

SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO

ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR

20 December 2000

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
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Approximate Deployment of Forces in the DRC (Source: IRIN)



SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO

ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed eighteen months ago to stop the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has proved hollow. The accord largely froze the armies in their positions, but did not stop the fighting. The mandated United Nations observers, who were to oversee the disengagement of forces, have remained unable to deploy for the most part due to the continuation of hostilities. Similarly, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, that was to have brought a 'new political dispensation' to the Congo, appears stillborn.

Faced with this impasse in the peace process, the Congo has begun to fragment. Throughout the country a humanitarian catastrophe is underway. The fighting has already cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and an estimated additional two million Congolese have been displaced as a result. The violence has also encouraged ethnic militarism to grow, and the east of the country has already been transformed into a patchwork of warlords' fiefdoms. The territorial integrity of the Congo is threatened, as will in time be the stability of its nine neighbours if the chaos continues.

The failure of the Lusaka Ceasefire has been due to an absence of leadership. The agreement depended entirely upon the cooperation of the parties to succeed. Tragically, none of the signatories fulfilled what they had pledged. Each suspected the others of a double game, and used its suspicions to justify its own duplicity. Since the belligerents themselves were the ones responsible for policing the agreement, and since there was no external guarantor to compel their compliance, the agreement quickly became empty.

Today it remains only as a reference document, at hand for when the belligerents come to realize that they have no other options. At present this is not yet the case. All are determined to persist with their military adventurism precisely because they have so far failed to accomplish their war objectives. They all need to recoup something for the investment of blood and treasure they so foolishly squandered in the Congo. They all want to win, despite the fact that winning is no longer possible.

Rwanda and Uganda's second war in the Congo has seriously endangered their own stability. The lightning strike they unleashed in August 1998 to overthrow Kabila has since become a war of occupation, and risks becoming an unsustainable war of attrition. Energies and funds that each need to spend on economic development have been redirected towards their growing defence budgets. And, under the weight of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC, and the repeated clashes between their forces in Kisangani, the reputations of Rwanda and Uganda's leaders have plummeted.

The war has been no better for Kabila's allies. The DRC President's adamant refusal to accept MONUC's deployment, and preference for sharing the country rather than sharing power, has trapped Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe in the Congo. Now the Harare strongman has little room left to manoeuvre, unwilling to risk a unilateral and undignified withdrawal because of the internal economic and political unrest at home. Angola, on the other hand, has escaped paying the costs of its intervention so far. Its apparent success has tempted President Dos Santos to assert himself as a regional power-broker for West-Central Africa. He supports Kabila because he cannot permit the appearance of a strong and independent leader in Kinshasa. An imminent change in the military situation, however, is likely to call into question the success of this DRC policy, and reveal the limits of Angola's power. In power because there seems to be no other options, Kabila is only a ruler by default.

The inadequate policies of the international community have contributed to this ongoing fragmentation of the Congo. Determined to stop the fighting, the world powers pressured the belligerents to sign the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. The document fitted especially well with the United States' preference for 'African solutions for an African problem'. The limits of this policy have now become clear. At present none of the belligerents has the power to escape the Congolese quagmire without help. ICG therefore recommends a stronger and more determined involvement of the world powers to revive the Lusaka peace process, ultimately restore the territorial sovereignty of the DRC and achieve regional security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

General

1. Pass a resolution to reconcile Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000) with the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, that de-links the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarmament of armed groups, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from one another, in order to permit each to achieve the maximum forward progress.

On Dialogue

2. Promote negotiations on power sharing and transition between the main players (Government/rebels/civil society): the Community of Sant Egidio and Belgian government would be the ideal facilitators.

3. Give greater moral, financial, and logistical support to the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, including the appointment of a francophone 'co-mediator' based in Kinshasa, and force Kabila and the rebels to permit him to conduct consultations throughout the DRC.

On Disengagement

4. Support the Maputo Process and the implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan as a first step to a phased withdrawal.
5. Pressure all countries involved in the war, and especially the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to provide a secure environment in which additional MONUC MILOBS can be immediately deployed along the frontlines, as recommended by resolution 1332 (2000).

On Disarmament

6. Create an international structure, headed by a high level personality, to find solutions for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the armed groups. This body would consult with the region, and the armed groups, in order to formulate a robust and realistic plan for DDR.
7. Pressure Kabila to allow the Burundian FDD to join their country's on-going Peace Process.
8. Pressure the countries at war in the DRC to invest more of their energies in domestic political reconciliation efforts, that in the end offer the only means to convince the rebel fighters to return home.

On Peace-building

9. Design a 'new humanitarian framework' to tackle the complex emergency unfolding in the DRC that follows the recommendations of the JMC resolution adopted in Lusaka in early December. This can be accomplished by establishing a separate humanitarian operations office under a UN Director for Congo Humanitarian Operations responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of a strategy for relief operations in both rebel and government territories.
10. Pressure Uganda and Rwanda to give compensation for the destruction of Kisangani as called for in Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000).

TO THE DONOR COUNTRIES

11. Link the foreign belligerents' commitment to the DRC peace process – together with their illegal exploitation of the nation's wealth - to scrutiny of their domestic economic performance and record of 'good governance' in order to assess their qualification for financial aid, debt relief and trade agreements.
12. Pressure SADC countries to compel Kabila to comply with the implementation of the Lusaka agreement. Means to accomplish this include restricting the quantity of fuel the DRC imports, and limiting the amount of SADC military support his regime receives.

TO THE FOREIGN WARRING PARTIES

13. Recognize that the Lusaka process offers the only way out of the DRC quagmire, with all parties being involved in systematic negotiations as opposed to military endgames or ad hoc, back-room contacts.
14. Provide MONUC MILOBS with the minimum guarantees needed to deploy in the field, especially so that the unarmed UN observers can work unhindered.
15. Restore support to the JMC, by calling regular monthly Political Committee meetings, pushing for further deployment of teams in the field and implementing the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan.
16. Assist Masire's office to prepare for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by providing access to all parties and DRC territory.
17. Step up sincere domestic reconciliation efforts to end political or ethnic rivalries that have spilled over into the DRC and drawn them into an ever-widening conflict.

Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000



SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO

ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR

I. INTRODUCTION

In July and August 1999, six Heads of State and over fifty rebels leaders signed a ceasefire in Lusaka, Zambia, to end the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – Africa's first continental scale war. Tragically, the fighting never stopped.

The war is said to be a Congolese civil war between DRC President Laurent-Desiré Kabila and a rabble of different rebel movements. In fact, it is also chaotic mix of other peoples' wars, which together have overtaken the remnants of the country its disgraced and defeated former ruler, Mobutu Sese Seko, left behind when he fled in 1996. At one level it is a conflict between two regional alliances – a 'Great Lakes' alliance of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, versus one of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. On another level, it is a violent mixture of national civil wars, including those of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, all of which are partly fought on Congolese soil. Finally, in the midst of this chaos, the Congo's own stew of local ethnic feuds has sparked an explosion of bloodshed in the eastern part of the country. All of these conflicts feed and reinforce one another, and together risk to transform the Congo into a patchwork of warlord's fiefdoms.

The Lusaka agreement outlined both military and political measures to bring peace to the Congo. Unfortunately it was never a very realistic document. It called for the deployment of 'an appropriate' UN Chapter VII peacekeeping force to help implement the ceasefire, as well as track down and disarm militias, and screen them for war criminals. For the interim period prior to the UN deployment however, the Agreement assigned the belligerents themselves with the task of policing the disengagement of forces. This was to be done under the auspices of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of two representatives from each signatory and a neutral OAU-appointed chairman, that reported to a Political Committee made up of the the combatants' Foreign and Defence Ministers.

On the political front the Lusaka Agreement envisioned a National Dialogue that would deliver 'a new political dispensation' to the Congo. The aims of this Dialogue would include the organisation of democratic elections, the formation of a new national army and the re-establishment of state administration throughout the country. President Kabila, the two factions of the rebel *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), the rebel *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC),

unarmed opposition groups, and civil society groups all would participate as equals under the aegis of a neutral, OAU appointed Facilitator.

This agreement was never implemented. At first it was undermined by the belligerents' own non-compliance with its terms. Now it may have become impossible for them to carry out what they promised, due to their mutual distrust for one another, as well as their ill-concealed desires to pilfer the Congo's riches. Nevertheless, the principles of Lusaka remain as a reference for how the country might be put back together, should the resolve to do so be found.

The destruction of the war has surpassed the expectations of all the belligerents. What they all thought would be a rapid contest has become a bloody and expensive stalemate. Moreover, the alliances with which they began the war, have either collapsed in bloody in-fighting, or have withered away as a result of foreign reluctance to fight the Congolese's own battles. As a result no one has the power to win the war. The current impasse however, will not last. Each country faces the risk of defeat due to the Congo war's corrosive effects upon state institutions (such as disciplined standing armies) and national economies. In addition each faces the ever-present threat of bad luck on the battlefield.

In December 2000 it appears that fortune favours Rwanda and Uganda. Since August the Kampala backed MLC have threatened the key Congo River town of Mbandaka - and by extension Kinshasa four days down river. The Rwandans and their RCD allies have just decisively repulsed a *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC) offensive in Katanga, and have captured the important border town of Pweto. Good fortune in war however, breeds over-confidence and risk taking. Both Uganda, and Rwanda, may believe that they can overcome the stalemate, and win a military victory in the Congo. Desperate to salvage success from the stalemate, they may accept this gamble – and suffer defeat as a consequence.

Similarly, Kabila's defeats make him look weak at present. This does not mean however that his allies will accept his – and their defeat. Common interests between them and Kabila have grown-up in the more than two years of war. As a consequence, they have incentives to stand by the government in Kinshasa.

In this report, ICG gives a comprehensive analysis of the intertwined dimensions of the Congo conflict and offers some concrete proposals on how to revive a meaningful peace process.

II. THE STALEMATE ON THE CONVENTIONAL FRONTLINES

Eighteen months after the Lusaka Agreement, there is still no end in sight to the war. The fighting mixes three different kinds of conflict. Along the frontline a largely conventional war is fought between the foreign armies and their Congolese allies. Elsewhere the national wars of DRC's neighbours are fought out on Congolese soil. And finally, under the destructive influence of the violence, pre-existing tensions between different Congolese communities have erupted in horrific bouts of ethnic bloodletting.

The military background to Lusaka

At the time of the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire, Kabila was faced with the threat of imminent military defeat. Government FAC and allied troops had failed to make headway against the rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan patrons. Heavier than normal rains in early 1999 slowed the movement of the FAC and its allies. On the other hand, the lighter Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) pushed on with its slow westward advance.

In the midst of the Lusaka talks, the situation turned critical for Kabila and his government. On 15 June 1999, RPA forces crossed the Sankuru River and captured the Kasai Oriental town of Lusambo.¹ The river formed the last natural obstacle in front of province's diamond-rich capital of Mbuji Mayi. The overwhelmed FAC defenders fled, leaving behind their Zimbabwean and Namibian allies.² The RPA pressed on towards Kananga.³ By early July they had enlarged their bridgehead with the capture of the towns of Pania-Mutuombo and Dimbelenge, 75 km short of Mbuji Mayi.

In the east other RPA units simultaneously advanced from the direction of the north Katanga town of Kabalo. Heavy fighting was reported in Eshimba, east of Kabinda on May 22.⁴ A week later the RPA had reached Kabinda, some 120 km to the east of Mbuji-Mayi. "The noose is obviously tightening," reported *Radio France Internationale*.⁵ Kabila was under serious pressure and appeared on the verge of losing the war had a ceasefire not been reached.

The strategic importance of Mbuji Mayi cannot be overstated. The Kasais form the geographical heart of the DRC. Unlike the impenetrable jungles and swamps that lie to Kinshasa's northeast, the route from the Kasais to the capital is relatively clear of natural obstacles. Moreover the mineral revenues from Kasai diamonds are a critical source of finance for the war. If Mbuji Mayi were to fall, the government would be deprived of these funds and lose its land links to Katanga, also rich in minerals. In the words of RPA Deputy Chief of Staff James Kabarebe: "If Kananga, Mbuji Mayi and Kabinda are taken, then Kinshasa will fall."⁶ Under immense international pressure the Rwandans eventually agreed to stop their military advance and sign a ceasefire.⁷

The military situation since Lusaka

Today the war grinds on as the combatants jockey for positions of tactical advantage along the 2,400 kilometre 'conventional' frontline. This battle line is rarely discernible. No country's army is very large, and the combatant forces are dwarfed by the Congo's vast size and remoteness. Troops are clustered in strongholds built around logistical assets such as ports, airfields and the few

¹ Ferdinand Bigumandondera, 'Lusambo Under Rebel Control', PANA (16 June 1999).

² Sam Kiley, 'Kabila At Risk in All Out Battle for Gem Fields', The Times (18 June 1999).

³ 'Kabila's Last Throw', Africa Confidential, (8 July 1999).

⁴ 'Kigali Accused of Violating Ceasefire' New Vision (2 June 1999).

⁵ Ghislaine Dupon, 'Fighting reported in south - North Korean troops reportedly arrive', Radio France Internationale, Paris, in French 1230 gmt 29 June 99, as monitored by the BBC.

⁶ ICG Interview, Col James Kabarebe, RPA Deputy Chief of Staff (11 August 2000).

⁷ See ICG Africa Report N° 18, *The Agreement on a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analyses of the Agreement and the Prospects for Peace*, 20 August 1999.

passable roads. Attacks are only possible after long marches through jungle or savannah. Soldiers are generally cut off from regular supply lines and are forced to live off the unlucky civilians in their immediate vicinity.

	Estimated size of forces deployed to the DRC	What they bring to the war effort
AliR (Interahamwe and ex-FAR)	30,000-40,000	Seen as determined fighters. They are divided between the conventional frontline, and the Eastern Kivus region.
Angola	2,000 - 2,500	The Army is poorly disciplined, but heavily equipped. Troops in the DRC are 'second echelon' quality. Nevertheless their air power is a decisive advantage despite poor equipment maintenance.
Burundi	2,000	Thought to be adequate tactically at the small unit level. But at present they are distracted by heavy fighting in Burundi
Democratic Republic of Congo -FAC	45,000 - 55,000	Even the 'elite' troops have proved to be unreliable in battle. This number includes Interahamwe and FDD forces present in the FAC.
Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)	16,000	Burundian rebels who have come to fight in the service of Kabila. Their forces are split between the Congo and the Tanzanian refugee camps.
Movement for the Libération of Congo (MLC)	6,500 – 9,000	Troops of various quality and origin. They enjoy the advantage of Bemba's complete control over the movement.
Namibia	1,600 – 2,000	Infantry, some artillery. Generally of little importance to the overall conflict.
RCD-Goma	17,000 – 20,000	Unreliable in battle. Many deserted from the FAC when the rebellion broke out, and have little loyalty to the rebel cause.
RCD-ML	2,500	Divided by internal feuds, and little able to assist Uganda with the war effort against Kabila.
Rwanda	17,000 – 25,000	Troops are respected for their determination. The force however has little firepower, and remains something of a guerrilla army.
Uganda	10,000	Greater firepower than the RPA, but troops are less reliable.
Zimbabwe	11,000	Viewed as a well-equipped and professional military. However their performance in combat to date has been poor.

(See Appendix C for complete conventional order of battle data)

Since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, these forces have clashed on every front. In Equateur, the forces of Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC have crept westwards in the face of repeated FAC counter-offensives. On the central Kasai front, the Rwandans have skirmished with their opponents to tighten their grip around Mbuji Mayi. On the southern Katanga front, the FAC and its allies have repeatedly sought to break through to Lake Tanganyika, and the Kivus. Elsewhere less conventional forms of fighting have occurred. In the Eastern province of Kivu, Kinshasa's agents have encouraged resistance to the RPA and have sought to threaten Rwandan territory itself. Armed with Kabila's assistance as a result, the Interahamwe grew stronger. Also benefiting were the more traditional Congolese 'Mai Mai' militias that have proliferated in the region since the Lusaka agreement.

A. The Equateur Front

The MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba has grown from a motley collection of 154 fighters in December 1998 to a force of over 6,000 that controls most of Equateur province. With staunch UPDF support, these troops have advanced to threaten the key town of Mbandaka on the Congo River.

Located at the mouth of the Ruki River and its navigable system of tributaries, the town's fall threatens to force a collapse of FAC and allied forces across the whole of the north of the country. Moreover, if captured intact, the town's ferries and airfield would serve as a springboard for an advance on Kinshasa, only a few day's travel by boat downriver.

To counter this threat, Kinshasa has launched two major offensives into Equateur along the Ubangui River since the Lusaka Agreement. The first lasted from mid-October to mid-December 1999, and made little progress.⁸ The second opened in May 2000 and was at first more successful. By early August 2000 FAC forces had advanced almost 200 km northwards. But then disaster struck; on 9 August the MLC sank a ferry carrying hundreds of troops and overwhelmed Kabila's elite 10th Brigade. FAC resistance crumbled and with the support of UPDF artillery, by early October Bemba recaptured all the ground he had previously lost.

Energized by these victories, Bemba threatened to march on Kinshasa. In the West Equateur town of Gemena, on 1 October 2000, before a crowd of several thousand supporters celebrating the second anniversary of the MLC's foundation, Bemba said, "(Kabila) understands only the language of war and I will give it to him."⁹ He warned that the first step towards this would be an attack on Mbandaka. "We have the capacity to enter this town and tomorrow you will hear that Mbandaka has fallen and the MLC has entered the town," he told the crowd. In response they shouted, "Mbandaka must fall."¹⁰

Bemba's success has allowed Kampala to reconsider pursuing a military solution for the DRC war. At the time of writing MLC forces are on the move towards Mbandaka. UPDF Commanders are said to be considering what would be required for an advance on Kinshasa.¹¹ But this manoeuvre would be militarily impossible in the face of the resistance of Angolan forces. The terrain between Mbandaka and Kinshasa is heavily forested and marshy, and an advance by river would be highly vulnerable to observation and attack from the air.

⁸ Despite the signature of Jean-Pierre Bemba on the Lusaka Agreement his MLC forces continued to threaten Mbandaka. The Kinshasa paper *Le Potentiel* reported in December that the MLC was advancing towards Mbandaka from along the Lulonga River from the East, and along the Ubangui River from the North. Bemba told reporters however that Kabila was responsible for the fighting. Specifically, he claimed that the FAC had amassed 15 battalions of 15,000 troops in Northern Congo, and had launched more than 40 attacks against his positions since the beginning of November. Later when FAC forces captured the river port of Nkonya in mid December Bemba told journalists that the attack was "part of a general offensive which has been going on since October 15". In addition he claimed that Kinshasa was reinforcing their force in Mbandaka with troops and equipment, and said that they had sent one naval battalion up the Congo River to attack rebel positions. Fighting in the region persisted into January near the towns of Mobambo, Ngalangba, Gwanlangu, Poto, Imese, and Libanda. See 'Paper Says Rebels Attacking on Three Fronts', *Le Potentiel*, Kinshasa, in French (8 December 99), as monitored by the BBC (11 December 1999); Todd Pitman, 'Congo Fighting rages, UN Team Arrives in Rebel Town', Reuters (27 November 1999); Chris Simpson, 'DRC Belligerents Urged to End War', The Post of Zambia (17 December 1999); Todd Pitman, 'Rebels Claim 120 Prisoners in new Congo Fighting', Reuters (2 December 1999).

⁹ Emmy Allio, 'Bemba Plans Assault', New Vision, Kampala (2 October 2000).

¹⁰ Todd Pitman, 'Congo Rebel Threatens to Strike Towards Capital', Reuters (1 October 2000).

¹¹ 'Great Lakes Update', IRIN (4 October 2000).

B. The Kasai and Katanga Fronts

At the moment of the Lusaka ceasefire, the RPA was poised to take the strategically critical city of Mbuji Mayi. Since then this advantage has slipped away from the Rwandans. The FAC used the time secured by the agreement to rearm and re-organize the defense of the town assisted by its Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Namibian allies. Meanwhile the RPA has had to overcome the daunting logistic and command obstacles required to maintain an army in the field, stretched from southern Equateur to the Zambian frontier, and to respond to the worsening insurgency in the Kivus and the sudden outbreak of hostilities with Uganda.

Since the ceasefire therefore the strategic balance has continued to change. Feeling militarily strong, Kabila has been more and more tempted to repudiate the agreement. Afraid of losing the military superiority it held at Lusaka, the RPA has felt increasingly compelled to take pre-emptive action to safeguard its advantage. Without progress on the diplomatic front, this situation has been a sure recipe for a very tenuous ceasefire.

An early flashpoint was the town of Ikela in Southern Equateur, where Rwandan and its allied RCD rebels had encircled several thousand Zimbabwean, Namibian and FAC troops. In late November 1999 a relief force attempted to break through, supported by air and river gunboats, from Bukungu 64 km to the northwest. "There was a massive attack by Kabila with three boats, four helicopters and many, many Antonov bombers" rebel RCD-Goma spokesman Kin Kiey Mulumba told journalists. "Our troops had to retreat."¹² For its part the Government of Zimbabwe confirmed the story, saying that rebel attempts to cut off food supplies had necessitated the attack's launch. Ultimately the offensive failed to relieve the town and its garrison. Press reports quoting Rwandan and rebel sources claimed a deal had been made between Kigali and Harare, in which Bukungu would be returned to Rwandan and RCD control in return for their letting in food supplies. Embarrassed, Zimbabwe angrily denied the story. Nevertheless fighting died down around the town until the following year.

Fighting around Ikela resumed in February 2000 when a combined force of Zimbabwean, Namibian and Congolese troops was reported to have relieved the siege.¹³ But then when significant FAC troop movements were reported in the region that summer, observers again believed that government forces were seeking to counter an RPA/RCD attempt to cut the town's supply lines.¹⁴ The recent demilitarisation of Kisangani following clashes between the RPA and UPDF however, led UN officials in the region to speculate that the fighting may have been due to a FAC attempt to take Kisangani by advancing towards Opala on the Lomani River.¹⁵ If taken, the FAC forces would have been poised to retake Kisangani, either by land or via Yangambi and the Congo River. Rumours of battalion-scale RCD troop losses around Ikela fuelled these suspicions at the time. Top RCD *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC) Commanders denied these stories, claiming that they originated in the desertion of only a handful of Katangan soldiers on the Ikela front.¹⁶ Other

¹² Todd Pitman, 'Congo Conflict Re-Ignites, Fighting Spreads', Reuters (4 December 1999).

¹³ United Nations Security Council. 'Second Report of the Secretary-general on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (18 April 2000), para. 30.

¹⁴ 'UN Condemns MLC Threat Against MONUC', IRIN (21 July 2000).

¹⁵ ICG Interview, Kisangani (5 August 2000).

¹⁶ Interview with Commandant Bob Ngoy, Kisangani (4 August 2000).

sources alleged that some seventy soldiers had deserted because of the persistent failure of the RCD to keep them supplied.¹⁷

In March heavy fighting erupted in Kasai Occidental. A Rwandan offensive ostensibly launched in response to FAC provocations, captured Idumbe, Mashala, and Demba. In the east Kabinda was also reportedly attacked.¹⁸ These advances brought the RPA and RCD to within several kilometres of the Katanga railroad that connects Kinshasa with the southern province via the Kasai River port of Ilebo.¹⁹ If cut, the capital would be separated from the mineral-rich Kasais and Katanga, whose profits have financed Kabila's war effort. Aware of the danger, the FAC and Zimbabwean Army counter-attacked on the Katanga-Kivu frontier, along a line between Kabalo and Kongolo.²⁰

The FAC and allied forces have been more active on this southern front where they benefit logistically from the proximity of the Zambian frontier at Ndola, and can receive air support from the airbase at Kamina.²¹ The Rwandans face greater logistic difficulties, and must either fly in all the supplies they need, or bring them in by barge and rail to Kabalo, from where they must be flown or carried to units elsewhere on the front.

Heavy fighting occurred in the summer 2000 in Northern Katanga between Kabalo and Nyunzu. Rwandan leaders denied that these attacks represented a serious threat, but UN observers believed that they might have been an attempt by FAC forces to open a corridor to Lake Tanganyika.²² Whichever the case, the RPA reportedly rushed in at least two battalions by boat and air to Kalemie.²³ Rwandan Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes, Patrick Mazimpaka, also told journalists that there had been an upsurge in the fighting. "There is fighting, there are infiltrations,

¹⁷ ICG Interview, Kisangani (30 July 2000).

¹⁸ The DRC Representative to the United Nations, Andre Mwanba Kapanga, also accused Kigali of cooperating with the rebel Angolan movement UNITA to seize Luisa, 200 km to the south. 'Serious Fighting Reported on Eastern Front', IRIN, (22 Mar 2000).

¹⁹ ANC Commander and RCD-Goma First Vice President Jean-Pierre Ondekane explained the offensive's justification. "Comme il n'avait pas une armée solide, il a dû signer d'abord, préparer une armée par recrutement ensuite et lancer enfin une offensive. Les accords de Lusaka lui sont apparus comme du chiffon. C'était pour lui un temps de repli lui permettant d'organiser son armée par recrutement des jeunes gens et par rééquipement en armes et avions. Laurent Kabila a essayé de nous attaquer du côté de Gandajika où il a essuyé des échecs. Il a pu nous prendre Bukungu et Kela que nous contrôlions avant les accords. Qu'allions-nous faire ? Continuer à observer que l'ennemi nous massacre ? Nous avons lancé une riposte foudroyante du côté du Kasai Occidental. Nous avons repris les localités d'Idumbe et de Dekesse. A toute action doit correspondre une réaction. Nous avons ouvert tous les fronts parce que Kabila a déchiré les accords de Lusaka', Interview with Jean-Pierre Ondekane by Nicaise Kibel' Bel Oka, Les Coulisses no. 79, Goma (April 2000).

²⁰ "Rebels Capture Strategic Town", IRIN, (15 Mar 2000); 'Serious Fighting Reported on eastern Front', IRIN (22 March 22); 'Zimbabwe/Congo-Kinshasa- A Military Trap', Africa Confidential (28 April 2000).

²¹ Kamina also serves as the coalition's main operational headquarters.

²² An attack towards Nyunzu was reported to have taken place on 4 July 2000 in the vicinity of Ankoro. It may have been carried out by the 3rd, 101th, and 106th ALIR Brigades, which were reported to have detached themselves from the FAC forces in Katanga, Pweto and Lubumbashi for redeployment in the Kivus. They also admitted that a large concentration of Interahamwe had gathered at Pweto, from where they were expected to seek to break into southern Kivu. ICG Interview, RPA Officer, Kigali (July 2000).

²³ 'Burundi News Agency Reports Ferrying of Tutsi Battalions to Southeastern DR Congo' Azania (6 August 2000) Bujumbura, in French 1715 gmt (6 August 2000) as monitored by the BBC.

there is shelling. It's an organized offensive. The whole front has been reactivated."²⁴

FAC attacks resumed in mid-October when they seized Pepa, and repeatedly bombed Kalemie and Moba.²⁵ RCD officials claimed that the attacking aircraft used Tanzanian airspace to approach their targets.²⁶ Press reports from Rwanda noted that the offensive was carried out by a combined force including one Interahamwe militia brigade, two Burundian *Forces pour La Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD) brigades, two FAC brigades, supported by Zimbabwean artillery and mechanized units.²⁷ Western diplomats with access to satellite intelligence confirmed that Zimbabwean artillery at least participated in the attacks. By 10 November, Kigali claimed to have recaptured Pepa after two days of intense fighting. The RPA and their Congolese allies then pushed forwards towards Pweto, which they captured on 4 December 2000.

The fall of Pweto came after heavy fighting, that sparked the flight of thousands of civilians and FAC soldiers (some 300 of which were reportedly Zimbabwean) into neighbouring Zambia.²⁸ RPA officers told journalists that the FAC losses in weapons, munitions and other materiel were "enormous".²⁹ Many of the casualties were reportedly Burundian FDD rebels, allied to Kabila, while much of the captured weaponry was Zimbabwean. Kinshasa termed the loss of the town a 'tactical withdrawal' made because the 8 April 2000 Kampala Disengagement Plan guaranteed the town would be returned 'without a fight'.³⁰ The loss of the town came only days before a meeting in Harare where the belligerents pledged – again – to comply with the Kampala Plan with effect from 15 December. Suddenly seized with confidence that their enemies are on the verge of breaking however, Rwandan sources raised the possibility of further military offenses.

C. Rwanda and Uganda Also Come to Blows

Another setback for Rwanda was the collapse of its alliance with Uganda in the three confrontations for the diamond-rich city of Kisangani.³¹ This partnership had formed the bedrock of Kigali's security strategy since the 1994 overthrow of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda. But the events in the town were also bad for Uganda. Although it maintained control of most diamond producing regions, the

²⁴ 'War resumes in DR Congo', Reuters, printed in the Monitor, Kampala (3 August 2000). In his September report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan confirms that there has been a number of attacks in the region, but said that MONUC had not been able to verify the accuracy of the reports. See United Nations. Security Council. 'Fourth Report of the Secretary-general on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', (21 September 2000) para. 26.

²⁵ The FAC reportedly also seized other areas in Katanga including Kantoula, Kasaika, Musa, Balanmga, Mututo-Moja, Kyeruzi and Murungusha. See 'Rebel RCD Group Claims it has Recaptured Pepa', PANA (12 November 2000).

²⁶ 'Attaques Aériennes sur Kalémie', PANA (2 December 2000).

²⁷ 'Rwandan Army, DR Congo Rebels Recapture Eastern Town', Radio Rwanda, Kigali, in English 1915 gmt (10 November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.

²⁸ Stella Mapenzauswa, 'African Defence Chiefs Sign Deal on Congo Withdrawal', Reuters (6 December 2000). 'Runaway DRC Soldiers held in Zambian prison', IRIN, (15 November 2000).

²⁹ 'Intense Fighting in Southeast Ahead of signing of Withdrawal Pact' AFP (4 December 2000).

³⁰ 'Congo Governmentt Calls Loss of Town "Tactical Retreat"', Reuters (6 December 2000).

³¹ For a more in depth look at the origins of this Fighting See ICG Report 'Uganda And Rwanda: Friends Or Enemies?', (4 May 2000); 'Report Of The UPDF/RPA Joint Inquiry Into The Incidents Between 6 and 17 August 1999 in Kisangani, DRC', (17 August 1999).

UPDF was defeated by the RPA in the city itself. At the same time the outbreak of the fighting severely tarnished Uganda's reputation in the eyes of the international community.

Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first broke out on the 7 August 1999 over an attempt by the Ugandan-supported RCD dissident Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba to hold a political rally. Renewed violence broke out on 14 August, followed by three days of clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central bank and the major road junctions. By 17 August, when Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a temporary ceasefire, the fighting had caused 600 casualties and had forced much of the city's population to flee into the jungle. When the Joint Commission of Inquiry established by the two countries placed the blame largely on the shoulders of the UPDF, the government of Uganda refused to accept the verdict.³²

Fighting between the two armies broke out again on 5 May 2000. At dawn the city's residents awoke to the sounds of artillery and gunfire that kept up throughout the day, and forced the inhabitants to remain cowering in their homes. Later, it was determined that some 250 shells had fallen on the town, killing scores of civilians, and injuring approximately 150 others. An RCD-Goma statement, signed by then Second Vice-President Moise Nyarugabo, accused the Ugandan army of trying to secure the town of Kisangani for Wamba's rival "minority faction". In response, Uganda's National Political Commissar James Wapakhabulo said that Rwanda had deployed additional troops to the city, and had without provocation attacked UPDF troops at Simi Simi Airport.³³

Alarmed by the violence, the international community deployed a team of UN military observers to Kisangani on 12 May to broker a demilitarisation of the city.³⁴ Ten days later, a plan of demilitarisation of Kisangani had been agreed between the UPDF and RPA commanders. By 4 June, the UPDF had moved all their forces, other than a single company left at Bangboka airport in line with the agreement, to Camp Kapalata North of the city. Then at 8:00 AM the next morning, a UPDF liaison vehicle on the Bangboka road was involved in a mysterious accident. The Ugandans claim it was a Rwandan ambush that killed the vehicle's two occupants. MONUC says that a military observer who arrived at the scene minutes afterwards saw the car burning, but no sign of any occupants.

Approximately an hour later, heavy canon and gunfire erupted in the city, and raged for six straight days. Tens of thousands of city residents remained trapped in their homes without food or water, and at least 60,000 fled into the surrounding jungles. Stray small arms fire fell in all parts of the city. Artillery units north of the Tshopo and south of the Congo Rivers both fired over and into the city. Random shellfire struck all residential and commercial districts. Serious damage was inflicted on the power station, the Tshopo hydroelectric dam, the Cathedral, and one of the cities

³² 'Report Of The UPDF/RPA Joint Inquiry' op cit.

³³ "'Intensive' fighting in Kisangani', IRIN (5 May 2000); Rwanda accuses Uganda of troop build-up on border', IRIN (8 May 2000).

³⁴ From the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

hospitals. Worst hit were the mud dwellings of the frontline Tshopo Commune.³⁵ Interviewed after the battle, one neighbourhood resident told a journalist that 'around Tchopo (sic) it's complete carnage...dogs are eating bodies in the streets. I went to look for my brother but the house was empty, they're all gone. Houses are burned, houses have dead inside buried under the rubble.'³⁶

To stop the fighting, MONUC brokered a ceasefire signed by the countries' army commanders that was due to start on 5 June at 4:00 PM. Despite this senior intervention, the truce was ignored by the troops in the field. MONUC negotiated a further nine cease-fires before the fighting finally stopped on 11 June.³⁷

In the week after 12 June, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) collected the bodies of some 630 civilians and 140 combatants. Teams of ICRC and RCD-Goma soldiers also spent three weeks marking and collecting unexploded ordnance and war debris.

The battle had brought the two countries no gain. The US condemned its two 'friends' harshly. UN Secretary General accused them of breaking promises to stop what he termed 'an outrage', and recommended a harsh Security Council response. This came with the passage of Resolution 1304 on 16 June 2000, which called for the withdrawal of the two armies from the DRC *without further delay* – in apparent contradiction to the Lusaka agreement, which had emphasized the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign armies – and called for Rwanda and Uganda to pay reparations to the victims of their feud.

D. Conclusion to the Military Situation

In December 2000 the MLC and UPDF are at the gates of Mbandaka, and may be able to take the town if they choose. What would be gained by such an attack remains unclear. First, they would have decisively repudiated Lusaka. Second, from Mbandaka, the MLC would threaten Kinshasa, but a further advance on the capital would be impossible without the acquiescence of Angola. Discussions between Uganda and Angola have been underway over the course of the autumn. So far however, the result of these talks have not justified the risk of taking the town.

On the Kasai front, the advantage of being so close to Mbuji Mayi has slipped away from the RPA. Kigali is hard-pressed to find the troops needed to capture the city. In the intervening period Zimbabwean, Interahamwe, and FAC forces have built up its defences. The defenders may also benefit from air support based at near-by Kamina. To overcome these obstacles, a substantial logistical build-up would be required, placing further strain on Rwanda's supply lines. This would be difficult given the increasingly troubled state of the Kivus, and the near certainty of a FAC counterattack elsewhere along the frontline similar to that of October 2000.

The war today is in a state of tenuous stalemate. None of the actors have the power to achieve a decisive victory; each risk to suffer a decisive defeat. This ever-present threat makes all the combatants dangerously dependent on their uncertain allies.

³⁵ MONUC says that weapons used by the rival sides in the city included 120 MM and 81 MM mortars, multi-barrelled katyushas, field artillery, 12.7 MM 'Dushka' heavy machine guns, RPG-7, recoilless rifles and possibly two tanks.

³⁶ Todd Pitman, 'Rwanda Pulls Out of Congo City, Fighting Abates', Reuters (11 June 2000).

³⁷ ICG Interview, Lt Col Khalid, MONUC Sector Commander, Kisangani (23 July 2000).

These alliances are not solid enough to sustain long-term endeavours however, and the belligerent's real power to direct the course of the war is little. Meanwhile the conflict impacts the foreign powers' own home fronts, where they must overcome the social and economic costs of their military adventurism. They are all determined to recoup something for the blood and treasure they have invested in the Congo. They are all determined not to lose the war; they have all already lost.

III. THE MANAGEMENT OF CHAOS: THE REBEL WAR EFFORT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A. The Breakdown of the Rwandan-Ugandan Alliance

The worst blow to the rebel cause was the Rwandan-Ugandan infighting in Kisangani. It revealed to the world that the rebel alliance was a myth, created to conceal the projects of Kampala and Kigali. The illegal exploitation of DRC's resources was similarly exposed. Even more important however, was the damage to the Rwandan and Ugandan war efforts. The three Kisangani clashes have left a residue of distrust between the two one-time allies, who henceforth will unavoidably remain a threat to one another.

When the Congolese rebels signed Lusaka they and their supporters were militarily strong but politically divided. These tensions first burst into the open in August 1999 during the first clash between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani. Lusaka offered Rwanda and Uganda the opportunity to save some of what they had invested in the war and to preserve the advantage they had won on the battlefield before events turned against them. The agreement also offered both the means to continue working towards their objectives. For Rwanda this was the destruction of the Interahamwe and the fall of Kabila from power. For Uganda it was the pursuit of the rebel Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the desire to influence events in the DRC. Burundi was not a signatory to the agreement.

The divisions between these former allies contributed to the failure of the Lusaka ceasefire. Kabila's self-interested obstruction was in large part made possible by the rebel's own divisions. Simply put the Kisangani fighting destroyed whatever credibility the RCD had to be an alternative to Kabila. In addition the military advantage they had enjoyed as a consequence of the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance disappeared when the two became rivals. Rather than comply with the terms of the Lusaka, Kabila would henceforth attempt to exploit the differences between the two former allies.

B. Rwanda and Burundi's Unfinished Civil Wars, and Local conflicts in the Kivus

1. The Rwandan Patriotic Army versus ALiR³⁸

At the heart of the two wars in the Congo is the unfinished ten-year old Rwandan civil war. The conflict that began with the 1990 assault of the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic front (RPF) against the regime of the

³⁸ Armée de Libération du Rwanda.

Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana, reached a bloody climax in the 1994 genocide and subsequent RPF conquest of the country. After their defeat, the forces of the former regime fled to Eastern Congo, from where they continued their war against the newly installed Tutsi-dominated regime. In 1996, Rwanda intervened in the DRC in an attempt to secure final victory in its war against forces of the former Hutu government, which were retraining and re-arming in refugee camps along the two countries' border.

Rwanda's first invasion of the Congo made Kabila president of the country. The Hutu exiles were scattered by the war, and tens of thousands of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and many innocent civilians lost their lives in the fighting. Nevertheless the new ruler of the Congo soon turned against his former benefactors, and even made use of the same Interahamwe and ex-FAR responsible for the 1994 genocide.³⁹ These opponents of the Kigali regime found sanctuary in the vast, virtually ungoverned Kivus from where they waged a campaign to destabilize the country and topple the dominant Tutsi regime in Kigali.⁴⁰ Faced with a growing insurgency in their own Northwest at the beginning of 1998, and the apparent support of the Kabila regime for their long time enemies, Rwanda decided to attempt a second invasion of its giant neighbour in the summer of 1998.

The RPA's spectacular victory over Mobutu Sese Seko two years previously, and its intimate familiarity with the dysfunctional Kabila regime convinced it that it would be easily defeated. Consequently, the RPA struck rapidly at the towns of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, when the war broke out on 2 August 1998, before launching a spectacular trans-continental air assault against Kitona and Kinshasa itself. What Kigali had not anticipated however, was that Angola (its former ally in the 1996 war) would dispatch 7,000 *Forças Armadas Angolanas* (FAA) troops to defend Kabila.⁴¹ Surrounded, the RPA troops involved in the operation, together with the Banyamulenge FAC units that had joined them in Bas-Congo, fought their way to safety in Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)-controlled Northeast Angola, from where they returned by air to Rwanda.

After this failure, RPA strategy reverted to a more conventional advance across the country. Kisangani, the DRC's third largest city, fell to the RPA and their RCD proxies on 23 August 1998. In the south, the lakeside towns of Fizi, Baraka, Kalemie and Moba all fell by the end of the year. These were soon followed by the Katangan cities of Kabalo, and Kabila's hometown of Manono, in early 1999. On the central front, the Rwandans and the Congolese rebels pressed forward to capture the strategic town of Kindu on the upper reaches of the River Congo/Lualaba. By July, when international pressure compelled Rwanda to agree to sign the Lusaka Cease-fire, the front reached as far as Katanga

³⁹ According the Rwandan intelligence, Kabila had begun supporting ex-FAR and Interahamwe from September 1997. These militia forces had assembled in Masisi and Congo's Virunga's National Park, and had infiltrated Rwanda's adjoining Parc des Volcans. Before the second DRC war, these guerilla forces were firmly established in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi regions bordering DRC and were attacking the rural areas around Gitarama.

⁴⁰ See African Rights, 'Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest' (London, September 1999.)

⁴¹ Rwanda believed that it had received Angola's blessings to overthrow Kabila. The delegation that they sent to Luanda however, failed to meet with Dos Santos personally.

province and Kasai provinces. Angered by the pressure to sign, Kigali nevertheless acquiesced because it believed that, for all intents and purposes, it had already won the war.

But since then, the RPA has failed to topple Kabila and to destroy or even weaken the Interahamwe. Now more than two years later, Kigali finds itself occupying a territory many times its own size, inhabited by an increasingly rebellious population. Meanwhile, its erstwhile RCD allies have proven themselves to be politically incapable, as well as prone to human rights abuses that on top of the RPA's own actions have irreparably tarnished Kigali's international image.

Rwanda's war effort meanwhile, has exacerbated the anti-Tutsi feeling already present in tense and violent eastern DRC. The country is evolving towards a dangerous political and territorial fragmentation, where a new breed of ethnic warlords risks to replace the more traditional structures of authority. No military solution by itself is likely to be able to stop this ominous evolution towards chaos.

a. Who are the Interahamwe⁴²

The former ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias that fought for Habyarimana were routed and driven into exile in July 1994. Although they have been ceaselessly chased by the RPA since then, they have always managed to escape and reorganise.

Despite the deployment of thousands of RPA and RCD-Goma troops in DRC, the Hutu militiamen have only grown stronger. Guerrilla prisoners seized by the RPA relate that their morale remains high.⁴³ Continued recruitment has augmented their ranks with youths who may not have played any role in the genocide, together with Congolese Hutus⁴⁴. Their numbers have increased through regular infiltration of additional recruits from Katanga, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. They also benefit from the logistical support of the Kinshasa government delivered either by air to locations in the DRC, or by boat from Tanzania.

Today the Interahamwe and ex-FAR are known as the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), and can be found both in Kabila's conventional army and in the Kivus. Kigali believes that they comprise some 15-20 per cent of Kabila's better frontline soldiers. A senior ANC commander estimates their forces deployed on the frontline at 14,800 and that these fighters are on all fronts, particularly near Mbuji Mayi.⁴⁵ The Rwandans accuse Kabila and his Zimbabwean allies of recruiting in the Hutu refugee camps in Zambia and Tanzania and of running ALiR training camps in Lubumbashi and Kamina.

⁴² This information is based on ICG field interviews with Congolese, RPA and ANC officers, UN officials and international humanitarian agencies, Goma (July-August 2000).

⁴³ ICG Interview Lance Corporal Joseph Bizimana, ALiR, Sake DRC (July-August 2000).

⁴⁴ ICG Interviews RPA officers, Humanitarian sources, Goma, (July-August 2000).

⁴⁵ ICG Interview, Commandant Bob Ngoy, Kisangani (4 July 2000).

Other forces are conducting a hit-and-run guerrilla war in the Kivus, where apart from frequent ambushes, attacks have struck deep into the urban centres of Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira. RPA intelligence believes there are two Interahamwe divisions in the Kivus numbering some 15,000. This compares with estimates from 1999, which ranged from 3,000 to 5,000.⁴⁶ These numbers are likely to increase, for even Rwandan intelligence sources admit that the ALiR is recruiting from among Congolese Hutus. Other reports indicate the infiltration of an additional three ALiR brigades into South Kivu during July.⁴⁷

Ex-FAR Commander General Augustin Bizimungu is widely reported to have his base in Lubumbashi. Force operational headquarters for the Kivus is thought to be near Shabunda. In North Kivu alone the Rwandans believe that there are three brigades operating out of the forests of Walikale and the volcanic Virunga National Park. Located on the Lukweti-Mutongo axis is the 'Limpopo' Brigade commanded by Col Mwalimu. The 'Lilongwe' Brigade is based to the south, around Katoyi. And the 'Niamey' Brigade moves around Rutshuru. Each Brigade is reported to have three battalions that typically operate independently but which can combine for large-scale attacks.

The ALiR exhibit a high degree of military organization. Forces are grouped into permanent divisions, brigades, battalions, companies and platoons. They wear uniforms, maintain a formal rank structure, and for an insurgent army are well equipped with small arms and radio communications.

Larger formations possess limited numbers of heavier support weapons. Military sources say that each battalion has two 60mm mortars; each brigade two 12.7 anti-aircraft machineguns that are frequently used against troops. In addition each company is reported to have five rocket-propelled grenade launchers and five crew-manned machine guns. Their communications equipment includes limited quantities of hand-held Motorolas and man pack VHF radios.⁴⁸

The reports of the local populace indicate that they lack vehicles and regular supplies. They also suffer from perennial shortages of ammunition, food, radio and flashlight batteries and medicines. For such items they depend on raiding local populations. They loot village pharmacies and set ambushes along roads on market days. What they seize in these attacks can either be carried back to their bases in the forest, or resold. In fact, ALiR fighters frequently attend village markets to sell stolen goods and purchase supplies. Otherwise they live off of the yams that grow along the forests' edge in places that were formerly cultivated.

Since at least January 2000, the Interahamwe and some Mai Mai forces have reportedly been receiving supplies from Kabila via air.⁴⁹ The RPA subsequently occupied all but two drop sites, which are still used by the guerrillas.

⁴⁶ ICG Interview, International Goma-based humanitarian source, Nairobi (30 September 2000).

⁴⁷ The Brigades are the ALiR 3, 101, and 106.

⁴⁸ ICG Interviews, RPA Officers and Kigali-based diplomatic sources, (Goma and Kigali, July-August 2000).

⁴⁹ In an 11 August 2000 ICG interview, RPA Deputy Chief of Staff Col James Kabarebe said such drops had occurred at Kasese, Katshungu, Lungungu, Lulingo, Shabunda, Kilembwe (near Kimano II north of Kalemie), and Lulimba. ALiR prisoner Lance Corporal Joseph Bizimana, described one such operation to ICG Interview, Sake DRC (21 July 2000).

Coordinated by satellite telephone, these operations can be quite sophisticated. Independent sources confirm that in one instance in early 2000, a combined force of ALiR and Mai Mai seized and held the airstrip at Lulingo, near Shabunda long enough to land five cargo aircraft flights.⁵⁰ Senior officials in RCD-Goma allege that many of these flights originate in Western Tanzania.

ALiR infiltration into Rwanda has been on the increase during 2000. Their objective is apparently to demonstrate the inability of the RPA to protect its own national territory. For instance, the ALiR launched a bold three-hour attack against Ruhengeri on 1 August.⁵¹ This in turn pressures the Kigali government to concentrate its overstretched forces closer to its own borders.

b. The Rwandan Counter-Insurgency Effort

The Rwandans regard the ex-FAR and Interahamwe as savage criminals with whom there can be no compromise. They remain determined to neutralize them and destroy the threat they pose. RPA Lieutenant Colonel Alex Ibambasi, a Brigade Commander in Gisenyi explained to ICG: "These are people that have committed suicide [by committing genocide]. They cannot come back. They are determined to do wrong things until their deaths."

RPA forces have increased military pressure on the ALiR by striking their jungle bases and training camps. They suffered a temporary setback in June, when the insurgents used the third bout of Kisangani fighting between Rwanda and Ugandan troops to attack RPA positions in Kibarizo, Nyabyondo, Pinga, Gichanga and the Masisi Zone headquarters. But according to the RPA, the back of the offensive was swiftly broken. The most important Rwandan victory occurred when the RPA intercepted the ALiR Limpopo Brigade after it had attacked RPA Masisi headquarters. Over the course of the two battles, the RPA claimed to have killed 200 and captured 70 rifles while suffering only five wounded.⁵² This could not be checked independently, but the RPA claimed that the Interahamwe were dispersed deep into the forest, away from food sources on the cultivated fringe, where they would sicken and starve.

In the face of spiralling guerrilla war, the RPA has become concerned with the hostility of the Congolese population, and has launched a 'hearts and minds' campaign aimed at rehabilitating its image.⁵³ Like many conventional armies before them, RPA officers believe that they are winning the guerrilla war in the Kivus. They claim to have 'pacified' Masisi and Rutshuru, and to have virtually halted all cross-border infiltration into Rwanda. They also believe that they enjoy the support of the Hutu and Tutsi Banyarwanda – or people of Rwanda who

⁵⁰ ICG Interview, RPA officers and humanitarian sources, Goma (26 July 2000).

⁵¹ ICG Interviews, Goma, (August 2000); ICG Interview Lt Col Alex Ibambasi, Goma (16 August 2000); Rwandan intelligence sources report that they enter by three prefectures: Cyangugu, Kibuye, and Gisenyi. Those who infiltrate into Cyangugu come down from Walungu, Kaziba, Nyangezi, and in the moyen plateau of Rubalika, the plain of Rusizi, and the collectivity of Bafulero. Those that infiltrate in Kibuye come from Ziralo, Numbi, Bunyakiri Kahuzibiega Forrest and pass through lake Kivu. Those that infiltrate in to Gisenyi come down from the Masizi Mountains.

⁵² Humanitarian sources in Goma confirm that an attack against Masisi Zone Headquarters occurred in June in which approximately 60 Interahamwe died.

⁵³ ICG Interviews, RPA Officers, Goma, (July-August 2000).

immigrated to the Congo in multiple waves since the 19th century - as manifested by their participation in local defence forces.

Rwanda has sought to recruit the Congolese Hutus and organise them in local defence forces with the argument that there exists a common interest in peace for all the Banyarwanda. Early on during the RPA occupation, 'promising' individuals were transported to Rwanda for several months of political-military indoctrination.⁵⁴ Once the training completed, these students returned to their homes where they were tasked to spread anti-Interahamwe propaganda.⁵⁵ Similar three-month political-military courses are now conducted in the DRC for local defence forces.

When the RPA sets out to pacify a region, it begins by occupying it militarily. Then it makes contact with all the local authorities (such as chefs de quartier, *Mwamis* and priests) in order to mobilise support for the formation of a local defence force training camp. Other than medicine and instructors, the local population must supply everything, including food and students. At one point earlier this year in North Kivu, there were six training camps in operation simultaneously. In North Kivu alone the RCD claims to have 10,000 local defence forces members. In South Kivu these camps have reportedly been organised in Kiziba, Kavumu, Katana, and Kalemie.⁵⁶

The RPA also feels that it has made progress in combating the threat of a cohesive alliance between the ALiR and the native Congolese Mai Mai militias⁵⁷. While they are seen as militarily insignificant, the Mai Mai's native legitimacy threatens Rwanda's efforts to isolate its opponents from the local populations. The RPA claims that many Congolese have come to understand that the ALiR are the true enemy due to the fact that these guerrillas have laid waste the land. A prime example they cite is the case of the Hutu Banyarwanda 'Mongole Combatants'. Originally created to defend the Banyarwanda from expulsion from the Congo, the Mongole viewed the Interahamwe and ex-FAR as allies in 1994. Since the excessive brutality of the ALiR has caused tensions to grow between the two groups, according to the RPA, more than a thousand have changed sides. Similar approaches have been made to the Bunyakiri Mai Mai leader Padiri Karendo Bulenda in mid 2000, in which the two forces collaborated in an attack against Interahamwe near Bukavu.

Another element of the Rwandan counter-insurgency strategy is to promote the return of Hutu refugees from the DRC to Rwanda. Primarily, these are Hutus who fled Rwanda in 1994, and who constitute a natural support base for the ALiR. In North Kivu the prime agent behind this is the local non-governmental organization *Tous pour la Paix et le Développement* (TPD). In existence since October 1998, this group sends agents into regions inhabited by the Rwandan refugees in order to 'sensitise the population' and organize their return.⁵⁸ In

⁵⁴ Such individuals have included students, teachers, and government functionaries.

⁵⁵ ICG Interviews, Kisangani (July 2000), Uvira (August 2000).

⁵⁶ ICG Interviews, RPA officer, Goma (July 2000), Uvira, RCD administrative official (August 2000); 'Goma Rebel Force Trains 105 New Recruits in Katanga Province', RTNC radio, Goma, in French 0500 gmt (21 October 2000), as monitored by the BBC. Amnesty International, 'Killing Human Decency', (31 May 2000) 37.

⁵⁷ See section below on Fragmentation in the Kivus.

⁵⁸ ICG Interview with Alexis Makabuza, TPD Founder, Goma (16 August 2000).

South Kivu it is the RPA that does this work. Already, they have repatriated tens of thousands of Hutus to Rwanda.

This strategy also includes the return of the Congolese Tutsis to the DRC, who fled their homes during the 1996 Masisi war to seek refuge in Rwanda. Since 1999, there have been some 10,000 resettled in Masisi near the relatively safe town of Mashiki. Far more controversial is the clandestine effort by the TPD to resettle Tutsi refugees in Kiroliwwe (30 km north of Sake) on the border of the Virunga Park, which UNHCR says to be too unsafe to allow the return of refugees. Rwanda denies that it supports this, but it is hard to believe that the transportation of more than a thousand people across the border and through Goma by night could happen without the permission of Kigali. Nevertheless only once when a truck broke down in town did the city's population discover the operation – when they nearly attacked petrified Tutsi passengers.

A variety of motives might explain this policy. UN observers suspect that it is propelled by the need for more local defence forces, and maybe to justify RPA presence in the Congo with the need to protect the Tutsi populations. RPA officers angrily deny this and claim to be better qualified to judge whether the Virunga Park is safe. Finally, many of TPD's backers come from powerful landowning Congolese and Banyarwanda families, who have an interest in keeping their land settled.

Other motives may be rooted in Rwandan political-military strategy. Positioning a population of armed, loyal Tutsis along the Western edge of the Virunga Park may be an effort to block the infiltration of Interahamwe towards the Rwandan frontier. If this population helps to cement support for the RPA from the other inhabitants of the region, as is outlined in the Kigali's political strategy of fashioning a common Banyarwandan front for peace, then Interahamwe access to the park will be cut off. However, this strategy exposes the returned refugees to attacks by armed groups.

c. The Results on the Ground

Predictably, the RPA is claiming to 'see the light at the end of the tunnel' in the Kivus. The reality is very different. Traditional authority in the Kivus has collapsed in the chaos brought on by the war. The increasingly anti-Tutsi Church and civil society have gained influence in the urban areas, while in the countryside the equally prejudiced militia leaders have come to the fore. This makes it difficult for the RPA to find reliable allies who can ensure the stability of the Kivus. Despite its military strength in the region, the RPA cannot even control areas along major roads that lie within 30 km of its frontier.

Take for example the case of Kichanga, a village next to the Virunga Park some 60 kilometres north of Goma (close to Kiroliwwe) that the RPA claims to have pacified. The RPA, RCD-Goma, and its own local defence forces defend the town. But the reality for the villagers is that they have suffered attacks at least seven times since the beginning of the year (30 December 1999; 31 January 2000; 8 May 2000; 19 June 2000; 19 July 2000; 20 July 2000; 7 August 2000).⁵⁹

⁵⁹ ICG Interviews, North Kivu (August 2000).

Who is responsible for these attacks is often unclear. In the view of a local village leader who describes himself as a Mai Mai and claims to be in contact with the Interahamwe, the attacks may be the work of the Rwandans in collaboration with Hutu extremists. He believes this because of the failure of the RPA to defend the village, despite the written warnings that often precede the attacks. The ALiR is present in the region, however, as revealed by a series of late July attacks. But their identities are equally muddled. For example, a Congolese prisoner taken in one of these attacks met someone from his village among the gunmen, who told him that there were “many” local Hutus with the Interahamwe.

At about the same time, the limits of the RPA's grip on the border town of Goma were revealed by a dramatic increase in Interahamwe activity.⁶⁰ On July 25 a cyclist on the 20-kilometre Goma-Sake road came across a large group of Interahamwe crossing from south to north (he reported 2,500). That week the ALiR occupied a near-by Seminary at Buhima, and robbed motorists on the road for three days straight (25-27), killing four people. Men abducted that week claimed to have seen three thousand gunmen in a camp eight hours walk into Virunga Park. In Goma meanwhile the numbers of troops increased substantially. Congolese troops at the airport were even disarmed, while the RPA established positions in the surrounding hills. Then on July 30th, a reported 3,000 Interahamwe attacked Rubagabo near Rutshuru, before apparently heading to strike the Rwandan town of Ruhengeri on the night of 1 August.⁶¹

2. The Burundian Armed Forces versus the FDD/FNL⁶²

Spillover from the Burundian civil war has also contributed to the chaos in the DRC. Soon after the outbreak of the second war, the Burundian army deployed along on the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika, in order to guarantee the safety of its borders. The Government of Major Pierre Buyoya had feared that Kabila would offer the rebels bases, from which to wage their war in Burundi. But then as the FAC failed to make headway in its own war, and his allies grew more wary of shedding their soldiers' blood, ties between the Burundi rebellion and the Kabila government deepened. In return for Kinshasa's support, the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye agreed to assist Kabila in his war. Now they have become virtual mercenaries to Kinshasa. The importance of their contribution to the DRC president's war effort moreover means that Kabila cannot permit them to sign a peace deal with the Burundi government. Trapped in the Congo by their own greed and ambition, Burundi's most important rebel group now wages Kabila's war as much as its own.

a. Burundi's Civil War

Burundi's civil war dates back to the 1993 assassination of its first Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye, by extremist Tutsi army officers determined not to lose their grip on power. Overnight the country descended into a bloody chaos, in which as many as 50,000 people lost their lives in fighting between the two

⁶⁰ ICG Interviews, Goma (July-August 2000).

⁶¹ ICG Interviews, Humanitarian Workers, Goma, (August 2000); ICG Interview Lt Col Alex Ibambasi, Goma (16 August 2000). Eyewitness estimates of force sizes are often exaggerated.

⁶² Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie/ Front de Libération Nationale.

ethnic groups, and in the security clampdown that followed.

The most important Burundian rebel group, the CNDD was first created in the aftermath of Ndadaye's assassination. Léonard Nyangoma, a founding member of Ndadaye's FRODEBU party, refused to accept power sharing deal with those who had killed the President and denied the legitimacy of the 1993 election results. To re-establish the institutions of 1993, he launched the rebel CNDD movement in April 1994. His leadership was contested four years later by his cousin Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, who split the movement and took over its armed wing, known as the FDD.

The FDD is currently headquartered in the Katangan capital of Lubumbashi. Troops are recruited in the refugee camps of Tanzania, and are trained and organised in the Congo from where they launch their attacks against south-western Burundi in the regions of Rutana, Makamba, Bururi and Southern Bujumbura Rural. Today, the movement probably numbers about 16,000. The Nyangoma faction has also kept some military units, and launches attacks from the DRC into the northern Burundian province of Bubanza.

Another active rebel movement is the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) that was created in 1992 from the historic *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* (PALIPEHUTU) movement, launched at the end of the seventies after the extermination of Hutu elites by the Tutsi led regime of Colonel Michel Micombero in 1972. Like the FDD, the FNL has since split from its political wing due to difference within the movement over their relationship with the legal FRODEBU party.

The FNL mainly operate in the region of Bujumbura Rural, and frequently infiltrate from the Rusizi Plain on the DRC side of the border. The movement at one point also included many ex-FAR.⁶³ The FNL stronghold in Burundi is the region surrounding the capital, where 1,000-2,000 fighters are based. These forces are also well entrenched on the Congolese side of the border in the Rusizi plain, and have on occasion cooperated with Congolese Mai Mai.

b. Why Burundi is in the DRC

Congolese territory had been a base for the Burundian rebellion until 1996, when the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL) backed by Rwanda and the Burundi army attacked FDD camps and forced the rebels to flee to Tanzania.

After the AFDL war, few Burundian troops remained in the Congo to protect the country's commercial interests. Burundi at that time was under a regional trade embargo imposed in the aftermath of the July 1996 coup that brought Buyoya to power. Because the DRC government never observed the regionally imposed sanctions, Burundi's trade with the outside world passed through the Congo.

⁶³ The FNL fighters however seem to have been purged in February 2000 for reasons that remain obscure. The apparent rationale behind these killings was a plot between the Rwandans and the government to turn on the leaders of the FNL. The government estimates that between 200 and 300 were killed, but the independent Human Rights Watch assessment of about 100 seems more likely. For more details see ICG Africa Report N° 21, *The Mandela effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the Burundi Peace Process*, 18 April 2000.

This commerce was made doubly important by the on-going civil war in the country. Clinging to power in the face of a raging rebellion, the Government depended upon this route to import weapons, munitions, and gasoline.

When the second war broke out the government of Burundi closed its embassy in Kinshasa and deployed approximately a thousand troops to Kalemie, on the Congolese shore of Lake Tanganyika. President Buyoya was not happy with this course of events because the DRC government had permitted him to use its territory to by-pass the restrictions of the embargo. Consequently he wanted the deployment – which has never been officially acknowledged – to remain discreet. Government officials in Bujumbura however, were prepared to let it be known that these forces were there to prevent the rebels from establishing bases in the Congo from which they could attack the national territory of Burundi. They were also to protect the Lake Tanganyika trade against rebel piracy that could threaten Burundi's defense capability. In addition, the Burundian deployment in South Kivu could help secure some Banyamulenge communities, under threat from the Babembe or Bafulero Mai Mai.

At the RCD rebellion's outset however, the Rwandans had presented Buyoya with information that Kabila was assisting the FDD, and that many of these fighters were even serving in the FAC. The outcome of the war in Burundi was therefore linked to that of Congo. Soon after the war's outbreak moreover, some 3,000 Hutu rebel fighters left the Tanzanian refugee camps to join the FDD in the Congo in response to a recruitment campaign run by the DRC Consulate in Kigoma. Kabila had reportedly promised the FDD weapons, uniforms and money.⁶⁴

c. The Current Situation

After two years of negotiations to end their own civil war, 19 political parties signed a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, on 28 August 2000. The accord was signed under intense regional and international pressure, and orchestrated by the peace process' facilitator, Nelson Mandela⁶⁵. The agreement nevertheless did not include a ceasefire. Since 1998 the rebels have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Arusha talks, and have demanded that direct negotiations take place between the belligerents – themselves and the government.

Far from quelling the level of violence, the peace agreement marked the start of a resurgence of the war. Wearied by the bloodshed and rebel foot-dragging, regional leaders issued an ultimatum in September that threatened the rebellion with sanctions if they did not lay down their weapons. But the credibility of such a threat is questionable. Tanzania, the only country that could restrain the insurgents, is sympathetic to their cause and to Kabila's. Armed and equipped by the DRC president, and protected by Tanzania, the FDD have no interest in joining the peace process.

In private discussions with Western visitors, moreover, Kabila has repeatedly let it be known that he needed the Burundi rebels, and could never release them from his service.⁶⁶ For example, many of the troops employed in the October

⁶⁴ ICG witnessed the recruitment drive in Kigoma at that time.

⁶⁵ See ICG Africa Report N° 25, *Burundi : Ni Guerre Ni Paix. Une Evaluation du Processus de Paix Après la Signature de l'Accord d'Arusha le 28 Août 2000*, (1 December 2000).

⁶⁶ Interview ICG, Western diplomat, Brussels (30 October 2000).

2000 Katanga offensive were FDD. If the Zimbabwean forces start to withdraw, Kabila will become even more reliant upon the Burundian rebels.

The leaders of the FDD are suspected by their own troops to care little about the liberation of Burundi. Kabila has reportedly made them into millionaires, has permitted them to control a territory three to four times bigger than their own country. In return, for Kabila, the FDD also bring certain advantages. First, they are far more under his control than is the Rwandan ALIR. Second, they seem to have a never-ending supply of new troops from the Kigoma camps in Tanzania and are able to move easily between Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia and the DRC. Finally, their status as 'freedom fighters' in the Burundi peace process contradicts their position as 'negative forces' in the Lusaka agreement, and gives Kabila greater reason to demand its revision.

The continuation of the war is not a bad option at this point for President Buyoya. 'Rehabilitated' by his signature on the Arusha peace agreement, Buyoya intends to secure his appointment as the nation's leader during the upcoming 'transition period', while simultaneously retaining his military advantage on the ground with the help of the anti-Kabila alliance.⁶⁷

3. The Failure of the RCD

When the August 1998 RPA attack on Kinshasa failed, Kigali was forced to improvise a new strategy for a more protracted war. Its solution was to turn back to the RCD, which was created at the conflict's start to provide a Congolese political face for Rwanda's war effort. Since then the ineptitude and blatant opportunism of these RCD leaders has provoked its widespread rejection by the Congolese population.

The movement included an array of political viewpoints. Originally at the head of the movement was Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba the long-time Mobutu opponent and Dar es Salaam University. His position as leader was the result of a compromise between other factions in the movement, as well as the support of Museveni and the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, rather than any strong personal following in the movement. Other tendencies included former AFDL Banyamulenge members like Moise Nyarugabo, Bizima Karaha, and the North Kivu-Tutsi Déogratias Bugera. A third faction was made up of former Mobutists such as Lunda Bululu, a former prime minister under the Zairian strongman, and an anti-Kabila Katangan.

Internal divisions plagued the RCD from the outset. The movement never represented a coherent political program or belief. Instead, it was a coalition of opportunistic politicians who shared little more than a common antipathy for Kabila. This mixture was billed as a 'consensus based movement' that no single individual would be able to hijack as Kabila had done with the AFDL. Instead, its leaders immediately began to accuse each other of misusing funds, failing to rally popular support and of falsely claiming personal credit for military successes. In addition, differences between the movement's Rwandan and Ugandan supporters also spurred divisions: Those close to Kampala always claimed to be more concerned with political mobilization of the population than

⁶⁷ See also ICG Africa Report N° 25, *Burundi : Ni Guerre Ni Paix*, op cit.

were those backed by Kigali, who preferred to benefit from Kigali's war machine to reach a quick solution.

Of the founding members, the first to go was long-time opposition politician and president of the *Forces du Futur* party, Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, who said the movement had centralized too much power in the Executive Committee, and accused it of being insufficiently representative of the anti-Kabila opposition. Then in March 1999, opposition from within the movement prompted Wamba to move his headquarters from Goma to Kisangani. "There is no *coup d'état* but there is some malaise in Goma," he told journalists.⁶⁸ This break between RCD-Goma and the Ugandan backed 'RCD-Kisangani' – later renamed RCD-*Mouvement de Liberation* (RCD-ML) – was then formalized in May 1999 when the college of founding members voted to remove Wamba as the movement's president, and replace him with the Katangan Emile Ilunga. Wamba disputed his removal saying that it was a coup, and maintained that he remained the legitimate leader of the rebel movement.

In Goma, the popularity of Illunga's RCD faction continued to plummet. The absence of any political program was deeply resented by the population of Eastern Congo, as was the presence of the Banyamulenge leaders in key security and financial positions. Also damaging was the movement's failure to pay state employees (as Kabila had occasionally done after May 1997) and its soldiers, who as a result preyed off the population. This insolvency occurred despite the proliferation of new taxes, and the outright theft of bank deposits and water and electricity revenues.⁶⁹ The population's simmering resentment became clear by early 2000 with a wave of church-led 'dead city' civil disobedience campaigns in Bukavu and Goma. The RCD responded with the highly unpopular move of denying the Roman Catholic Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko the right to return to Bukavu.⁷⁰ Similar protests occurred in Kisangani during early to mid-2000.⁷¹

RCD-Goma's lack of legitimacy can be attributed to its failure to provide the average Congolese with a modicum of security. Indeed, instances of RCD troops abusing the civilians under their protection occur frequently.⁷² The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Roberto Garreton, in his January report concludes that RCD forces have retaliated to attacks "by massacring defenceless civilian populations with machetes, knives and guns, causing thousands of victims."⁷³ Abuses committed by the predominately Banyamulenge troops based in the

⁶⁸ The East African, 5 April 1999.

⁶⁹ These practices were all committed by the RCD-Goma government in Kisangani. ICG interviews, RCD-Goma Functionaries, Kisangani (July 2000).

⁷⁰ Under intense international pressure the Archbishop was permitted to return on 24 September 2000, only to die of a heart attack in Rome on 4 October.

⁷¹ ICG interviews, Kisangani (July 2000).

⁷² See Human Rights Watch, 'Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest', volume 12, Number 3 (May 2000); Amnesty International, 'Killing Human Decency (31 May 2000).

⁷³ He lists Chipaho, Lemera, Makobola, Burhale, Musinga, Bashali, Lukweti, Budaha, Walungu, Mwenga, Mikondero, Kamituga, Budaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube, Kibizi, Bunyakiri, Kasala, Kalambi, Kahungwe, Kashambi, Kalami and Chifunze. See United Nations. Economic and Social Council. 'Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Roberto Garreton, in Accordance with the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/56' (18 January 2000) para. 120.

region fuel the popular resentment driving the Mai Mai movement in South Kivu.⁷⁴ According to the RPA, undisciplined RCD soldiers are often responsible for the violence in the outskirts of Goma.⁷⁵

Kigali finally tired of the RCD leadership and removed Ilunga at the end of October 2000, replacing him with former Foreign Affairs Minister Adolph Onusumba. Also removed were his two Vice Presidents, Moise Nyarugabo and Jean-Pierre Ondekane. To explain the change, movement spokesman Kin-Kiey Mulumba told journalists that Ilunga had 'recognized the mistakes of his leadership', which included failures in the areas of political mobilization and communication of its message.⁷⁶ Since his appointment, the new president has apparently made efforts to change the RCD's corrupt image.

The Rwandans created the RCD in order to provide a political justification for their war. Likewise the Congolese politicians who signed up for the movement sought to use Kigali's military to capture their state. But instead of helping, the two hurt one another. Kigali's transparent effort to conceal its bellicosity behind the rebel movement undermined its own credibility. As its creator, moreover, Rwanda found itself responsible for its ally's brutality.⁷⁷ The rebels did no better however. They were never able to mobilise support because they were immediately labelled as Kigali's puppets. Even worse, when they seemed to be at the verge of victory in mid-1999, the Rwandans abandoned their cause and forced them to sign the Lusaka cease-fire.

4. Fragmentation and Warlordism in the Kivus

Society in Eastern DRC has been suffering from the effects of years of war and neglect by the international community. Successive conflicts have impoverished the population, by driving them from their farmsteads and robbing them of their livestock. Conditions of insecurity simultaneously empowered those with weapons, permitting them to seize the goods of the weak. A new, predatory system of violence has emerged, in which groups seek wealth and political power through the barrel of a gun. All this, combined with the re-emergence of ethnic politics, has sparked an explosion of ethnic bloodletting.

a. *Kabila's Second Front*

Today the rampant acts of violence committed by all sides strike down the innocent and the guilty alike. The ideology of genocide has spread from Rwanda to the Congo, where it has developed deep roots. "The Interahamwe made a school for tribalism in the Congo," one Bafulero Territorial Administrator told ICG. "And they taught the population evil things."⁷⁸

⁷⁴ ICG Interviews, Mutualité Leaders and Local Officials, Uvira (August 2000).

⁷⁵ ICG Interviews, Goma (July 2000).

⁷⁶ 'Rebel Leader Resigns Admitting "errors"', IRIN (30 October 2000).

⁷⁷ Rwanda is already responsible for the often brutal actions of its own troops as documented by human rights observers. See Human Rights Watch, 'Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest', volume 12, Number 3 (May 2000); Amnesty International, 'Killing Human Decency (31 May 2000).

⁷⁸ ICG Interview Bazira Kushabana, Uvira, August 2000.

A consequence of the latest war in the Congo has been a revival of the Kivu's longstanding tradition of rural militias known as the Mai Mai. The rationale behind their creation has always been a mix of self defence and profit secured from pillage and cattle rustling. Historically, these militias have also been an expression of discontent from some of the most marginalized communities in the region such as the Batembo and Babembe of South Kivu. Today, the radicalisation of the urban population and the country's economic collapse prompts even urban youths to join these movements. "Who are the Mai Mai? They are our children. They are the children of our houses," explains one urban Bafulero leader.⁷⁹ They are a manifestation of the collapse in traditional and state institutions of authority.

The Kabila government played a part in the surge of violence. As a former Mai Mai leader himself, Kabila was familiar with the currents of rebellion that have animated Eastern Congo since the 1960s. He evidently saw that with some small logistical support and political encouragement from Kinshasa, a firestorm of opposition could politically be raised in the Kivus to tax RPA resources in the DRC and threaten a resumption of attacks on Rwanda itself. To this end, he appointed fellow long-time Mai Mai Warrior Sylvestre Lwetcha as FAC Commander on 3 September 1999.⁸⁰ Other veteran leaders such as Padiri, Lwengamia Dunia, and Shabani Sikatende were named FAC Commanders at the same time. He knew also that he could make use of the presence of the Interahamwe and the Burundian Hutu rebel FDD in the region, and encouraged military coordination between them and the Mai Mai.

But the coalition between these local militias and the foreign forces never become very deep-rooted. At first the Congolese were prone to sympathy for the Rwandans, who they saw as little different from their own native Mai Mai militias. Ties between the gunmen and the civilian populace often acted as a brake upon violence. The Interahamwe were seen by many to simply want food, and people to act as temporary porters. For example they have on occasion been known to apologise to villagers for killings that they committed. Once when accused of murder, the militiamen delivered into the hands of the local Kichanga North Kivu authorities 'bandits' they said were responsible.

Over time however, the violence appears to have become more indiscriminate. Since the end of 1999, the population has complained about the attacks by the ALiR and lack of protection by RPA troops.⁸¹ On the night of the 9 June 2000 for example, a force of over three hundred Interahamwe stormed into the town of Sake, 20 km west of Goma, to loot the town's pharmacies. In the process they killed 34 people and razed two camps of displaced Hunde and Tembo peasants. The RPA believe they infiltrated from Masisi to attack these 'positive elements of the Congolese population', in order to incite them to hate the Rwandans.⁸²

The effect of this and many other such incidents is the transformation of the Kivus into a patchwork of militia fiefdoms and local conflicts, in which the Mai Mai are sometimes allied, and sometimes opposed to the Interahamwe. The longstanding presence of the Rwandan Hutu militias around Bunyakiri and

⁷⁹ Interview Aron Kashli, President de Mutualité des Bafulero, Uvira (August 2000).

⁸⁰ 'Congolese Rebel Leader Disapproves New Army Chief', Xinhua (6 September 1999).

⁸¹ ICG interviews, civil society members, Goma, March 2000.

⁸² Interview Lt Col Alex Ibambasi, RPA BRDG Commander, Goma (16 August 2000).

Walikale helps to explain the comparatively strong ties between the Mai Mai and the Rwandan guerrillas in that region. Further south the conflict with the Banyamulenge that predates the second war explains the anti-Tutsi character of the local Mai Mai despite their differences with the Interahamwe and FDD.

b. Ethnic Hatred: The Plight of the Banyamulenge

In South Kivu this ethnic conflict centres on the question of the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge, who are accused by other inhabitants of the region of being in league with the RPF regime in Rwanda.

Tensions between native Congolese and the more recently arrived Banyarwanda – or people of Rwanda - over land or citizenship rights have long existed in the Kivus. Civil wars in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi and the subsequent influx of Hutu refugees into the Congo in 1994 transformed these local conflicts and made them more focused against ethnic Banyarwanda Tutsis such as the Banyamulenge of South Kivu.

Faced with the growing threat of Hutu radicalism in the DRC, the Banyamulenge enlisted heavily in the 1996 AFDL war to oust Mobutu. When popular sentiment turned against the movement in the aftermath of the first war, the Banyamulenge were left even more isolated than before. Since the second war was precipitated by a mutiny of the Banyamulenge 10th Brigade in Bukavu against Kabila, they have become indelibly associated in the public mind with the Rwandan occupation. This perception persists despite the widely noted differences between Kigali and the Banyamulenge, and the lack of efforts by the RPA to defend their Congolese ethnic cousins. Meanwhile the anti-Tutsi tenor of public discourse in the Kivus has poisoned attempts to re-open dialogue with neighbouring communities.

Today the Banyamulenge find themselves besieged on the Haut Plateau region by the Mai Mai, FDD, and ALiR. Economically dependent on their access to the market in Uvira for selling cattle and purchasing goods they themselves cannot produce, they can only descend through the hostile *Moyen Plateau* with an RCD army escort. Travel between urban centres like Bukavu and Uvira is deadly if they happen to be stopped by anti-Tutsi militiamen. Conditions are little better in town, where Banyamulenge risk being attacked if they stray into the wrong neighbourhoods.

“We think that we are proceeding in the logic of genocide,” one Banyamulenge RCD official told ICG. The sentiment is common. The Banyamulenge can no longer travel, nor cultivate their fields, nor reach their cattle. Many villages in the Haut Plateau have been burned and the RCD appears to be powerless to prevent this. Since June 2000, Congolese Tutsis have been fleeing to Bujumbura. There they now number in excess of seven hundred families. This movement intensified in the first three weeks of August to such a degree that RCD authorities in Goma ordered local authorities to stop the flow – which they failed to do.

The other inhabitants of South Kivu blame the Banyamulenge for seizing upon their association with the AFDL to rustle cattle after 1996. This violence has continued. The people carrying out killings are both military and civilian

Banyamulenge known as 'guerriers' – warriors. Approximately 80 per cent of the ANC 9th Brigade based in Uvira is composed of Banyamulenge, and Banyamulenge-dominated units also control Fizi, Uvira, and Mulembe. The Rwandans attempted to try the soldiers responsible for killings in Makobola, there were confrontations between the RPA and ANC forces. In summary sighed one ANC officer "we do not have a real army here."⁸³

People join the Mai Mai to defend their families from mistreatment at the hands of the Banyamulenge. But when the attacks multiplied, the Mai Mai responded with attacks of their own. Now the situation is at an impasse. "The RCD cannot advance without resolving their problems with the Mai Mai," warned Aroni Kashali President of the Mutualité des Bafulero in Uvira. This means disarming the Banyamulenge guerriers. "If they put down their arms today there will be no vengeance" he promised. "What is happening here is the consequence of what they [the Banyamulenge] have done. All actions have consequences. When you do harm, it will come back upon you."⁸⁴

5. Scenarios

The pursuit after military victory holds expensive economic, political and social costs for Rwanda. Nevertheless the FPR regime is likely to persist in the effort.

a. The Costs of the War

There are enormous costs to Rwanda's never-ending war. The government has reportedly resorted to extra-budgetary funding such as re-allocating teachers salaries to pay for its defence bills.⁸⁵ The IMF contested the official tallies of 4.3 per cent of GDP for defence spending in 1998. In fact estimates that account for the revenues of semi-public companies and illegal diamond trading put the real figure closer to 8 per cent. Evidence of the difficulty of sustaining this spending was the appeal by the Speaker of the Parliament in November 1999 for financial support from Rwandans living at home and abroad to fill the 'budgetary gap' created by the war.⁸⁶

Other costs of the war effort are social and political. The all too scarce energy required for the post genocide reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis is squandered in the Congo. The continued ethnic overtones of the conflict undermine the trust, upon which the country's future rests. Moreover, its majority Hutu population feels itself marginalised by the war mentality that grips the country. The same is true for the Tutsi survivors of the genocide, whose needs go unmet as a consequence of the conflict. The regime's military priorities prevail over those required for the give and take of politics. Opposition and criticism are therefore not tolerated. Ultimately, as long as the war continues, there can be no sense of common interests between Rwanda's two ethnic groups.

⁸³ ICG Interview, ANC officer, 9th BRDG, Uvira, (August 2000).

⁸⁴ Aroni Kashali, President of the Mutualité des Bafulero, Uvira (August 2000).

⁸⁵ SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 297.

⁸⁶ 'Rwanda Calls on Citizens to Make Contributions' PANA, (11 November 1999).

Rwanda therefore is caught in a vicious circle. Its war against the evil that massacred up to a million persons in 1994 cannot be won without reconciliation at home, which in turn cannot happen while the war in the Congo continues. More ominously, the human and material consequences of Rwanda's military policies have been to deepen the roots of ethnic hatred across the region. Even some Congolese now speak openly of their desires to commit genocide against the Tutsis. This means that they have already crossed a dangerous threshold.

b. The Military Option

Rwanda appears determined to continue its pursuit of the military solution. This is true despite the proliferating difficulties it faces. First, Kabila enjoys the support of Angola and Zimbabwe, and therefore could not be defeated as easily as Mobutu. Second, the stalemated frontlines have since stretched Rwandan forces both militarily and financially. Third, the no doubt irreversible popular rejection of the RCD obstructs RPA efforts to enlist the Congolese population in its war effort. Fourth, the repeated clashes with the UPDF in Kisangani has transformed Rwanda's neighbour and former ally into a new strategic threat astride its immediate northern flank that will inevitably divert RPA resources from its primary objectives.

During mid-2000, in the aftermath of the harsh Security Council Resolution 1304, that condemned Rwanda and Uganda for their fighting in Kisangani, Kigali began to refashion its Congo strategy. The international community's apparent call for the two countries' forces to withdraw from the DRC before those of Kabila's allies, threatened the legitimacy of Kigali's war against the ALiR, as secured under the terms of the Lusaka agreement. The simultaneous unilateral rejection of the agreement from Kabila's government made the situation even more worrisome. In response to these developments, Rwanda adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the international community that was intended to refurbish its tarnished reputation, uphold Lusaka's principle of disarming the 'negative forces', and consolidate the RPA's military position in the DRC. This new strategy included the early August 'offer' for a 200 km withdrawal from the existing forward line of forces. The pull back from non-essential territory made sense for an over-stretched army in the context of growing instability along the Rwandan-DRC frontier. Rwandan diplomats moreover could take advantage of this manoeuvre by claiming it was to provide space for the safe deployment of MONUC peacekeeping forces. Since the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan only required a pull back of 30 km, Kigali thus appeared to be 'going the extra mile' for peace.

But in late 2000, it appeared as if Rwanda's strategy had undergone yet another evolution. The rise of Bemba's MLC forces in Equateur, and their military successes near Mbandaka, threatened to sideline Kigali and make it powerless to manipulate events in the Congo. In response to this, there are indications that Rwanda may be looking for ways to imitate Bemba's winning ethnic and regional formula to gain political and military ground for the RCD in the central Kasai region. The recent reshuffle of the rebel movement's leadership can be seen as evidence of this. The new rebel President, Adolph Onusumba, is an ethnic Tetela from the same village as nationalist hero Patrice Lumumba. Moreover, he demonstrated an ability to garner support for the rebellion when in the position of deputy governor of Kasai in charge of finances and administration for the

rebel government. His appointment to the top post therefore might be an attempt to imitate Bemba's winning ethnic formula, and to use Lumumba's legacy to rally support for the RCD-Goma in the Kasais.

Rwanda was also encouraged to re-engage in the war by the continuing crises swirling around the regime of Zimbabwe's President Mugabe. These included widespread price riots, an impeachment motion from the popular opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and a rising level of discontent in the president's own ZANU-PF. A withdrawal of Zimbabwe's 11,000 professional troops would radically alter the balance of military power. The Mugabe regime has already made it known that Zimbabwe intends to retire from the DRC in the 'near future'. Doubts persist about whether he personally could swallow his pride and accept defeat. A successor however, might well want to withdraw more quickly. With this in mind Kigali no-doubt focused on the mid-December ZANU-PF party conference. The mutterings heard from the ranks of the President's own followers suggested that he was already weakened. Kigali may have speculated that a military defeat in time for the conference could bring down the Zimbabwe strongman, and prompt a ZNDF withdrawal from the Congo.

The existence of these opinions in Kigali revealed themselves in the aftermath of the RPA and RCD capture of Pweto, on the Zambian frontier. In mid October 2000, Kabila launched an offensive in Katanga that aimed to open a corridor to Lake Tanganyika. Humiliated by the apparent success of the attack, the RPA riposted immediately, re-taking the town of Pepa, and ultimately Pweto. The fighting is reported to have been heavy. After three days however, the FAC and Zimbabwean defenders broke and fled, leaving behind a rich harvest of abandoned weaponry.⁸⁷

This suggests that a decisive military solution in the regional conventional war remains an option for Kigali's decision-makers. Their past relations with Kabila leave them convinced that there can be no peace while the DRC President remains in power. They are also aware of the costs of the conflict to their reputation and economic development. Thus, in view of the current collapse of Lusaka, and the fruitless efforts to replace it, they may well have concluded that a military victory is the only acceptable end to the war.

Militarily the RPA has few options at present. Concerned about their international image, they do not want to appear as the initiators of fighting. If they can have a pretext to attack however, their options still remain slim. A resumption of the conventional assault could aim for three alternative objectives (Mbuji Mayi, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi) - none of which hold much promise of success. There would be great symbolic value - for the RCD especially - in taking the capital. Kinshasa however, is a city of millions where there has been past evidence of strong anti-Tutsi feeling. The prospect of trying to take this city in the face of popular resistance probably does not tempt the RPA.

A somewhat implausible alternative course of action for Rwanda would be an attempt to destabilize Kinshasa. With Kigali's support, one of Kabila's rivals could be tempted into launching a coup attempt. This might come in conjunction with diversionary assaults on the frontline from the RPA and RCD. This scenario is

⁸⁷ ICG Interview, Nairobi, (7 December 2000).

unlikely however. It would be difficult for Kigali to find an individual willing to hazard such a dangerous alliance. The RPA would be unable to provide sufficient assistance to offer a credible defence against the certain resistance of at least some elements of the FAC, the Angolans, and the anti-Rwandan Kinois.

Other objectives include Kabila's own home province of Katanga, and the heavily defended Mbuji Mayi. But the RPA is already over-stretched and would be hard pressed to find the manpower necessary for either of these campaigns. Lubumbashi is 400 km from Pweto, and were an RPA column launched it would be dangerously vulnerable to being cut off in the southern DRC. Therefore of the two the only realistic objective is Mbuji Mayi. The RPA is already at the gates of the town. To capture it and its environs would place the RCD in the geographic heart of the country, astride the region's rich vein of diamonds. The rebel movement moreover might find the region's soil more fertile than the Kivus have proved to be. Unfortunately the town's defences would make a successful assault very difficult. Already stretched thin in the Congo, the RPA would have to mass a large percentage of its best troops to overcome the town's Zimbabwean, ALiR, and FAC defenders. Such a concentration of forces would be clearly visible to the FAC, and risks inviting Kabila and his allies to attack elsewhere on the front.

A second option open to the RPA would be to work to isolate Mbuji Mayi from Katanga to the south. A penetration in the vicinity of Kabinda that advanced 100 km could cut the Kananga-Lubumbashi railroad, and isolate the FAC and allied forces in Mbuji Mayi and its environs. The threat of such an attack succeeding would put pressure on Mugabe, and might even cause his fall from power. Decisive victories like Pweto, that suggest that the enemy is weak, encourage risk-taking. With such a prospect in mind, Kigali might decide to persist in its Congolese adventure.

Over the long term however, this strategy has little chance of success because of the differences between Kigali and Kampala. Should the RPA seem likely to take Mbuji Mayi, the Ugandan backed MLC would almost certainly seize the opportunity to advance on Kinshasa. Whatever the outcomes on the battlefields, the rebel movements' rival interests would become apparent.⁸⁸ If one movement were to emerge as a probable victor, the other movement would be likely to attempt to create obstacles because of the mistrust that exists between Kampala and Kigali. These differences are unlikely to be overcome by any reconciliation between Rwanda and Uganda. As long the current regimes remain in place, neither can permit the other to benefit disproportionately from their common war in the Congo.

C. Uganda: Back to the Military Solution?

Uganda also justified the effort to unseat Kabila by citing its security interests. Beneath the surface, Kampala had other motivations for the war such as its hopes for greater regional prestige, and economic gain. Viewed as the mastermind of the first rebellion that installed Kabila in power, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni could not afford to remain out of the second rebellion. However, Uganda's intervention has proven counterproductive in a number of respects. The ethnic

⁸⁸ In an effort to form a common front the different rebel groups have agreed to meet in Goma before the end of December 2000. Chances of success are slim. Levi Ochieng, 'Seeking a United Front to Oust Kabila', *The East African* (4 December 2000).

bloodletting in Ugandan-controlled areas and the fighting in Kisangani have all revealed the corruption and divisions in the UPDF, where senior officers openly sacrifice the interests of their country for their own personal financial gain. Meanwhile, the security situation in the country that justified the original intervention is no better than before the war. Once the leading light of new African leaders, Museveni now looks more and more like those from the older breed that he claimed to replace.

1. The Security Motives for the War

The UPDF ostensibly intervened in the DRC to destroy the rebel ADF's Congolese rear bases, and to prevent supplies from transiting the region in the future. For instance President Museveni explained to the Ugandan Parliament that, 'like his predecessor Mobutu had done, he [Kabila] entered into an agreement with the Sudan government to destabilize Uganda. Kabila put at the disposal of the Sudan Congo's airports to enable the Sudanese to supply the ADF and to use these facilities to destabilize Uganda directly.'⁸⁹

The ADF emerged in 1995 from a combination of pre-existing Sudanese supported opposition movements to the NRM regime in Kampala.⁹⁰ Since then the ADF has terrorized the inhabitants of southwest Uganda with its viciously brutal attacks. The movement is not strong enough to pose a military threat to the regime. However, it has proved resilient enough to resist UPDF efforts to crush it.

The UPDF advance into the DRC probably contributed to temporarily disrupting the rebel movement's operations. The army has simultaneously increased its counter-insurgency efforts in Uganda itself. For instance, in late 1999, the UPDF launched Operation Mountain Sweep in the Rwenzori with some 6,000 UPDF troops specially trained in mountain warfare under the command of army Chief of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini. The operation was 'to deal the final blow to the rebels' he told journalists.⁹¹ The Minister of State for Defense announced some two months after the operation was launched that the army had killed more than 80 'bandits' and that they had "depleted the enemy's strength both in terms of personnel and equipment captured."⁹²

The ADF was not so easily defeated, as they demonstrated in early December with a series of deadly attacks. One of these operations struck the Fort Portal Prison, and reportedly had as its target Kazini himself, who was present at the time. And whereas most ADF operations involve only a handful of fighters, this

⁸⁹ The President's Address to Parliament: Uganda's Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 28 May 2000; In addition the Lusaka Cease-fire agreement cites other anti-Kampala forces operating in the Congo. These include Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), the Uganda national Rescue Front II (UNRFII), the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBf). Although these groups pose less of a threat than the ADF, their inclusion in the agreement provide additional justification for the UPDF presence in the Congo.

⁹⁰ This included elements from the Tabliq sect who had been conducting insurgent attacks from the Kayera Gorge in the Hoima District, and veterans from the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and West Nile Bank Front (WNBf).

⁹¹ 'Troops Sent to 'Flush Out' Rebels in West', IRIN (9 November 1999).

⁹² 'Army Claims Success in Campaign Against ADF', IRIN (29 December 1999).

attack counted approximately 150 rebels, and succeeded in freeing 365 prison inmates.⁹³

An unforeseen development of the increased UPDF pressure in the Rwenzori Mountains was that it forced the rebels to move into other regions of the country. The year 2000 witnessed ADF attacks in Bushenyi, Hoima, Kibale, Bundibugyo, and even Mubende.⁹⁴ In early September President Museveni cancelled his trip to attend the UN Millennium Summit in New York because of the increase in violence in the West of the country. Touring Hoima district, he reportedly complained to the Resident District Commissioner about the authorities inability to bring the guerrillas to heel. "This talk of 'rebels escaped from us' - I hate it. How can the rebels come out of the forest, really escape from you and go back to the forest? Where was the army?" he asked.⁹⁵

2. The Army Goes into Business

The cohesion and discipline of the UPDF has suffered from its war in the DRC. The access to Congolese resources has proved an irresistible temptation to many a UPDF officer. In fact, the spoils of war, which Uganda had tasted in the first invasion, always loomed large among the reasons for Kampala's second intervention. In 1996, just after the fall of Mobutu, the UPDF controlled regions of North-eastern Congo yielded an estimated \$60 million in gold exports for Uganda. Official figures by the Bank of Uganda, which controls all gold exports, show that Uganda's gold exports shot up from \$12.4 million in 1994-95 to \$110 million in 1996.⁹⁶ The capture of key airports such as Kisangani and Gbadolite would permit the export of Congolese coffee and minerals directly to Kampala.

Since the beginning of the second DRC war, Kampala has exploited the resources of the Congo with impressive resolve. An illustration of this is again the spectacular rise in Ugandan gold exports, which became the country's largest non-coffee official export in 1999 despite the lack of any increase in domestic production. By way of contrast, according to a private Ministry of Natural Resources, reported gold production represented only 0.2 per cent of exports in the 1996/97 financial year. This sudden availability of gold corrected the country's US\$ 600 million trade deficit, and caused a significant improvement in Uganda's balance of payments despite radically increased defence expenditures that had caused the country to overshoot the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) limit of 1.9 per cent of the GDP. The defence budget overshoot this by 2.2 per cent in the first six months of 1999 and led to a temporary freeze in ESAF disbursement until government pledged to control defence expenditure.⁹⁷

⁹³ ADF Spokesman Rogers Kabanda claimed the attack's target was Brig Kazini who was reportedly in Fort Portal at the time. The rebels also abducted 365 of the prison's 902 inmates during the attack. "ADF Abducts 365 Inmates in Attack on Prison", IRIN (10 December 1999). On December 26 the Lord's Resistance Army, whose leader Joseph Kony lives in Sudan, also re-emerged in northern Uganda after nearly six months of inactivity.

⁹⁴ 'Museveni Talks Tough to Uganda's Rebels' BBC News, (9 September 2000).

⁹⁵ 'President Museveni Castigates Army for Not Routing rebels', New Vision, Kampala, (9 September 2000).

⁹⁶ Republic of Uganda. Statistics Department. *Statistical Abstracts*, (Entebbe: 1999) 75.

⁹⁷ William Reno, 'War Debt and the role of pretending in Uganda's International Relations', a paper presented at the conference 'Conflict and Peacemaking in the Great Lakes Region', Entebbe 11 July 2000.

Top UPDF officers were involved in Congolese business dealings since the first war. For example Major General Salim Saleh, the President's brother and at that time Minister of State for Defence, was deeply involved in buying gold in UPDF controlled areas. Although the gold deal was terminated last year, Saleh still has interests in Air Alexander, which since August 1998 has been flying cargo and passengers into Eastern Congo.⁹⁸ Other senior UPDF officers have behaved in a similar fashion. Brigadier Kazini is accused of distributing diamond and cobalt concessions while he was the commander of UPDF operations in the DRC.⁹⁹

Ties between front-line UPDF commanders and businessmen fuelled much of the Hema-Lendu violence, which may have claimed some ten thousand lives in the Ugandan controlled north-east since the war's outbreak. Kazini for instance carved out entire 'provinces' to award to his allies like Lotsove Adel - without even consulting the Congolese RCD-ML authorities ostensibly supported by the UPDF. Lotsove has since been dismissed from the RCD-ML on accusations of fuelling the violence to favour her business interests in timber and gold from areas such as Bombo and Mungualu. Likewise, former UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia, Lieutenant Colonel Arocha, and his deputy Captain Kyakabale stand accused of conniving with Congolese businessmen to fuel the killing of the Lendu. Local Congolese in Bunia allege that the two army officers abused their positions and involved UPDF soldiers in the clashes. The two officers were removed and placed under investigation by the UPDF on allegations that they were involved in mineral dealings.

3. The UPDF and the Bloodletting in Ituri

For years, the Hema and Lendu tribes have lived together in the Djugu region of Ituri. The Hema are a minority pastoral community that arrived in the Ituri region starting in the sixteenth century. Culturally, they are related to the Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda as well as the Hemas and Banyoros of western Uganda. The indigenous Lendu are farmers and hunters related to the Kakwa, Lugbara and even Alur of West Nile region in Uganda.

The heart of the dispute between the two peoples concerns land. Belgian colonial authorities favoured the Hema and permitted them to amass large landholdings in the final days of European rule. Despite the resentment of the Lendu, the two groups lived alongside one another peaceably until the closing days of the Mobutu regime. In the subsequent chaos however, rich Hema landowners upset the *status quo* by seeking to acquire additional land holdings from the Lendu. In this they were facilitated by the collapse of state administrative structures and the loss of important records such as land titles in the war to overthrow Mobutu. Powerless to respond legally because they lacked documentary proof of ownership, the Lendu turned to violent means of resistance. In the fighting that followed, it is estimated that more than 10,000 people died in a period of 18 months. The bloodshed is said to have been worst in two areas - Djungu and Fataki.

⁹⁸ He claims to have sold his share of Air Alexander to his wife last year.

⁹⁹ ICG Interviews, RCD-ML Officials, Bunia (August 2000). He was replaced in July 2000 by Brig Wamala Katumba.

Rather than prevent the fighting, the UPDF presence in the region and their interference in the already delicate social, political and economic balance of the ethnically divided society exacerbated these ethnic killings. Senior UPDF officers deployed to the DRC sided with rich members of the mainly Batutsi tribes such as the Hema in Ituri province. Instead of providing for the security of the whole society, they protected the interests of the rich Hema. Some UPDF officers are even accused of arming and training militia groups such as that led by Bosco Ntaganda, in return for financial payment to Hema business men. As a consequence, the UPDF has come to be seen as a brutal occupation force in much of the region, and in particular the Ituri and Mahago zones.

Recently, these resentments against the UPDF soldiers have led local peoples to turn their weapons against the Ugandan soldiers. In recent months they have even started targeting UPDF positions. For example on August 26, a group of about 10 local people, referred to by UPDF as Mai Mai, attacked a UPDF headquarters at Lubero in Beni. They were repulsed, but in the process over 33 were killed. Reports indicate the Congolese were armed with bows, sub machine guns, arrows and spears. In Ituri Province, another group attacked and overran an RCD-ML detachment at Nyakunde. The UPDF relief force had to deploy two tanks to overcome the attackers who were by then only 6 or 7 kilometres from Bunia town. On 11 September, a group of about 150 men armed with guns, machetes and spears attacked the Butembo residence of a UPDF officer. The Ugandans beat them back, killing 21 of the Congolese.¹⁰⁰

Investigations by the UPDF into the causes of these ethnic conflicts are underway. Security sources say there are indications that some of the Congolese behind the conflicts are prominent members of the rebellion who sought to inflame opposition to the UPDF. There was no independent confirmation of these claims but it reflects the continued resentment against the UPDF in many parts of Eastern DRC. For example, the North Kivu provincial Security Council has accused the UPDF of a number of human rights violations. Mbake Kayisavera, the Governor of the region, formally complained about this to the Ugandan Government on 16 August 2000

4. Uganda's Showpiece Rebel Movement: Wamba and the RCD-ML

From the outset, Rwanda and Uganda disagreed with one another over the best strategy for the war. Initially, Rwanda sought to topple Kabila through military means alone. When Uganda entered the war, Museveni tried to assert his authority by advocating a more political approach of 'empowering the Congolese'. The pressure of these differences fractured the rebel RCD movement, as individual leaders adopted the positions of their sponsors.

a. The Failure of 'Mchaka Mchaka'

Differences over 'the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 'Mchaka Mchaka' system of political military education were a factor in the 19 May 1999 split within RCD ranks.¹⁰¹ Convinced that victory was only possible through such means, President Museveni sought to duplicate the system in the DRC. Starting

¹⁰⁰ 'Mai Mai Attack Officer's Home', New Vision (14 Sep 2000).

¹⁰¹ *Mchaka Mchaka* was at first a Tanzanian idea of building camaraderie, discipline, and solidarity through physical exercise in the morning.

in February 1999, trained cadres were deployed to the Congo by the NRM Secretariat. Uganda advocated the system be adopted by the entire rebellion. Many RCD members such as Emile Ilunga, Bizima Karaha, Moise Nyarugabo, Lunda Bululu and Alexis Tambwe rejected this idea. Wamba however was better disposed to it and accepted the Ugandan training.

Wamba's RCD-ML therefore became the showpiece of Uganda's strategy to politically empower the Congolese. In the Northeast DRC, Uganda assisted with the training of rebel forces and encouraged the election of local leaders. Each of the provinces was to elect both a governor and local council officials to further enlist the population behind the war effort.

Nevertheless the Congolese population rejected the movement and its Ugandan system of political mobilization. Blind to this, the Ugandans sought to employ Wamba as the rebellion's leader despite his Western DRC origins. Well aware of these sentiments, their leaders preferred to mobilize support behind the proven standards of ethnic politics. In contrast, Mbusa Nyamwisi, the RCD-ML Prime Minister, used his local Mukonjo ethnicity to enlist followers in the Beni region. Similarly, Mbusa's deputy Tibasiima Atenyi used his local Hema roots to mobilize his own supporters in Ituri. Consequently, when Wamba attempted to suspend the two in August, he sparked a series of violent revolts in the region that fractured his RCD-ML movement.

A second force behind these divisions was the competition for resources in the fast-growing war economy. The RCD-ML was heavily invested in the gold trade from the outset. The movement formed its own army-mining brigade for use in zones like Bafwasende and Banalia.¹⁰² In a state of reckless enthusiasm, the movement even signed an agreement with the Bank of Granada for the organization of an "African Union Reserve system" for the financial administration and economic development of the Congo. As occurred with the UPDF, the opportunity to personally profit from these resources got the better of the rebel movement's leaders. Both Mbusa Nyamwisi and Atenyi Tibasiima are accused of misappropriating over US\$20 million in proceeds from mining deals since early 2000. In the midst of the 5 November 'coup' against him, Wamba explained to Reuters that "[Nyamwisi] wanted to have control of resources... he made promises to people, promises about money and diamonds."¹⁰³

b. Uganda Abandons Ideology for Ethnicity and Regionalism?

Uganda's showpiece rebel movement collapsed as Wamba's lieutenants abandoned him to recruit personnel armies of ethnic kinsmen. Aware that reconciliation was critical for resolving the region's ethnic disputes, Ugandan officials hastened to patch up the differences between the RCD-ML rival leaders. The alternative was to be confronted with popular discontent similar to that faced by Rwanda in the Kivus.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, September witnessed a flurry of

¹⁰² ICG Interview, Professor Wamba dia Wamba, President RCD-ML, Bunia, 24 August 2000.

¹⁰³ Todd Pitman, 'Congo Rebel Leader Accuses Rival of 'Coup Attempt'', Reuters (4 November 2000).

¹⁰⁴ Using his authority as President Wamba sacked Nyamwisi as Prime Minister. But to remove him from his post of President of the RCD-ML General Assembly, he needed the support of a majority of its members. But since only the President could convene a meeting of the Assembly, his replacement would be still difficult to engineer. To overcome this, Uganda hoped to convince

activity aimed at repairing the RCD-ML's internal divisions. Kampala made recommendations on how to re-structure the movement and launched a training and re-education program for the movement and its splinter groups.¹⁰⁵ Museveni later brokered an agreement between Wamba and his opponents in State House on 11 October 2000, which led to the re-appointment of Nyamwisi as the First Vice President of the RCD-ML and of Atenzi to Second Vice President two weeks later.¹⁰⁶

The Ugandan Government was working to correct the errors of its own misconceived strategy. There was a growing awareness in Kampala that Wamba could not overcome the leadership crisis in the RCD-ML. Unfortunately, Museveni was reluctant to admit that his original support for the former scholar, turned rebel leader, was misplaced. This would mean admitting that Uganda's NRM, and indeed its whole strategic approach to the war in the DRC, was misguided. It would also mean that Rwanda had been correct to seek the ouster of Wamba as RCD leader. Museveni still hoped that Wamba's potential would be realized once the rebellion reached Western Congo. Wamba was in the meantime promoted as a 'consensus builder' with excellent international contacts, who understood better than most the social, political, and economic problems that afflict the DRC.

Rancour nevertheless persisted between the two rivals despite their Ugandan-brokered reconciliation. In late October, supporters of Wamba suddenly became concerned when UPDF troops took control of the Bunia airport and Radio station. RCD-ML spokeswomen, Colette Ramm, told journalists that Ugandan officers seeking to protect their interests in the DRC initiated the move. "Things are getting very tense around here... it's going to be hard to contain the bloodshed", she said.¹⁰⁷ Events came to a head on 3 November, when Nyamwisi arrived in Bunia from Kampala to announce over the radio that Wamba had been deposed. Three days later, forces loyal to Nyamwisi launched a coup attempt against Wamba forcing him to seek refuge in Bunia's MONUC headquarters. "We control the situation here," announced Nyamwisi's spokesman Suddin bin Musme, "We control the town, the airport, and the radio station."¹⁰⁸

Fighting between the two sides continued off and on for another two weeks. On 12 November, Museveni ordered that Wamba be evacuated from Bunia back to Kampala, but the professor refused to leave.¹⁰⁹ Finally, on 19 November, Museveni dispatched his formidable advisor on DRC affairs, Colonel Kahinda Otavira, to Bunia to escort both Wamba and the others to Kampala. "We have chased all trouble and non-trouble makers out of Bunia... I have brought about

Wamba to accept Nyamwisi back as Prime minister of the RCD-ML, and to convince Nyamwisi to permit meetings of the Movement's assembly in return, which could help resolve the region's ethnic tensions.

¹⁰⁵ ICG Interview, Bunia. Also, 'Hundreds of DR Congo Rebels Reportedly Training in Uganda', *The East African* (25 Sep 2000).

¹⁰⁶ The meeting was attended by the Minister for the Presidency of Mozambique, Francisco Madeira, Tanzanian Envoy to the Great Lakes, Adam Marwa, the Ugandan National Political Commissar, James Wapakhabulo and Ugandan Minister for the Presidency, Ruhakana Rugunda.

¹⁰⁷ 'UPDF Turn on Wamba, Grab Bunia Airport not true, says Wapa', *The Monitor*, Kampala (31 October 2000).

¹⁰⁸ Todd Pitman 'Fighting Erupts for Control of Congo Rebel faction', *Reuters* (6 November 2000).

¹⁰⁹ 'Museveni Wants Wamba in K'la', *The Monitor* (13 November 2000). Todd Pitman, 'Congo rebels Accuse Rivals Over new Fighting', *Reuters* (15 November 2000).

60 Bunia leaders who are dangers to themselves. They have come to try and sort out their mess from here and we hope they do it," announced Otafire upon his return.¹¹⁰

The incident illustrates the disarray of Ugandan policy with the rebel groups. UPDF units intervened on both sides of the conflict – reflecting different interests within Ugandan ranks and the lack of overall control by the Commander in Chief. They had allowed Nyamwisi's group access to the radio station, but nevertheless continued to provide protection forces for the beleaguered Wamba after the *coup* attempt. A Ugandan soldier, identified as Tinkamanyire, reportedly announced the *coup* over the radio, and subsequently orchestrated the crackdown on anti-Nyamwisi demonstrators.¹¹¹ In early December 2000, Ugandan authorities still claim to recognize Wamba as the rebel movement's leader. Privately however, they admit that given Nyamwisi's ethnic support and economic power in Province Orientale, it is wise to have him head the rebellion to avoid further ethnic violence. In other words, Uganda's strategy of political empowerment along the lines of the NRM's *Mchaka Mchaka* ideology was dropped in favor of the more potent ethnic militarism.

A second motivation behind the deterioration in relations between Wamba and his Ugandan benefactors is the professor's long-held view that Lusaka is the best option to resolve the war in the DRC. While Uganda also claims to support the agreement, its recent successes alongside Bemba in Equateur have encouraged renewed thinking about a military solution.

5. Jean-Pierre Bemba and the MLC: A Winning Formula?

Faced with the continuing difficulties of Wamba and his NRM-inspired rebellion, Uganda has turned towards Bemba. The millionaire businessman enjoys a degree of popular and financial support unmatched by Wamba, or any other DRC rebel movement. Moreover, unlike both branches of the RCD, he is in sole command of his troops. These strengths have convinced Kampala that he might be in a position to win the war. This belief is not entirely a free choice however. Museveni wants some gain from his Congolese adventure before the upcoming elections (scheduled to take place before March 2001). Caught in a war without end, Museveni needs Bemba to save his pride, and pay his bills.

a. A Self-Financing Movement

Uganda's intervention has proved to be expensive. ADF violence has persisted in Western Uganda despite the UPDF's presence in the DRC. In the financial year 1997/98, Uganda's defence expenditure was some US\$70 million. This represented 1.5 per cent of GDP and was higher than the targeted expenditure of 1.1 per cent of GDP. In 1998/99, Uganda budgeted an increase in defence spending to US\$98.6 million. This rise was aimed at facilitating army operations to pacify Northern and Western Uganda and to protect the border with the DRC. However, actual spending for the financial year 1998/99 turned out to be much higher - US\$129.3 million. This overspending has drawn criticism from donors, who fear the government is neglecting priority areas such as poverty eradication, education and health. As a result of missed targets on defence spending, the

¹¹⁰ 'UPDF Takes Over Bunia', The Monitor, Kampala (20 November 2000).

¹¹¹ 'Nyamwisi Jolts Wamba Control of Bunia', New Vision, Kampala (16 November 2000).

International Monetary Fund (IMF) postponed a portion of its agreed loan in March 1999.¹¹²

In the view of a government under severe financial pressure, Bemba is thus a welcome client. His ability to raise revenues from taxes levied on tea, coffee, timber, gold and diamond exports is appreciated by his Ugandan backers. As a result, Bemba can finance much of his own war effort. According to the Finance Secretary, Francois Mwamba, the movement paid for 60 per cent of its expenses in August 2000. This was expected to rise to 90 per cent by the end of the year.¹¹³ The fact that Bemba even has his own captured Antonov transport airplane – larger than anything in the Ugandan Military inventory - also helps reduce what are otherwise expensive (approximately US\$30,000) charter flights between Entebbe and Gbadolite.¹¹⁴

b. A Popular and Regionally Balanced Movement

Ugandan officials trumpet the popularity of Bemba, and the fact that MLC seems to have put in place a representative government, with key appointments distributed to individuals from every province of the DRC. The Government's Secretary General (Prime Minister) is Olivier Kamitatu - son of Cleophas Kamitatu. Among the top ranks in the MLC forces are officers from different regions. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Amouri, comes from eastern DRC. The Defence Secretary, Colonel Mulomba Kibonge, is also from the East. The rebel movement has also created a central treasury with a Finance Secretary, Francois Muamba, a former member of Etienne Tshseke's party, who comes from Kasai Province. The Secretary of the Economy, Albert Mbia, is a former ambassador to Portugal and is from Equateur province. The movement is also in the process of drawing up a financial budget to be allocated to different organs for different activities.

c. The Reasoning Behind Uganda's Support

Museveni is wedded to Bemba for reasons of prestige. After the collapse of Wamba, and the humiliation of three successive defeats to the RPA in Kisangani, Museveni wants to find a winner who justifies his original intervention in the DRC. This desire stems partly from the Ugandan President's pride, and from his need to transform the politically unpopular war into a success in time for the Presidential elections that are to be held by March 2001. The sudden emergence of NRM Colonel Kiiza Besigye – a strong critic of Uganda's support in the DRC - as an election opponent, underscores this need. One commentator, for example, predicted in mid-October that: "Without a big trophy, the President will be ridiculed as a loser, and projected not as a star general winning wars, but as a

¹¹² Andrew M. Mwenda and agencies, 'Domestic Debt Record Shs 100bn, IMF Suspends Aid to Uganda', *The Monitor*, Kampala (13 March 1999); Consultative Group Meeting for Uganda's Donors. US Delegation Background Paper (March 2000); Government of Uganda. Ministry of Finance. *Background to the Budget 1999/2000*, (Kampala: June 1999) 93.

¹¹³ 'Rebels Use New Openings to Boost Economic Activity', *SouthScan*, Brussels (30 August 2000).

¹¹⁴ ICG Interview, RCD-ML officials, Bunia (August 2000); Information confirmed by VR Promotions, Kampala.

reckless gambler who was blinded by power and other unspeakable temptations in Congo and lost.”¹¹⁵

Uganda is currently assisting Bemba in every way possible. Officially, Kampala admits its providing support to Bemba in the form of artillery, medical, and communications. In reality, however, there are more than 10,000 UPDF in Equator Province under the overall command of Brigadier Katumba Wamala, based in Gbadolite.

Bemba's successes seem to have put Uganda in a strong position to affect the outcome of the war. If Mbandaka were taken, MLC forces would be a mere four-days boat ride from Kinshasa. But to move beyond the town would be well nigh impossible in the face of Angolan resistance. The FAA air force could inflict severe damage on forces using the river to approach Kinshasa. FAA ground forces could do the same in and around the capital city. Angola may be unhappy with Kabila, but they do not want to see him replaced by Bemba, who is a Mobutist with close ties to UNITA.¹¹⁶

Consequently, the threat Bemba posed to the key river port in the late summer of 2000 provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity. Angolan Chief of Staff, General Jogo Baptista De Matos, visited Kampala in late August for discussions with UPDF Commander, Major General Jeje Odongo, during which he met Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni and other high-ranking civilian officials.¹¹⁷ Bemba himself met with the Angolan Foreign Minister, Joao Bernardo Miranda, in Paris in August.¹¹⁸ The many talks sparked by the threat to Mbandaka even raised the possibility that Kinshasa's allies might remove Kabila as a result of negotiations with the rebel alliance. But then, at talks held in Windhoek on 9 October, Kabila's Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean allies pledged to defend Mbandaka and threatened 'full-scale war' against Uganda and Bemba's MLC forces. Following this, in late October, Luanda gave UPDF Commander, General Odongo, who was on a reciprocal visit to Luanda, a demonstration of its military muscle during visits to Catumbela airbase and the Funda Military Zone.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ 'Why Kinshasa Needs to Fall Before March 2001 Polls', *The Monitor*, Kampala, (12 October 2000).

¹¹⁶ At the moment of the FAA offensive against UNITA in December 1998, the Equateur businessman purchased fuel in Zambia for sale to the Angolan rebels in response to an appeal from Savimbi. See United Nations. Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council' with enclosure 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA', (10 March 2000) paras 64-65. There are also been reports of Ugandan troops 'seconded to UNITA'. See 'Zambian Aid for Angolan Rebels' *Mail And Guardian*, Johannesburg (9 April 1999).

¹¹⁷ 'President Meets Angolan Army Chief', *New Vision*, Kampala (26 September 2000).

¹¹⁸ Africa No 1 radio, Libreville, in French 1200 gmt (28 September 2000), as monitored by the BBC.

¹¹⁹ Angolan TV2 reported on the visit: "We are at Catumbela Air Base in Benguela, in the center of the country. General Odongo saw part of the Angolan's Army military potential, and some of the capabilities of the national Air Force. The visiting general obtained information about the advances that have taken place in the FAA. After seeing and hearing came the acknowledgements: FAA is much more advanced than Uganda's ballistic potential, therefore military cooperation is necessary, despite the differences that separate the two sides in the DRC conflict." Goncalves Inhanjica, Broadcast TV2 Televisao Publica de Angola, Luanda (1930 gmt 2 November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.

According to numerous sources, Bemba wants to take Mbandaka and maybe even push towards Kinshasa. However, UDFP has so far refused to support this option. An MLC advance on Kinshasa is not likely to bring an end to the war. If an accord were fashioned between the Angolans and Ugandans, Kigali would be likely to attempt to seize Mbuji Mayi. Kabila meanwhile, could be expected to flee to Lubumbashi. If based in Katanga, he could continue with the support of many Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, whose economic interests in the DRC lie primarily in the mineral-rich southern region. Together, these moves would make Bemba's success less important. He could take advantage of the implicit sovereignty accorded by control of the national capital - but he would not have access to the economic heart of the country.

Bemba would also face the opposition of rival rebel leaders. Outside of their hopes to win political power, the leaders of the rival factions all have economic interests that Bemba would be certain to oppose. Not surprisingly, many suspect Bemba of seeking complete control of the state. Despite the trappings of government in the MLC for instance, his grip on the leadership is total. He personally nominates all candidates for key positions such as the 12 National Secretaries and the seats in the Political and Military Liberation Councils. Even Kamitatu recently admitted in Uganda that the MLC was not running a government, saying instead that it was a guerilla movement that had created administrative structures to facilitate its operations.

And finally, Bemba would also face political difficulties in the capital city. Despite the ethnic mix in the movement's leadership positions, the Kinois are not likely to view him as a liberator because he comes from Equateur. More likely, he would be seen as a resurrection of the still-hated Mobutu regime. He is widely rumoured to have ties to Mobutist intelligence circles, and is thought to employ the *Union des Republicains Nationalistes Pour la Libération*, composed of former members of Mobutu's Special Presidential Division.¹²⁰

6. Conclusion

Ostensibly launched for security reasons, Uganda's effort in the DRC has failed to quell insurgent unrest in Southwest Uganda. Instead, the policy has spurred the growth of a war economy that has in turn, provoked the collapse of discipline in the UDFP. More tragically, the Ugandan policy has spurred an explosion of ethnic violence, and the rise of ethnic warlords, whose presence on Uganda's borders do not bode well for the future.

Short of a victory, President Museveni is probably incapable of ordering a withdrawal of the UDFP from the Congo. Many of the senior officers have carved out economic interests that they would be loath to surrender. More important however, is probably the Ugandan leader's own personal pride, which has driven his strategic decision making from the outset. He disagreed with the Rwandan's drive for a rapid military victory, substituting the lessons of his own experiences -

¹²⁰ Originally captured by Kabila and placed in re-education camps, these forces escaped in August 1998 to fight with the then Colonel James Kabarebe in the Bas-Congo axis. Evacuated to Kigali after the failure of the operation, these forces joined with the RCD for the march to Kisangani. When Uganda formed the MLC in September 1998, however, the group joined Bemba in what was, at the time, a first point of tension between Rwanda and Uganda.

that the people must be politically 'empowered'. His views were not necessarily wrong in principle, but nevertheless spurred the fragmentation of the rebel RCD movement, and contributed to the breakdown in relations between Kigali and Kampala.

In the end, the Congolese rejection of the alien ideology he sought to impose upon them sealed the fate of his 'empowerment strategy'. This failure has left him with no other choice than to accept the ultimately destructive mobilising power of ethnicity and regionalism. At present he still claims to recognize Wamba as President of the RCD-ML. If he is to maintain a semblance of control in the Northeast DRC, and thus protect Uganda's frontiers, he has no choice but to accept the rise of Nyamwisi.

IV. LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA: IN POWER BY DEFAULT¹²¹

Kabila's departure from office has often been predicted. His power base within the DRC has never seemed very secure. When he joined forces with the AFDL rebel movement in 1996, he had virtually no troops of his own, and few Congolese had ever heard of him. Today, after more than three years in power, he has yet to build a cohesive political party. His army does not fight enthusiastically. Even his cheerleaders have failed to organise pro-government demonstrations on any scale. Yet the regime does at least keep better order, in government-controlled territory, than its predecessor. The corruption and rent-seeking under this regime seem to be more controlled than they were under Mobutu, with fewer people profiting. Kabila's generals have not earned the reputation of Mobutu's generals, who were a law unto themselves. But while he probably spends less than his predecessor on internal supporters, Kabila spends a lot more on foreign allies.

Kabila has only one strategic objective: to stay in power. Observers in Kinshasa believe that he prefers sharing the country to sharing power.¹²² So far, he has succeeded in this respect despite the miserable performance of his troops and his complete dependence upon the support of foreign backers. Despite widespread discontent with his rule, Kabila's regime is not threatened by internal unrest, or even a coup. Kabila's fate depends mainly on whether or not he remains useful to his allies, and whether or not the cost of removing him remains higher than the benefits. Without strong internal support and despite his erratic behaviour, Kabila has only stayed in power because of his bargaining capacity with his foreign supporters, for whom no better Congolese option has appeared. In other words, he has been mainly a ruler by default.

¹²¹ The interviews quoted in this section of the report were conducted between 27 August and 15 September 2000 in Kinshasa. Unless they are members of the Congolese government the persons interviewed are only generically identified for security reasons. 'Members of the diplomatic corps' include embassy and UN officials; 'Congolese sources' include journalists, academics, economic operators, minor civil servants, representatives of civil society and the like; and 'members of the international NGO community' include representatives of humanitarian and developmental agencies.

¹²² Interview ICG, members of the diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, 27/08/00-09/09/00.

A. Kabila Inc.: The Absence of Regime Building

Kabila's claim to legitimacy comes from his victory over Mobutu, as well as his leadership in the war against the 'foreign invaders'. He presents himself as a nationalist and patriot, and frequently refers to the Western conspiracy to loot the Congo.¹²³ Foreign plots to rob the country of its wealth have been a popular political theme ever since independence. The Congolese see colonization and the Western-imposed Mobutu regime as examples of these attempts to exploit the Central African country. Consequently, Kabila's anti-colonial and anti-Western language, as well as his penchant for blaming foreigners for his own shortcomings, resonates in the DRC.

Measured against the final days of the previous regime, Kabila's rule appears less violent. So far, his army has not ransacked the capital, and the Congolese living in Government-held territory are better off than those in rebel zones. The political abuses of the authorities do not compare with those committed in the occupied territories, where UN Special Envoy for Human Rights, Roberto Garreton once reported the population was 'often denied the right to live'.¹²⁴

Yet Kabila's mismanagement of the economy and dictatorial tendencies have become a growing source of dissatisfaction for the population. Last year's estimated growth in real GDP fell to minus 14.5 per cent due to the effects of the war, and the Government's catastrophic handling of economic affairs - through an overvalued exchange rate, stringent restrictions on foreign-currency trade, uncontrolled growth in the money supply, constant harassment of business, and the looting of state owned companies. Some 80 per cent of state revenue now goes to the war effort.¹²⁵ The Government has had to slash civil servants' salaries (redirecting some of the spending to meet the army payroll), and cut the already-minimal spending on social services and infrastructure. For example, it now dedicates less than 1 per cent to education, and less than 2 per cent to public health. In the past few months, a foreign-currency crunch has sparked a worsening fuel shortage. In November, the government responded by devaluing the *Franc Congolais* (FC) from 23 to the US dollar to 50 FC – about half of the black market rate.

The government blames this economic situation on its internal enemies, who are trying to weaken its grip on the country. Alternatively, it is the result of an insidious attempt by the international community to undermine Kabila's anti-colonial government.¹²⁶ As evidence, its apologists point to the refusal of foreign donors and

¹²³ For a brief analysis of the original ideological discourse and philosophy of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the AFDL see ICG Africa Report N° 16, *How Kabila Lost his Way: The Performance of Laurent-Désiré Kabila's Government*, DRC report n°3, (21 May 1999) and Villers (G. de), Willame (J.-C.), et alii, *RDC: Chronique Politique d'un Entre-Deux-Guerres (Octobre 1996-Juillet 1998)*, Cahiers Africains n° 35-36, Institut Africain-CEDAF/L'Harmattan, Tervuren/Paris, (December 1998).

¹²⁴ Garreton (R.), *Rapport sur la Situation des Droits de l'Homme dans la République Démocratique du Congo*, Commission des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme, E/CN.4/2000/42, (18 January 2000).

¹²⁵ ICG Interview, members of the diplomatic corps, (August-September 2000)

¹²⁶ ICG Interview, Minister for Finance Mawapanga, Kinshasa, 01/09/00. One explanation of inflation brought up by M. Mawapanga was for instance, the conspiracy of former Mobutists allied to MLC leader J-P. Bemba selling massive quantities of FC to siphon all foreign currencies from the market. Another, and more credible, explanation is that a huge traffic in foreign currency is currently taking place in Kinshasa, led by some military officers who steal the soldiers

multilateral institutions to provide aid for the past ten years. But the Congolese do not fall for this 'foreign conspiracy' excuse. Were it not for his stridently nationalist stance, Kabila would have very few supporters outside his closest collaborators and family.¹²⁷

1. Political Control Compensates a Fragile Legitimacy

For most of last year, the DRC could be called a 'no-party state'. Kabila assumed all executive, legislative and military powers in early 1999, when he relieved the AFDL of the last vestiges of its independence. He promised presidential and legislative elections within two years, but then postponed them indefinitely in May 1999. At present, political activities are heavily restricted. Parties cannot operate unless they have registered with the authorities. The internal opposition is unanimous in saying that the conditions set out by decree in January 1999 are impossible to fulfil. These require parties to hold meetings, with the approval of local authorities, in every province, including those controlled by the rebellion. The Government also reserved the right to deny registration on grounds such as the moral and intellectual fitness of the applicants.¹²⁸ To date only four (more or less pro-government) parties have complied with the process of registration.

Government apologists claim that the Kinshasa political class was either complicit with Mobutu, or in the case of the opposition parties, corrupt. They say the parties do not speak for the masses, who support Kabila, as was demonstrated during the AFDL war and, later, during the three-week August 1998 RPA siege of Kinshasa. Since the country is at war moreover, it cannot afford divisive politics. Therefore political freedoms must be curtailed, so that the country can unite and concentrate on the war effort.¹²⁹

The Government has employed several means to mobilize support. It created the *Comités de Pouvoir Populaire* (Committees for Popular Power or CPPs) to organize the population politically. It organised its own 'transitional process' towards a reform of government in order to torpedo support for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue: this included the creation of an *Assemblée Constituante et Législative-Parlement de Transition* (ACL-PT) that was inaugurated in Lubumbashi in August 2000. Despite these efforts to bring legitimacy to Kabila's rule, the regime remains internally weak, which in turn has led to an increase of political repression.

a. The Committees for Popular Power, National Consultation and Assembly all Fail the Credibility Test

Elections for the North Korean-inspired CPPs were held in Kinshasa in February 2000.¹³⁰ Theoretically, every citizen belonged to this government-created 'movement of the masses', and was supposed to elect their street

pay to buy US dollars at 10 to 20 per cent over the black market rates and then export them out of the country.

¹²⁷ Many ICG interviews with Congolese sources, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹²⁸ Cf. for more details, see ICG Africa report N° 19, *Kinshasa sous Kabila à la veille du dialogue national*, 21 September 1999.

¹²⁹ ICG Interview, Minister for Human Rights, Léonard She Okitundu, Kinshasa, 29/08/00.

¹³⁰ Cf. for more details, see ICG Africa report N° 19, *Kinshasa sous Kabila à la veille du dialogue national*, op. cite.

representatives. The winners would in turn, elect his or her neighbourhood representatives, who would then choose the commune's CPP. Complaints that some commune representatives were chosen before the street elections had even been held, forced the government to annul the election results, and to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. On state TV, Foreign Affairs Minister, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, explained that the commission also needed to validate the results because 'the people are not used to voting. They are not used to reading either. We needed to make sure that those elected were real patriots.'¹³¹ In the end, the Commission of Inquiry nevertheless confirmed most of the election results.

The CPP's have since failed to appreciably mobilize public support for the Government. Under the former AFDL Commissioner for Propaganda, Raphaël Ghenda, the institution has failed to symbolize the democratic roots of Kabila's rule. On the contrary their members are seen as opportunists, composed mostly of unemployed young Katangans paid by the government, who spend their time spying on the people with a view to extorting money or denouncing "antipatriotic" activities to the security services.¹³²

In November 1999, the CPPs were tasked to recruit 20,000 men for a local defence force. After a few days training however, almost all the 'volunteers' had deserted to avoid being sent to the front.¹³³ The Government has also experienced difficulties in mobilising people for the official celebrations and demonstrations of support that were common in Mobutu's time. In March 2000, a free concert and rally in honour of the President was to be held in the national stadium (capacity 50,000). Some of the nation's most popular musicians, preachers and miracle healers were billed to perform. But, due to the lack of public enthusiasm, the event was moved to a smaller venue where according to state TV it attracted only 5-6,000 people.¹³⁴ In March 2000, the CPPs received a resounding 'thumbs down' when the 1,100 delegates to the National Political Consultation called for their abolition.¹³⁵ Since then the Government has placed less emphasis on them.

The results of other Government efforts to mobilize support have been equally disappointing. It created a Congolese women's movement called the *Réseau des Femmes Congolaises*, (REFECO) led by pop star, and reputed presidential mistress, Tshala Mwana; a National Bureau for Social Protection (BNPS) led by former AFDL executive, Agathe Mulimbi; and a paramilitary movement named the *Service National* (SN), which some at first feared would become a reservoir for pro-Kabila militias.¹³⁶ These fears were unjustified. None of these institutions possess the financial resources to have any real impact on the population, whether good or bad, and none seems to be particularly active at present. The BNPS is a Presidential welfare organisation. Mainly run by women, it is best known for the *Magazins du Peuple* - state shops with controlled prices - which they have tried to organise. But these shops are too few to have much impact,

¹³¹ ICG Interview with Congolese source, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ 'La consultation nationale se retourne contre le régime Kabila' Congo Presse Service, (6 March 2000).

¹³⁶ ICG Interview with Congolese source, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000)

even if they were properly managed, and the Congolese press tends to be very dismissive of their performance. The National Service's most-publicised project to date has been the cultivation of unused land on Plateau Bateke, near Kinshasa, to help overcome the food deficit of the capital. Despite announcements that more than 10,000 hectares would be planted by April 2000, only a small proportion of this area has been planted according to UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) officials. The resultant crop would supply only one and a half days of the capital's food needs. Its chief, General Denis Kalume Numbi, has announced that demobilised child soldiers would work for the SN. But the poor record that the government enjoys nowadays with the *Kadogos*, and its need for fighters on the front, makes it highly unlikely that the SN contribution to feeding Kinshasa will amount to much¹³⁷.

The closest thing to a representative assembly that Kinshasa has witnessed since the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 has been the two week National Political Consultation of February 2000. Organized by religious leaders, the meeting gathered representatives from Government, parastatals, political parties, the business community, NGOs, women's groups, youth groups, as well as lawyers, academics and customary chiefs. Those in attendance came from all over the country, but were mostly resident in the capital. Invitations seem to have been easily attainable, but the rebels are not thought to have been present.

In spite of the Government's efforts to pack the assembly with its supporters, the resounding majority of delegates vocally opposed the Kabila regime. The conference, which had been supported by the President as an illustration of his political benevolence, quickly turned into an open forum for criticism against his Government. The audience loudly applauded calls for an end to his personality cult (a ban on Kabila lapel badges, and the removal of posters with his portrait from around the capital), the appointment of a new Government, the abolition of the notoriously-arbitrary Court of Military Order (COM) and Office for Wrongly-Acquired Goods (*Office des Biens Mal Acquis* or OBiMA), the freeing of political prisoners, the lifting of restrictions on political activity, and the immediate start of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.¹³⁸

The President and Government disregarded the criticism and created the Constituent Assembly, which they claimed would offer the population the means to determine its own destiny. At first this assembly was to be set up after an electoral process.¹³⁹ Instead of organizing elections however, the Government invited applications, in May 2000, from all those interested in serving on a Preparatory Committee for the creation of the Assembly. In response to this appeal, it received 966 dossiers in two weeks. But when the membership of the 15 member preparatory committee was announced, the only well-known names from outside the Presidential entourage were those of two former organisers of Mobutu's *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) party.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Interview ICG with Congolese source and diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹³⁸ See *Le Potentiel*, (6 March 2000).

¹³⁹ Cf. Congo presse service, (31 March 2000).

¹⁴⁰ Interview ICG with Congolese source, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

Subsequently, in July, it was announced that 60 of the MPs had been chosen by the President himself and the other 240 would be selected by the Preparatory Committee. The Assembly was to be based in Lubumbashi, capital of the President's home province, Katanga. Among the nominated MPs were Congolese pop stars Tabu Ley and Tshala Mwana. On 21 August the President formally opened the parliament. The new Assembly, he declared, was 'constitutionally the second institution of the nation' - the Presidency was the first. He then warned the members to behave themselves: 'your behaviour must be credible ... you have learned this during the [pre-opening political] seminar. We did not want to brainwash deputies... but we wanted that together we would understand the immense tasks that lie before you.'¹⁴¹ Despite this warning, the members immediately began to challenge the Government's management of the country.

The first task the Assembly faced was to pass a motion calling for revision of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In September, it was announced that a committee of MPs would even be charged with the preparations for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The regime also said that two recent defectors from the rebel RCD would serve on this body. These appointments aroused the resentment of Assembly members however, who then tabled a motion in opposition to this move. Other disputes concerned official compensation for member's expenses. In the end, assembly sessions were suspended in October when police cleared members from their offices in the parliament building. What was to have been a rubber stamp assembly had turned into a coterie of demanding political clients, all of whom sought to constantly renegotiate their support for the Government.

b. A Divided Political Opposition Subjected to Repression

Congolese political parties are deeply divided along regional, ethnic, historical and personal lines.¹⁴² Other than the *Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social* (UDPS) and the MPR, none possess much in the way of financial resources or national following. And yet the capacity they demonstrated in the early 1990s to mobilize in Kinshasa makes them a threat to Kabila, who has repressed them persistently. After two years of this most are on the verge of extinction.

The DRC's best-known opposition politician is Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the UDPS. A Minister of the Interior under Mobutu in the 1960s, he eventually became an opponent to the regime, and founded his own party in 1982. Subsequently, the Sovereign National Conference elected him Prime Minister in 1991 and then again in 1992. In 1993, he even formed a government in defiance of Mobutu. People in Kinshasa also remember that the UDPS is the only opposition party to have filled the national stadium in Kinshasa (again during the Sovereign National Conference). But Tshisekedi's image suffered when he agreed to serve in government under Mobutu. His popularity slipped further when he failed to condemn the rebels at the outbreak of the second war in 1998. The party has also been weakened of late by the Kabila-encouraged breakaway of Katangan leader, Kibassa Maliba, and his followers. Nevertheless, while the UDPS' centre of support remains Kasai Oriental, no other party has more national organization or support.

¹⁴¹ Presidential speech, opening day of the ACL-PT, (21 August 2000).

¹⁴² For a detailed account of their activities in the "transition period", see Villers (G. de), *Zaire : la transition manquée*, Cahiers Africains n°27-29, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997.

The other nationally structured political organization is Mobutu's MPR, the former single party. In mid 2000, the current leader, Catherine Nzuzi Wa Mbombo, was imprisoned for several weeks because she had challenged Kabila over his management of the country. At present, it is unlikely that the MPR movement could rally a national following because it is blamed by most Congolese for the country's ruin.

The other established opposition parties are almost completely defunct. The *Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien* (PDSC) is supported by some intellectuals. Regionally its centre is Bandundu, where it is split between Northern and Southern factions. Like Tshisekedi, its leaders, André Bo-Boliko and Cléophas Kamitatu Massamba, served in governments under Mobutu. Arrested after making a strongly anti-government declaration to the press, Kamitatu was sentenced to four-years imprisonment for corruption under the former regime in June 1999.

The *Parti Lumumbiste Unifié* (PALU) was formed in the 1960s by Antoine Gizenga, a minister in Lumumba's government who was released from jail in 1964, and one of the few politicians who seems to have never co-operated with Mobutu. His movement however, is regarded as largely a tribal affair supported by the Bapende and Bambunda of Bandundu. Gizenga moreover, is known for claiming magical and spiritual powers, and has, for the past year stopped appearing in public. It is possible that the PALU could cause serious disturbances in Kinshasa. Kabila has therefore worked to disarm this threat by filling the local authorities with people from Bandundu, who presumably would not hesitate to suppress the Kasaian supporters of the UDPS. The people of Bandundu have consequently been a major source of recruits for the new *Police d'Intervention Rapide* (PIR). Similarly, the Governor of the capital, Théophile Mbemba, is a Bandundu ethnic leader.

The *Mouvement Nationaliste du Congo/Lumumbiste* (MNC/L) originates from Patrice Lumumba's party, the MNC. His son, François Lumumba, who has proclaimed himself heir to his father's political legacy, has since kept the tradition alive. His party has his father's name with which to rally support. It also claims as a member Kisase Ngandu, a popular Tetela leader like Lumumba who was killed in the early days of the AFDL. At present, the party's leader has fled to Brussels after a brief imprisonment, and its strength on the ground looks minimal.

A more recent creation is the *Forces Innovatrices de l'Union et de Solidarité* (FONUS) Its leader, Joseph Olenghankoy, is the youngest of the well-known opposition leaders, and has no experience of government. He has won a reputation for fearlessly condemning dictatorship, under Mobutu and Kabila, but observers doubt whether he has a national or regional following. His outbursts have never had much effect, and have earned him repeated spells in detention.

The opposition probably has more difficulty mobilising people than the government. Since 1994, they have not even tried, preferring instead to call upon their supporters to stay at home, on strike. Street marches, and the pillaging that could result from demonstrations, do not appeal to the middle class or to anyone with a livelihood to lose. Virtually the first attempt to organise an opposition protest in the capital since 1997 came in March 2000, when the

FONUS' leader Olenghankoy said that he would launch a strike on 8 April if all the foreign troops - including the Government's allies - had not quit the country by 1 April. On 30 March, he was arrested briefly, and the protest failed to materialise. The UDPS called another strike a few weeks later, which reduced traffic for a few hours, but was not followed by the mass of the city's workers. Since then, there have been no more attempts.

The fear of repression and the frequency of arbitrary arrests have also cut the numbers of opposition leaders at liberty to agitate against the Government. In September, the UN High Commission for Human Rights appealed to the government to release 253 prisoners of conscience, political prisoners and others in the DRC whose fate was of particular concern to the organization. Two amnesties have been declared in the past year, but some of these prisoners have remained in detention. The respected NGO *Voix des Sans Voix* reported in late 2000 that 91 activists of PALU have been held for more than seven months, and that ten UDPS activists have been held for three months. The PDSC leader, Cleophas Kamitatu, has been in detention since last year. Civil society leaders are even more frequent targets of these arrests because of their support for an Inter-Congolese Dialogue.¹⁴³

Some human rights circles believe that political detainees could actually be ten times the official figure. Throughout the country, people suspected of 'intelligence gathering for the rebellion' often disappear, and can be held *incommunicado* for months. They are transferred from one prison to another ahead of the visits of human rights groups, and families without means have virtually no hope of getting information about their loved ones. There are also fears that prisoners risk being sent to the front.¹⁴⁴

2. Personal Rule in the Extreme

Mobutu dismembered the Congolese state long before Kabila took power in Kinshasa. Territorial sovereignty is often an illusion in Africa, but in the case of the DRC amounts to a complete fantasy. Kabila's rule is restricted to a few major towns (Kinshasa, Kikwit, Mbandaka, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kolwezi, Lubumbashi) and strategic locations (the port of Matadi and the Inga hydro-electricity dam) and some important roads and rivers. Kabila's empire is therefore, relatively small and his methods of leadership have not differed fundamentally from those he practiced as a militia leader in Fizi-Baraka or while running his many Tanzanian businesses.

He rules his territory like the autocratic father at the head of a family enterprise. Power sharing is not part of his thinking, and no single minister or civil servant can take a decision independently.¹⁴⁵ He does not hesitate to send those who misbehave, or forget his authority, to prison for a few weeks. Only two of the current Ministers of State, Gaëtan Kakudji and Mwenze Kongolo, have avoided arrest. Kabila even dared to jail the Angolan-backed former Petroleum Minister,

¹⁴³ See for detailed accounts: La Voix des Sans Voix, *Bulletin d'information pour la défense et la promotion des Droits de l'Homme*, n°19-23, (January 1999-April 2000).

¹⁴⁴ Observers in Kinshasa that this may be the case with approximately 800 death penalty convicts held in Kananga. ICG interview, diplomatic corps and international NGOs, (August-September 2000).

¹⁴⁵ Interview ICG, diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

Victor Mpoyo, who he detained briefly in June 2000 in response to allegations of corruption. His accuser, the head of Hydrocongo and of the OBiMA Kazadi Nyembwe, suffered the same fate soon afterwards.

a. Family, Balubakat, Lunda and the Diaspora¹⁴⁶

Political repression and divide and rule tactics have permitted Kabila to overcome the domestic discontent with his rule.¹⁴⁷ These practices are not conducive towards regime-building, however, and it is doubtful whether he can rely on any strong power base within the country. Therefore Kabila needs people he can control or trust completely to run the affairs of the State. This explains the ubiquitous family members in the security apparatus, the role of unknown figures from the Congolese Diaspora in the Government, and the absence of any alliance with well-known regional or ethnic leaders.

Key positions in the DRC security services are filled with the family members of the President. Kabila's son, Joseph, is Deputy-Chief of Staff and Commander of Land Forces. General Yav Nawesh, the commander of the *Forces d'Intervention de la Capitale* (FIC) is a relative by marriage. He heads the army brigade based in Kinshasa that merges the troops of the capital's 7th Military Region with the Presidential Guard (*Groupe Spécial de Sécurité Présidentielle* or GSSP). Gaetan Kakudji, the Minister of the Interior and head of the country's intelligence services, is a cousin, as is the President's Aide-de-Camp Colonel Eddy Kapend, who is one of the most feared men in the administration. The late commander of the security services in Lubumbashi, Commandant Georges Masile Fundi, is a half-brother, and the chief of the national police, Celestin Kifwa, is a brother-in-law. Moreover, his son, Jean-Claude, known as "Commandant Tango-Tango", is second to General Nawesh in the Kinshasa army brigade.

Kabila's father was a Mulubakat from Manono, in North Katanga, while his mother was from the Lunda tribe, which inhabits South-West Katanga, Western Kasai and Western Bandundu. The Balubakat (or Luba from Katanga) do not appear to monopolize leadership positions however. Of the dozen leading members of the cabinet, only three are from Katanga. Joseph Kabila is the only one among the army chiefs of staff. Out of the commanders of the eight Military Regions and the two ministers who are also generals, there are only three Katangans. The three most senior personnel in one of the national intelligence services (*Agence Nationale de Renseignement* or ANR) are not Katangan. Lunda elites actually occupy more visible positions in the security services, especially in the army. Most of the generals and security chiefs served the previous regime and already occupied relatively senior posts when Kabila took over. This apparent widespread distribution of leadership positions gives the Kabila government an appearance of national unity. For the most sensitive matters moreover, Kabila has preferred to rely on trained professionals whatever their

¹⁴⁶ The Balubakat are Swahili-phone Baluba from Katanga. In the singular, it is written Mulubakat.

¹⁴⁷ For a systematic and detailed account of Human Rights violation in DRC see Garreton (R.), *Rapport sur la situation des Droits de l'Homme dans la république démocratique du Congo*, Commission des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme, E/CN.4/2000/42, (18 January 2000).

regional origin.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, these individuals are monitored by Katangans loyal to Kabila, who he has placed in subordinate positions.

Who's who around Kabila¹⁴⁹

NAMES	ORIGIN	CURRENT POSITION AND BACKGROUND
Family Members		
Joseph Kabila	Mulubakat, son of the president	Commander of the Land Forces.
Gaëtan Kakudji	Mulubakat, cousin of the President	Minister For Home Affairs, right hand man to the President.
Mwenze Kongolo	Mulubakat, cousin of the President	Minister for Justice, left hand man and ambassador at large for the President.
Col Eddy Kapend	Mulunda, cousin of the president	Presidential Aide-de-Camp.
Gen Celestin Kifwa	Mulubakat, brother-in-law to the president	Inspector general of the Police including the PIR. Former General in the Angolan army.
Cmdt Jean-Claude Kifwa - 'Tango-Tango'	Mulubakat, son of Celestin Kifwa, nephew to the president	Second in command to Brigadier General Nawesh at the head of the FIC.
Brig Gen Jean Yav Nawesh	Mulunda, brother-in-law to the president	Former General in the Angolan army. Commander of the FIC.
Maj Gen Denis Kalume Numbi	Mukusu from Maniema, wife's family related to the head of State	Minister for Reconstruction and Commander of the National Service Corps.
Other Key Cabinet Ministers		
Pierre Victor Mpoyo	Muluba from Kasai	Minister for State without portfolio, former Minister of Petroleum and employee of Elf-Aquitain. A close friend to Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos and former financier of the AFDL
Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi	Kongo from Bas-Congo with Senegalese father	Former head of the presidential cabinet and Minister for Foreign Affairs, now Minister of State for National Education. A Holds a PhD in Philosophy and was a Lacanian psychoanalyst based in Paris for many years. Currently under an international warrant from a Belgian judge for his anti-Tutsi utterances in August 1998.
Dominique Sakombi Inongo	Equatorian born and raised in Kinshasa	Former propagandist for Mobutu who subsequently became a charismatic leader and is now Minister for Information and Propaganda. Is the chief censor for the regime.
Leonard She Okitundu	Mutetela from Kasai Oriental	Minister for Foreign Affairs, and former Minister for Human Rights. Exiled in Geneva for many years. Fancied by the international community.
Didier Mumengi	Mbunda from Bandundu	Minister for the Youth and Sports, former Minister for Information. Is sometimes used by the President as an ambassador at large.
Parastatals		
Raphaël Ghenda	Tetela, Kasai oriental	Head of the CPPs, former Commissioner for propaganda in the AFDL
Agathe Mulimbi	Mulubakat	Head of the BNPS, former executive of the AFDL.
Tshala Mwana	Friend of the President. Muluba from Kasai Orientale	Head of the Réseau des Femmes Congolaise, REFECO and member of the new Assembly
Kazadi Nyembwe	Mututsi from Burundi	Head of Hydrocongo and of the OBiMA. A

¹⁴⁸ For instance, Leta Mangasa, the head of the National Intelligence Agency is an Equatorian reported to have received some Israeli training.

¹⁴⁹ Source : Interview ICG, Congolese sources and diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000) and Villers (G. de), Willame (J;-C.), eds., *RDC : Chronique politique d'un entre-deux guerres (Octobre 1996-Juillet 1998)*, Cahiers Africains n°35-36, CEDAF/L'Harmattan, 1998.

		close friend and associate of the President since the early eighties.
Security services		
Leta Mangasa	Ngbaka from Equator	Administrator for the ANR, internal wing
Dr Ismail	South Kivu	Administrator for the ANR, external wing
Col Damas Kabulo	Mulubakat	Head of DMIAP internal wing
Col. Mulimbi	Mulubakat	Head of DMIAP external Wing
Constantin Nono Lutula	Mutetela from Kasai oriental	Security advisor to the President and the head of the State Security Council.
Hadith Juma	Mubembe from Fizi	Head of the DGM

b. The Multiplication of Intelligence Services and the Withering of the Army

Laurent Kabila seems to believe that he will follow in the footsteps of Patrice Lumumba, and die as the victim of a Western conspiracy and the treason of his own men.¹⁵⁰ To prevent this he has created multiple official and unofficial intelligence services. The UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur reported that as many as thirteen security services are active in the DRC.¹⁵¹ The president's paranoia compels these organizations to uncover plots against his rule, or risk appearing complicit in them. Consequently, spies linked to one or another of the official or unofficial security services are found everywhere in the DRC.

<i>Agence nationale de renseignement (ANR)</i>	The National Intelligence Agency. Run by a General Inspector and two administrators for internal and external affairs. Thought to be the most professional of the security services, and is led by people trained in Israel, Belgium, France and the USA under the Mobutu regime. Officially under the Ministry for Home Affairs.
<i>Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie (DMIAP)</i>	Service for the Detection of Anti-patriotic Activities. Organized in the same fashion as the ANR, the DMIAP is supposed to cater for military intelligence but in fact replicates the ANR with its interest in all forms of "anti-patriotic" activity. A Balubakat stronghold.
<i>Conseil de Sécurité de l'Etat (CSE)</i>	The National Security Council. Official umbrella organization for all the security services. Found within the office of the President.
<i>Direction Générale des Migrations (DGM)</i>	The Immigration Service. Officially in charge of all movements in and out of the country.
<i>Force d'Intervention de la Capitale (FIC)</i>	Military intervention Force for the capital. Created in late 1999, the force merged the GSSP and the Kinshasa-based 7th army Brigade. The FIC is mostly composed of Balubakat and is ready to crush attempts at insurrection. In this respect, it proved efficient during the camp Tchatchi mutiny of early September 2000.
<i>Police d'Intervention Rapide (PIR)</i>	Paramilitary Force in charge of policing the streets of Kinshasa. A Bandundu Lunda stronghold that is trained by Angola. Reputed to be prone to shooting suspects and rowdy soldiers. Largely credited for the return of safety on the streets of the capital.
<i>Unité Spéciale Présidentielle (USP)</i>	The force responsible for the security of the presidential palace. Composed solely of people from Kabila's hometown of Manono.

Kabila employs the same shadowy management of ethnic loyalties with the army. When Kabila took over from Mobutu in May 1997, the AFDL's three main components were the Congolese Tutsis from the East of the country, the *Kadogos*, or children recruited on the way to Kinshasa, and the Angolan

¹⁵⁰ Interview ICG, diplomatic corps and Congolese sources, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹⁵¹ Garreton, R., *Rapport sur la situation des Droits de l'Homme dans la république démocratique du Congo*, op. cit.

'Tigers'.¹⁵² At that point these Swahili speakers made up the majority of soldiers in the new FAC. Historical animosities existed between them and the Western Lingala speakers who had dominated the *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ) since its creation. A series of wars had been fought between the two groups, including the Katanga secession, the two Shaba revolts and the insurgency in the Kivus. At last in command thanks to Kabila, the often-defeated Easterners treated the FAZ brutally, and hundreds or more may have died in post-war AFDL re-education camps.

These soldiers from the east have a vested interest in preventing a mutiny or *coup* by a different regional group. They are very aware that they might themselves face re-education camps if Kabila were overthrown by a non-Katangan. As a result, the Swahili speakers remain the only FAC troops that fight with any enthusiasm. Soldiers from Katanga make-up the backbone of the FAC. Swahili replaced Lingala early in Kabila's presidency as the language of command. In August 1999, some 760 new officers were appointed, many of who were Katangans. Since the outbreak of the current rebellion however, their predominance has been diluted somewhat.

Important units for the protection of the regime are still dominated by the Katangans however. Approximately 80 per cent of the Kinshasa-based FIC are reputed to be Balubakat. The unit in charge of protecting the Presidential palace is entirely composed of people from Kabila's hometown of Manono.¹⁵³ The second most important component of the security forces are Lunda troops from South-Western Katanga and Bandundu. Many Tigers are Lundans, as are the Angolan-trained leaders of Kabila's army such as General Nawesh, Colonel Kapend, and General Faustin Munene.¹⁵⁴ Not coincidentally, the two groups are historical enemies of one another. The Lunda supported secession attempt of Moïse Tshombe, and many subsequently became 'Katangan Gendarmes', while the Balubakat favoured the Lumumba government.

Corruption, favouritism, and differences in units' pay pose the greatest threat to the regime. The most serious breakdown in military discipline in Kinshasa under this regime, a two-hour shootout at camp Tchatchi, occurred in late August. There were no official reports of casualties, but sources close to the Presidency said at least 15 men were killed and 27 wounded. It arose when a previously privileged group of soldiers, alleged to be Kivu Kadogos, did not receive their habitual bonus, and refused to go to the front. When it was discovered that this group had kept weapons within the camp, the Kinshasa brigade was sent to suppress the mutiny. The unit regarded Joseph Kabila as its patron, and refused to answer the orders of any other commander, resulting in the shoot-out. Since September, rumours and accusations about a vendetta against Kadogos and more specifically Kivutian members of the FAC have spread. Officers reportedly unhappy with their treatment and Kabila's lack of decisive support for the Mai-

¹⁵²The historical descendants of the tigers are the 'Katangan Gendarmes'. When their attempted succession from the Congo failed, they fled to Angola and joined with the MPLA in order to fight Mobutu in the 1970s and 80s. They later contributed decisively to the AFDL effort to win the first war.

¹⁵³ ICG Interview, diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

Mai have been arrested "en masse", further weakening the cohesion of the armed forces¹⁵⁵.

Morale in the FAC is generally very low. The August defeat of the elite 10th Brigade on the Ubangui River has had serious consequences on the force's eagerness to fight. The pre-combat desertion rate in the FAC is estimated to be 60 per cent at least. At present, only frontline units are regularly paid or fed.¹⁵⁶ These units' families are expelled from the barracks in Camps Tchatchi and Kokolo while they are away from home however, so that new recruits can be lured with free housing.¹⁵⁷ The regime has not introduced conscription, but many recruits are press-ganged by local authorities or customary chiefs. The Ministry for Defence launched a recruitment drive in Kinshasa in August 2000, which netted only 1400 new soldiers. It then turned to the army camps to enlist soldiers' own children into the force. As the war continues therefore, discontent is growing among all units.

c. No Grand Ethnic Alliance

The absence of regime building is also apparent in Kabila's refusal to concede any degree of power to recognised regional leaders. Kabila has chosen many of his close collaborators in government from among the Congolese Diaspora. The Ministers for the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Petroleum, Justice, Finance, Energy, Human Rights, and the Secretary-General of the CPP all returned from exile during the AFDL war. Most of them had been out of the country for a decade or more, do not have domestic political power bases, and are not viewed as legitimate community leaders by the public. Similarly, few of Kabila's collaborators had been leading figures in the internal opposition.¹⁵⁸ Kabila cannot tolerate the growth of independent leaders who might threaten him, and responds harshly to challenges to his authority.

The main victims of this policy are the economically powerful Kasaïans. The regime's attitude towards them is typified by the affair of the Ngokas diamond and the monopoly of industrial diamond marketing given in August to a single and so far unknown Israeli company: IDI Diamond Ltd. In late May, Ngoyi Kasanji, President of the *Fédération des Diamantaires Congolais* (Fecodi), the private association of Congolese diamond traders, was arrested in Kinshasa when he tried to sell a 267 carat stone. The government alleged that the diamond was stolen from the state-run Miba mining company (*Minière du Bakwanga*). Security officials confiscated the diamond and tried to sell it. Buyers in Kinshasa stayed away however, after traders in Antwerp were warned that the diamond was stolen property. Miba moreover had not reported the theft of any

¹⁵⁵ Some suspect that up to 300 Kivutian officers have been arrested in October and November 2000. ICG interview, diplomatic corps, (December 2000) and CAD1/Uvira, "SOS: Les militaires de l'ex-Kivu en danger de mort à Kinshasa", mimeo, 1/12/00.

¹⁵⁶ When Kabila first came to power, the soldiers were promised US\$ 100 a month by the government. Soon afterwards, they began to be paid in FC at the official rate - five to six times less than the black market rate.

¹⁵⁷ Interview ICG, diplomatic corps, international NGOs and Congolese sources, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹⁵⁸ Two notable exceptions are Frederic Kibassa Maliba, former Minister for Mines and now leader of the state authorised wing of the UDPS, and Theophile Mbemba, the Governor of Kinshasa. Both men were once key figures in Tshisekedi's UDPS, Kibassa as a regional standard bearer, and Mbemba as a party strategist.

diamonds during the period in question. Eventually Ngoyi was freed after his case had been heard in court. It took another three months to persuade the government to return the stone to him. After selling the diamond for a cool US\$ 18 million, Ngoyi held a parade in the capital to thank the President for seeing justice done. Yet, the Ngokas diamond saga sent a strong message to the diamond traders and the Luba of Kasai as a whole: their economic power would not last if it did not serve the Government's interest. The monopoly granted to the previously unknown IDI Diamond, contained the same message. The deal later collapsed when it became clear that IDI could not pay for consignments it received. The attempt to freeze diamond tenders was nevertheless viewed as a declaration of economic war by the Kasaïans, revealing the government's instinct to destroy alternative sources of power in the country.

The same attitude prevails with the Equatorian economic elite. Bemba Saolona, the Mobutist entrepreneur and Minister for Economic Affairs for a few months (and father to rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba), was demoted in June 2000 and arrested for a few weeks. Catherine Nzuzi wa Bombo, the leader of the MPR was simultaneously detained for several weeks, sending a clear signal of the behaviour that the President expected from members of the former regime.

The possibility of a political opening by the Kinshasa regime to former Mobutists, or any other parties, is highly unlikely. Dominique Sakombi, the Information Minister, set off for a tour of some Western capitals in November to meet ex-Mobutists and other opposition figures. Sakombi was already responsible for the return of General (professor) Likulia Bolongo, a former Prime Minister for Mobutu, and of Professor Vunduwawe Te Pemako, another heavyweight of the previous Republic. Sakombi's mission is expected this time to involve a meeting with Kengo Wa Dondo, among others. Likulia, Vunduwawe or Lambert Mende are useful people for Kinshasa to have on its side. They all have considerable influence in their home areas: Vunduwawe in Equateur, Likulia in Province Orientale, and Mende in North Kasai Oriental. Any former Mobutist who does not pledge his support to Jean-Pierre Bemba can be considered as a victory for Kabila.

But Kabila did not offer much, other than immunity and the return of their property. For some time it was thought that Likulia would get a senior cabinet position, but in the end he was only given the Ministry for Transport. Catherine Nzuzi Wa Mbombo, was in fact arrested the same day Vunduwawe was 'unveiled', as if to remind Mobutists that they are not permitted to operate as a party even though individual ex-Mobutists may receive VIP treatment. Former rebels who defect from the RCD receive the same treatment at the hands of Kinshasa. The most important was Professor Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, who was groomed for the post of Prime Minister (which was to be specially created for him). In the end however, he was only offered the junior position of Minister for the *Francophonie*, which he eventually turned down.¹⁵⁹ Power sharing with leaders of the previous regime or members of the rebellion is not on Kabila's agenda.

In the end, Kabila's rule does not rely on the legitimacy of the new political institutions he attempted to create, or on strategic alliances with the country's regional power bases. Kabila simply filled the vacuum left by Mobutu's

¹⁵⁹ ICG Interview, diplomatic corps and Congolese informants, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

overthrow, and has since managed to stay in power thanks to coercion, divide-and-rule tactics, and most importantly – the support of foreign powers intent on seeing a weak leader in Kinshasa.

B. Kabila and Co.: Angola, Zimbabwe, and Others

Kabila has no real power over his foreign backers, but has nevertheless made himself valuable to them over the past three years. The proceeds of diamond and cobalt sales - which are said to amount to approximately US\$ 1 billion a year – permit him to purchase weapons and otherwise finance the war. On the ground however, he depends upon the support of his foreign allies: Angola and Zimbabwe to hold the front and coordinate logistics, and the CNDD-FDD, Interahamwe and ex-FAR to launch offensives.¹⁶⁰ To pay for the presence of the foreign forces, Kabila has mortgaged the economic resources of Government-held territory.

1. Angola: The Godfather

The decisive intervention of the FAA saved him from defeat at the hands of the RPA in August 1998. Since then, Angolan heavy artillery support and air power have played a key role in defending the Government-held towns of Mbuji Mayi and Mbandaka.

In Luanda however, the recent military successes of the FAA in the DRC – and in the region - have created a growing imperialist appetite in the MPLA regime. The Angolans have intervened in four wars in the two Congos over the past three years. The rationale for each intervention has been their strategy of encircling UNITA, cutting off the rebels' lines of communication and denying them secure rear bases. They also sought to protect the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, wedged between DRC and Congo Brazzaville.

These expeditions transformed the FAA into a regional policeman for West Central Africa. President Dos Santos is seen by many as the new kingmaker of the region. He controls Africa's second largest resources of crude oil (production is actually going to overtake Nigeria in 2001) and is said to be able to break half a dozen neighbouring governments if he so chooses (Namibia, Zambia, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, RCA). Dos Santos has embraced this hegemonic role, and intends to decide who rules in Kinshasa. This has provoked a competition between Rwanda and Uganda for the favour of Angola. But for a bankrupt country already embroiled in its own 25-year-old civil war, such ambitions can be dangerous because they invite challenges.

a. *The Angolan Civil War and the DRC*

Angola first entered the DRC war to save Kabila's regime and, afraid of the vacuum that might result from his fall, guarantee that no support would be forthcoming from Kinshasa to the UNITA rebels of Jonas Savimbi. It suspected that Rwanda and Uganda had close ties to these rebel opponents. Both Entebbe and Kigali airports were thought to be important hubs in the gunrunning and diamond business of the Angolan rebels. At the time moreover, UNITA was in the final stages of a major re-armament that guaranteed an imminent clash. In

¹⁶⁰ See part II for Interahamwe, ex-FAR, CNDD-FDD and FNL role in the war along side Kabila.

these circumstances, the FAA felt that an effort to break UNITA's supply lines in the DRC was an essential strategic objective.

The civil war between the MPLA regime and UNITA has raged almost continuously since the country's independence from Portugal in 1975. At first the conflict was aggravated by cold war geopolitics that led the Soviet Union and Cuba to back the Marxist MPLA regime, while the United States and apartheid-era South Africa supported Savimbi. The end of the super power conflict brought hopes for peace to Angola with the signing of the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord. Subsequently, when Savimbi refused to accept the UN monitored September 1992 election results, the war resumed.¹⁶¹ An uneasy peace later returned to the country with the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. This agreement however, also unravelled because UNITA failed to comply with its terms, which specified returning territory to state control, handing in its weapons and demobilising its troops.

In the months leading up to the outbreak of the second rebellion in the DRC, the MPLA's rebel opponents became increasingly powerful. UNITA had used the brief interlude of peace to re-build the military potential of its purported 60,000 strong force.¹⁶² The glut of former Warsaw Pact weaponry for sale at this time benefited UNITA arms purchasers. Using false end-user certificates supplied by the Government of Zaire among others, and the services of a number of shady arms dealers, the rebel movement purchased tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and small arms.¹⁶³ Countries from which these weapons were purchased reportedly include Bulgaria, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation.

By mid 1998, it was essential for the FAA to cut UNITA's supply lines and deny them the use of DRC's ports and airfields. The rebel's perennial shortage of fuel was their critical weakness. They would also need spare parts, weapons and munitions in the coming clash. Their increased reliance on vehicles promised moreover, to make these needs even more pressing.

There were nonetheless risks associated with Luanda's decision to send thousands of its best troops to the DRC when a major rebel offensive loomed. The country was faced with an external debt burden of US\$ 11 billion and

¹⁶¹ In response to UNITA's repeated broken promises the UN imposed a laundry list of sanctions upon the movement. In September 1993 Resolution 864 imposed the first set upon the sale of arms and petroleum products to the rebels. A second package of sanctions came with Resolution 1127 in October 1997 that closed the its overseas offices, froze UNITA bank accounts, forbade unauthorized flights into its territories, and banned international travel by its leaders. In July 1998, a third set of sanctions were imposed with Resolution 1173 that forbade the sale of mining equipment to the rebels, and banned international trade in Angolan diamonds not certified by the Luanda government.

¹⁶² See United Nations. Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council' with enclosure 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA', (10 March 2000); Action for Southern Africa, 'Waiting on Empty Promises: The Human Cost of International Inaction on Angolan Sanctions', (April 2000); ALSO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH.

¹⁶³ These reportedly included four T-64 main battle tanks, BMP-1 and BMP-2 armoured vehicles, South African made SAMil-100 armoured personnel carriers, BM-22 Uragan multiple rocket launcher, 73mm SPG-9 anti-tank guns, and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns.

depressed world oil prices.¹⁶⁴ UNITA attacks moreover, picked-up almost immediately as the rebels moved to recapture those territories they had earlier surrendered to the government. The long-awaited UNITA offensive began in earnest in December 1998, with large-scale armour and artillery supported assaults upon the towns of Huambo and Cuito in the central highlands. To repulse these attacks, the FAA was forced to fly in reinforcements from its forces in the DRC. Fighting in the central region of the country, and in the north along the frontier with the Congo, raged through the spring.

Many reports from these battles highlight the links between the wars in Angola and the DRC. According to Angolan radio in the December attacks on Cuito there were many Rwandans and Banyamulenges.¹⁶⁵ There are also reports of Ugandan troops being seconded to UNITA forces.¹⁶⁶ On 26 March 1999 UNITA reportedly captured the important frontier city of Maquelo do Zombo with the help of Congolese rebels. To recapture the town, the heads of state from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the DRC agreed to mount a joint operation.¹⁶⁷ And indeed, on 28 April 1999 it was reported that UNITA had been driven back into Uige by FAA troops operating out of the DRC.¹⁶⁸ A 29 September 2000 press release from Action by Churches Together reported that two FAA battalions from the DRC were operating against UNITA forces in Moxico province.

The Government counter-offensive began in September 1999, after the signature of the Lusaka Ceasefire for the DRC. FAA forces rapidly lifted the siege of Cuito and Huambo. Under the pressure, UNITA began to crumble. One reason for the collapse was a shortage of fuel. UNITA only had 500,000 litres of fuel (approximately 25 tankers-full) when the FAA struck. By January, this had declined to only 100,000.¹⁶⁹ Within months, the conventional military capacity that it had built up since 1994 was destroyed. A mid-November press story quoted a Western diplomat with access to intelligence reports on Angola saying that there had been a significant drop in UNITA radio communications since the onset of the offensive. "They are almost silent now, and this is an indication both of a crisis in the leadership as well as the loss of communications equipment."¹⁷⁰ The FAA captured its fortified headquarters at Jambo on 24 December 1999. By July 2000 the Government claimed to control 92 per cent of the country's 157 districts. The last provincial capital in UNITA hands, Cazombo on the Zambian

¹⁶⁴ In April 1999 the Angola government announced that it had exhausted its savings on the war effort against UNITA. At about the same time press reports indicated that it had been forced to mortgage future oil sales to finance the purchase of weapons. See 'Government Mortgages Oil Sales for Military Equipment', IRIN (11 May 1999).

¹⁶⁵ Angola Peace Monitor, no. 4 vol. V (18 December 1999).

¹⁶⁶ 'Zambian Aid for Angolan Rebels', Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg (9 April 2000).

¹⁶⁷ The Zimbabwe Independent reported on 5 November that 2,000 Zimbabwean Commandos had been operating in Angola for four months under the command of Brigadier general Kachana. The Zimbabwe government denied the report.

¹⁶⁸ Angola Peace Monitor, no. 8 vol. V (29 April 1999).

¹⁶⁹ To resolve this fuel shortage Savimbi turned for assistance to Jean-Pierre Bemba among others. The Equateur Businessman reportedly complied by purchasing fuel in Zambia to sell the Angolan rebels. See Angola Peace Monitor, no. 7 vol. VI (30 March 2000); United Nations. Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council' with enclosure 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA', (10 March 2000) para 64-65.

¹⁷⁰ 'Unita General Defects', IRIN, (19 November 1999).

border, fell on 19 September along with its strategically important three-kilometre airstrip.

In strictly military terms, the intervention of Angola in the DRC is a success. The year 2000 witnessed the defeat of UNITA as a conventional military force. This was due in large part to the presence of FAA troops in the DRC, which frustrated UNITA efforts to find fuel, munitions, and spare parts. Nevertheless, the rebel movement retains its nation-wide organization and is capable of continuing its guerilla war. Already in the midst of the government victories, there has been a rise in ambushes, hit and run attacks, standoff bombardments and mine-laying actions across the country.¹⁷¹ Government control outside the towns is reported to be tenuous at best.

b. The Angolan Commitment to Kabila

The Angolan commitment in the DRC war, following its original intervention, has been minimal. FAA forces in the country are thought to have remained less than 5,000, and are at present said to number only 2,500. Its troops limit themselves to protecting important strategic points such as the port of Matadi, the Kamina airbase, and the Inga hydro-electricity dam that feeds the Angolan grid.¹⁷² Also important is the FAA's fleet of MiG and Sukhui jet planes and helicopter gunships that remain ready to intervene in the DRC

The economic spoils of the DRC war are distributed by Dos Santos himself and help to cement his overall hold on power. The Presidency controls Sonangol (National Angolan Fuel Company), which, in return for the FAA's assistance, has gained control of DRC's petroleum distribution and production networks via its Cohydro firm. Reports in 1999 suggest that Kabila relinquished his government's share of the offshore Coco crude production, estimated at 15,000 barrels per day.¹⁷³ Angola has also positioned itself to control deals covering future exploration in Kinshasa's offshore territorial Congo Basin. These agreements were in part, negotiated by Mpoyo, who has ethnic ties to Angola. Strategically therefore, Angola has gained control of a 1,000 km stretch of Atlantic seaboard, including DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and its own Cabinda enclave - and this could translate into further gains in the oil industry.¹⁷⁴

c. What Next?

Angola's intervention in the DRC has created new interests and new enemies. Its financial interests in the Congo, as well as the reputed interests of its generals in the country's diamond business, makes it difficult for Luanda to contemplate a loss of influence. The intervention has also transformed former allies, like Rwanda, into enemies.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ 'Security Report Suggests UNITA Still Strong', IRIN (28 November 2000).

¹⁷² Interview ICG, members of the diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

¹⁷³ Energy Compass, (12 March 1999).

¹⁷⁴ Africa Confidential, (20 November 1998).

¹⁷⁵ After the failure of the August 1998 attack on Kinshasa, two RPA Battalions and allied ex-FAC forces were stranded in Bas-Congo by the FAA's arrival. In order to rescue these forces, Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame contacted Savimbi to request his assistance. No doubt aware of the advantages to be had with such a relationship, the Angolan rebel agreed to allow the RPA to withdraw into the UNITA-controlled Northeast of Angola, from where they were later evacuated by aircraft to Kigali. There are also reports that some RPA remained with UNITA. See

The Angolan rebels appear to have remained in contact with Kigali. Areas of co-operation have included the dispatch of UNITA SA-16 Anti-Aircraft crews to aid the Rwandan-backed RCD rebels in Congo.¹⁷⁶ In return Kigali seems to have permitted the Angolan rebels to use Kigali as a transshipment point for diamonds, weapons and war materials. There are also allegations that after UNITA's 1999 loss of Andulo and Bailundo, the movement deployed troops to fight alongside the RPA in the DRC. In addition, Rwanda reportedly attempted to carry out an airdrop into UNITA territory on 15 January 2000.¹⁷⁷

The state of Angola's relations with Uganda are little better, as evidenced by its views on Bemba. Luanda distrusts Kabila for his erratic behaviour, and penchant for presenting his allies with *faits accomplis* such as the summer 2000 Equateur offensive. At times therefore, it suits Angola to appear equivocal. Its officials make an effort to tell foreigners that they are fed up with Kabila. The day after the FAA Chief of Staff's late September meeting with Museveni, Kabila was summoned to Luanda for three hours of discussion with Dos Santos, the subject of which was not disclosed to observers. Luanda however, has no intention of dropping Kabila for Bemba - to whom they refer as the 'young delinquent'.¹⁷⁸ The evidence of MLC cooperation with Savimbi therefore, as well as Bemba's Mobutist links, are sufficient to condemn him in Angola's eyes.¹⁷⁹ This message was driven home to Ugandan Army Commander Jeje Odongo in late October when, during a visit to Luanda, he was given displays of Angolan military power.

Angola remains therefore, the most important of Kabila's allies. It fears that replacing the DRC president – or permitting his flight to Lubumbashi - could open the way for UNITA to re-establish its bases in the DRC. Other factors contributing to Angola's support for Kabila include its fears that chaos could erupt in Kinshasa were it to attempt to replace him, as well as its disinclination to give up the spoils of the war he provides. Its forces in Cabinda, Brazzaville, Pointe-noire and Dolisi are positioned within a few hours of the Congo's capital city. Even more important are their allies in the DRC government. Former Katangan 'Tigers', whose leaders all served in the FAA, are the most influential members of the security forces. Angola is also training the PIR together with Congo-Brazzaville's police.

United Nations. Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council' with enclosure 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA', (10 March 2000) para 25-26.

¹⁷⁶ By February 1999 this battery was reputed to have shot down one MiG fighter. See United Nations. Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council' with enclosure 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA', (10 March 2000) para 50.

¹⁷⁷ Action for Southern Africa, 'Waiting on Empty Promises: The Human Cost of International Inaction on Angolan Sanctions', (April 2000).

¹⁷⁸ ICG Interview, European Diplomat, Brussels (31 October 2000).

¹⁷⁹ According to an opposition newspaper in Kinshasa, flights between UNITA airstrips and Bemba's Equateur airstrips have occurred in the past months.

This support for Kabila was revealed in the 27 October Kinshasa summit, organised under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), which called for the revision of the Lusaka agreement.¹⁸⁰ In attendance were Dos Santos and Kabila, along with the heads of state of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Prime Ministers of Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic. Some observers believe that this meeting is evidence of the formation of a coalition of central African oil-producing countries, under the leadership of Dos Santos and supported by France, to oppose Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Another important motivation behind the meeting was the war's effect upon the Congo River trade. The summit's participants agreed to mount patrols to ensure security on the Congo and Ubangui Rivers. Gabonese President Omar Bongo warned Bemba to take note of this initiative. "If he attacks us, we will respond in good and due form," he told reporters.¹⁸¹

Kabila's dependence upon this support was demonstrated in the November Government re-shuffle. Yerodia was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry for Education. He had been a diplomatic disaster, and since early August had been handicapped by the issue of an international warrant against him by a Belgian Judge for his role in the August 1998 massacre of Tutsis in Kinshasa. His replacement was the internationally respected former Minister for Human Rights, Leonard She Okitundu. Other key figures in the new regime are thought to have close links with Luanda because they are Lundas from near the Angolan border. These include the new Vice Foreign Minister, Ilunga Awan, Generals Yav, Numbi, Munene, and the Governors of Katanga and Bas-Congo.

Luanda is said to be considering the establishment of a transition government however, either with or without Kabila.¹⁸² The new leadership could be the product of a power-sharing agreement negotiated between the foreign belligerents. How the Angolans could depose Kabila, without calling into question the legitimacy of their original intervention to save him, and without provoking a major succession crisis in Kinshasa, is unclear. Moreover, it is unlikely that Luanda would want to see a strong government emerge in Kinshasa.

But Luanda is in a risky position. The desire to be a regional hegemon is a dangerous distraction for a country still in the throes of its own vicious civil war, and which admits to being broke.¹⁸³ To date, it has been able to maintain its ambitions with only a minimal commitment of troops, but a serious reverse on the military front would force it to live up to its pretensions. The DRC is a second front in its own civil war, and Luanda would be forced to increase FAA troops deployed to the country. Discussions on the subject held in mid-April 2000 between the Defence Ministers of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia in Kinshasa, allegedly concluded that the FAA would have to send more troops.¹⁸⁴ Now,

¹⁸⁰ 'Summit calls on aggressors to leave the territory'. Africa news service, (29 October 2000).

¹⁸¹ 'Central African leaders Want to Alter Congo Accord', Reuters (28 October 2000).

¹⁸² ICG Interview, Brussels, (27 October 2000); 'Angola America's Good new Friend Luanda', The Economist (7 October 2000).

¹⁸³ In April 1999, the Angolan government declared that it had exhausted its savings. See C. Gordan, 'Angola's Debt Burden', Daily Mail and Guardian (1 July 1999).

¹⁸⁴ Diplomatic Sources.

in early December Government sources in Kinshasa report that additional Angolan forces have been deployed to Lubumbashi in response to hints of withdrawal from Harare, and in the aftermath of the Pweto defeat. The scale of Luanda's commitment to the DRC in other words, is not entirely its own to decide.

Another option for Luanda would be to try and fashion a deal with either Rwanda or Uganda. At present there appears to be competition between the two Great Lakes countries to curry favour with Angola. Luanda could decide to accept one or the other of these aspirants were a Zimbabwean withdrawal from the DRC actually to take place. Nevertheless, this would be a radical departure from its habitual antipathy towards all those with ties to UNITA, as well as its DRC policy of the past three years. The likelihood of a pro-UNITA regime in Kinshasa, originating either out of the Mobutist MLC, or somewhat more improbably, out of the Rwandan-backed rebels, probably means that Angola cannot surrender its hold over Kinshasa.¹⁸⁵

2. Zimbabwe: Trapped in the Congo

The backbone of the FAC is Zimbabwe's contribution of 11,000 professional soldiers. They include infantry, artillery units, an armoured car squadron, tanks, engineers and support staff, along with periodic deployments of UK-built Hawk and Hunter ground attack aircraft. Namibian troops are also present. These number from 1,600 to 2,000, and include an artillery battalion. These troops are vital for the defence of Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi.

For Zimbabwe the involvement in the DRC has always been a dangerous adventure that it could not afford. President Mugabe's August 1998 decision to intervene had more to do with his own ambitions to assert his leadership as an African statesman, and the economic interests of the ruling elite, than with the interests of his country. Now under political pressure at home, he finds that he is stuck in the Congo. He cannot pull out without achieving a return on what he has already foolishly invested in the war. This would damage the interests of powerful domestic political forces upon whose support his position depends. Nor can he afford to fight because of the economic crisis that afflicts his country.

a. Zimbabwe's Financial Interests in the DRC

Protocols for military and economic cooperation between Zimbabwe and the DRC pre-dated the outbreak of the war. Since then, Kabila has promised Zimbabwe a great deal more in return for its military support. On 4 September 1998, Presidents Kabila and Mugabe signed a deal providing for a 'self-financing' intervention by the Zimbabwean National Defence Force (ZNDF). Under its terms, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) was to provide arms and munitions to the DRC, in return for which the Zimbabwean mining company, Ridgepointe, would take over the management of Gecamines, and receive a 37.5 per cent share of the DRC state mining company. Moreover, between 20 and 30 per cent of the DRC government's 62.5 per cent of the firm's profits was to be used for

¹⁸⁵ For details on Rwandan ties to UNITA see United Nations Security Council. 'Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From The Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the president of the Security Council', Robert R. Fowler Chairman (10 March 2000).

financing the Zimbabwean war effort.¹⁸⁶ Subsequent agreements have dealt with electric power, civil aviation and agriculture.

So far however, the benefits to Zimbabwe have been elusive. When the Lusaka agreement was signed, the DRC government already owed the Government of Zimbabwe US\$2.6 million for arms payments. Subsequently, it has stopped paying the monthly instalments it owes Zimbabwe.¹⁸⁷ Other forms of compensation have proved equally fruitless. Zimbabwean exporters face twin obstacles in doing business with the Congo - a lack of hard currency on either side, plus the lack of a banking system in the DRC. Up to the present some imports have been bartered for electricity or paid for in FC distributed to Zimbabwean troops. In August, ZDI announced they had exported two million dollars worth of food to the DRC in three months, paid for by barter. More imports are expected to come on stream with the opening of a so-called 'Grand Silo' project in Kinshasa. Banks in DRC and in Zimbabwe have been found to guarantee (in local currencies) barter transactions, and the storage facilities for Zimbabwean products are being built.

The Zimbabweans were wrong to believe that Gecamines could easily make them profits. Harare does not have the US\$50 Million required to restore the firm's operations. Meanwhile, the state mining company produces only between 10 and 20 per cent of its 1980s production of 475,000 tonnes of copper and 17,000 tonnes of cobalt.¹⁸⁸ A contract with Gecamines to supply 2,500 tonnes of copper monthly to a reprocessing plant in Zimbabwe produced only 3,000 tonnes over 18 months.¹⁸⁹ In addition, the firm faces US\$1 billion of long-term debt and has immediate trade liabilities of US\$50 million.¹⁹⁰ The chairmanship of white Zimbabwean transport mogul Billy Rautenbach, who had been Mugabe's pick for the post, was terminated last year because of his failure to turn the firm around.¹⁹¹

Other Zimbabwean mining interests include a joint venture between its army firm Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy), and the DRC's Comiex, to buy diamonds and gold for sale on the Kinshasa Precious Minerals Market. Harare was reported to be investing US\$3.5 million a month earlier this year.¹⁹² Short of funds these

¹⁸⁶ 'Rhodies to the Rescue', Africa Confidential (5 November 1999); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 296.

¹⁸⁷ Mutsakani, A., 'Arms Firm in Desperate Bid to get Kabila to Pay-Up', Financial Gazette, Harare (29 July 1999); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *'SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security'*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 293.

¹⁸⁸ 'Democratic Republic of Congo – Country Profile', Quest Economics Database- Africa Review World of Information (30 August 2000).

¹⁸⁹ 'Zimbabwe's Mhangura Copper hit by DRC Supply Problems', Platt's Commodity News (18 September 2000).

¹⁹⁰ 'Democratic Republic of Congo Review 2000' Quest Economics Database, Africa Review World of Information (30 August 2000).

¹⁹¹ 'Rautenbach Kicked Out of Gecamines', The Insider, Harare (22 April 2000). He was replaced by Belgian George Forrest.

¹⁹² 'Zimbabwe Army in Congo Diamond Deal', BBC News (23 September 1999); 'No Diamond Cheques for Zimbabwe in the DRC', The Independent, Harare (13 March 2000).

firms tried to float the Oryx Diamonds mining consortium on the London Stock Exchange in June 2000, but were blocked by the British Foreign Office.¹⁹³

Outside the mining sector, Harare has other interests. The ailing Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) has signed a deal to double its import of electricity from the Inga Dam in Bas-Congo. The deal is dependent on rehabilitating Inga's power plant, as well as upgrading the capacity of the link to Zimbabwe via Katanga and Zambia. The plan makes good economic sense but depends on the still uncertain participation of Western or South African firms. In addition, 500,000 hectares of Katanga farmland was given to one of Zimbabwe's largest state-owned farms.¹⁹⁴ In the longer term the plan is also to upgrade rail links between Zimbabwe and Kinshasa. The funds required for all these projects will be difficult to raise without peace.

The Zimbabwean Government has admitted that its involvement in the Congo war is costing the country more than it can afford - US\$200 million in the two years since August 1998, according to Finance Minister Simba Makoni. 'Our economy cannot support spending of this magnitude over the long term', said Mr Makoni in August, 'which is why the government is committed to repatriating the troops at the first opportunity.' The ZNDF claims to spend US\$3 million a month for the upkeep of its 11,000 troops – a third of its entire force - deployed to the Congo. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank assessed the true monthly figure at US\$27 million, and put on hold US\$340 million of desperately needed aid to the country.¹⁹⁵ In February 2000, one Harare newspaper (whose editors had received numerous death threats) reported that the country had spent \$US160 Million in public funds during the 18 months of war – although these had not appeared in any budget. In addition, it reported that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces had lost equipment valued in excess of US\$180 million over the same period.¹⁹⁶ Even Makoni admitted, in late August, that the war had cost over US\$ 200 million. His calculations, however, accounted only for food rations, salaries and basic equipment for the troops and did not include the US\$73 million in spending on new equipment from France, Russia, and Libya.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Oryx was granted rights to exploit diamond concessions near Mbuji Mayi that it claimed were worth US\$ 1 billion, or US\$ 208 million when discounted for exploration costs and political risk. Profits in this venture were to be shared out with Oryx taking 40%, Osleg 40%, and the Osleg-Comiex joint venture Cosleg the remaining 20%. See 'Zimbabwe –Glittering Prizes from the War', *Africa Confidential* (26 May 2000); Jamie Doward, 'Barred Oryx Weighs Up Flotation in Dublin', *The Guardian* (18 June 2000).

¹⁹⁴ 'Kabila's Congo Steps Up Cooperation with Zimbabwe', *Reuters* (29 Sep 1999).

¹⁹⁵ Morris H. and Fidler, S., 'Zimbabwe Misled IMF Over Spending on War', *Financial Times* (4 October 1999); Mutume G., 'The Economics of Financing War in Africa', *Daily Mail and Guardian*, Johannesburg (20 October 1999); 'World Bank Suspends Aide to Zimbabwe', *Financial Times* (8 October 1999).

¹⁹⁶ 'DRC War Costs Tax payers \$6 Billion in 18 Months', *Financial Gazette*, Harare (3 February 2000); This equipment included a MiG fighter aircraft, three helicopter gunships (and crews) as well as transport aircraft. See Al J. Ventor, 'War in the Congo Ensnarers Zimbabwe', *Janes Intelligence Review* (1 January 2000). The costs of equipment losses are estimated to have risen to US\$ 281.5 million by late August. See 'DRC War Figures Disputed', *IRIN* (31 Aug 2000).

¹⁹⁷ 'DRC War Figures Disputed', *IRIN* (31 Aug 2000).

The government had perhaps naively expected these costs to be recouped from the proceeds of the deals in Congolese diamonds, gold and copper. Zimbabwe Defence Minister Moven Mahachi once described joint ventures with the DRC as a payment option: "Instead of our Army in the DRC burdening the treasury for more resources, which are not available, it embarks on viable projects for the sake of generating the necessary revenue."¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately, the DRC did not prove to be the El Dorado that Zimbabwe expected to find when it intervened, and Mahachi has since admitted that: "The DRC is willing to contribute to the upkeep of our forces, but it does not have the necessary cash to do so."¹⁹⁹

b. Domestic Political Crises

At home meanwhile, Mugabe is faced with escalating political and economic crises. After twenty years of rule, the President's ZANU-PF party has come under serious pressure from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A violent campaign for the country's fifth parliamentary election, marred by widespread efforts to intimidate opposition voters, resulted in the nine-month-old opposition party winning 57 out of 120 seats. This has sparked growing opposition to Mugabe from within the ruling party itself, which threatens his hold on the movement's leadership post, although – despite much anticipatory speculation – no challenge to him emerged at the December 2000 ZANU/PF congress. The opposition MDC opposition submitted a motion to impeach Mugabe that was accepted for consideration by the ZANU-PF controlled Assembly, and the parliamentary and general political pressure upon him is not expected to dissipate.

The public dissatisfaction with Mugabe is being driven in large part by his stewardship over the worst economic crisis that the country has experienced since its independence. The government is in the process of dismantling its white-owned and economically successful commercial farming sector in order to carry out politically motivated land redistributions.²⁰⁰ Riots have erupted in Harare and Bulawayo, sparked by an annual inflation rate of over 62 per cent, along with an unemployment rate of over 50 per cent.²⁰¹ All foreign aid programs are under review and both the World Bank and the IMF have suspended loans. Foreign exchange reserves are dangerously low, according to the Deputy Finance Minister, and fuel lines are at their worst after nearly a year of critical shortages. As a consequence, Zimbabwe is listed among the world's poorest countries in a World Bank report that predicts 120 per cent inflation and a 10 per cent drop in GDP during the upcoming year.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ 'Zimbabwe Army in Congo Diamond Deal', BBC News, (23 September 1999); 'Zimbabwe Accused of Economic Colonialism', BBC News (1 October 1999); 'Zimbabwe Losses Add Up in Congo', BBC News (25 November 1999).

¹⁹⁹ 'Zimbabwe Accused of Economic Colonialism', BBC News (1 October 1999).

²⁰⁰ See ICG Africa Report No 22, *Zimbabwe at the Crossroads* (10 July 2000) and Africa Briefing, *Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Election* (25 September 2000).

²⁰¹ 'Police, Protesters Clash in Zimbabwe Township', Reuters (18 October 2000); Zimbabwe September CPI rises to 62.0 per cent', Reuters (11 October 2000).

²⁰² JanRaath, 'World Bank Blow to Zimbabwe', The Times (2 October 2000).

c. The Search for an Exit

Mugabe has been looking for a honourable exit from his Congolese adventure for some time. His government is adamant that he came to Congo in order to help a SADC ally invaded by enemies and that his motivation was to guarantee the integrity of the Congolese territory, rather than to salvage the rule of Kabila.²⁰³ He seems to have been willing to sign a ceasefire deal as early as November 1998. Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC had all agreed on the ceasefire, which was rejected by the Congolese rebellion. At about the same time, rebel forces had cut off a large contingent of Zimbabwean troops at Ikela, in Southern Equateur Province, and had forced Harare to enter into talks with Kigali for the evacuation of the wounded and the delivery of food supplies. Embarrassed when this was disclosed in the press, Harare denied that the story was true. Since then Kabila's intransigence has sabotaged the frustrated Zimbabwean efforts to find an exit. After his late 1999 Equateur offensive, one Zimbabwean official in Kinshasa commented: 'He's like a man who starts six fires when he's only got one fire extinguisher...The fire fighters are the Zimbabwean Army'.

Under pressure at home, and increasingly anxious about the Congolese quagmire, Mugabe has steadily distanced himself from Kabila. In March 2000, while attending the National Consultation in Kinshasa, he delivered a speech that invoked the memory of Patrice Lumumba and called for Bantu solidarity, but did not once mention Kabila. Relations between the two men worsened in April after Kabila refused to accept the deployment of UN troops in Kinshasa, and rejected the OAU-appointed Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, former Botswana President and long-time Mugabe friend, Sir Ketumile Masire. Kabila later stayed away from the 6 August SADC summit in Windhoek, on the excuse that he was 'busy'. When he was late for the 14-15 August Lusaka summit, and then walked out early claiming he had to attend a funeral, Mugabe said publicly that it would be difficult to resolve the war if Kabila did not start listening to his allies. At the time Mugabe and the other allies had refused to back Kabila's call for a revision of Lusaka agreement.

The subsequent 16 October summit in Maputo, chaired by South African President Thabo Mbeki, was held in response to an appeal from Mugabe to find relief for the threatened garrison of Mbandaka.²⁰⁴ The meeting's participants reiterated their support for the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan. Immediately afterwards, Mbeki flew to Kigali, where he lectured Rwandan leaders about the fruitlessness of the war while speaking at the opening of the October reconciliation conference. The Rwandans were in no humour to listen, as they were angered by the offensive in Katanga that had begun on the very day of the Maputo Summit, and which involved Zimbabwean troops. When Mugabe later addressed the COMESA summit in Lusaka on 31 October, he turned to Kagame and remarked acidly, "There are some warmongers on the African continent. It is something that Africa must discourage."²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Interview ICG, Zimbabwean diplomat, Nairobi, (20 November 2000).

²⁰⁴ Gregory Mthembu-Salter, 'Mbeki Takes New Lead in the Peace Process' Daily Mail And Guardian (20 October 2000); 'Mbeki To Rescue Mugabe From DRC', Zimbabwe Independent, Harare (20 October 2000).

²⁰⁵ Rwandan President Kagame walked out of the room in response to Mugabe's words. 'Zimbabwe's Mugabe Offends Rwanda, Burundi Leaders Reuters, Lusaka (31 October 2000).

Since he cannot afford the war, Mugabe has strong incentives to find a settlement. However, he has already made a substantial investment in the Congo, which compels him to maintain ZNDF forces in the DRC (there is a direct correlation between the number of troops and the respect for contracts already signed). Mugabe's own pride also stands in the way of a withdrawal. A unilateral departure from the DRC is virtually impossible without admitting defeat, and he cannot bring home a defeated army with the 2002 presidential elections looming on the horizon. Even opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, despite his repeated commitments to withdraw troops from the DRC, is calling for this to be done 'with honour'. Unfortunately, this appearance of Zimbabwean weakness only encourages Rwanda and Uganda to maintain their military pressure rather than negotiate. For example, Kigali's early December 2000 desire to continue to attack in the vicinity of Pweto may have been a strategy to bring Mugabe down at the mid-month ZANU-PF party congress. Finally, Zimbabwe is not strong enough to sign a deal without the permission of its allies. In particular, it would be difficult to withdraw the several thousand Zimbabwean troops from Mbuji Mayi without the agreement of the far more numerous Congolese and Interahamwe.

The withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces could occur however, if Mugabe fell from power. The reality of this threat is apparent in the recent price riots and the growing political opposition, even though for the moment he remains in control of his party and, perhaps more importantly, key elements of the security services. Mugabe's fall would certainly upset the current military stalemate, and could have far-reaching effects upon the outcome of the war. Kabila would be deprived of some of the best troops fighting on his side, and the defence of Mbuji Mayi would be substantially weakened. Angola would be forced to decide whether its interests in Congo justified taking Zimbabwe's place in the frontlines. If they are not willing to do this, they would have to sacrifice Kabila for the sake of a deal with Rwanda or Uganda. If these two countries could not overcome their distrust for one another, and agree on a candidate to rule their giant neighbour however, the result of a Zimbabwean withdrawal could well lead to a prolongation of the war.

Namibia, the last SADC ally, came into the DRC conflict in a far more moderate fashion than Angola and Zimbabwe. It claims that it could not refuse the request of the other two SADC countries, and President Sam Nujoma is a long time friend of Kabila. Only 2000 troops were reported to have moved into Congo, and only to train some FAC units at the Kamina base. It also gained its share of DRC resources. The London-based *Africa Confidential* reported in November 1998 that Namibia benefited by supplying the DRC with fish and that Windhoek President Sam Nujoma's brother-in-law, Aaron Mushimba, had been awarded a stake in the Miba diamond mining company. The magazine indicated that Mushimba also ran the business arm of the ruling South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) Kalahari Holdings. Namibian troops are on their way out, and their leaving would actually have little impact on the status of the war.

3. The Other Allies: Mercenaries and Mineral Buyers

Other states have reportedly assisted Kabila's regime. These include China, Libya, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and North Korea – which has been the most active. Pyongyang deployed several hundred military advisors to the DRC in mid 1999,

where they have served to train FAC forces.²⁰⁶ North Koreans have also assisted with munitions production. They assemble 250-500 kg bombs at Camp Mura in Likasi under the umbrella of the Congolese parastatal Afridex. Poor manufacture resulted in the explosion of one of these at Njili Airport in Kinshasa on 14 April 2000.²⁰⁷ North Korea has apparently shown interest in the DRC's Shunkolobwe uranium mines in return for their support to the FAC. The mines are reported to be in a state of complete disrepair however, and it is doubtful whether any production is currently feasible. Ultimately North Korea – along with China – is probably happy to get access to DRC's cobalt, a key mineral for their aeronautical industries.

Cynical commentators in Kinshasa deplore the fact that Kabila is 'not even' a dictator. He himself is not in firm control of his country. Despite his canny ability to maintain the support of his allies, he has been unable to build a sustainable regime in Kinshasa, and is therefore, the DRC's president only by default. That Kabila is well aware of this tenuous position is made clear in his paranoia and obsession with his own security. His policies are so erratic, however, that even those hoping to help him are getting frustrated as regional and international initiatives to end the war collapse one after the other. The prospects for the future look grim indeed.

V. AN INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE TO A LEADERLESS PROCESS

The response of both the belligerents and the international community to the situation in the DRC has been insufficient. The region's meager efforts to implement the Lusaka agreement have permitted a humanitarian tragedy to unfold in the Congo. The international community's efforts to help the Congolese, by creating MONUC and supporting the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, have been at best, only half-hearted. These institutions were to have overseen the implementation of the ceasefire, and the evolution of the Congo towards a new 'political dispensation'. Both have since proved to be disappointments.

There are a variety of reasons why MONUC and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue have failed up until now. Most apparent of these is the belligerents' own duplicity and obstruction of the process. They seem to prefer holding out for a return on their investment in the war rather than find a solution to end it. None, moreover, wanted to take the lead in the diplomatic process outlined by the agreement. And finally, the continued lack of international will to confront the problem of disarming the ex-FAR and Interahamwe – which lies at the heart of both Congo wars – has also undermined policy responses to the Lusaka agreement.

A. Humanitarian Tragedy is Underway in the DRC

1. Massive Displacement and Food Crisis

The pulverisation of the Congo has created a humanitarian tragedy in the country. The International Rescue Committee, an American NGO, estimated in a May report that the conflict had caused 1.7 million deaths by either direct or

²⁰⁶ See 'Fighting Reported in South – North Korean troops Reportedly Arrive', Radio France Internationale, Paris, 29 June 1999, Monitored by BBC Monitoring Service.

²⁰⁷ Interview ICG, members of the diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).

indirect means. Of these, some 200,000 were killed in fighting; the rest died as a result of malnutrition and disease. Even if there is a degree of inaccuracy in these figures extrapolated from a statistical analysis of 1,000 randomly picked households, they still indicate the devastating impact of Congo's war.

Up to 2 million persons have been displaced by the conflict, including an estimated half million in the first six months of 2000 alone.²⁰⁸ A quarter of a million have fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. In addition, refugees from other conflicts such as Angola (18,000 in October 2000 alone) have fled into the DRC. A FAO mission to the remote central Maniema region estimated that 68 per cent of the population had been forced to flee their homes at some point since August 1998, and that 110,000 were still hiding in the forest.²⁰⁹ Displaced populations are utterly destitute. Regions that have suffered severely from displacement include:

- Ituri: Four or five rounds of inter-ethnic fighting around Bunia, manipulated by business interests, have caused tens of thousands of deaths and displaced some 125,000 people
- Kisangani: Three clashes between the forces of Rwanda and Uganda have caused well over a thousand deaths and, at one time, 60,000 displaced
- Equateur: During fighting in August-September 2000, some 120,000 fled, either to other areas inside DRC or across the frontiers to the Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic
- Kivus: In the last year the number of displaced has risen to 1,090,000
- Katanga: Here the recent October-December fighting between the Government alliance and the Rwandans and their client RCD forces has displaced some 150,000-200,000.²¹⁰

Economic conditions have worsened due to the conflict, even for populations that have not been displaced. Normal trade routes have been cut or disrupted by battle lines. Two examples are barge traffic on the rivers, or roads to Banyamulenge-inhabited areas of South Kivu. As a result, markets have collapsed for food surplus areas, while food prices have skyrocketed in food deficit areas. In regions such as the Kasais, the collapse of food markets and insecurity have forced inhabitants to switch from farming to other activities, such as the exploitation of mineral resources due to their high value and portability. Finally, the entire population has suffered a reduced access to both health care and education – creating the conditions for long-term impoverishment, spread of disease and even the perpetuation of the conflict for a younger, unschooled generation. The World Food Program estimates that approximately 16 million - one third of the DRC population - are affected by food shortages, with two million of these facing 'critical' shortages.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ OCHA, 'DRC Humanitarian Bulletin', (October-November 2000).

²⁰⁹ OCHA, 'DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin', (May-June 2000).

²¹⁰ Internal UN memos, October 2000.

²¹¹ 'WFP "Very Concerned" Over Humanitarian Situation', IRIN (16 October 2000).

A novel characteristic of DRC's humanitarian disaster is the prospect of urban famine and suffering in the capital, Kinshasa – which is one of Sub-Saharan Africa's largest cities with a population of 4.5 to six million. The city has benefited from the redirection of food exports from Bandundu Province due to fighting in the traditional markets of Northern Angola. However, UNDP reported in mid-2000 that the food supply to the capital was 100,000 tons below the pre-war level. In 1999, the agency estimated that food supply was 400,000 tons, or 30 per cent, below pre-war levels – which were still regarded as significantly below adequate. Other estimates of the situation are less dire. But even if food is present in the market, the recent 53 per cent depreciation in the official value of the FC, as well as the annualized inflation rate of 298.6 per cent, combine to put its price out of reach of the average Congolese household.

2. Lack of Donor Commitment

The low level of assistance can also be blamed on the international donors, who have displayed a marked lack of interest in funding humanitarian efforts in the DRC. Of the US\$37,039,207 requested by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2000, donors have contributed US\$9,380,611 – or just 25.3 per cent. By comparison, the UN committed US\$58.7 million to the MONUC peacekeeping mission up to June 2000, out of a budgeted US\$200 million aimed purely at covering operations up to the stage of deploying the 5,537-strong force.²¹² Ultimately, MONUC was itself supposed to provide a vehicle for the delivery of aid, but since it has not been able to deploy more than a fraction of its force, this option has not been implemented.

Rampant insecurity also blocks humanitarian access to most at-risk populations. These difficulties are compounded by the relief agencies' own failure to bind the various combatants to formal agreements to cooperate with aid operations. They have also been reluctant to establish regular contacts with so-called 'non-state actors', such as the Mai Mai and other guerrilla armies. To be fair communication with such groups is difficult. They operate in secrecy for the most part, and leaders are hard to identify. Aid groups also worry about giving undeserved legitimacy to them, and are concerned not to endanger their relations with the RCD authorities. Finally their hesitation stems from their political reluctance to contradict the architects of Lusaka, who term these armies as 'negative forces', despite the fact that they may control territory and enjoy a degree of local support.

Donors are also aware that among the catalysts for the country's last two wars was the role played by UN agencies and NGOs in the delivery of aid to Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo between 1994 and 1996. During this period, Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias were able to rearm and train in the protection of the camps. From that point, they were able to both threaten Rwanda's borders and ignite existing local ethnic tensions. The subsequent dispersal of these extremist forces following the AFDL/RPA invasion helped to destabilise the entire region.

Finally, humanitarian operations are hampered by the DRC's vast size, remoteness and the collapse of the infrastructure. Many areas are accessible

²¹² Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 June 2000.

only by air, the most expensive option open to agencies. As a result of this, not more than 10,000 tonnes of food have been transported by this means.

3. An Urgent Necessity to Create Incentives for Peace

The Congo war is a complex emergency: political, military and humanitarian aspects of the crisis are frequently interdependent. In such circumstances, the prospects of resolving conflict will not diminish unless the humanitarian aspect is addressed. Despite this, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement failed to make provision for humanitarian action – nor have the parties signed a formal protocol covering guarantees of access, security or freedom from rebel or government fees and taxes. No single UN office co-ordinates humanitarian efforts in the DRC, although the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is meant to. In addition there is a department under the stalemated MONUC peacekeeping mission. Some UN officials believe a separate humanitarian office should be created under an influential ‘Czar’ to champion DRC aid efforts both internationally and on the ground. However, officials within the world body itself have so far stymied this plan.²¹³

Addressing the humanitarian crisis coherently, apart from doing more to alleviate suffering, could build bridges towards ethnic reconciliation alongside the framework of Lusaka and slow down the militarisation of local communities. Examples on the ground abound of how humanitarianism could assist with building peace on a local level. The UN has organised ‘national immunisation days’ against polio, measles and other diseases. It has reached 10.2 million beneficiaries and only in conflict zones of Equateur did access prove impossible. To access children in the Kivus, aid workers have built informal contacts with guerrillas such as the Mai Mai – or local paramedics have emerged from the forests to obtain vaccines. In Kisangani, workers have maintained the city’s water and electricity services, despite fighting between rival foreign armies and the fact that they have not been paid for months or even years. In rebel-held areas, with UN assistance, children have been able to sit national exam papers that are then transported to Kinshasa for marking – thus ensuring that at least the vestiges of a Congolese education system survive.²¹⁴

It is widely accepted that due to the increasing number of actors in the DRC’s conflict, *how* the humanitarian assistance is given is as important as *how much* is delivered. To be sure, logistics must be improved with greater funding – particularly to establish a more efficient air transport capability. Before stepping up aid in terms of financial commitments or commodities such as food, there is wide acceptance that agencies should carefully target aid and take into account the danger that it could fuel the conflict through providing resources to the armed factions.²¹⁵ As with the complex emergencies of the 1990s – such as those of Somalia and Sudan – aid threatens to create a fresh logic for a continuation of the conflict and the rise of warlord militias.

To avert such dangers, aid workers have advocated that humanitarian assistance is aimed at promoting local peace initiatives and given to communities engaged in ‘reconciliation and cohabitation’ efforts, including organisations such as the

²¹³ ICG interview with United Nations staff member, (6 November, 2000).

²¹⁴ ICG field interviews in Goma, Kisangani and South Kivu, (July-August 2000).

²¹⁵ Internal UN memos obtained by ICG.

church and local NGOs. Secondly, more has to be done to access vulnerable populations: currently just 18 per cent of the two million displaced receive humanitarian relief.²¹⁶ In areas such as the Kivus, one way to do this is to have 'non-state actors' drawn into negotiations for the delivery of aid and their good conduct encouraged by 'messages of peace'. Such approaches should also include schemes such as 'food for work', that encourage disarmament, and help rehabilitate the young men drawn into the conflict out of economic desperation.

B. The Failures of Lusaka

The Lusaka ceasefire agreement laid out a map for peace in the DRC that would predictably, be difficult to follow. The document realistically identified the questions of regional security and political reconstruction that must be confronted for peace to be achieved, and it outlined useful institutions to lead the way. What the agreement did *not* do was define who should take the leadership in overseeing its implementation. The consequence has been that these institutions were burdened with tasks, timeframes and expectations that they could never realistically fulfil.

In late 2000, the Joint Military Commission, once hailed as the manifestation of regional leadership behind the Lusaka Agreement, is bankrupt and on the verge of closing down. Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) remained unable to deploy due to the continuation of fighting, the lack of security guarantees and restrictions on MONUC personnel movements. And finally, the Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue struggles forward without the support of the signatories, or even of the international community – many of whom secretly hope he will disappear.

1. Belligerents Made into Peace Keepers: The Story of the JMC

At first the Lusaka agreement seemed to mark an ambitious attempt by the region to seize the leadership role in its own search for peace. The Zambian-brokered ceasefire called for an "appropriate" chapter VII UN force, defined its mandate, and laid down a calendar for its deployment. To police the ceasefire in the interim before the blue helmets could be deployed, the document created the Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the representatives of the belligerents. It was intended that this body would carry out the necessary peacekeeping operations.

The inspiration for this concept came from the December 1998 proposal by Thabo Mbeki, which called for a peacekeeping force composed of the belligerent forces under a neutral command. The rationale behind this idea was the fact that the size of force needed in the DRC was far greater than either the UN or the world's major military powers were willing to provide. The proposal was criticised at the time for reinforcing the idea of a *de facto* partition. Subsequently, the Lusaka Ceasefire resurrected the idea by assigning the duties of overseeing the agreement's implementation to the parties, as co-ordinated through the JMC, until the UN force arrived.

The JMC created by Lusaka was a decision-making body composed of two representatives from each signatory under a neutral OAU-appointed chairman.

²¹⁶ OCHA bulletin (August-September 2000).

The body was to answer to the Political Committee, composed of the signatories' Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The mandate of the JMC was to establish the location of units at the time of the ceasefire, and verify their disengagement and subsequent withdrawal. Even more daunting was the Lusaka Agreement's assignment to the JMC that it was to work out mechanisms for "tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting all armed groups in the DRC". To assist the JMC with its task, neutral OAU observers – from Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and Malawi – deployed to the DRC in Boende, Lisala, Kabalo and Kabinda.

The JMC has faced persistent problems that have, in turn, complicated MONUC's work.²¹⁷ Together, the two wrote the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan that outlines the location of each nation's forward line of forces, and the positions to which they are to re-deploy. Since then, obstructions to its work have proliferated. Belligerents from the anti-Kabila alliance blocked plans to move the JMC's headquarters to Kinshasa, to work alongside MONUC HQ, due to fears for the security of their representatives in the city. The divisions in the Political Committee also hampered the ability of the JMC to work. The Disengagement Plan was suspended at a session of the Committee in late July, after the government argued that UN Resolution 1304 called for a revision of Lusaka and MONUC's mandate.²¹⁸ No doubt frustrated by the experience, the first OAU-appointed Chairman, Algerian General Lallani Rachid, was chronically absent from the JMC and finally resigned in September.

The JMC has also been plagued by a lack of money. It was forced to suspend many of its activities because it never had the US\$ 6 million a year it needed in operating funds.²¹⁹ The intended regional JMC's were never established due to budget difficulties. One Malawi officer heading operations in Lisala told journalists that they were "handicapped. We have no boats to cross rivers, no helicopters but a few motorcars. We cannot move over 200 km to see for ourselves what is at the battlefronts."²²⁰ Shortage of funds later forced the committee to discontinue missions as the yearlong assignments of its officers expired.²²¹ The second JMC Chairman, Zambian Brigadier Timothy Kazembe, nevertheless claimed that the observers had succeeded in reducing the level of fighting in those areas where they were deployed.²²²

Lack of funds, and the proliferation of cease-fire violations, now cast doubt on the institution's future. "Hostilities have not only intensified, but ceasefire violations are currently the order of the day on various fronts" said Zambian Presidential Affairs Minister Eric Silwamba recently. "The JMC, which was established as a stop-gap measure for verification of violations, has been

²¹⁷ See ICG Africa Report No 18, *The Agreement on a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, (20 August 1999).

²¹⁸ Resolution 1304 (16 June 2000) calls for Rwanda and Uganda's withdrawal from the DRC 'without delay'. However, it also specifies 'that each phase of withdrawal completed by Ugandan and Rwandan forces be reciprocated by the other parties in conformity with the same timetable.'

²¹⁹ 'DRC Joint Military Commission Faces Serious Threats', PANA (17 November 2000).

²²⁰ 'Regional Mission Relies on Ugandan Army to Access DR Congo Conflict Areas', New Vision, Kampala (25 September 2000).

²²¹ 'DRC Joint Military Commission Faces Serious Threats', PANA (17 November 2000).

²²² 'JMC Calls for International Support for Congo Peace', Xinhua (9 November 2000).

experiencing such grave financial constraints that its very survival is under threat.”²²³

2. MONUC: Mission Impossible?

The Lusaka agreement assigned the UN mission two broad roles. First, it was to work with the JMC to observe and monitor the cessation of hostilities, supervise disengagement of forces, withdrawal of foreign troops, weapon's collection, and to oversee humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians. Second, it was to engage in a chapter VII peace enforcement mission, in which it would track down, disarm and rehabilitate members of 'armed groups', which were not signatories to the Agreement. These so-called negative forces would be screened for war criminals and 'genocidaires' and handed over to the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda.

The belligerents never believed that the UN could accomplish the tasks they set out for it in the cease-fire. Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame, whose lieutenants authored the majority of the Lusaka agreement, made this clear on the occasion of its signing. 'I know how to fight insurgents...Does the UN also know?' he said, citing both the genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent arming of Hutu refugees in Zaire 'under the eyes of UN observers'. Asking for a chapter VII force was the best way to expose Western powers' reluctance to commit to the DRC. It also served to demonstrate their double standards when it came to the African continent, in contrast to the UN approval in June 1999 of a massive peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. How this was supposed to help the Congo is a mystery. What is clear however is that the demonstration of Western good-will towards the Congo, manifested by the creation of MONUC, was pre-destined to disappoint the Congolese and embitter relations between the region and the world body.

The Unrealistic MONUC Timeline

Establishment of Joint Military Commission and Observer Groups	D-Day – D-Day+7 days
Disengagement of Forces	D-Day + 14 Days
Redeployment of the Forces of the Parties in the Conflict Zones	D-Day+15 Days – D-Day+30 Days
Provide Information to the JMC, OAU and UN Mechanism	D-Day+21 Days
Mobilisation of OAU Observers	D-Day+30 Days
Release/Exchange of Prisoners of War	D-Day+7 Days – D+30 Days
Deployment of UN Peace Keeping Mission	D-Day+120 Days
Disarmament of Armed Groups	D-Day+30 Days – D-Day+120 Days
Orderly Withdrawal of all Foreign Forces	D-Day + 180 Days

a. *MONUC: The UN Responds to Lusaka*

On 6 August 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1258 to authorize an initial deployment of UN military liaison officers to the capitals of Lusaka's signatories. Their mission was to lay the groundwork for a much larger

²²³ Manoah Esipisu, 'Negotiators Say Congo Peace Process a Stalemate', Reuters (18 November 2000).

operation. Subsequently, on 1 November, the Secretary General requested a further 500 Military Observers (MILOBS) to be deployed to the DRC as a 'second phase' of the MONUC mission. A third phase, involving the deployment of a full-scale peacekeeping force, was envisioned some time in the future.

Seven months after the Lusaka ceasefire, on 24 February 2000, the Security Council finally passed Resolution 1291, which authorised the dispatch of 5,037 military personnel and 500 MILOBS. The mission laid out in the resolution however, fell short of Lusaka's call for a peacekeeping force. Instead, it was to be an observer mission that included a four battalion-strong armed protection force, in addition to other specialist logistical back-up personnel.²²⁴ Their deployment moreover, depended on adequate security guarantees and cooperation from the parties to the conflict.²²⁵

MONUC was given a limited Chapter VII mandate to defend itself along with 'civilians under imminent threat of physical violence'. Together with the JMC, MONUC was broadly directed to 'monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate any violations'. It was also instructed to assist with humanitarian operations, and cooperate with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue. Finally, MONUC was ordered to draft an action plan for the overall implementation of the Agreement by the warring parties themselves, including some of the more dangerous tasks, such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed group members and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

b. Modest Achievements

To date, the mission has only deployed 218 military observers, 24 troops and 207 other international staff to the DRC. MILOBS have also been deployed to a total of 13 locations inside DRC. In addition, liaison offices have been established in six regional capitals.²²⁶

MONUC officers can claim two major achievements: together with the JMC of representatives they drafted the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan. This set out front line positions of all forces and committed them to a withdrawal that would create a 30 kilometre-wide demilitarised zone across the provinces of Equateur, the Kasais and Katanga. Despite the continuation of hostilities, all combatants consistently refer to this plan as a key reference document to justify their field positions. For example, the belligerents again pledged themselves to follow this plan at the 16 October Maputo Summit convened by South African President Thabo Mbeki. The Plan therefore, remains the best hope for future ceasefire efforts.

²²⁴ Morocco, Pakistan and Senegal all agreed to send contingents. Other countries, including Uruguay and Tunisia have also been identified as possible contributors.

²²⁵ Res. 1291 expanded on Res. 1258 (6 August, 1999), which authorised an initial MONUC deployment of 90 military liaison personnel, plus support staff to the capitals of Lusaka's signatories.

²²⁶ Inside the DRC, this includes: Kinshasa, Bunia, Gbadolite, Goma, Boende, Kabalo, Kabinda, Lisala, Gemena, Isoro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, Mbandaka. The six capitals are Luanda, Harare, Kigali Bujumbura, Kampala and Lusaka.

Unarmed MILOBS also helped to end the clash between UPDF and RPA in Kisangani. After they reinforced their presence, in May 2000, to oversee the withdrawal of rival UPDF and RPA forces, the presence of MILOBS provided a means for the Congolese – who felt isolated from the world – to voice their discontent over the presence of the occupying forces. For example, on one occasion, following the murder of a local pastor who had accused Rwanda-backed RCD soldiers of looting his home, an angry crowd brought his body to MONUC headquarters. On another peasant women organized a protest in front of MONUC to publicize their alleged mistreatment, including rape, at the hands of the UPDF.²²⁷ Subsequently, the presence of the observers probably helped to end the third bout of fighting, which erupted on 5 June. UN liaison officers in Kampala and Kigali, and the MILOBS, worked to broker a ceasefire to the fighting with the help of Rwandan and Ugandan officers stranded at MONUC's Kisangani headquarters. This finally took hold on 11 June. Without the presence of MONUC's observers and communications equipment, the hostilities would probably have worsened.

Furthermore, MONUC assisted with humanitarian aid for civilian victims, helped with the exchange of POWs, reporting the dimensions of the crisis to the outside world together with the ICRC – which allowed the international community to mount pressure against the combatants to withdraw from Kisangani in Security Council Resolution 1304.

c. *Obstacles and Flaws*

The limitations of the concept of operation

From the outset, the UN was determined to give its own interpretation to Lusaka. A UN official told ICG at the time "There is no way the region will impose the terms of reference of UN involvement in the DRC. We will have our own chain of command, our own structure".²²⁸ Nevertheless, the world body and the major powers backed the idea of a peacekeeping mission in the Congo. At the same time however, they denied this force the resources required for the operation to work. In particular, the United States, whose diplomats and military planners designed the MONUC mission, and whose logistical capabilities could permit its success, has had persistent cold feet about the Congo.²²⁹

The Americans authored Resolution 1291, and conceived the concept of operations it outlined. In fact, Washington offered its support for MONUC on the condition that the UN accept the American plan. UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke testified before US Congressmen on 17 February that it was 'what the US Government, including the Department of Defence, has advocated as the best approach. After months of resisting unrealistic peacekeeping proposals for

²²⁷ Group Justice et Libération, *La guerre des alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le droit à la Paix*, (Kisangani : July 2000).

²²⁸ ICG interview, UN official, Lusaka, September 1999.

²²⁹ The US has sought to avoid missions in Africa since the American-led UNOSOM II Chapter VII operation to Somalia became embroiled in fighting with warlord Mohamed Farah Aydiid. Washington withdrew its troops from the mission months after losing 18 US servicemen on 3 October, 1993, and the operation collapsed by March 1995. As a result of Somalia, the US refused to support reinforcement of UNAMIR in Rwanda during the April-July 1994 genocide until after the Rwanda Patriotic Front defeated the rump Hutu government.

the Congo, we have succeeded in getting the UN to adopt this three-phase approach concept designed in part by US military planners.²³⁰

The American concept contained several shortcomings. First, the MONUC mandate was impossible to accomplish because it did not realistically address the issue of armed groups. Resolution 1291 ignored the fact that three intertwined, but very different, types of conflict were underway in the DRC: conventional war, guerrilla insurgency and ethnic bloodletting. The blue-helmets could monitor the first, but not the second or third, in which they would face intolerable risks. The resolution however, made no distinction between them, and even tasked MONUC to develop an 'action plan' to disarm the armed groups. This was an expansive mission could not be accomplished by the force envisaged. American and UN officials knew this very well. How could the UN succeed, where the understandably more motivated RPA had failed?

Second, the concept of operations envisaged a bulky protection force in what was to be strictly an observer mission. Alongside observers and support staff, the UN was to deploy four mechanized infantry battalions, each of whom would establish a regional strong point. In the event of trouble, the observers would retreat into these bastions for evacuation by air. The difficulty with these understandable American concerns about force protection was that it would take the UN between four and six months to actually move the battalions to the DRC.

As it is designed, MONUC faces enormous logistical obstacles. Virtually all UN troops and equipment would have to be brought in by air because of the limited capacity of Matadi, the Congo's only ocean port, and the virtual impassability of most of its roads. The country's airports are often in an equally poor condition. They all lack the radars, air traffic control systems, night lighting, fire fighting and unloading equipment required for 24-hour operations. These are all essential logistical requirements that Washington was unwilling to provide, because to do so would require putting American troops on the ground in the Congo. Moreover, the majority of DRC's airfields are too small for larger transport aircraft to land. Even Bangboka airport in Kisangani, one of the country's three largest, would only be able to handle two flights a day because of these difficulties. To deploy the battalion designated for the city however would require more than 150 flights.

Third, the American plan built-in additional political delays by linking the deployment of MONUC to the belligerents' own performance in implementing the Lusaka ceasefire. Holbrooke explained that the "approach ties UN deployments to concrete progress on the ground toward the Lusaka Agreement's political and military objectives".²³¹ This meant that even Resolution 1291 was held up as the belligerents squabbled over who was to be named the Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Just days prior to Masire's 15 December 1999 appointment, US envoy to the Holbrooke said, "the US will be unable to support a move to the next phase of UN peacekeeping if the Lusaka parties do not themselves choose the Facilitator called for under their own Accord."

²³⁰ Richard C. Holbrooke, US Ambassador to the United Nations, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington DC (15 February 2000). The top UN military planner in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also a US Army officer.

²³¹ Richard C. Holbrooke, US Ambassador to the United Nations, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington DC (15 February 2000).

The international response to the second Congo war was aimed above all at stopping the fighting. In essence, this meant freezing the war before the victor had become clear. Subsequently, the very unwieldiness of the US-designed concept of operations prevented the international community from replacing the dynamic of the war with that of a disengagement of forces. Incapable of disengaging without international assistance and pressure, the belligerents would remain facing one another in the DRC while they waited for the UN. This delay also increased the likelihood of clashes between the two forces, which would in turn delay the UN deployment. Whatever momentum Lusaka had given the disengagement of forces was soon wasted as the belligerents returned to fighting their war.

The obstruction of the Kabila government

All sides have, at one time or another, deliberately posed obstacles to MONUC despite their call for a UN force. They have refused permission for observer teams to deploy in some cases, or to land aircraft in others. In one case, the rebel MLC threatened to shoot down a MONUC aircraft that allegedly did not have flight authorisation. In Bunia, RCD-ML guerrillas have twice occupied a MONUC base to escape their rivals during factional fighting.²³²

However, UN officials say that, in 95 per cent of the cases, the obstructions to MONUC activities have come from Kabila's Government. The UN Secretary General's fourth report on the UN mission in the DRC accuses Kabila of persistent harassment and intransigence in its attitude to MONUC including: refusal to authorize MONUC's flights, media hate campaigns, state-organised street protests, an extortionate currency exchange rate, plus taxes and fuel charges that add millions to operational costs. In addition, Kinshasa has rejected certain MONUC contingents, such as a 165-strong South African logistical team that is needed to assist with the deployment of the main battalions.

For its part, Kinshasa has variously claimed that MONUC forces violate DRC's sovereignty and that it should first and foremost force the 'aggressors' troops out of the country. It claims that MONUC consistently violates the April 2000 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between itself and the DRC by not consulting the Government on flight authorizations. Kabila has therefore, systematically refused to permit deployments in territory he controls. Government distrust of the UN appears to reflect the fact that, for many Congolese, MONUC – and particularly the idea of deploying armed troops – revives memories of the ONUC blue helmet army that became involved in Congo's civil war during the years 1960-1964.

The problems for MONUC in Kinshasa began immediately following the arrival of the first personnel in September 1999 and have continued to date. UN Special Envoys have made several high-profile visits to the DRC in an attempt to persuade Kabila to co-operate. An apparent breakthrough finally came in late August after UN Special Envoy and Nigeria's former ruler, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, met Kabila in Kinshasa. Following this, the Government promised to grant MONUC observers free movement, to lift the requirement that flights to rebel held territory pass through a 'neutral third country', and to permit MONUC

²³² Fourth report of the Secretary-General, paragraph 41. RCD-ML leader Wamba dia Wamba took refuge in MONUC's office once again during factional fighting in early November 2000.

flights to take place without prior authorisation. Since that time, however, Government co-operation has failed to improve.

More recently, at the second Maputo summit on 25 November, the government again promised to lift the movement restrictions for MONUC. This new and positive attitude is almost certainly as a result of pressure by his allies to salvage MONUC before its mandate ran out on 15 December 2000.

d. Salvaging MONUC?

In his fourth report to the Security Council, the Secretary General warned that, unless the parties display 'unequivocal commitment' to re-launching the peace process, the future of the MONUC mission would be in doubt.²³³ The international body has repeatedly extended the Force's mandate, while seeing little progress towards the accomplishment of its objectives, and has become frustrated with the impasse.

To salvage MONUC, Thabo Mbeki attempted to reinvigorate the region by organising the 16 October Maputo summit on the disengagement of troops in the DRC. Only belligerent countries' Heads of State or their representatives attended. Angolan President Dos Santos did not come for 'logistical reasons'. Neither the rebels nor Masire were invited. South African sources report that Mbeki had to pressure Mugabe to ensure that Kabila attended the meeting (which he did). As a result, the belligerents re-pledged their commitment to the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan.²³⁴ At the subsequent 28 November Maputo summit, organized to review progress towards implementation, the Heads of State again reiterated their commitment to the Plan, and scheduled a 5 December meeting of their Chiefs of Staff in Harare. President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, who chaired the meeting, reported that Kabila had told the summit that he was prepared to study ways to improve his relationship with MONUC.²³⁵

Since the end of October, there appears to have been an improvement in the Government's attitude towards the UN mission. It reaffirmed its commitment to guarantee the UN observers free movement between Kananga, Mbandaka, Mbuji Mayi, and Kisangani, and to provide free parking for MONUC planes at Njili airport.²³⁶ MONUC officers, and the Secretary General's representative in Kinshasa, see this attitude as an encouragement to deploy troops. But other UN officials note that Mbeki's effort has already run into some snags. The second Maputo meeting was scheduled for 29 October, but had to be postponed three times. This was due to a "lack of consensus among the parties about holding a meeting", reported Mozambican Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi.²³⁷ Furthermore, the mid-October FAC offensive in Katanga, that coincided with the first Maputo summit, and the DRC's absence at the 17 November JMC in Lusaka suggest that Kabila does not take his commitments to Mbeki very seriously. Finally sources at the DRC presidency suggest that Maputo is superseded by the

²³³ Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (21 September 2000).

²³⁴ Gregory Mthembu-Salter, 'Mbeki Takes New Lead in Congolese Peace Process', Daily Mail and Guardian (20 October 2000).

²³⁵ "Summit on DRC claims success", PANA, (29 November 2000).

²³⁶ Congo Press Service, (3 November 2000).

²³⁷ 'Mocumbi Explains Reasons for Derailed DRC Summit', PANA (17 November 2000).

subsequent 8 November Tripoli Agreement calling for a deployment of neutral African peacekeepers on the DRC's Eastern frontier.

UN officials believe therefore that Kabila's new commitment is suspect. His behaviour, they say, has been an example of the "worst case behaviour described in the Brahimi report [on UN peacekeeping] as an obstacle to deployment".²³⁸ They also believe that a UN deployment without a proper agreement between all the belligerents would be set-up for failure. Furthermore, the recent government offensive in Katanga, which is a clear violation of the ceasefire, makes any type of sizable UN deployment impossible.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials therefore prepared a plan for a phased operation, strengthening the presence of unarmed observers before contemplating the deployment of the full MONUC force. This plan was presented in the fifth Secretary General report to the Security Council on 7 December, which recommendations were endorsed by Resolution 1332 (2000) on 14 December. Resolution 1332 extends MONUC's mandate by six months (until 15 June 2001) and recommends the deployment of additional military observers and support units along the front line, where and when conditions permit it.²³⁹ As a second step, it also envisages the deployment of infantry units to back up observers in Kisangani, Mbandaka "and other areas the secretary-General deems necessary", including in Goma or Bukavu, along the border between Rwanda and the DRC.²⁴⁰

The second phase of deployment is still far-fetched. Kabila's consistent opposition to the presence of UN armed troops on his part of the Congolese territory, and the likely rejection by Rwanda and Uganda of any deployment on their side only, makes it impossible at this stage. But the deployment of additional MILOBS along the frontline could be a very positive development.

To undertake this plan, MONUC needs adequate security assurances from the armies on the ground. Once these can be secured, the deployment of unarmed MILOBS - into both rebel and Government areas when and where possible - could breathe life back into the Lusaka peace process. It may also give fresh momentum to the UN efforts to entrench the ceasefire through the disengagement of rival forces. Such a mission moreover, could continue to operate under the same Resolution 1291 mandate, on the grounds that it represented a staggered or limited interpretation of the envisioned deployments.

MONUC's record in Kisangani proves that even a small team of unarmed observers can succeed in alleviating the conflict. Past UN operations in Africa have achieved the same. During the UNAMIR I operation in Rwanda, following the eruption of violence in April 1994 when most armed peacekeepers evacuated, the few dozen MILOBS who stayed behind were able to save many civilian lives. Furthermore, they gathered much of the evidence subsequently used by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). MONUC's Sector

²³⁸ United Nations General Assembly Security Council. 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).

²³⁹ "DRC: Annan recommends six-months MONUC extension", IRIN (8 December 2000).

²⁴⁰ "DRC: Security Council allows increase in UN observers", IRIN (15 December 2000), "L'ONU n'exclut plus d'intervenir à la frontière rwando-congolaise", AFP (15 December 2000), "Prorogation de la mission de l'ONU au Congo", PANA (14 December 2000).

Commander in Kisangani outlined the paradox entailed by the deployment of unarmed observers ahead of protection forces himself when he told ICG: 'The strength of the MILOB teams has been that we are unarmed'.²⁴¹

By its very nature, MONUC's mission must face a degree of danger. Its MILOBS have found themselves in dangerous situations, such as the June fighting in Kisangani – but they faced no greater peril than civilian staff from humanitarian agencies. Nevertheless, the further deployment of unarmed observers does pose serious risks. The Mission Commander would have to weigh carefully the benefits of deploying officers to dangerous or remote locations. It is not necessary for the mission to maintain a presence everywhere in the DRC. The ability to monitor the activities of major combatant commands, and key logistical choke points, would provide a wealth of information about the course of hostilities and the intentions of the combatants. Individual countries could also discretely assist the UN by providing information collected through other more technical means, such as satellite imagery, communications intercepts, and analytical assistance. Armed with such data, MONUC could work to restrain hostilities by providing the Security Council with an accurate and timely understanding of events in the Congo.

2. The Failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

a. The Mandate

Lusaka also attempted to address the issue of power sharing and state-building in DRC, by providing a framework for inter-Congolese negotiations, called the National Dialogue.

The National Dialogue was supposed to produce a 'new political dispensation', leading to the establishment of new institutions in a space of three months. The new government would take on a range of tasks, including 'the formation of a National Congolese Army (composed of FAC, RCD and MLC forces), the organization of free and fair elections and the drafting of a Constitution under which DRC would be governed after the holding of elections.

The National Dialogue was to include the DRC Government, the rebel forces, the political opposition, as well as representatives of the *forces vives*; and all participants would 'enjoy equal status' in the Dialogue. The OAU was tasked to organize the dialogue "under the aegis of a Facilitator chosen by all parties". It was supposed to start immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of the JMC and the disengagement of Forces, and be completed before the deployment of the UN Peace-Keeping mission, the disarmament of armed groups and the withdrawal of foreign forces. Ultimately, it was to lead to the re-establishment of state administration over the territory of the DRC and the implementation of security measures to normalize the situation along international borders.

²⁴¹ ICG Interview, Lt Col Khalid, MONUC Sector Commander, Kisangani (23 July 2000).

Inter-Congolese Dialogue Timetable

Selection of a facilitator	D-Day +15
Beginning of a national dialogue	D-Day +45
Deadline for the close of national dialogue	D-Day +90
Establishment of new institutions	D-Day +91

b. No Power-Sharing in Sight

Efforts to find a suitable candidate to fill the position of Facilitator caused the Dialogue to fall behind schedule from the outset. Under the aegis of OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, several candidates were considered but failed to win the required unanimous support of the signatories. Finally, on 12 December 1999 – five months after Lusaka – the former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, was approved as the Facilitator, at the suggestion of President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe.

Masire has conducted three trips to the DRC and has met with parties both in the Congo (two trips to Kinshasa and five in all to rebel territory) and outside (in Cotonou). He has also briefed regional leaders (at Lome in July and at Windhoek, Lusaka and Harare in August).

His team has prepared a broad outline of how a national dialogue might work to fulfil the demands of the Lusaka Agreement. This involves preparation for the Dialogue conference itself. A preparatory meeting will have to take place at an, as yet, undecided location, but which the EU and US have already pledged to fund. The structure of the National Dialogue will include four commissions: a humanitarian commission, which should come up with a reconstruction plan for the Kivus; an electoral commission, which should plan for a national census before the elections, which the EU has already committed to fund (Masire's team estimates that it will take about a year to determine constituencies that have changed since the conclusion of the 1992 National Sovereign Conference); a constitutional commission, which should use the work done in 1992 to prepare a new post-election constitution; and finally, a military commission to design a plan for demobilization and disarmament.

Masire's efforts have been seriously impeded by a number of obstacles. From the start, he has encountered systematic obstruction from the Kabila Government. Masire visited Kinshasa in February and March and met Kabila at the Algiers OAU summit at the end of April. A short time after these meetings, the Government declared that it would no longer cooperate with him, and requested that the OAU appoint a new Facilitator. On 20 June, it closed Masire's Kinshasa office. Several high-level attempts to change the government's attitude have since failed – including two OAU summits, two SADC summits and General Abubakar's visit in August.

Masire's closest supporters are his regional neighbours, including Zimbabwe and Angola, who have tried to convince Kabila to accept him. At SADC summits in Windhoek and Lusaka in August, regional leaders, including Chiluba, Mbeki and Chissano, gave Kabila a tongue-lashing for not supporting the work of the former Botswana president. Nevertheless, they have been powerless to alter Kabila's determined opposition to Masire. Instead, the Government claims that the Inter-

Congolese Dialogue will henceforth be conducted through a 300-member Constituent Assembly unilaterally appointed by Kabila and inaugurated on 21 August in Lubumbashi.

Kabila and his lieutenants have come up with several excuses for rejecting Masire. First, they objected to Masire because he is a "total Anglophone".²⁴² They claimed that he was picked by Rwanda on the grounds that he was the Chair of the OAU panel investigating the OAU role in Rwanda. However, the Government's own contradictory positions have undermined their arguments. Despite the objections that Masire is not Francophone, by mid-November, Kabila's Ambassador to Dar es Salaam was calling for a panel of prominent Tanzanian politicians (all Anglophone) to lead the dialogue and accusing Masire of being pro-rebel.²⁴³ Civil society leaders in Kinshasa, who had earlier termed the appointment of an Anglophone Facilitator an 'insult to the Congolese people', have in fact accepted Masire as Kabila's choice and declared themselves ready to commit to the process.²⁴⁴

Second, in contradiction with the Lusaka agreement, Kabila has on numerous occasions declared that the National Dialogue would never be held under occupation.²⁴⁵ His representatives have argued for a separation of the military and political aspects of Lusaka - requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops before a national dialogue can take place. The bitterest pill of the Lusaka agreement for Kabila has always been the principle, which stipulates that all participants enjoy an equal status. The rebel groups and their Rwandan backers designed the dialogue to confront Kabila, on an equal footing, with the overwhelming opposition to his regime. Consequently, since the day of Lusaka's signature, Kabila's representatives have consistently rejected making any compromises on the sovereignty of the government.

The international support for Masire has been lukewarm. Despite ostensible public support by western governments and the UN, Masire has suffered from a lack of funding. Of the \$5.85 million pledged by donors in March 2000, the office had access to just \$657,000 by October. Early on in the year, the UK Ambassador to Gaberone initiated donor funding by personally signing a cheque for UK £20,000. Delays are partly due to bureaucracy in the disbursement of aid, but it says little to recommend the commitment of the donors to solving the problem. The failure or delay in funding has undermined Masire's credibility.

The unrealistic timetable for the National Dialogue, to which the parties agreed, and that the OAU and UN witnessed, set-up the Facilitator for failure. Masire's team has studied other regional peace processes, notably those held in Burundi and Somalia. Taking these into consideration, the team's own lawyer says that he believes the process will take at least three years rather than six weeks.

²⁴² In French "un anglophone total", ICG interview, Foreign Ministry official, Kinshasa, August 2000.

²⁴³ Individuals named were former Presidents of Tanzania and Zanzibar, Ali Hasan Mwinyi, and Dr Salmin Amour, as well as former Prime Ministers, John Malecela, Joseph Warioba, and Cleopa Msuya. Tanzania's 'Sunday Observer', (12 November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.

²⁴⁴ ICG interviews, civil society leaders, Kinshasa, August 2000.

²⁴⁵ "Le dialogue intercongolais ne se tiendra jamais sous le diktat des occupants", President Kabila's speech to the UN Security Council, 24 January 2000.

Apart from being extremely vague, the objectives set out for the Dialogue are very optimistic for a country that has never benefited from democratic rule. It is equally hard to see how 'the process of free, democratic and transparent elections' referred to in the Ceasefire Agreement can be organized given the state of the DRC.

The international community must be prepared to continue support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process as it evolves over the space of years, rather than weeks or months. It may be that a transitional executive and administrative structure has to be established first – since the best legitimate ruler in the DRC is likely to be one that has control over territory. A national dialogue may therefore, have to run alongside the transitional authority for a long period.

C. Revising or Reviving Lusaka?

1. The Belligerent's Views

Aware that the Congo has become a quagmire, the belligerents have begun to search for a diplomatic exit from the conflict. Everyone has now admitted that the Lusaka agreement has not worked, and that calling for its implementation means in essence calling for the *status quo*. Numerous bilateral consultations have taken place between the warring parties, including Angola and Uganda, Angola and Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Their determination to recoup their investment however makes these efforts unimaginative and sterile. Different positions can be observed on this debate:

Rwanda and Uganda continue to call for the implementation of Lusaka. Both countries say that the withdrawal of foreign forces needs to be decided by the belligerents themselves. Their position is weakened however, by Security Council Resolution 1304, adopted on 16 June 2000 in the aftermath of their third clash in Kisangani, that demands: "that Rwanda and Uganda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan."²⁴⁶

Kabila suspended Lusaka on 23 August following Resolution 1304. He presents a number of arguments on why the agreement needs to be revised. First, he says that Resolution 1304 recognizes that the war is an international conflict instead of a civil war. The withdrawal of foreign troops therefore becomes a priority and should be de-linked from any other aspect of Lusaka, such as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue - which cannot happen as long as the country is occupied.²⁴⁷ Moreover, he doesn't see why he, as the representative of a sovereign government, should accept power sharing while his neighbours all continue to resist this principal. Second, he claims the agreement is outdated. The rebel groups party to the document have fragmented, with some of the leaders even defecting to the Government's side. Third, he argues that labelling the FDD as 'negative forces' contradicts their invitation to the Arusha peace talks on Burundi.

²⁴⁶ United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1304, (16 June 2000) 4, a.

²⁴⁷ President Kabila's address, UN Security Council, 24 January 2000.

Kabila wants a separation between the international and the national dimensions of the Lusaka Agreement. He proposes direct negotiations between the warring parties, intended to lead to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi's withdrawal from the Congo. The deployment of an international force along the country's eastern border would provide the means to satisfy their security concerns. Finally, the signature of a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact would cement the relations between the DRC Government and its eastern neighbours.²⁴⁸ After all the foreign troops are withdrawn from the DRC, he promises to hold the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

By de-linking the external from the internal dimensions of the peace process, Kabila hopes to win on both counts. In the first, he is the legitimate leader of a sovereign nation. In the second, he becomes the incumbent President, faced with a divided and easily dispatched opposition. These tactics are apparent in his 10 December offer to hold a National Forum on Democratisation in Libreville, Gabon.²⁴⁹ Planned for 21 December, the talks will include only registered parties and civil society groups. Consequently, they are not evidence of Kabila's willingness to follow the terms of the Lusaka Agreement, or for that matter, share power.

2. The International Position

Most international players, including France, US, Britain and Belgium, among others, agree that Kabila is the main obstacle to the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, and believe that he will not accept any compromise if he is not weakened militarily. Similarly, for them the Kisangani fighting was the catalyst for the rebel alliance's loss of credibility. The clash exposed the end of the Rwanda/Uganda alliance. It also exposed that the illegal exploitation of DRC resources was an objective of the war. As a consequence, they all agree that Lusaka is still the only road map for peace, but that it should be given a new interpretation.

Belgium initially took the lead in trying to unlock the stalemate by proposing to mediate between the parties, re-launch the negotiations and have the different provisions of Lusaka implemented. France's concerns focus on the consequences of a partition of the country and its continued exploitation by its neighbours. Paris fears the Congolese population will be the loser in any strictly regional settlement and foresees a catastrophic worsening of the humanitarian situation in such a scenario. This concern was apparent in Resolution 1304, strongly supported by Paris. President Chirac moreover, is opposed to the "African solutions for African problems" doctrine, and has long advocated for an internationally led regional conference on the Great Lakes to end the war. France is, of course, equally concerned with a spillover of the war to its oil-producing allies (Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon). Paris also fears the humanitarian burden it would shoulder were the world's second-biggest Francophone country to disintegrate.

²⁴⁸ ICG interview, Leonard She Okitundu, Minister for Human Rights, Kinshasa, 29/08/00. The recent initiative by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville who came to Kampala late November to mediate between the warring parties for a regional settlement to the conflict is in the same vein and does not have any better chance to succeed.

²⁴⁹ "Kabila préconise un dialogue intercongolais", PANA, 11/12/00.

The US is pushing for a revival of Lusaka, which they believe should be taken over by the UN. They want to 'call the shots' from inside the international body and guarantee the protection of their strategic interests in the region: safe exploitation of the Angolan oilfields and easy access to the Colton of Eastern DRC –used to manufacture fighter aircraft. However they do not want to be directly involved. Washington is therefore, putting pressure on Angola and Zimbabwe to force Kabila to respect his commitments, and permit the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.

3. The New Focus on Disengagement: Saving MONUC and Saving the SADC?

South African President Thabo Mbeki also seems intent on adapting Lusaka. Mbeki's recent Maputo initiative came in response to a personal appeal from Mugabe, who was concerned that Bemba's MLC might attempt an assault on Mbandaka. The South African President seized upon this opportunity to play the regional leadership role that he believes is due to Pretoria. His motivations appear to be a concern over the stability of Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe and the necessity of offering him an exit strategy from the DRC. Pretoria's foremost interest is to stem a further decline in the situation of Zimbabwe, which could spread southwards and have a spill over into South Africa. Mbeki's approach also follows the long-held opinion of the South African Government that progress could be made if the belligerents simply honoured the promises they made in Lusaka and Kampala. This explains his focus on military affairs alone, and his claim to support Lusaka and the leadership role of Zambian President Chiluba in the process.

This emphasis on the withdrawal of foreign troops is an important departure from the Lusaka agreement, and from the UN three phase plan for the deployment of MONUC, both of which had emphasised the need for simultaneous progress on all fronts. The Maputo meeting made no mention of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This suggested two things: first, that Kabila's allies don't really have an interest in a change of power in Kinshasa and second, that Kabila has succeeded in convincing them that he could agree to a MONUC deployment - if the focus of Lusaka shifted to the withdrawal of foreign troops and if plans for the Dialogue are dropped.

Following the first Maputo summit, another summit was organised under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), but was nevertheless dedicated to discussions on the DRC conflict. In attendance were Dos Santos, Kabila, along with the Heads of State of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Prime Ministers of Equatorial Africa and the Central African Republic.

The 27 October Kinshasa summit which called for the 'unconditional retreat of the aggressors of the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to permit the Congolese people to find a final solution in all sovereignty questions of internal politics,' is another example of efforts to replace the Lusaka agreement, which they said remained only "an important basis for peace."

Since then, on 8 November, a summit in Tripoli, Libya, called for the deployment of a neutral African force to secure the frontiers of Rwanda and Uganda before the disarmament of militias had begun. This is another departure from the

Lusaka framework to which no doubt Rwanda and Uganda only agreed to keep the erratic Gadaffi happy. Sidelined by these efforts, South Africa has understandably ridiculed the Tripoli meetings.

VI. CONCLUSION

Two key questions are raised by this investigation into the war in the Congo. Should the DRC remain a single state? And given its current occupied, exploited, and fragmented condition – can it?

Kabila and his backers would be content with the western half of the country. Kabila prefers sharing Congo to sharing power, people in Kinshasa say, and would be unable to rule a restored country successfully. In any case, Kabila is no Mobutu and would not survive if the country was at peace. Angola, moreover, is quite satisfied to keep a weak leader in Kinshasa, who is unable to threaten its ambition to become the power broker of West-Central Africa.

Zimbabwe meanwhile, has never concealed its intention to construct a zone of economic influence stretching through Zambia to Katanga and Kasai, upon which it can base its future prosperity. The restoration of territorial sovereignty under the patronage of the international community, and the creation of a Government of Transition, would severely limit Harare's ability to profit from the Congo. In such an outcome, the South African competition would be likely to shoulder them aside, just as at the end of the Mozambican civil war. Thus, despite its claims to the contrary, the partition of Congo would serve Zimbabwean interests.

The fight for Kisangani revealed that Rwanda and Uganda are in the Congo for more than just the security of their borders. Both countries see the Eastern DRC as their legitimate sphere of political influence, as well as the source of their future economic prosperity. Uganda has the ambition to become the power broker of Eastern Africa. It wants to make itself the centre of regional integration, and intends to build its own prosperity on its dominance over the Great Lakes markets. To overcome its Kenyan rival, and succeed in this objective, it must have access to the resources of the Congo.

As for Rwanda, it believes permanent access to the greater Kivus to be the only long-term solution to its security problem. Apart from foreign aid, this is also seen as the only means to revive the country's economy. Unable to solve its problem alone, the RPA is ready to wait as long as necessary for regional and international good will to emerge and help them disarm the Hutu rebels.

In the end, the Inter-Congolese negotiations and restoration of the DRC's territorial integrity is in no one's interest other than the Congolese's. The assessments of most Western governments, and of the US in particular, appears based on this *realpolitik*. Washington seems to have given up on – or to have lost interest in – the prospects for positive change in the Congo. Policies based on the doctrines of 'African solutions to African problems' and 'trade not aid' provide cynical excuses for leaving the continent to its fate. In the absence of a more dynamic and determined policy from the international community, the Congo is certain to continue to fragment. This also means the abandonment of the Congolese people to the chaos now looming over them.

The international community must re-engage in the DRC if the Lusaka peace process is to be revived. This means in the first place a number of actions being taken by the United Nations Security Council, beginning with the passage of a resolution to reconcile Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000) with the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, that de-links the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarmament of armed groups, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from one another, in order to permit each to achieve the maximum forward progress.

Many other steps are required on which the Security Council can and should take the lead. On the the question of dialogue, negotiations must be promoted on power sharing and transition between the main players – government, rebels and key civil society groups - with the Community of Saint Egidio and Belgian government as ideal facilitators. Greater moral, financial, and logistical support needs to be given to the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, including the appointment of a francophone 'co-mediator' based in Kinshasa, and efforts made to force Kabila and the rebels to permit him to conduct consultations throughout the DRC.

On the question of disengagement, it is necessary to support the Maputo Process and the implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan as a first step to a phased withdrawal. All countries involved in the war, and especially the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, should be pressured to provide a secure environment in which additional MONUC MILOBS can be immediately deployed along the frontlines, as recommended by resolution 1332 (2000).

On the question of disarmament, an international structure headed by a high level personality should be created to find solutions for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the armed groups: this would consult with the region, and the armed groups, in order to formulate a robust and realistic plan for DDR. Pressure must be applied to Kabila to allow the Burundian FDD to join their country's on-going Peace Process, and to the countries at war in the DRC to invest more of their energies in domestic political reconciliation efforts, which in the end offer the only means to convince the rebel fighters to return home.

On the question of peace-building, a 'new humanitarian framework' needs to be designed to tackle the complex emergency unfolding in the DRC that follows the recommendations of the JMC resolution adopted in Lusaka in early December. This can be accomplished by establishing a separate humanitarian operations office under a UN Director for Congo Humanitarian Operations responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of a strategy for relief operations in both rebel and government territories. Uganda and Rwanda should also be specifically pressured to give compensation for the destruction of Kisangani as called for in Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000).

The donor countries have a particular role in reviving and advancing the peace process. They should link the foreign belligerents' commitment to the DRC peace process – together with their illegal exploitation of the nation's wealth - to scrutiny of their domestic economic performance and record of 'good governance' in order to assess their qualification for financial aid, debt relief and trade agreements. They should also pressure SADC countries to compel Kabila to comply with the implementation of the Lusaka agreement. Means to accomplish this include

restricting the quantity of fuel the DRC imports, and limiting the amount of SADC military support his regime receives.

As to the foreign warring parties - Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe - they are unlikely to break the stalemate in the war until they recognize the limitations of their strategies. This may simply be a matter of time, but at the moment none of the parties is able to conduct an honest 'cost benefit analysis' of its part in the war and admit it is facing failure. However, for the foreign players, their domestic problems are likely to mount as they exhaust themselves on the battlefield of Africa's 'First World War'. Only when this reaches a critical mass will they understand the benefits of reaching a compromise deal. They should recognize that the Lusaka process offers the only way out of the DRC quagmire, with all parties being involved in systematic negotiations as opposed to military endgames or ad hoc, back-room contacts.

More specifically, they should provide MONUC MILOBS with the minimum guarantees needed to deploy in the field, especially so that the unarmed UN observers can work unhindered; restore support to the JMC, by calling regular monthly Political Committee meetings, pushing for further deployment of teams in the field and implementing the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan; assist Masire's office to prepare for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by providing access to all parties and DRC territory; and step up sincere domestic reconciliation efforts to end political or ethnic rivalries that have spilled over into the DRC and drawn them into an ever-widening conflict.

Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000

APPENDIX A: Abbreviations, Names²⁵⁰ and Places

Abubakar, Abdulsalami (General)	Former ruler of Nigeria who served as a UN Special Envoy to meet with Kabila in August 2000.
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre: Kabila's rebel group in 1996-1997.
ALiR	Armée de Libération du Rwanda. A Hutu rebel group composed of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and new recruits.
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	Ugandan insurgent movement whose operations out of the Eastern DRC served as a justification for Uganda's intervention in the war.
Amouri (Colonel)	MLC Chief of Staff.
Atenyi, Tibasiima	Renegade Second Vice President of the RCD-ML
Augustin Bizimungu, General	Ex-FAR Commander. See Appendix E.
Bangboka Airport	The larger of two Kisangani airfields fought over by the RPA and UPDF. One of the three longest runways in the country.
Banyamulenge	Ethnic Tutsis who have lived in South Kivu since the 1900's. Their rights to Congolese citizenship are questioned by many, and their communities are under assault from rival ethnic groups.
Banyarwanda	A collective name for the inhabitants of DRC who are of Rwandan ancestry.
Bemba, Jean-Pierre	Leader of the Equateur-based MLC.
Besigye, Kiiza (Colonel)	An early member of the Ugandan NRM who has challenged President Museveni in the upcoming Ugandan elections.
Bo-Boliko, André	A leader of the PDSC.
Bugera, Déogratias	North Kivu Tutsi, and founding member of the RCD.

²⁵⁰ For names, see also Appendix C: Who's Who in the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), and Appendix D: Who's Who Among Interahamwe Military Commanders.

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Bululu, Lunda	Former Prime Minister of Zaire, and founding member of the RCD.
Buyoya, Pierre (Major)	President of Burundi since his July 1996 <i>coup d'Etat</i> .
Chiluba, Frederick	The President of Zambia, and broker of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement.
Chissano, Joachim	The President of Mozambique.
Comiex	DRC company, chaired by Pierre Victor Mpoyo, involved in mineral exploitation with Zimbabwe's OSLEG.
CPP	Committees of Popular Power. Local bodies elected under the direction of the Kinshasa Government.
Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo	President of Angola.
Dunia, Lwengamia	Mai Mai leader in the Fizi region of South Kivu. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.
Ex-FAR	Former Rwandan Armed Forces which took part in the 1994 genocide.
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises or Congolese Armed Forces. The military force of the Kinshasa Government.
FAZ	<i>Forces Armées Zaïroises</i> . The Mobutu regime's military.
FDD	A Burundian Hutu rebel group led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. Many fight alongside the FAC.
<i>Forces d'Autodéfense Populaire (FAP)</i>	The official name of Dunia's Mai Mai militia.
<i>Forces Innovatrices de l'Union et de Solidarité (FONUS)</i>	DRC opposition party led by Joseph Olenghankoy.
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA)	A largely defunct Uganda rebel group.
Gécamines	The DRC's state mining corporation.
Habyarimana, Juvénal	Late Hutu President of Rwanda, whose assassination marked the start of the 1994 genocide.
Hedi Annabi	Assistant UN Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
Hema	Eastern DRC-based ethnic group with powerful land and business interests.

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Holbrooke, Richard	US Ambassador to the United Nations.
Ilunga, Emile (Doctor)	Former President of RCD-Goma.
Interahamwe	Extremist Hutu militia group that committed the bulk of Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Now known as AliR.
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye	Leader of the Burundian rebel Hutu FDD movement. At present is an ally to Kabila Government.
Jogo Baptista De Matos, General	Chief of Staff of the Angolan armed forces.
Joint Military Commission (JMC)	A body composed of two officers picked from each of Lusaka's signatory armies, appointed to plan and implement the Cease-fire and forces' disengagement with the help of UN and OAU.
Kabarebe, James (Colonel)	RPA Deputy Chief of Staff. Commander of August 1998 attack on Kitona and Kinshasa
Kabila, Joseph	DRC President Laurent-Désiré Kabila's son and a top commander in the FAC. (See Appendix D).
Kabila, Laurent-Désiré	President of the DRC.
Kakudji, Gaetan	Kabila's cousin and DRC Minister of the Interior.
Kamitatu Massamba, Cleophas	A leader of the PDSC who is currently imprisoned in Kinshasa. Also the father of leading MLC member - Olivier Kamitatu.
Kamitatu, Olivier	Jean-Pierre Bemba's lieutenant in the MLC.
Kapend, Eddy	<i>Aide-de-Camp</i> to DRC President Kabila.
Karaha, Bizima	Chief of RCD-Goma Security. An ethnic munyamulenge.
Kataliko, Emmanuel	The late Catholic Archbishop of Bukavu. Accused of encouraging resistance to the Rwandan presence, he was barred from the city in early 2000.
Kazembe, Timothy (Brigadier)	Zambian officer named as second Chairman of the JMC.
Kazini, James (Brigadier)	UPDF Chief of Staff.
Kibassa Maliba, Frederic	Former DRC Minister of Mines. Leader of the state authorised wing of the UDPS.
Kibonge, Mulomba (Colonel)	MLC Defence Secretary.

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Kifwa, Celestin	DRC National Police Chief (See Appendix D).
Kony, Joseph	Leader of the rebel Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Lendu	Eastern Congo ethnic group that has been embroiled in bloodletting against the Hema.
Lumumba, Francois	Leader of MNC/L party. Currently resides in Belgium.
Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement	Signed by the DRC war combatants – five foreign states, Congo's government and rebels - in July and August 1999.
Mahachi, Moven	Zimbabwe Defence Minister.
Mai Mai	Traditional militias found in the Eastern DRC.
Makoni, Simba	Finance Minister of Zimbabwe.
Mamba, Mashako (Doctor)	DRC Health Minister.
Mandela, Nelson	Former President of South Africa and current Burundi Peace Negotiations' Facilitator.
Masire, Sir Ketumile	Former President of Botswana and OAU appointed Inter-Congolese Dialogue Neutral Facilitator.
Mazimpaka, Patrick	Rwandan Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes.
Mbemba, Theophile	Governor of Kinshasa. Once a key intellectual and strategist in the UDPS.
Mbia, Albert	MLC Secretary of the Economy.
Mbombo, Catherine Nzuzi Wa	Current leader of Mobutu's MPR party.
<i>Mchaka Mchaka</i>	The name of the ideological program employed by the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) in its revolution, and then subsequently recommended to the Congolese.
Miranda, Joao Bernardo	Angolan Foreign Minister.
Mocumbi, Pascoal	Prime Minister of Mozambique.
Mongole Combatants	A Hutu militia formed in the early 1990s to defend the interests of the North Kivu Banyarwanda.
Monsengwo Pasinya, Laurent (Cardinal)	He presided over the Sovereign National Conference, would probably be called upon to contribute to a Dialogue.
MONUC	United Nations Organisation.

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	Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created in August 1999 and authorised to deploy 5,537 observers and armed troops by the Security Council.
<i>Mouvement Nationaliste du Congo/Lumumbiste</i> (MNC/L)	DRC opposition party that originated with Patrice Lumumba's MNC party.
<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</i> (MPR)	Mobutu's governing party. Its current leader is Catherine Nzuji Wa Mbombo.
<i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (MLC)	Jean-Pierre Bemba's Equateur-based guerrilla group.
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)	Zimbabwe's main opposition party.
MPLA	Angolan ruling party.
Mpoyo, Pierre Victor	DRC Petroleum Minister.
Muamba, Francois	MLC Finance Secretary.
Mugabe, Robert	President of Zimbabwe.
Mulumba, Kin Kiey	RCD-Goma Official Spokesman. Was Mobutu's last Minister of Information, and is President of the Brussels based <i>Le Soft</i> Newspaper.
Museveni, Yoweri	President of Uganda.
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. A clandestine and largely defeated guerrilla force.
National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Yoweri Museveni's political-military group created in the bush war in the early 1980s that became the government army after he took power.
Nawej, Yav (Brigadier General)	Commander of the FAC Kinshasa Brigade.
Ndombasi, Yerodia Abdoulaye	Former DRC Foreign Affairs Minister. Current Minister for Education.
Ngoma, Arthur Zahidi	Long-time opposition politician, and leader of the <i>Force du Futur</i> party. Was a founding member of the RCD, but subsequently quit the movement.
Ntaganda, Bosco	A Hema militia leader who is alleged to have received support from UPDF officers.
Nyamwisi, Mbusa	Former First Vice President of the RCD-ML and, from November 2000, self-declared President.
Nyarugabo, Moise	Former RCD-Goma Second Vice President, and still on of

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Odongo, Jeje (Major General)	the Movement's senior leaders.
Olenghankoy, Joseph	UPDF Chief of Staff.
Onusumba, Adolphe	Leader of FONUS party.
	President of RCD-Goma since October 2000. Previous to he served as the movement's Foreign Minister.
Oryx Diamonds	Zimbabwean-Omani-DRC mining consortium that failed to gain a London Stock Exchange listing in mid-2000.
Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy)	Zimbabwean Army company engaged in buying diamonds in the DRC.
Padiri Karendo Bulenda	Bunyakiri-based Mai Mai leader. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.
<i>Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien</i> (PDSC)	DRC opposition party that enjoys considerable support among intellectuals but has less nationwide appeal than the UDPS. Like Tshisekedi, its leaders and had served in governments under Mobutu.
<i>Parti Lumumbiste Unifié</i> (PALU)	Party formed in 1964 by Antoine Gizenga, minister in Lumumba's government.
Ramm, Colette	Official spokeswoman for Wamba's faction of RCD-ML.
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie or the Congolese Rally for Democracy.
RCD Kisangani or ML faction	Faction of RCD that followed Wamba dia Wamba when he split from the Goma based RCD in March 1999.
Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)	The army of Rwanda. Originally created as a guerrilla movement to fight the former Hutu government between 1990-94.
Saleh, Salim (Major General)	President Yoweri Museveni's brother and former Minister of State for Defence.
Saolona, Bemba	The father of Jean-Pierre Bemba, and former Minister under both Mobutu and Kabila.
Savimbi, Jonas	Leader of the Angolan rebel movement UNITA.
She Okitundu, Léonard	DRC Human Rights Minister.
Sikatende, Shabani	A Mai Mai leader. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.

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Silwamba, Eric	Zambian Presidential Affairs Minister.
SONANGOL	Angolan state oil company. Involved in DRC oil exploration and distribution.
Sovereign National Conference of 1991	DRC's 18-month constitutional talks conducted under the aegis of then President Mobutu Sese Seko, who later sabotaged the process.
Tambwe, Alexis	A founding member of the RCD.
Mbeki, Thabo	President of the Republic of South Africa.
<i>Tous pour la Paix et le Développement</i> (TPD).	North Kivu NGO involved in the repatriation of Hutu and Tutsi refugees.
Tshisekedi, Etienne	Leader of the UDPS. DRC's best-known opposition politician.
Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF)	The army of Uganda.
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Angolan rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi.
Wamala, Katumba (Brigadier)	Overall Commander of the UPDF operations in Congo after July 2000.
Wamba dia Wamba, Ernest	Embattled leader of Bunia based RCD-ML that broke away from the main RCD faction in March 1999.
West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB)	A largely defunct Ugandan rebel group.
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwean ruling party.
Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA)	Zimbabwean state power company supplied by the DRC's Inga Hydro-electrical Dam.

• Appendix B: Chronology of the War in the DRC

2 August 1998	Second rebellion in the DRC breaks out.
6 August-1 September 1998	Rebels and Rwandans seize Kitona, and move on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola intervene to save Kabila from being overthrown, and beat back the rebels and their allies from the capital city. In Kinshasa anti-Tutsi massacres break out.
23 August 1998	Rebels and Rwandans seize Kisangani.
October 1998	Growing international pressure on Rwanda to "admit its role" in DRC.
27 October 1998	Zambian President Frederick Chiluba mandated to press on with peace initiative to end the war after consultations between regional foreign and defense ministers.
November 1998	New rebel group, the <i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (MLC), reported in Equateur province. Its leader is Jean-Pierre Bemba, son of leading businessman Bemba Saolona who was close to ex-president Mobutu.
6 November 1998	Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame admits Rwandan troops helping DRC rebels, citing security concerns. Reports say he acceded to a request by South African President Nelson Mandela to admit involvement in a bid to advance peace talks.
1 January 1999	RCD claims they killed 400 Hutu rebel militiamen in three days of fighting at Makobola near Uvira. Missionary news service report that hundreds of civilians shot and hacked to death.
18 January 1999	Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola agree on cease-fire at Windhoek meeting. RCD not invited, but promises to examine text.
22 January 1999	RCD restructures movement. General assembly enlarged from 28 to 147 members, including 22 military personnel. Executive committee comprises 23 departments, up from eight. Ten-man political council created to head the movement. General assembly urges better cohesion between political and military wings.
30 January 1999	Cracks appear in RCD. Non-Tutsi Congolese members query why Banyamulenge "hold so many posts" in new set-up. Belgian daily <i>Le Soir</i> describes the new "political mixture" in the RCD as "explosive". RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba reportedly at odds with his deputy chairman of the RCD, describing its Members as "petty puppets".
25 February 1999	UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in DRC, Roberto Garreton, urges international community to take action against Tutsis detained in Kinshasa, expressing concern for their safety.
5 March 1999	Missionaries claim 100 people killed in RCD reprisal attack at Kamituga in South Kivu. RCD denies the allegations.
9 March 1999	Rebels confirm strategic town of Kindu is under their control.
22 March 1999	Southern African Development Community (SADC) reaffirms support for Kabila, at meeting in Botswana, but expresses concern over continuing destabilization of the region.
3 April 1999	Kagame vows to keep his troops in DRC as long as Rwanda's national security is threatened.
5 April 1999	Tension increases within RCD, as Wamba moves his base from Goma to Kisangani. Disagreement between RCD and MLC in Kisangani also intensifies.

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18 April 1999	Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and Kabila sign cease-fire accord in Sirte, Libya, through the mediation of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refuse to be bound by the agreement.
20 April 1999	Kabila announces dissolution of ADFL, which swept him to power in 1997, accusing some members of "opportunism" and "self-enrichment".
4 May 1999	Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, spearheading peace efforts for the DRC, "agrees to work" with Gaddafi to implement Sirte accord. Rwanda says it only recognizes the Chiluba peace initiative. Presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania meet in Dodoma to discuss growing rift between Ugandan and Rwandan military campaigns in DRC.
7 May 1999	Outbreak of a hemorrhagic fever in rebel-held Watsa, possibly due to Marburg virus. WHO confirms Ebola virus not present. First ever flight between Kinshasa and rebel-held territory since the conflict began, lands in Goma bringing medical experts.
11 May 1999	Over 40 killed and 50 wounded in bombing of Goma by Government and its allies. The aircraft then went on to bomb Uvira, killing two.
15 May 1999	Details of Sirte accord released, in which Kabila reportedly agrees to "direct talks" with the rebels. He previously resisted all attempts to meet the RCD.
16 May 1999	Disaffection within the RCD reaches its peak as Wamba ousted, and Emile Ilunga announced as the new leader. Wamba refuses to step down, saying he is the victim of a "coup" within the rebel movement.
17 May 1999	Kabila celebrates two years in power with a lackluster ceremony and "forced parade".
23 May 1999	Rival RCD factions clash in Kisangani. Rwanda and Uganda deny reports of a split.
26 May 1999	Chad, which supported Kabila, withdraws troops from Equateur province "in line with the Sirte agreement".
29 May 1999	Rwanda declares unilateral cease-fire in DRC.
2 June 1999	Uvira and Bukavu airport bombed by Government forces.
3 June 1999	RCD issues statement explaining that Wamba's leadership style had resulted in a "series of crises " within the movement. It announces new structures, including a Congress, Council and an Executive with the latter two headed by the same person, DR. Emile Ilunga. The now-defunct General Assembly decamps to Kisangani in a show of support for Wamba.
7 June 1999	Journalists confirm that Kabila's hometown of Manono, in Katanga province, is under rebel control.
8 June 1999	Rebel factions meet in Uganda, along with Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, to try and iron out differences and form a united front against Kabila.
10 July 1999	Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and the Minister of Defence of Angola sign an Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in the DRC. Representatives of the RCD and MLC refuse to sign.
15 July 1999	RPA forces cross the Sankuru River, capture the East Kasai town of Lusambo, and advance to within 50 km of Mbuji Mayi. The UN Secretary General issues report on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment to the DRC.
1 August 1999	Jean-Pierre Bemba signs the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement.

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7 August 1999	Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first breaks out in the Northeastern city of Kisangani over an attempt by then Ugandan-supported RCD dissident, Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, to hold a political rally.
14 August 1999	Renewed violence breaks out in Kisangani, followed by three days of clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central bank and the major road junctions.
17 August 1999	Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a temporary cease-fire. The fighting had caused approximately 600 casualties.
31 August 1999	50 Representatives of the RCD sign the Lusaka Cease-fire agreement.
September 1999	Intensification of militia activities in South Kivu.
1 October 1999	RCD Kisangani moves its headquarters to Bunia.
October 1999	DRC Government launches offensive against the MLC in the vicinity of Mbandaka that lasts till mid December.
11-12 October 1999	First meeting of the JMC occurs in Kampala.
15 October 1999	First meeting of the Political Committee in Lusaka. Expresses concern about the "slow pace at which the United Nations was handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo" and calls on it to address the situation "with the urgency and seriousness it deserves."
23 - 24 October 1999	The third and final round of polio immunizations carried out in the DRC.
1 November 1999	Secretary General issues a second report on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the DRC.
November 1999	At mid month 15 Congolese women accused of aiding the Mai-Mai are allegedly buried alive at Mwenga in South Kivu.
November 1999	FAC and ZNDF forces attempt to advance from Basankusu to relieve the siege of Ikela. The attempt fails.
3-10 November 1999	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Moustapha Niasse, visits Kinshasa to discuss the difficulties experienced by MONUC in positioning liaison officers at rear military headquarters, as well as the freedom of movement for the operations of the technical survey team.
30 November 1999	Security Council decides that the personnel authorized under Resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999) should constitute MONUC until 1 March 2000.
9 December 1999	ADF guerrillas attack Fort Portal Prison in Southwest Uganda.
10 December 1999	Government of the DRC declares a moratorium on Capital Punishment on the occasion of the 51 st Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Military Court of Justice continues to sentence prisoners to death and conduct executions.
11 December 1999	Kamel Morjane of Tunisia assumes his duties as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Kinshasa. On the same day he meets with US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who was on a tour of the sub-region.
14 December 1999	A rebel massacre of 23 women and children alleged to have occurred near the town of Kalima, North East of Kindu. Victims were accused of complicity with the Mai Mai.
15 December 1999	OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, announces the appointment of former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, as 'Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations'.

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16 December 1999	UN Security Council briefed by Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet. Informed that the detailed Concept of Operations plan for MONUC is impossible to carry out until the mission's observers are guaranteed full security and freedom of movement. US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, says the US supports the operation, but wants to "get it right."
17 December 1999	Government of the DRC frees 156 political prisoners. The majority are activists of PALU or the UDPS.
22 December 1999	UN Secretary General writes to Chairman and Secretary general of the OAU to urge the establishment of the JMC as a standing body.
29 December 1999	Government of the DRC accuses rebels of burying 15 women alive in Kivu province under the suspicion that had ties with the Mai Mai.
January 2000	With his authority as Temporary Chairman to the Security Council, US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke declares that the month will be dedicated to Africa. A coordinated attack by Interahamwe, Mai-Mai and some FAC commanders succeeded in temporarily seizing Shabunda.
24 January 2000	Security Council Meeting on the Congo Peace Process. Kofi Annan declares, "The entire sub region has been engulfed in a crisis of such complexity that it continues to defy our best efforts to resolve it... The Lusaka Agreement remains the most viable blueprint for resolving grievances and achieving a comprehensive negotiated solution."
25 January 2000	UN Mini-summit in New York on the Congo Peace process.
27 January 2000	Masire presents his preliminary requirements for achieving his mission as Neutral Facilitator to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at a donors meeting in New York. President Kabila declares his willingness to participate in the dialogue, and meet with Masire.
28 January 2000	An investigation into the Mwenga massacre conducted by the DRC branch of UNHCR. Investigation lasts till 15 February, and ascertains that the event did in fact take place.
31 January 2000	Unrest breaks out in Goma and Bukavu, in which the local population conducts strikes aimed at the RCD authorities until 6 February. These events prompt the RCD-Goma to refuse Archbishop Kataliko permission to return to his parish in Bukavu.
February 2000	Fighting between the MLC and FAC continues around Mbandaka. At Ikela, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Congolese troops relieved the siege of the city. Also clashes reported in the East between the Rwandans and rebel forces.
15 February 2000	Holbrooke testifies to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa: "The time has come for the parties to realize the full potential of the Lusaka Agreement. And the time has come for the US to lend its support."
16 February 2000	US Secretary of Defence meets with current South African President Thabo Mbeki in Pretoria, and promises to provide logistics support to a Congo peacekeeping operation once there is a "genuine agreement."
11-17 February 2000	Masire visits Kinshasa, where he meets with Kabila, representatives of civil society, the opposition, and the Secretary General's Special Representative.
17 February 2000	US President Bill Clinton addresses the opening of US National Summit on Africa. About the Lusaka agreement, he says "it is more than a cease-fire; it is a blueprint for building peace. Best of all, it is a genuinely African solution to an African problem.... I have told our congress that America intends to do its part by supporting the next phase of the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Congo, which will

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	send observers to oversee the implementation of the agreement.”
19 February 2000	Presidential Decree by Kabila on amnesty for political prisoners.
23 February 2000	Signatories of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement meet in Lusaka. The group reaffirms its support for the agreement, welcomes the imminent adoption of resolution 1291 (2000) by the Security Council, and establishes a new implementation calendar for the Lusaka process starting 1 March 2000.
24 February 2000	Security Council passes Resolution 1291 authorizing the expansion of MONUC to 5537 military personnel and appropriate civilian staff. Resolution also authorized a phased deployment of MONUC by the Secretary General in accordance with specified prerequisite conditions of security assurances.
March 2000	Banyamulenge inhabitants of the Haut-Plateau area, in the vicinity of Fizi-Uvira, come under effective siege by the interahamwe and Mai Mai forces.
12 March 2000	A 13 member ad-hoc commission (<i>Commission ad hoc chargé de veiller à la stricte application du décret</i>) headed by the Minister of Justice established to ensure the strict application of the DRC Presidential decree on amnesty.
12 March 2000	Rwandans and RCD-Goma seize Idumbe as part of an offensive launched Southwards and Westwards in Kasai province. Offensive included attacks towards Longa, Lodi, and Bena Leka astride the Ilebo-Kananga railroad. The Rwandans and RCD Goma also continue efforts to cut off Kabinda and Mbuji-Mayi.
17 March 2000	Kamel Morjane met with J-P Bemba in Gbadolite, and with President Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African Republic.
20-22 march 2000	Masire visits Kinshasa, where he is prevented from traveling in the interior of the country. He subsequently cuts short his visit.
29 March 2000	Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the DRC, Roberto Garreton, submits his sixth report to the Commission on Human Rights.
4 April 2000	JMC meets in Kampala to discuss a draft plan for the disengagement of forces from the confrontation line.
7 April 2000	Security Council passes Resolution 54/260 grants commitment authority for USD 200 million for MONUC in order to permit its logistical preparations for phase II. Secretary General's third report on MONUC predicts that some US\$58.7 million will be spent by 30 June 2000.
8 April 2000	Kampala disengagement plan signed by the Political Committee.
10 April 2000	Kabila held a special cabinet meeting and issued statement reaffirming the government's support for the inter-Congolese dialogue.
14 April 2000	A series of explosions devastate Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa.
18 April 2000	Issue of second report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
21 April 2000	As per the Kampala agreement the parties required to provide MONUC and the JMC with detailed military information, area by area, for the planning on disengagement.
21 April 2000	Masire briefs the Security Council on the approach he intends to follow in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
30 April 2000	OAU summit on the DRC convened in Algiers.
5 May 2000	Heavy fighting breaks out between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani.
4 - 8 May 2000	Security Council mission, led by Holbrooke, visits Kinshasa, Lusaka, Harare, Kigali, and Kampala.

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9 May 2000	The second outbreak of fighting between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani resumes.
12 May 2000	MONUC reinforcements arrive in Kisangani from Kinshasa.
14 May 2000	Presidents Museveni and Kagame meet in Mwanza, Tanzania. The two reaffirm their willingness to demilitarise Kisangani.
11-21 May	Masire travels to Kinshasa where he meets with Kabila. Then he continues to meet RCD leaders in Goma, RCD-ML leaders in Bunia, and MLC leaders at Gbadolite.
22 May 2000	RPA and UPDF Chiefs of Staff sign an agreement and calendar for the demilitarisation of Kisangani.
23 May 2000	Jean-Pierre Bemba assures the Secretary General's Special Representative that his forces will halt their forward movement. Nevertheless, their advance continues.
23- 24 May 2000	Masire returns to Kinshasa, where he meets with the Foreign Minister instead of Kabila.
25 May 2000	DRC Government announces that they had launched a counter-attack to stem the MLC's advance.
28 May 2000	Museveni addresses Parliament on Uganda's role in the DRC.
29 May 2000	Start of Kisangani demilitarisation.
31 May 2000	Bangboka airport in Kisangani re-opened to civilian flights.
3 June 2000	Kabila and Kagame meet at Eldoret, Kenya. End of demilitarisation around Bangboka Airport and La Forestière (Zone 1) camp.
5 June 2000	Heavy fighting between RPA and UPDF breaks out in Kisangani. UPDF crosses Tshopo River, and occupies Northern portion of the city. Incident is the third outbreak of fighting between the two countries. MONUC observer team in Mbandaka requested to convey message from government of the DRC to Bemba threatening to push back the MLC forces if they did not withdraw to the positions they occupied at the time of the Lusaka Agreement. DRC government officials prevent representatives from civil society and the unarmed opposition from leaving Kinshasa for Inter-Congolese Dialogue meeting Cotonou.
7 June 2000	RPA asks MONUC to leave Kisangani because they are not able to assure their security. MONUC Commander declines.
8 June 2000	A cease-fire is signed by the Ambassadors of Rwanda and Uganda to the UN, scheduled to go into force at 1600 Kisangani time. Cease-fire is not observed. Holbrooke and Annan contact President's Kagame and Museveni to urge them to order an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of their respective forces from Kisangani. The Political Committee meets in Lusaka to discuss preparations for the meeting with the Security Council in New York on 15 and 16 June.
11 June 2000	Kisangani fighting comes to an end in early morning. MONUC deploys to Tshopo Bridge between the two armies.
12 June 2000	Third Report of the Secretary General on MONUC.
12 June 2000	Ugandan forces reported to have withdrawn northwards from Kisangani.
9-14 June 2000	A series of violent demonstrations, involving several hundred people, takes place outside of MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. Protests are intended to criticize the UN's supposed inaction during the

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	fighting in Kisangani. Demonstrations occurred on the 9 th , 10 th , and 14 th .
15 June 2000	Open meeting on the situation in the Congo. Holbrooke states “the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement is one of the few things standing between order in the DRC and its degeneration to war-lord dominated, resource driven satrapies.”
16 June 2000	UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 Condemning Rwanda and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani.
16 June 2000	The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1304 calling upon Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from the DRC.
30 June 2000	DRC celebrates its fortieth anniversary since independence. Promises to inaugurate Constituent Assembly on 1 July.
4 July 2000	OAU mini-summit in Algiers.
19 July 2000	Uganda appoints Brigadier Edward Katumba Walumba as overall Commander of Operation Safe Haven – the UPDF operation in the DRC. He replaces UPDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini.
24 July 2000	RCD Government of Kisangani replaced because of popular dissatisfaction in the city.
27 July 2000	Fighting reportedly intensifies at Ikela.
1 August 2000	Interahamwe attack on Ruhengeri Commune in Rwanda.
7 August 2000	SADC summit meeting in Windhoek Namibia. DRC president Kabila does not attend because he is ‘busy’.
9 August 2000	MLC forces decisively repulse FAC advance northwards along the Ubangui River near Libenge. The ‘high-tide mark’ of Kabila’s Equateur Offensive.
9 August 2000	The Rwandan Government announces that it is willing to withdraw 200 km from the current DRC frontlines, rather than the 15 km called for in the Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000.
10 August 2000	RCD-Goma rebel movement announces that it is willing to withdraw 200 km alongside its Rwandan supporters.
14-15 August 2000	All night summit in Lusaka between the warring parties, minus the rebels, breaks down in acrimony as Kabila maintains his rejection of Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire.
16 August 2000	UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, recommends a one-month extension of the MONUC mandate.
21 August 2000	Kabila swears in constituent and legislative assembly in Lumumbashi. He says the body is not a ‘sham’.
22 August 2000	Former Nigerian President, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, arrives in Kinshasa as the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the DRC, and meets with Kabila.
23 August 2000	DRC Government officially ‘suspends’ the Lusaka Agreement, and then authorizes the deployment of MONUC observers to monitor the cease-fire. The Security Council extends the MONUC mandate until October 15.
28 August 2000	A grenade attack at a social gathering in Bukavu leaves seven dead and 43 injured. The authorities blame forces loyal to the Kabila government of using terrorist tactics. Bukavu civil society blames Rwanda and the RCD of the same thing.
11 October 2000	Museveni hosts reconciliation conference between rival RCD-ML leaders Wamba and Nyamwisi in State House.
28 October 2000	RCD-Goma President Dr. Emile Ilunga resigns from the Movement’s top post. Is reported to have recognized the ‘mistakes of his leadership’. His two Vice Presidents, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and

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	Moise Nyarugabo, also resign. The new President, Adolph Onusumba, reshuffles the rebel cabinet.
5 November 2000	Forces loyal to renegade RCD-ML First Vice President Nyamwisi launch a coup attempt against movement president Wamba dia Wamba. The attempt fails.
8 November 2000	Talks in Tripoli, Libya, conclude with decision to send an African peacekeeping force to the DRC. The summit was attended by the Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mali, as well as representatives from Angola, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa.
14 November 2000	South African President Thabo Mbeki cancels his trip to Maputo Mozambique, where he had been scheduled to lead a second round of discussions on the DRC conflict.
15 November 2000	DRC Government defers the introduction of new rules requiring import taxes and a number of other government fees to be paid in foreign currency. The measure had threatened to paralyse the Congolese economy, cause a shortage of basic goods, and contribute to inflation.
16 November 2000	Tension in Bunia is reported to be 'very high'. Nyamwisi orders Wamba to leave the town within the week. Wamba says that it is out of the question for him to leave the people of Bunia to this fate.
16 November 2000	Fighting reported in the vicinity of Pepa. RPA and RCD reported to be advancing on the town.
27 November 2000	South African President Thabo Mbeki convenes a second summit in Maputo Mozambique, to review progress on the implementation of the Kampala Disengagement Plan. Summit breaks down in arguments between the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC.
29 November 2000	DRC President Kabila says UN demands for freedom of movement in the DRC for MONUC amount to a denial of national sovereignty.
29 November 2000	Political Committee overseeing the Lusaka Peace Process meets in Lusaka and calls on the UN to increase its military presence in the DRC, to take advantage of the renewed commitment by the parties to pull back their forces.
30 November 2000	Acting UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Carolyn McAskie, briefs the Security Council on the situation in the DRC, which she describes as "one of the world's worst humanitarian crises."
4 December 2000	An Antonov Transport Aircraft owned by the Great Lakes Company is hijacked while enroute from Goma to Kindu. Hijackers demand that the plane be flown to Government controlled territory. The attempt fails when an RCD Commander on the plane fatally shoots one of the hijackers in the neck.
4 December 2000	RPA and RCD forces seize Pweto. Tens of thousands civilians resident in the region flee towards Zambia. Several thousand Government and allied troops accompany them. DRC Government calls the retreat a 'tactical withdrawal'. Zimbabwe Government explains that their forces had pulled back in order not to violate the Lusaka Cease-fire.
8 December 2000	The International Court of Justice refuses to order the suspension of an international arrest warrant issued by Belgium against the former Foreign Minister of the DRC, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, for his role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa. The DRC Government had complained that the warrant prevented Yerodia from traveling, and therefore, from doing his job as Foreign Minister. The World Court however, ruled that the recent Cabinet reshuffle that transferred him to the Ministry of Education invalidated the appeal.

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14 December 2000 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1332 extending by six months the mandate of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and agreeing to a proposal by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to increase the number of military observers monitoring the disengagement of forces from confrontation lines. It gave qualified support to the idea of sending infantry units to the DRC's eastern border with Rwanda, agreeing to support Annan on the matter "as soon as he considers that conditions allow it".

Appendix C: The Balance of Conventional Military Forces²⁵¹

Angola: Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA)		
Numbers	Total Armed Forces 107,500 Army 100,000 Navy 1,500-2,000 Air Force/Air Defence 6,000 Paramilitary 15,000 Rapid Reaction Police 15,000	Only 2,000 -2,500 second echelon troops deployed to DRC. Most are thought to be in Mbuji Mayi, Mbandaka, and in the western DRC near Matadi.
Organization	35 Regiments including both infantry and armoured. Strength and quality vary.	
Equipment		
Main Battle Tanks	300 X T-54/55 230 X T-62 30 X T-72	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	50 + BMP-1 100 X BMP-2 40+ BRDM-2 (recce) 100 X BTR-60/-80/-152 APC 400 BMP 1/2	
Artillery	300 X Towed Artillery including M-1942 ZIS-3 76mm 85mm D-44 D-30 122mm M-46 130mm 100mm SU-100 assault guns (quantity unknown) 50 X BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launchers 40 X 122mm RM-70 240 mm BM-24 (some) 250 X 82mm mortars 40 + 120mm M-43 mortars	
Anti Tank	AT-3 Sagger (quantity unknown) 500 X recoilless rifles including 82mm B-10 107mm B-11	
Air Defence	200 + including 14.5mm ZPU-4 23mm ZSU-23-2 M-1939 37mm S-60 57mm towed 40 X ZSU-57-2 SP (wheeled) 20 ZSU-23-4 SP (tracked)	
Surface to Air Missile Systems	SA-7 and SA-14 launchers (quantity unknown) 40 X SA-2 12 X SA-3 25 X SA-6 15 X SA-8 20 X SA-9 10 X SA-13 (mostly unserviceable)	Missiles Include Air to Surface: HOT, AT-2 <i>Swatter</i> Air to Air: AA-2 <i>Atoll</i>
Combat Aircraft	20 X Mig-21 MF/bis 30 X MiG-23 12 X SU-22 4 X SU-25 2 X SU-27 12 X L39	9 X SU-22 M4 being delivered)
Coounter-Insurgency / Reconnaissance Aircraft / Training	9 X PC 7/9 3 X Cessna 172 6 X Yak-11 Emb-312	

²⁵¹ Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS), London, *The Military Balance* (1997-98, 1998-1999, 2000-2001). Specific numbers are the most recent given.

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Maritime Reconnaissance	2 X EMB-111 1 X F-27 MPA 1 X King Air B-200B	
Transport Aircraft	2 X AN-2 9 X AN-26 6 X BN-2 2 X C-212 4 X PC-6B 2 X L-100-20 2 X C-130 8 X AN-12 (leased from the Ukraine) 2 X Il –76 (leased from the Ukraine)	
Combat Helicopters	15 X Mi-25/35 5 X SA-365M gunships 6 X SA-342 with HOT anti vehicle/personnel rockets 14 Mi-24B	
Transport Helicopters	8 X AS-565 30 X IAR-316 25 X Mi-8/17	
Naval Ships	4 X <i>Mandume</i> Type 31.6m PCI 3 X <i>Patrulheiro</i> PCI 1 X SS-C-1 <i>Sepal</i> 1 X Sov <i>Yevgenya</i> (counter mine) 1 X Sov <i>Polnochny</i> LSM,(Amphibious TroopsTransport with capacity 100 tps, 6 tanks)	Many ships are non-operational.

Congo-Kinshasa: Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)		
Numbers	55,000 Army	
Organization	10 + Infantry Brigades 1 X Presidential Guard Brigade 1 X Mechanized Infantry Brigade 1 X Commando Brigade (reported)	
Specialized Units	Some specialised units reportedly trained by ZNDF and North Koreans	
Equipment		
Main battle Tanks	20 X Chinese type 59 (being refurbished) 40 X Chinese type 62	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	30 X Panhard AML 60 30 X Panhard AML 90 12 X M113 12 X YW-531 60 X Panhard M-3 Some Casspir, Wolf Turbo 2, and <i>Fahd</i> APC	
Artillery	30 X M116 75mm Pack howitzers 20 X Chinese Type 56 85mm field guns 20 X M-1938 D-30 122mm 15 X Chinese Type 60 122mm field guns 8 X Chinese Type 59 130mm gun-howitzers 20 X Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launchers 10 X BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launchers 81 mm mortars (quantity unknown) 107mm M-30 mortars (quantity unknown) 50 X 120mm Brandt	
Anti Tank	57mm M-18 recoilless rifles (quantity unknown) 75mm M-20 recoilless rifles (quantity unknown) 106mm M-40A1 recoilless rifles (quantity unknown)	
Air Defence	14.5 mm ZPU-4 40 X 37mm M-1939/ Type 63 40mm L-60 SA-7	

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Aircraft		Few aircraft remain servicable. 10 SU-25 reported as on order
Naval Ships	4 X Chinese Shanghai II PCC (most non operational) 2 X Swiftships PCI 6 X Armed Boats (most non operational)	

Zimbabwe: Zimbabwean National Defence Force (ZNDF)		
Numbers	Total Active 40,000 Army 35,000 4,000 Air Force Police 19,500 (incl Air Wg) Police Support Unit 2,300	11,000 Deployed to the DRC including 6000 Infantry Artillery Regiment Armoured car Squadron Tank Squadron Field Engineer task Force Military Police Support Units
Organization	5 X Brigades HQ 1 Mechanized Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Presidential Guard Group 1 Armoured Squadron 18 X Infantry Battalions including 2 X Presidential Guard Battalions 1 X Mechanized Battalion 1 X Commando Battalions 1 X Parachute Battalions 2 X Field Artillery Regiment 1 X Engineer Regiment 1 X Air Defence Regiment	
Equipment		
Main Battle Tanks	22 X Chinese type 59 10 X Chinese type 69	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	20 X Eland 60/90 armoured cars 90 X EE-9 Cascavel with 90mm guns 30 X Chinese Type 63 YW-531 UR416 APCs (quantity unknown) 40 X Crocodile 23 X ACMAT	
Artillery	4 X Chinese Type 54 122mm field guns 12 X Chinese Type 60 122mm field guns 18 X Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launchers 52 X RM-70 122 mm multiple rocket launchers 502 X 81/82mm mortars 14 X M-43 120mm mortars	
Air Defence	215 including 14.5mm ZPU-1/-2/-4 23mm ZU-23 37mm M-1939 17 X SA-7	
Aircraft	2 X Ground Attack Squadrons with 1 with 11 X Hunters 9 X FGA-90 1 X F-80 1 X T-81 1 with 8 X Hawk (MK-60/MK-60A) (2 servicable) 1 X Fighter Squadron with 12 X Chinese F-7 (MiG 21) (9 servicable) 1 X Recce Squadron with 14 X Reims-Cessna 337 Lynx 1 X Transport Squadron	Servicibility rates are likely to be low

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	with 6 X BN-2 8 X C 212-200(1 VIP) 1 X Training/Reconnaissance/Liason Squadron with 22 X SF-260 Genet(9-C, 6-F, 5-W, 2 TP) 1 X Helicopter Squadrons 2 X As 532 UL(VIP) 10 X AB-412 1 X Helicopter Squadron (armed/liaison) 24 X SA-319 2 X Mi-35 2 X Mi-35P	
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Namibia: The Namibian Defence Force (NDF)		
Numbers	Army 9,000, Coast Guard 100	1,600 - 2,000 troops deployed to the DRC with 1 X Artillery battery 2 X Infantry battalions
Organization	6 X Infantry Battalions 1 X Combat Support brigade with 1 X Artillery Regiment 1 X Air Defence Regiment 1 X Anti-Tank Regiment	
Main Battle Tanks	4 X T-34 7 X T-55	Servicibility doubtful
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	BRDM-2 20 X Casspir APC 30 X Wolf APC 10 X BTR 60	
Artillery	8 X 88mm field guns 24 X 140mm G-2 gun-howitzers 5 X 122mm BM21 multiple rocket launcher 81mm mortars 82mm mortars	
Anti Tank	B10 82mm recoilless guns (some) 57mm anti-tank guns (some) M1942 76mm ZIS-3 anti-tank guns (some)	
Air Defence	50 X 14.5mm ZPU-4 15 X 23 mm <i>Zumlac</i> (ZU-23-2) 50 X SA-7	
Aircraft	1 X Falcon 900 1 X Learjet 36 5 X Cessna 337/02-A 2 X Y-12 1 X F406 Caravan (maritime patrol) 2 X SA-319 <i>Alouette</i> helicopters	Servicibility rates are likely to be low
Naval Ships	1 X <i>Oryx</i> PCO 1 X <i>Osprey</i> PCC	

Rwanda: Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)		
Numbers	55,000-70,000 (up top 90,000 reported) Army 49,000-64,000 Paramilitary 7,000 Gendarmerie 6,000	17,000 – 20,000are in the DRC
Organization	6 X Brigades 1 Mechanized Infantry regiment	
Main Battle Tanks	12 X T-54/-55	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	15 X AML-60 AML-245 (quantity unknown) AML-90 (quantity unknown) 16 X VBL BTR (quantity unknown) Panhard (quantity unknown) 16 X RG-31 <i>Nyala</i>	

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Artillery	35 guns including 105mm (quantity unknown) 6 X122mm 250 mortars including 81mm mortars 120 mm mortars	
Air Defence	150 including 14.5mm 23mm 37mm SA-7 SA-16 (reported)	
Aircraft	1 BN-2A Islander 2 + Mi-24 helicopters 4 X MI-17 MD helicopters	

Uganda: Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF)		
Numbers	Army 50,000 – 60,000 Presidential Protection Unit 2,000 Air Force 800 Local Defence Forces 15,000 Border Defence Unit 600 Marines 400	10,000 deployed to Congo with most of its best personnel and equipment
Organization	4 X Army Divisions (2 with 3, 2 with 4 brigades) 12 X Brigades with 12 X Infantry Battalions 2 X Armour Companies 2 X Artillery Batteries 2 X Air Defence Regiments 1 X Marine Battalion Presidential Protection Unit	
Main Battle Tanks	140 X T-54/55 20 X PT-76 Light Tanks	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	40 X <i>Eland</i> armoured cars 60 X <i>Ferret</i> armoured cars 12 X BTR 60 4 X OT-64 SKOT 20 <i>Mamba</i> APC 20 X <i>Buffel</i> APC	
Artillery	60 X 76mm M-1942 20 X 122mm M-1938 12 X 130mm M46 4 X G5 155mm 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers (quantity unknown) L-16 81mm mortars (quantity unknown) M-43 82mm mortars (quantity unknown) 60 X Soltam 120mm mortars	
Anti Tank	40 X AT3 Sagger	
Air Defence	48 X 14.5mm ZPU-1/2/4 20 X 23mm ZU-23 (towed) 20 X 37mm M-1939 SA-7 (quantity unknown)	
Aircraft	7 X MiG-21 bis Fishbed-N (5-MF, 2 UTI) 3 X Mi-24 attack helicopters 3 X Mi-17 assault helicopters 3 X Bell 206 transport helicopter 2 X Bell 412 transport helicopter 1 X <i>Jet Ranger</i> police helicopter	However the UPDF has not yet trained pilots the fly the five upgraded MiG-21.
Boats	8 riverine patrol craft, plus boats	

Burundi: Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB)

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Numbers	Army 45,500; Air Force 100	
Specialized Units	Parachute Battalion Commando Battalion	
Organization	7 X Infantry Battalions 2 X Light Armoured battalions 1 X Engineer Battalion 1 X Artillery Battalion 1 X Air Defence Battery 10 X battalions of Reserves (reported)	
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	6 X AML 60 (Recce) 12 X AML 90 (Recce) 9 X Panhard M-3 APC 7 X Shorland SB-301 Armoured car 30 X BRDM-2 (quantity unknown) 20 X BTR-40 APC	
Artillery	18 X M116 75mm field gun 18 X D-30 122 mm (quantity unknown) 100 + mortars incl M-43 type 82mm mortar 120 mortar (type unknown) 12 X 122mm BM-21multiple rocket launchers (quantity unknown)	
Anti Tank	15 X 75mm Chinese Type 52recoilless rifles 83mm: Blindicide	
Air Defence	15 X 14.5mm ZPU-4 23mm ZU-23 (quantity unknown) 18 X 37mm Type 54 SA-7	
Fixed Wing Aircraft	4 X SF 260W T/P 2 DC-3 Transports	
Helicopter	2 X SA 342 L Gazelle 3 X SA-316B 2 X Mi-8	
Boats	4 X Huchuan PRC Type 026 1 X Landing Craft Troops (LCT) 1 X spt 4X boats	

APPENDIX D: Who's Who in the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC)


(Except where noted, all the military commanders have occupied their current posts at least since September 1999.)		
Minister of Defence	President Kabila	
Minister Delegate of Defence	Tchamlesso	A comrade of Kabila's for many years, he took part in Kabila's Parti de Revolution Populaire (PRP) guerrillas in South Kivu. A native of the region, he has a reputation for implacable hostility against Tutsis. He was appointed in November 2000
Vice-Minister of Defence	Major General Dieudonné Kayembe	A Luba from Kasai, and ex-FAZ officer. He served a long prison term under Mobutu for suspected disloyalty.
Minister for Reconstruction and Commander of National Service Corps	Major General Denis Kalume Numbi	A Luba from Maniema, and ex-FAZ officer. Served a long prison term under Mobutu for suspected disloyalty.
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces	Lieutenant General Sylvestre Lwetcha (also spelled Lwessa, Louetcha etc).	A Bembe from South Kivu. A long time Mai-Mai leader, involved in guerrilla resistance to Mobutu since 1969. According to one accounts he was also a FAZ officer. He is an old man and was probably appointed because of his political status among the Mai-Mai. Not clear how much he was involved in Kabila's PRP.
Commander of Land Forces	Major General Joseph Kabila.	The President's (eldest?) son. His mother is reputedly a Rwandan Tutsi. Too young to have seen much service before the mid-1990s. Has spent most of his life outside Congo.
Commander of the Naval Force	Major General Liwanga Mata.	From Equateur. Ex-FAZ officer.
Commander of the Air Force	Major General Faustin Munene	From Bandundu. Said to be the son of Pierre Mulele, a revolutionary leader in the 1960s. If so, his father and his mother were executed and mutilated by Mobutu's forces. Brought up in Angola, where he rose to a high rank in the Angolan army. Related by marriage to President Eduardo Dos Santos. Munene was one of the commanders of the so-called 'Katangan Gendarmes', some of whom are descendants of Congolese who fled to Angola after the Katanga Secession. (Some of the Katangan Gendarmes have military experience, but for others the label is more political). He was commander in chief of the armed forces until September 1999. Has been arrested and severely humiliated by Kabila on several occasions. Also rumoured to have survived several assassination attempts in the past two years. Seen as a threat to

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		Kabila. Has nevertheless remained the Head of the Air Command because of his close links with the Angolans. Said to have a bitter distrust of westerners due to his parents' fate.
COMMANDERS OF MILITARY REGIONS		
1st Region (North and South Kivu)	Major General Sikatende Shabani	A Mai-Mai leader from Kivu or Maniema, probably operating in the east. Commands the allegiance of one 'wing' of the Mai-Mai (the others are loyal to Luetcha or Padiri).
2 nd Region (Province Orientale)	Brigadier General Joseph Mundimbi	Said to be an ex-Katangan Gendarme'. Probably from east DRC.
3 rd Region (Maniema and Kasai Oriental)	Brigadier General Felicien Kiyana	Possibly an ex-FAZ. Probably from east DRC.
4 th Region (Katanga)	Brigadier General John Numbi	Said to be ex Katangan Gendarme. He was a Politician and organiser of the JUFERI a youth movement that followed the populist Katangan politician Kyungu wa Kumanza, who incited the expulsion of Kasaiens from Katanga in 1990s. Numbu is a mulubakat, (same tribe as the President).
5 th Region (Equateur)	Brigadier General Kisempia Songilanga	From either Bas-Congo or Katanga. He replaced Brigadier General Jean-Leon Mabila, also a Katangan, who was blamed for incompetence and military reverses in Equateur. Kisempia is an ex-FAZ officer, Mabila was an ex 'Katangan Gendarme' but without much military experience.
6 th Region (Kasai Occidental and Bandundu)	Brigadier General Felix Mbusa Mabe	From Equateur. A colonel in the ex-FAZ. Imprisoned under Mobutu.
7 th Region (Kinshasa)	Brigadier General Jean Yav Nawej	From South Katanga. A Lunda. Elderly. Ex-Katangan Gendarme. Said to be related to the President.
8 th Region (Bas-Congo)	Brigadier General Marcelin Lukama	Ex-FAZ officer. From Kasai Oriental.
Commander of the National Police including the Police d'Intervention Rapide (PIR)	Celestin Kifwa	Kifwa was Commander in Chief of the armed forces at the outbreak of the rebellion, but was replaced by the more experienced Munene. A so-called Katangan Gendarme, Kifwa is apparently a Mulubakat, and married to the President's elder sister.
Second in command of the Force d'Intervention pour la Capitale (FIC)	Jean-Claude Kifwa	Celestin Kifwa's son and Kabila's nephew. Also called Cmdt 'Tango-Tango'. Second in Command of the FIC, but is said to be the more active commander.


APPENDIX E: Who's Who Among Interahamwe Military Commanders

Function	Name	Location
Commander in Chief	General Augustin Bizimungu	Lubumbashi
?	Colonel Athanase Gasake	Lubumbashi
?	Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho	Lubumbashi
?	Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo	Lubumbashi
?	Major Protais Mpiranya	DRC
?	Major Evariste Nyampame	DRC
ALiR Operations Cmdr	Colonel Omari	?
Communications/Liaison Officer	Major Sebirayi	Kigoma
?	Major Makilo	?
Interahamwe Command Structure in the Kivus		
Cmdr of PALIR & ALIR in the Kivus	General Paul Rwarakabije	Shabunda
1st Division		
Cmdr 1st Division	Colonel Bemera (formerly Maj Haguma)	North Kivu
2 I/C 1st Division	Colonel Mutabazi	North Kivu
Brigade Limpopo (Formerly Brigade Artere - Pfunda and then Mike - Echo while in Rwanda in 1997-1998)		
Brigade Cmdr, Limpopo Brigade	Colonel Mwalimu (formerly Capt Murenzi)	Lukweti-Mutongo
2 I/C Limpopo Brigade	Major Mbuyi	Lukweti-Mutongo
Brigade Intelligence Officer, Limpopo Brigade	Major Ninja	Lukweti-Mutongo
Bn Toro Cmdr	Captain Sindi	Lukweti-Mutongo
2 I/C	Captain Linani	Lukweti-Mutongo
Bn Mbarara Cmdr	Captain Fils	Lukweti-Mutongo
Bn Abidjan Cmdr	Captain Darius	Lukweti-Mutongo
BRIGADE NIAMEY		
Brigade Niamey Cmdr	Colonel Kakeri	Rutshuru
BRIGADE LILONGWE		
Brigade Lilongwe Cmdr	Colonel 'Omega'	Katoye
2nd Division		
Cmdr 2nd Division	Colonel Mutabazi	South Kivu
2 I/C 2nd Division	Colonel Rwagakinga	South Kivu
Cmdr Mobilization in South Kivu	Major Mahoro	South Kivu
Brigade Okapi Cmdr	Major Mugabo	South Kivu
Brigade	?	South Kivu
Brigade	?	South Kivu
Coordinator of Infiltration into Cyangugu	Captain Saddam/Sadick	Near Bukavu
Logistical Coordinator	Commander Georges	Near Bukavu



A. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (Source: Reliefweb)

APPENDIX F



B. The Kivus (Source: Reliefweb)

