Their World noted that “A UK-funded programme in Sudan shows social acceptance of FGM has fallen an estimated 18% in the past two years”.⁶⁴⁰

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report published in November 2018 noted that:

The 2003 Penal Code argues that: “Whoever makes or causes female circumcision to be done commits an offence and shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or with fine, or with both” (Section 284.a). The existing national laws criminalise the performance of all types of FGM/C except type 1 (Sunna) [...]. In 2008, the practice was included in Criminal Law, including National Public Health Law of 2007, but the sections banning FGM/C were deleted by Parliament before it passed both pieces of legislation. [...]

FGM/C abandonment has been included in a number of national policies and including the Government’s Population Policy (2002) and The Medical Council Resolution No. 366 (2003) prohibiting doctors from practising any form of FGM/C [...]. In 2008, the National Strategy on the Abandonment of FGM/C was extended for 2008-2018 [...]. In 2013, the Sudan Free of FGM/C programme was launched and the National Council on Child Welfare started coordinating a national task force and initiative, Saleema, aimed at changing the social norms associated with uncut girls [...]. Despite these interventions, Sudan is one of the countries where the practice of FGM/C is most widespread [...]. Women who are not circumcised are reported to be pressured to undergo the practice before marriage.⁶⁴¹

Information specific to Darfur

UNFPA’s October 2017 report also outlined FGM-related service providers:

Born Saleema Initiative in Hospitals and Health Centers: The Saleema Initiative promotes positive communication approaches with families and communities by promoting wide usage of new positive terminology to describe the natural bodies and social status of girls and women. The ‘Born Saleema Initiative’ reached 100,751 parents in hospitals and health centers in seven states to enlighten and educate mothers on the advantages of leaving their girls Saleema (uncut) and took pledges from mothers and families to leave their daughters Saleema. More than 170,500 new-born were registered through Extended Programme on Immunization (EPI) system. 6,788 mothers signed the pledges to leave their daughters Saleema.

Health providers Call for Enforcement of Laws to Prevent FGM: The Sudan Midwifery Association collected 1,483 signatures from the midwifery community (585 students and 898 practitioners) from Gadarif, North Kordofan, South Darfur and Khartoum states as a collective call for a petition to enforce a law against FGM. The Sudan Pediatrician Society also signed petitions in 2016 to end FGM in their medical practice.

Legal Aid for GBV Survivors: The Joint Programme established a free legal aid centre for GBV survivors, including FGM survivors, in Gedaref.⁶⁴²

On 31 October 2017, WHO reported that:

In South, North, Central and West Darfur, UNFPA carried out a highly specialized campaign to prevent and repair obstetric fistula and successfully operated 211 women. The specialist fistula surgeon who carried out the operations also proceeded to train 24 Obstetrics Gynecologists from Darfur region to continue the campaign. Additionally, the agency also works closely with Social Welfare Development Ministry to address underlying causes of fistula like child marriage, early child bearing, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and gender inequality.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴⁰ Their World, [UK makes biggest investment to help end FGM in African countries](#), 23 November 2018

⁶⁴¹ Social Institutions and Gender Index, [Sudan](#), 13 November 2018

⁶⁴² UNFPA, [State of World Population 2017](#), October 2017

⁶⁴³ WHO, [Health Cluster Bulletin, August-October 2017](#), 31 October 2017

UNAMID reported in its quarterly update of February 2018 that:

Engagements and advocacy with state authorities in Darfur by UNAMID HRS have highlighted concerns over the prevalence of harmful traditional practices such as female genital cutting. While the focus of the advocacy has been on the need for action by state authorities, sensitization programs also continued to be organized in local communities and internally displaced persons' camps. On 19 December 2017, upon the request of the Wali Adviser on Children and Women's Rights, UNAMID HRS organized a oneday workshop in El Daein, East Darfur, on harmful traditional practices. The workshop targeted 35 women leaders, who are known to have influential voices in and around El Daein. The workshop was aimed at enhancing the knowledge of the women leaders on the medical and human rights implications of harmful traditional practices.⁶⁴⁴

The US State Department on Sudan's Human Rights Practices in 2017 noted that "The most significant human rights issues included [...] lack of accountability in cases involving violence against women, including rape and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) [...]".⁶⁴⁵ The report further stated that:

FGM/C remained a problem throughout the country. No national law prohibits FGM/C, and the procedure continued to be used on women and girls throughout the country. The government launched a national campaign in 2008 to eradicate FGM/C by 2018, and since 2008, five states had passed laws prohibiting FGM/C: South Kordofan, Gedaref, Red Sea, South Darfur, and West Darfur. The government, with the support of the first lady, continued to prioritize the "saleema" (uncut) campaign, which raised public awareness about FGM/C. The government continued to work with UNICEF, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and the World Health Organization (WHO) to end FGM/C. According to UNICEF and UNFPA, the national prevalence rate of FGM/C among girls and women between 15 and 49 years old was 87 percent. Prevalence varied geographically and depended on the local ethnic group.⁶⁴⁶

In July 2018, the NGO 28 Too Many published a report regarding FGM in Sudan. The report found that "In Sudan, the prevalence of FGM in women aged 15–49 is 86.6%". Prevalence rates are 97.6% in North Darfur; 97.3% in East Darfur; 88.2% in South Darfur; 61.2% in West Darfur; and 45.4% in Central Darfur. The report found that:

- Most women have been cut between the ages of five and nine.
- Type III ('sewn closed') is the most common type of FGM practised.
- More than three-quarters of FGM cases are carried out by nurses, midwives or other medical personnel.
- 52.8% of women aged 15–49 who have heard of FGM believe it should be discontinued.⁶⁴⁷

The July 2018 28 Too Many report stated that:

Although the Constitution does not specifically mention FGM, Article 32 refers to harmful practices in relation to the 'Rights of Women and Children': The State is obliged to (2) 'promote women's rights through affirmative action', (3) 'combat harmful customs and traditions which undermine the dignity

⁶⁴⁴ UNAMID, [Human Rights First](#), February 2018

⁶⁴⁵ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, *Executive Summary*

⁶⁴⁶ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, *Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

⁶⁴⁷ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

and status of women' and (5) 'protect the rights of the child as provided in the international and regional conventions ratified by Sudan' [...].

There is currently no national law against FGM covering the whole of Sudan. Various states have put laws in place that only apply to FGM undertaken within the boundaries of those states, including Gedaref, South Darfur, South Kordofan and Red Sea. Although in 1946 Sudan was the first country in Africa to criminalise Type III FGM ('infibulation'), the article was subsequently removed from the Penal Code following the introduction of Sharia law in 1983. More recently, in September 2016, an amendment to the Criminal Act (1991) was approved by the Council of Ministers to criminalise FGM under a new Article 141; at the time of writing it is still pending endorsement by parliament. [...]

There are no penalties at the national level for practising FGM.⁶⁴⁸

With regards to medicalised FGM, the July 2018 28 Too Many report found that:

National legislation does not effectively uphold professional ethics for medical personnel in Sudan. Medical Council Resolution Number 366 from 2002 prohibits doctors and midwives from performing all forms of FGM.¹² All involved, including the hospital or healthcare facility, will be subject to punishment if caught performing FGM. The sanctions, however, are only administrative in nature rather than criminal. Punishment for doctors and midwives under this resolution is at the discretion of the Medical Council and can result in the annulment of practicing licences and dismissal from the profession.⁶⁴⁹

The same 28 Too Many report further noted that four states have attempted to criminalise FGM: South Kordofan, Gadaref, South Darfur and Red Sea. With regards to South Darfur, the report noted: "South Darfur (FGM prevalence 88.2%) – under Article 11 of the South Darfur State Child Act 2013, all forms of FGM are prohibited".⁶⁵⁰ However, "The Child Act 2013 does not include a provision for penalties".⁶⁵¹

7.2 Honour killings

No information has been found relating to honour killings in Darfur and almost nothing in Sudan.

Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) noted in September 2018 that:

Girls and young women who attempt to escape forced marriage, or take action to defend themselves against abuse are endangering their lives and freedoms by appealing to laws that enforce honour-related violence and oppression of women. [...]

The legal system in Sudan is influenced by Sharia Law, under which, religious traditions and ideologies restrict the liberty of women, violate their rights, and enforce honour punishments that hold many captive in abusive marriages. Under Article 27 of the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991, the death penalty was made legal, enabling the honour killing of women inside courts of law. At present, impermissible restrictions on information are blocking investigations into the criminal prosecution of women who seek escape, and of Sudan's use of the death penalty.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁸ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

⁶⁴⁹ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

⁶⁵⁰ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

⁶⁵¹ 28 Too Many, [Sudan: the law and FGM](#), July 2018

⁶⁵² HART, [The Bride Price in Sudan](#), 12 September 2018

7.3 Early and forced marriage

No information was found amongst the sources consulted in the time frame for this report specific to Darfur. Information pertaining to the situation in Sudan in general has therefore been included.

A November 2017 UNICEF report noted that “apart from Sudan, all countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which restricts states from giving legal effect to marriages that involve children, and urges states to specify a minimum age for marriage”. The report further added that “In both Sudan and Yemen, puberty is broadly used as the age at which marriage of girls is appropriate and acceptable”.⁶⁵³ The report explained that:

In Sudan, in legislation and in practice, Sharia law defines adulthood at the age of puberty and thus does not include protection against child marriage. Article 40 of the Personal Status Law of Muslims (1991) provides that pre-pubescent girls as young as 10 may be married with the consent of a male guardian and a Sharia court judge. Under Sudanese law, for a civil marriage contract to be valid, one of the criteria requires that the minimum age for men be 18 and for girls 16 and both parties must consent to marriage. However, a woman needs permission from a male guardian to validate the marriage. The CRC has identified recommendations focused on the priority need to adopt legislation that sets the minimum age for marriage as 18 years and criminalizes child marriage. However, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is working on revising the 1991 Personal Status Law, with a key informant at the MoJ reporting that the review has been a collaborative process with other government entities and civil society organizations. They expect to make several important changes, including setting the minimum age of marriage for girls to 16 or 18 years of age.⁶⁵⁴

Regarding state actions against child marriage, the 2017 UNICEF report stated that:

Key informants in Sudan noted that the National Taskforce to End Child Marriage has attempted to implement trainings and awareness sessions on child marriage with members of the police and military, but due to regular transfers to other areas, there is frequent turnover. To mitigate this problem, the Taskforce is calling for regular training for Family and Child Protection Units (FCPU).⁶⁵⁵

According to a September 2017 CHR Michelin Institute report on child marriage:

Sudan is among the African countries with a high prevalence of child marriage [...] Early pregnancy increases the risk of both maternal and child mortality. Added to that, girl brides are more likely to suffer domestic violence and marital rape. Child brides are rarely allowed to continue their education. With limited access to education and subsequent economic opportunities, child brides and their families are more likely to live in poverty.⁶⁵⁶

The September 2017 CHR. Michelsen Institute paper further stated that:

While there has been no legal reform of the Muslim Personal Law of 1991 at the time of this report, the 2010 National Child Act defines “child” as a person below the age of 18. The 2010 law also includes

⁶⁵³ UNICEF, *Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2017, p8

⁶⁵⁴ UNICEF, *Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2017, p66

⁶⁵⁵ UNICEF, *Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2017, p60

⁶⁵⁶ CHR. Michelsen Institute, *Girls, Child Marriage, and Education in Red Sea State, Sudan: Perspectives on Girls' Freedom to Choose*, September 2017, p5

provisions protecting children against all forms of discrimination, and, accordingly, it has been used as a platform to advocate for legal reform of the minimum age of marriage.⁶⁵⁷

The same report summarised civil society initiatives aimed at addressing child marriage in Sudan as follows:

Child marriage in Sudan has received heightened attention since late 2016 when it emerged as a recommendation from the UN after Sudan presented its Universal Periodic Report. In addition, the topic has recently come onto the public agenda in the context of reforming the Muslim Personal Law of 1991. That law sets the minimum age of marriage at tamyeez (“maturity”), which is 10 years old under the law. Furthermore, under the 1991 law, a woman needs a male guardian (a father, brother, or uncle) to contract her marriage. When the 1991 act was passed, the Islamic government of the time employed religious arguments to defend the legalization of child marriage. However, both government and civil society are now working for both legal and social change. In particular, the NGO Sudan Organization for Research and Development (SORD) has advocated for legal reform of the 1991 law’s provisions on child marriage. The SEEMA Center [Center for Training and Protection of Women and Child’s Rights] has also turned its attention to child marriage, particularly by working with victims. In December 2015, the Sudanese government launched the African Union campaign to end child marriage in Africa. In addition, the National Council for Child Welfare (NCCW), under supervision of the Sudan’s minister of social welfare, has formulated a strategy for abandoning the practice, which is in process of being endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers.⁶⁵⁸

The same CHR Michelin Institute report described the state response to child marriages:

Progress in Sudan on the specific issue of child marriage has been limited. Despite international and domestic pressure for making 18 the minimum age of marriage, the Muslim Personal Law of 1991 remains unchanged. Neither the National Strategy for Women Empowerment nor the National Family Strategy of 2009 even mentions child marriage. Although the 2010 National Child Rights Act includes provisions against discrimination of the girl child, it does not mentions child marriage specifically. However, the 2010 Child Act does define a child as a person below the age of 18, and since the 2010 Child Act is to take precedence over all other laws, women inside and outside of the government are of the belief that a reform of the Muslim Personal Law with regards to child marriage is inevitable. NCCW [National Council for Child Welfare] continues to tackle child marriage through awareness raising, but with a low profile. A strategy to eliminate child marriage, which was initiated by NCCW, is still waiting approval by the parliament.⁶⁵⁹

UNICEF reported in December 2017 that between 2010 and 2016, 12% of children were married by 15 years old and 34% by 18 years old. UNICEF further noted that 67% of births were registered between 2010 and 2016.⁶⁶⁰

The US State Department on Sudan’s Human Rights Practices in 2017 noted that “There is no minimum age for consensual sex or statutory rape law”.⁶⁶¹ The report further stated “The legal age

⁶⁵⁷ CHR. Michelsen Institute, Girls, [Girls, Child Marriage, and Education in Red Sea State, Sudan: Perspectives on Girls’ Freedom to Choose](#), September 2017, p6

⁶⁵⁸ CHR Michelin Institute, [Girls, Child Marriage, and Education in Red Sea State, Sudan: Perspectives on Girls’ Freedom to Choose](#), September 2017, p6

⁶⁵⁹ CHR Michelin Institute, [Girls, Child Marriage, and Education in Red Sea State, Sudan: Perspectives on Girls’ Freedom to Choose](#), September 2017, p17

⁶⁶⁰ UNICEF, [State of the World’s Children 2017: Statistical Tables](#), December 2017, Table 8 Child Protection

⁶⁶¹ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

of marriage was 10 years for girls and 15 years or puberty for boys. The government and the president's wife continued to work to end child marriage".⁶⁶²

A news story published by Their World in May 2018 noted that:

Sudanese law allows children above 10 to be married with a judge's permission. One in three girls are married before they turn 18 and more than one in 10 by the age of 15.

Child marriage can disrupt girls' education and puts them at risk domestic violence and abuse, as well as health complications, death in childbirth and infant mortality.

As many as three million children are out of school in Sudan - more than half of them girls.⁶⁶³

In May 2018, the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa reported that:

Despite the fact that Sudan is a signatory to the convention on the rights of the child, the Sudan Personal Status Law allows girls to be married as of age 10 years old. The Sudanese Personal Status Law emerges as demeaning to the identity of women and girls presenting them as inferior, unable to survive, decide and manage their lives without oversight from men.

The concept of guardianship in Sudanese Personal status Law is one of the greatest restrictions to women's ability to control their lives and make decisions independently. Under Article 33 of the Personal Status Law, the guardians are: adult men that are Muslim, of sound mind and they do, among other things, decide upon the suitability of a potential husband, meaning that a woman can effectively be married without her consent if her guardian approves. [...]

This is not to mention forced marriages and marriages to minors which are permitted by the Personal Status Law under Article 34, with permission of the girls' guardians and with her consent.⁶⁶⁴

Amnesty International reported on the case of Noura Hussein Hamad Daoud on 15 May 2018:

Nineteen year old, Noura Hussein Hamad Daoud, was sentenced to death on 10 May for killing her husband in self-defence after he tried to rape her for a second time. The Central Criminal Court of Omdurman in Sudan, on 29 April, found her guilty of the murder of her husband Abdulrahman Mohamed Hammad. Noura's case highlights the failure of the Sudan government to tackle the tragedy of early and forced marriage as well as marital rape. [...]

Under Sudanese law, children can be married off from age 10. When Noura Hussein refused to consummate the marriage, on 2 May 2017 Abdulrahman Mohamed invited two of his brothers and a male cousin to hold her down as he forced himself on her, raping her. The next morning on 3 May 2017 he tried to rape her again and Noura Hussein used a knife to defend herself. Her 27-year-old husband died as a result of the injuries he sustained. A medical examination conducted on Noura Hussein indicated that she also sustained injuries as a result of the scuffle between her and her husband.⁶⁶⁵

On 26 June 2018, Amnesty International reported that a Sudanese court quashed Noura Hussein's death sentence.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶² US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6. *Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

⁶⁶³ Their World, [Death penalty for victim of child marriage and rape sparks outrage in Sudan and beyond](#), 18 May 2018

⁶⁶⁴ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, [TRAPPED IN BETWEEN MISOGYNY AND DOGMA: NOURA'S CASE AND THE DILEMMA OF SUDAN'S LEGAL SYSTEM](#), 14 May 2018

⁶⁶⁵ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action: Forcibly married, raped girl sentenced to death](#), 15 May 2018

⁶⁶⁶ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Quashing of Noura Hussein death sentence must now lead to legal reform](#), 26 June 2018

A June 2018 CHR. Michelsen Institute brief on Sudanese family law noted that “The family law in Sudan, legalises child marriage, stipulates a wife’s obedience to her husband, and gives the male guardian veto power on women’s consent to marriage”.⁶⁶⁷ The report noted that:

The Personal Status Law for Muslims came into being in 1991, following an intense period of Islamification led by the Sudanese government [...] The principal elements of the 1991 Personal Status Law for Muslims are marriage, maintenance, divorce, custody and inheritance. [...] as the law is based on Sharia it is considered untouchable; therefore, reforms to the law have largely met resistance from religious conservatives. [...]

According to the 1991 law, the age of consent to marriage is tamyeez, that is, maturity understood as the age at which a minor has attained the ability to discriminate between right and wrong. A subsequent provision explicitly allows the guardian to contract a minor in marriage when there is overriding interest in doing so, and with the permission of a judge. Here, it does stipulate the specific age of 10, effectively making 10 the minimum age of marriage. Further, the 1991 law provides that a male guardian (wali) should only arrange the marriage of his ward with her consent. However, a subsequent section of the article on consent essentially gives the guardian the power to contract a marriage without the permission of his ward, so long as she consents later on. A contract concluded by the guardian before securing his ward’s consent may be termed voidable, but her refusal to consummate the marriage does not automatically void the contract. Rather, the woman must petition the court and prove that she did not consent to the marriage.⁶⁶⁸

CHR. Michelsen Institute noted in a June 2018 briefing that:

There are 23 organisations or institutions currently supporting interventions for ending child marriage in Sudan. They use religious, health and social perspectives to raise awareness among parents, school girls, grandparents, religious leaders, community leaders, and political parties (Badri and Al-Husseni, 2014). These organisations vary across Sudan and have little support from the Sudanese government in their work, meaning there is a fragmented approach to ending child marriage.⁶⁶⁹

HART reported in September 2018 that:

Sudan has one of the highest rates of forced marriage in the world, an epidemic caused by generations of civil war; conflict and north-south disputes have been linked to the escalating numbers of brideprice ceremonies in the country’s fragile states, where girls as young as ten are being sold into marriage. [...]

The sexual and reproductive rights of child brides are forfeited in forced marriage, a contract in which marital rape continues with impunity, and expressions of violence continue without punishment. According to UNICEF, 34 per cent of Sudanese girls are married in childhood. These brides are vulnerable to the trauma of battery, sexual violence and life-threatening pregnancies.⁶⁷⁰

On 20 September 2018, Amnesty International reported that:

Sudanese law forbids, women and girls, regardless of their age, to marry without the consent of a male guardian. The guardian is usually their father, brother, or uncle but can sometimes be the prospective bride’s own son! Without this consent, the marriage is void. On the other hand, and despite a legal requirement that women give their consent to be married, there are no legal safeguards to ensure consent has been clearly and freely given.

⁶⁶⁷ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [CMI brief: Family law reform in Sudan: A never ending story?](#), June 2018

⁶⁶⁸ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [CMI brief: Family law reform in Sudan: A never ending story?](#), June 2018

⁶⁶⁹ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Interventions for the abandonment of child marriage in Sudan](#), June 2018

⁶⁷⁰ HART, [The Bride Price in Sudan](#), 12 September 2018

Wedding contracts, traditionally, are men-only ceremonies. They often take place in mosques away from women. In practical terms, this means that marriage contracts are signed between the groom and the bride's "guardian," without checking whether she has given her consent. If a woman or girl finds a way to meet the Imam/registrar and inform him that she does not consent to the marriage, then the marriage contract is rendered null and void. However, the social context in which most weddings take place in Sudan does not allow women and girls to do so.⁶⁷¹

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report, published in November 2018, stated that:

Child marriage is not prohibited under the Muslim Personal Law Act of Sudan (1991). The Personal Status Law of Muslims, 1991, allows the marriage of a girl once she has hit puberty, however there is no clear provision as to at what age a woman attains puberty. Section 34.1 argues that "her word regarding her attainment of pubescence shall be conclusive unless it contradicts the obvious" [...] Article 40.3 argues that "the guardian of a minor girl cannot conclude her marriage contract unless there is permission from the judge. The guardian has to prove that the marriage will benefit the minor girl, that the husband is suitable and the husband pays the dowry usually paid to women of her status" (Article 40.3). The Marriage of Non-Muslims Act of 1926 sets the age of marriage at 13 for non-Muslim girls, and 15 for non-Muslim boys [...]. The Child Act 2010 does not include protection against early or forced marriage.⁶⁷²

The Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, published in November 2018 noted that:

While welcoming the ongoing review of personal status laws, and also noting the State party's 2015 strategy to end early marriage, the Committee is, however, concerned about the persistence of entrenched discriminatory provisions within the Personal Law Act of 1991, such as article 25 (c), which provides that the contract of marriage for a woman shall be concluded by a male guardian; article 34, which allows for the marriage of a pubescent woman to be concluded by a male guardian; and article 40 (3), which allows the conclusion of the marriage of a minor girl, if it can be proven that the marriage will "benefit" the girl.⁶⁷³

7.4 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

For information on sexual and gender-based violence against IDP communities, also see 5. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, [5.1 Security](#).

A report by the Secretary General on the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, covering events from 15 August until 15 October 2017, published in October 2017 noted that:

There were 27 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the form of rape and attempted rape involving 31 victims, including 15 minors (all girls), and 2 cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention involving 41 victims. Violence against women and girls continued unabated. Challenges of restricted access to areas where incidents occurred and the non-reporting of cases by some victims of sexual violence due to stigma and limited access to justice for women, in particular in remote areas, remained.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁷¹ Amnesty International, [Why Sudanese teenager Noura Hussein's case matters](#), 20 September 2018

⁶⁷² Social Institutions and Gender Index, [Sudan](#), 13 November 2018

⁶⁷³ UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018, paragraph 17

⁶⁷⁴ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 October 2017, paragraph 11

Radio Dabanga reported in September 2017 that a displaced woman had been raped en route to Central Darfur capital,⁶⁷⁵ that two girls had been raped in Tawila locality, North Darfur,⁶⁷⁶ and a 13-year-old girl was raped in the western part of Nyala city.⁶⁷⁷ In October 2017, the same news sources reported that four girls were raped in West Darfur⁶⁷⁸ and there was an attempted rape in a North Darfur camp.⁶⁷⁹

The UN Security Council report of 27 December 2017, detailing the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur between 15 October until 15 December 2017, noted that during the reporting period “There were 11 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict related sexual violence, in the form of rape, involving 13 victims, including 9 female minors”.⁶⁸⁰

The US State Department on Sudan’s Human Rights Practices in 2017 stated that “The international expert on the human rights situation in Sudan and UNAMID’s human rights section reported that they received regular reports of incidents of rape and sexual and gender-based violence”.⁶⁸¹ The report further noted that:

There were continuing reports that government security forces, progovernment and antigovernment militias, and other armed persons raped women and children. [...]
Human rights groups continued to report that government forces and militias raped, detained, tortured, and arbitrarily killed civilians in the five states of Darfur [...]
From December 2016 to November, UNAMID documented 115 cases involving 152 adult female victims of conflict-related sexual violence and 68 minors. In 2016 UNAMID documented 100 cases with 222 victims. UNAMID received the cases from all five Darfur states. Gross underreporting remained prevalent. [...]
All states in Darfur were under varying states of emergency. Between January 1 and November 10, UNAMID police received 1,737 reports of criminality and banditry [...] The attacks included rape [...] and were allegedly carried out primarily by Arab militias, but government forces, unknown assailants, and rebel elements also carried out attacks.⁶⁸²

In December 2017, Radio Dabanga reported that three young women had been gang raped by herders in Central Darfur⁶⁸³ and that two girls had been raped in West Darfur.⁶⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch reported that:

On 19 December 2017, a 16 year old girl and a 19 year old woman were held at gunpoint and raped repeatedly by six armed militiamen as they were out gathering firewood three kilometres from the internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Nertiti town, Central Darfur state.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁷⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Displaced woman raped en route to Central Darfur capital](#), 6 September 2017

⁶⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Two girls raped and hospitalised in North Darfur](#), 13 September 2017

⁶⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Girl raped in South Darfur city](#), 14 September 2017

⁶⁷⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Four girls raped in North Darfur](#), 6 October 2017

⁶⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Displaced woman shot in North Darfur camp](#), 31 October 2017

⁶⁸⁰ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 December 2017

⁶⁸¹ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

⁶⁸² US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 1.g

⁶⁸³ Radio Dabanga, [Three young women gang raped by herders in Central Darfur](#), 18 December 2017

⁶⁸⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Two girls raped in West Darfur](#), 11 December 2017

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan submitted a letter to the UN Security Council in December 2017 and noted that “Sexual and gender-based violence remains prevalent, exacerbated by impunity and the ready availability of weapons”.⁶⁸⁶ The report further stated that:

Sexual and gender-based violence remains a constant threat for civilians in Darfur, in particular women and girls. The proliferation of weapons, criminality and sporadic intercommunal clashes make civilians more vulnerable to such violence.

While crimes of sexual violence occur both in urban and rural settings, women and girls in displaced persons camps and in rural communities are systematically preyed upon by armed men, especially when they are on the move and engaged in livelihood activities. As in previous years, there was a peak in sexual violence cases during the 2017 farming season, in particular in areas with a high presence of armed militia and other armed actors, such as North and Central Darfur. While in certain instances these acts are opportunistic, in others they are aimed at instilling fear in the victims and their communities. In rural communities, women and girls are often in charge of farming and essential sustenance activities, and one of the means used by armed actors to deter them from cultivating their lands is the threat of rape. These incidents also affect the freedom of movement and livelihoods of women.

Sexual violence also affects the possibility of return of civilians to their places of origin. For example, in For Baranga, West Darfur, a Darfurian family — which had formerly been living in Chad as refugees — returned to Chad after a family member was gang-raped, fearing further attacks by the perpetrators. These cases highlight the need for enhanced security and basic services in areas of origin to facilitate the return of those displaced by the conflict.⁶⁸⁷

In January 2018, UN News reported that “The [Security] Council also voiced concern that improvements in the security situation [in Darfur] has not translated into a commensurate reduction in the level of human rights violations and abuses, such as sexual and gender-based violence, and serious violations against children, perpetrated with impunity”.⁶⁸⁸

In January 2018, Dabanga reported that:

Members of the RSF, the main pro-government militia in Sudan, abducted three girls from their family houses in Birkatuli village in Abu Ajura, El Salam locality. [...]

Residents of Birkatuli confirmed that the abduction of girls happened “by force of arms carried out by the RSF commander”. They claimed that this is not the first incident of its kind:

“This incident is the seventh of its kind at the hands of captain Abdelrahman. He has taken a number of people, including ten girls by force over the course of the year,” a villager said. He said that the incidents happen over farms, water resources and roads. We have been silent about the incidents throughout this period, out of fear for his vengeance and threats to hurt anyone who files a complaint.”

⁶⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch, [*Addressing the Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Sudan: To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the UN Human Rights Council*](#), 4 September 2018

⁶⁸⁶ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, *Summary*

⁶⁸⁷ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, *paragraphs 118-120*

⁶⁸⁸ UN News, [*Security Council stresses need of ‘sustainable solutions’ for millions displaced in Darfur*](#), 31 January 2018

This time, however, the residents said they decided to hold a demonstration that condemned the incident. They filed a complaint to the police in Donki Dreisa and asked the state authorities to conduct an investigation in the area.⁶⁸⁹

UNAMID reported in its quarterly update of February 2018 that:

In Darfur, the alarming situation of sexual violence and discrimination against women who constitute the majority of the victims stems from this context. Sexual violence which has deeply violated social values, humiliated women and girls in the majority, is an issue of major focus for monitoring and reporting for UNAMID and preceding missions since the conflict started in 2003.

[...] Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) seems prevalent in domestic settings including isolated places. Types of violations and crimes: harassment, rape, abduction for rape, sexual exposure and humiliation, rape and murder, attempted rape. Victims: women and girls especially from the internally displaced communities, minor girls in domestic settings and to a lesser extend minor boys. Perpetrators: often identified as armed men in civilian clothes, members of the armed forces, Arab proxy forces, Arab tribal militia, armed nomads, criminal gangs and men in unspecified military uniforms, civilian men and minor boys.

[...] Poverty and violence characterize the lives of women in Darfur, with many women having suffered harassment, rape and other forms of sexual abuse.[...] Life in the IDP camps has made women vulnerable to unacceptable levels of sexual and gender based violence. Women travel out of the camps for water and firewood and in the process get raped or abused by armed militia.⁶⁹⁰

On 27 February 2018 following a visit to Sudan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict issued a statement noting that:

[...] there remain serious concerns regarding conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan. During my brief visit, I learned that women continue to be raped while collecting water or firewood, or when they leave camps to pursue livelihood activities. I also heard from women who are unable to return to their pre-war homes due to the absence of security and fears of being raped. In addition, women told me about sexual violence committed in the context of inter-communal conflicts over land and natural resources. [...] NGOs feel restricted from voicing their views or carrying out programmes on conflict-related sexual violence for fear of reprisal and other consequences.⁶⁹¹

In February 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that “A girl was raped near a camp for displaced people in Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur”.⁶⁹²

In March 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that:

Figures from South Darfur on sexual violence against children in 2017 released this week paint a dismal picture, with four to six new cases reported to police in the state every day. Government sources acknowledge that the actual number might be far higher.

According to official statistics released in the South Darfur state capital of Nyala, there were 1,800 reports of sexual assaults on children in the 21 localities of South Darfur during 2017.

A government source said that 70 per cent of the complaints were filed by the newly established children's court in Nyala, set-up in response to an increase in cases. Other reports have been filed to the police and prosecution as a result of incomplete investigations. [...]

⁶⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [RSF commander accused of abductions in South Darfur](#), 16 January 2018

⁶⁹⁰ UNAMID, [Human Rights First](#), February 2018, p. 6 and 10

⁶⁹¹ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, [Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Ms. Pramila Patten Concludes Visit to Sudan and Calls for End to Culture of Denial for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence](#), 27 February 2018

⁶⁹² Radio Dabanga, [Girl raped near North Darfur camp](#), 20 February 2018

An official source at the family and children's office said the rate of sexual assaults on children ranged from four to six cases a day.

He pointed out that in reality, the number might be far higher as many cases are not reported so do not fall within these statistics. "The social stigma means many such crimes are settled among families before reaching the police or judicial system, on the grounds of concern for the reputation of the victim."⁶⁹³

A report by the Secretary General on conflict related sexual violence in March 2018 found that:

There is a discernible pattern of combatants profiting from sexual violence, while communities suffer increased economic hardship. Women have been sexually assaulted while conducting livelihood activities that are prescribed on the basis of gender, such as trading at marketplaces, tending fields and fetching firewood, as seen in the [...] Sudan.⁶⁹⁴

The same report by the Secretary General on conflict related sexual violence of March 2018 noted that:

[...] Conflict-related sexual violence has primarily occurred around displaced persons camps, but has also been noted in villages and remote areas to which displaced persons have begun to return, where perpetrators typically prey upon victims when they are engaged in livelihood activities. In some cases, security fears have forestalled the return of civilians to their villages of origin. In one incident, a family living in West Darfur, which had previously fled to Chad as refugees, were forced back across the border into Chad after a relative was gang-raped, for fear of further attacks [...]

In 2017, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur documented 152 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, affecting 84 women, 66 girls and 2 boys, across the five states of Darfur, a decrease from the 222 victims in 2016. The cases involved rape (90 per cent), attempted rape (6 per cent) and gang rape (4 per cent). In 2 per cent of cases, the victims were killed and, in many others, suffered grievous bodily harm. Sexual violence continues to be chronically underreported due to stigma, harassment, trauma, the lack of protection afforded to victims and witnesses and the perceived inaction of law enforcement, with police and service providers alike having been pressured to drop cases. Rape is often resolved through traditional justice mechanisms, which tend to order victims to marry the perpetrator.

The perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence were identified by victims as armed men or militia members in civilian attire in 70 per cent of cases, and as members of the national security apparatus, namely the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces, border guards and members of the Sudanese Police Force, in 30 per cent of cases. As in previous years, a spike in sexual violence coincided with the farming season, from July to October, especially along the migration routes of armed nomadic herders, with male farmers being physically attacked and women subjected to sexual assault. Data compiled by the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur indicated that the rape of minors, especially girls, is on the rise, with the highest rates of child rape recorded in South Darfur (58 per cent). Of 286 cases of the rape of minors reported in 2017, only 86 cases have been adjudicated, although in the view of the Special Prosecutor, none of those cases constituted conflict-related sexual violence. The Government attributes the increased numbers to efforts to raise awareness and improve evidence collection.⁶⁹⁵

The UN Security Council report of 25 April 2018, detailing the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, noted that during the reporting period (16 February to 15 April 2018), "21 cases of sexual and gender-

⁶⁹³ Radio Dabanga, '[Four to six reports of sex assault on children a day in 2017](#)', 9 March 2018

⁶⁹⁴ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence](#), 23 March 2018, paragraph 17

⁶⁹⁵ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence](#), 23 March 2018, paragraphs 70-72

based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, in the form of rape and attempted rape, involving 27 victims, including 21 children” were reported.⁶⁹⁶

In May 2018, Amnesty International reported on a deadly attack by a pro-government militia on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Central Darfur. The report noted that “Amnesty International has also received reports of sexual violence and prior research indicates that the pro-government militias, especially the RSF, are implicated in most of these violations”.⁶⁹⁷

MSF reported in May 2018 on people displaced in a camp in the village of Sortoni in Darfur and noted that:

Violence is never far away, as armed tribal groups live close to the camp and frequently come into conflict with the displaced people over grazing rights. We hear of women and children who have been attacked, beaten, sexually assaulted and sometimes even kidnapped, while searching for grass, wood or water outside the camp.⁶⁹⁸

Amnesty International reported on 28 June 2018 that:

According to information received by Amnesty International, between July 2017 and May 2018, incidents of [...] sexual violence [...] persisted in Darfur. [...] The pro-government militias especially the Rapid Support Force have allegedly committed most of these crimes, such as [...] rapes and torching of homes.⁶⁹⁹

In June 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that:

The Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdelwahid El Nur leadership (SLM-AW) claims that its forces repulsed two separate attacks on the movement sites in western and southern Jebel Marra on Tuesday, and accused retreating government soldiers of raping six girls. [...] The military spokesman accused government forces of raping six girls, including two children at Limo area south of Jebel Marra, after being defeated by the movement’s forces.⁷⁰⁰

The Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan dated 13 August 2018 stated that:

The vulnerabilities of women, girls and boys to sexual violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, remain a major concern. According to information received, from April 2017 to April 2018, UNAMID documented 111 cases involving 148 victims of sexual violence. The cases included rape, attempted rape, gang rape and killing of the victims in some instances. Displaced women and girls from internally displaced person camps remained the most vulnerable to, and were most often the victims of, conflict-related sexual violence, which primarily occurred around the camps for the displaced, villages of return and other remote areas while victims were engaged in livelihood activities. There was a spike in sexual violence during the farming season due to transhumance activities. The perpetrators were identified by the victims as armed men, militia members in civilian clothes and

⁶⁹⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Report of the Secretary General](#), 25 April 2018

⁶⁹⁷ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Pro-government militia open deadly fire on IDP camp in Central Darfur](#), 22 May 2018

⁶⁹⁸ MSF, [Dreams of returning home remain distant for displaced in Darfur camp](#), 18 May 2018

⁶⁹⁹ Amnesty International, [SUDAN: DOWN-SIZED UN MISSION FOR AN OVER-SIZED HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS](#), 28 June 2018

⁷⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur rebels: ‘Defeated Sudanese soldiers rape six girls in Jebel Marra’](#), 13 June 2018

members of State security forces such as the Sudan Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, border guards and police.⁷⁰¹

In September 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that a man was shot and killed while attempting to prevent young women being raped on a farm in South Darfur⁷⁰²; that two girls were raped on a farm in El Fasher locality;⁷⁰³ and that woman had been killed following an attempt to rape her in Deleig, Central Darfur.⁷⁰⁴

In October 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that three West Darfur schoolgirls had been raped⁷⁰⁵ and in a separate incident in October that seven women and girls were raped and 12 others were injured, during a two-hour ordeal by armed men in South Darfur.⁷⁰⁶

Care International's report on displaced girls published in October 2018 noted that:

Displaced girls in Darfur are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence. A 2017 joint assessment by the African Union and the UN details sexual attacks on 530 people in Darfur between 2014-16, most of them girls. More than 40 percent of the assessment's documented rape survivors sustained serious physical injury. One of most shocking injuries from sexual violence in the developing world is a traumatic fistula, which is a hole between the vagina and bladder or rectum. It causes incontinence in girls and women who continuously leak urine and feces and, because of the odor that results, become ostracized from their communities and even their families. While virtually unseen and unheard of in the developed world, traumatic fistulas are tragically common in the developing world, particularly in areas of crisis where armed groups use sexual violence as a weapon against girls.⁷⁰⁷

A UN Security Council report of October 2018, covering events from 11 June until 3 October 2018, recorded that:

Sexual and gender-based violence remained a serious concern and restricted women's freedom of movement in areas of return, as well as around internally displaced persons camps, where venturing outside the camps for farming, firewood or water exposes them to risk. There were 38 cases of sexual and gender-based violence documented by UNAMID, including conflict-related sexual violence in the form of rape involving 88 victims, including 24 minors. Incidents of sexual violence generally remain underreported.

There were 44 incidents of grave violations affecting 80 children (34 boys; 46 girls) documented by UNAMID during the reporting period, as verified by the country task force on monitoring and reporting. A total of [...] 22 girls were raped [...].⁷⁰⁸

Radio Dabanga noted in November 2018 the attempted rape of farmers in North Darfur⁷⁰⁹ and the gang rape of a young woman by three armed men on a farm in North Darfur.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰¹ UN General Assembly, [Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#),¹³ August 2018, paragraph 50

⁷⁰² Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur school teacher killed trying to prevent rape](#), 9 September 2018

⁷⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Sisters raped on farm near North Darfur camp](#), 14 September 2018

⁷⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Woman stabbed to death after rape attempt in Central Darfur](#), 25 September 2018

⁷⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Three West Darfur schoolgirls raped](#), 9 October 2018

⁷⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Seven women, girls raped, beaten in South Darfur ordeal](#), 31 October 2018

⁷⁰⁷ Care International, [Far from Home](#), 11 October 2018

⁷⁰⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Report of the Secretary General](#), 12 October 2018, paragraphs 12 and 13

⁷⁰⁹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur farmer shot defending women from rape attempt](#), 12 November 2018

⁷¹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [17-year-old raped as mother held at gunpoint in North Darfur](#), 1 November 2018

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report, published in November 2018, states that:

Violence against women in Sudan should be understood in the context of serious attacks committed by Government forces against civilians, including widespread killings, rape, and destruction of property, in the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile state and Nuba Mountains [...]. In fact, ongoing conflict and the humanitarian crisis, the particular vulnerability faced by persons displaced by conflict and drought, have further exposed women to violence [...]. Rape and sexual violence are used as a weapon of war against civilian women and girls by all sides in the conflict [...].⁷¹¹

7.5 State response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan dated December 2017 covering the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017 noted that:

Improving accountability and access to justice for survivors of sexual violence must be an integral part of peacebuilding efforts in Darfur. Judicial authorities are making some efforts to deal with the issue. For example, in late October, four Arab men accused of raping two female schoolteachers from Adar village, 20 km from El Geneina, were sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment by the local General Court. The victims had been abducted from their guesthouse in February and held at the men's settlement, where they were beaten and raped. Local justice authorities have stressed their commitment to ensuring greater accountability for such crimes, highlighting the deployment of additional prosecutors and police, including to rural areas. They have also expressed concern over the increase in reported cases of child rape. It should be noted, however, that, the bulk of sexual violence cases handled by justice authorities are not conflict-related.

Despite these efforts, significant challenges remain in combating impunity for sexual violence. First, sexual violence remains a sensitive subject for local authorities, who frequently downplay its prevalence and deny its occurrence. In addition, underreporting — owing, among other reasons, to fear of reprisals, harassment and social stigma — remains a key concern. When incidents are reported, lack of follow-up and inadequate response by police and judicial authorities represent significant challenges, in particular when the perpetrators are alleged to be armed actors or of Arab ethnicity. Protection for victims and witnesses who come forward is also lacking; at times, victims face pressure not to file complaints or are intimidated to drop charges. Finally, the victims' limited access to essential medical and psychosocial services, the lack of trained personnel and the weak referral pathways are additional impediments to curbing sexual violence. Aid and health workers can at times face restrictions imposed by the authorities on the provision of services to survivors and on prevention and monitoring activities, which in turn limits the accurate collection of data on cases.⁷¹²

A report by the Secretary General on the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, covering events from 15 August until 15 October 2017 noted that:

There were 27 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the form of rape and attempted rape involving 31 victims, including 15 minors (all girls), and 2 cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention involving 41 victims. Violence against women and girls continued unabated. Challenges of restricted access to areas where incidents occurred and the non-reporting of cases by some victims of sexual

⁷¹¹ Social Institutions and Gender Index, *Sudan*, 13 November 2018

⁷¹² UN Security Council, *Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 28 December 2017, paragraphs 121-122

violence due to stigma and limited access to justice for women, in particular in remote areas, remained.⁷¹³

On 31 October 2017, Radio Dabanga reported that “four men convicted of raping two West Darfur teachers to imprisonment, lashes, and a fine. The sentence has been branded ‘too lenient’ by Darfur lawyers. The following days, people in the West Darfur capital staged a number of protests against the repeated sexual violence in the area, and called on the authorities to bring the perpetrators to trial”.⁷¹⁴

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted in December 2017:

The scale of sexual violence in Darfur is likely much greater than any reports indicate. Independent monitors are unable to access most of Sudan’s conflict affected areas and survivors often do not report incidents, due to insecurity, stigma, the fear of reprisal and other obstacles. Among the obstacles are laws and policies that fail to ensure a safe environment for reporting sexual and gender based violence incidents and a consistent failure to prosecute these crimes. Despite recent changes to the definition of the offence of rape in Sudan’s criminal law, the law remains unclear about evidence standards that apply and women who report sexual offences remain at risk of prosecution for adultery or committing “immoral acts” if they fail to prove a rape case.

In addition, many of the international and domestic organisations expelled from Sudan following the ICC indictment provided medical, legal, and psychological services to women, and local civil society groups have faced serious difficulties filling this gap.⁷¹⁵

UNAMID reported in its quarterly update of February 2018 that:

Judicial redress for violent crimes against women and girls remains inadequate throughout Darfur. There is absence of police and judicial infrastructure in many remote areas and localities including victim friendly spaces like women centers for victims of sexual violence and gender desks at most of Police Stations to deal with SGBV and CRSV related crimes. Protection for survivors of sexual violence against reprisals is lacking in an environment characterized by a general culture of impunity and stigmatizing of rape victims, hindering both reporting and accountability.

There is inadequate medical response and support to survivors of sexual violence in remote areas compounded by shortage of actors like medical professionals (with knowledge and skills), necessary medication, specialized equipment, and referral coordination. Psychosocial support is constrained due to absence of institutional psychosocial support services for victims and survivors. The challenge is compounded by access restrictions in terms of information sharing with the government law enforcement authorities, victims and among protection partners.⁷¹⁶

On 27 February 2018 following a visit to Sudan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict issued a statement noting that:

A key observation from my visit to Sudan is the existence of a deep-seated culture of denial which enhances and feeds the culture of silence about sexual violence. Unlike victims of other crimes where perpetrators are condemned, it is usually the victims of sexual violence who are shamed or stigmatized.

As a result, victims of sexual violence are very often fearful of reporting the crime or seeking assistance, further compounding their suffering. Because sexual violence is so vastly underreported,

⁷¹³ UN Security Council, [Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 27 October 2017, paragraph 11

⁷¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [14 years, lashes, and fine for rape of West Darfur teachers](#), 31 October 2017

⁷¹⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), [Government allied militia gang rape a 16-year-old girl and a woman in Nertiti, Central Darfur State](#), 19 December 2017

⁷¹⁶ UNAMID, [Human Rights First](#), February 2018, p6

the lack of reported cases cannot be equated with the absence of violence. It deeply saddened me to hear interlocutors in Sudan doubting and questioning victims as well as the appalling nature of these crimes. The pervasive culture of denial is the most serious obstacle to eradicating this heinous crime. In many of my meetings, senior government officials explained that there is no sexual violence in Sudan because such violence is strictly prohibited by the Islamic religion. No religion or faith, however, is immune from sexual violence..⁷¹⁷

The same source further noted that:

I was dismayed to learn that, to date, the Special Prosecutor's Office has not investigated a single case of conflict-related sexual violence. In contrast, there continue to be references to conflict-related sexual violence in Security Council resolutions and reports relating to Sudan, including those of the Secretary-General, the International Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), the Panel of Experts on Sudan established under Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) and the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. I also learned that there are no female judges in any of the five states of Darfur. There is a need for female judges as well as more female police investigators and prosecutors..⁷¹⁸

A report by the Secretary General on conflict related sexual violence in March 2018 found with regards to Darfur that:

Sexual violence continues to be chronically underreported due to stigma, harassment, trauma, the lack of protection afforded to victims and witnesses and the perceived inaction of law enforcement, with police and service providers alike having been pressured to drop cases. Rape is often resolved through traditional justice mechanisms, which tend to order victims to marry the perpetrator..⁷¹⁹

The same source further noted

Although article 149 of the Sudanese Criminal Act (1991) was amended in 2015 to define rape in a manner more consistent with international standards, in practice, victims continue to fear that a failure to prove rape may expose them to being charged with adultery, a situation that perpetuates the reluctance of survivors to report. Local justice authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring accountability for such crimes, noting the deployment of additional prosecutors and police, including to rural areas. The United Nations has delivered training to justice and security sector personnel and supported the creation of "gender desks" in a number of police stations. UNFPA helped to build the capacity of medical personnel to deliver life-saving clinical management services for survivors of rape and to extend programmes on combatting gender-based violence to the newly-accessible areas. In February 2018, the Government facilitated the first visit of my Special Representative to the Sudan, which included several locations in North and West Darfur. I am encouraged by the constructive dialogue that began during that visit, with a broad range of stakeholders, including senior officials within the security, justice and health sectors..⁷²⁰

The UNAMID publication, *Voices of Darfur*, reported in March 2018 that:

⁷¹⁷ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, [*Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Ms. Pramila Patten Concludes Visit to Sudan and Calls for End to Culture of Denial for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*](#), 27 February 2018

⁷¹⁸ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, [*Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Ms. Pramila Patten Concludes Visit to Sudan and Calls for End to Culture of Denial for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*](#), 27 February 2018

⁷¹⁹ UN Security Council, [*Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence*](#), 23 March 2018, paragraph 71

⁷²⁰ UN Security Council, [*Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence*](#), 23 March 2018, paragraph 73

There is widespread impunity for rape and gender based crimes as most perpetrators are not brought to justice, and due to lack of the functioning of the judicial system, sexual violence and other cases are often dealt with in traditional settlements in contravention of international human rights standards.⁷²¹

Freedom House noted in its 2018 annual report published in March 2018 that:

Violence against women is a major problem, particularly in conflict-affected regions, and few perpetrators are brought to justice. There has been no accountability for the more than 200 women and girls who were raped, some of them repeatedly, when soldiers entered Tabit, in North Darfur state, in 2014.⁷²²

The US State Department's 2017 Sudan Human Rights Practices report stated that:

Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, especially in Central Darfur, continued to be taboo. Humanitarian actors in Darfur continued to report that victims of sexual and gender-based violence faced obstructions in attempts to report crimes and access health care.⁷²³

The same source noted with regards to the situation in Sudan in general that:

Human rights organizations cited substantial barriers, including cultural norms, police reluctance to investigate, and the widespread impunity of perpetrators, to reporting sexual and gender-based violence, including a substantial gap between the law and its implementation. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Women, and Child Affairs is responsible for matters pertaining to women. The Violence against Women Unit is responsible for implementation of the National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women. It had offices in 14 of the 18 states.⁷²⁴

The report further noted that "In addition access limitations remained in place for UNAMID human rights reporting and verifications of sexual and gender-based abuses".⁷²⁵ The same report added that:

Government restrictions, harassment, and the threat of expulsion resulted in continued interruption of gender-based violence programming. Reporting and outreach were limited [...]. Some UN agencies were able to work with the Darfur governor's advisers on women and children to raise awareness of gender-based violence and response efforts.⁷²⁶

Human Rights Watch reported in May 2018 that:

Sudan's security forces have also raped civilians in Darfur, sometimes on a mass scale, and in other conflict zones, crimes which may constitute crimes against humanity, and for which nobody has been brought to justice.⁷²⁷

⁷²¹ UNAMID, [Voices of Darfur](#), March 2018, p23

⁷²² Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2018: Sudan](#), 15 March 2018

⁷²³ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 1.g

⁷²⁴ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6.

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⁷²⁵ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 5. *Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights*

⁷²⁶ US State Department, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Sudan](#), 20 April 2018, Section 2.d

⁷²⁷ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan's Many Nouras](#), 15 May 2018

A UN Security Council report of October 2018, detailing the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, stated that:

35. The mission welcomed the Government's willingness to adopt a framework of cooperation with the United Nations on conflict-related sexual violence under Security Council resolution 2429 (2018) and to discuss the issue, as well as human rights in general, with the United Nations to guide future support for national authorities to enhance prevention and response measures. In a positive development for accountability, a member of the Sudanese Armed Forces personnel who was on trial in El Geneina, West Darfur, for the rape of a 15-year-old girl in January 2018, was convicted on 6 September and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

[...] 39. In collaboration with the Sudanese Ministry of Social Affairs, the mission also organized five workshops to revive the state committees for combating gender-based violence. In West Darfur, UNAMID sensitized 10 members of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Sudan Police Force and community leaders on the role of the military and police in preventing sexual and gender-based violence.⁷²⁸

Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, published in November 2018 noted that state actors were allegedly culpable for some of the sexual violence cases reported:

51. [...]The Committee notes with concern reports of 111 cases, involving 148 victims of sexual violence between April 2017 and April 2018 in Darfur, allegedly committed by militia members and members of the State security forces (arts. 2, 6–7 and 12).⁷²⁹

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report, published in November 2018, states that:

Sudan has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), denying women the broader human rights protection provided under international law (OHCHR, 2013: para 43). International NGOs have criticised Sudan's government for failing to protect women's rights and enabling an environment in which violence against women can be perpetrated with impunity. [...] Sudan has a weak normative framework regarding violence against women and girls with no comprehensive law prohibiting all forms of violence against women and girls. [...] There are units for combating violence against women at the federal and state levels with their own substructures and departments. There are Women's directorates within all 17 states, gender focal points within each ministry, and the National Committee for the Advancement of Women have been established. According to the Special Rapporteur, the various overlapping federal and state level institutional mechanisms do not allow for efficient and comprehensive remedies for violence against women and more clarity is needed to define their roles and competencies. [...]

At the national level, there are a number of policies and strategies on violence against women, including the 2011-2016 national plan for eradicating violence against women, along with its successor for 2015 to 2031. There is no access to the 2015-2031 national plan. [...]

The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women reported that officials at the highest levels, including from units specifically set up to combat violence against women, deny the existence of any manifestations of violence against women in the Sudan, except for Darfur.⁷³⁰

With regards to rape victims, the 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report noted:

⁷²⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Report of the Secretary General](#), 12 October 2018

⁷²⁹ UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018

⁷³⁰ Social Institutions and Gender Index, [Sudan](#), 13 November 2018

Sexual violence and rape in the Sudan is more prevalent in conflict areas [...].Victims of rape face challenges in reporting cases to the police. Participate in prosecutions could lead not only to shame and stigmatization but also to suspicion of adultery by the family and community. This is reinforced by the previous article 149 of the Criminal Act, under which women could be criminalized for adultery and risked being sentenced to death.⁷³¹

7.6 Trafficking of women

No information regarding trafficking in women in Darfur was found. The information provided below pays reference to literature pertaining to Sudan in general.

On 3 October 2017, Radio Dabanga reported that “the United States added Sudan to a list of countries it accuses of failing to fight human trafficking. Under a law called the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000), the United States does not provide non-humanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance to any country that fails to comply with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking and is not making efforts to do so”.⁷³²

In November 2017, Human Rights Watch reported that:

The European Union has pledged hundreds of millions of euros for the 'Khartoum Process', a multinational effort to manage migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe.

In Sudan, it supports a mix of development and humanitarian assistance - but also the country's controversial border control and counter-trafficking and counter-smuggling operations. [...]

The EU's programs in Sudan have been widely criticised on human rights grounds, in large part because its border control support the notoriously abusive Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which were responsible for atrocities in Darfur. [...]

Sudanese forces, including the RSF, collude with human traffickers and smugglers rather than responsibly investigate them, Human Rights Watch and the United States government have found.

Moreover, the violence Hemeti boasts about triggers other abuses. Sudan's law enforcement and judicial officials conflate trafficking and smuggling, resulting in criminal prosecution of trafficking victims.⁷³³

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan detailed in a letter to the UN Security Council in December 2017 that:

In meetings with the Panel, Government authorities have indicated their commitment to fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the Sudan, while at the same time acknowledging the challenges they face. In particular, they have noted that the vast and porous nature of the Sudan-Libya border, the lack of trained personnel and the desert terrain make it difficult to patrol border areas. Among other initiatives, training is being provided to justice and law enforcement authorities, with international funding, to strengthen local capacities in tackling criminal networks; these efforts are mainly focused in Khartoum and in eastern Sudan. Cooperation is also being strengthened between the Sudan and other countries of the region. On 8 November, the Government launched its first national plan aimed at combatting human trafficking. While these efforts are important,

⁷³¹ Social Institutions and Gender Index, [Sudan](#), 13 November 2018

⁷³² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's Al Bashir announces two-year development programme](#), 3 October 2017

⁷³³ Human Rights Watch, [EU Must Put Sudan Under Microscope at Africa Summit](#), 27 November 2017

understanding and addressing the root causes of migration is key to improving migration management and to adequately protecting migrants from violence and abuse.⁷³⁴

The US State Department 2018 annual report on trafficking in persons (covering April 2017 to March 2018) stated that:

As reported over the past five years, Sudan is a transit, source, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, sex trafficking and child soldiering. [...] Sudanese women and girls, particularly internally displaced persons or those from rural areas, and refugee women are vulnerable to domestic servitude; Sudanese girls are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. [...] Sudanese citizens are subjected to forced labor, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking abroad.⁷³⁵

The same 2018 US State Department report noted that:

The Government of Sudan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government made key achievements during the reporting period; therefore Sudan was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included increasing the number of investigations, prosecutions, and arrests of traffickers, including complicit officials; expanding training for law enforcement and judicial officials highlighting the differences between trafficking and migrant smuggling; improving screening processes to prevent government armed forces' recruitment of child soldiers; and identifying more victims through law enforcement operations. Despite these achievements, the government continued to penalize victims for crimes they committed while subjected to trafficking; did not make efforts to address sex trafficking or identify any sex trafficking victims; did not develop standard operating procedures to identify or refer victims to care; did not report providing assistance to any trafficking victims; and reports of official corruption and complicity in trafficking crimes continued.⁷³⁶

Regarding prosecutions, the 2018 US State Department report detailed that:

The government increased law enforcement efforts. The 2014 anti-trafficking law criminalized some forms of trafficking, but failed to define what constituted exploitation. [...]

Unlike in previous years, following increased training by the government and international organizations, senior officials and working level law enforcement and judicial officials demonstrated a clearer understanding of the differences between migrant smuggling and human trafficking, although some conflation of kidnapping, smuggling, and trafficking still existed at the working level. During the reporting period, the government reported investigating 99 total trafficking cases involving 179 suspected traffickers. These cases included several instances of suspected forced labor, but no alleged sex trafficking cases. The government prosecuted 94 of those cases involving 160 suspects, and convicted seven traffickers under the 2014 anti-trafficking law to sentences ranging from three years to death, compared with 450 investigations of potential traffickers during the previous reporting period; however, previous year's reporting likely included cases of migrant smuggling among other crimes. International organizations alleged that some police officers and local officials in Sudan were complicit in trafficking crimes, especially in the east of the country. The government reported prosecuting and convicting two complicit officials—one police officer and one colonel in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)—and sentenced the police officer to 10 years in prison under the 2014 anti-trafficking law, compared with no prosecutions or convictions of complicit officials reported during

⁷³⁴ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 28 December 2017, paragraph 144

⁷³⁵ US State Department, [*Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan*](#), 28 June 2018, *Trafficking Profile*

⁷³⁶ US State Department, [*Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan*](#), 28 June 2018, *Tier 2 Watchlist*

the previous five years. The government also reported convicting six officials for trafficking and sentencing them to between 10 and 15 years imprisonment in a special court in eastern Sudan.⁷³⁷

The US State Department's June 2018 Trafficking report outlined issues relating to the protection of trafficking victims:

The government increased efforts to identify trafficking victims subjected to forced labor but failed to identify victims of sex trafficking and likely penalized some victims for crimes they may have committed while being subjected to trafficking. Although victim protection remained a substantial gap in the government's anti-trafficking efforts, it took significant steps through the trainings listed in the previous section to increase the capacity of law enforcement and other first responders to proactively identify victims and refer them to care, in partnership with NGOs and international organizations.

In 2017, the government reported identifying 400 potential trafficking victims through the course of law enforcement activities, compared with 142 during the previous year; however, the government did not report referring any victims to care. The government did not have systematic procedures to identify trafficking victims, nor did it consistently use a standard mechanism to refer victims to protective services. The government also lacked a mechanism to screen for trafficking for use by officials engaging with vulnerable populations. As a result, trafficking victims who may have committed unlawful acts as a direct result of being subjected to trafficking were likely detained or deported from Sudan—or prosecuted—without access to protections afforded to them. Vulnerable individuals such as persons in prostitution, migrants, and refugees may not have reported abuses due to fear of retaliation by an employer or arrest by government authorities. Authorities—particularly in eastern Sudan—continued to charge some trafficking victims for immigration violations and held them in custody throughout the duration of court processes, and some victims participating in investigations risked retaliation by traffickers. [...]

The [National Council for Child Welfare] NCCW also reported partnering with international organizations to provide temporary shelter and services to 34 victims of trafficking.⁷³⁸

The Sudan Tribune reported on 9 May 2018 that “The Sudanese army has arrested human traffickers holding 231 people in Gaili Forest, on the eastern plains of Butana, Gedaref State [...] the victims include 34 women and 3 children [...] Last March, the Sudanese police arrested human traffickers holding 177 victims including 27 women in the capital Khartoum. Also, a joint police force in Sudan's eastern state of Kassala last December managed to free 95 victims of human trafficking following an exchange of fire with the perpetrators”.⁷³⁹

In July 2018, the Sudan Tribune reported that “Sudan's Higher Committee to Combat Human Trafficking said it would develop a national anti-trafficking strategy as well as activating existing laws to counter the phenomenon in accordance with the established international standards”.⁷⁴⁰ The report also outlined that:

In January 2014, the Sudanese parliament approved an anti-human trafficking law which punishes those involved with human trafficking with up to 20 years imprisonment.

Also, in 2014, Khartoum hosted a conference on human trafficking in the Horn of Africa, organised by the African Union (AU), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Sudanese government.

The East African nation has also forged a strategic partnership with several European countries and the EU to combat illegal migration and human trafficking.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁷ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Protection*

⁷³⁸ US State Department, [Trafficking in Persons 2018 Report: Sudan](#), 28 June 2018, *Protection*

⁷³⁹ Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese army free 231 victims of human trafficking](#), 9 May 2018

⁷⁴⁰ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan to develop national anti-human trafficking strategy](#), 16 July 2018

⁷⁴¹ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan to develop national anti-human trafficking strategy](#), 16 July 2018

On 29 August, the Sudan Tribune reported that 28 illegal migrants who were Sudanese nationals, heading towards the Libyan territory were arrested by the RSF.⁷⁴²

On 6 September 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that:

The commander of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan (aka Hemeti), announced that his government has stopped dealing with illegal immigration and combating human trafficking and smuggling "because the Western countries have not responded to Khartoum's efforts in this regard".

He said in an interview with Sudan National Television: "There is no international response, so we have stopped fighting human trafficking and illegal immigration".

He pointed out that Sudan is a major crossing point, dealing with 65 per cent of illegal immigration to Europe.

However, Sudan's Second Vice-President Hasabo Abdelrahman confirmed [...] his government's commitment to combating the phenomenon representing a contemporary form of slavery and announced that his government has been reviewing the national legislation in line with international law.⁷⁴³

In October 2018, Radio Dabanga reported that child traffickers had been arrested in North Darfur:

The authorities in North Darfur arrested three men in El Kuma locality in North Darfur on Monday. They are accused of kidnapping children and selling them to herders in the area.

Two of the three detainees are members of the Popular Police Forces, who are suspected of kidnapping children in North Darfur and selling them in El Kuma to serve as herders. [...]

Maryam Adam, the mother of 12-year-old Abu Ebeida Abdallah, told the press in El Fasher on Tuesday that her son disappeared in August. [...]

After the kidnappers were arrested, the family of Abdallah reported that they were pressurised "by influential people" to withdraw their complaint against the policemen. His mother therefore appealed to human rights organisations to protect them from "influential people who are trying to close the file".⁷⁴⁴

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index report published in November 2018 noted that:

The Human Trafficking Act, enacted in January 2014 and adopted in March 2015, adopts the definition of trafficking as outlined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [...].

Sudan is a transit and destination country for human trafficking. Since 2011, there has been a significant increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees who have been trafficked into slavery and slavery-like situations after crossing the border to seek asylum or secondary migration to the Middle East and Europe. A national committee to combat trafficking in persons has been set up in Kassala State and a special prosecutor investigates crimes of human trafficking in Eastern Sudan. The Government is involved in the implementation of the Joint UNHCR-IOM Strategy to Address Trafficking, Smuggling and Kidnapping of Persons in Sudan, particularly in the areas of investigation and criminal prosecution of such cases.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴² Sudan Tribune, [28 illegal migrants arrested on Sudan-Libya border: RSF](#), 29 August 2018

⁷⁴³ Radio Dabanga, [Militia leader: 'Sudan no longer combats human trafficking'](#), 6 September 2018

⁷⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, ['Child traffickers' arrested in North Darfur](#), 10 October 2018

⁷⁴⁵ Social Institutions and Gender Index, [Sudan](#), 13 November 2018

8. Individuals of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities

8.1 Legal framework

Sudan has laws criminalising private, consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex.⁷⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch noted in their annual report for 2017 that, “Sudan [...] criminalizes same-sex sexual activity with harsh penalties such as life in prison or death”.⁷⁴⁷

The US State Department reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2017 that:

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons are not considered a protected class under antidiscrimination laws. The law does not specifically prohibit homosexuality but criminalizes sodomy, which is punishable by death.⁷⁴⁸

Article 148 of Sudan’s 1991 Penal Code contains the following provisions:

148 Sodomy

(1) Any man who inserts his penis or its equivalent into a woman’s or a man’s anus or permitted another man to insert his penis or its equivalent in his anus is said to have committed Sodomy.

(2) (a) Whoever commits Sodomy shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and he shall also be liable to five years imprisonment.

(b) If the offender is convicted for the second time he shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and imprisonment for a term which may not exceed five years.

(c) If the offender is convicted for the third time he shall be punished with death or life imprisonment.⁷⁴⁹

Article 151 of the Penal Code refers to acts of “gross indecency upon the person of another person or any sexual act which does not amount to Zina or Sodomy”:

151 Indecent Acts

Whoever commits an act of gross indecency upon the person of another person or any sexual act which does not amount to Zina or Sodomy shall be punished with not more than forty lashes and shall also be liable for imprisonment for a term which may not exceed one year or fine.⁷⁵⁰

Human Rights Watch noted in April 2018 that:

Sudan's 1991 penal code criminalizes same-sex sexual activity with harsh penalties such as life in prison or death. These restrictions severely impede the ability of groups who work on LGBT issues to register as NGOs.⁷⁵¹

Human Rights Watch further noted in a report documenting LGBT activism in April 2018 that:

Sudanese law also may inhibit freedom of expression for LGBT people, including gender expression. Article 152 states that whoever “does in a public place an indecent act or an act contrary to public

⁷⁴⁶ Human Dignity Trust, [Jurisdictions Criminalising Private, Consensual Sexual Conduct Between Adults of the Same Sex](#), 24 September 2018; Human Rights Campaign, [Criminalization Map](#), September 2018

⁷⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2018: Sudan, Events in 2017](#), 16 April 2018

⁷⁴⁸ US State Department, [Sudan 2017 Human Rights Report](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

⁷⁴⁹ Sudan, [The Penal Code](#), 1991, Article 145 p.39

⁷⁵⁰ Sudan, [The Penal Code](#), 1991, Article 151, p.40

⁷⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, [Human Rights Watch Country Profiles: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity - Sudan](#), 16 April, 2018

morals or wears an obscene outfit or contrary to public morals or causing an annoyance to public feelings” will be punished with up to 40 lashes, a fine, or both. It specifies that an act is considered contrary to public morals “if it is regarded as such according to the standard of the person's religion or the custom of the country where the act takes place.” Under article 153, making, possessing, or circulating “materials contrary to public morals” is subject to up to one month in prison or 40 lashes, as well as a fine, while running any “exhibition, theatre, cinema or public place” where such materials are exhibited or presented is punished by up to sixty lashes, up to three years in prison, or with both.⁷⁵²

Outright International published a report in August 2018 examining the legal right to register LGBT organisations. Sudan was one of 30 countries where LGBTQI organisations could not be found.⁷⁵³

The summary of the October 2018 UN Human Rights Committee meeting to review the situation of civil and political rights in Sudan noted the following reply by Mahmoud Abaker Dugdug, State Minister of Justice of Sudan:

Moving on to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the delegation noted that regardless of their sexual orientation, persons held the same citizenship rights. However, when it came to family affairs, marriage was defined as a union between a man and a woman. [...] The repeal of the crime of sodomy would not be in line with the cultural values in the country. However, there was no systematic targeting of that segment of society. Sudan had asked in various international fora that its cultural values be respected.⁷⁵⁴

The November 2018 Human Rights Committee report on the measures taken to implement the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights noted that:

The Committee remains concerned about the persistence of entrenched discriminatory provisions in legislation, in particular in the area of family law and personal status, and concerning sexual orientation. The Committee notes that article 31 of the Interim Constitution does not define discrimination, nor does it provide for a list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, in accordance with articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant. The Committee is further concerned about the absence of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation (arts. 2 and 26). The Committee is troubled by article 148 of the Criminal Code of 1991, which criminalizes sodomy, an offence punishable by flogging and a prison sentence, and which incurs the death penalty after a third conviction (arts. 2, 6–7, 17 and 26).⁷⁵⁵

8.2 Treatment of individuals of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities

Darfur specific information was not found amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report so this section relies upon the treatment of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities across Sudan.

8.2.1 By state actors

⁷⁵² Human Rights Watch, [Audacity in Adversity: LGBT Activism in the Middle East and North Africa](#), April 2018, Sudan p. 73

⁷⁵³ Outright International, [The Global State of LGBTIQ Organising](#), 8 August 2018

⁷⁵⁴ UN Human Rights Committee Meeting Summary, [Human Rights Committee reviews the situation of civil and political rights in Sudan](#), 10 October 2018

⁷⁵⁵ UN Human Rights Committee, [Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Sudan](#), 19 November 2018, paragraphs 14-15

Freedom House noted in its annual report covering 2017 that “Same-sex sexual acts are illegal, though this prohibition does not appear to be strongly enforced”.⁷⁵⁶ The same source further reported that “Official and societal discrimination against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals is widespread”.⁷⁵⁷

The US State Department reported in their annual human rights report covering events of 2017 that:

Antigay sentiment was pervasive in society. LGBTI organizations increasingly felt pressured to suspend or alter their activities due to threat of harm. Several LGBTI persons felt compelled to leave the country due to fear of persecution, intimidation, or harassment.

In September, Public Order Police arrested journalist-blogger Marwa Altijani and released her the same day after filing apostasy charges against her for publishing an article online in which she asserted, “Nothing is wrong with being a lesbian.”

On October 24, a man was arrested at a social event for wearing “indecent” female clothes and makeup. A Public Order Court sentenced him to 40 lashes and a fine of 5,000 SDG (\$625). The punishment was reportedly carried out the same day.

There were no reports of official action to investigate or punish those complicit in LGBTI-related discrimination or abuses.⁷⁵⁸

A November 2018 Home Office report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum that took place in August 2018 cited Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, founder of the European & African Centre (a British voluntary human rights organisation in Sudan) as noting that, “there are no rights for the LGBT community and freedom of speech is restricted”.⁷⁵⁹

Freedom House reported in an annual report on online freedom covering 2017/2018 and published in November 2018:

Online journalists and activists often face extralegal intimidation, harassment, and violence for their online activities, though there were fewer reported incidents of violence during the coverage period compared to previous years.

Most online violence targets social media influencers and minority groups such as LGBTI. In October 2017, a video circulated of a young man wearing makeup and dancing in a wedding hall. He was reportedly arrested after the party and sentenced to a fine and 40 lashes. The young man also received serious threats online and off, which eventually led him to flee the country.⁷⁶⁰

8.2.2 By non-state actors

The 2019 Social Institutions and Gender Index ranked Sudan at 89.9% for discrimination in the family, the 4th highest in the global index.⁷⁶¹

The NGO Erasing 76 Crimes reported in March 2018 that “The climate of homophobia—especially in the countries of Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria and Mauritania that retain the death penalty for same-sex conduct—makes social organizing all but impossible”.⁷⁶²

⁷⁵⁶ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2018: Sudan](#), 15 March 2018

⁷⁵⁷ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2018: Sudan](#), 15 March 2018

⁷⁵⁸ US State Department, [Sudan 2017 Human Rights Report](#), 20 April 2018, *Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

⁷⁵⁹ Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, *para 3.1.2 p.38*

⁷⁶⁰ Freedom House, [Freedom on the Net 2018 - Sudan](#), 1 November 2018

⁷⁶¹ Social Institutions and Gender Index, [2019 Index](#), undated [accessed 7 January 2019]

9. Persons living with HIV/AIDS

Darfur specific information was not found amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report so this section contains information related to Sudan in general.

Prevalence rates

UNAIDS produced statistics of epidemic estimates: in 2017, there were 4,700 new HIV infections and 2,600 AIDS related deaths in Sudan and UNAIDS estimates that there are 51,000 people living in Sudan with HIV.⁷⁶³ This is a sharp increase from the 2005 figure, 29,000.⁷⁶⁴ Between 2000 and 2017, there has been a 56% rise in AIDS related deaths.⁷⁶⁵

UNAIDS also estimated that there is an estimated 260,000 sex workers and 140,000 gay men and other men who have sex with men in Sudan.⁷⁶⁶ HIV prevalence amongst sex workers is 1.3% and gay men and other men who have sex with men is 1.4%. Condom use is 34.9% and 26.9% respectively.⁷⁶⁷ UNAIDS reported that:

Almost two thirds of new HIV infections in 2017 were in Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sudan. Special efforts are needed to expand and improve the HIV testing and treatment programmes in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sudan, which accounted for more than 60% of the region's deaths from AIDS-related illness in 2017.⁷⁶⁸

The CIA World Factbook, based on 2017 estimates, reported that the HIV/AIDS adults prevalence rate stands at 0.2% with 51,000 people in Sudan living with HIV/AIDS. The CIA further reported that as at 2017, there have been an estimated 2,600 deaths owing to HIV/AIDS.⁷⁶⁹

The CIA World Factbook noted that the contraceptive prevalence rate is 12.2%. This is the percent of women of reproductive age (15-49) who are married or in union and are using, or whose sexual partner is using, a method of contraception according to the date of the most recent available data (2014).⁷⁷⁰

In December 2017, UNICEF reported that there are an estimated 560 new HIV infections amongst children aged 1-14 years and 1,100 new HIV infections amongst adolescents aged 15-19.⁷⁷¹

Radio Dabanga reported on 7 December 2017 that:

The Ministry of Health of Khartoum has announced that it has screened thousands of pregnant women for HIV/AIDS this year. [...] In a statement, the Ministry announced that 6,550 pregnant women have been tested for HIV/AIDS so far this year. Of these, 16 were shown to be HIV-positive.⁷⁷²

⁷⁶² 76 crimes, [‘400 million LGBT people in jeopardy worldwide’](#), 28 March 2018

⁷⁶³ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.31

⁷⁶⁴ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.30

⁷⁶⁵ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.31

⁷⁶⁶ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.6

⁷⁶⁷ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.31

⁷⁶⁸ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.2

⁷⁶⁹ CIA, [The World Factbook](#), last updated 3 December 2018, *People and Society*

⁷⁷⁰ CIA, [The World Factbook](#), last updated 3 December 2018, *People and Society*

⁷⁷¹ UNICEF, [Sudan: key demographic indicators](#), 6 December 2017

9.1 Legal framework

The US State Department noted in its annual report on human rights practices in Sudan in 2017 that there is no legal protection for people with HIV-positive status:

Law and regulations prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, gender, disability, tribe, and language, but they are unevenly applied. There is no legal protection for classes according to [...] HIV-positive status [...].⁷⁷³

In July 2018, UNAIDS noted that there are no laws criminalizing the transmission of, nondisclosure of or exposure to HIV transmission. Related laws are available [here](#) and below.⁷⁷⁴

LAWS AND POLICIES	
Laws criminalizing the transmission of, non-disclosure of or exposure to HIV transmission	No
Criminalization of sex work	Selling and buying sexual services is criminalized
Criminalization of same-sex sexual acts	Yes, death penalty
Drug use or possession for personal use is an offence	Possession of drugs for personal use is specified as a criminal offence
Criminalization of transgender people	...
Laws or policies restricting the entry, stay and residence of people living with HIV	Yes
Parental consent for adolescents to access HIV testing	Yes, for adolescents younger than 18 years
Spousal consent for married women to access sexual and reproductive health services	No
Mandatory HIV testing for marriage, work or residence permits or for certain groups	Yes

9.2 Societal attitudes towards persons living with HIV/AIDS

Relying on 2014 statistics, UNAIDS reported that the percentage of women and men aged 15–49 years who report discriminatory attitudes towards people living with HIV is 66%.⁷⁷⁵

The US State Department noted in its annual report on human rights practices that “There was societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS”.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of pregnant women screened for HIV/AIDS in Sudan capital](#), 7 December 2018

⁷⁷³ US State Department, [Sudan 2017 Human Rights Report](#), 20 April 2018, Section 7

⁷⁷⁴ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.30

⁷⁷⁵ UNAIDS, [Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa](#), 18 July 2018, p.30

⁷⁷⁶ US State Department, [Sudan 2017 Human Rights Report](#), 20 April 2018, Section 6

9.3 Treatment of persons living with HIV/AIDS

According to Avert, relying on 2013 data, 'in Sudan, only one in five people living with HIV are aware of their status'.⁷⁷⁷

UNAIDS reported that of the 51,000 people living with HIV in Sudan, 7600 are receiving antiretroviral therapy.⁷⁷⁸

The UNAMID reported on 14 December 2017 that:

On 13 December 2017, UNAMID's Rule of Law and Communications and Public Information Sections, in partnership with the North Darfur Prisons Administration and the State AIDS Programme (SAP) of the Ministry of Health, organized an HIV/AIDS awareness campaign at the New Shallah Women's Prison in El Fasher, North Darfur. The theme of the event was "Stand up for HIV/AIDS prevention- Your Health, Your Right." [...] Addressing the occasion, UNAMID representative, Musi Khumalo, stated that the workshop will provide women inmates with information on HIV/AIDS and urged all participants to take advantage of the Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) services provided during the event.⁷⁷⁹

UNAIDS stated in July 2018 that 7% of pregnant women in 2017 living with HIV are accessing antiretroviral medicines.⁷⁸⁰ Relying on 2014 statistics, the same UNAIDS report further noted that knowledge of HIV prevention among young women aged 15–24 years stands at 8.5%.⁷⁸¹

9.4 Access to basic services and employment

Aidsmap lists four organisations assisting people living with HIV/AIDS. This list is available [here](#).⁷⁸² However, it is unclear whether they are still offering services and none of the organisations listed have functioning websites.

UNFPA reported in November 2017 that, "About 80% of new HIV cases are detected amongst most-at-risk population groups. Due to stigma and discrimination, access to preventative services is limited".⁷⁸³

All Africa news portal reported on 11 December 2017 that:

The First Lady, Wife of the President of the Republic, Widad Babkir, has emphasized the state's commitment to combat AIDS, and its keenness on the partnerships, tight coordination, and the

⁷⁷⁷ Avert, *HIV and AIDS in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA)*, 30 November 2017

⁷⁷⁸ UNAIDS, *Country factsheet: Sudan 2017*, undated [accessed 7 January 2019]

⁷⁷⁹ UNAMID, *UNAMID facilitates HIV/AIDS sensitization of women inmates at Shallah Prison*, North Darfur, 14 December 2017

⁷⁸⁰ UNAIDS, *Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa*, 18 July 2018, p.31

⁷⁸¹ UNAIDS, *Miles to go: the response to HIV in the Middle East and North Africa*, 18 July 2018, p.31

⁷⁸² Aidsmap, *Sudan*, undated [accessed 7 January 2019]

⁷⁸³ UNFPA, *Country Programme Action Plan Between The Government of Sudan and UNFPA, Seventh Programme Cycle 2018-2021*, 15 November 2017, p.5

activation of continuous response to the combating activities, announcing the inauguration of the AIDS integrated treatment center in Omdurman in the advent of New Year.⁷⁸⁴

UNAIDS reported in July 2018 that:

With UNDP advocacy, the health and social welfare ministries in Sudan extended social health insurance for all people living with HIV in the country. This will provide support to more than 5000 people living with HIV on treatment and to their families.⁷⁸⁵

Avert noted in a report dated 7 August 2018 that:

In 13 countries including [...] Sudan [...], homosexuality is punishable by the death penalty. As a result, men who have sex with men are less likely to access HIV services for fear of their sexual orientation and identity being revealed.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸⁴ All Africa, [Sudan: First Lady Emphasizes State's Commitment to Combat Aids](#), 11 December 2017

⁷⁸⁵ UNAIDS, [Middle East and North Africa regional report](#), 1 July 2018

⁷⁸⁶ Avert, [Men who have sex with me \(MSM\), HIV and AIDS](#), 7 August 2018