



COI QUERY

Country of Origin	Pakistan
Main subject	Recruitment by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Question(s)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Information on incidents of kidnappings of minors for the purpose of forced recruitment by the Jamaat-ud-Dawa group in Punjab and Muzaffarabad (2011-2017).2. Information on incidents of kidnappings of young men for the purpose of forced recruitment by the Lashkar-e-Taiba group in Kashmir with a focus on Khairatta and Kotli area (2008-2014).3. Information on treatment by members of either the Jamaat-ud-Dawa or the Lashkar-e-Taiba towards minors/young men who refused to join their groups respectively.
Date of completion	11 December 2018
Query Code	Q127/128
Contributing EU+ COI units (if applicable)	

Disclaimer

This response to a COI query has been elaborated according to the [Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI](#) and [EASO COI Report Methodology](#).

The information provided in this response has been researched, evaluated and processed with utmost care within a limited time frame. All sources used are referenced. A quality review has been performed in line with the above mentioned methodology. This document does not claim to be exhaustive neither conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to international protection. If a certain event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

The information in the response does not necessarily reflect the opinion of EASO and makes no political statement whatsoever.

The target audience is caseworkers, COI researchers, policy makers, and decision making authorities. The answer was finalised on the 11 December 2018. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this answer.



COI QUERY RESPONSE

Background information on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawa groups

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), meaning 'Army of the Righteous'¹, was founded in 1990 by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed as the military wing of the Pakistani Islamist organisation Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)². MDI, meaning 'Center for Preaching and Guidance'³, was founded in the mid-1980s as a fusion between the small preaching group of Muridke, (Lahore) and anti-Soviet jihadists⁴. With the support of Pakistan's Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), LeT fought a proxy war against India in the disputed territory of Kashmir⁵.

On 26 December 2001, the United States designated LeT as an official Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Muhammad Saeed Hafiz was designated as a SDGT as well⁶. Due to political pressure from the United States and India,⁷ the group was formally banned in Pakistan on 13 January 2002⁸. Nevertheless, LeT was able to continue its terrorist operations in the Kashmir territory⁹.

As a result of the ban, Saeed announced that he was no longer affiliated with LeT and became the leader of MDI, which he renamed to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)¹⁰. JuD became a 'charitable front' of LeT¹¹ and provided social services, such as schools, hospitals and several universities, that the government falls short on. This made the organisation popular in Pakistan's most densely inhabited province Punjab¹².

The demarcation between LeT and JuD is not always clear. In an article by the New York Times they are described as 'synonymous'¹³. According to the American scholar Christine Fair, LeT and JuD are

¹ Counter Extremism Project, Lashkar-e-Taiba, 3 August 2016, [url](#) p. 1.

² Stanford, Mapping Military Organizations - Lashkar-e-Taiba, 30 January 2016, [url](#)

³ Fair, C.C., Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Converting Kuffar at Home, Killing Them Abroad, 4 November 2017, Hudson Institute, [url](#)

⁴ Roul, A., Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream, in: CTC Sentinel, April 2015, Vol. 8, Issue 4, [url](#) p. 23.

⁵ New York Times (The), Pakistan Detains Founder of Group Suspected in Mumbai Attacks, 11 December 2008, [url](#)

⁶ US DoS, Amendments to the Terrorist Designation of Lashkar e-Tayyiba, 2 April 2018, [url](#)

⁷ Roul, A., Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream, in: CTC Sentinel, April 2015, Vol. 8, Issue 4, [url](#) p. 24

⁸ Stanford, Mapping Military Organizations - Lashkar-e-Taiba, 30 January 2016, [url](#)

⁹ Counter Extremism Project, Lashkar-e-Taiba, 3 August 2016, [url p. 2](#)

¹⁰ Stanford, Mapping Military Organizations - Lashkar-e-Taiba, 30 January 2016, [url](#)

¹¹ Counter Extremism Project, Lashkar-e-Taiba, 3 August 2016, [url](#) p. 2

¹² New York Times (The), Pakistan Detains Founder of Group Suspected in Mumbai Attacks, 11 December 2018, [url](#)

¹³ New York Times (The), Pakistan Detains Founder of Group Suspected in Mumbai Attacks, 11 December 2018, [url](#)



‘interchangeably’¹⁴. Other sources call JuD a ‘spin-off’ of LeT¹⁵, or label JuD as a ‘sister organization’ of LeT¹⁶. According to an article by Animesh Roul, executive director of the New Delhi-based policy research group Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, there is evidence that MDI (the predecessor of JuD) and LeT ‘were jointly operated by the same group of leaders’, even after the first-mentioned group was banned in 2002¹⁷. Both groups ‘were put on the United Nations terrorist blacklist of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Taliban’ in December 2008.¹⁸ In 2013, the American scholar Stephen Tankel reported that LeT and JuD are not only one of Pakistan’s oldest militant groups, but also the most powerful.¹⁹ The headquarters of LeT/JuD is in Muridke, a suburb of Lahore.²⁰

General information on the recruitment process by the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawa groups

In a paper, named ‘The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death’, published by the Combating Terrorism Center, the authors stated that the large majority of LeT’s fighters are recruited from Pakistan’s Punjab province and that the most common forms of recruitment are: via a current LeT member, family, mosque or madrassa, LeT speech or literature, and family. Furthermore, they reported that there is a strong increase of recruiting via family members.²¹

A 2008 academic paper noted that JuD mainly recruited during the three-day annual congregation organised in Muridke every winter. The majority of the recruits were from Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)²². With regard to those who were recruited to fight in Kashmir, he noted that ‘every candidate had to get permission from the family, and convince them of the utility of his mission’. Without their permission the death of the jihadi could not be celebrated as ‘martyrdom’²³.

In a report published by International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD), it is stated that LeT ‘recruits members from public schools and higher levels of education’²⁴. According to South Asia

¹⁴ Fair, C.C., *Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Converting Kuffar at Home, Killing Them Abroad*, 4 November 2017, Hudson Institute [url](#)

¹⁵ McGirk, J., *Kashmir: the politics of an earthquake*, 18 October 2005 [url](#)

¹⁶ Roul, A., *Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream*, in: CTC Sentinel, April 2015, Vol. 8, Issue 4 [url](#) p. 23

¹⁷ Roul, A., *Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream*, in: CTC Sentinel, April 2015, Vol. 8, Issue 4 [url](#) p. 24

¹⁸ New York Times (The), *Pakistan Detains Founder of Group Suspected in Mumbai Attacks*, 11 December 2018 [url](#)

¹⁹ Tankel, S., *Protecting the homeland against Mumbai-style attacks and the threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba*, 12 June 2013, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [url](#) p. 1

²⁰ ICG, *Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan*, 23 January 2014 [url](#) p. 36

²¹ Ressler, D. et al, *The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death*, Occasional Paper Series, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2013 [url](#)

²² John, W., ‘Resurgent Radicalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jamaat-ud-Dawa’, in: CLAWS Journal, Winter 2008 [url](#) p. 65

²³ John, W., ‘Resurgent Radicalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jamaat-ud-Dawa’, in: CLAWS Journal, Winter 2008 [url](#) p. 64

²⁴ International Center for Religion & Diplomacy, *Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan*, March 2016 [url](#) p. 4



expert and journalist Arif Jamal, 'JuD placed equal stress on recruiting its members from all professions and gives training to its members in all fields of statecraft'²⁵.

1. Information on incidents of kidnappings of minors for the purpose of forced recruitment by the Jamaat-ud-Dawa group in Punjab and Muzaffarabad (2011-2017).

Among all sources consulted and within the timeframe allocated to respond to this query, no information could be traced on incidents of kidnappings of minors for the purpose of forced recruitment by the JuD group in Punjab and Muzaffarabad (2011-2017).

Nonetheless, the below information could be of relevance.

In 2011, the public opinion researcher Shehzad H. Qazi published an article on the origins, organisation and recruitment of Taliban groups in Pakistan. In that paper he reported that:

'In 2009, the Pakistan Army rescued almost 20 boys, most of who had been kidnapped in Swat [a valley and an administrative district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province] by the local Taliban. While some were cleaning dishes in camps, others were being trained to fight in the field or become informants or suicide bombers. The boys had been kidnapped from their villages and some underwent Islamist indoctrination, being told that militant jihad was the boys "religious duty". Others are coerced into joining through their associations with madaris, which are frequented by the Taliban or affiliated with them'²⁶.

In September 2014, news medium Foreign Policy interviewed the aforementioned journalist Arif Jamal with reference to his book 'Call for Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba (1985-2014)'. After he was asked how JuD recruits, Jamal answered:

'It recruits through families. They have probably recruited upward to 100 babies already. Some people in Pakistan prefer to donate their children instead of money. These newborns are returned to the families, who are then told to make sure they are raised as JuD members. So now the group's officials will be in touch with the families, continuously instructing them on how to raise their children, all the while working to bring the entire family into their fold. This is how they motivate people. There is a scripted act every time [Hafiz Muhammad] Saeed addresses a crowd. During the speech, a man will suddenly walk up to the stage and hand over his child, who will then of course be returned. I remember once asking Saeed who are these people who give him money. His reply was, "Those who give me their babies also give me money."²⁷

In July 2015, the NGO Child Soldiers International reported that:

²⁵ Diplomat (The), Arif Jamal: Why Jamaat-ud-Dawa Is a Bigger Threat Than ISIS, 7 December 2016, [url](#)

²⁶ Qazi, S.H., 'Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban', in: Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22, no. 4, 20 September 2011, available by subscription at: [url](#) p. 593.

²⁷ Foreign Policy, The Rise of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Q&A with Arif Jamal, 26 September 2014 [url](#)



'The Taliban (both those that operate in Afghanistan and others that operate within Pakistan) and other armed groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT], are widely believed to recruit children, although their numbers remain unknown. Once recruited, child soldiers are required to perform a range of tasks, which include frontline combat, exploding landmines, detonating bombs, scouting, spying, guarding camps, cooking and other support functions. They are transferred to the front lines of conflict areas, where they are exposed to grave risks of physical harm'²⁸.

In their annual security report on changing recruitment patterns covering 2015, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) wrote the following:

'Educational institutions and radical segments of religious groups are still attractive as sources of recruitment for sectarian terrorist groups. Radical tendencies among educated youth, from both public and private educational institutions, have the potential to serve the purpose of global terrorist movements as well as local violent radical groups. Self-radicalised individuals who are influenced by militant ideologies fall in this category. Members of conventional militant groups like Jamaatud Dawa [JuD] and the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad always remain available for Al Qaeda and IS'²⁹.

On 30 March 2017, Human Rights Watch wrote in its 'Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Pakistan, among other things, that 'Armed militant groups recruited children into combat'³⁰.

In April 2018, the US Department of State wrote in its annual report on Human Rights Practices:

'Child Soldiers: Nonstate militant groups kidnapped boys and girls and used fraudulent promises to coerce parents into giving away children as young as 12 to spy, fight, or die as suicide bombers. The militants sometimes offered parents money, often sexually and physically abused the children, and used psychological coercion to convince the children the acts they committed were justified. The government operated a center in Swat to rehabilitate and educate former child soldiers'³¹.

Based on the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, issued on 16 May 2018, which covers which covers the period from January to December 2017, the Office of the Special Representative of the aforementioned Secretary-General reported on their website that 'The United Nations continued to receive reports of the recruitment and use of children, including from madrasas, and allegations of the use of children by armed groups for suicide attacks'³².

²⁸ Child Soldiers International, Alternative report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the occasion of Pakistan's fifth periodic report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 2015, [url](#) p. 8.

²⁹ PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2015, 5 January 2016, [url](#) p. 51.

³⁰ Human Rights Watch, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Pakistan, 30 March 2017, [url](#)

³¹ US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Pakistan, 20 April 2018, [url](#) p. 21.

³² UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Children and Armed Conflict - Pakistan, 13 August 2018, [url](#)



In June 2018, the US DOS noted in their annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report:

‘Non-state militant groups kidnap children, buy them from destitute parents, or coerce parents with threats or fraudulent promises into giving their children away; these armed groups force children to spy and fight in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s large number of IDPs, due to natural disasters and domestic military operations, are vulnerable to trafficking’³³.

On 20 September 2018, the US Department of Labor wrote in its annual report ‘Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor’ the following regarding Pakistan:

‘Non-state militant groups forced children to engage in suicide attacks. There are reports that religious schools are used for recruitment of children for armed groups. Additionally, the Taliban recruited and forced children to attend madrassas, or religious schools, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they received religious and military training. Some families received cash payments in exchange for sending their children to the Taliban-run schools’³⁴.

2. Information on incidents of kidnappings of young men for the purpose of forced recruitment by the Lashkar-e-Taiba group in Kashmir with a focus on Khuiratta and Kotli area (2008-2014)

Among all sources consulted and within the timeframe allocated to respond to this query, no information could be traced on incidents of kidnappings of young men for the purpose of forced recruitment by the LeT group in Kashmir with a focus on Khuiratta and Kotli area (2008-2014).

For information which could be of relevance, see under subsection 1.

3. Information on treatment by members of either the Jamaat-ud-Dawa or the Lashkar-e-Taiba towards minors/young men who refused to join their groups respectively

Among all sources consulted and within the timeframe allocated to respond to this query, no information could be traced on treatment by members of either the JuD or LeT towards minors/young men who refused to join their group.

³³ US DoS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 – Pakistan, 28 June 2018, [url](#) p. 340.

³⁴ US DoL, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor – Pakistan, 20 September 2018 [url](#) p. 2.



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