

INDONESIA:
KEEPING THE MILITARY UNDER CONTROL

5 September 2000

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INDONESIA: KEEPING THE MILITARY UNDER CONTROL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There has been since the fall of Soeharto's New Order in May 1998 a drastic decline in the political influence of the military. It no longer exercises a dominant influence over the government, and at present is in no position to regain political power. However, the full consolidation of democracy will require the dissolution, or at least drastic re-orientation, of the territorial network, the civilianisation of the domestic intelligence agencies, the regularisation of military finances, and the establishment of military cohesion and discipline. It will also require the formulation of an unambiguous doctrine supporting civilian supremacy.

This process of bringing the military under control was in train under President Habibie: the military's representation in the national and regional legislatures was reduced, active officers were prohibited from being elected or appointed to positions in the civilian government, the military adopted a stance of neutrality between political parties, and the police were separated from the armed forces.

Civilian control of the government was consolidated by President Abdurrahman Wahid after his election in October 1999. The decisive moment was in February 2000 when he in effect dismissed General Wiranto from his Cabinet after Wiranto was named in an official report as being among those responsible for human-rights violations in East Timor during 1999. That the president had established his authority was indicated by the virtual absence of reaction from the military when the military 'strong-man' of only four months earlier was forced out of the government. During the first months of the Abdurrahman presidency the military leadership formally abandoned the Dwifungsi (Dual Function) doctrine that had guided their political involvement during the Soeharto era.

Although the military no longer plays a decisive role in the government, its withdrawal from participation in day-to-day politics has proceeded at an uneven pace and is not yet complete. Military officers continue to be involved in some political activities carried over from the Soeharto era, including holding seats in the legislatures. The appointed military representatives are only due to leave the national and regional parliaments in 2004 and the People's Consultative Assembly in 2009. And the Indonesian National Military (TNI) retains other resources through which it can still exert political influence:

- Through its territorial structure, the army maintains military units in every province, district and sub-district throughout Indonesia, which provides it with the means to influence political developments at every level of government.
- The military, especially the army, is still strongly represented in the state and military intelligence agencies which continue to focus on domestic political and social affairs.

- The military, through business enterprises and other means, raises funds to cover around 75 per cent of its expenditures. These fund-raising activities are generally not subject to public scrutiny: military commanders have access to large sums of money that could be used to finance future political manoeuvres.

Despite these political resources, it is not possible for the military to regain control of the government in the near future. It is far too fragmented to act cohesively; it lacks confidence in its capacity to provide answers to Indonesia's manifold challenges; and, most importantly, its leaders know that any attempt to restore its political power would almost certainly trigger massive demonstrations throughout the country, which could easily turn into riots – which they are unsure, in turn, of their capacity to handle.

Nevertheless, military officers – either on their own initiative or on instructions from higher levels in the military hierarchy – have sometimes engaged in activities that seem designed to undermine the authority of the elected government. For example:

- There are some indications of military resistance to government policy, especially in regions experiencing disturbed security conditions, such as Aceh, Maluku, West Timor and Irian Jaya;
- Although not proven, it is widely believed in political circles – including at the highest levels in the government – that some retired officers continue to influence serving officers to carry out activities, including the aggravation of social conflict, to undermine the stability of civilian government; and
- The military seems to have succeeded in delaying and obstructing the holding of trials of officers accused of violation of human rights.

This report identifies the basic measures that need now to be taken to reinforce the current commitment of the Indonesian military to stay out of politics – practical measures aimed at restraining the capacity of the military, or elements within it, to challenge and frustrate government policies by unconstitutional means. The emphasis here is on the direction of the necessary responses rather than their administrative detail: future ICG reports on the military will address such issues as the role of the military and police in internal security operations, military power at the local level, and the politics of military reform.

Some of the recommendations developed in the concluding chapter of this report, and summarised below, require action by the military alone, but for the most part what is required is a cooperative relationship between the government and military – with the civilian government playing the leadership role. There are roles in the process of military reform for many actors – the President and his ministers, the legislatures, and the civilian political forces, as well as the military itself. But basic questions about the functioning of the military should not be decided by the military alone, simply because these matters are of fundamental importance for the nation as a whole. The ultimate goal in a democratic society must always be the achievement of full democratic control over military affairs by the civilian government

RECOMMENDATIONS

Doctrine

- 1) The military's formal doctrine should explicitly acknowledge civilian supremacy and limit the military's role to its professional duties.
- 2) This doctrine should distinguish clearly between the field of defence that is the responsibility of the military and the field of internal security that is the responsibility of the police.

Military Representation in Legislatures

- 3) The military should follow the logic of its own declared goals and withdraw its appointed representatives from the legislatures. In particular, it should not continue to be represented in the People's Consultative Assembly after its current term expires in 2004: this requires the rescinding of the decree adopted by the MPR in August 2000.
- 4) The prohibition on military personnel voting in elections should be rescinded.

Territorial Structure

- 5) The army's territorial structure should be dismantled, or at least drastically reformed, in order to reduce the capacity of the military to interfere in regional politics.
- 6) The strengthening of the police in order to take over current police functions performed by the army is likely to be implemented more smoothly if it is gradual.

Domestic Intelligence

- 7) Domestic intelligence should be the responsibility of a civilian agency accountable to the government and the parliament. It is no longer appropriate for the military, as a defence force, to play a large role in the field of domestic intelligence.

Military Finance

- 8) So long as economic circumstances continue to force the military to rely on extra-budgetary sources of funds, the government should ensure that funds available to military commanders are used transparently and appropriately: this requires that such funds should be properly supervised and audited by an agency, such as the State Auditing Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), outside the military itself.

Military Discipline and Cohesion

- 9) The military leadership should accept the responsibility of ensuring that discipline is imposed on officers resisting government authority, and protect military officers under pressure from retired officers or other political interests outside the military hierarchy.

Accountability

- 10) Firm measures should be taken by senior military officers to prevent the violation of human rights by military personnel.
- 11) In the event of violations taking place, it is the responsibility of the government to bring to an end the current virtual impunity of senior officers.

International Support for Civilian Government

- 12) The most useful long-run contribution that can be made by the international community is support for strong and effective civilian government.
- 13) The threat of sanctions and embargoes should be maintained as a disincentive to military coups.
- 14) Exchange and education programs, and reciprocal visits, should be pursued as important means of providing Indonesian military officers and key parliamentarians with new perspectives on the military's functions in democratic societies.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 September 2000



INDONESIA: KEEPING THE MILITARY UNDER CONTROL

I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia now has a civilian government that came to power through a democratic constitutional process. The establishment of civilian democratic rule has resulted in a drastic decline in the political influence of the military. Confronted with public criticism and condemnation for its support of the Soeharto regime and human-rights abuses committed by its members, the military was compelled to withdraw its officers from the positions they had occupied in the government during the 32 years of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto's New Order. The military no longer exercises a dominant influence over the government.

There is no possibility of the military regaining control of the government in the near future. Shocked by its sudden loss of authority, the military is far too fragmented to act cohesively and it lacks confidence in its capacity to provide answers to Indonesia's manifold challenges. And, most importantly, the military's leaders know that any attempt to restore its political power would almost certainly trigger massive demonstrations throughout the country – which could easily turn into riots. They are unsure of their capacity to handle mass disturbances and are aware that brutal repression would meet with international condemnation and end Indonesia's hopes of early economic recovery.

Although the military has to a considerable degree adjusted to the loss of its previous political position, its transformation is not complete and it maintains important residual resources that could enable it to apply political pressure on the government by non-democratic means. This report identifies some of these residual resources. In particular the army retains its territorial structure through which it exercised much political influence in the past, and it continues to control domestic political intelligence. The military also has access to funds that could be used for political purposes. Despite the drastic weakening of its political position during the past two years, the military's potential political influence is by no means negligible. The widespread public perception that some elements in the military have engaged in activities intended to destabilise the government cannot be proved but neither can it be dismissed as mere speculation. That the military continues to wield some influence is shown by its apparent ability to protect senior officers against charges of human-rights violations.

The likelihood of the military reversing the trend of the last two years and restoring its political power in the short term is remote and it still seems improbable in the longer term. Ideally civilian institutions – the civilian government, the legislatures, the courts and the political parties – will work in such a way as to strengthen the legitimacy of democratic government. But, in the event of the inadequate performance of civilian government and its loss of popular legitimacy, it is possible that the military might be tempted to try to re-enter the political arena. This report

recommends steps that could be taken to limit the capacity of the military to restore its political power in the future.

II. HABIBIE: THE TRANSITION

The Indonesian National Military (TNI)¹ formed the backbone of President Soeharto's New Order regime for more than three decades until 1998. Military security and intelligence agencies exercised tight supervision over society and prevented the emergence of organised civilian opposition. Retired and active military officers were appointed to key positions in the state as Cabinet ministers, members of parliament, provincial governors, district heads, senior bureaucrats, ambassadors, directors of state enterprises, and supreme court judges. Through its territorial organisation, which shadowed the civilian government, the army ensured that regional governments remained loyal to Jakarta and that the military-backed Golkar party won every election by a large margin. Inadequately supported by the government's budget, the military supplemented its finances through an extensive network of business enterprises stretching from Jakarta to the regions. The military's activities outside the military sphere were justified by the doctrine of Dwifungsi (Dual Function), according to which the Indonesian military is both a military force and a socio-political force. The military believed that its contribution to the anti-colonial revolution in the 1940s made it permanently responsible for the overall well-being of the nation and therefore entitled its officers to hold key positions in the government.

The resignation of the President Soeharto on 21 May 1998, following a huge riot and mass demonstrations in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, resulted in a drastic reversal of the military's political position. Soeharto was succeeded by his civilian vice-president and longest-serving Cabinet Minister, Dr. B. J. Habibie. The new president inherited an administration in which the military was still deeply entrenched and he therefore felt vulnerable to a reassertion of military power. However, the post-Soeharto military was badly fragmented and confused in the new circumstances. The Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, therefore, committed the military to support the new government. Habibie, however, was subjected to heavy international and domestic pressure to liberalise his regime. Fearful of a military challenge and further mass uprisings, he felt that he had little choice but to embark on a program of liberalisation and democratisation. Controls were lifted on the press, new political parties were formed, political prisoners were released and eventually a free general election was held. These reforms could hardly have been welcomed by the military leaders but they too had little choice. If they had moved against the new government they knew that the probability of mass opposition in the streets – and the outbreak of further rioting – was very high and, fearful of further internal fragmentation, they were not confident of their capacity to handle such disorder.

In the new open and liberal atmosphere, civilians were quickly emboldened to criticise the military in ways that were unimaginable during the New Order period. Military officers were confronted by an onslaught of criticism in the mass media which soon turned into unrestrained condemnation. The military was denounced as a key component of Soeharto's discredited authoritarian regime and military personnel were accused of systematic human-rights abuse. On several occasions

¹ Tentara Nasional Indonesia. Before April 1999 the armed forces (including the police) were known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia).

local commanders felt it necessary to apologise publicly for the behaviour of their troops and General Wiranto himself apologised for the many abuses committed by – to use his words – 'individual soldiers' in Aceh. In a particularly notorious case, eleven soldiers from the elite Special Forces (Kopassus – Komando Pasukan Khusus) were court-martialled while their former commander and son-in-law of the deposed president, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, was dismissed from the military. The sudden collapse of their public image had a devastating impact on military morale and put the armed forces on the defensive in a way they had never experienced before.

The military's poor reputation was aggravated by their declining capacity to maintain public order and internal security. Although military officers claimed that the TNI was the only organisation that could hold the country together, their performance came under increasingly critical scrutiny. Not only did the military fail to control the separatist rebellion in Aceh but separatist sentiment grew stronger partly in response to the brutal methods often used by military and police troops. The military's performance in dealing with the admittedly very difficult religious conflict in Maluku struck an even more devastating blow to its prestige as soldiers sided with the combatants and reportedly even supplied them with arms and ammunition. And, despite broad public support in Indonesia for the retention of East Timor as part of the country, the military not only failed dismally in its mission to win a vote in favour of integration but was unable to prevent the wave of destruction carried out by its own soldiers and their militia allies after the result of the referendum was announced.

The new atmosphere provided an opportunity for a small number of reform-minded professional officers to come forward with a program aiming to reduce the military's day-to-day involvement in politics. The military reformers believed that the excessive involvement of the military in political affairs under Soeharto had undermined its capacity to perform its professional military duties in the fields of defence and internal security. They were particularly resentful of the way Soeharto had used the military for his own short-term political purposes. At an official military seminar held in September 1998 the military adopted what it called its 'New Paradigm' which envisaged a drastic reduction in its political involvement. In the future the military would no longer seek to 'occupy' positions in the state but would only 'influence' government decisions while its influence would be exercised 'indirectly' rather than 'directly'. Instead of dominating the government, the military would 'share' power with civilian political forces.² The New Paradigm, however, did not constitute a comprehensive blueprint for the overhaul of the military but was rather an indication of the direction of change.

The reformers themselves were by no means radical in outlook and were well aware that their proposals would meet with resistance from many of their fellow officers. They believed, therefore, that the TNI could only be reformed gradually. Nevertheless, substantial steps were taken during the Habibie presidency to reduce the TNI's direct role in government:

Reduction of military representation in the legislatures: The reduction in the number of appointed military and police members of legislatures, begun by President Soeharto, continued under Habibie. As a concession to public

² *TNI Abad XXI, Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa* (The TNI in the 21st Century: Redefinition, Repositioning, and Reactualisation of the Role of the TNI in National Life) (C.V. Jasa Buma, Jakarta, 1999). Published by the Department of Defence and Security.

discontent, Soeharto had instructed that military representation in the 500-seat national parliament (DPR – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) formed after the 1997 general election be reduced from 100 to 75. In response to the new mood after Soeharto's fall, new legislation was adopted in January 1999 that reduced the number further to 38 and also reduced the proportion of military seats in regional assemblies (DPRD – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) from 20 to 10 per cent. The 38 members of the TNI/Police group in the national DPR are also members of the 700-strong People's Consultative Assembly (MPR – Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) which elects the president and vice-president, and adopts decrees setting out guidelines for legislation in the DPR.

Removal of active military officers from civilian positions: At the beginning of 1999, around 4000 active military officers were serving in civilian positions in the government and bureaucracy. As part of its reform program, the military leadership decided that from 1 April 1999 military officers would be required to resign from the military if they opted to retain or accept positions in civilian government.³

Political 'neutrality': In the past the military provided the essential backing that enabled the government party, Golkar, to win overwhelming victories in every election. But in 1998 the military severed its formal links with Golkar and in 1999 General Wiranto ordered the TNI not to involve itself in the general election campaign.⁴ The TNI's institutional neutrality between parties in the general election was continued in the presidential and vice-presidential elections in October 1999 when the 38 military and police representatives did not vote as a bloc but were permitted to vote according to their individual preferences.

Separation of the police from the military: Throughout the Soeharto era, the police had been an integral part of the armed forces and subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. It was normal for army and police personnel to take part in joint internal-security and public-order operations. The military reformers, however, believed that human rights abuses by the military had arisen in part because of the excessive involvement of military personnel in police functions. They also believed that the integration of the police as part of the armed forces had resulted in the 'militarisation' of the police. On 1 April 1999, the Commander-in-Chief of the TNI, General Wiranto, took the first step toward institutional separation by formally removing the police force from his own command. The practical effect, however, was limited as the police remained under the authority of the Department of Defence and Security, of which General Wiranto was Minister at the time. Nevertheless, this move was understood to be the first step toward full separation and the 'civilianisation' of the police.

Very much on the defensive in the new political circumstances, most military officers were ambivalent toward these reforms. While generally accepted as unavoidable, the reforms were also in varying degrees resented. The severance of the link with Golkar and the separation of the police caused less distress than the

³ As discussed later in the report, this instruction has been strictly observed for new appointments but many military officers occupying civilian posts have been allowed to see out their terms.

⁴ This policy, of course, was not without calculation as it was obvious that Golkar would lose a lot of ground. By adopting a neutral stance, the TNI was also keeping open its options

reduction in the number of members of the legislatures and especially the ending of secondment to civilian positions in the government. But officers who had grown accustomed to the privileges they enjoyed under the New Order and had expected to retire into lucrative political or bureaucratic positions now faced the prospect of an uncertain future. The military leadership therefore stressed that reform should be implemented gradually for fear that rapid reform might aggravate internal divisions and even lead to open resistance on the part of some sections of the military.

During the Habibie presidency, the steps toward withdrawal from direct involvement in the government were taken largely on the initiative of reform-minded military officers themselves who had concluded that it was no longer tenable to maintain the military's old political position. Although hardly a committed reformer himself, the Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, accepted proposals originating from a group of reform-minded advisors headed by the armed forces' Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs, Maj. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.⁵ These reforms were not initiated exclusively by the military but were a response to strong pressures from society. The military had little choice but to abandon its old role. Nevertheless, although the reduction of military representation in the legislatures was imposed on the military after hard bargaining in the MPR and the DPR, the other reforms were basically formulated within the military itself.

Civilian control over the government, however, was not effectively consolidated during the Habibie presidency. Widely perceived as a carry-over from the Soeharto regime, Habibie lacked the necessary political support to assert full civilian control and preferred to share power with the Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, in an arrangement that left Wiranto largely in control of the military. Nevertheless, the achievements of Habibie's government should not be belittled. Although constantly wary of the military, Habibie introduced major democratic reforms that undermined military influence and he acted independently on important occasions. For example, Habibie refused to bow to military demands to declare states of emergency in Aceh and Maluku and, most dramatically, he overruled the military by allowing the people of East Timor to determine their own future in the 'popular consultation' of August 1999.

III. ABDURRAHMAN: CONSOLIDATING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

It was not until the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as president in October 1999 that civilian domination of the government was consolidated and the TNI leadership made clearly subordinate to civilian authority. It should not be imagined that Abdurrahman (usually called Gus Dur) came to power with a clear blueprint for the subordination of the military. In the first place, as discussed in our previous report,⁶ he was confronted by a host of pressing challenges among which the establishment of firm civilian dominance was only one. Second, Gus Dur's background did not prepare him for understanding the details of institutional reform in the military. As the leader of a traditional religious organisation and a democratic activist, he was acutely aware of factional rivalries in the military and adept at dealing with officers on an individual basis but had little interest in

⁵ Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is now the Co-ordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs in the new Cabinet announced by President Abdurrahman on 23 August 2000.

⁶ *Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic but not Acute*, ICG Indonesia Report No. 2, 31 May 2000.

institutional military affairs.⁷ Third, Gus Dur's personal style is characterised more by ad hoc instinctive reactions to changing circumstances than long-term planning. Indeed, he is famous for his inconsistent public statements in response to particular immediate issues. And finally, he is a very shrewd politician who is ever conscious of the need to maintain political support and is always ready, if he considers it necessary, to do a deal with (almost) any group, including conservative military officers.

While President Abdurrahman was certainly committed to the principle of civilian supremacy, he was also motivated by the need to secure his own position against possible military pressures. After his election, he quickly moved to undermine remaining military potential to challenge his government. He replaced General Wiranto, who was still several years short of retirement age, as Commander-in-Chief with Admiral Widodo Adi Sucipto, the first non-army officer to hold this position. The appointment was based on the expectation that a naval officer would not be able to mobilise the army in any future confrontation with the president. He also appointed a civilian, Professor Juwono Sudarsono, as Indonesia's first non-military Minister of Defence since the 1950s. At the same time he appointed General Tyasno Sudarto as army Chief of Staff in a move that he expected would weaken Wiranto's remaining influence in the army. Tyasno was an intelligence officer who had opposed Wiranto's hope to be nominated as Vice President. Gus Dur then persuaded Tyasno to bring back to Jakarta the controversial army regional commander in Sulawesi, Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, whom Tyasno appointed to the crucial post of Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad – Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat) – although Gus Dur denies that he proposed that Agus be appointed to a specific position. Agus was a vigorous advocate of military reform and an open critic of General Wiranto who had been responsible for 'exiling' him to Sulawesi.

As a long-time democratic activist, Abdurrahman aimed to establish a government in which the military's direct role would be minimal but at the same time, since he was also a political realist, he was willing to appease some military aspirations. Although active officers could no longer be appointed as ministers, the military continued to be 'represented' by individual retired or about-to-retire officers in the Cabinet. In his first 35-member Cabinet, Abdurrahman appointed six serving or retired military officers but they were by no means a cohesive group. The key military appointment was that of General Wiranto as Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs but none of the other military ministers felt indebted for their appointments to Wiranto. Indeed, two of them, the new Minister of Communications, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, and the new Minister of Mining and Energy, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had both aspired to leadership of the TNI and were clearly disappointed by their appointments to the Cabinet. Two of the other military ministers had already left the military hierarchy and it was their experience as regional governors – Lt. Gen. (ret) Surjadi Soedirdja in Jakarta and Vice Admiral Freddy Numberi in Irian Jaya – that qualified them for their Cabinet appointments. Finally, Admiral Widodo, the new Commander-in-Chief of the TNI, also enjoyed Cabinet status. By appointing six ministers with military backgrounds, the president showed that he was not excluding the military but at the same time they did not form a solid bloc behind General Wiranto.⁸

⁷ In an interview, one of the president's very close advisors said that 'Gus Dur knows nothing about military matters'.

⁸ In his second 26-member Cabinet announced on 23 August 2000, all the ministers with military backgrounds were retained except Vice Admiral Numberi.

The end result of these moves within the military and the Cabinet was that General Wiranto – whether inadvertently or by design – found himself isolated in February after a fact-finding commission appointed earlier by the Habibie government named him among more than thirty others considered as responsible for gross human-rights violations in East Timor. At the same time a United Nations commission of enquiry recommended the establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible for crimes in East Timor. In these circumstances the president decided – after much prevarication on both his and Wiranto's part – to make Wiranto 'non-active' as a Cabinet minister. That the president had established his authority over the military was indicated by the virtual absence of reaction from the military. The military 'strong-man' could do nothing to save himself and a few months later tendered his formal resignation.⁹

President Abdurrahman's informal style and failure to observe formal chains of command, however, led to some irritation within the military. His tendency to intervene in relatively junior military appointments, for example, caused resentment. In January 2000 the president personally announced the dismissal of the TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen. Sudradjat, who was considered to be a close ally of Wiranto, and reportedly ordered the replacement of the West Java regional military commander and three sub-regional military commanders.¹⁰ The president's old habit, in his previous roles as head of the Muslim Nahdatul Ulama and the Democracy Forum, of repeating political gossip and speculation also alienated military officers. His open speculation during a long overseas tour about the fate of General Wiranto created much confusion that was aggravated when he told journalists about an alleged secret meeting of disaffected generals in Jakarta.¹¹ During one television interview he claimed that 10 per cent of the members of the TNI were disloyal and in another interview he alleged that one unidentified regional commander was undermining him.¹² The president rarely felt any need to provide evidence for his claims.

After a few months, however, Abdurrahman seemed to have taken account of military unhappiness about his public interventions in military affairs. In contrast to his first months as president, he began to restrain his natural tendency to make public comments on military (and other) matters and he seems to have agreed to respect the authority of the Commander-in-Chief and the army Chief of Staff to make internal military appointments. While he was certainly consulted about military promotions and reshuffles in his constitutional position as Supreme Commander of the TNI, it appears that he was no longer attempting to influence appointments and did not make any effort to prevent the dismissal of Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah after only four months as Kostrad commander in August 2000.¹³ It seemed that the president and the military leadership had come to an understanding under which they would not challenge him but he would not 'interfere' in what they considered to be their spheres of professional competence.

⁹ The level of TNI representation in the Cabinet was soon restored with the appointment of Lt.Gen. Luhut Panjaitan as Minister of Industry and Trade.

¹⁰ *Republika*, 25 January 2000. The regional military commander was a major-general while the sub-regional commanders were only colonels.

¹¹ *Kompas*, 4 February 2000,

¹² *Analisa*, 24 January 2000, *Kompas*, 17 March 2000.

¹³ The outspoken Agus Wirahadikusumah's populist style and willingness to 'wash dirty linen in public' had alienated other officers. The final straw appears to have been his exposure of the disappearance of about US\$20 million from Kostrad enterprises during the tenure of his predecessor.

Under present arrangements the Commander-in-Chief of the TNI is directly responsible to the president while the Minister of Defence's authority is limited to administrative matters. This distinction was not especially important when the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister were the same person, as during General Wiranto's tenure. However, the civilian Minister of Defence appointed by President Abdurrahman had no authority over military operations and was not even consulted about military promotions. In the case of the dismissal of Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, the minister admitted that he only learnt of it the next day from the press.¹⁴ The new Minister of Defence appointed in August 2000 to replace Juwono, Professor Mahfud M. D., claims to have little knowledge of defence issues. But he is an expert in constitutional law and human rights who, after his appointment, said that the president has given him the task of 'repositioning' the military within the government structure.¹⁵ one of his first duties will be to steer a new bill on National Defence through the DPR.¹⁶

On the TNI's side, its leadership moved beyond the New Paradigm of 1998 and formally abandoned the long-established doctrine of Dwifungsi. At the TNI's annual meeting of senior officers in April 2000, Admiral Widodo stated explicitly that the military no longer carries out a socio-political role – the second element in the Dwifungsi.¹⁷ The military leaders also endorsed the concept of 'civilian supremacy', a step that had always been resisted in the past. According to Admiral Widodo, 'The TNI strongly supports civilian supremacy. The present government is a government based on the constitution, is democratic and possesses legality. Therefore the TNI supports and protects all its policies'.¹⁸

The abandonment of Dwifungsi was accompanied by an emphasis on the military's primary responsibility for defence against external aggression – symbolised in October 1999 by the change in name of the Department of Defence and (Internal) Security to Department of Defence. During the previous year, the police, still under General Wiranto as Minister for Defence and Security, had increasingly taken over internal-security functions performed by the army. The new Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Widodo, announced that the TNI would no longer be directly responsible for internal security which was now the responsibility of the police. Nevertheless, the TNI would remain ready to contribute to the maintenance of internal security if its assistance is requested by the police in circumstances where the police lacked the resources to handle the disturbances.¹⁹ In practice this means that the army will continue to be deeply involved in internal-security operations against armed separatist movements in Aceh and Papua (Irian Jaya) and in regions affected by severe social conflict such as Maluku. If fully implemented, however, the long-term conversion of the TNI to an externally-oriented defence force would further undermine its capacity for political intervention.

The final separation of the police from the military – and thus its full 'civilianisation' – was planned for 1 January 2001 but this date was suddenly advanced to 1 July 2000 when the president issued a presidential decision moving the police from the

¹⁴ *Kompas*, 1 August 2000.

¹⁵ *Kompas*, 24 August 2000.

¹⁶ A subsequent ICG report will address the policy – and political – issues involved in this and other measures to formalise the new democratic relationship between the civilian government and the military.

¹⁷ *Kompas*, 20 April 2000.

¹⁸ *Kompas*, 12 February 2000.

¹⁹ *Kompas*, 20 April 2000. The roles of the TNI and the police in the management of internal security will be the subject of a future ICG report.

Department of Defence and placing it directly under himself as president.²⁰ Day-to-day leadership of the police continues to be exercised by the National Chief of Police who is directly responsible to the president. One of the reasons for bringing forward the date of the separation was to remove ambiguities about the status of the police as long as it was placed under the Department of Defence. The government hopes that the complete separation will make it easier to obtain foreign aid for police training.

By August 2000, little more than two years after the fall of President Soeharto, the TNI was no longer a key force in the national government. Although the process was not completely smooth, the TNI itself had taken significant steps to withdraw from involvement in day-to-day politics. It has abandoned the Dwifungsi doctrine, begun the process of withdrawal from legislative bodies and severed its formal ties with the Golkar party. Although retired officers are permitted to serve as Cabinet ministers, governors, district heads and bureaucrats, they are no longer directly backed by the military institution and their numbers are likely to continue to decline. In contrast to their role under President Habibie, who treated the military Commander-in-Chief as his principal partner in the government, the military leadership is now clearly subordinate to President Abdurrahman.

Nevertheless, the government continues to rely on the military and police to combat separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya and to counter ethnic and religious conflict in various parts of the archipelago. However, the military's involvement in these operations does not appear to have enhanced its political influence. On the contrary, the government has rejected military pressure to declare a state of emergency in Aceh and the Abdurrahman government signed an agreement with the Acehnese separatist movement for what was called a 'humanitarian pause' despite military discontent with the proposal. And it was only after almost total breakdown in Maluku that the Abdurrahman government agreed to impose a 'civil emergency' – the lowest level of emergency – in June 2000. The government continued to reject military calls for the level of emergency to be raised to a 'military emergency'.

IV. RESIDUAL DWIFUNGSI PRACTICES

Although the TNI no longer plays a decisive role in the government, its withdrawal from participation in day-to-day politics has proceeded at an uneven pace and is not yet complete. Military officers continue to hang on to some political activities that have been carried over from the Dwifungsi era. However, the direction of change is clear and unlikely to be reversed.

One area of remaining participation is in the legislative bodies. The TNI and police continue to be represented – even if temporarily – by appointed members in the MPR, DPR and DPRD as a result of a decree of the MPR at its special session in November 1998 and legislation passed by the DPR in January 1999. At that time the military's political influence was stronger than it is now because the membership of the MPR and DPR had been unchanged since their formation in the Soeharto era after the 1997 general election. Based on this prior legislation, active military officers were appointed to the MPR, the DPR and the provincial and district DPRD after the general election in June 1999. The 38 TNI and police officers are

²⁰ Presidential Decision (Keppres) No. 89/2000, 1 July 2000. This presidential decision was subsequently reinforced by Decree VI/MPR/2000 adopted by the MPR at its August session.

members of both the DPR and MPR. At the provincial and district levels, the TNI/Police group makes up 10 per cent of the membership. The total number of military/police personnel serving in the various legislatures is around 1400.

The continued representation of active military officers in day-to-day legislative politics clearly conflicts with military doctrine as it evolved in 2000. In line with the TNI's new approach, Admiral Widodo announced that the TNI was willing to withdraw its representatives from the DPR and the regional DPRD's at the end of their current terms in 2004. However, he expressed the hope that the military would continue to be represented by appointed members in the MPR because of that body's role in setting the general directions of state policy and electing the president and vice-president. In support of his case, he pointed out that military personnel are not permitted to vote in elections and therefore could not be represented in the legislative institutions except through appointment. In response to the obvious solution of allowing TNI personnel, like the military in virtually all other democracies, to vote in elections, Widodo pointed to the possible negative consequences on the TNI's unity. 'If TNI members vote,' he said, 'they will vote for various parties, thus giving the impression of groupings within the institution'.²¹

In a surprise decision that dismayed supporters of democratic reform, the annual session of the MPR in August 2000 adopted a decree permitting the TNI to retain its seats in the MPR until 2009 'at the latest' – although it would no longer be represented in the DPR and DPRD's after 2004.²² The number of retained seats will be determined by the DPR in later legislation. The decree emerged as a result of bargaining among the main parties which in the past had set the deadline of 2004 for the complete removal of military and police appointees from legislative bodies. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that the military is preparing to reassert its power. In the context of increasing rivalry between political parties in an assembly where no party has a majority, the most likely explanation is that each of the parties is trying to woo support from the 38 military and police members. Thus, the president, who is facing possible impeachment, has an obvious motive to cultivate political support from any quarter while the parties that might be planning to impeach him have the same interest in trying to win the military vote-bank to their side. Ironically, the extension of time given to the appointed TNI/Police members – what many Indonesians would see as anti-democratic – was a result of a democratic process in the MPR.

Apart from military representation in the legislatures, the Dwifungsi doctrine had also legitimated the placing of both active and retired military officers in civilian positions in the government and bureaucracy. As noted above, the TNI adopted a rule that active military officers were no longer permitted to serve in civilian positions after April 1999. At that time, four of 21 Cabinet ministers, ten of 27 provincial governors and 128 of 306 district heads (mayors and bupati) were active military officers.²³ However, there was no restriction on retired officers serving as Cabinet ministers, provincial or district heads, or bureaucrats. Some retired officers, therefore, continued to serve in these positions. While some active officers – most notably Habibie's Minister for Transmigration and Settlement of Forest Squatters, Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono – refused to abide by the new rule, most accepted it. The active officers appointed to the Abdurrahman government were also tardy in

²¹ *Kompas*, Jakarta Post, 26 February 2000.

²² *Kompas*, 14 August 2000.

²³ *Tempo*, 12 April 1999.

handing in their resignations from the military which were delayed to fall on their individual birthdays.

Although the new regulation does not prevent retired military officers serving in government positions, in practice such opportunities have narrowed drastically. During the Soeharto era, governors and district heads were ceremonially 'elected' by regional DPRDs but in reality they needed the endorsement of the president or the Minister for Internal Affairs who often consulted regional military commanders. Thus, many were military officers. Since Soeharto's fall, retired officers already holding civilian positions have usually been permitted to complete their terms in the case of elected officials or to serve out the remaining years to retirement in the case of bureaucrats. But the current democratic atmosphere is such that only exceptional retired military officers can hope to win elections. The case of the military officer who sought a second term as governor of North Sulawesi has served as a warning to other officers. He not only lost the election but was humiliated by his failure to win even a single vote in the provincial DPRD.²⁴ The civilianisation of elective positions also has an impact on bureaucratic appointments. Party leaders appointed to the national Cabinet or elected as governors or district heads are likely to appoint their own party supporters rather than military officers to subordinate positions in their administrations. In the case of the judiciary, also, the appointment of military officers is in decline. When the DPR endorsed the nomination of seventeen new Supreme Court judges in July 2000, not one was an active or retired military officer. If this process goes ahead without interruption, it can be expected that the bureaucracy and judiciary will be largely demilitarised over the next few years.

Another practice, reflecting the *Dwifungsi* concept although in fact having its origins before Soeharto's New Order, is the granting of Cabinet status to the Commander-in-Chief of the TNI and the National Chief of Police. The heads of the TNI and the police are appointed directly by the president and are not responsible to the Minister of Defence or any other minister. As officials with Cabinet status, they routinely attend all Cabinet meetings, not just meetings at which issues relating to defence and security are discussed. At its annual session in August 2000, the MPR adopted a decree that required the President to obtain the approval of the DPR in appointing the Commander-in-Chief of the TNI and the National Chief of Police but this decree was in fact aimed more at restricting the powers of the President than reducing the authority of the military and police leaders. Nevertheless, the decree provides some scope for strengthening civilian control over the military although it has also given rise to fears that the selection of future military and police leaders might be more influenced by political connections than professional capability.

As in the past, the involvement of retired military officers in politics continues but they are now found in most of the main parties, not just Golkar. Golkar, the dominant party of the Soeharto era, had been founded in 1964 by military officers and under the New Order the military had always been represented in the Golkar leadership both at the national and regional levels. However, as the 1999 election approached, Golkar realised that it needed a new public image and therefore decided to shed its direct links with the military; while the military leadership, also wanting to distance itself from its identification with the previous regime, adopted the principle of political neutrality. In contrast to the past, when retired officers were prominent among Golkar leaders, a small number of retired military officers

²⁴ *Kompas*, 4 March 2000.

now hold prominent positions in other parties including Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan) and Amien Rais's National Mandate Party (PAN – Partai Amanat Nasional).

Despite its shrinking role in formal politics, however, the TNI retains significant resources that can be mobilised to exert political pressure and influence.

V. RESIDUAL POLITICAL RESOURCES

A. The Army's Territorial Structure

Although the military's role in national politics has declined drastically, its political influence has not been entirely eliminated. Despite its stated commitment to withdraw from day-to-day politics, it continues, as discussed in the previous section, to participate in some limited areas of formal political activity. But more importantly, the TNI still possesses resources that allows it to exert political pressure and could support an attempt to extend its political influence in the future. The military, in particular the army, still maintains a regional and local infrastructure that could be used as a channel through which to exert political pressure. It also retains significant control over domestic political intelligence. And military officers have access to substantial sources of funds to finance political operations. These resources are discussed in this and the following two sections.

The Indonesian army consists of centralised commands and territorial commands. The main centralised commands are Kostrad, which consists of two conventional divisions and an independent brigade with about 32,000 personnel and Kopassus, with about 6000 members. In contrast to the centralised commands, the territorial forces – numbering around 140,000 personnel – are spread throughout the archipelago. At present there are eleven regional military commands (Kodam – Komando Daerah Militer), some of which cover single large provinces in Java while others cover several small provinces in the Outer Islands. Each Kodam is normally headed by a major-general. The territory within each Kodam is divided into several sub-regional military commands (Korem – Komando Resor Militer) headed by colonels and based in the major towns of the region; each Korem is divided into district military commands (Kodim – Komando Distrik Militer) headed by lieutenant-colonels and based on *kabupaten* (civil administration districts); and each Kodim is divided into smaller sub-district military commands (Koramil – Komando Rayon Militer) headed by captains or lieutenants and based in *kecamatan* (civil administration sub-districts). At the bottom of this structure are soldiers placed in villages as Village Guidance NCOs (Babinsa – Bintara Pembina Desa).²⁵

The army's territorial structure is rationalised in terms of a defence doctrine, known as the Total People's Defence and Security System (Sishankamrata – Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta), that grew out of the experience of Indonesian forces during the nationalist revolution against Dutch colonial rule in the late 1940s. After independence the Indonesian military lacked modern arms, equipment and training and therefore realised it would be no match for a technologically advanced enemy. Instead of defending the nation's borders, therefore, Indonesia's defence doctrine envisaged a withdrawal to the hinterland

²⁵ Reportedly, there are 33,000 babinsa in villages throughout Indonesia, 3,309 Koramil and 266 Kodim. *Tempo*, 28 May 2000, p.26.

where its territorial forces would mobilise the civilian population in guerilla resistance – as they had during the anti-colonial revolution. This doctrine remains at the core of Indonesia's official defence strategy although it now possesses a significant conventional defence force including the army's Kostrad and Kopassus, the Navy and the Air Force.

In reality, however, Indonesian defence planners do not envisage the prospect of an invasion in the foreseeable future. In practice, the army's territorial forces are concerned with internal security rather than defence. The territorial forces expanded during the 1950s and 1960s when Indonesia faced a series of separatist movements and the Communist Party was growing stronger in rural Java. Military officers often argue that the territorial forces are still needed today in order to prevent the outbreak of social conflict between racial, ethnic, and religious groups as well as violent protests by economically aggrieved elements. In more remote regions they often argue that the military performs an important role in providing services to isolated communities that might otherwise be neglected by the civilian government.

The problem posed by the territorial structure in the context of democratisation is that the military's capacity in the field of internal security can also be directed toward intervention in local politics under the guise of maintaining 'stability'. During the Soeharto period, territorial troops were used to monitor and control the activities of political parties, religious organisations, student groups, trade unions and various other non-government organisations. Territorial forces were used to break strikes, remove peasants from their land, crush student protests and, every five years, ensure overwhelming Golkar victories in general elections. In effect, the territorial structure became a major means for keeping the Soeharto regime in power.

Following the fall of Soeharto, the army's territorial structure came under increasing criticism from civilians but only in late 1999 was it questioned publicly by military officers themselves. Previously even the military reformers had argued that there was nothing wrong with the structure itself but only the way it had been used by President Soeharto. The most vocal critic was Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had recently been appointed as regional military commander in Sulawesi. Earlier in the year Agus had denounced Dwifungsi as 'an illegitimate child' and he led a group of officers who published a book in October questioning established military doctrines.²⁶ In December he was called – most unusually for a serving officer – to speak to a parliamentary commission where he portrayed the territorial structure as an 'instrument of power'.²⁷ Nevertheless, Agus did not advocate the immediate abolition of the territorial structure but only its gradual reduction beginning at the lowest level in provinces where security was already firmly established.

Agus Wirahadikusumah's views were by no means widely accepted within the military and he himself estimated, perhaps optimistically, that only 20 per cent of officers agreed with him. Within days other officers rushed to the defence of the territorial structure. The head of military information, Maj. Gen. Sudradjat, emphasised the importance of the territorial units at a time when the nation faced

²⁶ Agus Wirahadikusumah, et. al., *Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999).

²⁷ *Kompas*, 14 December 1999.

the threat of disintegration²⁸ and the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Tyasno Sudarto, asserted that the 'territorial function is still relevant in defending the country'.²⁹ Nevertheless, Agus had powerful support in the government and it seems that President Abdurrahman may have influenced the next round of military appointments which saw Agus brought back after only four months in Sulawesi and placed in command of Kostrad, one of the most important positions in the army.

During the next few months the future of the territorial structure continued to be debated within the military. At a meeting of senior army officers in May 2000, some wanted a rapid contraction but others supported the retention of the system. Taking a middle position, the TNI's Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs, Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, envisaged a phased contraction over 7-10 years.³⁰ A number of possible alternatives were considered in which the army would concern itself only with defence and security while withdrawing from direct political involvement. The army Chief of Staff, General Tyasno, mentioned the possibility of establishing 'regional defence offices' in place of the present territorial command structure. These offices would be restricted to coordination of defence matters and no longer 'manage all aspects of social life'.³¹ By August, however, no final decision had been taken on the long-term structure of the army. Meanwhile, General Tyasno announced plans to withdraw *babinsa*, the non-commissioned officers who were assigned to village level administrations, from the 'villages' in big cities such as Jakarta and Surabaya as a first experimental step, but at the same time reaffirmed that the *babinsa* were still needed in rural areas.³² It was also decided to dissolve Koramil in some parts of Jakarta.³³ In fact, of course, the role of *babinsa* and Koramil in cities had always been minimal compared to their role in rural areas.

The dismantling of the territorial structure will necessarily be gradual. First, many officers continue to believe that the territorial forces are needed to maintain order and prevent ethnic, racial and religious violence. Others argue that the territorial forces can only be reduced in line with an increase in the number and capacity of the police. Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo has emphasized that the pace of contraction should not be uniform but adjusted to specific conditions in particular regions.³⁴ Thus the territorial structure might eventually be dismantled in Java, for example, but preserved in Papua and other less developed parts of Eastern Indonesia.

Second, the rapid elimination of the territorial structure would create the problem of what to do with tens of thousands of soldiers currently serving in territorial units. It is not possible simply to demobilise these troops: the last thing Indonesia needs at present is the sudden unemployment of thousands of men trained in the use of arms. The possibility of transferring soldiers from an over-sized army to an under-sized police force might seem an obvious solution but would be unpopular with soldiers who perceive the army as the superior service. Further, such a move would hinder the professionalisation and demilitarisation of the police force. Gradual contraction on the other hand will permit the reduction in the overall size of the military by normal attrition.

²⁸ *Kompas*, 16 December 1999.

²⁹ *Jakarta Post*, 22 December 1999.

³⁰ *Tempo*, 2 July 2000, p.33.

³¹ *Tempo*, 18 June 2000, p.27

³² *Kompas*, 27 April 2000.

³³ Media Indonesia, 11 June 2000.

³⁴ *Tempo*, 2 July 2000, p.33.

Third, it is an open secret that soldiers in territorial units supplement their quite inadequate salaries by taking on non-military work – some of it legal and some of it illegal. To a considerable degree the territorial units are in practice self-financing. If the territorial forces were simply withdrawn to military bases and cut off from the opportunities provided by the territorial system to supplement their salaries, military personnel might face a drastic drop in welfare and the military could be confronted with growing disciplinary problems.

The reform of the territorial structure cannot be implemented in isolation but will depend on simultaneous progress in other areas. It will be easier to implement in the context of broad political stability and economic growth. Progress will depend on the simultaneous strengthening of the police force and improved capacity to pay adequate salaries to military personnel. Moreover, many officers want to retain the territorial structure. As long as the territorial structure remains in place, the army leadership at both the national and regional levels will have at their disposal an instrument that has been used in the past to further the military's political objectives and could be used again.

B. Domestic Intelligence

The military's political power in the past was also based on its control of domestic political intelligence. The intelligence agencies undoubtedly made a crucial contribution to the durability of the New Order regime. The State Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency (Bakin – Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara), although nominally civilian and responsible directly to the president, is staffed largely by military personnel. Within the military itself the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS – Badan Intelijen Strategis) – previously known as the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (BIA – Badan Intelijen Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) – is the peak intelligence agency and is linked to the intelligence sections of the regional commands throughout the country. The Coordinating Agency to Support the Maintenance of National Stability (Bakorstanas – Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional) was the co-ordinating security organisation that acted on intelligence reports. It was used during the Soeharto era to repress political opposition.

Bakorstanas was abolished in April 2000 but the other two agencies have not undergone fundamental reform. An initial move to loosen the grip of the army was made when President Habibie appointed his previous chief of staff, Lt. Gen. (ret) Z. Maulani, to head Bakin. Maulani had a background in military intelligence but had acquired a reputation in civilian circles as a relatively open-minded officer who often wrote articles on military affairs in the press. Maulani presided over Bakin during a period of unprecedented liberalisation when restrictions on political parties, trade unions, non-government organisations and the press were lifted while political prisoners were freed. President Abdurrahman, however, despite his personal democratic orientation, appointed another retired intelligence officer, Lt. Gen. Arie Kumaat, to head Bakin. Arie was a more traditional type of intelligence officer who had no previous reputation for liberalism.

BAIS, in contrast to Bakin, is an integral part of the TNI structure. One of BAIS's sections deals with external intelligence but its main focus has largely been on what it perceives as domestic threats. The 'culture' of BAIS in the past was far from democratic, with military intelligence officers prominent among those who are alleged to have been involved in human-rights abuses. It is also widely believed in

Jakarta elite circles that officers associated with BAIS are among those who may be stirring up ethnic and other violence as a means to destabilise civilian government.

President Abdurrahman's appointment of the previous head of BAIS, Let. Gen. (now Gen.) Tyasno Sudarto, as the new Chief of Staff of the army may have been intended in part to neutralise potential rearguard resistance from the military intelligence agencies. At the same time the grip of the army was loosened by the appointment of an air force officer as the new head of BAIS, suggesting also that the government hopes eventually to change BAIS's priorities from internal security to defence. The decision that the TNI will henceforth focus on national defence and leave internal security to the police might be expected to involve the eventual full transfer of responsibility for domestic political intelligence to the police but there has been no indication that this is likely to happen soon. Meanwhile consideration is currently being given to a proposal to transfer BAIS from the TNI to the Department of Defence.

As long as the intelligence agencies remain dominated by military officers whose values and attitudes were shaped during the Soeharto era, the democratisation process will remain vulnerable to the kind of 'black operations' that they have commonly sponsored in the past. The central intelligence agencies are linked to intelligence sections in the territorial commands and therefore have an established network through which they can operate.

C. Access to Finance

Despite the parlous condition of the military's finances, military officers continue to have access to funds that could conceivably be used to finance political operations. The military's long-established practice of raising funds outside the official government budget gives military officers resources that are not subject to outside scrutiny. Although the resources at the military's disposal are not as great as they were before the 1997 economic collapse and the fall of the Soeharto regime, they are still quite substantial.

The official defence-and-security budget in the year 2000 was, according to the Minister of Defence, only sufficient to cover about 25 per cent of minimal operating costs.³⁵ Military salaries are extremely low – the official monthly salary of a major-general is only Rp. 1.6 million (about US\$200) while a corporal receives only Rp. 850,000 (about US\$100).³⁶ Officers also receive special allowances depending on their appointments but their official incomes are tiny compared, for example, to professionals in the private sector. In order to bridge the gap between budgetary allocations and actual expenditure, the military has for decades been involved in raising its own 'non-conventional' funds to supplement salaries, provide barracks and uniforms, purchase equipment, finance operations and meet various other expenses. The military's main centralised commercial venture is its foundation, Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi, which has interests in banking, construction, forestry, real estate, manufacturing and other areas. In addition, each of the services – the army, navy and air force, as well as the police – run centralised commercial cooperatives. Individual units, such as the Kostrad, Kopassus and the regional commands, also sponsor commercial enterprises. Many of these enterprises are managed by ethnic Chinese businesspeople on behalf of the military and, during

³⁵ *Kompas*, 24 May 2000.

³⁶ *Kompas*, 6 May 2000. The estimate in US dollars is very approximate as the exchange rate has been subjected to considerable fluctuation.

the Soeharto period, they received special treatment at the hands of the bureaucracy.³⁷ Since the economic crash in 1997, however, military-backed enterprises have, like most other corporations, been hit hard and some are on the verge of bankruptcy. Others, however, continue to make profits.

In addition, military commanders are experienced in obtaining funds from other sources. It is an open secret that the managers of mines, plantations and industrial enterprises are often pressed to make donations to the military while local commanders often 'hire out' soldiers to protect the premises of commercial enterprises, including brothels, gambling casinos and nightclubs. Military involvement in illegal fishing, illegal mining, smuggling, narcotics and other illegal activities is often reported in the press. It has also been virtually routine for officers to receive substantial kick-backs on purchases of armaments and other military equipment.

A recent highly publicised case provides an illustration of how funds could become available to the military for political purposes. An audit conducted by the newly appointed commander of Kostrad, Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, revealed how his predecessor had, as Chief Commissioner of Mandala Airlines (a company owned by Kostrad's commercial arm) simply withdrawn Rp 135 billion (nearly US\$20 million) from the company on his own authority. The audit also revealed cases where land for soldiers' housing and military equipment had been bought at highly inflated prices, implying kickbacks. That these revelations were not welcome to the military mainstream was demonstrated when the reform-minded Lt. Gen. Agus was quickly dismissed as Kostrad commander after only four months in that position.³⁸

The flow of funds that make up the 75-per cent shortfall in the official military budget provides plenty of opportunities for military officers to divert substantial resources to finance political activities. That the military budget is quite inadequate for normal operations does not mean that military officers lack funds to finance political operations outside the knowledge of the civilian government.

D. Resistance to Government Authority

1. Regional Conflict

Although civilian control of the military seems firmly established at the national level, political observers have identified indications that government policies are sometimes ignored or distorted at the local level, particularly in regions affected by insurgency or other conflict. These indications of insubordination are, of course, not easy to prove but they are so widely believed that it is difficult to dismiss them as mere rumour. It is also difficult to determine whether military actions in the regions are in implementation of policies laid down by the military headquarters in Jakarta or are taken on the initiative of local commanders. It is also possible – and widely believed – that some military officers are still responsive to pressures emanating from retired officers opposed to the Abdurrahman government. As the recently retired Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, explained, 'alliances are always changing. It depends on the development of networks of money, loyalties, and personal obligations to old leaders'. Speaking of 'the lieutenant-colonel, the

³⁷ See Indria Samego et. al., *Bila ABRI Berbisnis* (Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).

³⁸ *Tempo*, 13 August 2000.

major, the sergeant,' he said, 'we don't know exactly the direction of their loyalties'.³⁹

For example, military officers in Aceh are critical of the government's approach to separatist forces led by the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). It is no secret that the military would prefer that a military emergency be declared in that province to provide a 'legal umbrella' to allow them to take more drastic action to defeat the insurgency. The military claims that in the present atmosphere soldiers might be vulnerable to human-rights charges if they take what they consider to be necessary military action. The government, however, mindful of the massive human-rights violations perpetrated by the military in Aceh both during the last decade of Soeharto's rule and after his fall, has been unwilling to give the military a longer leash. That military officers might have different views to the government should not in itself be a matter of concern but there is a widespread perception that elements in the military might be encouraging violent incidents in order to strengthen their case for the application of emergency law. It also seems that many military officers were opposed to the government's moves to open negotiations with representatives of GAM. When the acting State Secretary, Bondan Gunawan, met a GAM military leader in a rebel-held area in March 2000, police troops conducted a 'sweeping' operation in the vicinity which many saw as designed to aggravate the strong suspicions already held by GAM members and thus obstruct the possibility of peace talks.⁴⁰ When the peace negotiations were eventually held and produced an agreement for what was called a 'humanitarian pause' in the conflict, violent incidents continued to take place which, according to some observers, may have been provoked by elements within the military in order to sabotage the agreement.

Similar suspicions are common in regard to the conflict in Maluku.⁴¹ The civil conflict in Maluku arose from a complex combination of religious, ethnic, economic, political and historical factors and cannot be explained simply in terms of military provocation. But it is widely believed that elements in the military have fanned the flames of conflict for their own reasons. One particular development during the first part of 2000 has boosted these suspicions. During the early part of the year the level of conflict seemed to have subsided until May when about two thousand or so members of the Laskar Jihad arrived in Maluku from Java. The Laskar Jihad is a radical Muslim organisation based in Java which openly calls for jihad against Christians in Maluku. After obtaining military training in Bogor, not far from Jakarta, Laskar Jihad members managed to make their way to Surabaya where they embarked on ships that took them to Maluku. Following their arrival, the level of fighting increased sharply. Before their departure for Maluku, President Abdurrahman himself had ordered that they be arrested if they tried to go to Maluku but no attempt was made by either the police or the army to stop them. And, as the Minister of Defence has revealed, containers of arms were awaiting them when they reached Ambon.⁴² Moreover, in the renewed fighting, they seem to have been assisted by at least some military forces, including troops from Kostrad. (It should also be noted that other troops, especially from the police, seem to have sided with Christians fighters). The questions that arise include: who gave the Laskar Jihad their military training? how were they able to travel from

³⁹ *Panji Masyarakat*, 2 August 2000.

⁴⁰ *Kompas*, 21 March 2000.

⁴¹ See ICG Briefing, 'Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: the Issues', 19 July 2000.

⁴² *Jakarta Post*, 15 July 2000.

Jakarta to Surabaya and then to Maluku without hindrance from the police and military? and who supplied the containers of arms that awaited them in Maluku?

Another example can be found in West Timor. The links between Indonesian military officers and the pro-Indonesian militias that destroyed much of Dili and other towns in East Timor in September 1999 are well known. Following the defeat of the pro-Indonesia camp in the referendum on independence, these militias crossed into West Timor where they continue to dominate refugee camps in Kupang and on the East Timor border. When President Abdurrahman visited East Timor in February 2000 and apologised to the people for the events of the past, militia incursions across the border into East Timor increased markedly, apparently in protest against the president's conciliatory attitude.⁴³ Armed militia groups have continued to control refugee camps and prevent refugees from returning to East Timor. And, in August 2000 armed militia members forced UNHCR staff to evacuate their offices on the border. While the military and police have taken some steps to curb the militias, they seem unwilling to take firm action to remove the militias from the border region. Once again important questions arise: why, after almost one year, are militias continuing in effect to control refugee camps and why are armed militia incursions continuing to take place into East Timor?

How can we explain the apparent unwillingness of the security forces to carry out their duties in these cases?

The least worrying explanation in the Maluku and West Timor cases is that the military and police are reluctant to take action that could provoke even wider violence. If action had been taken, for example, in Surabaya to detain members of the Laskar Jihad, other Muslims organisations may have come to their defence with the risk that firm action might have resulted in significant casualties. Both police and TNI commanders in Surabaya may have preferred to 'export' the problem to Maluku than to have blood on their own hands in Surabaya. Similar considerations may have been present in West Timor. Any attempt to clear the refugee camps of armed militia members would most likely be resisted with the result that casualties might easily involve not just militia members and police personnel but also refugees. In the case of the 'sweeping' operation conducted immediately after Bondan Gunawan's talks with the GAM leaders, the most benign explanation was that of the police chief who claimed that there had been a 'misunderstanding'.⁴⁴

A more worrying explanation focuses on the motives of local military units. In West Timor, the militia units grew out of bodies formed by Kopassus officers, including then Colonel Prabowo Subianto, in the mid-1990s. As allies of the Indonesian forces in East Timor, the militias enjoyed the strong sympathy of Indonesian military and police officers. It is, therefore, not surprising that Indonesian commanders are reluctant to order their troops into action against people they consider as loyal friends. Indeed, many military officers believe that these loyal friends were betrayed by Indonesia. In the case of the Laskar Jihad, too, it is possible that some Muslim officers sympathise with their desire to protect Muslims in Maluku from Christian aggression, just as Christian officers sympathise with their co-religionists. Other local motives could also come into play. As noted above,

⁴³ A UN official noted 14 incursions in the weeks after the president's apology on 29 February 2000. *Gamma*, 21 March 2000.

⁴⁴ The National Police Chief, Lt. Gen. Rusdihardjo said 'It was just a misunderstanding'. He added that 'The operation should not have been conducted directly after the meeting. They did not ask for permission from their superiors'. *Jakarta Post*, 22 March 2000.

Indonesian military and police personnel are very poorly paid and are therefore forced to supplement their meagre incomes from other sources. It is often claimed that military units exploit the opportunities available in disturbed regions to supplement their incomes, especially by offering protection services. In Aceh it is widely believed that military elements share in the profits of the trade in ganja. According to this view, the source of the problem is not in Jakarta but among local units with their own motives.

The third explanation is the most worrying. It is widely believed in political circles that much social conflict in Indonesia is manipulated by elite groups to serve their own interests. One common version of this view – supported by former Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono – is that ethnic and religious conflict is sponsored by people close to former President Soeharto and his family as a means to counter popular demands that he be put on trial for corruption.⁴⁵ In another version, President Abdurrahman tends to blame rival politicians aiming to destabilise his government for such conflict.⁴⁶ Yet another version sees the military 'old guard', both active and retired, as promoting violence in order to remind the people that the military is still needed as a major component of the government to maintain stability and prevent national disintegration. The common theme in these theories is the claim that elite interests in Jakarta continue to influence military officers in the field through the exploitation of old loyalties and the deployment of virtually unlimited funds.

It is, of course, very difficult to assess these explanations in the absence of convincing evidence. On the other hand, these opinions are so widely held – in elite circles as well as among ordinary people – that it is difficult to dismiss them out of hand.

2. Resistance to Government Authority: The Issue Of Impunity

One area where military resistance to government authority is obvious is in the field of human rights. An important test of the government's capacity to assert its authority will lie in its ability to demand accountability for human-rights abuses. So far some junior officers and soldiers have been prosecuted for human-rights violations but no senior officer has yet been brought to court.

During most of the Soeharto era, the military was largely immune to charges of human-rights violation. Whether repressing rebellion in the periphery or dissidence in the centre, the military usually felt free to use whatever methods were needed to achieve their immediate objectives. In the 1990s, however, increasing international pressure, as well as domestic concern, forced the government to take action against soldiers or policemen involved in gross human-rights violations. Starting with the court-martialing of junior officers responsible for shooting demonstrators in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991, military personnel occasionally faced military courts in cases that involved the killing of civilians. But, often accused only of failing to observe 'standard procedures', they usually received sentences that seemed extraordinarily light.

Following the fall of the Soeharto government, international and domestic pressure increased. In 1998, eleven members of the elite Kopassus – the most senior of whom was a major – were convicted by a military court of kidnapping radical

⁴⁵ *Panji Masyarakat*, 2 August 2000.

⁴⁶ *Tempo*, 10 July 2000.

activists and in early 1999 another major was convicted of leading a group of soldiers who beat prisoners to death in Aceh. During 1999, the Habibie government established commissions to enquire into human-rights abuses in Aceh and East Timor – the latter under the threat of the possible establishment of an international war crimes tribunal. The Aceh enquiry identified five clearcut cases which were ready for prosecution while the East Timor enquiry recommended that more than thirty officers, including the then TNI Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, should be further investigated with a view to eventual prosecution.

After many delays, the first trial in Aceh resulted in the conviction in May 2000 of 24 army personnel – the highest ranking officer being a captain – and a civilian for the killing of a pro-separatist religious teacher and more than fifty of his followers.⁴⁷ The soldiers, however, claimed that they had only been following the orders of their commanding officer, Lt. Col. Sudjono, but Sudjono had somehow 'disappeared' before the trial began. The 'disappearance' of Sudjono meant that it was impossible to link higher-ranking officers to the case. Meanwhile the other four priority cases have not yet been brought to court, let alone the many other cases mentioned in the commission's report. In the case of East Timor, investigations are continuing slowly. Many human-rights lawyers, however, are sceptical about whether senior officers can be brought to trial under the current law which applies only to the direct perpetrators of crimes and does not recognise 'crimes of omission'. It is possible that ordinary soldiers, like those in Aceh, could be convicted for their actions in East Timor but senior officers might escape unless it could be shown that they directly ordered the commission of crimes. Meanwhile a proposed new human-rights law, which covers 'crimes of omission' and includes a retroactive provision was made inapplicable to East Timor when the MPR, at its session in August 2000, accepted a proposal from the TNI to include 'freedom from retroactive prosecution' in a constitutional amendment on human rights. To many observers, this constitutional amendment seemed designed to prevent the prosecution of senior military officers. It should be remembered, however, that the retroactive provision also caused concern in legal circles as well as among civilians who perhaps feared that investigations might even extend back to the anti-communist massacres of the mid-1960s.

Nevertheless several investigations into past military abuses are in progress. In one case, senior retired military officers are being investigated about their roles in the attack on the headquarters of the Indonesian National Party (PDI) in July 1996 while a new investigation has begun on the basis of an enquiry by the National Human Rights Commission into the shooting of dozens of demonstrators at Jakarta's port, Tanjung Priok, in 1984. In these enquiries, and also the enquiries into Aceh and East Timor, the Indonesian public has witnessed a succession of previously 'untouchable' military officers being called for intensive interrogation by civilian authorities. Among these retired officers have been all but one of the Commanders-in-Chief since 1983.⁴⁸ Whatever the eventual outcome, these enquiries, however limited or unfinished, have resulted in further discrediting of the military as a political actor.

The moves to make military officers accountable for human-rights violations, however, have not progressed far. There is a general scepticism about whether

⁴⁷ *Jakarta Post*, 19 May 2000.

⁴⁸ They are Generals Benny Murdani (1983-88), Try Sutrisno (1988-1993, also Vice President, 1993-98), Feisal Tanjung (1993-1998) and Wiranto (1998-99). The exception is General Edi Sudradjat who held the office for only a few months in 1993.

investigations will lead to trials and convictions of the senior officers regarded as ultimately responsible for the behaviour of their troops. This scepticism has increased after the adoption of the constitutional amendment on non-retrospectivity, which will prevent prosecution for acts committed before new human rights tribunals come into existence. Further, the 'disappearance' of Lt. Col. Sudjono seems inexplicable in the absence of connivance on the part of some elements within the military and strongly suggests that the TNI as an institution might not be fully committed to cleansing itself of those involved in major abuses. There has been no public indication that the top military leadership has taken action, for example, against officers who might be suspected of facilitating Sudjono's 'disappearance'.

The slow pace of the government's enquiries into past human-rights abuses and its failure so far to prosecute senior officers suggests that it is wary about pushing the military to the point where it could lead to open resistance. Government leaders do not seem to have made a serious attempt to defeat the constitutional amendment providing protection against retrospective prosecution. It is probably true that some officers are not especially disturbed by the possibility of legal action against senior officers whom they consider to have been responsible for giving the military a bad name. But at the same time many officers who had participated in what, according to the standards of the past, were 'normal' operations may now feel vulnerable to further enquiries. The ambiguity of the government's position is illustrated by the President's promise to grant pardons to former Commanders-in-Chief of the TNI who are found guilty of human-rights abuse. The government's reluctance to risk provoking the military is an indication of the TNI's residual political influence.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The TNI's political position has been transformed in ways that seemed unimaginable before the fall of Soeharto's New Order in May 1998. The military no longer enjoys a privileged status in the government with special access to the president. It no longer claims the special rights inherent in the Dwifungsi doctrine and it publicly acknowledges civilian supremacy. Active military personnel are no longer appointed to government positions and the military's links with the Golkar party have been severed. It is no longer entrusted with primary responsibility for internal security although it is still involved in operations in disturbed regions. Of crucial importance, military officers are no longer 'untouchable' and military abuses are regularly exposed in the press and the parliament although senior officers still seem to enjoy immunity from human-rights prosecutions.

Despite the drastic decline in its political influence, the military – especially the army – retains several mechanisms through which it could reassert itself in the future:

- Through its territorial structure, the army maintains military units in every province, district and sub-district throughout Indonesia. This provides it with the means to influence political developments at every level of government. As long as this territorial structure remains in place, the army has a mechanism that could be activated to serve political ends.

- The TNI, especially the army, is still strongly represented in the state and military intelligence agencies which continue to focus on domestic political and social affairs.
- The TNI, through business enterprises and other means, raises funds to cover around 75 per cent of its expenditures. These fund-raising activities are generally not subject to public scrutiny. This gives military commanders access to large sums of money that could be used to finance future political manoeuvres.

There are also signs that military officers – either on their own initiative or on instructions from higher levels in the military hierarchy – have sometimes engaged in activities that seem designed to undermine the authority of the elected government:

- There are some indications of military resistance to government policy, especially in regions experiencing disturbed security conditions, such as Aceh, Maluku, West Timor and Irian Jaya.
- Although not proven, it is widely believed in political circles – including at the highest levels in the government – that some retired officers continue to influence serving officers to carry out activities – including the fanning of social conflict – aiming to undermine the stability of civilian government.
- The military seems to be delaying and obstructing the holding of trials of officers accused of violation of human rights.

Despite the presence of remnants of the New Order system, the TNI at present is in no position to regain political power. However, the full consolidation of democracy will require the dissolution, or at least drastic re-orientation, of the territorial network, the civilianisation of the domestic intelligence agencies, the regularisation of military finances, and the establishment of military cohesion and discipline. It will also require the formulation of an unambiguous doctrine supporting civilian supremacy.

The basic measures that ICG believes need to be taken to support the maintenance of constitutional government, and the current commitment of the TNI to avoid direct political involvement, are set out below. They are practical measures aimed at restraining the capacity of the military, or elements within it, to challenge and frustrate government policies by unconstitutional means. The emphasis here is on the direction of the necessary responses rather than their administrative detail: future ICG reports on the military will address such issues as the role of the military and police in internal security operations, military power at the local level, and the politics of military reform.

Some of our recommendations require action by the military alone, but for the most part what is required is a cooperative relationship between the government and military – with the civilian government playing the leadership role. There are roles in the process of military reform for many actors – the President and his ministers, the legislatures, and the civilian political forces, as well as the military itself. But basic questions about the functioning of the military should not be decided by the military alone, simply because these matters are of fundamental importance for the nation as a whole. The ultimate goal in a democratic society

must always be the achievement of full democratic control over military affairs by the civilian government.

Doctrine

The TNI's doctrines are now undergoing significant change. In the new circumstances, the TNI has abandoned its old Dwifungsi doctrine and progressed well beyond the ideas contained in the New Paradigm of 1998. However, the process of rethinking the proper role of the military in a democratic environment has not been completed.

It is important that the TNI's formal doctrine explicitly acknowledge civilian supremacy and limit the military's role to its professional duties. Among other issues that need to be made clear is the distinction between the concepts of defence (now the responsibility of the TNI) and internal security (now the formal responsibility of the police). The doctrine of Sishankamrata, which underlies the territorial structure of the army, also needs reconsideration in an era when the threat of enemy invasion and occupation is not a high priority

It is not appropriate in a democratic society for the military to have unilateral authority to determine its own doctrine. Civilian institutions – the government and the legislative bodies – have the responsibility in the new democratic atmosphere to contribute to the revision of military doctrine. The Department of Defence has recently prepared a draft of a new National Defence Bill that is soon to be debated in the DPR. The members of the DPR are urged to make the most of this opportunity to carry out their responsibilities in shaping future military doctrine.

Military Representation in Legislatures

In most democracies all seats in legislatures are filled by popular election. In some cases, however, special seats are reserved for under-privileged groups or minorities. The TNI does not fall into this category. The representation of the military in the legislatures is a legacy of the authoritarian Soeharto era and is due to end in 2004 for the DPR and DPRD's and, following a recent decree of the MPR, in 2009 for the MPR.

Although continued representation conflicts with the TNI's rejection of a political role, its leaders argue that it needs to be represented in the MPR because military personnel are prohibited from voting in elections. The recent MPR decree was in fact adopted on the basis of the short-term political calculations of political parties and has disappointed democratic opinion. Critics argue that the decree sends 'the wrong message' to the TNI and to society in general. It would be advisable to reinforce the pressure for the military to withdraw fully from formal political activity. This pressure would be enhanced if the MPR rescinded the decree and the DPR amended legislation that prevents military personnel from exercising their democratic right to vote.

Territorial Structure

As long as the army's territorial structure is intact, the democratisation process will be vulnerable to military pressure or intervention at the regional and local levels. Democracy, in the long run, will be strengthened if the territorial structure is dismantled or transformed. The question of the army's territorial structure,

therefore, is not just an internal military issue but one for the government also. The government is advised – in co-operation with the military – to formulate a strategy to reduce the capacity of the territorial structure to exert political pressure at the local level.

It needs to be understood by the international community that it is not a simple matter to reform such an established structure. There seem to be few viable alternatives to a gradual approach that would see the steady contraction of the territorial system by natural attrition as soldiers eventually retire from active service. At the same time some territorial functions should be taken over by the police. This process could be faster if general economic recovery could provide attractive employment opportunities in the civilian sector but in the short term the prospects of rapid economic growth seem dim.

Domestic Intelligence

The withdrawal of the military from political involvement requires its withdrawal, as an institution, from responsibility for domestic intelligence. As a defence force, it is appropriate for the TNI's intelligence functions to be restricted to defence-oriented intelligence. The civilianisation of domestic intelligence is a necessary aspect of democratisation and the withdrawal of the military from politics. To achieve this goal, the government, with the co-operation of the TNI, will need to present new legislation for consideration by the DPR.

Military Finance

One of the most fundamental obstacles to the professionalisation of the TNI is the huge gap between minimum requirements and available funds. As long as the state budget supplies only 25-30 per cent of required funds, military units will continue to seek funding from other sources. This opens up the possibility that military commanders can gain access to large sums of money that could be used to finance political operations.

It is therefore necessary for the government to ensure that non-budgetary funds are properly supervised and audited by an agency, such as the State Auditing Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), outside the military itself. This process has begun but has met with considerable resistance from within the military. In the long run, of course, the solution is for the government to provide 100 per cent of the military's budget but that is an impossible objective in present economic circumstances.

Military Discipline and Cohesion

Indications of military resistance to government authority at the regional level are in most cases probably, although not certainly, more a consequence of weak command structures and fragmentation rather than deliberate policy determined at the TNI headquarters. It is therefore important that the process of military professionalisation should continue and that the chain of command is capable of imposing discipline on recalcitrant officers. It is especially crucial to avoid a situation where active military officers respond to pressures from retired officers or other political interests outside the military hierarchy. This is primarily a responsibility of the military leadership itself.

Accountability

It is important that the military takes firm measures to prevent the violation of human rights by military personnel. If the virtual impunity of senior officers to charges of human-rights violation continues, it will be extremely difficult to convince future generations that they must be accountable for illegal actions. Civilian supremacy will be undermined if the TNI appears to be protecting from prosecution those of its members accused of gross human-rights violations.

International Support for Civilian Government

The best guarantee against the return of the military to direct participation in the government continues to be, in Indonesia as elsewhere, strong and effective civilian institutions. If civilian government is successful, the military is not likely to challenge civilian authority.

In the short-run, one of the most powerful disincentives to military takeovers of governments lies in economic sanctions and embargoes on military purchases. However, more subtle measures are needed to encourage the military to accept a non-political role and to deal with political assertiveness that falls short of a military coup. The application of economic pressure or arms embargoes in order to reach certain specific targets can have a positive effect in some cases (e.g. militia incursions into East Timor) but can be counter-productive in other cases. Policies in this area cannot be determined a priori but require sensitivity to particular circumstances and possible unintended consequences.

More routine programs are also helpful but cannot be expected to bring immediate results. Military exchange programs and military education are important means of providing Indonesian military officers with alternative perspectives on the military's functions in democratic societies. It would also be valuable to provide opportunities for members of the DPR's Commission One (which deals with defence and security issues, among others) to make exchange visits to members of similar parliamentary commissions and committees in other democratic countries.

Glossary of Acronyms and Indonesian Terms

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa (Village Guidance NCO) Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (State Auditing Agency)
BAIS	Badan Intelijen Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
Bakin	Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency)
Bakorstanas	Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (Coordinating Agency to Support the Maintenance of National Stability)
BIA	Badan Intelijen Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency)
Bupati	District Head
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional House of Representatives)
Dwifungsi	Dual Function
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Freedom Movement)
Kabupaten	District
Kecamatan	Sub-district
Keppres	Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decision)
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
Kodim	Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
Koramil	Komando Rayon Militer (Sub-district Military Command)
Korem	Komando Resor Militer (Sub-regional Military Command)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces)
Kostrad	Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
Laskar Jihad	Islamic Fighters
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
Nahdatul Ulama	National Awakening (a Muslim organisation)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Sishankamrata	Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Total People's Defence and Security System)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees