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- Greece, General Secretariat for Migration Policy, Greek Asylum Service, Asylum Processes and Training Department

It must be noted that the drafting and review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.
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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)\(^1\). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 13 August 2021, while the reference period of the report is January 2020 – 30 June 2021, or earlier whenever relevant. Any event taking place after this period is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the Introduction.

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\(^1\) The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal [here](url).
Glossary and Abbreviations

aqal  dome-shaped nomadic hut
berked (berkad)  water reservoir used in arid area to collect water during the wet season
BRA  Benadir Regional Administration
buul (pl. buush)  makeshift hut
deyr  minor rain season in Somalia (September – November)
FFM  Fact-Finding Mission
FPENS  Formal Private Education Network in Somalia
FSNAU  Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAR  Gross Attendance Ration
GBV  Gender-Based Violence
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
goof  uninhabited, unused land
goof-leh  owner of unused land
gu  major rain season in Somalia (April – July)
hagaa  dry spell in Somalia (July – September)
ITZ  Inter Tropical Convergence Zone
jilaal  dry spell in Somalia (January – March)
khat  stimulant. Its leaves are usually chewed or brewed as a tea
MRC  Migrant Response Centre
NAR  Net Attendance Ratio
NISA  National Intelligence and Security Agency
tahrib  Somali youth migration to Europe
UNOCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH  Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant context information in view of the assessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. Among others, the report is intended to inform the development of Country Guidance on Somalia (2022).

The report provides background information and details on key socio-economic indicators in three Somali cities, namely Mogadishu, Garowe, and Hargeisa. These represent the main urban centres in Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland. The report builds upon the preceding EASO COI report on Somalia: Actors (July 2021) and belongs to the same Somalia COI project along with the EASO COI report on Somalia: Targeted profiles and EASO’s COI report on Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).

This report provides an overview as well as details about demographic/clan composition, humanitarian issues, mobility and accessibility, socio-economic indicators, and social-protection networks in the above-mentioned cities.

Methodology

The reference period is from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021. The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources until 30 July 2021. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 13 August 2021.

This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)² and the EASO COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).³

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference of this report build on the input received from policy experts from EU+ countries⁴ within the context of country guidance development on Somalia. Terms of reference for this report can be found in Annex 2.

Collecting information

The information gathered results from two main sets of sources: on the one hand extensive desk research using predominantly public, specialised paper-based, and electronic sources until 13 August 2021; on the other hand on a number of oral sources and experts interviews that were conducted for the purposes of the report between 23 June and 29 July 2021. All these sources, including when restricted or non-public information has been used to cover specific details, were duly referenced and described.

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² EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
³ EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
⁴ EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
The sources used are referenced in the Bibliography. Wherever information could not be found within the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, this is stated in the report. The main sources consulted are included in the bibliography.

Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology and that the Terms of Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 13 August 2021. EASO also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources

In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; national and international think tank reports and specialised sources covering Somalia; information from civil society, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Somali and regionally-based media; academic publications and books.

At the same time the report relies extensively on experts interviews that were carried out for the purpose of the report between 23 June and 29 July 2021 (see the Bibliography for additional details).

Structure and use of the report

The report is divided into three parts, each one of them addressing specifically the socio-economic situation in the three selected Somali cities: Mogadishu, Garowe, and Hargeisa. Each part provides an overview as well as details about demographic/clan composition, humanitarian issues, mobility and accessibility, socio-economic indicators, and social-protection networks in the above-mentioned cities.

Note on Transliteration

A national orthography for the Somali language was codified relatively late by adopting a Latin script (21 October 1972). Nevertheless, even today, Somali lacks a commonly applied and binding orthography.

In this text, Somali places, clans and personal names usually follow Somali orthography: ‘long vowels are indicated by doubling them’, as in Darood or Abbaan, ‘the Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close to the Arabic ë (ayn), while “x” denotes the strongly aspirated ż (ha)’. However, given the fact that other sources adopt different conventions, the reader will sometimes find other forms of places, clans, and personal names in the text, including where direct citations are used or in references.

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5 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, p. 7
Districts Map of Mogadishu

Figure 1. Mogadishu City Zones

6 Open Street Map, City Boundaries © UNDP, 2021
1. Mogadishu

1.1 Mogadishu’s overview

Mogadishu is the capital city of both Somalia and the administrative region of Benadir (Banadir) and covers the same territory.⁷ The terms ‘Municipality of Mogadishu and Benadir Regional Administration are used interchangeably’.⁸ The city is divided into 17 districts.⁹ A reference map of the Benadir region dated March 2012 published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) lists the following 16 districts: Dharkeynley, Deymun, Hodan, Wadajir (Medina), Waber, Hawl-Wadag, Wardhigley (renamed as Warta Nabadda)¹⁰, Yaqshid, Bondhere, Hamar Jajab, Hamar-Weyne, Shingan, Shubis, Abdi-Aaz, Huriwa and Karan.¹¹ Kaxda (Kahda) district was formed in 2012 and became Mogadishu’s seventeenth district.¹² The mayor of Mogadishu is also the governor of the Benadir Regional Administration.¹³ As of May 2021, these positions are held by Omar Filish.¹⁴

For further general information on Benadir and Mogadishu, on relevant dynamics and the governance structure, please see sections 7.3 and 7.3.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.

1.1.1 Demographics and clan composition/distribution

1.1.1.1 Population

In 1975 Somalia conducted its first population and housing census, publishing fragmented results. The findings from the following census, carried out in 1986, were not published officially, ‘as they were considered to suffer from significant biases’.¹⁵ Owing to the unfolding civil war and state decay in 1991¹⁶, no subsequent census was conducted. In 2014, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Ministry of Planning published the Population Estimation Survey of Somalia (PESS), the most recent nationwide population estimation.¹⁷ The survey estimated the total population at 12 316 895¹⁸ and noted that the population was growing relatively fast.¹⁹

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⁸ Somalia, MPWR, RAP Ex-Post Audit Report For Sharif Abow Road: Shangani District, Mogadishu, 3 February 2021, url, p. 1, footnote 2
⁹ Global Shelter Cluster, Banadir - Overview, June 2021, url
¹⁰ AMISOM, Somali district name changed to symbolize peace [source: Radio Bar-kulan], 9 April 2012, url; some sources still refer to the district as Wardhigley, e.g. Global Shelter Cluster, Banadir - Overview, June 2021, url
¹¹ UNOCHA, Benadir Region - Mogadishu City [Map], 16 March 2012, url
¹² Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, url, p. 457
¹³ Somalia, MPWR, RAP Ex-Post Audit Report For Sharif Abow Road: Shangani District, Mogadishu, 3 February 2021, url, p. 1, footnote 2; RVI and HIPS, Land Matters in Mogadishu - Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city, February 2017, url, p. 8, footnote 5
¹⁴ East African (The), Somalia election certain, now the focus is women seats, security, 31 May 2021, url
¹⁵ Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, url, p. 2
¹⁶ Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021. Jutta Bakonyi is Professor of Conflict and Development from Durham University, specialised in Somalia.
¹⁷ Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
¹⁸ UNFPA and Somalia, Population Estimation Survey of Somalia (PESS), October 2014, url, p. 31
¹⁹ UNFPA and Somalia, Population Estimation Survey of Somalia (PESS), October 2014, url, p. 44
According to a World Bank report published in 2021, existing population numbers were ‘the result of projections or estimations, both of which suffer from large error margins given the scale of uncertainty regarding population movements.’

The PESS of 2014 estimated the population of the Benadir region at 1,650,227, including 369,288 IDPs. 49.3% of the non-IDP population was male, while 50.7% was female. The above-mentioned 2021 World Bank report noted that Mogadishu had a population ‘between 1.7 million and 2.6 million people, depending on estimates’. According to UN data referring to ‘the urban agglomeration’ of the capital city, Mogadishu’s population numbered 2,179,900 as of 2019, while the CIA World Factbook lists 2,388,000 people as Mogadishu’s inhabitants as of 2021.

As of 2016, ‘at least 400,000 IDPs lived in Mogadishu, 55 percent of whom lived in Daynile and Kaxda on the city outskirts.’ According to the UNHCR Operational Data Portal as of 9 April 2020 Mogadishu’s IDP population at sites assessed by the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster was estimated to be 497,000 persons. An overview on the website of the Global Shelter Cluster notes that ‘estimates of IDPs in Mogadishu range between 500,000 and 700,000’.

### 1.1.1.2 Religion

The majority of the population of Somalia is Sunni Muslim, traditionally following the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence and practicing Sufism. However, before the civil war, most other Islamic schools of thought also existed in the country. Non-Islamic religious groups combined are estimated to constitute less than one percent of the population.

In April 2021, Vatican News published an article mentioning ‘a very small Christian community which […] continues to move forward with its faith.’ WorldAtlas mentioned in 2018 a small Christian community of approximately 1,000 persons. Bishop Giorgio Bertin, the Apostolic Administrator of Mogadishu and president of Caritas Somalia, leads the community. According to the article the ‘Somali Catholic community is very small: in the entire country there are just a few dozen who secretly profess Christianity.’

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20 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 58
21 UNFPA and Somalia, Population Estimation Survey of Somalia (PESS), October 2014, url, p. 31
23 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 74
24 UN Data, Somalia, n.d., url
26 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 63
27 For further information on the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster please see CCCM, About, n.d., url
28 UNHCR, Operational Data Portal - CCCM Cluster Somalia, last updated 9 April 2020, url
29 Global Shelter Cluster, Banadir - Overview, June 2021, url
32 WorldAtlas, What Religions are Practiced in Somalia?, 4 April 2018, url
33 Vatican News, The hidden life of Somalia’s Christians, 30 April 2021, url
34 WorldAtlas, What Religions are Practiced in Somalia?, 4 April 2018, url
35 IOMC, H.E. Bishop Giorgio Bertin, n.d., url
36 Vatican News, The hidden life of Somalia’s Christians, 30 April 2021, url
Traditionally, the majority of Somalis were organised in Sufi orders. However, since the 1970s the Salafi schools of thought gained prominence. Some Salafi groups (like Al-Ittihad, Raas Kambooni, Hisbul Islam or Al-Shabaab) propose a violent solution while others opt for the use of non-violent means (like the Somali Muslim Brotherhood -Al-Islaah- whose members also held a significant influence on the consecutive Federal Governments and Parliaments). Al-Shabaab showed no tolerance for non-Salafi Islam interpretations and practices, and actively targeted Sunni-Sufi practices and Sufi leaders. The latter were labelled as ‘non-believers’ and there with presented as ‘legitimate targets for attacks’. In reaction to destructions of Sufi shrines and tombs by Al-Shabaab in 2008, Aḥū Sunna wa Jama’a, a loose coalition of Sufi orders, took up its fight against Al-Shabaab. However, beyond the so-called Jihadi groups, the rise of Muslim Brotherhoods (al-Islaah, Damul Jadid) and their deep-seated influence in contemporary political affairs also attests to a transformation of religious practices and a tendency towards Salafist Islam interpretations. The country, however, also sees attempts to re-emphasize Sufi practices. An article by Al Jazeera published in March 2016 described a religious parade by a group of Sufi in Mogadishu, ‘making a short but a symbolic slow walk to a nearby mosque in the Bakara area of the seaside city to continue their afternoon prayer programme’. Cultural Atlas, a website that provides information on the cultural background of the migrant community in Australia, states in 2019 that ‘Sufism is having a resurgence as some Somalis are becoming disaffected with Salafism over the actions of offshoot militant groups such as Al-Shabaab. Some see Sufism as a non-political spiritual alternative’. A local radio station reported in September 2020 that officials from the Benadir regional administration, among others, visited tombs of Sufi clerics and saints buried in Wadajir, a town about 90 km north of Mogadishu.

According to the US Department of State (USDOS) report on International Religious Freedom in 2020 there is also ‘an unknown number of Shia Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and those not affiliated with any religion’ in the country as a whole.

1.1.1.3 Clan distribution

Mogadishu is dominated by the Hawiye, in particular the Abgaal, Habar Gidir and the Murasade sub-clans. According to sources interviewed for a report on a Finnish fact-finding mission in March 2020, members of the Abgaal are living in Karan, those of Habar Gidir mostly in districts that were occupied

38 Marchal, R. and Sheikh, Z., Salafism in Somalia: Coping with Coercion, Civil War and its Own Contradictions, 2015, p. 137
39 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
40 Al Jazeera, Somalia’s Sufi revival, 29 March 2016, url
42 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
43 Cultural Atlas, Somali Culture, 2019, url
44 Radio Dalsan, Officials visit Wadajir Somalia’s Popular Tour Destination, 2 September 2020, url
47 Finland, FII, Somalia: Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 38; see also International Crisis Group, Why Somalia’s Electoral Crisis Has Tipped into Violence, 27 April 2021, url
by the clan during the civil war’, 49 while members of the Murasade have ‘a strong foothold in the Daynillah district’. 50 The majority of people in IDP camps/settlements in Mogadishu belongs to the Rahanweyne (Digii-Mirfille). In addition, there is an unknown, but not small number of Somali Bantu and other minorities. 51 In a May 2018 report Landinfo noted that ‘there is no survey of the clan or group affiliation of Mogadishu’s residents, but according to local resource persons, “most” clans are represented in the city’. 52

Members of (sub-)clans tend to settle in the same neighbourhoods 53 and certain (sub-)clans dominate over others, 54 however ‘people come together across clan boundaries in terms of work, trade, schooling and other social settings’. 55 According to the Finnish fact-finding mission report of August 2020, the population from most districts in Mogadishu ‘has a heterogeneous clan background and there are people from many different communities.’ However, the old neighbourhoods such as Hamar-Weyne, Bondhere, Shibis, Shingan, Abdi-Aziz, and Hamar-Jajab are ‘regarded as more cosmopolitan’. 56 A report by the World Bank from 2020 stated that inhabitants in most urban districts, including Mogadishu, ‘are treated locally as the domains of their most numerically and politically dominant sub-clans. Others may live and do business there, but the dominant clans of these districts invoke the right to govern and enjoy most of whatever “rents” accrue from control of the district, such as local taxes, jobs, and contracts.’ 57

In 2016 IOM stated in a report that the largest companies and most of the district administrations in Mogadishu are managed by members of the Hawiye. 58 A World Bank report published in 2021 noted that the different water companies constituting Mogadishu’s water sector are owned by sub-groups of the Hawiye. The report mentioned that Xamer Water Development is owned by Murasade members, the Banadir Water Development Co. by members of the Habar Gidir, and the Somali Water Development Union by members of the Abgaal. 59 With regard to district administrations, the Finnish fact-finding mission report of 2020 further noted that the ‘administration of districts is usually the responsibility of the powerful clan in the district’, which ‘emphasises the position of the Hawiye/Abgaal and Hawiye/Habar Gidir clans’. Bantu do not hold influential positions, although a significant number of members live in Mogadishu. 60 The governor of the Abdiaziz district stems from

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49 The FIS report notes that ‘the north side of the capital city and its districts of Kaaran, Yaaqshid, Bondheere, and the Bermuda area, as well as the district of Madina in the south, were manned by the Hawiye/Abgaal clan. The rest of the city centre and the southern sections were controlled by Hawiye/Habar Gidir.’ Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 38; see also RVI and HIPs, Land Matters in Mogadishu - Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city, February 2017, url, pp. 42-44
50 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 38
51 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
53 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 40
54 RVI and HIPs, Land Matters in Mogadishu - Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city, February 2017, url, p. 65
56 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 39
57 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 90
58 IOM and Altai Consulting, Youths, Employment And Migration In Mogadishu, Kismayo And Baidoa, 9 February 2016, url, p. 70
59 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 101
60 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 40
the Darood-Majeer teen clan, Hamar-Weyne and Shangani district is governed by a Reer Hamar (minority clan) and the Hamar-Jaab district has a governor from the Dir-Bilyomaal.\(^{62}\)

Members of marginalised groups mostly live in the districts of Wadajir, Hamar-Jaab, Hamar-Weyne, Dharkenley, Medina, Bondhere, Shibis, and Shingani. Members of the Bantu are predominantly living in the districts of Bondhere and Waberi.\(^{62}\) Alongside the Bantu, the report further mentions the Reer Hamar/Beediri and the Tumal as marginalised groups living in Mogadishu.\(^{63}\) Most, if not all, minority groups are likely residing in Mogadishu. Their numbers are, however, not known.\(^{64}\)

Regarding fighting that erupted on 25 April 2021 in the context of the postponed indirect elections,\(^{65}\) the International Crisis Group noted that it mostly took place in ‘neighbourhoods where pro-opposition Abgaal, Haber Gedir and Murosade sub-clans of the Hawiye are dominant.’\(^{66}\)

### 1.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview

People in Somalia face continuous socio-economic challenges due to high poverty and highly precarious conditions regarding employment, housing, food and water supplies. Violent conflicts and climatic shocks, among which droughts and floods, lead to displacements and contribute to vulnerabilities.\(^{67}\) Since no formal social protection program exists, vulnerable households mainly rely on remittances, community-based safety nets and international aid.\(^{68}\) Somalia’s malnutrition rates are high, and health outcomes poor.\(^{69}\) By mid-2020, almost 70 % of the population was reported to live in poverty, and one-third of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance.\(^{70}\) In general, wage labour employment and remittances are better accessible in cities. Only land and housing are easier accessible in rural areas.\(^{71}\)

Within this context, Mogadishu stands out with a poverty incidence above average. However, access to basic services such as electricity, water, sanitation, improved housing, education, and health is better than in other cities in south and central Somalia.\(^{72}\) The Finnish Immigration Service published findings of their fact-finding mission to Mogadishu undertaken in March 2020. They concluded that ‘the humanitarian conditions in the capital city are severe’. Ongoing instability and a troublesome security situation prevented people in need from seeking assistance and services. An expert told the mission in March 2020 that the problematic conditions in Mogadishu are ‘mostly related to

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61 Bakony, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
62 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url]. p. 39
63 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url]. p. 41
64 Bakony, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
65 The fighting broke out between forces loyal to President Farmajo and those aligned with the political opposition. The rival forces exchanged gunfire in parts of Mogadishu., International Crisis Group, Why Somalia’s Electoral Crisis Has Tipped into Violence, 27 April 2021, [url]
66 International Crisis Group, Why Somalia’s Electoral Crisis Has Tipped into Violence, 27 April 2021, [url]
67 Bakony, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
71 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, [url]. p. 35
72 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, [url]. p. 35

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accelerated urbanisation, urban poverty, chronic cholera, diarrhoea, malnutrition and lack of education and health services’. The expert added that malnutrition affects IDPs most but also applies to other urban poor, and thus to a large part of the city’s population.\textsuperscript{73}

From information by NGOs, the Finnish mission learned that Mogadishu has poor food security and relies heavily on food imports because of insufficient food production in the country. Therefore, food prices are high.\textsuperscript{74} In 2020, the largest locust swarms in 25 years hit Somalia’s agriculture and drove Somalia into severe food insecurity.\textsuperscript{75} In November 2020, they invaded farmlands at Mogadishu’s outskirts putting farmers’ livelihoods at risk.\textsuperscript{76}

According to a 2018 article by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), fast urban growth and high numbers of arrivals of people fleeing crises in rural areas have made Mogadishu the most crowded city in Africa and the second-most densely populated city in the world.\textsuperscript{77} This development increases the scarcity of already overstretched resources and challenges urban infrastructure and service facilities.\textsuperscript{78}

UNHCR related the three main challenges with regard to the humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu to education, health care, and housing.\textsuperscript{79} Access to safe water is equally challenging and water-borne diseases are common across the city.\textsuperscript{80}

1.1.2.1 Floods

Mogadishu is located in an area affected by recurrent flash floods.\textsuperscript{81} The Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) moves across Somalia twice a year, creating the major rain season, the \textit{gu}, from April to July in its northerly movement and the minor rain season, the \textit{deyr}, from September to November in its southerly movement. The two rain seasons alternate with the dry spells \textit{jilal} from January to March and \textit{hagga} from July to September.\textsuperscript{82} In Mogadishu, heavy rainfall leads to floods because the drainage system cannot intercept the water. Houses can collapse, or the water seeps in. Many dwellings of internally displaced people lack adequate protection from rain. Strong rainfall and floods caused severe problems again in the first rainy season of 2021.\textsuperscript{83} Between January and April 2021, Benadir district (in Benadir region) recorded the highest number of internal displacements due to

\textsuperscript{73} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{https://www.fis.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/fis_mogadishu_security_final_report.pdf}, p. 30
\textsuperscript{74} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{https://www.fis.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/fis_mogadishu_security_final_report.pdf}, p. 30
\textsuperscript{76} Independent (The), Locusts swarm into Mogadishu’s pasture land amid resurgence in Horn of Africa, 10 November 2020, \url{https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/leb-headlines/locusts-swarm-mogadishus-pasture-land-amid-resurgence-in-horn-of-africa-11816279.html}.
\textsuperscript{79} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{https://www.fis.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/fis_mogadishu_security_final_report.pdf}, p. 31
\textsuperscript{80} Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
\textsuperscript{82} FSNAU, Somalia - Climate, n.d., \url{https://fsnau.org/somalia-climate/}; FAO and SWALIM, Somalia Rainfall Outlook for the 2020 Deyr Season, 3 September 2020, \url{https://fsnau.org/somalia-climate/}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{83} Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
floods. 1,610 people departed while 1,790 arrived. 84 Flash floods and heavy rains continued in May 2021, killing at least 16 individuals in Benadir. 85 On the other hand, if rainfall fails or remains below average, this also has serious implications, especially for pastoral and farming populations raising the number of food-insecure households as both livestock and crop production will decline. 86 A ‘stressed’ food security situation was forecasted for March to June 2021 for the Benadir region 87 and reported in the first quarter of 2021. 88 Severe droughts are linked to climate change 89 and increase disruptions to water access, malnutrition, disease outbreaks, and food insecurity. 90 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) predicted below-average rainfall in the Benadir region for the deyr season 2020. 91 However, in November 2020, UNOCHA reported that a number of 13,000 people were affected by deyr flash floods, 6,500 had been displaced, and three had been killed within the past month. 92 More than 10,000 people had already been displaced by floods during the hagaa season (drought season) in Benadir between June and September 2020. 93

1.1.2.2 Impact of the security situation

Somalia ranks among the most insecure places worldwide. Armed conflict between the Somali government, and non-state groups, primarily Al-Shabaab, is ongoing. 94 Al-Shabaab commits terrorist attacks, regularly causing dozens of civilian casualties in Mogadishu. 95 UNOCHA reported that 15 humanitarian workers had been killed, 12 wounded and 24 kidnapped between 1 January and 31 December 2020. 96 The UN compound in Mogadishu was hit by mortar bombs six times, and four aircrafts carrying humanitarian aid and humanitarian workers crashed, were hit by ground fire or were being shot down in the first half of 2020. 97 As of February 2021, Al-Shabaab continued to hold three international staff members. 98 For more details, please see the sections 4.1 and 4.3 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors (July 2021) as well as EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021). The situation in Mogadishu destabilised further in February 2021, because the scheduled presidential elections had been cancelled. In response, opposition candidates were building clan militias to fight the central government. 99 According to Jutta Bakonyi, who was interviewed for this report, violence and regular attacks in Mogadishu and the conflict between the president and his

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84 UNHCR, Somalia: Internal Displacements Monitored by Protection & Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) April 2021, 17 May 2021, url
85 UNOCHA, Somalia: 2021 Gu’ Season Floods Update 1, As of 9 May 2021, 9 May 2021, url, p. 1; see also FloodList, Somalia – 400,000 Affected by Floods Says UN, 7 June 2021, url; FloodList, Somalia – Deadly Floods Strike Mogadishu, Rivers Overflow in Jowhar, 9 May 2021, url
86 afrol News, Deyr rainfall fails in Somalia, Somalia nd, 14 November 2003, url
87 UNOCHA, Somalia: Overview of Water Shortages (As of 09 March 2021), 9 March 2021, url
88 FSNAU and IPC, Somalia Acute Food Insecurity Situation Overview - Rural, Urban and IDP: Current Food Security Outcomes: January - March 2021, 4 February 2021, url
89 ILO, Employment programs and conflict in Somalia, December 2019, 17 October 2019, url, p. 15
90 ILO, Employment programs and conflict in Somalia, December 2019, 17 October 2019, url, p. 15
91 FAO and SWALIM, Somalia Rainfall Outlook for the 2020 Deyr Season, 3 September 2020, url
92 UNOCHA, Somalia: Deyr Season Floods Update #3: As of 22 November 2020, 23 November 2020, url, p. 1
93 UNOCHA, Somalia: Hagaa Floods Response Status [table, map], 22 November 2020, url, p. 1, see also UNOCHA, Somalia: Hagaa Floods Update 2, 26 July 2020, url, p. 2
94 ILO, Employment programs and conflict in Somalia, December 2019, 17 October 2019, url, pp. 8, 10; ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 6
95 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 11
96 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan - Somalia, 15 February 2021, url, p. 42
97 UNOCHA, Somalia: Situation Report, as of 6 September 2020, url, p. 3; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 18
98 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan - Somalia, 15 February 2021, url, p. 42
99 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 6
competitors affect the humanitarian situation in Benadir region with its capital Mogadishu. It caused people to rather stay indoor, and transportation efficiency to worsen. Security issues were also a major reason for limitations and barriers in terms of internal mobility, which hampered humanitarian organisations’ ability to provide their services.

1.1.2.3 Displacement and humanitarian assistance

IDP populations, inflows and outflows

A qualitative study undertaken in 2020 in Baidoa and Mogadishu, investigating the impact of COVID-19, showed that Mogadishu is hosting the largest IDP population in the country. The study concluded that the city is ‘host to respectively 497 000 IDPs’. UNHCR numbers for April 2021 indicate 198 000 IDPs arriving in and 186 000 departing from the Benadir region; the number due to floods is particularly high. According to the World Bank, Mogadishu was hosting 20% of the approximately 2.6 million IDPs in Somalia in 2018, and one-third between 2016 and 2019.

IDP sites in Mogadishu and general conditions

The number of IDP sites is fluctuating due to ongoing evictions and establishments of squatter settlements and camps across the city and at its outskirts. Estimates range between 500 and 1 500 IDP sites in Mogadishu. Displaced people often join overcrowded IDP camps at Mogadishu's outskirts.

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2021, 1.6 million IDPs in Somalia are in humanitarian need. A high number of them lives in the Benadir region. The safety and protection situation in IDP camps is generally weak and unsanitary conditions prevail. Many women in Mogadishu are affected by gender-based violence (GBV). Distance to water points and firewood collection sites constitutes a safety risk for women and girls in IDP camps at the outskirts of the city. IDPs face severe risks of exclusion, discrimination, and evictions. Most evictions are enforced without adequate previous notice. UNOCHA reported that 139 000 people were evicted in Mogadishu from January to October 2019.

For more information on IDP sites in Mogadishu, please see sections 1.3.2.3 Informal settlements and IDP sites and 1.3.2.4 Evictions.

100 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
103 UNHCR, Somalia: Internal Displacements Monitored by Protection & Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) April 2021, 17 May 2021, url
104 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 36
105 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
107 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, pp. 22, 32
109 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
110 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 22 December 2019, url, pp. 22, 57; see also UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 84
111 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 22 December 2019, url, pp. 4, 12
Humanitarian needs

On arrival in Benadir in April 2021, displaced people’s priority humanitarian assistance needs were, according to UNHCR, food (39 %), livelihood support (35 %), shelter (21 %), and health services (5 %).112 There is a high need for material to protect houses and shelter from the rain. The low need for health services might be explained by a hesitance of people to seek medical support in the context of chronic exhaustion and inability to pay fees.113 Humanitarian assistance has been disrupted by prevalent violence and insecurity.114 Based on data collected between November 2019 and February 2020, REACH and the CCCM Cluster assessed ‘severe’ and ‘extreme’ severity of humanitarian needs of residents in IDP camps in three districts in Mogadishu.115

For more information on this topic, please see sections 1.3 Socio-economic indicators and 1.4.2.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups.

Access to humanitarian assistance

Several districts in Mogadishu are inaccessible to humanitarian operations. As of May 2021, people who were displaced to Garasbaly and Kahda districts have not yet received humanitarian assistance.116

Under the prevalent circumstances, IOM scaled-up its cooperation with the Somali government regarding COVID-19 response in order to access hard-to-reach locations and communities in 2020.117 Furthermore, IOM established a new Migrant Response Centre (MRC) in Mogadishu, which was handed over to the Benadir Regional Administration in November 2020. The MRC serves the purpose of ‘providing direct assistance, information, counselling, and referrals, to returnees, host communities and migrants in the city’.118 According to UNOCHA, COVID-19 restrictions in 2020 resulted in the reduction, suspension or cancellation of humanitarian projects and programmes’.119 Humanitarian actors, state, local governmental, and other actors have responded to displaced people’s needs with ‘unprecedented or exceedingly rare actions’ during the pandemic response measures.120

1.1.2.4 Diseases

Moreover, the Benadir region is affected by outbreaks of cholera following floods — the current outbreak had started in December 2017 —,121 counting 102 cases between January and April 2021 as reported by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET). Even though measles infections are decreasing compared to the years 2016-2020, Benadir had the highest number in Somalia, with 280 recorded cases between January and April 2021.122 Also, high numbers of tuberculosis and malaria cases have been reported for

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112 UNHCR, Somalia: Internal Displacements Monitored by Protection & Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) April 2021, 17 May 2021, url
113 Balkony, J., communication, 7 July 2021
114 UNOCHA, Somalia: Displacement Update for Banadir, Berdale, and Baadweyn, as of May 2021, 6 May 2021, url
115 CCCM and REACH, Detailed Site Assessment (DSA): Key Findings, January 2020, 31 January 2020, url, p. 1
116 UNOCHA, Somalia: Displacement Update for Banadir, Berdale, and Baadweyn, as of May 2021, 6 May 2021, url
118 IOM, IOM Somalia 2020 Programmatic Overview, 14 June 2021, url, p. 34
119 UNOCHA, Somalia: Situation Report, 10 August 2020, url, p. 4
120 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan - Somalia, 15 February 2021, url, p. 91
121 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic-Prone Diseases: Outbreak Update – Cholera in Somalia, 7 March 2021, 23 March 2021, url
122 FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jilaa Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, url, p. 9
In response, the government implemented a national malaria programme aiming to ‘attain zero deaths and reduce malaria incidence to at least 0.5 per 1,000 people by 2025’. Jutta Bakonyi confirmed the prevalence of high tuberculosis and malaria rates in Mogadishu. Regarding HIV, she further noted that infections are not being tested on a regular basis because HIV is highly stigmatised. Therefore, estimates vary greatly.

### 1.1.2.5 COVID-19

In March 2020, the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic reached Somalia, adding another dimension to the overall situation of humanitarian need. The government implemented rapid measures to curb the spread of the pandemic as soon as the first COVID-19 cases were detected, such as the closure of border crossings and schools, restrictions of in-country movements and group functions. With 1,593 cases and 57 deaths, the Benadir region recorded more than 36% of the total number of reported cases as of 21 November 2020. Mogadishu had high infection rates. From 1 to 22 February 2021 alone, a total of 1,432 new cases and 76 deaths were reported in Mogadishu – the largest increase in a week since May-June 2020. The De Martino Hospital in Mogadishu serves countrywide as the main referral hospital for COVID-19 patients. It is being supported by the WHO with training, medical supplies, and funding. For more information on the impact of COVID-19 on health care in Mogadishu, please see section 1.3.4 Health care.

### 1.2 Mobility and accessibility

#### 1.2.1 Mogadishu airport and flight connections

Mogadishu has an international airport, the Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ), which has formerly been known as Mogadishu International Airport. Mogadishu airport is located about 1 mile (1.6 kilometres) west of the town on the Indian Ocean coast. Information on the airport’s website says that it has one terminal serving the following international airports via direct flight connections or via transit: Ambouli Airport (JIB) (Djibouti), Berbera Airport (BBO), Bosasso Airport (BSA), Dubai (DXB) (United Arab Emirates), Entebbe (EBB) (Uganda), Galkayo Airport (GK), Hargeisa Airport (HGA), Istanbul (IST) (Turkey), Jeddah (JED) (Saudi Arabia), Nairobi (NBO) (Kenya), Riyah Mukalli Airport (RIY) (Yemen), Sharjah (SHJ) (United Arab Emirates) and Wajir Airport (WJR) (Kenya). Closest airports to Mogadishu airport are K50 Airport (89.6 kilometres), Baledogle Airport and...
(105 kilometres), Baidoa Airport (246 kilometres), Bardera Airport (335.05 kilometres), Beledweyne Airport (339.4 kilometres), Garbaharey Airport (376.55 kilometres), Lugh Ganane Airport (412.49 kilometres), Kismayo Airport (413.49 kilometres) and Kelafo Airport (Ethiopia) (418.72 kilometres).  

1.2.1.1 International flights and carriers

The airline African Express Airways operates in Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Somalia connecting Mogadishu with Nairobi in Kenya on Sundays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays, as well as Juba in South Sudan.  

Freedom Airline Express approaches Mogadishu on Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays, as well as Galkacyo and Kismayo from Nairobi.  

Air Djibouti connects Mogadishu to Aden (ADE) (Yemen), Addis Ababa (ABB) (Ethiopia) and Djibouti (JIB).  

The Djibouti Daallo Airlines offers flight connections to and from Mogadishu to and from Dubai (DXB), Nairobi (NBO) on Mondays, Thursdays and Saturdays, and Jeddah (JED) about once a month.

Ethiopian Airlines connect Mogadishu to Addis Ababa on a daily basis.  

Turkish Airlines serve Mogadishu to and from Istanbul (IST),  

Kenya Airways to and from Nairobi (NBO) and Qatar Airways to and from Doha (DOH).

Salaam Air Express operates between Mogadishu and Nairobi on a demand basis.  

Fly Premier Airlines operates flights from Nairobi to Mogadishu on Fridays and Sundays.  

Utair Express operates between Mogadishu and Entebbe (EBB).

1.2.1.2 National flights and carriers

Domestic flights of African Express Airways connect Mogadishu with Bosasso, Garowe, Hargeisa on Mondays and Thursdays, and Kismayo.  

Air Djibouti operates domestic flights between Mogadishu and Hargeisa (HGA).  

Daallo Airlines offers connections between Mogadishu and Bosasso (once a week) as well as Hargeisa (twice a week).  

Ethiopian Airlines serves Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe.  

Freedom Airline Express operates domestic flights between Mogadishu and Garowe on Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays, and Blue Sky Air serves Adado (AAD), Abudwak (AWQ), Baidoa (BIB), Beledweyne (BWO), Dhoblel (DOH), Galkacyo (GLK), Guriel (GUK) and Kismayo (KMU) from Mogadishu.  

Blue Sky Air in cooperation with Freedom Airline Express connects Mogadishu with Adado (AAD), Abudwak (AWQ), Baidoa (BIB), Beledweyne (BWO), Bosasso (BSA), Galkacyo (GLK),

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135 Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport, Airport Information, n.d., [url]
137 FlightConnections, Non-stop flights to Mogadishu (MGQ), n.d., as of 13 August 2021, [url]
138 Freedom Airline Express, Nairobi – Mogadishu, n.d., [url]
139 Air Djibouti, Home, n.d., [url]
140 Daallo Airlines, Home, n.d., [url]
142 Turkish Airlines, Flights to Somalia, n.d., [url]
144 Qatar Airways, Flights to Africa, n.d., [url]
145 Salaam Air Express, Home, n.d., [url]; Salaam Air Express [Facebook], posted on 15 July 2021, [url]
146 Fly Premier Airlines, Flights to Mogadishu, n.d., [url]
147 FlightConnections, Utair Express routes and airport map, n.d., as of 13 August 2021, [url]
149 Air Djibouti, Home, n.d., [url]
150 Daallo Airlines, Home, n.d., [url]; FlightConnections, Non-stop flights to Mogadishu (MGQ), n.d., as of 13 August 2021, [url]
152 Freedom Airline Express, Nairobi – Mogadishu, n.d., [url]; FlightConnections, Non-stop flights to Mogadishu (MGQ), n.d., as of 13 August 2021, [url]
153 Blue Sky Air, Flights, n.d., [url]
Garowe (GGR), Guriel (GUK), Hargeisa (HGA) and Kismayo (KMU). 154 Salaam Air Express schedules passenger and cargo flights within Somalia on a demand basis. 155 The Mogadishu based airline Mandeeq Air announced in a social media post in August 2018 that it connected Mogadishu with Adado, Galgacyo, Dobolet, Nairobi, Baidoa and was starting to serve additional connections between Mogadishu - Kismayo and Dolow - Mogadishu from August 2018. 156 Saacid Airline, also based in Mogadishu, offers charter flights and tours within Somalia as well as cargo flights. 157

In April 2020, the government imposed COVID-19 related restrictions on Mogadishu and closed all airports. 158 FAO reported that the restrictions were partly lifted in October 2020 and airports reopened. 159 UNOCHA stated that flight suspensions were lifted on 3 August 2020 and that humanitarian cargo had been exempt from the suspensions throughout. 160 The closure of the airport in Mogadishu had a significant impact. People who can afford it prefer travelling by plane to travelling by bus, since it is considered safer and domestic flights are not overly expensive. 161

1.2.2 Internal mobility, including checkpoints

The Finnish Immigration Service published findings of their fact-finding mission to Mogadishu undertaken in March 2020. The report mentioned several hundred checkpoints in Mogadishu manned by security forces that were meant to ensure the safety of the city. Most of them were in the city centre, where political institutions are situated, and in the northern section around the military headquarters. All main roads leading to the city – two from the coastline: one from the south and another one from the north; two from the west towards Ethiopia: one towards west from Baidoa and Buurhakaba and one from the northwest from Beled-Weyne, Jawhar and Afgooye – had checkpoints. 162 According to Bakonyi, their number has not decreased since, on the contrary, the number of checkpoints has increased.

It happened in 2020, under prime minister Mahdi Mohammed Gulaad, that whole streets were closed. This led to protests, particularly by businessmen, who said they were not able to transport and trade their goods anymore. His successor, Mohamed Hussein Roble did not continue this practice. 163 According to sources interviewed by the Finnish Immigration Service, the checkpoints were partly temporarily, partly permanently installed to stop traffic. Responsibility for maintenance was divided between police, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the military. Sometimes clan affiliations were considered. For example, members of the subclans Habar Gidir and Abgaal (both from the Hawiye clan) who belonged to the security forces, were posted at checkpoints in areas populated by the respective clan communities. 164 UNHCR in Mogadishu confirmed in an

155 Salaam Air Express, Home, n.d., url: Salaam Air Express [Facebook], posted on 11 July 2021, url
156 Mandeeq Air [Facebook], posted on: 5 August 2018, url: Mandeeq Air [Facebook], posted on: 15 August 2018, url
157 Saacid Airline, Home, n.d., url
160 UNOCHA, Somalia: Situation Report, as of 6 September 2020, url: p. 4
161 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
162 Finland, F5, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url: p. 22; Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
163 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
164 Finland, F5, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url: pp. 21-22
interview with the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) in June 2020 that the main checkpoints in the city were controlled by Federal Government forces.\footnote{Canada, IRB, Somalia: Entry and exit requirements at land borders and airports, including documentation required; whether there are checkpoints for domestic and international travel; whether there are travel agencies that facilitate travel within and outside Somalia (2018-August 2020), 3 September 2020, url}

The Finnish mission could not acquire confirmed information on official fees for passage. One expert said that security forces sometimes extorted money from people passing through checkpoints; one said that drivers of vehicles always had to pay a fee and only pedestrians were exempt; and others said that fees applied to everyone; or that no fees applied to passers-by but that identities were checked and that it was necessary to indicate a contact person on the other side of the checkpoint that would take responsibility for them. Regarding the amount charged by security forces at checkpoints experts and NGO members stated a range between 0.25 and 5 US Dollars.\footnote{Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, pp. 22-23} Iman Elman, former Director of External Affairs at Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and Head of Programs and Security for Committed to Good (CTG), a private company in international development, stated in January 2019 that security checkpoints in Mogadishu were commonly located every one to two kilometres, and that one should make sure to provide an ID card at checkpoints.\footnote{CTG, Staying Safe in Somalia: 9 Top Security Tips For Humanitarian Aid Workers, 22 January 2019, url} However, Bakonyi stated in July 2021 that a majority of people in Mogadishu does neither possess IDs nor other identity documents. Official fees are not levied at checkpoints, but bribes may be requested and especially so if identity documents are missing. People without IDs are more likely to be body checked. Also, cars are checked for explosives at checkpoints, which is among the reasons for the popularity of motorbike taxis. Sometimes, people have to leave taxis behind at checkpoints, pass on foot and look for alternative means of transportation.\footnote{Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021}

Bakonyi, as well as the Finnish report, stated that residents were often irritated by the restrictions of movement through checkpoints in the city.\footnote{Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021; Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 24} For members of marginalised groups, passage was not always possible even though they had the required identity certificates. People reported fearing going through checkpoints because of corrupt police officers or the risk of terrorist bomb attacks. Violent incidents at checkpoints causing death included shootings at three-wheel mopeds and other vehicles for not obeying security forces’ orders to stop, clashes between different units of security forces and terrorist attacks by armed groups (the majority of which perpetrated by Al-Shabaab).\footnote{Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 24} In addition, harassments by NISA or other security agents at checkpoints have been reported.\footnote{Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the Worlds Human Rights, 7 April 2021, url, pp. 19, 323; Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 25; AA, Suicide bomber strikes near Somali mall, police station, 23 February 2021, url; Reuters, At least 8 killed in Mogadishu by suicide bomb targeting government convoy, 10 July 2021, url} Yet terrorist attacks happen not only at city checkpoints but in all kinds of infrastructure used by government officials, politicians and security forces in Mogadishu, including restaurants, hotels and shopping malls.\footnote{Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 24} This is why generally, ‘moving about in the city causes fear and anxiety among city residents’.\footnote{Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021}
According to scholar Jutta Bakonyi, Mogadishu is an unsafe place for everyone living there. Particular challenges of accessibility are faced by the wealthiest, by those working for the government and the UN and by well-known businessmen who refuse to pay taxes to Al-Shabaab. These people often use bulletproof cars and move around the town as little as possible. Private cars are used only by the wealthiest to go about the town, the rest relies on the chaotically functioning bus system, three-wheel vehicles (bajaj) originally from India, motorbikes, motorbike taxis, taxi cars and a taxi app via mobile application. The number of motorbike taxis has increased in the last years due to the proliferation of checkpoints and subsequent traffic jams in the city.

For additional details see section 6 of EASO's COI report *Somalia: Targeted profiles* (September 2021).

In Mogadishu, the 'airport zone', which is also known as Halane, is a high security zone hosting the UN offices, most European and the Kenyan embassies. Access to the walled airport zone is only provided through three gates with heavy security checks. Surrounding Mogadishu's highly secured airport zone is the 'green zone', where further international organisations and government officials reside and where hotels are located which are used by international and national experts who are not able or willing to move into the segregated airport zone. The green zone has a high number of checkpoints and is heavily patrolled by Somali security forces. Nonetheless attacks could not be entirely prevented.

COVID-19 related dusk-to-dawn curfews in Mogadishu between April and August 2020 restricted people’s movements and the government banned assemblies and large gatherings, closed schools and academic institutions. Physical isolation and movement restrictions imposed by the government sometimes caused limited access to food and medical supplies. Two people who had violated the curfew in April 2020 were shot dead by a police officer in Mogadishu. Later, the officer was sentenced to death by a military court. The government’s response to a consequent COVID-19 wave in 2021 was 'more lax' and, with markets, mosques and football stadiums remaining open, life 'continued relatively normally'.

For more information on mobility, please see section 3.1 of EASO’s COI report *Somalia: Actors* (July 2021).

### 1.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city

Yahya Amir, professor in Mogadishu, explained to the Finnish fact-finding mission that there was a division of the city between zones controlled by the Abgaal and Habar Gidir from the Hawiye clan during the civil war in the 1990s. Northern, some central and the southern Madina district were under the control of the Abgaal, the remaining central and southern zones under the control of the Habar Gidir. According to Yahya Amir, in March 2020 this clan setting still had an impact and the Abgaal and

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174 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
175 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
177 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
178 TNH, *Who’s afraid of COVID-19? Somalia’s battle with the virus*, 5 May 2021, [url](https://www.tnh-online.com)
181 TNH, *Who’s afraid of COVID-19? Somalia’s battle with the virus*, 5 May 2021, [url](https://www.tnh-online.com)
Habar Gidir clans held strong positions. UN-Habitat and JPLG follow the same line when saying that the city’s ‘economy, politics and power structures are dominated by geographical clan groups’. For more information on the influence of clan affiliation on settlement patterns, please see section 1.1.1.3 Clan distribution.

But ‘in principle, people can move freely within the capital city regardless of their clan background, and there are no clan-based restrictions on movement’, local experts told the Finnish mission. UNHCR informed the mission that ‘People with means can buy a residence and settle in the best areas of the city, even if they are not members of the capital city’s powerful clans’. Still, the clan background often determines where people feel it is safest for an individual to live. When clan conflicts turn violent, it seems safest to move into the districts where the own clan dominates or at least more people from the same clan live. The clan can also provide a safety net in case of hardship.

The rural-urban dynamic of movement of the internally displaced population in Somalia is a major driver of cities’ growth in Somalia and in many cities IDPs are meanwhile a large percentage of urban residents. But also returnees and refugees from neighbouring countries tend to settle in and around Somalia’s urban centres, among which Mogadishu. A study by Charlotte Bonnet et al. indicated that, in the Somali context, the label IDP was not used in the same way as by the international community but rather as a generic term for poor urban residents that had settled in the city in the past 20 years. Therefore, the line between newly displaced and urban poor residents of Mogadishu was blurred. Bakonyi explains in her study on displacement that in the common Somali understanding, someone is considered an IDP when he or she settles on land particularly designated for displaced people. The alignment of places of settlement to status as “displaced” was common in all Somali cities, excluding those who join relatives or live in rented accommodations across the city.’ In Mogadishu, the majority of residents at IDP sites do not belong to one of the clans that hold political power. The perception of being an IDP depends particularly on the place where an individual settles (e.g. IDP camps, relocation areas, squatter settlements) and on the clan affiliation. Bakonyi notes that urban poor newcomers to the city are not generally considered IDPs. If they move in with relatives, for instance, or if they are able to rent a place, they are not considered IDPs even if they technically are. Likewise, they are not represented in the IDP numbers. Together with her co-authors, Peter Chonka and Kirsti Stuvøy, she explains in their study on Mogadishu and Bosasso from August 2019 that ‘displaced people without social networks and prior knowledge of the city often ended up on the city’s streets where they turned to begging for their survival’. Newcomers would eventually find shelter in one of the

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182 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, URL, p. 38
183 UN-Habitat and JPLG, Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning, 2019, URL, p. 3
184 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, URL, p. 39
185 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, URL, p. 39
186 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
187 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, URL, p. 36; see also UN-Habitat and JPLG, Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning, 2019, URL, p. 21
188 Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, URL, pp. 451-452
189 Bakonyi, J., The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities, 15 October 2020, URL, p. 18
190 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
191 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
camps and erect a buul (makeshift hut) on goof (uninhabited, unused land), which belongs to a goof-leh (owner of unused land). Especialy in Mogadishu, informal settlement managers (ISMs), also referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ play an important role in the process. They ‘preside over a lucrative industry providing space for shelter and protection for IDPs,’ sometimes buying up land and then actively filling it up with IDPs. Such new camps attract humanitarian aid, from which gatekeepers take a share. In this way, as the national or local state fails to provide shelter and security to the vulnerable, an informal industry has arisen in Mogadishu that ‘negotiat[es] access to plots from local landlords’ and ‘facilitate[s] access to shelter, principally for internally displaced persons (IDPs) but also for long-term urban poor residents, refugees and returnees.’

Meanwhile, one has to pay a fee to the gatekeeper for a place to settle in one of the camps with good humanitarian support. In 2017 a study suggested that approximately 140 gatekeepers operated in Mogadishu. Most of them belong to the dominant Hawiye clan and sometimes to the Darood. Their number has most probably increased since 2018 and 2019 saw a higher influx of IDPs, many of them settling in Kaxda district. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Econvalue Consult, SDI Kenya, Social Development Direct (SDDirect) and Tana Copenhagen noticed that clan concentration diminished and the city developed a greater diversity in some locations. Still, relatives’ support and clan networks remain important to IDPs upon and after their arrival to the town. This is why they ‘usually move to areas where they have relatives and networks.’ It is not uncommon that, if landowners wish to develop their land, they clear it through forced evictions. For more information, please see sections 1.3.2.3 Informal settlements and IDP sites and 1.3.2.4 Evictions.

IDPs from minority clans and ethnic groups, particularly those of Bantu origin from southern Somalia, face stronger discrimination and a higher risk of evictions compared to members of majority clans or to non-displaced clan members, who also reside in informal settlements in Mogadishu. For more information on minority clans and ethnic minorities, please see sections 4.2 and 4.3 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (September 2021).

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194 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, p. 5
196 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, p. 5
197 Bakenyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
198 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, p. 5
199 Bakenyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021a
200 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, p. 5, p. 5, footnote 3
201 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, p. 8
203 IIED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, pp. 6, 8
1.3 Socio-economic indicators

1.3.1 Economic overview and food security

1.3.1.1 Economic overview

Somalia’s economy is dominated by subsistence agriculture and fishing.\footnote{IMF, IMF Survey : IMF to Help Somalia Rebuild Its Economy, 24 June 2013, \url{url}} According to data from Statista, the agriculture sector produced 80.3% of the country’s total GDP in 2019.\footnote{Statista, Somalia: Distribution of employment by economic sector from 2009 to 2019, n.d., \url{url}} The majority of the population lives at the subsistence level. People engage as petty traders or small-scale producers of livestock and other agricultural products.\footnote{Gertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Somalia, 2020, \url{url}, p. 25} Somalia is heavily dependent upon imports. In 2020, household final consumption expenditure accounted for 144% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), imports of goods and services amounted to 84% of the GDP.\footnote{Federal Republic of Somalia, National Bureau of Statistics, Somalia Gross Domestic Product Report, June 2021, 30 June 2021, \url{url}, pp. 3, 5} According to 2020 data the GDP per capita in Somalia was 309.4 US dollars.\footnote{World Bank (The), GDP per capita (current US$) — Somalia, n.d., \url{url}}

Private consumption is the main driver of the Somali economy and, according to the Somali Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, relies to a large extent on remittance inflows,\footnote{Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 34; Boston Globe (The), Mogadishu is booming, 25 June 2021, \url{url}; see also Majid, N. et al., How Will Remittances Affect the Somali COVID-19 Response?, LSE COVID-19 [Blog], 7 April 2020, \url{url}} which contribute up to 40% to the Somali economy.\footnote{Somalia, MoPIED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, [2019], \url{url}, p. 49} Transport, communication and construction are major drivers of growth on the supply side, for which Mogadishu serves as a major hub.\footnote{Somalia, MoPIED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, [2019], \url{url}, p. 49} Still, the city’s economy remains largely informal and is not regulated by the government.\footnote{UN-Habitat and JPLG, Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning, 2019, \url{url}, p. 18; Somalia, MoPIED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, [2019], \url{url}, pp. 29-31} Domestic revenues are mainly derived from customs duties collected at the Mogadishu sea- and airport, amounting to 5.5 million to 8.5 million US dollars monthly. Furthermore, sales taxes on \textit{khat}\footnote{Khat is a stimulant, popular in the region. Its leaves are usually chewed or brewed as a tea’, see Kicullen, D., Hargeisa, Somalia and Invisible City, 2019, \url{url}, p. 25, footnote 7} are collected at the sea- and airport, and income tax is imposed on salaries and government wages.\footnote{Somalia, MoPIED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, [2019], \url{url}, p. 297} Apart from that, the country is dependent on international aid.\footnote{Bahadur, J., Fishy Business, Illegal fishing in Somali and the capture of state institutions, June 2021, 2 July 2021, \url{url}, pp. 1, 40; see also EEAS, The European Union hands over 9 refrigerated trucks to Somali coastal communities as part of the EU funded “No Piracy” fisheries project, 28 January 2021, \url{url}}

Somalia’s coastal areas, among them Mogadishu, have access to one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. However, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities as well as piracy challenge the fishing sector, contributing to the environmental destruction of Somalia’s marine resources and undermining the ability of the state to generate legitimate revenue from fisheries.\footnote{Somalia, MoPIED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, [2019], \url{url}, p. 24-25} The federal government issues fishing licences beyond a 24 nautical mile limit from the shoreline and other permissions. The management of fishing within this limit is in the responsibility of the federal member states. Yet, weak
state structures and corruption are the reasons for which different local Somali authorities do not recognize each other’s licences and permissions. Local fishers use small boats to catch fish along the coast and supply the fish markets in Mogadishu. Fish is also being distributed to the hinterland. Fishers can come from all major clans, while labourers who slaughter, distribute or carry the fish are often from minority groups, such as Bantu or Madiban. In a recent bilateral initiative, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on the exchange of khat with fish.

On Mogadishu’s outskirts, pastoralists and farmers engage in agricultural production and animal husbandry. Since January 2020, goat prices have declined and cereal prices risen. For instance, in January 2021, the sale of a goat bought 158 kilogrammes of maize, which is 24 % less than in January 2020. In 2016, FSNAU reported that from Mogadishu’s Bakara market. locally produced cereals were being traded to central Somalia. In the past 10 to 15 years, agriculture saw an increase in cash crops production. Lemon, bananas and sesame are produced in the south and along the Shebelle river and then transported to Mogadishu for the local or the export markets. Markets in Mogadishu are the main destination for livestock, such as camel trade and other local agricultural products from surrounding regions.

Annual inflation has been in single digits between 2012 and 2019 based on inflation rates derived from data on consumer prices obtained in Mogadishu. The World Bank projects a stagnation of private consumption in 2021 and a steady international poverty rate of 71 % in 2022 and 2023 for Somalia. Recent gains in economic growth have been lost due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Current information on average income in Mogadishu is not available, since many people engage in the trade sector that is highly dependent on business success, such as import, export, wholesale, kiosk, or otherwise handicraft trade.

Mogadishu is the country’s most vibrant commercial and the state’s administrative centre. Despite its chronic insecurity, it is the main economic hub, where approximately a third of Somalia’s urban population lives. A report by the Bertelsmann Stiftung described an ongoing building boom and the reopening of restaurants, supermarkets and shops in Mogadishu as ‘signs of economic recovery’ in the time between January 2017 and January 2019. Similarly, UN-Habitat reports that increased stability between 2014 and 2019, remittance inflows and donor support have contributed to a boom.
in construction, telecommunication, trade and transport sectors in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{230} Due to investments from the diaspora, also the real estate market expanded in the past 20 years.\textsuperscript{231} Yet, spiking land and real estate prices in Mogadishu result in large-scale evictions and manifest the growing inequality between rich and poor.\textsuperscript{232}

Compared to other cities and rural areas, Mogadishu concentrates a larger number of tradable services enterprises, which create employment opportunities, and have strong connections to markets in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and the South West State.\textsuperscript{233} However, the Finnish mission found that few business and employment opportunities existed in Mogadishu (see section \textit{1.3.6 Means of basic subsistence and employment}).\textsuperscript{234} Some Somalis, who have been raised and educated abroad are returning to Mogadishu, investing and opening new businesses.\textsuperscript{235} In Somalia, there are some wealthy businessmen and international traders but the majority of the population lives at the subsistence level.\textsuperscript{236} Urban wage labour is less dependent on climate or seasonal conditions. Therefore, the majority of urban households make their living on wage labour. In Mogadishu with 64\%, the proportion of households engaged in wage labour is the highest.\textsuperscript{237}

In June 2020, the Somali Public Agenda published an article on the impact of COVID-19 on the informal economy on Mogadishu. The article states that due to COVID-19-related restrictions and a night curfew in Mogadishu from April 2020, many businesses were closed. Informal businesses such as roadside cafes, milk and tea vendors, hawkers, vegetable and fruit sellers, restaurants, teashops, shoe shiners, travel agencies, \textit{khat} traders/sellers, remittances, \textit{bajaj} drivers, school and university teachers, clothes businesses and other imported goods businesses were heavily impacted by the restrictions. To cushion the economic impact, the Somali government rolled out a 100\% tax exemption for rice and dates and a 50\% tax waiver for wheat flour and cooking oil in April 2020.\textsuperscript{238} Due to the COVID-19 crisis remittance flows were interrupted causing a decline of consumption in local markets in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{239}

\textbf{1.3.1.2 Food security}

The majority of the population in Mogadishu is affected by food insecurity with highest malnutrition rates among IDPs (for more information on IDPs, please see section \textit{1.1.2.3 Displacement and humanitarian assistance}).\textsuperscript{240} FEWS and FSNAU provide an outlook on the food security situation in Mogadishu. They classify the second and third quarter of 2021 as phases of ‘crisis’ in IDP settlements

\textsuperscript{230} UN-Habitat and IPLG, \textit{Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning}, 2019, \url{url}, p. 18
\textsuperscript{232} Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Somalia, 2020, \url{url}, pp. 25, 28
\textsuperscript{233} World Bank (The), \textit{Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development}, 2020, \url{url}, p. 51
\textsuperscript{234} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 32
\textsuperscript{235} World Bank (The), \textit{Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development}, 2020, \url{url}, p. 51; Boston Globe (The), Mogadishu is booming, 25 June 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{236} Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Somalia, 2020, \url{url}, p. 25
\textsuperscript{237} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, pp. xix, 35, 51
\textsuperscript{238} Somali Public Agenda, The impact of Covid-19 on the informal economy of Mogadishu, 4 June 2020, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{240} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, pp. 30, 37
and as ‘stressed’ in urban settlements.\textsuperscript{241} ‘Crisis’ means that households either ‘have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition’ or ‘are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies’; and ‘stressed’ means that ‘households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.’\textsuperscript{242} The CCCM Cluster recognised a rise in food related complaints in IDP sites where they provide their services, e.g. within Daynile district. The cluster reported an all-time high with regard to food security complaints and information requests in April 2021. This relates to the elevated number of new displacements and coincides with increase of IDP numbers.\textsuperscript{243} In March 2021, FSNAU reported a monthly number of 125 000 recipients of food assistance in Mogadishu since July 2018.\textsuperscript{244} FSNAU stated in December 2020 that a persistently critical level of acute malnutrition prevailed among IDPs in Mogadishu since 2019 due to high morbidity and effects on household incomes.\textsuperscript{245} UNOCHA reported a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of 16 % in some IDP sites in Mogadishu for the year 2019.\textsuperscript{246} Data collected in the course of the World Bank’s Somali High Frequency Survey Wave 2 in December 2017 shows that 72 % of the population in Mogadishu were poor and almost 50 % suffered from food poverty.\textsuperscript{247}

As the local food production cannot sustain the city’s demands, Mogadishu relies mostly on food imports from abroad.\textsuperscript{248} Moreover, the city’s supply from local producers is vulnerable to climate change, from which food security suffers in time of droughts.\textsuperscript{249} According to UN-Habitat, ‘facilitation of trade is therefore of vital importance to increase food security.’\textsuperscript{250} Somalia imports much of its basic food items including rice, pasta, sugar, flour or cooking oil.\textsuperscript{251} Markets fulfil central supply functions in the town. Bakaara market in Mogadishu is the largest of such open markets in all Somalia and one of the largest in East Africa. Another wholesale and supply market is the Zeybian market in Hodan district. From there, food stuffs are being traded to other districts via retailers, who, as well, form wholesale markets within their districts like Suq Bacad and Hamar Weyne or Medina markets. Suq Bacad in Yaqshid district and Hamarweye are Mogadishu’s second and third largest markets.\textsuperscript{252} In neighbourhoods and IDP camps in Weydow and Tabella smaller emerging markets serve the specific needs of the urban poor and IDPs. Nevertheless, there are blank spots in the north-eastern and south-western parts of the city, which are not served.\textsuperscript{253} The terms of trade (TOt) between daily labour wage

\textsuperscript{241} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jialal Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, \url{https://www.fnsau.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/20210511_Jialal%20and%20Gu%20Season%20Brief.pdf}, p. 16
\textsuperscript{242} FEWS NET, Integrated Phase Classification, n.d., \url{https://www.fews.net}
\textsuperscript{244} IPC, Somalia: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, January - June 2021, March 2021, \url{https://www.fnsau.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/20210511_Jialal%20and%20Gu%20Season%20Brief.pdf}, p. 3
rate and cereals per kilogrammes amounted to nine kilogrammes for white maize in June 2021. Local cereal prices, specifically white maize prices, increased in Benadir by 6% between June 2021 and May 2021, and also wheat prices slightly increased between June 2020 and June 2021.\textsuperscript{234}

1.3.2 Housing and shelter

The different types of housing and shelter in Mogadishu include: huts (\textit{buush}), \textit{jingoad} (a basic housing structure of only metal sheet), \textit{bacweyne} (iron sheet house, but better decorated than \textit{jingoad}). \textit{Bacweyne} are often erected in a first phase by people owning a small plot of land before they can afford to build a brick or stone structure house for their families. All of these types of houses have outside toilets (pit-latrines). Brick or stone houses have several rooms, iron sheet roofing and indoor bathrooms.\textsuperscript{235}

In Mogadishu, informal housing is widespread. The federal government is unable to meet the shelter needs of the most vulnerable residents. Therefore, an informal industry has arisen maintaining and, sometimes, exploiting IDP populations, urban poor, refugees and returnees. ‘Gatekeepers’ are the informal power holders, who provide access to land or shelter and basic services against a fee.\textsuperscript{236} Access to land enables people to build their own houses to live or to become landlords (even if only petty landlords allowing other people to establish huts or metal sheet houses). If people can afford it, they can also rent land, rooms, apartments or houses.\textsuperscript{237}

UNHCR informants to the Finnish fact-finding mission stated in March 2020 that housing conditions in Mogadishu were challenging.\textsuperscript{238} The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) related the challenges to ‘the informal nature of the housing sector in Somalia’ lacking ‘clear laws to regulate transactions’.\textsuperscript{239} Similarly, in a 2017 fact sheet by the Global Shelter Cluster rental agreements were described as being often informal.\textsuperscript{240} The World Bank’s assessment of major socio-economic parameters from 2019 showed that due to scarcity of land, access to land and housing was constrained in urban areas and people’s chances of owning property were smaller than in rural areas. Mogadishu had the highest proportion of renters (71%) and the highest land values in Somalia.\textsuperscript{241} The World Bank saw the need for ‘a proper land administration system’ together with ‘effective land use planning’ and accompanied by ‘coordinated infrastructure investments’ in order to keep the growth of the city under control and provide security of tenure to IDPs.\textsuperscript{242} The growing influx of IDPs as well as of returnees from neighbouring countries (please see section 1.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city) has further constrained access to land in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{243} According to Bakonyi, an ongoing building boom could trigger speculation with urban land and the expansion of rent economy. This would result in mass-

\textsuperscript{234} FSNAU, Market Update, June 2021, 15 July 2021, \url{url}, pp. 1, 2
\textsuperscript{235} Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
\textsuperscript{236} IED, et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, \url{url}, p. 5
\textsuperscript{237} Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
\textsuperscript{238} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 31
\textsuperscript{239} IDMC, UnSettlement: Urban displacement in the 21st century - City of flight: New and secondary displacements in Mogadishu, Somalia, November 2018, \url{url}, p. 2
\textsuperscript{240} Shelter Cluster, Somalia Fact Sheet, September 2017, 31 October 2017, \url{url}, p. 2
\textsuperscript{241} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 40
\textsuperscript{242} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 36
\textsuperscript{243} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 40
scale evictions of the urban poor and displaced people.\textsuperscript{264} The Shelter Cluster’s dashboard showed as of 30 April 2021 that in Banadir, 7,846 persons or 1,255 households out of a number of 2.5 million targeted people were reached by in-kind emergency shelter programmes in January and March 2021.\textsuperscript{265} From June to November 2020, the organisation recorded 21,639 persons or 3,069 households out of 1.4 million targeted people who were reached by in-kind of emergency shelter programmes.\textsuperscript{266}

### 1.3.2.1 Costs

Some districts, including Waberi, Madina, Hodan and the airport area have become ‘extremely expensive’. Prices in districts on the outskirts, such as Hurriwa and Suuqa Hoolahan, were ‘more affordable’.\textsuperscript{267} A room of 25 square metres with no fittings or fixtures and a concrete floor in best quality location could cost up to 100 US dollars per month. People, who could not afford rents in better regions, were forced to live in less secure areas.\textsuperscript{268}

Apartments for rent in the different residential areas are available from monthly rates of about 100 US dollars for a one room apartment in less safe areas up to 400 US dollars in the safe area (Green Zone) around the airport, Maka Al-Mukarama Road that connects airport and state house. In recent years, high rise buildings of up to 10 floors were being constructed in Mogadishu, where one can buy apartments with three to four bedrooms and a bathroom for about 100,000 US dollars or more. A maisonette house, if not located in the city centre, costs about 150,000 US dollars. A new suburb at Mogadishu’s outskirts is under construction by the telecom company Hormud. The project offers gated maisonettes for sale at about 300,000 US dollars.\textsuperscript{269} Markus Hoehne\textsuperscript{270} said in an interview in March 2021 prices for housing varied significantly between safe and unsafe areas. On the outskirts, where Al-Shabaab was still active and which were partly in their sphere of influence, housing was much cheaper. The safer districts in the centre were secured by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and monthly costs for a studio in these areas were at minimum 150 US dollars. The same amount applied on the outskirts of Mogadishu for villas with four or five rooms.\textsuperscript{271} The Finnish report remarked that it happened that people coming from outside were charged a higher rent than Mogadishu locals.\textsuperscript{272} The July 2020 study by Charlotte Bonnet and her colleagues contained a table on housing types, costs and locations in Mogadishu: \textit{buul} (pl. \textit{buush}), self-built temporary shelters which are mainly located in the periphery and inhabited by IDPs and other Mogadishu residents who are locked out of the city’s formal housing market. If rent applied at all, it amounted on average to about 10 US dollars per month. Corrugated iron sheet housing accommodated usually low-income and lower-middle class households in central and peripheral areas. Average rent amounted to 140 US dollars per month. IDPs belonging to one of the majority clans sometimes resided informally in abandoned government buildings, which were often close to informal settlements in and around the

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\textsuperscript{264} Bakonyi, J., The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities, 15 October 2020, \url{url}, p. 20

\textsuperscript{265} Shelter Cluster, Somalia: Shelter Cluster 5W (Who’s doing What, Where, When and for Whom) – Banadir 2021, 30 April 2021, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{266} Shelter Cluster, Somalia: Shelter Cluster 5W (Who’s doing What, Where, When and for Whom) – Banadir 2020, 30 April 2021, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{267} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 31

\textsuperscript{268} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, pp. 31-32

\textsuperscript{269} Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021

\textsuperscript{270} Markus Höhne [Hoehne] is a scholar at the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Leipzig. He has been working on Somalia since 2001 and has spent several years in the country. He speaks Somali fluently

\textsuperscript{271} ACCORD, ecol.net-Themendossier zu Somalia: Humanitäre Lage, 7 May 2021, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{272} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 32
city. In apartments one could find middle-class and upper middle-class households, who paid monthly rents of about 350 to 500 US dollars on average. Many of those were located within the city close to the city centre. As a last category, the table presented villas, which were detached houses with their own compound located in the older parts of the town. Villas were accessible to upper-middle class and wealthy households as well as were rented out to foreign nationals and local and international organisations.\footnote{Especially in Mogadishu, Somalis from the diaspora and local elites purchased land, despite the lack of a functioning land registry.}

### 1.3.2.2 Discriminated groups

Tenants need a local male person to vouch for them before a new rental arrangement is made. Single women encounter difficulties when renting their own apartment. Living alone is not customary and might be criticised as westernised. Leaving the parental household is only acceptable for women upon marriage.\footnote{Moreover, single young men are particularly disadvantaged in accessing shelter due to stereotypical views of them as drug-takers, potential Al-Shabaab members, or people likely to cause trouble. For people living with disabilities (PLWD) almost no provisions exist regarding housing. Therefore, they are generally entirely reliant on family members for support. Ethnic minorities outside of the clan system, such as so-called Bantu, experience significant discrimination and tensions surrounding security of tenure or evictions.}

### 1.3.2.3 Informal settlements and IDP sites

Bakonyi states that displaced people were mainly living in self-established camps at the fringes of Mogadishu.\footnote{Numbers from 2017 counted 480 informal settlements across Mogadishu, most of them located in the north-western Hodan and Daynile districts. According to World Bank data from 2017 as well as UN-Habitat and the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG), 55\% of IDPs in Mogadishu resided in peripheral settlements, namely in the outskirt districts Daynile and Kahda. In an analysis of their field work carried out in Mogadishu, Bonnet and her colleagues show that housing consisted predominantly of corrugated metal sheet shacks or temporary shelters made of sticks, plastic and fabric (buuls) inhabited by IDPs. Newly established settlements at the peripheries were disconnected from urban infrastructure. It happened that poverty drove also non-IDP residents into informal settlements in Mogadishu because they could 'no longer afford decent housing'.} IDP and poor households in Mogadishu lack lasting tenure security agreements and face increasing difficulties to find locations to settle that do not bear the risk of eviction.\footnote{In IDP camps, the central figure of the ‘camp leader’ or ‘gatekeeper’ (please see section 1.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city) decides who is allowed to settle in the camp, register

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\footnote{Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, url, p. 454}
\footnote{Bretelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Somalia, 2020, url, p. 28}
\footnote{Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 32}
\footnote{IED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, url, pp. 7-8}
\footnote{Bakonyi, J., The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities, 15 October 2020, url, p. 13}
\footnote{Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, url, p. 451}
\footnote{World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, pp. 40-41; UN-Habitat and JPLG, Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning, 2019, url, p. 21}
\footnote{Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 454-455; see also World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, p. 41}
\footnote{Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, url, p. 451}
\footnote{NRC et al., Back to Square One, 12 January 2018, url, p. 11
newcomers and identify the spots where they can set-up huts.283 The CCCM Cluster surveyed 25 IDP sites in Mogadishu’s district Daynile and found that 7% of shelters were durable, 18% transitional, 18% temporary and 57% make-shift.284 Residents were not satisfied (46%) or not at all satisfied (12%) with the public infrastructure in these sites.285 In 2017, IDP settlements already occupied 16% more space than in 2013.286 For more information on IDPs, please see also sections 1.1.2.3 Displacement and humanitarian assistance and 1.4.2.2 Vulnerable groups.

1.3.2.4 Evictions

Without secure land tenure the risk of evictions rises. After their forced eviction many urban IDP residents moved to the cities’ outskirts.287 In May 2021, the NRC reported the eviction of 1,937 households – approximately 11,622 people – from 18 IDP settlements in Garasbaley in the Benadir region. The evicted people relocated to settlements in Igadawage in Daynile district.288 In early 2020, an eviction moratorium was issued in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.289 And, in 2019, new policies regarding the protection of returnees and IDPs against displacement290 as well as land distribution for housing to returnees and IDPs,291 social protection292 and national eviction guidelines293 were adopted.294 Nevertheless, evictions by security forces and private landowners continued in 2020295 — e.g. in December a landlord forcibly evicted nearly 7,000 IDPs from seven settlements in Benadir.296 In 2018, a majority of more than 200,000 people affected by forced evictions in Somalia were from Mogadishu. The Bertelsmann Stiftung reported further that security forces regularly demolished settlements in Mogadishu in 2018.297 Similarly, the NRC found that in Mogadishu 153,682 persons were evicted in 2017, 143,510 in 2016 and 123,421 in 2015. More than 11,000 IDPs were evicted each month between 2015 and 2017.298 In Mogadishu, forced evictions by private actors were mostly executed in order to have clear land that they can develop.299 It happens that, if the value of the land in the camp rises due to its better integration into the city’s networks, the owner might wish to develop or sell the land. In this case the inhabitants will be evicted and have to move again.300 Repeated evictions and little social upward mobility create a circle of displacement and push urban

285 CCCM, Household Satisfaction Surveys - March 2021, 18 March 2021, url, pp. 2, 9
286 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, p. 40
287 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, pp. 40-41
289 USAID, Somalia - Complex Emergency, 8 January 2021, url, p. 3
290 Somalia, Federal government of Somalia, National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 2019, url
293 Somalia, Federal Government of Somalia, National Eviction Guidelines, 2019, url
296 USAID, Somalia - Complex Emergency, 8 January 2021, url, p. 3
298 NRC et al., Back to Square One, 12 January 2018, url, p. 11
poor and IDPs further and further to Mogadishu’s outskirts.\textsuperscript{301} Bakonyi and her co-authors attest the ‘extreme precarity of camp life’ as well as a ‘significant increase of such evictions’ since Mogadishu is characterised by a reconstruction boom after Al-Shabaab was forced to retreat and the (Transitional) Federal Government expanded its control across the city.\textsuperscript{302}

Although, at times also political and military elites conducted land grabs and issued forced evictions.\textsuperscript{303} This generated ‘significant intra-city migration flows between three of the most densely IDP-populated areas of Mogadishu (Kaxda, Hodan and Daynile) and the city centre (Dharkenley)’.\textsuperscript{304}

1.3.3 Hygiene, water and sanitation

In December 2017, the World Bank assessed deprivation of households considering dimensions of education, water, sanitation, electricity and monetary poverty.\textsuperscript{305} The study showed that 67% of households in Mogadishu had access to improved sanitation\textsuperscript{306}. This number corresponds with other urban areas in Somalia.\textsuperscript{307}

According to UNOCHA, the immediate access to the port of Mogadishu ensures regular supply of humanitarian WASH support. Therefore, Mogadishu experienced only minimum supply issues in 2020.\textsuperscript{308} RedSS, DRC and NRC reported in 2017 that 126 boreholes in Mogadishu were privately owned. There, water was sold at a price ranging from 0.8 to 1.5 US dollars per cubic metre. Additionally, 12 privately run shallow wells existed. In the IDP settlements KM13-15 Sarkust, Tabalaha Sheik Ibraheem, Jacadda Shabelle and Waydow, water was provided for free by humanitarian organisations.\textsuperscript{309} Additionally, there were 600 water wells in Mogadishu, but no standards or regulatory bodies involved.\textsuperscript{310}

According to the WASH Cluster Somalia, the average price of water was 0.3 US dollars per barrel (200 litres) as of 25 May 2021. In most districts in Benadir under their assessment there have not been significant price changes since February 2021.\textsuperscript{311} In 2017, the World Bank assessed that only 2% of households lacked access to water and even 96% of households had access to piped water at home. The assessment concluded that Mogadishu was least deprived in access to improved drinking water, by comparison to other parts of the country. Where no water pipes were installed, alternative sources


\textsuperscript{305} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31054}, pp. 32-33.

\textsuperscript{306} ‘Access to improved sanitation refers to those facilities that are not shared, and are likely to ensure hygienic separation of human excreta from human contact. They include flush/pour flush (to piped sewer system, septic tank, pit latrine), ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine, pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet.’ World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31054}, p. 28, footnote 51.


35
for drinking water were boreholes and water trucks.  

312 Water trucking mainly serves outskirts and IDP camps, but also in these places access to piped water is increasingly available through tanks from where residents can buy water.  

313 In July 2019, REACH inquired about coping strategies of people in case of water shortages during dry season. Although relocating was stated in other cities, informants in Benadir, as well as people belonging to ethnic minorities and people living with disabilities (PLWDs), did not mention it. Among the instances which would cause water shortages were, according to the informants, aid shortages. Aid shortages reportedly affected residents in Mogadishu in particular.  

314 Regarding access to water in IDPs settlements, Bakonyi experienced a different picture of IDP sites in Mogadishu lacking access to piped water. Rather, they rely on water kiosks, thus on tanks, wells or pipes established in their neighbourhood, where they can buy water from the people owning or managing the kiosks.  

315 ReDSS pointed out that access to water, sanitation and level of hygiene was not adequate in IDP settlements and that for IDPs it was difficult and expensive to access water.  

316 In Mogadishu, 50% of the privately sold piped water supplied corrugated iron sheet houses, 40% villas and 10% multi-storey concrete buildings. IDP settlements were served by water tankers.  

317 IDPs and residents of informal settlements have greater difficulties accessing clean water and are less likely to have access to sanitary or latrine facilities, which are often lacking in informal settlements. Besides, water is less affordable to IDPs.  

318 Water transport to IDP settlements is provided by tankers.  

319 IOM reported in February 2021 the installation of a new solar powered water borehole in the Helwa IDP site in Mogadishu that will serve 4 200 people.  

320 In May 2021, a number of newly evicted IDP households did not have access to clean water at their new location in Daynil and had to buy water at a fee of 1 000 Somali shillings [1.7 US dollars] per 20 litre jerrycan.  

An overview of the severity of WASH needs in IDP-hosting districts from September 2018 to January 2019 provided by REACH showed ‘critical’ needs in Mogadishu’s districts Abdulaziz, Hawl Wadaag, Hodan, Waaber and Wardhigley. In the 12 other districts the severity of WASH needs was ‘high’.  

322 With regard to sanitation, the majority of IDPs used either ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP), pit latrine with slab, or pit latrine without slab (91%). In Mogadishu, 1% of the population, probably IDPs, had no access to toilets but used open defecation.  

323 In December 2020, shelters, latrines and water distribution points in seven settlements in Benadir were reportedly destroyed by a landlord, who forcibly evicted nearly 7 000 IDPs. According to USAID, this incident put the evicted IDPs in urgent need of shelter and WASH support.  

324 The 1 937 households reportedly evicted in May 2021 (see

312 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, [url], pp. 33, 38-39  
313 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021  
315 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021  
316 ReDSS et al., Durable Solutions Framework – Local Integration Focus: Benadir Region, Somalia, March 2017, [url], p. 27; ReDSS, Somalia: Solutions Analysis Update 2019, 2019, [url], p. 53  
317 Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, [url], p. 453  
318 ReDSS et al., Durable Solutions Framework – Local Integration Focus: Benadir Region, Somalia, March 2017, [url], p. 30; ReDSS, Somalia: Solutions Analysis Update 2019, 2019, [url], p. 53; Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, [url], pp. 451, 458  
319 Bonnet, C. et al., Inclusive Shelter Provision in Mogadishu, 28 July 2020, [url], p. 453  
320 IOM, IOM Somalia: External Updates January & February 2021, 19 April 2021, [url], p. 9  
321 NRC and IOM Somalia Protection Cluster, Rapid Assessment Report – Garasbaley Evictions, 30 May 2021, [url], p. 5  
323 ReDSS et al., Durable Solutions Framework – Local Integration Focus: Benadir Region, Somalia, March 2017, [url], p. 27  
324 USAID, Somalia - Complex Emergency, 8 January 2021, [url], p. 3
above, section 1.3.2.4 Evictions) from 18 IDP settlements in Garasbaley lacked any WASH facilities and latrines at their new settlements in Igadawage in Daynil district. At the previous site, 79 latrines had existed.325

Floods compromised sanitation and increased the number of cholera cases.326 In times of droughts less water for hygiene and sanitation was available and water contamination increased.327 According to the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), poor water management in Benadir was another reason for the outbreak of diseases in 2019 and before.328 The WHO reported in May 2021 that a current cholera outbreak with active transmissions in the Benadir region started in December 2017 following floods. Flash floods in April 2020 led to the contamination of water sources, which resulted in an increase in cholera cases. In 2021, the highest attack rate of cholera was reported from the districts of Danyile, Madina, and Dharkenly and the majority of deaths were reported in Benadir.329

1.3.4 Health care

According to a baseline survey of the Somali healthcare system published in May 2020, the essential health workforce (medical doctors, nurses and midwives) per 1 000 population in Somalia in 2017 was 0.4, the health facility density per 10 000 population was 1.69.330

While most of Somalia’s health facilities are located in larger cities including Mogadishu331, experts have described the healthcare situation in the capital as ‘worrisome’332 or even absolutely insufficient.333 Markus Hoehne estimated that the six largest hospitals in Mogadishu each have a capacity of between 25 and 200 beds, except for the public Benadir Hospital334, which has 500 beds.335

326 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic-Prone Diseases: Outbreak Update Cholera in Somalia, 7 March 2021, 23 March 2021, url
327 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, p. xxii
328 ReDSS, Somalia: Solutions Analysis Update 2019, 2019, url, p. 53
329 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic-Prone Diseases: Outbreak Update Cholera in Somalia, 7 March 2021, 23 March 2021, url
331 Denmark, DIS, Somalia Health System, November 2020, url, p. 24
333 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer-innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi [source: Jutta Bakonyi]], 31 May 2021, url, p. 28
334 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholabusus [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehne]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url
335 Denmark, DIS, Somalia Health System, November 2020, url, p. 46
This signifies that there are no more than 1,000 to 1,200 beds for the city’s population estimated at 1.7 and 2.6 million. Many Mogadishu residents are therefore unable to access medical care.\textsuperscript{336}

According to findings from studies commissioned by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) on four Somali cities including Mogadishu,\textsuperscript{339} hospitals are operated by ‘Somali health authorities, international NGOs, UN or in collaboration with other national governments (e.g. Turkey).\textsuperscript{340} A director of an international organisation was quoted by the Finnish Immigration Service as saying that medical services available in Mogadishu are of ‘poor quality’ both in the public and the private sectors. Although basic drugs are available, their proper storage is difficult and people ‘keep dying’ from normally easily treatable diseases such as measles, malaria or cholera. Dialysis treatment and ultrasound examinations, for example, are unavailable in the city.\textsuperscript{341}

According to a qualitative study conducted in Mogadishu and published in 2017, the ‘private healthcare system is the dominant health care system in Mogadishu’.\textsuperscript{342} The DIS referred to the Federal Ministry of Health, according to which “the private health care sector’s dominance is due to better capacity, service delivery, diagnostic equipment and experience of staff.”\textsuperscript{343} According to the May 2020 baseline survey of the Somali healthcare system, there were 61 public health facilities in Benadir in 2019 and 1,279 confirmed private health care facilities in south central Somalia in 2018.\textsuperscript{344}

According to UNHCR, public hospitals quite often have to send their patients to private facilities because they lack necessary equipment and expertise.\textsuperscript{345} The public Benadir Hospital, a facility specialised in maternal medicine and paediatrics,\textsuperscript{346} reportedly (according to its director) has good equipment but it performs mostly only basic surgeries and no advanced treatments such as cancer treatment.\textsuperscript{347} Its treatments, which also include HIV therapy, have been reported to be generally free of charge.\textsuperscript{348} While healthcare in Somalia is generally not free of charge, Hoehe noted that services in public hospitals are mostly cheaper than in the private healthcare sector. According to local physicians he interviewed in January 2020 and April 2021, inpatient treatment in a public facility costs at least 5 USD per bed and night. Additionally, patients have to pay for food. In large public hospitals

\textsuperscript{336} ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholabusus [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehe]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url

\textsuperscript{337} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 74

\textsuperscript{338} ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholabusus [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehe]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url

\textsuperscript{339} The other three cities covered in these studies are Kismayo, Baardheere and Beled Weyne.

\textsuperscript{340} Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, p. 24

\textsuperscript{341} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 31

\textsuperscript{342} Gele, A. A. et al., Beneficiaries of conflict: a qualitative study of people’s trust in the private health care system in Mogadishu, Somalia, 2017, url, p. 127

\textsuperscript{343} Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, p. 26

\textsuperscript{344} Heritage Institute and City University of Mogadishu, Somalia’s Healthcare System: A Baseline Study & Human Capital Development Strategy, May 2020, url, pp. 41, 15

\textsuperscript{345} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 31

\textsuperscript{346} Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, p. 46

\textsuperscript{347} Finland, FIS, Somalia, Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, January 2018, 5 October 2018, url, p. 35

\textsuperscript{348} Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, p. 46
like Mogadishu’s Madina Hospital, there are no extra charges for surgeries, but laboratory tests are often charged. If drugs are available, they are distributed free of charge.**349**

While private healthcare facilities provide specialised and, at times, advanced treatment, several sources have emphasised that the health sector is highly unregulated and that the types of services and their quality are unknown.**350** A government source added that clinics are big business in Mogadishu and people from Somalia and other countries open private clinics. The source added that their qualification is not checked and they often lack equipment and are not able to do complicated procedures.**351** According to UNHCR, patients in private healthcare centres are obliged to pay for treatment.**352** Hoehe noted that in private healthcare facilities, patients have to pay for their surgeries, quoting local doctors as saying that for a small outpatient surgery (such as removal of an ulcer from the hand) the patient is charged approx. 50 USD, in addition to a 5–10 USD admission fee and some 30 USD for post-treatment with medicines.**353** Balonyi added that ‘pharmacies and private practices charge for medication.’**354** According to findings from a study published in 2017, the cost of private healthcare was unaffordable for a large part of the population.**355**

Funding for the healthcare sector (just like the delivery of healthcare) has been described as ‘fragmented’.**356** The majority of funding comes from international donors and is ‘channeled directly to healthcare providers through a patchwork of projects and instruments, rather than through government systems and budgets.’**357** The assistance ‘is mostly managed and distributed according to donor priorities and does not necessarily match the needs of the Somali health authorities.’ The spending of the Somali government on health in 2017, 2018 and 2019 ‘amounted to less than five percent of the total health sector expenditure’.**358** A 2020 study for which representatives of government, UN agencies, NGOs, and health facility staff were interviewed noted that the ‘health system was primarily funded through donors including the US government, the European Commission, and the governments of the UK, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey and Qatar’. The respondents added that ‘these donors played an important role in determining what health services were provided’.**359** According to a government source, Turkey has invested in three hospitals. They are all privately managed, have comparatively good standards but are very expensive, allegedly the most expensive...

**349** ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholausursachen [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehe]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url...

**350** Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, pp. 26-27

**351** Balonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021

**352** Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 31

**353** ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholausursachen [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehe]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url; see also Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, January 2018 [Director of a hospital in Mogadishu], 5 October 2018 url, p. 35

**354** Balonyi, J., telephone interview, 7 July 2021


**356** WHO, Somalia: building a stronger primary health care system, 15 September 2020, url

**357** OD, Beyond the pandemic: strengthening Somalia’s health system, 7 October 2020, url

**358** Heritage Institute and City University of Mogadishu, Somalia’s Healthcare System: A Baseline Study & Human Capital Development Strategy, May 2020, url, p. 15

**359** Ahmed, Z. et al., Understanding the factors affecting the humanitarian health and nutrition response for women and children in Somalia since 2000: a case study, 27 May 2020, url, p. 8
hospitals in Mogadishu. The source believes that Qatar has invested in one hospital and knows that Kuwait has invested in another hospital (which also treats COVID-19). Another donor are the Emirates. Italy has not opened any hospitals, but the Italian government finances health programmes throughout Somalia. Among the programmes are Mother and Child clinics, donating drugs/equipment to hospitals, and supporting the Ministry of Health and general health institution building in Mogadishu and the Federal Member States.360

An assessment conducted in September 2020 found that ‘severe access barriers to basic health services’ contributed to high morbidity and death rates among some IDP populations in Mogadishu.361 As for the treatment prospects for persons with mental disorders, it has been noted that there is a ‘particularly acute’ shortage of mental health specialists.362 According to estimates by local doctors, there are only about 15 psychiatrists across the country. In a few larger cities including Mogadishu, hospitals have psychiatric wards, although their capacity is very limited.363 It has been noted that there are no institutions authorised to verify the qualifications of hospital staff working in mental healthcare.364

While it has been noted that minority groups such as the Bantu, Tumaal, Rehamar/Benadiri and Madhibani suffer from exclusion, rights violations and lack of protection365 (for further information, please sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles, the researchers of local studies commissioned by the Danish Immigration Service reportedly ‘did not observe signs of clan-based discrimination in any of waiting rooms’ of health facilities included in their research sample. The DIS referred to several sources emphasising that there is no clan-based discrimination with regard to access to healthcare.366 Another report quoted the director of the Keysaney hospital, a facility run by the Somali Red Crescent (with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC), as saying that the hospital ‘admits all patients regardless of their clan, religion or political affiliations’.367

Displaced persons and humanitarian workers interviewed in IDP camps in three districts in the Mogadishu area stated that IDP’s access to healthcare is limited. Moreover, healthcare services have been scaled down by nearly half as a result of night-time curfews and other restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic (including measures to limit crowding in clinics).368 Mobile health services serve some outskirt camps on weekly or bi-weekly basis, but neither these services nor diagnosis or medication are regular. Many people interviewed by Bakonyi and her team in IDP camps had underlying health issues, such as diabetes or kidney stones, but either did not receive treatment or

360 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
361 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 37
363 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholabusus [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehne]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url
364 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung; Behandlungsmöglichkeiten von Alkoholabusus [Query response on Somalia: Situation of persons with mental illness; access to treatments for the mental ill; situation and risks facing persons addicted to alcohol; treatments for alcohol abuse [source: Markus Hoehne]], a-11559, 19 April 2021, url
365 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 4
366 Denmark, DIS, Somalia – Health System, November 2020, url, p. 31
367 IRC, Somalia: 28 years of providing health care in Mogadishu, 17 February 2020, url
368 AI, Somalia: Internally displaced people surviving by “the grace of God” amidst COVID-19, 21 July 2020, url
received medication only on an irregular basis, either because it was not available or people were unable to pay for it.  

Regarding the COVID-19 situation, in March 2020, the first wave of the pandemic reached Somalia. In the same month the Federal Ministry of Health (MoH) developed a ‘national contingency plan for preparedness and response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)’ for Somalia with the support of the WHO and other international organisations, which allocated an almost 5 million US Dollars-fund for the development and rehabilitation of nationwide healthcare facilities. Mogadishu was one of only a few places were a COVID-19 response was rolled out. UN agencies and cluster partners provided additional funding as outlined in their ‘Somalia Country Preparedness and Response Plan (CPRP) COVID-19’. The government established a national response committee and an incident management system. Mogadishu accounted for over a third of all COVID-19 cases reported in Somalia between March and November 2020. It has been reported that in March 2021, the country received a first batch of COVID-19 vaccines and launched the vaccination rollout in Mogadishu. As Bakonyi noted most recently with reference to a Somali government official, a total of 500,000 doses has been delivered to Somalia from the United Kingdom and China. By late April, a total of 121,743 people in Somalia [had] received their first doses of the Oxford Astra-Zeneca vaccine. There was a lack of hospitals treating COVID-19 patients. A May 2020 report cited Mogadishu’s De Martino Hospital as the only facility dedicated to the treatment of COVID-19 cases. In addition, a lack of medical equipment prevails, as BBC News reported in June 2021. The article quoted Dr Ubah Farah Ahmed, director of the family health department at Somalia’s health ministry, saying that ‘no government-run hospitals have oxygen plants. Only three private hospitals in the capital, Mogadishu, have them.’ A 2021 report noted that according to some sources, free COVID-19 testing is offered by the De Martino hospital in Mogadishu. Other sources complained about ‘a lack of testing facilities, or a refusal to test.’ Displaced persons and humanitarian workers interviewed in IDP camps in three districts in the Mogadishu area stated that there were no COVID-19 testing facilities within IDP camps.

1.3.5 Education for children

In principle, children’s education is free and compulsory. Although, school attendance is not enforced. Article 30 (1-2) of the Provisional Constitution grants free primary and secondary

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369 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
370 UN Somalia, UN Country Results Report: Somalia 2020, March 2021, p. 5
374 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview - Somalia, 9 March 2021, p. 22
376 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
377 UN OCHA, Somalia - Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2021, 11 May 2021, p. 4
379 BBC News, African Covid patients ‘dying from lack of oxygen’, 16 June 2021
381 AI, Somalia: Internally displaced people surviving by “the grace of God” amidst COVID-19, 21 July 2020
382 AACRAO, Somalia, n.d.
education as a basic right of all Somali citizens.³³³ Under Farmajo’s presidency, the Ministry of Education has taken on and unified the development of school curricula and the administration of exams.³³⁴ The (USDOS) reported that a new national curriculum framework was under development in 2020,³³⁵ which was still underway in March 2021.³³⁶ Therein, the Federal Government of Somalia highlighted the importance of ‘secular education with a focus on Islamic values and instruction in Somali’ in order to ‘counter efforts by the terrorist group al-Shabaab to impose a strict version of Islamic law’. The curriculum declared ‘Somalia as the language of instruction for primary school, Islamic religious instruction at all levels, and Arabic-language Islamic religion courses at the secondary level.’³³⁷ Before, the educational system in Benadir was characterised by a ‘curriculum chaos’ and an inconsistent ‘language policy’ in formal basic schooling.³³⁸

1.3.5.1 Public establishments

Primary education includes dugsi hoose (primary school), which covers the first four years of education beginning at the age of six, followed by four years of dugsi dhexe (intermediate school). Secondary education is differentiated between vocational secondary school (two years), dugsi sare (general secondary school) and technical secondary school (both four years).³³⁹ In interviews, Bakonyi reported an amount of about 10 US dollars per month for public primary education in Mogadishu.³⁴⁰ According to informants to the Finnish fact-finding mission, the few public schools charged fees ranging from 15 to 25 US dollars for part-time to 40 to 50 US dollars for full-time per month.³⁴¹

1.3.5.2 Confessional or private school

Education in urban areas is primarily provided by various non-state actors.³⁴² Most children access education through confessional schools. Previously, the leading provider of private education was FPENS (Formal Private Education Network in Somalia), an umbrella organization formed by Islamic charities.³⁴³ Since the integration of the education into the ministry’s control, FPENS has lost influence.³⁴⁴

In addition to the secular school system, many madrasas (Islamic schools) in Somali called dugsi Quran³⁴⁵ (Quran school) exist in Mogadishu, and they play an important role. Most people try to send their children to both secular and Islamic schools. Those, who cannot afford secular schools, rather send their children to madrasas. For madrasas fees apply as well, but they are usually lower and teachers tend to be ‘more lenient’ and children will not be expelled immediately if the parents cannot pay the amount. Generally, there is a lenient attitude to a varying degree in other schools as well depending on the location and the teachers.³⁴⁶

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³³³ Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, [url]. Article 30 (1-2); World Bank (The), Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project (P172434), 10 March 2021, [url], p. 4
³³⁴ Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
³³⁶ World Bank (The), Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project (P172434), 10 March 2021, [url], p. 4
³³⁹ AAFRAO, Somalia, n.d., [url]
³⁴⁰ Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
³⁴¹ Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url], p. 31
³⁴² World Bank (The), Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project (P172434), 10 March 2021, [url], p. 5
³⁴⁴ Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
³⁴⁵ Some sources refer to the Somali madrasa or Quran school simply as dugsi.
³⁴⁶ Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
In March 2021, the World Bank reported that in Benadir, more than 90% of all enrolled students were enrolled in non-state schools.\textsuperscript{397} In March 2020, UNHCR told the Finnish fact-finding mission that 220 of the 250 schools and educational institutions in Mogadishu were private for which monthly fees between 5 and 500 US dollars applied—uniforms and materials not included.\textsuperscript{398}

1.3.5.3 Role of local, community-led and international organisations

Since the decay of the state in 1991, education in Somalia is privatised and most educational initiatives are supported by international organisations.\textsuperscript{399} In Mogadishu, many primary schools have been founded and financed by international organisations. There, enrolment was free at first, but uniforms and materials were not included. Later, private operators\textsuperscript{400} or Islamic charities\textsuperscript{401} took over and charged school attendance fees in order to maintain them.\textsuperscript{402}

1.3.5.4 Enrolment and attendance

In primary schools, the net attendance ratio (NAR)\textsuperscript{403} was 19.7% for boys and 17.2% for girls; at the secondary level, the NAR was 10.6% for boys and 7.9% for girls.\textsuperscript{404} The NAR, literacy and enrolment rates were higher in urban than in rural areas but very low among nomadic households.\textsuperscript{405} The gross attendance ration (GAR)\textsuperscript{406} was 28.6% for boys and 25.2% for girls in primary education; at the secondary level, it was 28.1% for boys and 19.6% for girls. These countrywide figures showed a small gender imbalance at the primary level and a greater gender imbalance at the secondary level.\textsuperscript{407}

Oxfam and SSWC (Save Somali Women and Children) in 2021 presented data on primary enrolment in Benadir of 90.3%, the highest rate in South Central Somalia.\textsuperscript{408} Refugees International, however, claimed in December 2019 that only 30% of IDP children attended school.\textsuperscript{409} Such numbers are often contradicting each other if one assumes that 500 000 IDPs live in Mogadishu, and a large percentage of the population in Mogadishu is considered poor.\textsuperscript{410} A development organisation operating in Somalia told the Finnish fact-finding mission in March 2020 that many low-income families could not afford education for their children.\textsuperscript{411} According to a document published by the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development presumably in 2019, enrolment of children aged 6-13 ranked

\begin{footnotes}
397 World Bank (The), Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project (P172434), 10 March 2021, \url{url}, p. 5
398 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 31
399 GPE, Somalia, 30 May 2021, \url{url}; Gonnelli, M., The Italephone Somali Diaspora and Social Change in Somalia, PhD Thesis, 27 November 2018, \url{url}, p. 75
400 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
402 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
403 NAR = the proportion of children at school age attending school (6-13 for primary school, 14-17 for secondary school), see Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, \url{url}, p. 24
404 Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, \url{url}, p. 25
405 World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 38; Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, \url{url}, p. 25
406 GAR = the total number of school students relative to the official school-age population, see Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, \url{url}, p. 24
407 Somalia and UNFPA, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020, April 2020, \url{url}, p. 25
408 Oxfam and SSWC, Gender Gap Assessment - South Central Somalia and Puntland, 11 January 2021, \url{url}, p. 41
409 Refugees International, Durable Solutions in South Central Somalia: Moving from Policies to Practice for IDPs in Mogadishu, December 2019, \url{url}, p. 15
410 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
411 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 32
\end{footnotes}
at 60 %\textsuperscript{412} and World Bank assessment from 2019 showed that satisfaction with primary education was at 95 % in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{413}

In 2018, out of a sample of 1 349 learners enrolled at the primary level in Benadir, 739 were boys and 610 were girls. The attendance rate in relation to the numbers of enrolments was particularly low in Benadir with 61 % (70 % boys and 51 % girls). Computed numbers of enrolled learners with physical disabilities were 0.07 % of the total enrolment rate at primary level in Benadir. All of them were boys. The same figures applied for hearing and visually impaired learners. 36 % of displaced boys and 30 % of displaced girls participated in an integration programme at primary level. In four surveyed primary schools in Benadir, the number of children per classroom were 36 on average. In only one out of the four schools, classroom furniture was adequate.\textsuperscript{414}

Benadir had the second highest secondary enrolment rate in South Central Somalia and Puntland. When asked about the reasons why their children did not attend secondary school, 83.3 % of the responding parents in Puntland and South Central Somalia told Oxfam and SSWC they had no money to send them to school.\textsuperscript{415} Despite the constitutional declaration, fees apply for all secondary schools, and only few of the operate in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{416}

\subsection{1.3.5.5 Teaching quality}
In September 2020, secondary schools in Mogadishu reported massive failure in the national examination. In response, the Education Minister Goddaah Barre spoke of poor quality of tutors.\textsuperscript{417} The World Bank noted in March 2021 that Benadir had among the lowest number of qualified primary teachers. Results of an assessment of teachers in Benadir in 2019 showed that they lacked both pedagogical skills and content knowledge.\textsuperscript{418}

\subsection{1.3.5.6 School closures}
Children’s education was disrupted by school closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 with partial reopenings for examinations in July 2020.\textsuperscript{419} Alternative learning platforms were implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of Education at the Federal level and member states, and safe return to school campaigns were undertaken together with education stakeholders across the country.\textsuperscript{420} A teacher in Mogadishu said that children had no access to online classes for primary and secondary education during the time of the school closure.\textsuperscript{421} In June 2021, Save the Children reported that the number of enrolled children in Mogadishu had decreased by 17.3 % compared to the time before the school closures.\textsuperscript{422} The organisation conducted interviews with school children’s

\textsuperscript{412} Somalia, MoPED, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia, (2019), url, p. 262
\textsuperscript{413} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, url, p. 39
\textsuperscript{414} Wafula, C. and Mulongo, G., Are Children in South and Central Somalia Accessing Education, and Are They Learning? Baseline Information, 2020, url, pp. 4-7
\textsuperscript{415} Oxfam and SSWC, Gender Gap Assessment - South Central Somalia and Puntland, 11 January 2021, url, pp. 42-43
\textsuperscript{416} Bakiyoni, J., communication, 7 July 2021
\textsuperscript{417} East African (The), Mass exam failure stirs up a storm in Somalia, 9 September 2020, url
\textsuperscript{418} World Bank (The), Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project (P172434), 10 March 2021, url, p. 7; see also Gonnelli, M., The Italo-phone Somali Diaspora and Social Change in Somalia, PhD Thesis, 27 November 2018, url, p. 76
\textsuperscript{420} Save the Children, Somalia: Coronavirus, conflict and climate crisis prevent children return to learning, Save the Children warns, 1 June 2021, url
\textsuperscript{421} Herring, E. et al., COVID-19 Responses and Education in Somalia/Somaliland, 20 October 2020, url, p. 209
\textsuperscript{422} Save the Children, Schools Must be Open, Accessible and Safe from Attacks, Say African Children, 16 June 2021, url, footnote ii
parents. 71% of the parents told them that they feared their children would catch the COVID-19-virus at school and spread it to the family.\textsuperscript{423} Social mobilisation activities by UNICEF in April 2021 resulted in the enrolment of 176 school children in Galgaduud and Benadir.\textsuperscript{424}

In a study co-authored by Eric Herring and others, participants in Mogadishu stated that the vulnerability among children had increased in the context of the school closures due to more time spent at home. Girls, in particular, faced a higher risk of violence and exploitation by their families as well as of being forced into early marriage.\textsuperscript{425} Similarly, Save the Children warned of children’s risk of being forced into child marriage, child labour, or domestic chores when not continuing their education.\textsuperscript{426}

\subsection*{1.3.6 Means of basic subsistence and employment}

In Mogadishu, 64% of households were engaged in wage labour in 2019, according to calculations based on the 2nd Somali High Frequency Survey conducted in 2017.\textsuperscript{427} Sources interviewed for a report on a Finnish fact-finding mission in March 2020 stated that employment opportunities in Mogadishu were ‘limited’ and the best jobs among the few ones on offer were ‘usually taken’.\textsuperscript{428} Reportedly, work opportunities were offered by building sites (wages can be approx. 100 USD per month), the Port of Mogadishu, NGOs, the Somali government and by security forces such as the police and the military.\textsuperscript{429} According to Bakonyi, all following salary data are estimates only. Local sources indicated that people working with the United Nations or international NGOs are better paid and can earn between 1 000 (starting salary) and 5 000 USD, which is why these jobs are in high demand. A member of parliament currently earns 3 500 USD. The salaries of most skilled jobs such as university lecturers, professors and civil servants were estimated to range between 400 and 700 USD (senior level), a teacher earns between 200 and 400 USD per month and a housemaid (full time) between 50 and 70 USD per month.\textsuperscript{430} There were no precise statistics on unemployment, but the figure was estimated to be high.\textsuperscript{431} Public health measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 have severely impacted people’s income and livelihoods.\textsuperscript{432} Regarding the labour situation in the formal sector, a World Bank/UNIDO survey of private businesses across five major cities in Somalia (including Mogadishu) found that the rate of employment dropped by 30% as a result of COVID measures. The World Bank notes that while micro-enterprises (the most common type of formal-sector businesses in Somalia) were generally reported to be ‘less affected [...] compared to large firms’, some 31% of these

\begin{itemize}
\item[423] Save the Children, Somalia: Coronavirus, conflict and climate crisis prevent children return to learning, Save the Children warns, 1 June 2021, \url{url}.
\item[424] UNICEF, Somalia: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4, April 2021, \url{url}, p. 3.
\item[426] Save the Children, Somalia: Coronavirus, conflict and climate crisis prevent children return to learning, Save the Children warns, 1 June 2021, \url{url}.
\item[427] World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 51.
\item[428] Finland, F15, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 32.
\item[429] Finland, F15, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 33.
\item[430] Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021.
\item[431] Finland, F15, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 33.
\end{itemize}
enterprises in Mogadishu had to suspend their activities, and over 90% reported shortfalls in liquidity.\footnote{433}

According to UNOCHA, most poor households in urban centres like Mogadishu (these include IDP households, the non-IDP urban poor and/or migrants from rural areas) have to rely on casual labour to secure an income.\footnote{434} The Finnish fact-finding mission quoted an international organisation as saying that many in Mogadishu lived from small-scale sales at markets or worked at restaurants and tea shops. UNHCR noted that women selling fruit at markets usually earn a maximum of 1-2 USD per day.\footnote{435} A 2020 study on Bajaj drivers in Mogadishu stated that more than 60% of the 400 surveyed respondents said their average income was about 15-20 USD a day.\footnote{436} Vulnerable and uneducated persons are particularly affected by ‘severe lack of access to the labour market in urban settings.”\footnote{437} This situation is compounded by a steady influx of displaced people from the countryside that has resulted in increased competition for urban livelihoods.\footnote{438} Concerning the impact of COVID measures on the informal sector, in a recent qualitative study conducted among IDPs and host population members in Mogadishu (Dayniile district) and Baidoa, respondents emphasised that it was the COVID-related lockdowns, curfews and restrictions on travel (rather than the disease itself) that had the most significant impact on their daily lives, with the studied population described by the authors as being ‘highly dependent on daily wage labour’. Nearly half of the respondents reported that they had lost their incomes and/or their jobs as a result of these measures, although ‘the level to which people were affected economically, depended on the type of livelihood or other daily activity such as education or household responsibilities’.\footnote{439} For example, as reported by the Somalia Public Agenda, small roadside businesses like small cafes or restaurants that used to operate both day and night were affected by the night-time curfews and have lost large numbers of customers. Some have been forced to close. Similarly, curfews and reduced numbers of passengers have affected the city’s important rickshaw (bajaj) business, and ‘many middle-sized hotels have either temporarily closed or reduced their catering capacity’.\footnote{440} According to a 2020 study by IOM and the local research firm Raagsan Consulting in Mogadishu, ‘woman-owned businesses have been especially hard-hit’. Nearly 60% of the female-led businesses surveyed said ‘they had been forced to shut down during the pandemic, with about one third of that group closing permanently.’\footnote{441}

Strategies employed by residents to cope with the drop or loss of income included buying less, living off savings or relying on one’s family network.\footnote{442} Remittances from family members and relatives (though not accessible for most IDPs) have been playing a significant role as a coping mechanism in Somalia.\footnote{443} However, as family members (including those living abroad) were affected by job loss, illness or inability to travel to Somalia during the pandemic, remittances decreased.\footnote{444} According to

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433 World Bank (The), Coronavirus and fragility: The impact of COVID-19 on Somalia’s private sector, 13 January 2021, url
434 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 8
435 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, pp. 33-34
436 SRA, A Closer Look at Bajaj Drivers in Mogadishu-Somalia, 2020, url, p. 4
437 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 8
438 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 23
440 Somalia Public Agenda, The impact of Covid-19 on the informal economy of Mogadishu, 4 June 2020, url
441 IOM, IOM Empowers Women Business Owners in Somalia to Recover from COVID-19 Impact, 12 August 2020, url
443 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 36
444 Braam, D., COVID-19 impact on health and livelihoods in a complex emergency, n.d., url; see also UN-Habitat, EU cash transfer supports unemployed father injured in Mogadishu blast, 3 June 2021, url
conservative estimates, remittances sent to Somalia decreased by almost 50%. A 2021 report noted that remittances, ‘decreased by about 36 % in April [2020]. By September, at least half of people surveyed nationwide reported receiving less remittances.’

1.4 Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups

1.4.1 Clan-based protection

In Mogadishu, the Hawiye clan, and in particular their Abgaal and Habar Gidir subclans are reported as constituting a majority influencing political processes and a significant part of the government forces. Apart from these, most clans (or even all clans) are represented in Mogadishu. The majority of the city’s districts are heterogeneous in terms of clan affiliation, but according to a World Bank report ‘the dominant clans of these districts invoke the right to govern and enjoy most of whatever “rents” accrue from control of the district, such as local taxes, jobs, and contracts.

The Hawiye clans have been campaigning for the creation of a clan-based Benadir Federal Member State (with Mogadishu as its capital), arguing that Hawiye are the only clan family without political representation, but the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has so far rejected these demands according to a 2021 World Bank report. The debate whether Mogadishu should be governed by locally dominant clans like other Federal Member States (FMS) should be considered as capital belonging to all clans, remains undecided at this point. For more details, please see section 7.3.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.

A report by the Finnish Immigration Service states that while there are certain freedoms for people outside the powerful lineages (e.g. regarding freedom of movement), clan networks play a very important role in Mogadishu. The UNHCR confirms this in its assessment that ‘people without strong social networks and financially capable relatives will not be able to access financial support’. It has been noted that if someone wished to engage in business-related activities of any significant scale, this would require the support of the dominant clan groups that wield economic and political power.

Indeed, most of Mogadishu’s districts are treated as the domains of their most numerically and ‘politically dominant sub-clans’, while only few administration heads belong to groups other than

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447 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021; Norway, Landinfo, Sikkerhetsmessige utfordringer i Mogadishu, 15 May 2018, [url], p. 13
448 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url], p. 4
449 Norway, Landinfo, Sikkerhetsmessige utfordringer i Mogadishu, 15 May 2018, [url], pp. 13-14
450 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url], p. 4
451 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, [url], p. 90
452 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, [url], p. 24
453 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url], p. 4
454 UNHCR, UNHCR Somalia Interim Livelihoods Strategy 2021-2022, April 2021, [url], p. 10
455 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, [url], p. 4
456 World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, [url], p. 90
the Abgaal and Habar Gidir and display limited influence.\textsuperscript{457} Clans and their social and political leaders are also involved in the distribution of resources. This, according to a World Bank report, ‘works against the transparent, merit-based, and equitable allocation of resources that serve more marginalized groups’.\textsuperscript{458}

As outlined in EASO’s report \textit{Somalia: Actors} from July 2021, the clan network provides protection and solidarity among its members and members of other clans with whom an arrangement has been concluded, as well as towards closely affiliated individuals outside the clan context.\textsuperscript{459} However, a fact-finding report by the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS) from 2014 stated that the scope of protection was only limited, particularly in Mogadishu, where many districts were generally deemed unsafe. Furthermore, protection for members of minority clans was weaker than for members of strong clans.\textsuperscript{460} Minority groups like the Bantu, Tumaal, Reer Hamar/Benadir, and Madhiban occupy a weak position in society, some are subjected to racist discriminations\textsuperscript{461} or ‘removed from the clan-based support system that gives others a safety net and protection’.\textsuperscript{462} Geographically, most IDPs live clustered in ‘peri-urban areas’, and belong to non-dominant clan groups. They are, therefore, both physically and socially excluded from network-reliant services. Moreover, many IDPs come from rural areas in southern Somalia and lack the skills needed to secure livelihoods in an urban environment, which confines them to low-paid day jobs\textsuperscript{463} or exhausting petty entrepreneurial activities.\textsuperscript{464} Returnees who have been absent for several years with little clan contact may also lack clan support.\textsuperscript{465} Thus, marginalised groups lack financial means and face difficulties when it comes to acquiring land, defending land ownership rights or jobs.\textsuperscript{466} Indeed, it has been reported that people from minority groups have much lower chances of getting a job, even if they are educated and have a university degree and even when it comes to employment in ‘the Somali government or international organisations’.\textsuperscript{467}

Meanwhile, many people from minority groups enter ‘into an alliance with local powerful clans in order to protect themselves against instability and legal infringements’\textsuperscript{468}

Moreover, an expert noted that within the same clan, not every member is treated equally. People may be favoured or disadvantaged based on their wealth, specific patrilineal lineage, gender (men are advantaged in the patrilinear logic) or the morality of their behaviour. For instance, individuals who have suffered rape, committed crimes, consumed drugs or otherwise display fragility may find less support within their family networks or wider society. Thus, while kinship networks allow some people

\textsuperscript{457} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 40
\textsuperscript{459} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 90
\textsuperscript{460} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 11
\textsuperscript{461} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 23
\textsuperscript{462} Bakonyi, J. and Chonka, P., Precarious Labour – Precarious Lives: Photographic Glimpses from Displaced People in Somali Cities, January 2021, \url{url}, p. 205
\textsuperscript{463} NOAS, Persecution and Protection in Somalia: A Fact-Finding Report by NOAS, 2014, \url{url}, pp. 40-41
\textsuperscript{464} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 4
\textsuperscript{465} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 11
\textsuperscript{466} World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 23
\textsuperscript{467} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 42-43
\textsuperscript{468} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 43
\textsuperscript{469} Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, \url{url}, p. 44
(including returnees) to get support, such as borrowing money, finding accommodation and obtain accessing the job market, others may not receive or receive only very little help.\textsuperscript{469}

1.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups

1.4.2.1 Returnees

The majority of returnees from neighbouring countries as well as from the diaspora settle in cities, such as Mogadishu, Kismayo or Baidoa,\textsuperscript{470} with many opting ‘not to return to their areas of origin, preferring to settle in urban areas’.\textsuperscript{471} DIS explained in their report from July 2020 that there were no support structures in place regarding failed asylum seekers returning to Somalia from Europe without a network.\textsuperscript{472} Large numbers of returnees who lack financial means end up in IDP camps where the living conditions are no different than for those internally displaced,\textsuperscript{473} thus with ‘limited access to basic services.’ The urban system is ‘already overburdened due to a lack of funding to cover the needs of a rapidly growing urban population’, according to UNOCHA.\textsuperscript{474} At the same time, some sources outline that returnees educated and trained abroad may come back with a broader set of skills that allows them to access better jobs compared to those who have remained in Somalia. Meanwhile, Bakonyi emphasised that networks of families, neighbours, and friends are highly significant for returnees. The support they may be able to muster depends, among others, on whether a person has maintained social networks (including clan-based networks) and can upon return mobilise help from it. In a similar vein, clan-based networks play a crucial role, which is why most returnees (though not all) settle in areas where they can find members of their own clan.\textsuperscript{475}

1.4.2.2 Vulnerable groups

Endemic insecurity, recurrent violence and climatic shocks have left a large segment of the population vulnerable and with few coping mechanisms. According to a World Bank report, people without access to social safety nets and those who are chronically poor often adopt coping mechanisms that further increase their vulnerability, such as ‘selling or consuming productive assets, incurring debt, taking children out of school, foregoing medical care or reducing the share of meals consumed’.\textsuperscript{476}

IDPs

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\textsuperscript{469} ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehe and Jutta Bakonyi] [source: Markus Hoehe], 31 May 2021, \url{url}, pp. 33-34

\textsuperscript{470} ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehe and Jutta Bakonyi] [source: Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 24; World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 36; see also UN-Habitat and JPLG, Towards Mogadishu: Spatial Strategic Plan, Urban Analyses / Urban Development Challenges / Urban Strategic Planning, 2019, \url{url}, p. 21; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Somalia, 2020, \url{url}, p. 28

\textsuperscript{471} UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview — Somalia, 9 March 2021, \url{url}, p. 44

\textsuperscript{472} Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia: Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees, July 2020, \url{url}, para. 14

\textsuperscript{473} ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehe and Jutta Bakonyi] [source: Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, \url{url}, pp. 24-25, 27

\textsuperscript{474} UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview — Somalia, 9 March 2021, \url{url}, p. 44

\textsuperscript{475} ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehe and Jutta Bakonyi] [source: Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 25

\textsuperscript{476} World Bank (The), Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey, April 2019, \url{url}, p. 105
According to UNOCHA, IDPs ‘have limited livelihood assets and options, and therefore often rely on external humanitarian assistance’, adding that their situation ‘has worsened in the COVID-19 pandemic context with declined remittances, increased food prices, and declined employment and income earning opportunities (particularly in urban areas).’ According to a 2019 report, gatekeepers have ‘established themselves as unavoidable actors in relation to aid delivery to IDPs, positioning themselves as intermediaries between the displaced and external actors, including the local government and the humanitarian community.’ Gatekeepers have been reported as “gatekeepers” organise IDP camps and act as middlepersons between IDPs, humanitarian organisations and landowners. They play a pivotal role in the operation of IDP camps and also provide basic services for a fee (including emergency medical care), albeit ‘usually of very poor quality’, thus ‘fill[ing] a vacuum left by a weak government incapable of meeting those needs, and a humanitarian community limited in its operations by Mogadishu’s prevailing insecurity’. According to a 2019 report, gatekeepers have ‘established themselves as unavoidable actors in relation to aid delivery to IDPs, positioning themselves as intermediaries between the displaced and external actors, including the local government and the humanitarian community.’ Gatekeepers have thus been criticised as being criminal and abusive, preventing humanitarian organisations from directly accessing IDPs, but others have also noted that gatekeepers may ‘care deeply about the well-being’ of the camp inhabitants or at least support the IDPs initial settlement and ability to navigate the city.

For more information on IDPs, please see sections 1.2.3 Displacement and humanitarian assistance, 1.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city and 1.3.2.3 Informal settlements and IDP sites.

Persons with disabilities

According to UNOCHA, ‘persons with disabilities are often excluded from humanitarian assistance either due to exploitation, pre-existing discrimination and stigma or due to a lack of adequate consideration’. A representative of an organisation for the rights of disabled persons in Somalia stated that international aid does often not reach Somalia’s disabled community and that ‘the UN and the international agencies don’t give much priority and attention’ to persons with disabilities.

477 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, Somalia, 15 February 2021, p. 22
478 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Somalia, 9 March 2021, p. 23
480 TNH, Somalia’s displacement camp ‘gatekeepers’ – ‘parasites’ or aid partners?, 18 July 2019, url
481 IED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, p. 5
482 TNH, Somalia’s displacement camp ‘gatekeepers’ – ‘parasites’ or aid partners?, 18 July 2019, url
483 IED et al., Access to shelter and services for low-income groups: lessons from Hawassa, Mogadishu and Nairobi on the politics of informal settlements and shelter access, October 2019, p. 5
484 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage: Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrerinnen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi] [source: Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, pp. 19-20
485 Bakonyi, J., Communication, 7 July 2021
486 TNH, Somalia’s displacement camp ‘gatekeepers’ – ‘parasites’ or aid partners?, 18 July 2019, url
487 Bakonyi, J., Communication, 7 July 2021
488 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, Somalia, 15 February 2021, p. 20
489 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Mogadischu: Informationen zu Repressalien, Diskriminierung oder sonstiger Ausgrenzung gegenüber körperlich behinderten Personen; gesundheitliche Unterstützung für körperlich behinderte...
Moreover, the source adds, ‘exclusion leads disabled to falls further into chronic poverty with little opportunity of breaking out of the cycle. When the main family breadwinner becomes disabled the whole households risks sliding more deeply into poverty.’ The COVID-19 pandemic, with its impact on an ‘already fragile’ healthcare system and socio-economic welfare mechanisms has further exacerbated the pre-existing dire situation of vulnerable groups.

Women and girls

While women are not per se vulnerable, they are generally disadvantaged in the patriarchal social set up of Somalia and thus, they are more likely to become vulnerable than men. Gender disparities in education, the social obligation towards unpaid care-work, the increased risk of women to become victims of gender-based and domestic violence and their exclusion from (political) decision making contribute to their overall increased vulnerability. The gendered division of labour can force women from poor urban households to take on jobs or to engage in entrepreneurial activities that bear a high risk of exploitation and even violence. It limits participation of women in better paid socio-economic activities and, in case of divorce or death of male partners, makes women more prone to poverty and precarity. The unequal access to inheritance and land ownership additionally increases their dependence on male family members and partners. DIS and DRC in a report on a fact-finding mission conducted in December 2017 cite an anonymous source as saying that ‘the situation is particularly dire for single women without a clan network and women who are internally displaced. The existence of a clan network can offer an individual, including a single woman, a level of protection.’ The same source adds that in Mogadishu, single women without a network are particularly vulnerable to violence and that the situation in IDP camps makes them even more vulnerable to SGBV (Sexual and Gender Based Violence). According to a 2019 report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the lack of protection in combination with the patriarchal system results in discrimination and exclusion of single women. According to Bakonyi, the position of women who are divorced or widowed depends on their social and economic situation, and to some extent on them and their children’s’ clan affiliation (children belong to the clan of the father) and the support network they can mobilise. Male family members (fathers, brothers of the father) are often favoured when it comes to custody of children and inheritance (here brother of the women). Single women (unmarried, not divorced, without children) usually live with their families or, if they shift

Personen seitens staatlicher oder privater Einrichtungen sowie seitens NGOs [Query response on reprisals, discrimination or other marginalization against physically disabled people; Health support for physically handicapped people from state or private institutions as well as from NGOs], a:11388-2 (11389), 16 October 2020, url.
490 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Mogadischu: Informationen zu Repressalien, Diskriminierung oder sonstiger Ausgrenzung gegenüber körperlich behinderten Personen; gesundheitliche Unterstützung für körperlich behinderte Personen seitens staatlicher oder privater Einrichtungen sowie seitens NGOs [Query response on reprisals, discrimination or other marginalization against physically disabled people; Health support for physically handicapped people from state or private institutions as well as from NGOs], a:11388-2 (11389), 16 October 2020, url.
492 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021; USDOs, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
493 Bakonyi, J., communication, 7 July 2021
494 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia - Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, 8 March 2017, url, p. 54; see also Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifas Report, Somalia: the position of women in the clan system, 27 April 2018, url, p. 13
495 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia - Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, 8 March 2017, url, p. 55; see also USDOs, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 30-31
towns, with other relatives. Their social position and vulnerability depends on their families social and economic standing, and on their education and occupation. 497

For more information on women without a support network in Somalia, please see section 2.5. of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (September 2021).

2. Garowe

2.1 Garowe’s overview

Garowe city (sometimes written ‘Garoowe’) is located in the Garowe district, one of the four districts of the Nugaal region, which lies in the Nugaaleed Valley (sometimes referred to as Nogal or Nugal Valley), in Puntland, a federal member state of Somalia situated to the north-east of the country. Puntland borders Ethiopia to the southwest, the Indian Ocean to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the North, Somaliland to the northwest (disputed border area) and the Galmudug state of Somalia to the south (disputed border). 498

Garowe city is located between two riverbeds which are dry except for the rainy seasons (Deyr from October to November and Gu from April to June). Garowe’s climate is arid. 499

After Bosasso and Galkayo (also Galkayo), Garowe is the third-largest city in Puntland and the administrative capital of the self-declared autonomous state (since 1998) of Puntland. 500 The executive, parliamentary and judiciary branches of the state are based in Garowe. 501

In January 2019, Said Abdullahi Deni and Ahmed Elmi Karash were elected respectively as President and Vice-President of Puntland. 502 Since the end of August 2018, Ahmed Said Muse holds the position of mayor of Garowe. 503

2.1.1 Demographics and clan composition

2.1.1.1 Puntland

Since the establishment of Puntland as an autonomous region in 1998, Garowe’s population significantly increased. 504 In 2012, Puntland became the first federal member state of Somalia. 505

497 Balonyi, I., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
500 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 6; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Puntland, nd., url; KAALO and OXFAM, Gender Analysis of the Impact of Recent Humanitarian Crises on Women, Men, Girls, and Boys in Puntland State in Somalia, April 2021, url, p. 10; BBC News, Puntland profile, 11 March 2019, url; Strøm Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, url, p. 3
501 UN Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 6; see also Strøm Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, url, p. 3
502 UNSOM, UNSOM Congratulates Said Abdullahi Deni on Election as President of Puntland, 9 January 2019, url; VOA, Somalia’s Puntland Region Elects New President, 8 January 2019, url
503 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 66
504 Strøm Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, url, p. 3
The Puntland government estimated its population at 2.4 million in 2003\textsuperscript{506} and at 4.3 million in 2016\textsuperscript{507}. Puntland’s population is the densest in urban areas such as Bosasso, Galkacyo, and the capital, Garowe.\textsuperscript{508} However, in a 2017 research paper, social scientist Strøh Varming cautions that in the Somali territories, census ‘have been scarce and highly disputed since the 1980s, and therefore reliable figures are hard to come by’.\textsuperscript{509}

According to Strøh Varming, Puntland’s growth in the last decades is due in part to people from the Darood-Majeerteen clans returning ‘from Mogadishu and other urban areas in south Somalia to their “original” clan territories in Puntland’ attracted by the relative peace and stability in Puntland.\textsuperscript{510} Puntland’s population growth is also attributed to the influx of IDPs from the other regions and refugees from Ethiopia and Yemen, many of Somali descent.\textsuperscript{511} The towns of Galkacyo, Bosasso, Garden, Goldogob, Burtinle, and Garowe hosted an estimated number of 270 000 IDPs based on data from the Economic Commission for Africa from 2013.\textsuperscript{512} A more current number for the estimated total number of IDPs in Puntland by UNHCR is 388 500.\textsuperscript{513}

For further general information on Puntland, please see section 7.6 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.

### 2.1.1.2 Garowe district and Garowe City

The urban population of Garowe district, which is by and large identical with Garowe city\textsuperscript{514}, increased steadily in the past decades. UN-Habitat compared data by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from 2005 with an estimate by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) from 2014 counting an urban population of almost 100 000 in Garowe district, indicating that ‘the population has more than doubled in less than 10 years’. The same source noted that these figures differ in the summer and the winter due to the influx of inhabitants from the coastal region who leave hot summer temperatures and high humidity behind.\textsuperscript{515} Garowe experienced rapid urban growth after the central government’s collapse in 1991 and partly also due to its status as political and administrative capital of Puntland. IDPs and returnees fleeing conflict in other parts of the country, as well as Ethiopian and Yemeni refugees, contributed to the growth.\textsuperscript{516}

### 2.1.1.3 Clans

The Majeerteen – who belong to the Harti branch of the Darood clan-family\textsuperscript{517} – constitute the vast majority of the population of Puntland, including Garowe.\textsuperscript{518} They are the dominant group in Puntland.

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\textsuperscript{506} Puntland State of Somalia, Puntland Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Puntland facts and figures 2003, 2003, \url{[url]}, p. 11

\textsuperscript{507} Puntland State of Somalia, Puntland Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Department of Statistics, Puntland facts and figures 2012–2017, \url{[url]}, p. 3

\textsuperscript{508} KAALO and OXFAM, Gender Analysis of the Impact of Recent Humanitarian Crises on Women, Men, Girls, and Boys in Puntland State in Somalia, April 2021, \url{[url]}, p. 10

\textsuperscript{509} Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, \url{[url]}, p. 31, endnote 6; see also US, CIA, The World Factbook Somalia, last updated 27 July 2021, \url{[url]}

\textsuperscript{510} Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, \url{[url]}, p. 10

\textsuperscript{511} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{[url]}, p. 8; Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, \url{[url]}, p. 10; see also Jama, A. A. and Mourad, K. A. Water Services Sustainability: Institutional Arrangements and Shared Responsibilities, 11 February 2019, \url{[url]}, p. 5

\textsuperscript{512} Mohamud, A. A. et al., Benefits, Mechanisms and Challenges of Integration of Internal Displaced People into Local Community: The Case of Garowe, 14 May 2018, \url{[url]}, p. 429

\textsuperscript{513} UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, Estimated IDPs in Somalia, last updated 1 January 2021, \url{[url]}

\textsuperscript{514} Balonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021

\textsuperscript{515} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{[url]}, p. 88

\textsuperscript{516} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{[url]}, p. 8

\textsuperscript{517} Hoehne, M. V., Mimesis and mimicity in dynamics of state and identity formation in northern Somalia. Africa 79(2), 2009, pp. 261-262

\textsuperscript{518} Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And Taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, \url{[url]}, pp. 8-9;
The three main sub-clans of the Majeerteen are the Osman Mahmoud (also Osman Mahmud, settled in and around Qardho and Bosasso), the Omar Mahmoud (also Omar Mahmud, settled in and around Galkacyo) and the Issa Mahmoud (also Issa Mahmud, settled in and around Garowe). Garowe District and Garowe city were established on the territory of the Issa Mahmoud. Therefore, they are the traditional inhabitants of the Garowe district, Garowe city included. Since Garowe City is the capital of Puntland, people of the other Majeerteen sub-clans have come to settle in the city, as well as people from other clans.  

In 2017, Kristine Strøh Varming who conducted fieldwork in Garowe city wrote about clan identity: ‘Particularly in major towns like Boosaaso and Garowe, […] clan diversity – although still primarily within Darood, but also with the presence of other Harti clans (Dhulbahante, Warsangelii and Marehan, Isaaq from Somaliland and Rahanweyn from Baydhabo) – is becoming more prevalent due to rapid urbanization and internal migration.’

2.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview

2.1.2.1 General information

Puntland regularly faces droughts and floods, locusts, which tend to render its population vulnerable and impede its access to food, income, education, and health. According to KAALO and Oxfam Puntlanders’ livelihoods, livestock, and land are ‘decimated’ by climatic shocks (general inconsistent and drastic climate variability as well as less common meteorological events like Cyclone Gati in November 2020) and recent locust infestations. Puntland is notably threatened by water shortages. Pre-drought conditions have been found by local authorities, UNOCHA, and partners in Puntland and other regions of Somalia in December 2020 and January 2021. The assessment noted ‘widely depleted berkeds’ and shallow wells, loss of livestock, as well as extensive critical loss of pasture’.

Puntland has been affected by a desert locust infestation, which showed signs of decline in March 2021. However, in the plateaus of Garowe, among other locations, newly formed immature swarms were observed. The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) in Somalia points to the risk for Gu season crop production as well as pasture availability (already impacted by previous drought conditions) posed by desert locust hatching and band formation.

21 settlements are home to close to 5 400 IDP households in and around Garowe, according to Shelter Cluster as of 2016. Parts of this large IDP population was relocated to sites at the city’s southwestern outskirts which lack a proper integration within the city’s urban fabric. Sites assessments conducted by the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (GCCM) Cluster from December 2020 to March 2021 classified IDPs’ needs in terms of protection, health and water, sanitation and

519 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
520 Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, url, p. 1414
521 KAALO and Oxfam, Gender Analysis Of The Impact Of Recent Humanitarian Crises On Women, Men, Girls, And Boys In Puntland State In Somalia, April 2021, url, pp. 5, 105, 10
522 Often written ‘berkad’, it designates a water reservoir used in arid areas to collect water during the wet season for use in the dry season, see Mercy Corps, Improved Berked Designs By Mercy Corps - Somalia, 11 October 2017, url
523 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan – Somalia, 15 February 2021, url, pp. 11-1211-12
524 UNOCHA, Somalia - Situation Report, 19 April 2021, url
525 FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jilaa Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, url, p. 5
526 Shelter Cluster, Mapping Exercise: Garowe, May 2016, url, pp. 4-6
527 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 8

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hygiene as ‘extreme’ and the food, security & livelihoods, nutrition and education needs as ‘severe’.\textsuperscript{528} For more information on IDPs, please see section 2.2.3.2IDPs and 2.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups.

2.1.2.2 COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained the fragile situation in Puntland, as restrictions greatly affected livelihoods and impeded unpaid and underpaid care work.\textsuperscript{529} The Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Development (MoPEDIC) stated, at the end of 2020, that the implementation of lockdown measures had placed the food value-chains under major distress, pointing especially to the international trade remittances from the diaspora and Small and Micro Enterprise Sector (SMEs) which constitute the main source of income for a large part of the Somali population.\textsuperscript{530}

As of 5 July 2021, Somalia’s Ministry of Health reported 3,377 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Puntland, with 74% of cases affecting men and 26% women. 80 cases resulted in death.\textsuperscript{531} But according to Mohamed Mohamed Ali Fuje, chief medical adviser to the government’s COVID-19 National Task Force, Somalia’s figures are only ‘the tip of the iceberg’, because of poor testing rates. The World Health Organization has set up three molecular COVID-19 testing laboratories that are located in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa. As of May 2021, no new lockdown had been decided.\textsuperscript{532} According to a local source, as of July 2021 no lockdown is implemented in Somalia.\textsuperscript{533}

2.2 Mobility and accessibility

2.2.1 Garowe’s airport and flight connections

Garowe Airport, also called Garowe International Airport, is the third largest airport in Somalia, located about 12 kilometres from Garowe’s city centre.\textsuperscript{534} It is operated by the Puntland Ministry for Civil Aviation and Airports.\textsuperscript{535} Based on online flight schedules accessed through tracking sites, the following connections were available from Garowe’s airport as of 27 July 2021.\textsuperscript{536}

Internationally:

- These destinations are served from/to Garowe:
  - Addis Ababa (Ethiopian Airlines) – 5 flights/week
  - Nairobi (Freedom Airline Express; Jubba Airways) – 2 flights/week

Domestically:

- These destinations are served from/to Garowe:
  - Mogadishu (Freedom Airline Express; Jubba Airways) - 5 flights/week

\textsuperscript{528} CCCM and REACH, Detailed Site Assessment (DSA): Garowe district, Nugaal region, Somalia (March 2021), 20 June 2021, \url{url}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{529} KAALO and Oxfam, Gender Analysis of the Impact Of Recent Humanitarian Crises on Women, Men, Girls, and Boys in Puntland State in Somalia, April 2021, \url{url}, p. 55
\textsuperscript{530} Puntland State of Somalia, MoPEDIC, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, December 2020, \url{url}, p. IVIV
\textsuperscript{531} Federal Republic of Somalia, MoH, COVID-19 Dashboard, Somalia, 5 July 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{532} TNN, Who’s afraid of COVID-19? Somalia’s battle with the virus, 5 May 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{533} Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
\textsuperscript{534} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{url}, p. 17
\textsuperscript{535} CAPA, Garowe International Airport, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{536} FlightConnections, Direct flights from Garowe (GGR), n.d., \url{url}; Flightradar24, Garowe Airport, n.d., \url{url}
- Galkacyo (Jubba Airways) – 1 flight/week
- Hargeisa (Jubba Airways) – 2 flights/week
- Bosasso (Ethiopian Airlines; Jubba Airways) – 2 flights/week

Garowe Airport was closed from 2013 to 2018 to undergo renovations and was officially reopened by the President of Puntland in January 2018. The modernisation of the airport was financially supported by the diaspora, by Kuwait, by the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The (IOM) was charged to equip the new airport with the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS), IOM’s border management information system, to allow Garowe International Airport to collect passenger information.

Somalia federal authorities banned international flights on 5 March 2020, with the exception of humanitarian flights. Among others, Somali diaspora’s seasonal return to Puntland in the summer was thus disrupted. As of July 2021, flights appeared to be landing in Garowe airport again.

### 2.2.2 Internal mobility, including checkpoints

#### 2.2.2.1 Circulation within the city

Garowe city is located at the crossroad of three main commercial roads: Garowe-Laascanood, Garowe-Galkacyo and Garowe-Bosasso. Garowe city is cut in two by the paved National Road, which became the principal town road as the city grew and is nowadays prone to congestions affecting the transport of goods and people. UN-Habitat reported that as of May 2019 existed only a few tarmac roads inside the town. The same source reported that in the absence of walkways or parking spaces, ‘vehicles share the streets with small vendors and pedestrians’. Transportation within the city and from Garowe city to other towns is carried out by private taxis or other privately-owned means of transportation; there is no government-owned public transport system in the city. The ever-growing number of private vehicles in Garowe city led to the opening of numerous gas stations throughout the town.

Several restrictions were put in place by Puntland’s government to manage the spread of COVID-19, including a night-time curfew in Bosasso, Galkacyo and Garowe, restricting movements at night and ordering shops to close at 7pm. Researchers noted in May 2020 that the enforcement of the curfew was less strict since the start of Ramadan and that restrictions on circulation within Puntland had been eased with the seasonal exodus from the coast to cooler inland areas.

#### 2.2.2.2 Safety within the city

Truck drivers coming from the port of Bosasso and driving to the market in Garowe are stopped at checkpoints manned by security forces, district officials or police officers from the local municipality who collect fees as well as bribes. According to a 2017 study by social scientist Kirstine Strøh Varming,

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539 IOM, Renovated International Airport Opens in Garowe, Somalia with IOM Support, 1 December 2018, [url](https://www.iom.int/press-centre/publication/renovated-international-airport-opens-garowe)
542 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, [url](https://www.habitat.org/urban-profiles/garowe), pp. 6, 176, 17
543 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, [url](https://www.habitat.org/urban-profiles/garowe), p. 1717
there were three to seven checkpoints between Bosasso and Garowe.⁵⁴⁷ The World Bank reports 20 checkpoints based on a 2018 source.⁵⁴⁸ According to Markus Hoehne, checkpoints are still frequent in Puntland in response to the tense security situation. According to a local source there are checkpoints between Garowe and Lasanod to the east, between Garowe and Galkacyo to the south and between Garowe and Bosasso to the north. At these checkpoints, cars importing or exporting goods are controlled. Taxes have to be paid mainly for goods coming from or exported via Galkacyo (in the south), Bosasso (in the north) or Lasanod (in the east; Lasanod is currently controlled by Somaliland). Security checks are implemented strictly around Galkacyo and Bosasso. Near Bosasso Al-Shabaab has a base and thus, vehicles in the area are checked carefully at checkpoints. Galkacyo being the ‘gate’ to the south, where Al-Shabaab is very active, ordinary passengers are checked to prevent the circulation of suspected terrorists. Finally, at all checkpoints, youngsters are controlled to prevent illegal migration (Somali: tahriib).⁵⁴⁹

According to Bakonyi, controls of people are regular, they don’t necessarily check IDs but ask questions to determine from where one comes. Rahanweyn who often came as IDPs speak a very distinct dialect (some call it language) and can therefore easily be identified (For more details, please see sections 1 and 3.1.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors as well as section 4.2 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles). Mistrust against IDPs especially from the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyne) Clans is still high in Puntland, as they are perceived as clan groups with highest support for Al-Shabaab and are, therefore, often particularly targeted by security forces.⁵⁵⁰

According to a town hall meeting organised in Garowe City by UN-Habitat in 2017, safety is a common concern among the population. The city is fairly secure in comparison to the rest of the country. Police patrols have contributed to a decrease of crime and violence. However, especially women’s perception of safety in Garowe city is low. UN-Habitat linked this low perception to the poor illumination of the streets (even if streetlights were installed in town in 2016⁵⁵¹) and the lack of space for pedestrians.⁵⁵²

For more information on mobility, please see section 4 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (September 2021), section 3.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors (July 2021) as well as EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).

2.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city

2.2.3.1 Accessing land and urban properties

Garowe city’s rapid growth (please see section 2.1.1.2 Garowe district and Garowe City) has made land tenure highly valuable. UN-Habitat states that ‘land grabbing, lack of official documentation, displacement and returnees of diaspora have contributed to mismanagement and lack of tenure security’. Conflicts around land ownership and use are not uncommon and Garowe city has experienced a high rate of land disputes due to unauthorised occupation of public lands in parts of

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⁵⁴⁷ Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And taxation In Garoowe, Puntland, 2017, url, pp. 16-17
⁵⁴⁸ World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 85
⁵⁴⁹ Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
⁵⁵⁰ Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
⁵⁵¹ UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 17
⁵⁵² UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 14, 1714, 17
the town and its outskirts. The diaspora’s investment in real estate has resulted in land banking and speculation.

### 2.2.3.2 IDPs

While Puntland hosts an estimated 388,500 IDPs, more than a third of the population of Garowe consists of IDPs (close to 5,400 IDP households according to data produced by Shelter Cluster from 2016). According to the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) most of these IDPs want to integrate locally, but are confronted with a growing competition for rare land, income opportunities, employment opportunities and access to basic services. UN-Habitat and the World Bank reported that IDP’s have in recent times been relocated from the city to its periphery on the South-West of Garowe, in settlements supported by international aid, warning for risks of exacerbated segregation and poverty. For more information on IDPs, please see sections 2.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview and 2.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups.

### 2.2.3.3 Impact of clan-identity

In Puntland, the presidency rotates, according to an unwritten power-sharing agreement, between the Osman Mohamoud, the Isse Mohamoud and the Omar Mohamoud lineages of the Majeenteen. Besides the dominant Majeenteen, the Dhubhante, Warsangeli and Deshisehe are also influential clans. Power is on the one hand divided between clans, sub-clans and lineages. On the other hand, there is competition before presidential elections. Once a new Puntland president starts his term, he brings along with him people he trusts as well as his own guard, all of whom are from the same lineage. Ministers also choose their secretaries and their security guards among their close patrilineal relatives. This indicates that trust is less rooted in state institution than in kinship ties; however, institutions and kinship can complement each other. Therefore, once a new president and new ministers take office, a large part of the civil service apparatus is replaced. Access to good jobs in the government and other positions linked to public services will thus be dependent on belonging to the president’s clan or the descent group of influential ministers.

It is different when it comes to positions within Garowe city that are not linked to the government, because the city is traditionally dominated by members of the Isse Mahmoud sub-clan. The mayor and the religious elites, and partly the intellectual elites in Garowe are from Isse Mahmoud sub-clan, regardless of who is the president of Puntland. Yet, businesspeople, traders and professionals from all other groups prevalent in Puntland can settle down in Garowe and go about their jobs. Garowe is generally not a ‘clannish’ city.

Although people can settle in all parts of the town, they tend to settle according to clan affiliation. Clan-based settlement patterns prevail throughout Somalia, since the clan network promises physical and social security.

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553 Puntland Post, Puntland President Sends Stem Warning Against Landgrabbing, 8 June 2021, url; UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 20; see also Germany, GIZ, Promoting the economic and social participation of extremely poor households, April 2021, url
554 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 13
555 UN HCR, Operational Data Portal, Estimated IDPs in Somalia, last updated 1 January 2021, url
556 Germany, GIZ, Promoting the economic and social participation of extremely poor households, April 2021, url; Shelter Cluster, Mapping Exercise: Garowe, May 2016, url, pp. 4-6
557 Germany, GIZ, Promoting the economic and social participation of extremely poor households, April 2021, url
558 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 23; World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, url, p. 7474
560 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
561 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
562 Bako, A., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
2.3 Socio-economic indicators

2.3.1 Economic overview and food security

2.3.1.1 Puntland

Puntland’s arid and semi-arid environment contributes to the very difficult and fragile conditions in which pastoralists survive. That being said, livestock exports constitute the pillar of the economy of Puntland and ‘contribute approximately 80% of foreign exchange earnings, 40% of the GDP and 60% of employment opportunities’ according to the Puntland State and based on World Bank data from 2017. Remittance from the diaspora (mainly located in the USA) accounts for a major part of the economy of Puntland. The Northern regions including Puntland received strong support from diaspora communities, also in the form of individual remittances, particularly in times of crises. A 2013 report on remittances and livelihoods support in Puntland and Sooland, which provides a comprehensive household survey on this subject, found that ‘in Puntland, 39 percent [of respondents] received between $1000 and $6000 [in the twelve months preceding the study]; the remainder 61 per cent of Puntland respondents received less than $1000 [in the last twelve months].’ Remittances are used for basic household expenses, and the degree of secondary distribution of remittances to other poorer households is high. As detailed below, Puntland households’ great economic dependence on remittances was highlighted by the decline in money transfers from the diaspora amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

Between August and September 2020 the Somali shilling lost more than 30% of its value, reaching 46 000 Somali Shilling per USD. The poor, i.e. low-income families and IDPs, as well as rural communities, are those who suffered the most from the ‘dollarization’ and depreciation of the Somali Shilling as they do not necessarily have access to e-money services and still rely on local currency for their everyday consumption and trade activities in a general context of ‘dollarization’.

2.3.1.2 Garowe

Garowe constitutes a business hub as it profits economically from its location at the ‘trunk road’ connecting Galgacyo and Mogadishu to the south and the port city Bosasso to the north. Garowe’s industry is mainly composed of ‘recently established, small-scale, privately owned manufacturing and construction enterprises’ according to UN-Habitat. The same source named hospitality, import and distribution of petrol, the khat market and remittances from the diaspora as other economic activities in Garowe. Most economic activities are conducted informally and the informal market is estimated to employ over 69% of the residents. A study conducted by the MoPEDIC in 2020 found that 26% of households in Garowe reported that

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566 Hammond, L., Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland, FSNAU, 5 June 2013, p. 2
567 Puntland State of Somalia, MoPEDIC, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 30 December 2020, p. 15
568 SIDRA Institute, The death knell for the mighty Somali Shilling, December 20, 2020, p. 1; Garowe Online, Puntland in path of rescuing Somali Shillings against dollar, 17 January 2021, FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia Food Security Outlook, 16 March 2021, p. 4
569 FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, p. vii, 4
570 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, p. 1313
571 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, p. 1313

59
the highest percentage of their income came from business, while another 26 % depended on paid jobs as their main source of income (based on data collected from a representative household's sample). However, according to the 2019 UN-Habitat report referring to sources from 2012, 2015 and 2017, lack of access to capital and lack of business skills among business creators, lead to a short life span of businesses and related jobs. According to the same source, unemployment stood at 39 %. Garowe city is the centre of many Government and Non-Government Organisations and UN agencies in Puntland which also generate employment opportunities. Livestock trade and distribution are important economic activities in Garowe, taking place mainly in Suuqa Xoolaha (the older market, outside of town) for camel and cattle trading and in Suuqa Injiga market (in the centre of town) for small ruminants. Most commodities, including vegetables and eggs, are brought to Garowe city by truck, with the exceptions of unbottled drinking water and meat, which are produced locally according to Strøm Varming. A FSN AU study from 2012 highlighted that many food items came from the southern parts of the countries among them 'cereal, pulses, fruit, vegetables and livestock products'. The poor state of roads affects transportation of goods to the markets.

2.3.1.3 Impact of COVID-19 on Puntland's economy

Puntland’s revenues from trade taxes on goods imported through its port have declined following lockdowns and reduced imports due to the COVID-19 pandemic. A study conducted by the MoPEDIC on the impact of COVID-19 in Galkacyo, Qardho and Garowe found that ‘domestic revenue declined by 55 percent in this [2020] fiscal year’, with a revenue loss of 28.4 % in the 1st quarter of 2020. The same source indicated that in the three towns where the survey was conducted, about one-third of the households’ sources of income were vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. After business and paid jobs, remittances were the most vulnerable primary sources of income. Livestock farming was more resilient as a source of income, according to the study. Scholar Mohamed Said Samantar wrote in a study that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have been unevenly distributed across Somalia’s economy. In Puntland, where prices were twice as high as those in Jubaland and South West State, the food inflation rate rose from 0.5 % to 2.0 % from February to March 2020. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Puntland’s economy was forecasted to grow by 4.6 % but Puntland’s Ministry of Finance estimated a 17.8 % decline during the first half of 2020 according to Samantar.

2.3.1.4 Food security

Somali livelihoods rely predominantly on the livestock sector, 60 % of the population are pastoralists. Livestock exports constitute the largest traded commodity for the country. Agro-pastoralists of Puntland, especially poor households, rely not only on meat and milk generated by livestock breeding but also on income generated by livestock and milk trading for the purchase of

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573 Puntland State of Somalia, MoPEDIC, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 30 December 2020, url, pp. 5, 9
574 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 12
575 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, pp. 12-1312-13
576 Strøm Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And taxation In Garoowe, Puntland, 2017, url, pp. 9, 16
577 FSN AU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, url, p. viii
578 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 17; WFP, Joint Market and Supply Chain Update - 28th February, 2021-07th March, 2021, 5 March 2021, url, p. 1
580 Puntland State of Somalia, MoPEDIC, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 30 December 2020, url, pp. 13, 14, 43
582 UN OCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, pp. 16, 29
food.\footnote{FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia Food Security Outlook, 16 March 2021, \url{url}, p. 12; see also Nori, M., Along the Milky Way: Marketing Camel Milk in Puntland, Somalia, 11 November 2011, \url{url}}

The livelihoods of agro-pastoral and riverine households rely heavily on pasture and grass land and are thus largely dependent on climatic conditions. Puntland has been affected by climatic shocks in recent years, alternating drought and floods, as well as the Gati cyclone in Bari in November 2020.\footnote{Puntland State of Somalia, MoPEDIC, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 30 December 2020, \url{url}, p. 37; KAAPO and OXFAM, Gender Analysis of the Impact of Recent Humanitarian Crises on Women, Men, Girls, and Boys in Puntland State in Somalia, April 2021, \url{url}, p. 5; CARE, Somalia Food Insecurity Crisis, April 2021, \url{url}; UNOCHA, Somalia, Cyclone Gari, 13 December 2020, \url{url}} Puntland is among the parts of Somalia facing critical water shortages, where pre-drought conditions were recorded in January 2021, characterised by ‘widely depleted berked and shallow wells, loss of livestock, as well as extensive critical loss of pasture’.\footnote{UNOCHA, Somalia – Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2021, 14 February 2021, \url{url}, p. 1} The Desert Locust infestation which affected Puntland (among other regions of Somalia) over the course of the year 2020 showed signs of decline in March 2021, due in part to control operations and poor rain falls which are less conducive to hatching. However, FSNAU and FEWS NET reported the presence of Desert Locust swarms and adult groups in April 2021 in Puntland (among other regions).\footnote{FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jilam Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 5; UNOCHA, Somalia – Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2021, 14 February 2021, \url{url}, p. 1; FAO, Desert Locust Emergency in Somalia – Update 5, 9 June 2020, \url{url}, p. 1; FAO, Desert Locust Emergency in Somalia - Update 9, 19 November 2020, \url{url}, p. 1}

The depreciation of the Puntland Somali Shilling had an impact on food prices. Notably sorghum and maize market prices in January 2021 were 11 to 28% higher than the previous year (2020) and the average over the five previous years. In January 2021 costs of imported rice were reported to be 29 to 53% above the five-year average.\footnote{FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia Food Security Outlook, 16 March 2021, \url{url}, pp. 5, 12}

A nationwide survey of urban and displaced populations in November 2020 found that 3 of the 19 population groups surveyed were affected by acute malnutrition at a ‘critical’ level. The Global Acute Malnutrition indicator (GAM) was used for measuring, for which the critical level starts at 15%. Of the three affected populations (IDPs and urban population) two were in Puntland with IDPs in Garowe and in Bosasso classified at a ‘critical’ level. An alert level of GAM was seen among the urban population of Garowe city with 5.2%.\footnote{IPC, Somalia: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis; January - June 2021, 1 March 2021, \url{url}, p. 7} In January 2021 the IDP population in Garowe was still in a ‘critical’ (IPC Phase 4) state of acute malnutrition while Garowe’s urban population was still classified as in ‘alert’ (IPC Phase 2).\footnote{IPC, Somalia: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis; January - June 2021, 1 March 2021, \url{url}, pp. 4, 7} Concerning acute food insecurity, IPC in March 2021 classified most displaced populations in the three largest cities of Puntland as in ‘crisis’ (phase 3 of the Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification), while most urban populations were classified as ‘stressed’ (IPC phase 2).\footnote{Hammond, L., Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland, FSNAU, 5 June 2013, \url{url}, p. 6}

### 2.3.2 Housing and shelter

Generally, in urban areas houses tend to be made out of stone, brick or cement blocks with corrugated iron sheet roofs.\footnote{FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia Food Security Outlook, 16 March 2021, \url{url}, pp. 5, 12} In an interview, Bakonyilists the housing types in Garowe: huts (*buush*), *jingaad* (a basic housing structure of only metal sheet, which can cost from 2000 to 4000 USD in Garowe), *bacweyne* (iron sheet house, but better decorated than *jingaad*). *Bacweyne* are often erected in a first phase by people owning a small plot of land before they can afford to build a brick or stone structure house for their families. Most privately owned brick or stone houses have several rooms, iron sheet roofing and indoor bathrooms. The other types of houses have outside toilets (pit-latrines). Like in
Mogadishu, most people in Garowe live in stone/brick houses on a land of 20 metres by 10 metres or 30 metres by 30 metres. A house with four to five bedrooms costs around 30 000 USD and can be rented for 300 to 700 USD per month, depending on the location, security of the area and size. The few (approximately 10) high-rise buildings and buildings out of concrete in Garowe are offices. The telecommunication company Dhabshiil is currently building a 10 storey-building.\(^{592}\)

In rural areas mud houses, \textit{aqal, buush}, stone houses surrounded by land (in villages), iron-sheet houses can be found but no apartment blocks neither high-rise buildings.\(^{593}\)

CCCM Cluster and REACH indicated in a detailed site assessment of March 2021 that in IDPs sites in Garowe district, the types of shelters were either \textit{buul} (88%), out of mud and stick walls with roofs out of corrugated iron sheets (64%), or shelters constructed using shelter kits (60%).\(^{594}\)

Major Somali cities currently experience a building boom conducive to economic development. Bakonyi warned against the violent consequences of this urban reconstruction: investors and political elites seeking new economic opportunities speculate with urban land and contribute to the expansion of rent economy, thereby precipitating mass-scale evictions of the urban poor and displaced people.\(^{595}\)

There is a direct link between access to land and access to housing and shelter, as people with land can build their own houses to reside in or can become landlords (even if only ‘petty landlords’), allowing other people to establish huts or iron-sheet houses.\(^{596}\)

In Garowe city specifically, UN–Habitat reported that land tenure has become highly insecure and that ‘due to the rapid urbanization and weak institutional control over land matters, disputes and conflicts around land ownership and use are not uncommon [...].’\(^{597}\)

In a report on taxation and budgeting in Puntland for Diakonia, analyst Abdulkadir S. M. Salah explained that after the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s, many residents of Puntland urban centres used the absence of police and formal justice system to ‘demarcate or illegally occupy owned or publicly-owned land at the peripheries of these centres’. When the local government was established, it did not have the capacity to evict those who annexed land and accepted - against bribes and/or kinship privileges\(^{598}\)- to regularise annexations by awarding land titles.\(^{599}\)

According to Salah’s report, claimants who want to see their grabbed land regularised rather seek the authorisation from the Islamic court, as the procedure is less complicated than the municipality’s and does not involve the obligation to retroactively pay taxes on the land for the years of occupation.\(^{600}\)

For more information on access to justice through formal and informal systems in Somalia, please see section 2.3 of EASO’s COI report \textit{Somalia: Actors} (July 2021).).

Since 2013 the municipality started collecting a property tax. UN–Habitat reported that property taxes covered close to 15 % of the total district revenue in 2016.\(^{601}\)

In 2019 property tax revenue

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\(^{592}\) Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021

\(^{593}\) Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021

\(^{594}\) CCCM and REACH, Detailed Site Assessment (DSA): Garowe District, Nugaal region, Somalia (March 2021), 20 June 2021, \textit{ud}, p. 3


\(^{596}\) Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021

\(^{597}\) UN–Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \textit{ud}, p. 20

\(^{598}\) Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021


\(^{601}\) UN–Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \textit{ud}, p. 2020
represented 126,454 USD in Puntland’s state revenue, according to its Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation (MoPEDIC). The municipality tried to establish boundaries for the urban area of the city, to define areas for housing development and to protect grazing lands. But urban developments have occurred more organically, ‘especially the new governmental zone north of Togga Garowe, and the South-West new constructions in Halgan and Israa’, according to UN-Habitat. The same source indicated that most of the IDPs have settled in the east of town in the Wabari district and in the south-east part of the city, which is not well connected to the city centre. In a 2017 paper based on a study conducted in an IDP settlement in Garowe, Mohamed S. Mohamed reported that illegal land expropriations were widespread in Puntland’s major cities and that land grabbers present themselves as legitimate landowners to IDPs from whom they demand rent, using ‘coercive force’.

2.3.3 Hygiene, water and sanitation

Social scientist Strøh Varming stated that in Puntland state budgets grew and tax collection increased, but basic services remained in the hands of private and international actors. Her analysis confirmed Salah’s which stated that public funds are disproportionately spent on security and the military rather than on basic services.

In Puntland, drinking water is provided by public private partnerships. Scholars A. A. Jama and K. A. Mourad presumably in 2018 conducted a study of this partnerships for water distribution in Puntland and found that roles and responsibilities were unclear between governmental and private bodies, ‘leading to poor and over-priced domestic water quality’. As a result ‘most consumers cannot afford a drinking water supply to their homes, so they are forced to walk long distances and queue for a long time in order to access water’.

UN-Habitat reported in 2019 that in Garowe city, Togga Garowe and Lan Alifirin seasonal streams provided water for domestic use after receiving water during the rainy season. Nugal Water Company (NUWACO) manages the piped water system (public private partnership), which covers around 90% of the urban area. UN-Habitat additionally reported that residents ‘also rely on hand dug shallow wells and berkads’, although the water is generally saline and does not meet World Health Organisation’s standards.

In April 2021 UNOCHA reported that most water points across Puntland had dried due to persistent dry conditions, Garowe counting among the worst affected districts. The same source further reported that ‘the water prices across most rural areas in Puntland are the highest across Somalia with the cost of water almost doubled in many parts since January 2020, with a 200-litre barrel of water now selling at US$ 7 to 9 up from an average of $3 in normal time’. This trend is consistent with price inflations observed on markets in this period. Water shortages had led to populations displacements in

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603 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 66
604 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 88
605 Mohamed, M. S., Factors affecting to local integration for internally displaced persons in Garowe, Somalia, November 2017, url, pp. 456-457
606 Strøh Varming, K., The Experiential Limits Of The State: Territory And taxation In Garowe, Puntland, 2017, url, p. 25
609 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 1616
610 UNOCHA, Somalia: Drought Conditions Situation Update (As of 14 April 2021), 14 April 2021, url, p. 1
611 FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia Food Security Outlook, 16 March 2021, url, pp. 5, 12
Puntland at the beginning of 2021. In May 2021 water prices were normal again, thanks to the recent rains, according to the World Food Programme.

UN-Habitat underlined the lack of reliable sewage or biomedical management system, reporting that 'toilets either discharge to a septic tank and absorption field or directly to the drainage network, allowing contamination of berkads, shallow wells and ground water, therefore a likely predisposing source of water related diseases'.

Another threat to hygiene is posed by littering of waste at the outskirt of Garowe city. UN-Habitat stated in 2019 that the lack of an adequate sewage system in Garowe city as well as the insufficient collection of waste and the mislocation of dumping sites 'further threaten[ed] water resources, health and hygiene within the population'. Indeed the proximity of the waste collection sites to the riverbeds posed risks of contamination of water resources and agricultural land when the seasonal rivers are full.

KAALO and Oxfam reported that in Puntland state generally, women and girls can be put at risk by WASH activities, 'such as fetching water, using the toilet and bathing, especially for the IDP communities, where toilets are some distance from many of the camp inhabitants and there are no lights'. Proper menstrual hygiene supplies were hardly available, and too costly when they were. The organisation noted that 'private spaces for proper cleaning practices do not exist and the locations of lavatories and water sources are inconvenient. Women and girls do not have basic hygiene supplies such as soap, and resort to the use of ash and clay to clean and wash.'

### 2.3.4 Health care

UN-Habitat mentioned in 2019 that the condition of health services in Garowe city was insufficient and found that 'the WHO minimum standard for health care services (20 physicians per 100,000 people) is not met, and numerous clinics are forced to close.' The growing margins of the city were even more underserviced regarding health care. In the nearby countryside, health services were poorer. People in the rural hinterland of Garowe 'rely on the urban centre, aggravating the load on the existing facilities.'

Garowe General Hospital (GGH) is the central and public facility regarding healthcare in Garowe. Besides Garowe, there are general public hospitals in Bosasso, Qardho, and Galkacyo within Puntland. GGH is supported by the Ministry of Health and an Italian NGO, it offers 'general and specialized medical, surgical, paediatric and maternity services.' In 2012, it had around 80 beds for inpatient care and also served outpatients, offered an emergency unit, a pharmacy, a medical store, a laboratory, an X-Ray room and an operation theatre. A local trader and civil society activist living in Garowe since a decade or more mentioned that GGH has existed since the 1970s. It is considered to be a public hospital. The normal admission fee is 5 USD. Admission for treatment by a certain specialist can be higher, up to 10 USD. Garowe Hospital has many wardens and offers treatment from

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612 UN OCHA, Somalia – Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2021, 14 February 2021, url, p. 2
613 WFP, Joint Market and Supply Chain Update, 23rd May, 2021 – 30th May, 2021, url, p. 2
614 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 16
615 Isse, M. A. and Said, A. D., Key Strategies In Efficient And Effective Solid Wastes Management In Garowe City, Puntland State of Somalia, October 2019, url, p. 2
616 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 22
617 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 14
618 KAALO and OXFAM, Gender Analysis of the Impact of Recent Humanitarian Crises on Women, Men, Girls, and Boys in Puntland State in Somalia, April 2021, url, p. 66
619 UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 19
620 Garowe General Hospital, Facebook Profile, n.d., url
mother and child care to reconstructive surgery. Laboratory tests have to be paid privately. Standard blood tests cost between 1 and 4 USD. Normal beds are free of charge. Single beds cost 10 USD per night. Care and normal services and medicine stored by the hospital are free of charge. Operations, however, have to be paid. A caesarean section, for instance, costs around 350 USD.\(^{623}\)

A 2012 FSNAU report also mentioned private hospitals in Garowe. Among these, Akram Hospital mainly provides orthopaedic and surgical services.\(^{624}\) A local trader and a local midwife mentioned that the largest private hospital in Garowe is called Qaran Hospital\(^{625}\), and that another one is Arafat Hospital\(^ {626}\). They added that generally, in private hospitals, admission fees are slightly higher than in GGH. All services and overnight stays have to be paid, operations costs are similar to the costs in the public hospital. There is a psychiatry located at the outskirts of Garowe; the stay there, including food and treatment, costs 100 USD/month.\(^ {627}\) FSU stressed that there are about 30 small private clinics and pharmacies including Qaran, Somali, Kismayo and Altwoba, which are found in or nearby Garowe. As of 2012, ‘consultation fees in most of the private clinics range between USD 3-5 (Sosh [Somali Shilling] 100,000-150,000)’.\(^ {628}\)

As elsewhere in Somalia, healthcare is not free in Garowe. However, the costs in the public hospital in Garowe are lower than, for instance, in Hargeisa Group Hospital, which is also considered public, but where every service has to be paid (please see section 3.3.4 Health care below).

A researcher working in Puntland mentioned that some people seek treatment abroad, e.g. in India, Malaysia or Pakistan. But this involves considerable costs (around 15,000 USD). People having these means can use their Somali passport to travel or they hold a passport from another country (e.g. Ethiopia or some country in Europe, if they lived there in the past).\(^ {629}\)

A local source stressed that the private pharmacies in Garowe function like normal businesses. The owner and staff running them frequently do not have any specialised education. Drugs can be imported from various countries. However, many of the medications on the market in Garowe and elsewhere in Puntland have been imported from Europe. An office controlling the quality of the medications coming to Puntland has been established, albeit it is not yet fully operational.\(^ {630}\)

### 2.3.5 Education for children

#### 2.3.5.1 Puntland

The out-of-school population in Somalia is one of the world’s most significant. Populations’ movements (60% of the population pursues pastoralist activities) and displacements due to violent conflicts or climatic shocks are the main impediments to children’s access to formal education.\(^ {631}\)

Education provision is of low quality in Somalia due to poor education infrastructure, multiple curricula and a high number of untrained or unqualified teachers. Education at primary and secondary

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\(^{623}\) Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021. Muse Abdrisaq Mire is a local businessman in Garowe and a former civil society activist (in the Puntland youth organisation).

\(^{624}\) FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, [url](#).

\(^{625}\) Qaran Hospital, Homepage, n.d., [url](#).

\(^{626}\) Arafat Hospital, Facebook Profile, n.d., [url](#).


\(^{628}\) FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, [url](#).

\(^{629}\) Said, F. O., telephone interview, 29 July 2021. Faysal Omar Said is a researcher in Puntland.

\(^{630}\) Husein, M. Y., telephone interview, 11 July 2021.

\(^{631}\) USAID, Somalia - Education, 19 March 2021, [url](#).
level is predominantly confessional, with schools being mostly under the management of private-sector umbrellas, community-owned or run by Islamic charities. The formal public education sector is supported by international organisations.632

Compared to the rest of the country, Somaliland and Puntland enjoyed a greater political stability, security and administrative development, contributing to an improvement of student enrolments over the past two decades.633 For more general information in Somalia, please see section 1.3.5 Education for children. In a report on taxation and budgeting in Puntland, Salah noted that only a small portion of Puntland’s state budget (30.7 million USD in 2014) was allocated to public services, with 3.46% allocated to education that same year.634 In 2019 the Puntland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies (MoEHS) allocated 7.5% of its budget to education, which represented 76.2 million USD.635

Puntland, like Somaliland, does not participate in government-administered exams. In 2020 the federal administration refused to recognise the school certificates of high school leavers from Puntland unless they sat the matriculation exam prepared by the federal government. In December 2020 the federal government and Puntland’s administration reached an agreement and the students were eventually granted federal high school certificates. The underlying dispute remains: Puntland demands a federalized education system (until the end of the secondary school level) while Mogadishu is in favour of one unitary education system. According to a source in the government, an initiative aiming at convincing Puntland to join the national curriculum is under way, led by the Ministry of Education.636

According to the MoEHS, in the scholastic year 2016–2017, the total enrolment in primary education (with Integrated Quranic Schools) in Puntland stood at 143,546 students, with a gross enrolment rate of 58.2%.637 The World Bank compared in 2019 the primary school survival rates to grade 5 across Somalia and noted that those of Puntland were comparatively ‘at the bottom’ at 56% (57.4% male, 54.2% female).638 Puntland’s Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation (MoPEDIC) reported a primary school survival rate of 62.7% for the scholastic year 2018–2019 and a primary school gross enrolment rate of 63.7% for the same year.639

In a 2020 paper based on education statistics by Puntland’s MoEHS, scholar Farah Abdiqani indicated that, as of 2019, 32,766 students were enrolled in secondary education.640 According to the MoPEDIC, in the scholastic year 2018-2019, the gross enrolment ratio for secondary school was 19.5% of the concerned population in Puntland.641

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633 GPE, Somalia, 30 May 2021, [url].
635 Puntland State of Somalia, MoEHS, Education Sector Programme Implementation Grant (ESPIG) Program document, 22 August 2019, [url], p. 27.
640 Abdiqani, F., Five Reasons for Student Dropout in Puntland Secondary Schools, October 2020, [url], p. 3.
2.3.5.2 Garowe

According to the MoEHS, the district of Garowe counts 30 primary schools\textsuperscript{642}, while UN-Habitat reported the figure of 37, also referring to the MoEHS.\textsuperscript{643}

Based on data from 2018, the World Bank noted that in Garowe district, 29 schools were managed by the government, 35 were independent and 35 had a mixed management.\textsuperscript{644}

Based on data by Puntland’s MoEHS, UN-Habitat counted 11 primary schools and 5 secondary schools in Garowe’s city centre in 2019 and further noted that ‘the peripheral districts of Wadair 2, Halgan, Israaac and Wabari appear to be under-serviced in terms of education facilities.’\textsuperscript{645}

2.3.5.3 Impact of COVID-19 on education

Puntland’s MoPedic produced a report on the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in Puntland, indicating that, after the relax of containment measures such as lockdown, education institutions had resumed normal operations. However, a significant percentage of children have not reported back to school, the main reasons advanced by the report being ‘financial constraints, fear of contracting the Corona virus and children being engaged as casual workers’ as well as early marriages during the COVID-19 pandemic (45 % of households in Garowe reported ‘an increase in early marriages in their neighbourhoods during this period’).\textsuperscript{646}

2.3.6 Means of basic subsistence and employment

UN-Habitat mentioned in 2019 that Garowe has an urban population of 99 581.\textsuperscript{647} According to an earlier study by FSNAU, poor, middle and well-off are the three wealth groups in Garowe: around 25-35 % of the urban population are poor; around 45-55 % are middle-class; and around 15-25 % are well-off.\textsuperscript{648} The average income of a poor household is between 1 500 and 2 550 USD a year. A middle-class family has per year 2 265 to 6 410 USD. A better-off family lives on 6 565 to 15 630 USD a year.\textsuperscript{649}

A local source working in and around Garowe mentioned that food and housing in Garowe are expensive, compared to other cities in Puntland such as Bosasso or Galkacyo. One room costs around 50 USD monthly. A whole house with four to five rooms costs between 200 and 300 USD monthly, depending on the exact location. Additionally, one needs between 20 and 50 USD for electricity and water (depending on the number of persons in the household) and another 10 USD for waste disposal costs monthly. Eating in ordinary restaurants costs around 2 to 3 USD for a breakfast, 4 to 8 USD for a lunch and around 2 USD for dinner. An adult single person needs minimum around 10 USD for eating and drinking per day, if he/she does not cook at home. Cooking at home is cheaper, but one needs additionally charcoal for the oven and water for the dishes.\textsuperscript{650} Monthly school fees at a private school are around 20 USD per child, at a public school the costs are around 10 USD. In general, a poor household consisting of six persons (including 4 children) would survive, in a shanty without access to clean water and sanitation, on roughly 200 to 250 USD per month. A middle-class household of the

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\textsuperscript{642} Puntland State of Somalia, MoEHS, Primary, n.d., \url{url}

\textsuperscript{643} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{url}, p. 1919

\textsuperscript{644} World Bank (The), Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Economic Update, August 2019, \url{url}, p. 18

\textsuperscript{645} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{url}, p. 1919

\textsuperscript{646} Puntland State of Somalia, MoPedic, COVID-19 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 30 December 2020, \url{url}, p. Vv

\textsuperscript{647} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{url}, p. 8

\textsuperscript{648} FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, \url{url}, p. 24

\textsuperscript{649} FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, \url{url}, p. viii

\textsuperscript{650} Nur, S. H., telephone interview, 11 July 2021. Said Haji Nur is an engineer who has been working for around ten years in and around Garowe, but originates from another region.
same size, in a stone house with proper access to clean water and sanitation, would need around 700 USD per month.\textsuperscript{651}

Income sources and types of income can be quite variable. Many people work in employment, business and irregular casual labour and petty trades.\textsuperscript{652} Employment for many is unstable. Due to the oversupply of labour, wage levels are depressed. Additionally, IDPs from southern Somalia who live in Garowe or nearby, as well as natural factors like droughts, burden the local economy. Simultaneously, Garowe is the seat of the government of Puntland and this means that many relatively well-paid jobs can be found in government and administration. Also NGOs and UN agencies have offices in town, and Garowe is home to a number of universities and higher learning facilities. This has a positive effect on the local employment situation.\textsuperscript{653} However, one source, a local trader and civil society activist, mentioned that when the president changes and new ministers are appointed, which happens normally every four years, the staff working at government offices, at least those directly working in ministries and in the presidential palace, is replaced (see also section 2.2.3.3 Impact of clan-identity). He added that the number of NGOs in Garowe has been decreasing recently. Many people work in the private sector, have little shops, work as cleaners or watchmen or in the security forces.\textsuperscript{654}

Industry is little developed in Garowe. UN-Habitat found that ‘it is mainly composed of recently established, small-scale, privately owned manufacturing and construction enterprises.’ The diaspora is investing in town, which produced a real-estate boom. There is much new construction going on, which creates jobs at least temporarily. Like in most other Somali towns, the service sector is offering considerable employment opportunities. In particular the telecommunications and financial sectors are thriving. Also, ‘hospitality is a sector in continuous expansion, with more than twenty hotels throughout the city.’ Finally, many households in Garowe receive remittances that cover parts of the essential costs. Generally, the informal sector remains the major driver of Garowe’s economy, with a share of over 69% of the district’s residents.\textsuperscript{655}

The salary of a watchman is between 200 and 250 USD a month, a policeman and a soldier earn 240 USD, a qualified nurse would earn around 350 USD, an established medical doctor around 1000 USD and a lower-level government employee around 300 to 400 USD.\textsuperscript{656}

Youth unemployment is very high. Young people often find only temporary or low-level jobs as cleaners or waiters. Many search for better options elsewhere, e.g. in Mogadishu, where life is generally cheaper and the job market is larger.\textsuperscript{657}

## 2.4 Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups

As capital of Puntland State, Garowe has been targeted by Al-Shabaab. Hoehne noted already in 2014 that the militant Islamists had been fighting against Puntland since a decade.\textsuperscript{658} Initially they threatened to conquer Puntland. After several attempts, they settled on occasional terror attacks,

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\textsuperscript{651} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
\textsuperscript{652} FSNAU, Garowe Urban Baseline Report, 15 May 2012, url, p. 24
\textsuperscript{653} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 12
\textsuperscript{654} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
\textsuperscript{655} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 13
\textsuperscript{656} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
\textsuperscript{657} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
mainly in Bosaso, but occasionally also in Garowe.\textsuperscript{659} Despite this, UN-Habitat found in 2019 that ‘Garowe has a fairly stable security in comparison to other parts of the country.’ The formal security apparatus works effectively in town. The relevant government institutions in cooperation with traditional authorities maintain the peace. The police has a visible presence in the city, which has contributed to the reduction of crime and violence; however, women are still vulnerable to harassment and attacks especially at night, due to missing street illumination and the structure of architecture in certain neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{660} Land conflicts are another source of insecurity. Garowe is traditionally dominated by members of the Isse Mahamud sub-clan of the Majeereteen clan (see below). A local source stressed that if someone from another patrilineal descent group buys land from a member of the Isse Mahamud sub-clan, it happens sometimes that conflicts arise after the value of the land had gone up. The current government of Puntland under President Deni issued an urban land management law in August 2020 that aims at tackling recurrent land conflicts.\textsuperscript{661} In recent years, land conflicts erupted most frequently in Garowe, compared to other places in Puntland.\textsuperscript{662}

2.4.1 Clan-based protection

The dominant patrilineal descent groups in Garowe are Majeereteen and Dhulbahante. Both clans belong to the Herti branch of the Darood clan family which is dominating in Puntland.\textsuperscript{663} Within Majeereteen, the sub-clan Isse Mahamud claims the area of Garowe and surroundings as their ‘clan-homeland’ (Somali: degaan, for further details see sections 3.1.1 and 7.6.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021). Members of this sub-clan dominate the traditional power positions within the city, like the office of the major and the position of the sheikh of the biggest mosque. However, also members of the Omar Mahamoud sub-clan of Majeereteen have a strong presence in Garowe. Dhulbahante have many businesses in the city and also hold important positions in the government of Puntland, therefore having a sizable presence in the capital city. Besides the named groups, other Majeereteen sub-clans and lineages as well as other clans belonging to the Darood/Herti clan-collective (e.g. Warsangeli and Dehiishe), which forms the backbone of Puntland State, reside in Garowe. A local source working in Garowe since many years (but originating from the neighbouring Sool region) emphasised that the inhabitants of Garowe are more tolerant towards people from other clans. IDPs, however, who do not belong to Puntland by patrilineal descent, have a difficult stand. There is little humanitarian aid offered to them in Garowe and surroundings.\textsuperscript{664}

According to a local source interviewed for this report, there are few members of minority groups in town. Members of two occupational groups, Madhabaun and Tumal, are prevalent. They are structurally marginalised and have limited access to economic resources. In politics, they have no substantial political representation. Madhabaan have one seat in parliament of Puntland (out of 66 seats distributed between various clans, sub-clans and lineages). Only regarding social segregation, the situation is less rigid in Garowe and Puntland in general than in some other places (e.g. in Hargeisa, Somaliland). There is no specific neighbourhood for Madhabaan or Tumal; they live among other members of society, including majority group members. Moreover, Tumal and Majeereteen marry each other, not very often, but sometimes, and without resistance from the families. Also, in case of conflict

\textsuperscript{659} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
\textsuperscript{660} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 14
\textsuperscript{662} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021; see also UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, url, p. 20
\textsuperscript{663} Hoehne, M. V., Mimesis and mimicry in dynamics of state and identity formation in northern Somalia. Africa 79(2), 2009, pp. 261-262
\textsuperscript{664} Nur, S. H., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
with members of majority groups, the minority group members are in a slightly weaker position, but still can get their right (e.g. compensation). Madhbaan, however, are facing considerable social exclusion and intermarriage with Majeerteen is not accepted.\textsuperscript{665}

### 2.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups

According to data produced by Shelter Cluster from 2016, close to 5 400 IDP households are residing in 21 settlements in and around Garowe. ‘On average, 15% of the households were reported to be from the host community [i.e., from Majeerteen or other clans predominantly residing in Puntland].’ More than half of these households are organised and have their own committees, which also address security issues. Shelter Cluster found that more than 70% of the interviewed IDPs perceived their security situation as good or very good.\textsuperscript{666} Also a local source confirmed that IDPs can have access to protection and safety. The most important source for the justice of vulnerable people is the office of the human rights defender,\textsuperscript{667} an institution created by the government of Puntland in 2014. This office is effective and operational and defends the rights of vulnerable persons.\textsuperscript{668}

IDPs work predominantly in low-status or casual jobs, as construction workers, cleaners of offices, private homes or hotels, or shoe shiners. They also run small kiosks at IDP camps. Many come from the regions of Bay and Bakool in the south. Some are also non-Somali, e.g., Oromo from Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{669} UN-Habitat and the World Bank noted in 2019 and 2021 respectively that IDPs in Garowe have been relocated from the city to its periphery exacerbating segregation and poverty.\textsuperscript{670} However, the local businessmen and civil society activists emphasised that IDPs are part of the local community and they are not threatened. In the past, between 2009 and 2014, IDPs were sometimes evicted and randomly deported, e.g. to southern Somalia. This happened against the backdrop of the intensification of the fight between Puntland state and Al-Shabaab, particularly in 2010 and 2011. In the past years, since around 2015, the rights and positions of IDPs in Garowe and other places in Puntland have been strengthened.\textsuperscript{673} For more information on IDPS, please see sections 2.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview and 2.2.3.2 IDPs.

Women are, as everywhere in Somalia, particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence. FGM is widespread in Puntland, including in Garowe.\textsuperscript{672} Yet, in June 2021, the President of Puntland, Said Abdullahi Deni, and his cabinet approved an anti-FGM-bill to be submitted to parliament. If it comes into force, it will criminalise FGM.\textsuperscript{673} Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, a lecturer at Puntland State University, mentioned that in Puntland ‘impunity for rape and other forms of sexual violence is pervasive’. In November 2016, the government launched the first ever Sexual Offences Law criminalizing all sexual offences in the region. ‘Despite the low numbers of rape prosecutions, it is a common perception that incidents of rape are increasing in the state.’ The lecturer continued that in the first quarter of 2019, over 15 cases of rape were documented across Garowe, Galkacyo, Bosasso and Qardho. Officials confirmed ‘that cases of rape have been on the rise in Puntland.’ Some cases were shockingly brutal, with a twelve-year-old girl raped and filmed and with footage then posted

\textsuperscript{665} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021  
\textsuperscript{666} Shelter Cluster, Mapping Exercise: Garowe, May 2016, \url{url}, pp. 4-6  
\textsuperscript{667} Office of Puntland Human Rights Defender, n.d., \url{url}  
\textsuperscript{668} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021  
\textsuperscript{669} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021  
\textsuperscript{670} UN-Habitat, Garowe Urban Profile, May 2019, \url{url}, p. 23; World Bank (The), Somalia Urbanization Review: Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development, 2020, \url{url}, p. 74  
\textsuperscript{671} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021  
\textsuperscript{672} Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021  
\textsuperscript{673} VOA, Somalia’s Puntland Moves to Ban Female Genital Mutilation, 11 June 2021, \url{url}
online, or a nine-month pregnant woman raped and then killed. In 2019, there was a brutal rape and murder of a two-year-old girl in Garowe. The Sexual Offences Act (SOA) provides investigators with a set of partly advanced tools to collect evidence and persecute perpetrators. Yet, more generally, societal values and norms are still often grounded in patriarchal views that habitually subject women (not just in Garowe but all over Somalia) to male rule and make them vulnerable to (sexualised) attacks. For further details please see section 2 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (September 2021).

3. Hargeisa

3.1 Hargeisa’s overview

Hargeisa (sometimes spelled Hargeysa) is a city of the Woqooyi Galbeed region in the territory of Somaliland, in north-western Somalia. The city is located in a valley of the Galdonon (also called Ogo) mountains677, 850 kilometres north of Mogadishu.678 The region Woqooyi Galbeed borders Ethiopia to the South, the region of Awdal to the West and Togdher to the East.679 A new administrative partition adopted by Somaliland (and Puntland) places Hargeisa in the new administrative region of Marodi Jung.680

In May 1988 at least 70 % of the city of Hargeisa was destroyed as the result of the use of artillery and aerial shelling by Siad Barre’s military government, leading to the displacement of a large part of its population, the majority of which was hailing from the Issa clan.681

Over 20 years later, Hargeisa has become the biggest urban setting in Somaliland, has been almost entirely rebuilt,682 and has expanded rapidly in both size and density.683 Estimates of the size of the city vary from 33 square kilometres to 65 square kilometres of built-up land area.684

675 Mohamed, M. A., The determinants of violence against women and access to human rights in Puntland, March 2020, url, p. 76
676 Ingiriis, M. H. and Hoehne, M. V., The impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles of Somali women: a blessing in disguise, 2013, url, p. 327
677 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Hargeysa, last updated 23 October 2006, url
678 Massoud, M., Shari’a, Inshallah - Finding God in Somali Legal Politics, 2021, p. xvi
679 Tahir, A, The production of clan segregation in urban Somalia: Historical Geographies of Hargeisa, April 2021, url, p. 55, Figure 1
682 Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, url, p. 5; GlobalShelterCluster, Somaliland - Overview, n.d., url
683 Stuway, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, pp. 154–156
Hargeisa serves as the capital of the self-declared but largely internationally unrecognised Republic of Somaliland (despite a recent increase in the number of states with diplomatic relationships; for this aspect please see section 7.7 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021). It is also among the most populated areas of Somalia. According to Global Shelter Cluster, the city attracts a large number of refugees, returnees and IDPs. Analysts write that Hargeisa’s economy benefits greatly from remittances sent by Somalilanders living abroad.

Since mid-June 2021 the mayor of Hargeisa is Abdikarim Ahmed Moge, who succeeded Abdirahman Mohamoud Aideed, also referred to as ‘Mayor Soltelco’ (elected in 2013).

For further general information on Somaliland, please see section 7.7 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.

3.1.1 Demographics and clan composition

According to the CIA’s World Factbook, Hargeisa is the second largest urban area of Somalia with a population of 1.033 million as of 2021. US-based companies specialised in demographics estimate that Hargeisa’s population in the last three years ranges from 477,876 to 923,000. UNOCHA featured the figure of 959,081 for the total population of Hargeisa in a 2021 report; while political scientist David Kilcullen wrote that state officials in Hargeisa referred to a population of 1.2 million, which would represent around a quarter of the total population of Somaliland. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1.2 million was an estimation by the city government of Hargeisa from the year 2000. The World Bank reported in 2021 that Hargeisa grew at an annual urban growth rate between 5 and 6.7%, with urban expansion data collected via remote sensing based on satellite images over the past decade.

Based on data from UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), the World Bank reported in 2021 that between 10,000 and 25,730 IDPs arrived in Hargeisa and its wider region from 2016 to 2019.
In Hargeisa and generally in the heartlands of Somaliland, the Isaaq clan and its sub-clans constitute a majority and dominate the political landscape. The scholar Abdifatah Ismael Tahir in April 2021 published an academic paper on clan composition over time in Hargeisa, based on archival materials, oral narratives and ethnographic field research in Hargeisa from 2013 to 2015 and 2020. He argues that the city of Hargeisa is organised according to a unique form of clan-based segregation:

‘At present, each of Hargeisa’s five administrative districts - Axmed Dhagax, Maxamuud Haybe, Gacan Libaax, 26 June, and Ibrastructure Koodbuur - is predominantly populated by a distinctive clan(s). For instance, the Arab and Aynub clans populate Axmed Dhagax, while the Garhais (Eidagale and Habar Yonis) clans populate Maxamuud Haybe District and parts of Gacan Libaax District, such as the New Hargeisa sub-district. Moreover, the Awdal clans (Sa’ad Muse and Isse Muse) predominantly populate Ismael Koodbuur, as well as the 26th June district and parts of Gacan Libaax, such as Sheikh Madar, and the Gaboye clan is found in the Daami neighbourhood of Gacan Libaax.’

Individuals of the Gabooye minority clan (for more information on the Gabooye, please see section 4.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles) were reported to reside mainly in Dami, a neighbourhood of Hargeisa, since 2 000 returnees from this minority clan returned from refugee camps in Ethiopia (Tefere Ber and Darwanaja) at the end of the 1990s.

3.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview

UNOCHA, which has a sub-office in Hargeisa, stated in its humanitarian needs overview for the year 2021 that the district of Hargeisa counts 959 081 people, of which 685 335 are in need of humanitarian assistance (84 553 IDPs, 600 782 non-displaced, 14 745 refugees). The most pressing humanitarian issues since 2020 related to food insecurity amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in the region. After the loss of livestock and pasture due to water shortages in December 2020 and January 2021, the region is affected by a wave of desert locusts damaging staple crops and rangelands.

In November 2017 the IOM stated that two of the three most populated IDPs sites in Somaliland (Stadium with 34 000 inhabitants and Statehouse with over 25 000 inhabitants) were located in Hargeisa. Daami, Ayaha, and Mohamed Mooge are further sites located in Hargeisa’s city centre. These settlements, often referred to as camps, have been established in Hargeisa since the 1990s.

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699 Stywéy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 163; Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021

700 Tahir, A., The production of clan segregation in urban Somalia: Historical Geographies of Hargeisa, April 2021, url, p. 54

701 Tahir, A., The production of clan segregation in urban Somalia: Historical Geographies of Hargeisa, April 2021, url, p. 54; All clans referred to in this quote are Isaaq sub-clans except the Gabooye: see also International Crisis Group, Somaliland: The Strains of Success, 5 October 2015, url, pp. 4, 20


703 UNOCHA, Somalia Staff Contact List, January 2020, url, p. 3

704 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Somalia, 9 March 2021, url, p. 50


706 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan – Somalia, 15 February 2021, url, pp. 11-1211-12

707 FAO, Desert Locust briefs 2021, n.d., url; Fews net, 3.5 million people are expected to be in crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June to September 2020, url, May 2020

708 IOM, Displacement Situation Report - Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Sanaag, Sool And Togdheer Regions (Somaliland), November 2017, url, p. 1

709 UNOCHA, Woqooyi Galbeed – Situation Analysis, October 2012, url, p. 1
when they were mainly composed of returnees from refugee camps in Ethiopia joined over time by in-migrants from Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia and, more recently, Yemen. For more information on IDPs, please see sections 3.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city, 3.3.2 Housing and shelter and 3.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups.

Somaliland confirmed the first COVID-19 case in March 2020 and from April 2020 until July 2020 the government of Hargeisa ‘implemented a full lockdown’. As of January 2021, most of the registered cases in Somaliland were in Hargeisa and as of 25 June 2021 the WHO counted 3 301 confirmed cases in Somaliland, 1 787 of which in the district of Hargeisa, and 275 deaths.

### 3.2 Mobility and accessibility

#### 3.2.1 Hargeisa’s airport and flight connections

Hargeisa’s airport is located 6 km from the city centre. Scholars place the construction date of the airport in the 1950s, after which it was used mainly as a military base. After the civil war, the airport was renamed after Mohammed Hajilbrahim Egal, president of Somaliland at the time. In the 1990s and 2000s the airport ‘remained in poor condition’ and was used primarily for humanitarian flights and small commercial flights. Since the mid-2000s, Hargeisa Egal International Airport (HEIA) saw an increase in the number of passengers and cargo flights departing and arriving. The airport was rehabilitated from 2012 to 2015, including the expansion of the runway and the implementation of security practices and new technologies, funded by the Kingdom of Kuwait, the United Kingdom, UNDP, USAID, the government of Somaliland, local businesses and private companies. Based on

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710 Stuwey, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, [url]
p. 154; Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
711 UN-Habitat and UNCDF, Global Compendium of Practices on Local Economic and Financial Recovery, 3 March 2021, [url]
p. 41
p. 7
714 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 7; Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, [url]
p. 162
715 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 7; Louis Berger S.A. and Afro-Consult P.L.C, Pre-Feasibility Study of the Regional Transport Sector in Berbera Corridor, September 2003, [url]
p. 7; see also Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, [url]
p. 162-163
716 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 11
717 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 12; see also TNH, Hargeisa airport avert closure, 26 September 2003, [url]
718 Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, [url]
p. 165; Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 12
719 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 12; Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, [url]
p. 160; Republic of Somaliland, Government of Republic of Somaliland, Hargeisa’s Egal airport reopen, powered by wind, 20 August 2013, [url]
720 Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, [url]
p. 12; Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, [url]
online flight schedules accessed through a tracking site, the following connections were available from Hargeisa’s airport as of 27 July 2021.\textsuperscript{221}

Internationally:

- The destinations are served from/to Hargeisa:
  - Addis Ababa (Ethiopian Airlines) – 14 flights/week
  - Dubai (Daallo Airlines; Flydubai) – 2 flights/week
  - Nairobi (Kenya Airways; Daallo Airlines; Jubba Airways) – 2 flights/week
  - Djibouti (Jubba Airways) – 1 flight/week

Domestically:

- The destinations are served from/to Hargeisa:
  - Mogadishu (African Express; Daallo Airlines; Taquan Air; Jubba Airways) – 13 flights/week
  - Galkacyo (Jubba Airways) – 3 flights/week
  - Garowe (Jubba Airways) – 1 flight/week
  - Bosasso (Jubba Airways) – 1 flight/week

The Department of Somaliland Immigration (SIBC) on its website lists travellers who, thanks to their type of passport or nationality, can apply for an ‘on arrival’ visa directly at HEIA, while other applicants must apply for visas in advance.\textsuperscript{222} According to the German foreign office, ‘on arrival’ visas are awarded for stays of up to 30 days.\textsuperscript{223} As a rule, an invitation is required as proof of the purpose of stay, without which entry can be refused. Visa fees (60 USD) must be paid locally in US dollars in cash.\textsuperscript{224} A Finnish resident born in Southern Somalia who was interviewed by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2019 stated that Somaliland authorities require anyone entering the country to have a proper travel document and may require a fee.\textsuperscript{225}

### 3.2.2 Internal mobility

#### 3.2.2.1 Circulation within the city

A 2020 research report by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) quotes the UNHCR office in Mogadishu on the presence of entry and exit checkpoints at each district within Somaliland, indicating that checkpoint authorities consistently verify travel documents, driver’s licenses, destination and origin of the trip, record plate numbers of vehicles and contact numbers of travellers. The UN agency noted, however, that borders with Ethiopia ‘are relatively porous and migrants might

\textsuperscript{221} FlightConnections, Direct flights from Hargeisa (HGA), n.d., \url{url}; Flightradar24, Hargeisa Airport, n.d., \url{url}

\textsuperscript{222} Republic of Somaliland, SIBC, Visa Section, n.d. \url{url}

\textsuperscript{223} Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalia: Reise und Sicherheitshinweise, as of 7 June 2021, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{224} Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalia: Reise und Sicherheitshinweise, as of 7 June 2021, \url{url}; Somaliland Travel, Somaliland Visa, n.d., \url{url}; see also Gandrup, T., Enter and exit: everyday state practices at Somaliland’s Hargeisa Egal International Airport, 2016, \url{url}, p. 16

\textsuperscript{225} Finland, F5, Somalia: Keski- ja Etelä-Somalista kotoisin olevien henkilöiden laillinen pääsy Somalimaahan, Ashraf-vähemmistöryhmän asema Somalimaassa [Somalia: Legal access to Somaliland for persons from South-Central Somalia, situation of Ashraf minority group], 24 October 2015, \url{url}, p.2
enter Somaliland without documentation’. Scholar Abdifatah Tahir, who was interviewed for this report, stated that 'There are no permanent checkpoints within the city but security forces maintain a random presence at all the major intersections in the city. There are also checkpoints on all the roads leading in and out of the city. I don’t believe this negatively impacts accessibility or mobility of residents.’

Circulation within Hargeisa is reported to be difficult due to the bad quality of the roads as well as the organisation of the circulation. Sources report increasing traffic on the road connecting Hargeisa to the port of Berbera as well as in Hargeisa itself. Frequent congestions occur as a result of the interaction of traffic with ‘pedestrians, donkey drawn carts, street markets, parked vehicles’ as well as khat deliver ring trucks, in the absence of traffic signs. Other paved streets in the city centre are reported to be potholed while many roads outside the business district are not paved. On occasional heavy rains, large areas of the city are reported to be flooded and roads to be ‘impassable due to mud’.

The construction of a highway linking Hargeisa to the port city of Berbera has begun in 2018 and is scheduled to be completed in 2022, promising to turn Hargeisa ‘into a major transport hub for traffic from across the Horn of Africa to Berbera’.

2.3.2.2 Safety within the city

Hargeisa is not considered to be particularly insecure by scholars conducting research in the city, when compared to other urban areas in the region. According to the scholar and specialist of Hargeisa Abdifatah Tahir, Somaliland’s prioritisation of security is however jeopardised in urban contexts by state-involved land conflicts. Basing his analysis on an in-depth study of Hargeisa, the author argues that such conflicts ‘induce a significant level of violence, pitting authorities against local land-owners or claimers’.

For more information on mobility, please see section 3.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.

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726 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Entry and exit requirements at land borders and airports, including documentation required; whether there are checkpoints for domestic and international travel; whether there are travel agencies that facilitate travel within and outside Somalia (2018–August 2020), 3 September 2020, url.
727 Tahir, A, email, 23 June 2021. Abdifatah Tahir is a specialist of Hargeisa who obtained his PhD from the University of Sussex and currently (as of June 2021) serves as a member of Parliament in Somalia.
728 Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Traffic Problems in Hargeisa City, 14 April 2013, url; Somaliland Chronicle, President Bihi Attends the Groundbreaking of Hargeisa Bypass Road, 4 May 2021, url; Louis Berger S.A. and Afro-Consult P.l.c, Pre-Feasibility Study of the Regional Transport Sector in Berbera Corridor, September 2003, url, p. 16.
729 Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, url, pp. 5, 15; Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Traffic Problems in Hargeisa City, 14 April 2013, url; Louis Berger S.A. and Afro-Consult P.l.c, Pre-Feasibility Study of the Regional Transport Sector in Berbera Corridor, September 2003, url, p. 3.
730 Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland– Invisible City, 2019, url, p. 15; see also Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Traffic Problems in Hargeisa City, 14 April 2013, url.
731 Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, url, p. 21; see also GCR, Berbera–Ethiopia highway set to turn Somaliland into “major regional trading hub”, 1 March 2019, url; Somaliland Chronicle, President Bihi Attends the Groundbreaking of Hargeisa Bypass Road, 4 May 2021, url.
3.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city

Abdifatah Tahir stated that Hargeisa’s population has a history of settling in the city according to a clan-based segregation (please see section 3.1.1 Demographics and clan composition). Newcomers settled where members of their clan lived, because they knew this network would facilitate their access to a range of institutions and services which the state failed to provide: ’[...] segregation in Hargeisa can be understood as a response to historical political, economic, and security problems in the city, persisting because of the state’s incompetence in managing public services as well as the key roles the customary institutions continue to play in mediating access to services, conflict resolution, and political participation.’

Hargeisa's urban landscape has however experienced rapid changes with the return in the late 1990s of people who had resided in refugee camps in neighbouring countries (please see section 3.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview). In Hargeisa they settled in buush aside and in ruins and/or government-owned vacant land. These settlements (often referred to as camps, for example Statehouse and Stadium) have nowadays become more densely populated, often overlapping with other areas of the city, even if they are separated from districts ‘with more affluent housing and business.’ Kirsti Stuvøy et al., a group of researchers who conducted a research project in these settlements from 2017 to 2019 pointed to the higher level of social diversity among their inhabitants, complicating the settlement patterns described by Abdifatah Tahir: “‘Original’ returnees, later displaced people, rural to urban migrants from Somaliland or Somalia, other low-income residents of Hargeisa, who were pushed out of other neighbourhoods in the city by rising rents, and non-Somali migrants, particularly ethnic Oromo from Ethiopia.” The researchers reported that interviewees admitted to follow clan-based settlement practices (preferring to settle where relatives lived) but ‘rejected practices of clan-based exclusion.’ Both Stuvøy et al. and Abdifatah Tahir converge in their analysis of an increasing competition over access to land in Hargeisa, whose current mechanism of access to land in urban areas marginalises the poor.' Land disputes are on the rise, opposing low-income land claimants and the state who threatens to evict them.

The scholar Tahir, who was consulted for this report on the subject of accessibility and settlement in Hargeisa stated:

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735 Tahir, A, The production of clan segmentation in urban Somalia: Historical Geographies of Hargeisa, April 2021, url, pp. 61-62
736 Buush (singular buu) are makeshift huts, see UNHCR, Somalia Settlement Typologies, 2017, url, p. 10
737 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 13 July 2021
738 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 154
739 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 163
740 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 161
741 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 163
742 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 164
743 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 1818
744 Tahir, A, Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, url, pp. 18, 175-18, 175
‘Yes, the settlement in the city is organised along clan lines. But this does not mean people cannot reside in a neighbourhood populated by a clan different than theirs. One way in which this may have a negative implication is when conflict over land arise. In such cases, returnees and displaced people may feel insecure and unsafe in areas populated by clans other than theirs. Gatekeepers or camp managers may exist in some circumstances i.e when a displaced camp is initiated on private land, speculators or by a closely knit group.’

In Hargeisa, many of the people who squat today on governmental land or reside in informal settlements across the town are returnees from refugee camps in Ethiopia. Over the years they have improved their living conditions, huts (buush) were replaced by houses made of corrugated iron sheets, lands were fenced off and an informal property and housing market developed. The squatters have started to rent out land to newcomers, people who were displaced in other parts of the country, fled from Ethiopia or could not afford rising rents in Hargeisa.

3.3 Socio-economic indicators

3.3.1 Economic overview and food security

3.3.1.1 General information

Animal husbandry and livestock export constitute the cornerstone of Somaliland’s economy and a consequent tax income for Somaliland authorities. This sector contributes to 85% of export earnings and 30% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 70% of the population. A 2012 World Bank survey estimated that the wholesale and retail trade in the formal and informal sector represented 20% of GDP, while 8% was derived from crops and 6% from real estate activities. Remittances from the diaspora are considered to be the largest contributor to Somaliland’s GDP. The 2012 estimated GDP per capita of $347 USD would have placed Somaliland in the fourth lowest place in the world ranking, with urban poverty estimated at 29% and rural poverty at 38%.

Still according to the World Bank, the deficit between the value of goods imported to Somaliland and the value of goods exported from Somaliland amounted to approximately 496 million USD in 2012.

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745 Tahir, A., email, 23 June 2021. Abdifatah Tahir is a specialist of Hargeisa who obtained his PhD from the University of Sussex and currently (as of June 2021) serves as a member of Parliament in Somalia.
746 Bakonyi, J., The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities, 15 October 2020, url, pp. 16-17
748 Musa, A. M. et al., Factors influencing livestock export in Somaliland’s terminal markets, 9 January 2020, url, p. 1; World Bank (The), New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 2014, url
749 World Bank (The), New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 2014, url
751 World Bank (The), New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 2014, url
752 World Bank (The), New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 2014, url; see also Kilicullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, url, p. 88
Remittances to Somaliland dropped in 2020 due to Covid-19 before picking up again at the end of the year.\textsuperscript{753}

Hargeisa is the largest economic centre of Somaliland.\textsuperscript{754} UN-Habitat reported that the city revenue dropped from March 2020 onwards (a decrease of 11% in 2020 as compared to the previous year) due to the closure of businesses during the lockdown. Moreover, the intergovernmental fiscal transfer that Hargeisa receives from Somalia’s central government has decreased by 53% in 2020 as compared to the previous year.\textsuperscript{755} Kilcullen wrote in 2019 based on an interview with Somaliland’s Ministry of Finance that much of the 700 million USD worth of remittances sent by Somalilanders in the diaspora flew through Hargeisa.\textsuperscript{756} The COVID-19 pandemic led to a fall in the level of remittances sent to Somaliland, ‘a concern to local people in Hargeisa’ according to UN-Habitat.\textsuperscript{757} In a context of decline in remittances, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) reported that, between April and June 2020, 28% of urban and IDP households in Hargeisa received external remittances.\textsuperscript{758}

Somaliland imports most of its foodstuffs, as David Kilcullen noted in 2019, adding that:

‘less than 13 percent of land is suitable for agriculture, only half of this is cultivated for local consumption and the national market, and only 10 percent of arable land is irrigated, while the rest is rain-fed. Most farm production is subsistence-based, with the sole (and recent) exception of watermelons, now a successful export to Djibouti. Most farmers grow sorghum or maize for household consumption on small farms of two to 30 hectares, while fruits and vegetables are grown in market gardens for sale to cities.’\textsuperscript{759}

Although no large industries developed, the private sector has thrived thanks to relative peace and security.\textsuperscript{760} The government lacks the resources to invest in public goods, notably urban infrastructure.\textsuperscript{761} It is the private sector which in Hargeisa ‘delivers basic services such as health, education, electricity, domestic water supply and urban waste disposal’.\textsuperscript{762} The high price of basic infrastructures such as electricity is considered to have a negative impact on businesses in Hargeisa.\textsuperscript{763}

\textsuperscript{753} openDemocracy, COVID-19 has transformed Somaliland’s remittance lifeline, 19 April 2021, \url{https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/}; see also FSNAU, Somalia 2020 Post Gu Food Security and Nutrition Outcomes and Projections, 30 September 2020, \url{https://www.fsnausom.org/}; p. 12


\textsuperscript{755} UN-Habitat and UNCDF, Global Compendium of Practices on Local Economic and Financial Recovery, 3 March 2021, \url{https://www.un-habitat.org/}; p. 42

\textsuperscript{756} Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, \url{https://www.fsnausom.org/}; p. 7

\textsuperscript{757} UN-Habitat and UNCDF, Global Compendium of Practices on Local Economic and Financial Recovery, 3 March 2021, \url{https://www.un-habitat.org/}; p. 42


\textsuperscript{759} Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, \url{https://www.fsnausom.org/}; p. 1111


\textsuperscript{761} Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, \url{https://www.fsnausom.org/}; p. 14


3.3.1.2 Food security

FEWS NET published a map on food insecurity in Somalia which classified the city of Hargeisa in a ‘crisis’ phase (phase 3 on the Acute Food Insecurity Phase ladder) in January 2021.\textsuperscript{764} Water and food insecurity are reported to pose the most significant challenge for Hargeisa.\textsuperscript{765}

Scholar Hamda Abdullah conducted a study on food insecurity in households in Hargeisa and published the results in 2018, notably showing that 53.2% of the total households were below the food insecurity line.\textsuperscript{766} Moreover he argued that the rapid increase in the population of Somaliland led to ‘easier access to food of low nutritional quality at reduced prices & seemingly less health quality’.\textsuperscript{767}

According to the FSNAU and FEWS NET, erratic rainfall distribution in agropastoral areas and a desert locust infestation in north-central Somalia led, among other factors, to significant crop losses in 2020 and livestock prices were ‘high across the country, reflecting persistently low supply in north-central Somalia’.\textsuperscript{768} A May 2021 quarterly brief on food security and nutrition in Somalia reported that the desert locust upsurge had ‘significantly declined in March’\textsuperscript{769} 2021 due to ongoing control operations and poor rainfall, but forecasted a below average Gu season cereal production in agro-pastoral areas of the North.\textsuperscript{770}

According to a 2020 report by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) on the impact of COVID-19 on food security in the East & Horn of Africa, the measures taken to limit the spread of COVID-19 such as restricting access to markets were particularly detrimental to ‘poor households’ ability to cover daily food needs’.\textsuperscript{771} The Food Security Outlook by covering the period between October 2020 and May 2021 stated, mostly in relation to urban areas and internally displaced person settlements, that ‘most poor households typically spend a high proportion of their income on food expenditures, and the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on their ability to purchase food.’\textsuperscript{772}

3.3.2 Housing and shelter

According to the director of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in Hargeisa who was interviewed for this report, the housing types in Hargeisa are: huts (buul) which can be rented for 20 USD per month, jingaad (a basic housing structure of only metal sheet, which can be rented 35 USD/month for a one-bedroom, 70 or 100 USD for a two- or three-bedroom, more if they are centrally located), baaweyne (iron sheet house, but better decorated than jingaad). Baweyne are

\textsuperscript{764} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia - Food Security Outlook - Weather shocks, desert locust, and COVID-19 economic contraction lead to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes – October 2020 to May 2021, 15 November 2020, \url{url}, p. 2
\textsuperscript{765} Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, \url{url}, p. 11
\textsuperscript{766} Abdullah, H., Determinants and Dimensions of Household Food Insecurity Risks in Hargeisa City, Somaliland, October 2018, \url{url}, p. 1216
\textsuperscript{767} Abdullah, H., Determinants and Dimensions of Household Food Insecurity Risks in Hargeisa City, Somaliland, October 2018, \url{url}, p. 1217
\textsuperscript{768} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia - Food Security Outlook - Weather shocks, desert locust, and COVID-19 economic contraction lead to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes – October 2020 to May 2021, 15 November 2020, \url{url}, p. 4
\textsuperscript{769} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jialal Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 5
\textsuperscript{770} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jialal Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 13
\textsuperscript{771} IPC, East & Horn Of Africa: IPC Food Security Phase Classification, Desert Locusts & COVID-19, 19 May 2020, \url{url}, p. 1; see also FSNAU and FEWS NET, Quarterly Brief with a Focus on the 2021 Jialal Impact and Gu Season Early Warning, 17 May 2021, \url{url}, p. 9
\textsuperscript{772} FSNAU and FEWS NET, Somalia - Food Security Outlook - Weather shocks, desert locust, and COVID-19 economic contraction lead to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes – October 2020 to May 2021, 15 November 2020, \url{url}, p. 7
often erected in a first phase by people owning a small plot of land before they can afford to build a brick or stone structure house for their families. All of these types of houses have outside toilets (pit-latrines). Most privately owned brick or stone houses have several rooms and iron sheet roofing, their price varies with their location and size (a house with four bedrooms, kitchen, inside toilet can be rented for 180 to 200 USD/month; a house with five bedrooms, kitchen, one toilet inside, one toilet outside, garage for one car can be rented for 200 to 250 USD/month; a ‘bangalo’ i.e. a house with seven bedrooms, a kitchen, two toilets inside, one outside, a garage for two cars can be rented 250 to 350 USD/month). Houses out of concrete (foq) are 2- or 3-storey-houses which can be rented or 800 USD to 2 500 USD depending on the location. This type of house is often rented by government agencies, international NGOs or UN agencies.\(^{773}\)

Returnees and IDPs settled on large patches of uninhabited private or public land since the late 1990s.\(^{774}\) Their so-called camps or settlements are nowadays located at the outskirts of the city but also within the city centre.\(^{775}\) They attracted large numbers of people over the years, not only forced displaced people but also residents of Hargeisa who could not afford rising rents.\(^{776}\) Settlements named Statehouse, Cakaaro, Dami, Mohamed Mooge, and Digaale are neighbourhoods commonly associated with a population of displaced people, but they inhabited in reality by people with quite different socio-economic profiles.\(^{777}\)

The Migrants on the Margins project carried out between 2016 and 2019 in Hargeisa (among other cities) compared three urban settlements, showing the diversity of housing types and living conditions.\(^{778}\) Camp A is two hours walk away from the city centre and the land is privately owned, with some residents paying rent to the landlord and some others not. Houses are constructed in the traditional aqal-style\(^{779}\), which the inhabitants are reluctant to modernise, fearing an imminent eviction from the land. Digaale however is a settlement planned by the government with support from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Residents own the land they were settled on and houses feature corrugated iron sheets. The camp is equipped with latrines and communal water tanks. The settlement referred to as Statehouse is the oldest of Hargeisa’s settlements, located in the city centre on ruins of public buildings.\(^{780}\) According to another study on State House in Hargeisa, ‘less than 15 % live in brick/masonry houses’.\(^{781}\) Stuvøy et al.’s research participants who resided in State House mentioned regular incidents of fire due to insecure cooking conditions and ‘dense packing of housing structures’, causing

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773 Ali, N. M., mail interview, 29 July 2021
774 Mohamed, S. I., Challenges Of Urban Land Conflicts In Somaliland: The Case Of Hargeisa, October 2018, url, p. 24; ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hohne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 17; see also Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 159
775 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 155; ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer:innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hohne and Jutta Bakonyi], url, p. 17
776 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 155
777 Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 160
779 aqal is a dome-shaped nomadic hut, see Hamilton, J., Somalia in Pictures, 2007, url, p. 46
781 Osman, A. M., Urban Poverty In Somaliland: The Case Of State House Area In Hargeisa, October 2018, url, p. 57

81
several deaths because the settlement’s narrow roads prevent fire trucks from intervening. Inhabitants hope that the city will reclaim the land on which they settled and relocate them to a new plot of land. Digale, Jimale, Ayah 1, 2, 3 and 4 are examples of neighbourhoods newly demarcated by the city on the outskirts of Hargeisa. For more information on IDPs, please see section 3.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview, 3.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city and 3.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups.

Major Somali cities currently experience a building boom conducive to economic development. Bakonyi warned against the violent consequences of this urban reconstruction: Investors and political elites seeking new economic opportunities speculate with urban land and contribute to the expansion of rent economy, thereby precipitating mass-scale evictions of the urban poor and displaced people. There is a direct link between access to land and access to housing and shelter, as people with land can build their own houses to reside or can become landlords (even if only ‘petty landlords’, allowing other people to establish huts or iron-sheet houses. Hargeisa experienced a rapid urbanisation in the past decades and saw land prices increase as well as the competition for access to land and housing. A plot of land of approximately 12m2 (large enough for a four-bedroom house) can be bought for approximately 15 000 USD, while a slightly larger plot (for a five-bedroom house with a garage) can be bought for 22 000 to 30 000 USD depending on the location, and a plot on which a seven-bedroom ‘bangalo’ can be built would cost between 40 000 to 50 000 USD.

In an article published in the Somaliland Peace and Development Journal in October 2018, Suleiman Ismail Mohamed listed different ways of acquiring land in Hargeisa: purchase from a private owner, from the government, inheritance of land after a close relative’s death, but also illegal grabbing. He described the latter as the process through which ‘individuals claim ownership of a large area of land as their own farms’. Land-grabbers can subsequently obtain a title deeds for their land, with the support of local government authorities via bribes or kinship networks. Tahir referred to this phenomenon as a malpractice resulting in some cases in the ‘multiple allocation and issuance of title deeds for the same pieces of lands’. According to his analysis, such malpractice resulted in a lack of faith in the land management system, leading people to build on land without permit. The absence of strong government and governing laws contributed to the problem.

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782 Stuovy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, p. 167
784 Stuovy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, url, pp. 168-169
785 Bakonyi, J., The Political Economy of Displacement: Rent Seeking, Dispossessions and Precarious Mobility in Somali Cities, 15 October 2020, url, p. 20
786 Bakonyi, J., telephone interview, 28 July 2021
788 Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, url, p. 18; Mohamed, S. I., Challenges Of Urban Land Conflicts In Somaliland: The Case Of Hargeisa, October 2018, url, pp. 21, 23
789 Ali, N. M., mail interview, 29 July 2021
790 Mohamed, S. I., Challenges Of Urban Land Conflicts In Somaliland: The Case Of Hargeisa, October 2018, url, pp. 24, 28; see also Hirana Online, The Cost of Corruption [source: Somaliland Times], 11 February 2007, url
792 Mohamed, S. I., Challenges Of Urban Land Conflicts In Somaliland: The Case Of Hargeisa, October 2018, url, p. 24

82
According to Stuvøy et al.’s estimate, several thousand people from squatter settlements in the city centre have already been relocated by the Somalian government, an approach which is supported by international governmental and non-governmental organisations.\textsuperscript{793} Taking the example of a conflict over the land surrounding the Hargeysa Egal International airport (HEIA), Tahir analysed that public officials have a ‘dual strategy’, seeking to negotiate relocation of land claimants, while doubting the legitimacy of local people’s land ownership by threatening with forceful evictions.\textsuperscript{794} In April 2020 the House Land and Property Working Group (HLPWG) in Somalian reported that 61 refugee households had been evicted by the Hargeisa municipality and received shelter grants through local NGOs.\textsuperscript{795}

### 3.3.3 Hygiene, water and sanitation

According to the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JIMMI) which conducted interviews in February 2021 with vendors in Hargeisa and other locations in Somalia, 50 % of vendors interviewed in Hargeisa reported having difficulties to stock trucked water in the three months prior to data collection.\textsuperscript{796} One result of the data collection conducted by JIMMI in November 2020 was that in Hargeisa 100 % of the vendors who participated in the study reported having difficulties to stock menstrual hygiene management (MHM) items in the three months prior to data collection. It was also the case for plastic gloves for 50 % of vendors and of water for 33 % of them.\textsuperscript{797}

In its 2019 working paper, Kilcullen described the water supply system in Hargeisa as follows:

'Fewer than one in 100 households in Hargeisa has access to running water, with access dropping off sharply as one moves out from the city centre. Most middle-class households purchase plastic or metal water tanks which they place on the roadside and replenish by purchasing water from donkey-driven carts that roam the streets at most hours of the day. One thousand litres of water costs roughly USD$6 as of late 2018, and lasts a family of four about 10 days. The carts are regulated by government, and their water comes from state-owned rigs and pipes in the city, but the water itself often originates from reservoirs and wells many miles from the city. Frequently, landowners commercialise public water pipelines on their properties, selling public water directly to consumers, and the government is paid by calculating the amount of water used – like a private household, though with far higher usage.'\textsuperscript{798}

In a 2019 report written by the team of the Infrastructure and Cities for Economic Development (ICED) Facility, the authors stated that ‘70% of the city’s population rely largely on water from tanker trucks and hand carts, paying at least four times the price of piped water per unit, creating an excessive cost burden that falls most heavily on the poorest.’\textsuperscript{799}

\textsuperscript{793} Stuvøy, K. et al., Precarious spaces and violent site effects: experiences from Hargeisa’s urban margins, May 2021, \url{...}, p. 169
\textsuperscript{794} Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somalian: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, \url{...}, p. 175175
\textsuperscript{795} UN OCHA, Somalia: Update 5 – Overview of Covid-19 directives, 1 June 2020, \url{...}, p. 1; see also UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs Overview – Somalia, 22 December 2019, \url{...}, p. 58
\textsuperscript{796} REACH, Somalia Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JIMMI), 20 April 2021, \url{...}, p. 12
\textsuperscript{797} REACH, Somalia Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JIMMI), 21 January 2021, \url{...}, p. 7
\textsuperscript{798} Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somailand – Invisible City, 2019, \url{...}, p. 15
\textsuperscript{799} ICED Facility, Case Studies: Delivering Inclusive Growth Through Infrastructure Programming in FCAS. Consolidated findings, August 2019, \url{...}, p. 9
Kilcullen referred to water as a ‘critical commodity’ for Hargeisa, as droughts in the hinterland due to uncertain rain-fall drive farmers to the city, increasing the demand on ‘already stressed water supply systems’.800

The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation noted in 2012 that the ‘limited water and electricity networks and lack of sewage’ in Hargeisa lead to high costs of access to such utilities.801

3.3.4 Health care

Medical doctor Djibril Ibrahim Moussa mentioned that in Hargeisa around 200 medical doctors are offering services for a population of roughly one million people or more which amounts to an estimated ratio of one medical doctor per 5 000 inhabitants or more.802 The desirable doctor-population ratio, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), is 1:1 000.803 A study of Fatumo Abdi Abdillahi et al. mentioned that in Somaliland, the ‘healthcare system has never developed beyond providing the most basic functions, which leave it ill-equipped to deal with any significant challenges’.804

Moussa added that health care in Hargeisa is essentially private.805 Although the largest hospital, the Hargeisa Group Hospital (HGH)806, which is the national referral hospital in Somaliland807, is called ‘public’ or ‘state’ hospital due to partly public funding, patients have to pay there for services.808 There is an admission fee of around 10 USD, a single bed costs around 20 USD/night, a bed in a shared room is around 10 USD/night.809 Operations cost, depending on the type and kind of operation, between 350 and more than 1 000 USD. A caesarean, which is a frequently performed operation, costs around 400 USD, an appendix operation slightly less; orthopaedical surgery or neuro-surgery are more expensive. Additionally, patients have to cover the costs for medication and other services.810 HGH consists of six main departments and has nearly 700 employees including specialised personnel, administrative support staff and auxiliaries. It serves over 260 patients daily in average811 and has a capacity of around 500-600 beds812. Medication costs may vary, depending on type and quantity, between 5 and 50 USD for a monthly dose. The smaller manual services cost between 2 and 5 USD per service. In the other (‘private’) hospitals in Hargeisa, costs for admission and beds are around 30 percent higher than in HGH, costs for operations and other services are roughly the same.813

800 Kilcullen, D., Hargeisa, Somaliland – Invisible City, 2019, url, p. 17
801 World Bank (The) and IFC, Doing Business in Hargeisa 2012, 2012, url, p. 3
802 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021. Djibril Ibrahim Moussa is a medical doctor who worked many years in Borama and in Hargeisa in Somaliland; he is among the staff of the public health faculty, Amoud University, near Borama.
803 Kumar, R. and Pai, R., India achieves WHO recommended doctor population ratio: A call for paradigm shift in public health, The Economic Times, 2018, url, p. 841
804 Abdi Abdillas, F., Ismail, E. and Singh, S., Mental Health in Somaliland: a critical situation, 2020, url, p. 11
805 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
806 Somaliland Chronicle, Dangerously unregulated: The dire conditions at Hargeisa Group Hospital, 30 June 2019, url
807 THET and LSTM, UPHS Scoping Assessment Report Somaliland, November 2020, url, p. 25; Hargeisa Group Hospital, About us, n.d., url
808 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021; Somaliland Chronicle, Dangerously unregulated: The dire conditions at Hargeisa Group Hospital, 30 June 2019, url
809 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021; compare also the prices given by Somaliland Chronicle, Dangerously unregulated: The dire conditions at Hargeisa Group Hospital, 30 June 2019, url
810 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
811 Hargeisa Group Hospital, About us, n.d., url
812 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
813 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
The other hospitals in Hargeisa, which are all private, are Edna Adan Hospital,814 Hargeisa International Hospital815, Gargaar Hospital,816 Haldoor Multispeciality & Teaching Hospital,817 Amal Grand Hospital818 and the Arab Medical Union Hospital,819 each of which has between 50 and 100 beds and several departments. The admission fees and bed-costs in these private hospitals are around 30 per cent higher than in HGH; the costs for operations are roughly the same. Costs for laboratory tests can be higher, depending on the available equipment.820

Furthermore, there exist numerous smaller clinics focusing on a special field, such as maternal health or internal medicine, and doctors have private offices all over town. Some have a degree from abroad, others, particularly the younger generation, have been educated in medicine at Hargeisa University or at Amuud University near Borama in the past 15 years.821

A study based on interviews found that during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, treating patients in Hargeisa was a problem, with a lack of trust in the health care offered. An interviewee stressed that health care was poor, especially in HGH. Reported death tolls were due to negligence of nurses and lack of ventilators.822 Structural problems with health care in hospitals in Hargeisa and elsewhere in Somaliland were addressed in discussions at Edna Adan University, a leading institution for training health professionals in Hargeisa. Among the central problems of the health system in Somaliland that were identified in the discussion were: the low preparedness for emergency, the lack of personal protective equipment and life-saving equipment, the lack of proper training and experience of health workers and the lack of standard operation procedures and guidelines.823

Pharmacies are private businesses often run by people without medical or pharmacological training. The medication is imported from Asia (India and Pakistan) and, more recently, predominantly from Turkey, but also occasionally from the UK and Germany.824 Until recently, no state institution regulated the import of drugs to Somaliland. In 2019, the National Medicines Regulatory Authority825 was established to oversee drug imports. However, it is not yet fully functional as of July 2021.826 The medical fields which exhibit the biggest gaps respectively, in which no health services are offered, are oncology, dermatology and various specialised forms of surgery (e.g., paediatric surgery, spine surgery, heart surgery). Those who can afford it can obtain a visa, sometimes seek medical treatment in these medical fields abroad, e.g., in Turkey, India, or on the Arab Peninsula.827

The field of mental health care is underdeveloped in Somaliland. However, in Hargeisa there are some services. HGH has 100 beds in the psychiatric ward. ‘All public psychiatric care is free of charge, and all departments offer limited in-patient (approximately 250 beds nationally) and out-patient services.’828 The main problem is the lack of qualified staff. There are only around five trained

814 Edna Adan Hospital, Profile of Ena Hospital, n.d., url
815 Hargeisa International Hospital [Facebook], About, n.d., url
816 Gargaar Multispeciality Hospital, Institutional Background, n.d., url
817 Haldoor Hospital, Homepage, n.d., url
818 Amal Grand Hospital, Facebook Profile, n.d., url
819 Arab Medical Union Hospital, Facebook Profile, n.d., url
820 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
821 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
822 Herring, E. et al., COVID-19 and sustainable development in Somalia/Somaliland, 2020, url, p. 105
823 THET and LSTM, UKPHS Scoping Assessment Report Somaliland, November 2020, url, p. 27
824 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021. Abdishakur Abdullahi Osman is an intellectual from Hargeisa.
825 Somaliland, National Medicines Regulatory Authority, Facebook Profile, n.d., url
826 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
827 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
828 Abdi Abdillahi, F. et al., Mental Health in Somaliland: a critical situation, 2020, url, pp. 11-12
psychiatrists in Somaliland; two are practicing in Hargeisa.  

The high relapse rates (between 30 and 50%) 'were attributed to the lack of available medication and poor treatment compliance due to social stigma.'

Payments for healthcare have to be managed privately. Normally, family members support each other regarding these costs. Typically, more substantial costs are paid by family members in the diaspora. If someone is completely destitute, he or she can turn to a mosque and ask the community of believers for help. Sometimes, as an exception, they can ask some better off businesspeople belonging to the community to help out.  

Hardly anyone in Somaliland has health insurance. According to the Somaliland Central Statistics Department there is less than 1% of households that have at least one member with health insurance. For urban settings like Hargeisa it is 1%, while in the countryside it is even less.

### 3.3.5 Education for children

The out-of-school population in Somalia is one of the world’s most significant. Populations’ movements (60% of the population pursues pastoralist activities) and displacements due to violent conflicts or climatic shocks are the main impediments to children’s access to formal education.

Education provision is of low quality in Somalia due to poor education infrastructure, multiple curricula and a high number of untrained or unqualified teachers. Education at primary and secondary levels is predominantly confessional, with school establishments being mostly under the management of private-sector umbrellas, community-owned or run by Islamic charities. The formal public education sector is supported by international organisations.

Compared to the rest of the country, Somaliland and Puntland enjoyed a greater political stability, security and administrative development, contributing to an improvement of student enrolments over the past two decades. For more general information in Somalia, please see section 1.3.5 Education for children.

The Republic of Somaliland’s ministry of education and higher studies (MoEHS) reported in 2017 that the budget for its Education Sector Strategic Plan for the period between 2017 and 2021 would be 275 million USD. In its 2019 Somalia Economic Update, the World Bank reported that the government of Somaliland allocated 7% of its total spending to education, commenting that it would be 'insufficient to support core functions of an effective public education system that include payment for teachers and school construction'. Somaliland has its own Education Sector Strategic Plans and does not take part in the Somali government-administered exams.

According to the director of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in Hargeisa, several education systems coexist in Somaliland. Public and private schools (from primary level to university) are

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829 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
831 Moussa, D. I., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
832 Somaliland, Central Statistics Department, The Somaliland Health and Demographic Survey 2020, October 2020, [url](https://example.org), p. 265
833 USAID, Somalia - Education, 19 March 2021, [url](https://example.org)
834 GPE, Somalia, 30 May 2021, [url](https://example.org); Gonnelli, M., The ItaloPhone Somali Diaspora and Social Change in Somalia, PhD Thesis, 27 November 2018, [url](https://example.org), p. 74
835 GPE, Somalia, 30 May 2021, [url](https://example.org)
836 Republic of Somaliland, MoEHS, Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP 2017-2021), October 2017, [url](https://example.org), p. xvi
837 World Bank (The), Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Economic Update, August 2019, [url](https://example.org), p. 2626
838 World Bank (The), Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Economic Update, August 2019, [url](https://example.org), pp. 25-26
regulated by the MoEHS and the Higher Education Commission. The numerous Madrasas or Quranic schools are regulated by the Somaliland Ministry of Religious Affairs and Islamic Endowment as well as by the Department of Informal Education within the MoEHS. Private schools, private universities and Madrasas are also owned by local people and/or by members of the Somaliland diaspora. The source analysed that ‘because of this plurality of school systems, multiple rival curricula have emerged, promoting competing views of history and identity, often promoting competing perspectives and different languages of instruction depending on their funders and administrators’.  

The school enrolment rate in Somaliland in 2014/15 was 48 %, with a 53.4 % enrolment rate among boys and 44.2 % among girls. Based on data from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education of the Republic of Somaliland from 2014/2015, Gandrup reported that 44.3 % of the total number of school age population was enrolled in school in this period. The same source added that the number of enrolled students in private schools increased between 2013 and 2014 while it stagnated in public primary schools. The Republic of Somaliland indicated that 50 % of children of both sexes were enrolled as primary students in the scholastic year 2015/2016. Quantitative data about school enrolment in Somaliland should be taken with caution as different sources present different figures. Gandrup wrote that it could be in part due to some schools slipping through data collection due to the difficulty to classify them as either public or private and to the difficulty to account for private schools which do not take part in government-led testing.

Based on a survey he conducted in Hargeisa in 2016, the scholar Abdirizak Mohamoud Osman reported that 45 % of children who had access to education dropped out from schools before intermediate or secondary school level. He added that ‘primary and intermediate school children also attend at least one formal or informal Quranic school known as Madaras’. The vast majority of all children in Somaliland gets at least a basic Islamic education, learning parts of the Koran by heart and getting some additional religious education. For many ordinary people in Somaliland, Islamic education clearly precedes learning in schools.

Children living in households receiving remittances in Hargeisa had relatively good school attendance rates, because families could pay school fees but also because members of the diaspora encouraged families in Hargeisa to send their children to school. Members of the diaspora who returned to Hargeisa with financial means tended to favour private education, ‘encouraging providers to offer smaller class sizes and English or Arabic medium teaching’. Gandrup reported that the private sector was rapidly expanding and that in Hargeisa ‘there were 53 public primary schools and 75 private

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839 Ali, N. M., mail interview, 29 July 2021
840 Somalia, MOEHE, Education Sector Analysis, 2012-2016, September 2017, p. 120; see also World Bank (The), Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Economic Update, August 2019, p. 26-27
841 Somalia, MOEHE, Education Sector Analysis, 2012-2016, September 2017, p. 120
844 Republic of Somaliland, MoPND, Somaliland in Figures – Edition 14 ; Data 2016, December 2018, p. 6
847 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
primary schools registered for the national exams in ‘2017’. 85.9 Even after the government tried to implement a free public primary education policy in 2011, gross enrolment rate numbers in primary schools stagnated from the school year 2011/2012 to 2014/2015 and contributions from parents still continued. 85.1 Those who can afford it prefer to send their children to one of the numerous private schools, which offer education from primary to university level for about 10 USD per month. State schools in Somaliland are often worse than private schools, and the teachers in state schools are also paid much less. 85.2

Children from minority clans (Gabboye – Madhibaan and Muse Dirye - as well as Yibir and Tumal) have limited access to education in Somaliland. 85.3 For more information on these groups, please see section 4.1 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (September 2021). A 2017 report by the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) indicated that access to education for children of minority clans was difficult because their places of residence often lacked schools. The report took the example of the Daami district in Hargeisa, where the only primary school was overcrowded. In schools attended both by children from majority and minority clans, the latter were sometimes bullied and/or discriminated against by teachers and other students. 85.4

3.3.6 Means of basic subsistence and employment

The government of Somaliland found in a survey from 2012, that still constitutes the most recent government-produced available information on the matter, that in Hargeisa employment-to-population ratios were at 23.4 % for males and 14.8 % for females. 85.5 A more recent blogpost by Oxfam reported that unemployment rates hovered around 65 % among Somaliland’s youth, which itself represents 70 % of Somaliland’s population. 85.6 UN-Habitat reported in a 2021 analysis of the impacts of COVID-19 on Hargeisa’s economy (among other cities) that local employment had decreased by more than 50 % in Somaliland. The source further reported that the local lockdown, lockdowns in other countries and ‘disruptions in international supply chains’ affected diverse sectors of Somaliland’s economy, particularly hurting small businesses. 85.7

In Hargeisa, the private sector is providing for health, education, electricity, domestic water supply and urban waste disposal. 85.8 Generally, doing business in Hargeisa is rather expensive, in global comparison. Particularly business licenses are expensive. This contributes to a boom of the informal sector. Taxes are often a matter of negotiation, this benefits particularly larger businesses. Legal security for businesses is often guaranteed through customary legal mechanisms. One central problem for start-ups and also for established businesses is getting credit; no international banks are operating in Hargeisa and ‘there is no public or private credit registry or bureau.’ 85.9 A researcher from

85.0 Gandrup, T., Making Schools: PrimaryEducation, Governance And The State In Somaliland, PhD Thesis, 21 September 2020, url, p. 33
85.2 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 6 July 2021
85.3 MRG, No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 31 January 2010, url, p. 17
85.4 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia, Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 48; MRG, No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 31 January 2010, url, pp. 17-18
85.5 Republic of Somaliland, Labour force survey 2012. Report on Boroma, Hargeisa and Burao, [2013], url, p. 35
85.6 Oxfam, Getting Somaliland’s youth back to work through skills training, 4 October 2019, url
85.7 UN-Habitat and UNCDF, Global Compendium of Practices on Local Economic and Financial Recovery, 3 March 2021, url, p. 41
85.8 World Bank (The) and IFC, Doing Business in Hargeisa 2012, 2012, url, p. 1
85.9 World Bank (The) and IFC, Doing Business in Hargeisa 2012, 2012, url, p. 3
Burao University found in 2020 that the reasons for small business failure in Somaliland were: ‘1. Poor economic conditions 2. High operating expenses like rents and wages 3. Competition’. 860

In 2017 a group of scholars found that the informal economy continued to be a key source of livelihoods in Somaliland861 and that a ‘laissez faire approach from government and lack of restrictive regulation has helped growth’. 862 Some religious leaders held the view that women should stay at home to take care of household responsibilities. The view of religious leaders is generally respected in Somali society. Therefore, women engaging in businesses might enter unsafe spaces and encounter structural barriers.863 Women are more often confined to the informal sector than men. On the one hand, they enjoy relative freedom in Somaliland, including Hargeisa, to trade in the market, open small or also bigger businesses, travel and, e.g. import goods for resale. On the other hand, Somali women in general (also in Hargeisa) frequently have less education than men.864 Additionally, they are supposed to marry early (as teenagers already), deliver many children and take care of them and of the household.865 In order to support each other, women traders engage in savings and credit associations. In Hargeisa, some NGOs have been working with groups, particularly women, ‘to associate, organise and accumulate capital together which alleviates some degree, the economic variables of business and the lack of access to credit of IE [informal economy] workers’. 866

The government of Somaliland found in a survey from 2012, that still constitutes the most recent available information on the matter, that Hargeisa’s unemployment rate was 22.3 % in total, with the youth unemployment rate being 37.6 %.867 The report also found that the main occupations in Hargeisa for men were in service and sales (28 %), followed by elementary occupations (17 %) and professionals (16 %). Almost half of women were employed in services and sales (42 %) followed by clerical workers (11 %) and technicians (10 %). 868

Abdifatah Tahir emphasised the crucial role that clan identity plays in the social and economic life of residents in Hargeisa:

‘For instance, employment opportunities are to a significant degree influenced by kinship. Justifications for this include that there are social expectations which bind business owners, shareholders and or senior officials to take part in their clan’s economic empowerment in order to benefit from its protection. Others point out that businesses require prospective employees to have some sort of a guarantor who could be held responsible in case of a theft and other forms of misappropriation. This makes the employment of people from one’s kinship networks much easier to trace and settle cases.’ 869

A local source provided information on monthly incomes. Accordingly, a cleaner earns around 70-80 USD per month, a watchman around 80-100 USD, a policeman or a soldier earns 110 USD, a mid-level military or police officer around 300 USD and a teacher in a public school earns 110 USD. A

862 Mackie, P. et al., Informal economies, conflict recovery and absent aid, 2017, url, p. 376
865 Mohamoud, B. A., To end child marriage, Somali mindsets must change, 25 June 2020, url
866 Cardiff University, The Informal Economy in Civil War: Hargeisa –Somaliland, 2017, url, p. 18
869 Tahir, A., Urban Governance, Land Conflicts And Segregation In Hargeisa, Somaliland: Historical Perspectives And Contemporary dynamics, PhD Thesis, 1 October 2016, url, p. 1212
teacher in a private school gets 100 USD per class and can earn around 300-400 USD per month, depending on the number of classes. A nurse earns 150-200 USD per month, a worker in a government office 200-300 USD, depending on the educational level. A general or a minister earns 1 500-2 000 USD per month. 870

With regard to costs for living, the same source reports that a house (four rooms) in Hargeisa costs 200-250 USD per month. Additionally, a household of six persons needs around 35 USD for electricity and around 30 USD for water and 5 USD for waste disposal monthly. Monthly school fees in public school are 5 USD and in private schools between 15 and 70 USD, including bus fare and depending on the school. A poor family (parents plus 4 to 6 children) in Hargeisa would need between 300 and 350 USD monthly; a middle-class family of the same site would need some 500-600 USD monthly. The normal income of the family head (e.g. the salary of the father who is a teacher or soldier) on government payroll) is often not enough to cover the family expenses; poorer families need regular contributions from relatives (either those having a good job in Hargeisa or elsewhere nearby, or those living in the diaspora). 871

Another local source living for the past ten years in Hargeisa, but originating from Sanaag region, mentioned that someone without relatives or family in Hargeisa would have to spend around 3 USD per night for a cheap hotel room, 2 USD for breakfast, 3 USD for lunch and 2 USD for dinner. The minimum expenses would be 10 USD daily, which means this person would need 300 USD a month to survive in Hargeisa without having a local family connection. This does not include any extra-costs, e.g., for health care 872

As mentioned above, it is estimated that in 2012 remittances constituted 40% of urban households’ income in Hargeisa and that remittances constituted the main source of income for one-quarter of these households. 873 A study published by the Cardiff University in 2017 also found that the economy remained highly dependent on diaspora remittances. 874 In April 2021, the Guardian found that, according to Somaliland’s central bank, between early 2020 and early 2021, ‘remittances increased from $1.1bn to $1.3bn’. 875

3.4 Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups

Hoehne, who lived several years in the region, including Hargeisa, mentioned that generally, society in Hargeisa is clan-based. The dominant groups all belong to the Isaaq clan-family. The dominant groups in Hargeisa are Habar Awal towards the north and the west of the city, Habar Jeclo to the northeast, Habar Yonis towards the west and Idagale (also Aidagalle) and Arab towards the south and south-east of the city. Some neighbourhoods of Hargeisa are dominated by one clan or sub-clan; others are ‘mixed’ (particularly the centre and neighbourhoods close to it, like ‘Statehouse’). Certainly, also non-Isaaq live, work and have property in Hargeisa (please see also section 3.1.1 Demographics and clan composition). Since the city is the capital of Somaliland, members from all groups represented in government have a residence in the city. Businessmen from all over Somaliland are

870 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
871 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
872 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021. Abdullahi Said Yusuf is a driver from outside of Hargeisa.
874 Cardiff University, The Informal Economy in Civil War: Hargeisa – Somaliland, 2017, p. 4
875 Guardian (The), Aid agencies can be harmful, says Somaliland tycoon, 9 April 2021
active in Hargeisa. Also IDPs from the region and from southern Somalia reside in Hargeisa. However, the strongest and most influential group are Isaaq.\\footnote{876}

### 3.4.1 Clan-based protection

A local source in Hargeisa mentioned that the city has become peaceful over the past 20 years. Government institution are firmly established, the police is working effectively, and also the court system is well-established.\\footnote{877} If a person has a conflict or a problem in Hargeisa, he or she can go to the police. If there are credible allegations that a crime has happened, the police start investigations and if evidence was found, the matter is handed over to the courts. Simultaneously, family elders still play a role. In case of theft, injury or even a killing, they can step in and start negotiations about compensation. If an agreement is reached between the elders of the perpetrator and the ones of the victim, the case is normally dropped by the police and/or the court and a compensation is paid to the family of the victim, which is notified officially by the local government (at least if the parties involved wish that). If a killing was intentional, the state does usually not accept to drop the case. In case of murder, normally a mandatory prison sentence of around 10 years is issued. The source added that inside Hargeisa, clan protection is not necessary, unless a person is involved in an active conflict and thus is a potential target in a revenge attack. Members of different patrilineal descent groups can go about their business, own property, buy land etc. without disturbance by others on clan basis.\\footnote{878}

Another local source emphasised that generally, security in the city was stable. Even those from non-Isaaq groups feel secure in everyday life in Hargeisa. However, in conflict situations, clan-belonging usually becomes important. If a member from a group whose ‘clan-home’ (Somali: deegaan) is in Hargeisa, clashes with a person who is an income originating from, e.g., the far east or far west of Somaliland, the local person has an advantage. He or she may have acquaintances and relatives in the police, in court or in other relevant positions. The source added that government institutions in Hargeisa do often not work effectively and they are also not neutral. Particularly courts were frequently prone to bribery and corruption. Additionally, and as a second way to defend one’s position in a conflict situation, a member of a subaltern group would have to mobilise his/her elders to support him/her. Yet, also in regulation procedures under customary law (Somali: xeer), the local groups in Hargeisa would still have an advantage over others.\\footnote{879} This is in accordance with the findings of Schlee, who mentioned in his discussion of conflict settlement among Somalis under customary law that ‘the outcome is largely determined by the differential in bargaining power.’\\footnote{880}

### 3.4.2 Returnees, vulnerable groups

Regarding IDPs in Hargeisa, a local source mentioned that they live in several locations, one camp is in ‘Statehouse’ area. Many IDPs are from the region (Somaliland). Many are impoverished countryside dwellers/nomads who are Isaaq or from another dominant group in Somaliland. They get free space or housing; their survival is guaranteed by relatives who pay for food etc. or through donations from international or local NGOs. Some IDPs are from southern Somalia. They are dependent on humanitarian aid. Some also can work as construction workers, as watchmen or cleaners. In case of

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876 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 12. July 2021
877 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
878 Osman, A. A., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
879 Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
880 Schlee, G., Customary law and the joys of statelessness: idealised traditions versus Somali realities, 2013, \url{url}, p. 263
conflict, also these vulnerable groups form ‘defence units’ (Somali: gashambuur). They try to mobilise their own elders to negotiate with the elders of the other conflict party.\textsuperscript{881}

The same source adds that IDPs in Hargeisa are sometimes accused by the majority population to be behind crimes.\textsuperscript{882} A recent example is reported with regard to refugees in Hargeisa who belong to the Oromo group. In July 2021, they demonstrated in the city, ‘saying that they were afraid to be deported [back to Ethiopia] because of rumours accusing Oromo to have abducted children from houses [in Hargeisa].’\textsuperscript{883} For more information on IDPs in Hargeisa, please see sections \textbf{3.1.2 Humanitarian situation overview}, \textbf{3.2.3 Accessing and settling in the city} and \textbf{3.3.2 Housing and shelter}.

Returnees from the diaspora generally connect with their local relatives (predominantly from the Isaaq clan-family) to get re-integrated into the local society. Hoehne observed that also diaspora Somalis who have been away for decades, e.g. in Europe or North America, normally retain ties to their patrilineal descent groups and some (distanced) relatives on the ground. Upon return to Hargeisa, these relatives would prepare the ground and assist the returnee in the first weeks or even months to establish herself/himself. However, if a returnee would be problem-bound, e.g. mentally ill, a drug addict or ‘penniless’, kinship solidarity could be short-lived. Some relatives might offer a place to stay and some food, but eventually, it is expected that returnees fend for themselves. Those returnees persistently violating basic cultural or religious norms are not tolerated; they have to reform themselves, otherwise they are excluded from family solidarity. Furthermore, those who have lived abroad, especially in the ‘global north’, for a longer time are expected to bring back economic and other resources and invest back home. Those who cannot do so are looked upon and mocked by local relatives and others.\textsuperscript{884}

Vulnerable groups in Hargeisa are, besides IDPs, minority groups. Minorities residing in Hargeisa are mainly occupational minorities belonging to the Gabooye collective (consisting of Madhibaan and Muse Diriye) and also Yibir and Tumal (for more information on this group, please see section 4.1 of EASO’s COI report \textit{Somalia: Targeted profiles}). They are marginalised regarding access to education and political and economic resources.\textsuperscript{885}

\textsuperscript{881} Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
\textsuperscript{882} Yusuf, A. S., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
\textsuperscript{883} VOA Somali, Itoobiyaanka ku nool Hargeysa oo maanta dibad-bax dhigay [Ethiopians living in Hargeysa made a demonstration today], 11 July 2021, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{884} Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 12 July 2021
\textsuperscript{885} Vitturini, E., The Gabooye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation and marginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474; Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Gans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, \url{url}, pp. 14-17
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

Mogadishu

1. Mogadishu’s overview
   1.1. Demographics and clan composition/distribution
   1.2. Humanitarian situation overview

2. Mobility and accessibility
   2.1. Mogadishu airport and flight connections
   2.2. Internal mobility, including checkpoints
   2.3. Accessing and settling in the city

3. Socio-economic indicators
   3.1. Economic overview and food security
   3.2. Housing and shelter
   3.3. Hygiene, water and sanitation
   3.4. Health care
   3.5. Education for children
   3.6. Means of basic subsistence and employment

4. Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups
   4.1. Clan based protection
   4.2. Returnees, vulnerable groups

Garowe

1. Garowe’s overview
   1.1. Demographics and clan composition
   1.2. Humanitarian situation overview

2. Mobility and accessibility
   2.1. Garowe’s airport and flight connections
   2.2. Internal mobility, including checkpoints
   2.3. Accessing and settling in the city

3. Socio-economic indicators
   3.1. Economic overview and food security
   3.2. Housing and shelter
   3.3. Hygiene, water and sanitation
   3.4. Health care
   3.5. Education for children
   3.6. Means of basic subsistence and employment

4. Social protection networks and (lack of) support to specific groups
   4.1. Clan based protection
4.2. Returnees, vulnerable groups

**Hargeisa**

1. Hargeisa’s overview
   1.1. Demographics and clan composition
   1.2. Humanitarian situation overview

2. Mobility and accessibility
   2.1. Hargeisa’s airport and flight connections
   2.2. Internal mobility
   2.3. Accessing and settling in the city

3. Socio-economic indicators
   3.1. Economic overview and food security
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