

“DERADICALISATION” AND INDONESIAN PRISONS

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“DERADICALISATION” AND INDONESIAN PRISONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Indonesia, like many countries where Islamic jihadi cells have been uncovered, has been experimenting over the last three years with “deradicalisation” programs. While the term is poorly defined and means different things to different people, at its most basic it involves the process of persuading extremists to abandon the use of violence. It can also refer to the process of creating an environment that discourages the growth of radical movements by addressing the basic issues fuelling them, but in general, the broader the definition, the less focused the program created around it. Experience suggests that deradicalisation efforts in Indonesia, however creative, cannot be evaluated in isolation and they are likely to founder unless incorporated into a broader program of prison reform.

One Indonesian initiative, focused on prisoners involved in terrorism, has won praise for its success in persuading about two dozen members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and a few members of other jihadi organisations to cooperate with the police. Key elements are getting to know individual prisoners and responding to their specific concerns, often relating to economic needs of their families, as well as constant communication and attention. One premise is that if through kindness, police can change the jihadi assumption that government officials are by definition *thoghut* (anti-Islamic), the prisoners may begin to question other deeply-held tenets.

Once prisoners show a willingness to accept police assistance, they are exposed to religious arguments against some forms of jihad by scholars whose credentials within the movement are unimpeachable. Some have then accepted that attacks on civilians, such as the first and second Bali bombings and the Australian embassy bombing, were wrong. The economic aid, however, is ultimately more important than religious arguments in changing prisoner attitudes.

The Indonesian program until now has largely been viewed in isolation from other developments and without much questioning about cause and effect. There has been little attempt, for example, to assess whether more people are leaving jihadi organisations than joining them; whether the men joining the program were already disposed to reject bombing as a tactic; or whether the initiative has created any backlash in jihadi ranks. There has been almost no

public discussion about where the appropriate balance should be between leniency toward perpetrators, in an effort to prevent future attacks, and justice for victims.

There has also been insufficient attention to the relationship between the deradicalisation program and the Indonesian corrections system – and the gains of the one can be undermined by the poor performance of the other. Indonesia has some 170 men (no women) currently incarcerated for involvement in jihadi crimes, less than half JI members. About 150 men and one woman have been released after serving sentences for crimes related to terrorist acts, more than 60 in 2006-2007 alone.

Ultimately, the police initiative is aimed at using ex-prisoners as a vanguard for change within their own communities after their release but the task is made infinitely harder by a lax prison regime where jihadi prisoners band together to protect themselves against inmate gangs; where hardcore ideologues can and do recruit ordinary criminals and prison wardens to their cause; and where corruption is so pervasive that it reinforces the idea of government officials as anti-Islamic. In fact, counter-terrorism police do their best to keep jihadi detainees in police holding cells, knowing that as soon as they are transferred to prison, the chances of keeping them on the right track plummet.

Indonesian prison administrators have just begun to be included in counter-terrorism training programs. Their involvement should continue but the problem goes much deeper. Unless prison corruption is tackled, jihadis, like narcotics offenders, murderers, and big-time corruptors, will be able to communicate with anyone they want and get around any regulation designed to restrict their influence over other inmates. Unless prisons get more and better trained staff, they will not be able to address the problem of gangs and protection rackets among inmates that serve to strengthen jihadi solidarity. Unless prison administrators know more about the jihadis in their charge, they will not know what to look for in terms of recruitment – who among ordinary criminal inmates joins jihadi groups, why and for how long – or dissemination of radical teachings. Unless there is better coordination between prison authorities and the counter-terrorism police, they may end up working at cross-purposes.

Prison reform is urgently needed in Indonesia for many different reasons but helping buttress deradicalisation programs is one.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia:

1. Encourage more donors to support an independent needs assessment for Indonesian prisons starting with the major prisons in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Bandung, Semarang, Bali and Makassar, and with particular attention to staff training needs, corruption controls and information management; those undertaking the assessment should make a point of interviewing wardens outside the prison, so they feel less constrained about talking freely, and former inmates.
2. Make reducing corruption in prisons a high priority and in particular:
 - (a) encourage independent and technically proficient audits of the prisons mentioned above, with publication and public discussion of the results;
 - (b) develop an incentive system for whistle-blowers to report on corruption of prison officials and a strict system of sanctions for those found to be skimming from prison contracts or imposing illegal levies on inmates and their families; and
 - (c) work with the University of Indonesia’s Criminology Institute and other academic institutes to conduct confidential interviews with inmates and ex-inmates about corrupt practices in a way that can feed into reform programs.
3. Establish an on-the-job training program for prison administrators designed to improve management practices, supervision of wardens and knowledge of problem inmates.
4. Improve coordination between corrections officials, the courts and the police, particularly in cases of those arrested for terrorism and related crimes, in terms of sharing background information on prisoners and tailoring prison programs and supervision to meet individual needs.

To the Corrections Directorate:

5. Set realistic performance goals for prison administrators and an incentive structure for meeting those goals in the following areas:

- (a) reducing corruption, including in the appointment of prisoner supervisors (*pemuka*) and their assistants (*tamping*);
 - (b) improving reporting and analysis of inmate activities, including meetings and discussions, gang organisation, and businesses activities;
 - (c) inspecting visitors, including searches not just for narcotics, weapons and cash but also for unauthorised printed materials and computer disks;
 - (d) setting up vocational training programs; and
 - (e) enforcing prison regulations including the bans on use of handphones and circulation of cash inside prisons.
6. Develop a manual for prison administrators on dealing with specific categories of prisoners, including those convicted of terrorism and related crimes, and describing what to look for to ensure that prisons do not become bases of jihadi recruitment.

To the Police:

7. Define what goals and benchmarks for success should be for the prisoner-based deradicalisation program and what is needed to achieve them; also conduct an internal evaluation to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the program, why some individuals have refused to join and what impact, if any, the program has had on the overall security threat.
8. Define more clearly, even if only for internal purposes, how the “deradicalised” vanguard can take their message to JI schools and other known places of recruitment.
9. Have a frank discussion, closed if necessary for security purposes but with outsiders present who can offer independent commentary, on the costs of the program, the perceived trade-offs between justice and conflict prevention and whether it is possible to go beyond the highly personal approach taken thus far to institutionalise the program.
10. Pay more attention to the criminal prisoners who become militant jihadis in prison and ensure that they are monitored in the same way as long-term members of jihadi organisations.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 November 2007

“DERADICALISATION” AND INDONESIAN PRISONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Governments around the world are grappling with how to handle prisoners convicted of terrorism. As the British know from Northern Ireland, the choices made can have long-term effects on the political movement the prisoners represent.¹ No country has found the perfect formula. The U.S. has become the poster child of prison abuse and an example of what not to do. France, Spain, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore and some other countries are offering their own models for emulation but it is not clear that they are readily exportable, or in all aspects desirable.

There are two major sets of issues. One relates to prison management. Should terrorists be isolated in a separate block or integrated with other prisoners, and what are the consequences of that choice? What is the appropriate balance between punishment and rehabilitation, between controls strict enough to prevent further recruiting and humane enough to prevent further radicalisation?

A second revolves around deradicalisation, a poorly defined concept but at its most basic, an effort to persuade terrorists and their supporters to abandon the use of violence. Like public diplomacy efforts aimed at “winning hearts and minds”, deradicalisation often seems to be an exercise in wishful thinking, backed by large amounts of funding and a poor knowledge of the networks targeted. It is also a term that can be used to cover everything from inmate counselling to development aid for Islamic schools. The starting point, however, is often prison-based, because prisoners convicted of terrorism are a finite group, a captive audience for different approaches, and once released, a potential vanguard for changing their own organisations and communities from within.

Where innovative deradicalisation initiatives with prisoners are underway, and there are some, they can be undermined by failures of prison management. Indonesia is a particularly interesting case study. It has deeply-rooted home-grown extremist organisations, of which Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is only the best known.² Some 170 men are in custody on

terrorism charges or lesser crimes related to jihadi activity, spread across more than twenty prisons and detention centres. More than 150 men and one woman have been released since 1999 after completing sentences, over 60 in 2006 and 2007 alone; and many others will return home over the next few years.³ Carefully thought-through, prison-based programs could have real payoffs, and the counter-terrorism units of the police have been experimenting with different approaches.⁴

This report is based on interviews with corrections officials, police and former inmates as well as extensive documentary material.

Current Status, 3 May 2007; Asia Report N°114, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*, 5 May 2006; Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005; and Asia Report N°83, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, 13 September 2004.

³ It is sometimes assumed that Indonesia only began arresting terrorist suspects after the October 2002 Bali bombs but in fact several members of a Darul Islam-linked group called AMIN were arrested in 1999 for a series of attacks in Jakarta; several JI members were arrested and tried for the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings and Atrium shopping mall bombing in 2001; and members of the Ring Banten group, linked to Imam Samudra, were arrested in 2001 for conducting military training with illegal weapons in West Java.

⁴ There are two such units. Detachment 88, known by its Indonesian acronym as Densus 88, is part of the formal police structure as a separate directorate (Directorate VI) within the police criminal investigation agency (Badan Reserse Kriminal, Bareskrim). It is led by Bekto Suprpto. The Bomb Task Force, now led by Surya Darma, was set up after the first Bali bombs outside the formal structure, reporting directly to the national police commander. Many arrests of JI leaders, including in March and June 2007, were carried out by the Task Force, though Detachment 88 got the credit. Relations between the two are sometimes strained.

¹ See Section III below.

² For more on Jemaah Islamiyah see among other Crisis Group publications, Asia Briefing N°63, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's*

II. PRISONS IN INDONESIA

Indonesia has some 400 district-level prisons and detention centres, but only about twenty hold more than one or two men convicted of radical Islamic terrorism.⁵ The largest concentration is in Cipinang Prison in Jakarta where some 25 men from the Bali, Marriott and Australian embassy bombings and other incidents are held.⁶ Sixteen others, mostly from the second Bali bombing (Bali II) are held in Kedungpane Prison in Semarang, Central Java. About the same number are held in Kalisosok prison in Porong, outside Surabaya, East Java, most of them convicted for crimes committed in Maluku in 2005; they were transferred from Ambon in late March 2007. Kerobokan prison in Bali holds about a dozen, from Bali I and II. Makassar prison in South Sulawesi holds more than twenty, including those responsible for the December 2002 bombing there of a McDonald’s restaurant and automobile showroom, as well as a 2004 attack on a karaoke cafe in a town to the north.

Some twenty local recruits involved in violence in Poso are spread around several prisons in Central Sulawesi. The three key operatives of the first Bali bombing, who were sentenced to death, are awaiting execution in a maximum security prison on Nusakambangan, off the southern coast of Java.

As of October 2007, government figures showed 124 men imprisoned for terrorism but that figure does not include men arrested but not yet tried; those tried but for various reasons held outside the prison system, for example at Jakarta police headquarters; or jihadis convicted of crimes other than terrorism.⁷ Some of the most important terror

suspects arrested in January, March and June 2007 are detained in police holding centres in Jakarta. About half of those in detention are members of JI; the others are associated with smaller groups such as KOMPAK, Ring Banten, and Laskar Jundullah-Makassar.⁸

A. THE LEGAL REGIME

Indonesia adopted a new law on prisons in 1995, the first major change in prison regulations since 1917. It states that the corrections system is designed to ensure prisoners are aware of their wrongdoing, improve themselves, do not again commit crimes, are received back into their communities, take an active role in development and live freely as upstanding and responsible citizens.⁹ In all subsequent regulations, presidential instructions, ministerial decrees and other materials relating to corrections, the focus on reintegration into the community is paramount.

Prison administration and policies fall under the corrections directorate of the ministry of justice and human rights (hereafter justice ministry). It oversees the prisons, detention centres and “corrections offices” (*balai pemasyarakatan*, BAPAS), which function somewhat like parole boards. Prison directors (*ketua lembaga pemasyarakatan, kalapas*) are civil servants, tasked with overseeing treatment of prisoners and rehabilitation programs, maintaining order, applying disciplinary sanctions as necessary and ensuring prisoners do not escape.¹⁰ The corrections office oversees preparations and programs for pre-release work programs, called assimilation (*assimilasi*); supervised leave pending release (*cuti menjelang pembebasan, CMP*); conditional release (*pembebasan bersyarat, PB*); and full release.

⁵ As of early 2007, there were 207 prisons and 190 detention centres, the latter used for holding suspects before trial or, in some cases, convicted prisoners whose appeals are pending. The only non-Muslims convicted of terrorism are seventeen Christians who murdered two Muslim fish traders in Central Sulawesi in September 2006 in reaction to the judicial execution of three Christians accused of taking part in a massacre of Muslims in Poso in May 2000. They were charged with terrorism rather than murder or manslaughter because the authorities believed that political stability in Poso depended on showing balance in the application of the terrorism law. Crisis Group interview, Central Sulawesi prosecutor, Palu, 2 February 2007.

⁶ The figure is constantly changing, as releases, transfers and new arrests take place. In July 2007, Cipinang had 31 men convicted of terrorism. At least three were released as a result of remissions granted on Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August, including senior JI leader Mustopha alias Abu Tholud and Mohammed Rais, JI’s liaison in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000-2001. Three KOMPAK men were granted conditional release after Idul Fitri in October 2007.

⁷ Crisis Group interview, Director General of Corrections Untung Sugiyono, Jakarta, 29 October 2007. Most of those convicted for

involvement in terrorist acts have been charged either under the 2003 anti-terrorism law or Emergency Law No.12/1951 banning the use, transport or possession of explosives and firearms. In some cases, however, where prosecutors did not think they had a strong enough case for terrorism, they have brought other charges, such as armed robbery, falsification of documents or immigration violations.

⁸ See Appendix B below. None of these smaller organisations have formal institutional links to JI, but there are connections. Members of JI, Ring Banten and Laskar Jundullah used the same training camp in Pendolo, Poso. Some of the original KOMPAK fighters and financiers were also JI members, although over time, the organisations took on distinctly different identities. Ring Banten members worked with JI on Bali I and with Noordin Moh. Top on the Australian Embassy bombing. There is also a small Laskar Jundullah in Solo, Central Java, under the leadership of Moh. Kalono, which sometimes works with local JI members but it has no organizational link to JI.

⁹ Articles 1 and 2, Law 12/1995 on Corrections, 30 December 1995.

¹⁰ Government Regulation 58/1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures Relating to the Authority, Tasks and Responsibilities for Management of Prisoners.

All prison staff are required to respect the human rights of their charges.¹¹ While the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners are not cited per se, they clearly inform Indonesian law, as all prisoners have rights to worship, exercise, opportunities for education, adequate food and medical care. They are entitled to visits from family, personal physicians, legal advisers, clerics, teachers and members of social welfare organisations, and they retain all political rights. While they are allowed books and other publications consistent with the prison program and access to electronic media, the prison director must give permission for prisoners to bring or have brought into the prison printed material as well as radios, televisions or other means of obtaining access to the mass media.¹² In practice, for a fee, prisoners can get access to almost anything. Prison officials also have the right to inspect or search visitors and their belongings.¹³

The structure of a prisoner’s trajectory from arrival to release is set forth in a separate regulation, with the focus on guiding an offender to become a better person.¹⁴ Remissions or reductions in sentences are available to prisoners with a record of good conduct, although being well-heeled is often more important than being well-behaved. After a public outcry in Indonesia over remissions for ex-president Soeharto’s youngest son Tommy (convicted of contracting the murder of a judge) and abroad, particularly in Australia, over those for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and other JI inmates, the justice ministry amended the rules in 2006 and again in 2007.

Ordinary criminals can now get remissions after the first six months of their sentences, but those arrested for terrorism, narcotics offences, corruption, state security crimes and serious human rights violations are not eligible until they have served one third of their sentence and then only through the formal decision of the justice minister.¹⁵ They are eligible for *assimilasi* after serving two thirds

of their sentence – although prisoners sentenced on terrorism charges rarely take part in such programs.¹⁶

The transfer of prisoners from one prison to another, for security or other reasons, can take place with the permission of the justice ministry’s provincial office, if within a province, or of the director-general of corrections if from one province to another. Families must be informed, and the prisoner must be given at least one day’s notice of the move.¹⁷ Prisoners convicted of terrorism most often have been moved to reduce the potential for recruiting but sometimes to improve surveillance and control, sometimes as a punishment, to separate one group of prisoners from another and sometimes as a reward, to bring a prisoner closer to his family.

B. PRISON ORGANISATION

A critical factor affecting prisoners is their own hierarchy. Prisoners who have served part of their sentences and are trusted by prison authorities can be given positions that bring privileges: better food, better facilities, opportunities for making money or all the above. All prisons have a system of cell leaders (*ketua kamar*) who report to block leaders (*ketua blok*). Individual cells are rare; the norm is a large room housing twenty or more men, and many prisons, particularly those on Java, are seriously overcrowded.¹⁸ Better housing can be had for a price. Cipinang, the main prison in Jakarta, is said to operate like a hotel, with “Super VIP”, VIP, deluxe and standard cells, each with its price.¹⁹

The cell leader is often a thug who collects regular payments from the inmates under his control, controls distribution of goods and hires other prisoners to do his washing and cleaning and provide other services, sometimes sexual.²⁰ A block is usually one wing of a building that may house

¹¹ Ibid, Article 4(2).

¹² Ibid, Articles 35-36.

¹³ Ibid, Article 39.

¹⁴ Ibid. A prisoner’s sentence is divided into three parts. The first stage is from arrival through the end of the first third of the sentence, with the first month of that period focused on observation and getting to know the prisoner. The second stage ends when half the sentence has been served. The third stage ends when two thirds of the sentence has been completed. At that point the pre-release programs begin, under the supervision of the corrections station. The exact nature of a prisoner’s program is based on the report of a team within the corrections office (Articles 9-11).

¹⁵ Government Regulation 28/2006 on Amendments to Government Regulation 32/1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights. This was further amended in a circular dated 5 October 2007 from the corrections directorate.

¹⁶ Government Regulation 28/2006, Articles 36-43.

¹⁷ Government Regulation 31/1999 on Guidance of Prisoners (*Pembinaan dan Pembimbingan Warga Binaan Pemasyarakatan*), 19 May 1999, Article 53.

¹⁸ According to the ministry of justice and human rights, Indonesian prisons in 2006 had a capacity for 70,241 inmates and were holding 116,688. See www.depkmham.go.id/xdepkmhamweb/xunit/xditjenpemasy/statistik.htm. Cirebon narcotics prison, with a capacity of 360, was holding 1,143 inmates; Paledang prison in Bogor, West Java, with a capacity of 500, had 1,639; and Cipinang in Jakarta, with a capacity of 1,500, had 3,800. See “Baseline Survey Penerapan Konsep Pemasyarakatan di Lembaga Pemasyarakatan” (Baseline Survey on the Application of the Concept of Corrections in Prisons), Partnership for Governance Reform, June 2007, p. 50.

¹⁹ “Menanggung Untung dari Bang Napi”, *Trust*, vol. 7, no. 44, pp. 11-13.

²⁰ The system of cell and block leaders is the same in detention centres (*rutan*) and prisons, and in men’s and women’s prisons. See “Rutan Tak Lagi ‘Hotel Prodeo’”, *Kompas*, 21 April 2007.

six or eight cells. The block leader controls other prisoners, often demanding cuts of whatever largesse is brought by visitors. He reports to a prisoner serving as security supervisor (*pemuka keamanan*), as well as to the relevant warden (*sipir*).

Prisoners can be appointed to other supervisory roles in relation to prison industries, administration, education, the health clinic or other areas – even parking, for particularly trusted individuals, because it gets them beyond prison walls.²¹ Supervisors (*pemuka*) are officially entitled to sentence reductions of a third more than ordinary prisoners. Each *pemuka* can be assisted by up to three people known as *tamping*.²² In some prisons, a *tamping* takes prisoners from their cell to the visiting area to meet friends or relatives, collecting fees for every gate that the prisoner has to pass through; in Cipinang Prison, this may be as many as five, with the prisoner paying Rp.5,000 or 10,000 (\$0.50 or \$1) each time.²³ The *tamping* then shares the take with the block leader or *pemuka* or others more senior to him in the prisoner hierarchy as well as the wardens.

At the same time, relatives visiting a prisoner often have to pay the *tamping* as well as prison officials to get in and out, with the fee depending on whether they use the regular visiting area or a more comfortable room, after normal visiting hours. The price for the latter can be up to Rp.200,000 (\$20) per visit.²⁴ Another prisoner is designated the mosque escort (*tamping mesjid*), accompanying prisoners from their cell for Friday prayers. Each *tamping* in turn can employ four or five other prisoners.

Because the *pemuka* and *tamping* roles are sources of cash, prisoners often have to pay to get appointed. The going rate for a *pemuka* position in Cipinang in 2007 was reportedly about Rp.3 million (\$300), paid to prison officials, and the number of positions had proliferated. There was not only a mosque supervisor, for example, but also a mosque cleaning supervisor.²⁵

The head of corrections said he could understand the incentive to become a *pemuka*, because the remissions process was accelerated, but there was no such incentive

for a *tamping*, and therefore he doubted that position could be bought and sold.²⁶ But once designated a *tamping*, a prisoner can usually be assured of a mattress rather than a woven straw mat to sleep on; a cell shared by four or five rather than twenty; better food; and likely promotion to *pemuka*.²⁷ There is thus a strong incentive for families and friends to purchase these positions, and convicted terrorists have as much access to them as anyone else.

One of the biggest sources of corruption in many prisons is food. The prison normally contracts with a caterer at a fixed price per meal per prisoner, with skimming done by both the caterer and the prison. A trusted prisoner who is designated chief cook can take the supplies coming in and hoard them, selling additional portions of meat, for example, to those who can pay. The cuts in meal portions (*jatah makanan*) are often serious enough that prisoners have to rely on additional meals brought in by relatives – putting those detained far from home at a distinct disadvantage unless they have other sources of cash. In 2006, the going rate for a decent meal at Jakarta’s Cipinang Prison was Rp.300,000 (about \$30) a month; alternatively prisoners could pay a *tamping* about the same amount and get a small stove so they could cook for themselves. One ex-prisoner said the *tamping* just collected the money to hand over to a prison official.²⁸

Because convicted terrorists often have external sources of funding from individual donors or sympathetic organisations, their ability to secure better food is an incentive in itself for other criminals to join them. One tactic of police to ingratiate themselves with detained jihadists is to see that they at least have access to good rice three times a day.

Protection rackets are also a common feature of Indonesian prisons. It is routine for a new arrival to be beaten up by other prisoners in his cell as a kind of hazing ritual. It can usually be avoided for a price. Relatives of well-off prisoners often become extortion targets, told that their loved ones will be the worse for it unless they pay, with the resulting funds going to individual prison officials and their inmate partners.²⁹ The venality of many prison employees

²¹ The *pemuka* role is outlined in a 1964 circular from the corrections directorate (then called *direktorat jenderal bina tuma warga*), number JH 1/2049, 16 December 1964. The information on the parking *pemuka* comes from a former inmate.

²² Circular JH 1/2049, op. cit. The word *tamping* is from the Javanese meaning “foreman” but inmates interviewed thought it was an acronym for *tahanan pendamping* (prisoner escort).

²³ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Bogor and Jakarta, September 2007; and “1,001 Pungutan di LP Cipinang”, *Kompas*, 25 April 2006.

²⁴ “1001 Pungutan di LP Cipinang”, *Kompas*, 25 April 2006.

²⁵ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Jakarta, September 2007.

²⁶ Crisis Group interview, Director General of Corrections Untung Sugiyono, Jakarta, 29 October 2007.

²⁷ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Palu, July 2007.

²⁸ “1,001 Pungutan di LP Cipinang”, *Kompas*, 25 April 2006; and Crisis Group interview, former inmate, Jakarta, September 2007.

²⁹ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Jakarta and Bogor, September 2007. An article in a Jakarta business magazine on corruption in Cipinang Prison includes an interview with a prison official who says collusion between officials and prisoners is a direct result of the emotional bond developed over the years between them. See “Bisnis Timbul dari Hubungan Emosional”, *Trust*, vol. iv, no. 44 (August 2006), pp. 14-20.

serves to reinforce a standard jihadi premise that Indonesian officials are *thoghut*.

Money thus affects everything that takes place in prison. Under a 2004 regulation, a chit system was supposed to have replaced cash.³⁰ In practice it has made little difference in the prison economy. Cash remains essential to survival, and the influential prisoner – whether drug dealer, corruptor or terrorist – is one who can keep it flowing. This also means that jihadi organisational hierarchies can be affected by money. In Cipinang, a JI leader named Adung, who was briefly caretaker leader (*amir*) of the entire organisation in 2003, was said to be losing influence because he had no steady income source.³¹

C. GANGS AND VIOLENCE

The dynamics of prison life are also related to the inmates' social organisation, particularly gangs. Each prison differs in this respect but in Cipinang the group that long dominated was Gang Arek, composed of ethnic Javanese criminals, mostly from East Java. One inmate estimated that some 70 per cent of Cipinang inmates belonged to Gang Arek. Through July 2007, they controlled much of the internal prison economy and dominated the *pemuka* positions. Second in influence was Gang Korea from Sumatra, mostly the cities of Medan and Palembang and mostly ethnic Batak.

Until 2000, Gang Arek controlled most of the illegal levies inside Cipinang; Gang Korea gained control of the business briefly after the then Gang Arek leader and convicted murderer, Pak De, was released.³² In 2001, however, Gang Arek took it back and ruled Cipinang more or less unchallenged until mid-2007, under the direction, since 2003, of Sukamat alias Monte, 37, a Surabaya native serving a twelve-year sentence for robbery and murder.

To resist the depredations of these two gangs, all the jihadis in Cipinang – from JI, KOMPAK, and various Darul Islam factions – joined forces; to other prisoners they became known as the “Ustadz Gang” (the gang of Islamic scholars),

and they were treated with respect because they were seen as standing up not just to Gang Arek but also to the Indonesian government and the U.S.³³ By mid-2007 rifts were emerging among the “ustadz” over personal issues, but it was clear these would be papered over if there was a need to stand together to resist extortion and physical attacks.³⁴

Exactly how urgent that need was became apparent in July 2007. Tensions between Gang Arek and the ustadz had been building since Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's release in June 2006. As long as Ba'asyir was present, according to one inmate, Gang Arek left the other jihadis alone, apparently out of respect for the older man. But after he left, the younger, more strong-willed jihadis refused to pay the fees that the Arek thugs levied for passing through gates to see visitors. They also resisted when Gang Arek demanded to have the contributions collected for the small mosque (*musholla*) the jihadis used within one of the Arek-controlled blocks.

To punish this resistance, Arek decided to strike. On 8 July dozens of men reportedly armed with knives, swords and other weapons and led by Monte and two other Arek leaders, Wili and Slamet, entered the mosque and attacked six men, mostly from KOMPAK, who were praying. The six managed to fend off the attackers, and their prestige soared accordingly. (Prison authorities did nothing; they were said to be afraid of Gang Arek.)

A few jihadis discussed possible retaliation, including by building alliances with other, smaller gangs inside Cipinang. Before they could do anything, however, other forces intervened. On the morning of 31 July, Monte and Slamet were killed inside their cell by several dozen Gang Korea members armed with machetes in what appears to have been a battle for control of the internal narcotics trade.

Monte reportedly had been demanding that prison authorities move the Gang Korea leader (Bosar, the Indonesian acronym for Big Boss, *bos besar*), to Nusakambangan, the prison off the coast of south Java where top narcotics dealers are supposed to be held – and where Bali bombers Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlis are also detained. Bosar was reportedly making so much from the drug trade inside Cipinang that he was encroaching on Monte's power.³⁵ He also had allied with

³⁰ Surat Edaran Direktorat Jendral Pemasarakatan nomor E.PR.06.10-70 Tahun 2004 Tentang Bebas Peredaran Uang (BPU).

³¹ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Jakarta, September 2007. The need for cash does not stop with release. One JI member on conditional release in early 2007 was being followed everywhere by a parole officer on a motorcycle. The officer asked the ex-prisoner to pay for his gas.

³² Mohammad Siradjuddin, alias Pak De, a retired army officer, was convicted in the 1985 murder of a pregnant fashion model, Dietje, who was rumoured to be a lover of one of Soeharto's sons. He was released in December 2000 after serving fourteen years of a twenty-year sentence.

³³ Crisis Group interviews, former inmates, Jakarta, July 2007.

³⁴ One of these rifts involved a married prisoner who took a second wife, the sister of a fellow inmate, while he was in prison. He was immediately ostracised, in part because other prisoners felt that if there were women available within their circle, the bachelor prisoners should be given priority to wed. (Conjugal visits are available at Cipinang for an hourly fee.)

³⁵ One article quoted an unnamed source inside the prison as saying Bosar was getting Rp.40 million (about \$4,000) a day

smaller gangs of thugs from Ambon and Flores against Gang Arek.

The day after the attack, authorities moved 192 prisoners from the regular prison to a special narcotics facility in the Cipinang complex, while 40 prisoners from the rival gangs, including all the block leaders, were moved to prisons in West Java.³⁶ Prison authorities now believe that Gang Arek’s power in Cipinang has been smashed.³⁷

The fact that the two men killed in this incident were the leaders of the assault on the jihadis three weeks earlier produced its own conspiracy theories. Some of the ustadz inmates, while relieved that their enemies were dead, were convinced that intelligence operatives inside prison had sparked the fight, hoping they would join in to take revenge on Gang Arek and thus give prison authorities an excuse for breaking up their group and transferring them to other prisons as punishment.³⁸ There is no evidence to support this but the whole episode appears to have increased jihadi solidarity.

As long as the need for protection from other groups creates an incentive for maintaining that solidarity, the effort to pick off individuals through ideological or pragmatic appeals may fail. One man involved in the police deradicalisation program said that several JI prisoners seemed to be responding well to individual approaches as long as they were detained in Jakarta police headquarters, a more controlled environment. “But all of our good work was undone when they were moved to Cipinang”, he said.³⁹

D. PRISON STAFF

As the inability of Cipinang guards to prevent the July clashes reveals, prison personnel are often too shorthanded and too poorly trained to cope with anything out of the ordinary and indeed are often more preoccupied with supplementing their meagre incomes through extortion of or collusion with inmates. Cipinang prison has some 3,800 inmates and a rotating staff of wardens, no more than 42 of whom are on duty at any one time.⁴⁰ New wardens are only

appointed once a year, and the retirement rate of older staff more than matches the intake. The average salary is about Rp.2 million (\$200) a month, which leaves almost nothing after transportation and basic living costs are met.⁴¹

After one warden in Bali became a jihadi as a result of regular contact with the Bali bombers, prison administrators began to be somewhat more attentive to some of the problems involved with jihadi prisoners; their short-term solution to stop recruitment was to try and assign non-Muslim guards to blocks housing such men but it is not always possible.⁴² In Semarang, one of the better-run prisons, the prison head said that guards for the terrorism block had been specially selected, but it was not clear what additional training they received.

A June 2007 survey of Indonesian prisons notes that there is a Corrections Science Academy (Akademi Ilmu Pemasarakatan, AKIP) under the justice ministry, whose graduates are somewhat better prepared for their jobs than other officials, but they constitute a small minority of prison employees. Many workers apply initially to become civil servants in other parts of the justice ministry; when they find themselves assigned to prisons, their morale and motivation sink.⁴³

It is not just the wardens, however, who are poorly prepared to deal with jihadi prisoners. When a new prisoner is incarcerated, the prison heads themselves usually only receive a single sheet from the court with a summary of the verdict and sentence. They often have no detailed information on the new arrival and no indication whether special attention is warranted, as in the case of some jihadis. Recently prison heads have begun to be included in counter-terrorism training courses designed for police and prosecutors but the problem of insufficient and inadequately trained staff remains.

from the trade. “Rebutan Lahan Pemalakan 2 Napi LP Cipinang Tewas”, *Pos Kota*, 1 August 2007.

³⁶ “232 Napi Cipinang Dipindahkan”, *Suara Pembaruan*, 1 August 2007.

³⁷ Crisis Group interview, Director General of Corrections Untung Sugiyono, Jakarta, 29 October 2007.

³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, August 2007.

³⁹ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, September 2007. A major transfer of JI prisoners from the Jakarta police command to Cipinang took place in January 2007 to make way for a new wave of detainees from Poso.

⁴⁰ “Bisnis Timbul dari Hubungan Emosional”, *op. cit.* The figures cited are from 2006.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Crisis Group interview, Director-General of Corrections Untung Sugiyono, Jakarta, 29 October 2007.

⁴³ “Baseline Survey”, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

III. ISOLATION OR INTEGRATION?

An issue every government has to face is whether to treat convicted terrorists as separate and qualitatively different from other inmates, or allow them to mix freely. One study suggests the British policy of segregating IRA prisoners in a separate block served to preserve the organisational hierarchy and facilitate the emergence of prisoner-run training camps:

It was only when the authorities decided that terrorists were to be treated according to the criminal acts they committed, rather than according to the ideological beliefs that had inspired them, that the use of prisons as terrorist universities began to be curtailed.⁴⁴

The lesson would seem to be that integration is better than segregation but there are costs as well. If the Cipinang example shows how solidarity among jihadis can grow in opposition to criminal gangs, an example from a Bandung prison, below, shows how integration allows the ideologues the opportunity to recruit. The lesson is not that integration is wrong but that every case has to be considered separately.

In Indonesia, there is not a single strategy, although there is a general policy that prisoners who are threats to internal prison security should be segregated; this includes narcotics offenders and those accused of terrorism.

One prison in Semarang has isolated all the terrorism detainees, most of whom were involved in the lead-up to the Bali II bombings of October 2005. The motivation is understandable: to prevent them from exerting influence over other inmates. But the policy does not distinguish between the hardcore and those more susceptible to rehabilitation. Among those housed in the separate block when Crisis Group visited in April 2007 were two young JI members caught in July 2003, when a safe house full of weapons and training manuals was uncovered. Both had trained in Mindanao but neither had been involved in violence; their job was guarding the safe house.

The prison director said that they had been model prisoners while incarcerated with common criminals but when the decision was taken to isolate terrorists from other prisoners, he had no choice but to put them in the block. They were thus housed with the men responsible for planning Bali II, among them Noordin Mohammed Top's most ardent followers. The danger is that they will be radicalised, and

the only saving grace is that their sentences will soon be up, so their exposure to the ideologues will be limited.⁴⁵

The same issue may arise with respect to a group from Ambon, convicted in connection with a string of attacks between 2003 and 2005 on police and other civilian targets. Worried about the group's success in recruiting common criminals in Ambon prison, police and local authorities sent sixteen men off to Java in late March 2007 with the intention of transferring them to the maximum security prison in Nusakambangan – known as Indonesia's Alcatraz – where Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas are detained.⁴⁶

It turned out that there was no space, so the men were temporarily housed at Wirogunan Prison in Yogyakarta, in central Java. After a few weeks, they were transferred again to a prison in Porong, Sidoarjo, East Java, because Wirogunan was overcrowded. (Why conditions at Nusakambangan and Wirogunan could not have been determined before the men left Ambon is unclear.) But it is unlikely that more than four or five of the sixteen were responsible for indoctrination efforts, and it might have made more sense to keep most of them in Ambon, where they could be near friends and family instead of running the risk of further radicalisation by enforced proximity to their more militant colleagues.

An aspect of prison recruitment that is sometimes overlooked is that it is a two-way street. It is not just that jihadis reach out to other inmates to draw them into the ideological fold, but also that other prisoners sometimes see joining jihadi ranks as a survival strategy, a way of securing better food, protection or status.⁴⁷ A rapist in Cipinang reportedly told his cellmates that he had been convicted of terrorism because he thought it would earn him more respect.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview, Semarang, June 2007.

⁴⁶ The Nusakambangan complex consists of five prisons: Permisan, built in 1908; Batu, built in 1925, where the three Bali bombers are held; Besi, built in 1929; Kembang Kuning, built in 1950; and a new “super-maximum security facility”, which opened in June 2007 and has 254 inmates, mostly big-time narcotics offenders. See two-part article “Mengunjungi Lapas ‘Supermaximum Security’ di Nusakambangan”, *Indopos*, 4 and 5 September 2007.

⁴⁷ The phenomenon of criminals joining Islamic gangs for protection is noted in “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization”, Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University and Critical Incident Analysis Group, 2006, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, August 2007.

⁴⁴ Ian M. Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists”, *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2004, p. 16.

A. KEROBOKAN PRISON, BALI

Kerobokan Prison in Bali provides an interesting case study in recruitment. This is where the three Bali bombers, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas, were detained until after the second Bali bombs in October 2005, when they were transferred to Nusakambangan. Despite nominal isolation, their impact on other prisoners and prison wardens was profound. How they managed to attract followers is instructive, because the same process almost certainly takes place elsewhere.

Ahmed (not his real name), a man arrested for pimping and drug dealing in 2001, was at Kerobokan while the three were there. He said he thought his life was over when he was sent to prison, but in fact, he found nothing changed. As long as he had money, he could get the same drinks and drugs inside Kerebokan as outside, and the only question was how to get the cash. He started doing laundry for “boss” prisoners – the cell and block leaders – and on a good day could make Rp.50,000 (about \$5), enough to participate in the parties that prison guards helped facilitate for a fee.

After a while he became bored with this routine and looked for something else to do. He attached himself to another inmate who was the *tamping mesjid*, the mosque escort, helping him by cleaning the mosque and doing other minor chores. By the time the Bali bombers arrived in late 2002, he was a *tamping mesjid* in his own right, entrusted with opening the cells of those who wanted to attend Friday prayers. In this way he got to know all the Muslim inmates, including the JI men, even though they were detained in a separate wing. (Since Kerobokan is in Bali, many of the ordinary criminals were Hindu.)

He found the JI group sympathetic compared to other inmates:

They always defended the other Muslim prisoners and put other people’s interests above their own, in a way that earned them the sympathy of the other prisoners and some of the Muslim guards. Some inmates who went to the mosque regularly would be given friendly advice, usually starting out with warnings about the dangers of smoking. I was smoking the first time I met Amrozi. He advised me to cut back, and I was thrilled – Amrozi had noticed me! After that I began to talk with him frequently about Islam.⁴⁹

Ahmed then opened a business with Amrozi and another JI prisoner, selling vouchers for mobile phones. The latter had the capital and outside contacts to buy pre-paid phone

time; Ahmed had the access through his mosque escort job to the potential customers among the inmates. He and his two partners gave 40 per cent of their profits to the mosque, then split the remainder.⁵⁰ There were obviously no meaningful controls on handphone usage; at one time one of Ahmed’s partners had fifteen phones in his cell.⁵¹

(In a search in February 2007, Kerobokan officials found 51 phones, including ten belonging to detained terrorists, a few of which were state of the art.⁵² The haul was almost certainly a fraction of the total in use at the prison. The problem was that officials announced the day before that prisoners should turn in their phones or face sanctions – thus giving them ample time to find hiding places. While officials found phones in flower pots and behind toilets, the prisoners in these cases are often more clever than the searchers.)

The terrorists generally had three key qualities that were attractive to ordinary criminals: access to money, from a range of sympathetic donors; an idealism that hardened criminals apparently appreciated; and a willingness to fight. Just as the prestige of the “ustadz” in Cipinang skyrocketed when they held off Gang Arek, a defining moment in Kerobokan came towards the end of 2004 when a group of Balinese thugs attacked three members of Ring Banten, the West Java-based Darul Islam group that joined JI in the first Bali bombing. Ahmed and another convict, Hardi (not his real name), a drug dealer who became Imam Samudra’s protégé, came to their defence, and together they were able to defeat the thugs. Word quickly spread around the prison, and the five were treated with a new respect.

After the fight, prison authorities transferred Ahmed and Hardi to a much smaller prison in Bali where they were put in isolation cells for a week. Eventually they were transferred back to Kerobokan, where they intensified their study with their respective JI mentors. Both are now free. Ahmed works as a part-time teacher in a JI school, and clearly sees his contact with the Bali bombers as a positive experience that straightened out his life. Hardi is also reportedly engaged in religious outreach of a particularly militant sort somewhere in Aceh.⁵³ But like many of the ordinary criminals who become jihadis in

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² “10 Ponsel Pelaku Bom Bali II Disita”, *Indopos*, 9 February 2007. Mohamad Cholily had a Nokia 3315; Masykur Abdul Kadir, a Nokia 3310; Abdul Aziz, a Nokia 3105; Junaedi, a Nokia 2100; Andi Hidayat, a Nokia 3315; Anif Solchanudin and Sarjiyo alias Sawad, Samsung CDMA N356; Dwi Widyarto alias Wiwid, a Sanex CDMA SC 5010; Abdul Rauf, a Siemens; Abdul Ghoni alias Umar Wayan, a Nokia 8310.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Crisis Group interview, former inmate, Jakarta, 12 July 2007.

prison, he has fallen off the screen of the authorities since his release.

Those in Kerobokan like Hardi who had Imam Samudra as a mentor, and there were several, seem to have adopted his militancy. Another is Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard accused in 2006 of smuggling a laptop computer into Samudra’s cell. The media focus at the time of Beni’s arrest was entirely on how Imam Samudra used the laptop in the lead-up to the second Bali bombing. There was much less focus on Beni himself and how he became a trusted “brother” of the Bali bombers. Yet prison authorities in Semarang, where he is now serving a five-year sentence, say he is the most militant of their charges, with all the ardour of a new convert.⁵⁴

To Ahmed and other prisoners in for drug offences, Beni was known as the guard with a good heart, because for a little money, he would let them have drinking and drug parties in one room in the prison (before he became a militant jihadi).⁵⁵ He also let the prisoners use his home address as a depot for anything friends or family wanted to send them; the infamous laptop was delivered to his home. Guards and wardens across the prison system are susceptible to bribes because of low pay and poor training, and the experience with Beni was a wake-up call to the government that prison employees would have to be chosen and supervised more carefully.

B. AMAN (OMAN) ABDURRAHMAN

The case of Aman Abdurrahman alias Oman alias Abu Sulaiman shows the multiple dynamics at work between criminals and jihadis in prison. Oman, a religious scholar at al-Sofwa, a Jakarta-based salafi institute, was arrested in March 2004 for setting up a bomb-making class in Cimanggis, on the outskirts of Jakarta. An accidental explosion blew the roof off the house where the class was taking place, and most of the participants were arrested.⁵⁶ Oman was tracked down and sentenced to seven years in February 2005. After less than a year at a prison in Krawang, West Java, he was transferred to the old Dutch prison in Bandung known as Sukamiskin.

In Sukamiskin Oman was the only prisoner convicted of terrorism, although not the only jihadi: one of the perpetrators of the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, a JI operation, was also there, sentenced under Emergency Law 12/1951 on illegal use of explosives. They were

joined in early 2006 by Yuli Harsono, an ex-army private accused of giving military training to jihadis with bullets stolen from the army ammunition depot that he was supposed to have been guarding.⁵⁷

Oman himself had no known connection to JI before his arrest. He was known largely for his excellent Arabic language skills, having been a star student of LIPIA in Jakarta, one of the premier institutes for the dissemination of salafi thought. He had begun to translate tracts by radical Middle Eastern ideologues from Arabic to Indonesian, particularly the writings of the Jordanian, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was known as the mentor of al-Zarqawi, the man responsible for some of the most grisly acts of terrorism in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi called his organisation Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad; Oman gave his group the same name.⁵⁸ Except for the bomb-making class, the group has never claimed responsibility for a violent act, although one member may have been involved in an attempted murder of a Christian convert from Islam outside Bandung in October 2006.⁵⁹ But the real focus of Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad’s efforts was publishing.

⁵⁷ Iqbaluzzaman alias Iqbal alias Didin Rosman is serving a twenty-year sentence in Sukamiskin, accused of violating Emergency Law No.12/1951 on illegal possession and use of explosives. He is probably a member of Darul Islam, not JI, but worked with Hambali on the Christmas Eve operation. Yuli Harsono was also convicted under Emergency Law No.12/1951 and given a four-year sentence after he was dishonourably discharged from the army. The training he conducted in Tawangmangu, outside Solo, Central Java, involved 35 people and was broken up by police in May 2004. Coordinated by Djarot Supriyanto of a JI-affiliated school, Pesantren Isykarima, it was allegedly sponsored by a group known as Generation of Islamic Nature Lovers (Generasi Islam Pecinta Alam) but in fact by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a group led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ammunition, weapons, and bomb-making material were found in Yuli’s barracks in a raid in June 2005; also found was an Indonesian army (TNI) manual from 1956 on how to make land mines and booby traps. Yuli also gave military training to recruits from the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) in the al-Sunnah mosque in Bandung. See “Khianati TNI, Praka Yuli Divonis 4 Tahun Penjara”, *Pikiran Rakyat*, 3 March 2006 and “Polisi Periksa Warga Terkait Kemah MMI”, *Koran Tempo*, 26 May 2004.

⁵⁸ The group seems originally to have been called al-Muwahhidun and had links to Darul Islam and Ring Banten through an Ambon and Poso veteran, Nazaruddin Muchtar alias Harun, arrested for involvement in the May 2005 attack on police in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku. Harun was one of the people who first recruited Heri Golun, the suicide bomber in the Australian embassy attack. See Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., p. 10. It is not clear when Oman changed the name to Jama’ah Tauhid wal Jihad but it may have been after his arrest.

⁵⁹ The victim was a Protestant evangelical pastor from Lamongan, East Java, who had converted from Islam and

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interview, prison officials, Semarang, 31 May 2007.

⁵⁵ Crisis Group interview, former inmate, Jakarta, 12 July 2007.

⁵⁶ Crisis Group Report, *Indonesia Backgrounder*, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

In Sukamiskin, as in the Krawang prison earlier, visitors would bring Oman printouts from Arabic-language websites, including al-Maqdisi's. Using the name Abu Sulaiman (the name of his first-born child), he would write out translations in long-hand, which the visitors would pick up. The translations first began to appear on a few Indonesian jihadist websites, one maintained by his followers and at least one linked to JI; then they began to appear as attractively printed books published by JI-linked companies in Solo and Jakarta. Many focus on the idea of *thoghut* governments in Muslim countries as the main enemy of Islam.

Prison officials were unaware of Oman's publishing activities until April 2007 when they were shown copies of books and online publications with a prison dateline. The officials said that visitors to the prison were regularly inspected to see if they were bringing in narcotics, weapons or other sharp objects but printed materials got little attention. If materials were in Arabic, they asked, who on the prison staff would understand them anyway?⁶⁰

But the translation activities were key, because they meant that Oman's stature grew among jihadi groups that were barely aware of his existence before his arrest. By late 2005, the most militant JI circles were seeking him out, and he was co-translating a book with Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubeid, the man arrested for being Noordin Mohammed Top's courier, himself then imprisoned in Cipinang, now free.⁶¹

was working with an organisation called Yayasan Dian Kaki Emas, led by another convert. The organisation has long been a target of Muslim groups, who see it as promoting apostasy. One man was caught shortly after the attack: Sultan Qolbi alias Ustadz Arsyad, who was arrested in Lembang, outside Bandung, on 17 October 2006. But it took several months for the police to realise that they were holding no ordinary criminal. Arsyad, an ethnic Madurese, was a KOMPAK leader in Ambon, wanted in connection with the May 2005 attack on a police post in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku, which left six dead. He was eventually transferred from Bandung to Ambon for trial and acquitted there of the Loki assault but found guilty of a 2004 sniper attack on a ship sailing off the coast of Buru island, Maluku. He fled to the Bandung area sometime after August 2005. His connection to Oman is through Harun (see previous footnote). Now that he has been convicted in the Maluku attack, chances that he will ever be tried for the attempted murder in Bandung are close to nil. His two accomplices in that attack remain at large, and one is believed to have been Oman's follower.

⁶⁰ Crisis Group interview, Sukamiskin, April 2007.

⁶¹ Ubeid, detained until mid-2007, was himself a prolific writer and translator from prison using the nom de plume Abu Musa ath-Thayyar. The book he and Oman did together was an excerpt from the writings of the imprisoned Egyptian radical, Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz. It was published in January 2007 with the Indonesian title *Melacak Jejak Thaghut* by Kafayah Cipta Media in Klaten, Central Java, one of several publishing houses

In addition to his publishing activities, Oman ran religious study sessions via mobile phone from Sukamiskin to various groups outside, including to the Australian embassy bombers in Cipinang prison.⁶² He also was the leader of a group of about a dozen hardliners inside Sukamiskin that seemed in mid-2007 to be steadily growing. It included Iqbaluzzaman, the Christmas Eve 2000 bomber; Yuli Harsono, the former soldier; and two convicted murderers, Helmi and Sugeng Said.⁶³ All refused to pray in the prison mosque except on Fridays because they believed it was government property and therefore tainted.⁶⁴

Oman was known to have money though – perhaps from his publishing work – and some of his followers appear to have attached themselves more in an effort to get better food and other amenities than because they were persuaded by the ideology. When Oman was finally moved out of Sukamiskin in September 2007 because of his recruiting activities, several reportedly immediately shaved off their beards.⁶⁵ The two murderers Helmi and Sugeng, however, became enthusiastic jihadis.

By mid-2007 Oman was being monitored more closely, and the prison authorities did not like what they saw. They were particularly taken aback in July, when they discovered that Oman and Sugeng had recruited a group of nine men who had only been in prison for two months. All were would-be civil servants from the Home Affairs Governance Institute (Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, IPDN), convicted of causing the 2003 death of a fellow student.⁶⁶ They had only arrived in Sukamiskin in late May. One in particular, Gema Awal Ramadhan, reportedly became so hardline that he refused to see his parents, castigating his mother as *thoghut* because she worked for

run by JI members. In February 2007, Oman's translation of a book by the London-based Abu Bashir was published as *Tiada Khilafah Tanpa Tauhid wal Jihad* (There is no caliphate without the oneness of God and jihad) by ar-Rahmah media, run by Mohamed Jibril. Jibril, the son of MMI leader Abu Jibril, was a member of the JI cell in Karachi known as al-Ghuraba that was broken up in September 2003.

⁶² Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, August 2007.

⁶³ This may be Helmi Priwardhani, sentenced to seven years in 2004 for killing an ethnic Chinese businessman. See “Helmi Tetap Tenang Lalu Meyalami Hakim”, *Pikiran Rakyat*, 5 February 2004.

⁶⁴ Crisis Group interviews, Sukamiskin officials, Bandung, April 2000.

⁶⁵ Crisis Group interview, prison official, Bandung, September 2007.

⁶⁶ The nine are Hendi Setiyadi, Dekky Susandi, Octaviano Minang, Gema Awal Ramadhan, Yopi Maulana, Dana Rekha, Bangun Robinson, Dadang Hadisurya and Yayang Sopiyan. They were originally detained in Sumedang prison, West Java, in April 2007 but moved to Sukamiskin after they were sentenced to one and a half years in May.

the government⁶⁷ As a result, prison authorities decided to move the key players. In September 2007, Oman and Sugeng Said were sent to Cirebon prison; Gema Awal Ramadhan and Yuli Harsono were transferred to Subang and Kuningan prisons respectively, both in West Java. Yuli was transferred again within weeks to a prison in Bogor, closer to Jakarta.

It remains to be seen whether Oman will continue his publishing activities from Cirebon and whether he can continue to lead the Jama'ah Tauhid wal Jihad group from the new prison. But the Cirebon authorities have, at least for the time being, chosen an isolation strategy, putting Oman and Sugeng in the same cell, separate from other prisoners. This may be the better option but only if it is combined with close supervision of visitors and strict enforcement of a prison ban on mobile phones, all too easy to overcome with a little money.

Control over phones is a perpetual headache for all prison administrators. The head of corrections noted that prisoners are allowed to send letters to their families but in this day and age, no one writes letters; the standard form of communication is sending text messages by phone, he said, and it seemed unfair to him to deny prisoners the right to communicate with their families this way. He said he and his colleagues were wrestling with how to permit limited use and prevent illicit contacts at the same time.⁶⁸ The only place where authorities have decided to block cell phone signals altogether is Nusakambangan, where the blockage reportedly extends for a 1km radius from the complex. Even there, some narcotics offenders seem to have found ways around it – by using satellite phones.⁶⁹

Until very recently, donor attention to prisons was limited to the problem of HIV/AIDS among inmates. In 2005 the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA, began supporting the Raoul Wallenberg Institute's programs aimed at promoting human rights in prisons. The donor consortium, Partnership for Governance Reform, funded the June 2007 baseline survey referred to above, which contains some useful recommendations on staff development and management training. Other donors are beginning to show an interest in working on prison reform but the need for targeted programs based on informed need assessments is urgent.

⁶⁷ Crisis Group interview, Sukamiskin prison officials, September 2007.

⁶⁸ Crisis Group interview, Director-General of Corrections Untung Sugiyono, 29 October 2007.

⁶⁹ “Napi dan Sipir Sama-Sama Mengidap Stres”, *Indopos*, 5 September 2007; and “Napi di Nusakambangan Pakai Telepon Satelit”, *Gatra*, 11 September 2007.

IV. “DERADICALISATION” STRATEGIES

It is in this context of corruption, violence and poor oversight of prisons that Indonesian deradicalisation efforts need to be examined. As noted above, “deradicalisation” has become popular in counter-terrorism circles but remains poorly defined in terms of ultimate aims or criteria for success. At different times, depending on who is speaking, it can mean a process of counselling aimed at modifying interpretations of key religious texts; distancing or disengagement from specific jihadi groups; or support for rehabilitation and reintegration of jihadi detainees into society.

It can embrace community outreach programs to “inoculate” vulnerable groups against extremist ideology through travelling “road shows” of popular Islamic scholars who reject violence; innovative use of the Internet and other media to counter jihadist teachings; and youth activity programs directed at young men in their late teens and early twenties who might otherwise be subject to recruitment.

Taken a step further, deradicalisation programs can be aimed at strengthening “moderate” institutions – an approach full of pitfalls – or addressing social and economic grievances in those areas where marginalisation and discrimination have fostered extremism.⁷⁰ But most deradicalisation programs start with prisons.

A. FOCUSING ON PRISONERS

In Indonesia, the only meaningful work is being done by the police. Vice-President Yusuf Kalla did try in late 2005 after Bali II to bring a team of Muslim scholars together under the ministry of religion to counter jihadist teachings but it had little impact, in part because some members were not persuaded that there was a serious need, and others had no idea of the content of the teachings they were supposed to counter.⁷¹

⁷⁰ The problem lies in defining “moderate” and assuming that there is a zero-sum game between “moderate” and “radical” institutions, so that strengthening the one leads to the weakening of the other. Also, a Western donor embrace of “moderate” institutions can weaken their legitimacy within the community if that embrace is seen as part of a counter-terrorism strategy.

⁷¹ The Team to Address Terror (Tim Penanggulangan Teror, TPT) emerged from an initiative of Vice-President Yusuf Kalla to bring a group of Islamic scholars together at his house after Bali II to watch videotaped statements from the suicide bombers and discuss how best to counter them.

In early 2006, team members made a couple of high profile visits to *JI-linked pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), including the one founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Ngruki, Solo that produced much of the *JI* leadership and several bombers. They announced that their mission was to restore the school’s good name and put to rest suspicions that it was a terrorist hotbed.⁷² They did produce two books on the correct interpretation of jihad but seemingly without much thought about the target audience, let alone any knowledge of the extent and sophistication of the jihadi publishing industry. The team still meets occasionally but is not a significant player.

The police program is much more pragmatic, focusing on prisoners and their families, and it evolved over time as knowledge of radical networks increased. In the beginning the aim was to identify prisoners who could be persuaded to cooperate and provide more intelligence about *JI* and other groups. The two star catches were Nasir Abas and Ali Imron. Nasir Abas, a Malaysian national, was a senior *JI* leader who had trained in Afghanistan and set up the *JI* structure in the southern Philippines. He believed in the use of military force to defend the faith and fellow Muslims against oppression but was opposed to attacking civilians and never took part in any of the Indonesian bombing operations.

Ali Imron, also an Afghan veteran, by contrast was involved in the 2000 bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s residence, the Christmas Eve bombings and Bali I. In his forthcoming autobiography, he notes that while he had reservations about these attacks, he went ahead with them because he trusted the men who were organising them – including his brothers, Mukhlas and Amrozi. Where Nasir Abas’s prestige rested on his military experience and strategic skills, Ali Imron had unimpeachable religious credentials and could hold his own on points of Islamic law with *JI*’s best scholars.

Police took a major gamble, giving these two access to other detainees to engage in informal debates and encourage discussion of what was right and wrong about their approach to jihad. Nasir Abas had the higher profile role from the beginning, in part because he had not been involved in violence, quickly served his ten-month sentence and could travel around the country without raising much of a stir. Ali Imron, on the other hand, was supposed to be serving a life sentence for his role in the Bali bombs. When a journalist’s camera found him in September 2004 at a Starbucks outlet in an elite Jakarta shopping mall drinking coffee with a senior police officer, public apoplexy in Jakarta and Canberra was such that he largely disappeared from public view thereafter, working

quietly from within Jakarta police headquarters to lead other detainees in discussion.⁷³

Indonesian police understood from the outset that any debate about the rights and wrongs of tactics had to take place within the movement itself; jihadis were not going to listen to “moderates” outside their own circle. They also understood that there was no hope of any serious reflection taking place in normal prisons, where every day was a struggle for money, influence or protection. The most important suspects, therefore, were almost always detained in Jakarta police facilities, rather than in official prisons or detention centres, where conditions were far better; police could draw on their knowledge at any time; and Ali Imron and Nasir Abas, aided by a few others, could do their work.

B. ALI IMRON’S ARGUMENTS

The arguments that Ali Imron makes to his fellow *JI* members for why the bombings were wrong are not ones that Western publics would find appealing or that mainstream Indonesian Muslims would make – and are therefore almost certainly more persuasive to his audience.

He does not say that the bombers’ interpretation of jihad was wrong. On the contrary, he says, their arguments were correct.⁷⁴ Because Indonesia is not an Islamic state and kowtows to America, he argues, it was legitimate to carry out bombings in Indonesia, particularly when Muslims were being killed in Ambon and Poso and America was working with Israel to wage war on Palestine. The Indonesian government’s failure to apply Islamic law in full, he adds, had also allowed deviant teachings, secularism and idolatry to flourish, immorality to rise, splits among Muslims to surface and the gap between rich and poor to widen. Ali says he and his brothers hoped that the bombings would be the beginning of a battle between Muslims and infidels (*kafir*) in which Islam would triumph, and truth and justice would be upheld.⁷⁵

But he says, we acted precipitously. We did not stop to think whether we had the necessary strength to take on *kafirs*, and waging war without adequate preparation can hurt the community. We did not stop to question whether we had the support of the Muslim community, and it turned out we did not. We had no secure base from which to mount an operation and, therefore, no guarantee that the aims of jihad could be fulfilled or that the Muslim

⁷² “Pondok Ngruki Tak Terkait Terorisme”, *Koran Tempo*, 21 January 2006.

⁷³ “Bali bomber spotted at Starbucks”, BBC News 24, 2 September 2004.

⁷⁴ Early draft of autobiography of Ali Imron, written in 2005-2006, due to be published in late November 2007.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

community would benefit from our actions. We did not know for sure, he adds, the status of those we targeted, nor did we try to persuade them by other means, for example through religious outreach, before we attacked. We did not think through the costs and benefits, and it turned out we brought more harm than good to our own community.⁷⁶

Arguments such as these, combined with other factors, helped bring around some key JI members, including Mohammed Rais, the man who had led JI’s office in Kandahar, Afghanistan and had a minor role in the Marriott bombing, and Mubarak, an Afghan veteran who like Ali Imron had been involved in the Christmas Eve and Bali I bombings. But Ali’s relatively comfortable lifestyle recently has been the subject of critical articles in the Indonesian media, and he has been attacked as a hypocrite by his former JI colleagues, so his influence may be waning.⁷⁷ This suggests that the police need to have a new infusion of high-ranking but repentant jihadis if they want the ideological part of their program to succeed.

One goal of the police in giving Ali Imron and Nasir Abas access to new detainees was to pick off important leaders of JI, in the belief that given JI’s hierarchical structure, if a leader changed his mind, others would follow. That said, one officer noted, it was also important to understand that ideology was not the driving force for all members and many other factors were at work. In Poso, where specific social, economic and political grievances came into play, police found that local recruits, many with thug backgrounds, were not particularly wedded to jihadism. The best counter-terrorism strategies for such areas needed to go beyond law enforcement to look at employment and justice programs.⁷⁸

C. CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICIALS

Detention at police headquarters also offered an opportunity to change jihadis’ attitude toward the police. It was not just that the police wanted to be liked or believed that kindness would produce cooperation. Rather, a central tenet of jihadi ideology was that police were *thoghut*, anti-Islamic, particularly when several of the senior counter-terrorism

officers were Christian, and that they were puppets of Western forces in the war on terror. If that tenet could be broken, others might be open to question.⁷⁹ While terrorism suspects often were not spared the usual police roughing up immediately after arrest, they were thus generally treated unusually well once they reached Jakarta.

Even before deradicalisation gained such currency, police were giving special consideration to some jihadi detainees, paying for their families in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and even Malaysia to visit, arranging a house in Jakarta for them to stay, providing extra meals, occasionally financing the in-custody weddings of detainees, arranging for long-distance learning, providing VIP medical treatment, and sometimes intervening with prosecutors or judges to “negotiate” lenient sentences.⁸⁰ When a new detainee was arrested, police interrogators would probe their economic concerns (often children’s school fees) and then find funds to address them in a way that earned the detainee’s gratitude and encouraged cooperation. A senior officer said if he had to choose between religious and socio-economic approaches to deradicalisation, he would always choose the latter, because it worked. But he also stressed that the approach had to be shaped to each prisoner’s needs and develop a personal bond, which took time.⁸¹

One problem, however, was that the kindness was not evenly distributed. Families of men arrested in Poso after police operations in January 2007 were showered with attention, and their travel to see relatives was liberally financed. The JI leaders arrested in March and June 2007 who were shot in the course of operations were given immediate medical treatment and encouraged to tell their stories on television.

The situation was very different for the jihadi detainees from Ambon, who were largely ignored. When the sixteen prisoners were suddenly moved from Ambon to East Java in March 2007, families received no travel assistance and were not given prior warning, in violation of justice ministry regulations. One of those transferred, Suhaib Ramadi, a JI Afghan veteran, had been shot when he was captured in 2005; two years later, the bullet remained in his foot, and he had no love for the police. It was only in August 2007, after Nasir Abas by accident discovered his name on a list of detainees and recognised an old friend

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Abu Rusdan, a top JI leader, says, “Ali Imron’s bombing of Bali resulted in many innocent people, including myself, being arrested. Why is he now being made out to be a hero?”, *Tempo* (English edition), 19 November 2007. On criticism of police treatment of Ali Imron, see “Terpidana Bom Bali Tinggal di Apartemen”, *IndoPos*, 16 October 2007; “Polisi Dinilai Berlebihan”, *IndoPos*, 17 October 2007; and “Alasan Polisi Sulit Dipahami”, *IndoPos*, 18 October 2007.

⁷⁸ Crisis Group email communication, Col. Tito Karnavian, Indonesian police, 27 October 2007.

⁷⁹ Crisis Group interview, Nasir Abas, Jakarta, October 2007.

⁸⁰ The wedding in October 2007 of Amril Ngiode alias Aat, a Poso detainee, to his long-term girlfriend at Jakarta police headquarters is one example. In addition to paying the wedding expenses, police also financed the roundtrip travel from Poso of the bride’s mother and another relative. For details on other cases of unusually generous treatment of jihadi prisoners, see Budi Setyarso et. al. “Inmates with Cell Phones”, *Tempo* (English edition), 19 November 2007.

⁸¹ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 29 October 2007.

from Afghanistan, that police thought to approach him. The bullet has since been removed.

There were three major reasons for the difference in approach toward Poso and Ambon. First, Poso was critical to JI’s ongoing operations in Indonesia; Ambon was not, after the conflict there waned. Any lasting peace in Poso depended at least in part on local JI members’ willingness to end their jihad and the severing of logistic links with Java. Secondly, because police had finally responded with force in January 2007 to ongoing violence in Poso, it was very much in police interests to ensure that they themselves did not become the targets of retaliation.⁸²

Finally, in reaction to the horrific beheading of three Poso schoolgirls in October 2005, counter-terrorism police had stationed a senior officer in Poso, who supervised the investigation, came to know all the major players and developed an appreciation for the complexity of the conflict. Through him police realised that if this generation of actors was not diverted from jihad, a second generation could follow.⁸³

But the question of balance remains, not only in terms of different groups of prisoners, but also in terms of balancing justice for victims with the desire to prevent the re-emergence of violent groups. Relatives of those killed in the May 2005 Tentena market bombing and other attacks may not appreciate police generosity toward the bombers and their families.

D. USING THE AFGHAN NETWORK

Police are the first to admit that favours to prisoners and their families do not necessarily address the larger issue of neutralising the jihadi movement more broadly. Just as men moving from police headquarters to prison often reverted to old ways of thinking, men once released were likely to be drawn back into old networks, especially because JI and others like it are not just terrorist organisations, focused on jihad, but social groups of friends who meet, eat, play volleyball, pick up their children from school and do business together. Renouncing membership in JI would be as unthinkable as renouncing

Indonesian citizenship, and there was never any point in setting that as a goal. Instead the thinking went, why not get a critical mass and try to redirect activities from within?

Accordingly in early July 2007, Nasir Abas, working with the police Bomb Task Force, invited 28 Afghan alumni to attend a meeting at a villa in Puncak, a resort area south of Jakarta. The Afghan generation – about 300 men in all – continues to enjoy high prestige and influence among jihadis, even as the leadership in many cases has passed to those trained in Mindanao or with combat experience in Ambon and Poso. The invitees were mostly but not exclusively JI – a few were Darul Islam members who had been in Afghanistan when the DI-JI split took place in 1993 but chose not to join Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder. Some were newly released from prison; others had never been arrested; a few, like Ali Imron, were technically still serving time. They had in common not just the Afghan training but a rejection of unprovoked violence, and the question was how their legitimacy could be used to influence others in the movement to take a similar stance.

Various ideas were put forward, according to one person present, including trying to make individual approaches to teachers in the JI-affiliated schools, of which there are now some 30.⁸⁴ But it was very much a preliminary meeting, and the only real consensus was that more Afghan alumni should be invited to the next one.

Discussions now appear to be heading toward a program that would help released prisoners with credit toward livelihood projects, both in the hope that focusing on economic goals may divert some from ideological pursuits and that the availability of capital may persuade fence-sitters to join the group.⁸⁵ It would almost certainly be attractive to many soon-to-be-released prisoners, who will need jobs; it may also attract some who will take the loans but are not prepared to make the ideological commitment.

It is worth noting that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Indonesian army offered compassion, conciliation and business concessions to former leaders of the defeated Darul Islam (DI) insurgency in West Java in an effort to counter Islamic radicalism. In most cases, the assistance was accepted, and in some cases it bought long-term cooperation. But government efforts at co-option also facilitated the rebuilding of DI – the organisation from

⁸² See Crisis Group Asia Report N°127, *Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge*, 24 January 2007.

⁸³ For a variety of reasons, Ambon was seen as less urgent. It also had ongoing violence after the February 2002 peace accords but JI was not a major player (KOMPAK was more important). Getting the cooperation of key Poso suspects, however, could help unravel more of the network and lead to some of Indonesia’s most wanted, such as Noordin Mohammed Top. Ambon was also more self-contained, while violence in Poso always had the potential for spilling over into other parts of Sulawesi. It was also linked to the route to Mindanao in a way Ambon was not.

⁸⁴ These are *pesantrens*, mostly led by inducted JI members, which share a curriculum and *manhaj* (method) and have a teacher training program, KMI, designed to produce cadres for the organisation.

⁸⁵ If the program materialises, it reportedly will not be supported by official police funding but by contributions of private donors.

which JI split in 1993. Political conditions in Indonesia today are far different but the precedent should serve as a cautionary tale for those distributing largesse today.⁸⁶

E. THE NON-PARTICIPANTS

Two interesting questions about the July 2007 meeting are who declined the invitation and who was not invited in the first place. The most prominent in the first category is Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan, a senior JI leader who briefly succeeded Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as amir, was released in 2005 after two and a half years in prison and, more than anyone else, is trying to rebuild the organisation. He retains enormous influence and credibility, and while ideologically he is close to those in the Nasir Abas-Ali Imron group – he certainly sees Bali I and the subsequent Noordin-led attacks as counterproductive for JI – he apparently finds overt cooperation with the police unacceptable. As long as he takes that stance, others will follow.

His opting out suggests that those who are taking part may constitute a kind of “B-list” among the Afghan alumni, a second tier with less influence than the hold-outs. That does not diminish the importance of trying to use the Afghan veterans as a vanguard but it does suggest that if Abu Rusdan is preaching the same message anyway, the “purist” as opposed to the “collaborationist” version may ultimately prove more effective among JI’s rank-and-file.

Among those not invited were the ideological hardcore among the Afghan alumni, including the former leadership of JI’s East Java wing, Fahim and Son Hadi, both now released from prison, and others of a similar persuasion. These are the people who cooperated with and assisted Noordin; it is their advocacy of violence that it is most important to change. If none of them have joined Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, then it may be that the vanguard of deradicalisation to some extent is preaching to the converted. But one man involved in the Afghan group said he saw the goal not so much as changing the minds of Fahim and his associates as ensuring that they had less and less influence.

The other big group of non-invitees were leaders of jihadi groups other than JI. Thus far they have received much

less attention – there is no KOMPAK or Ring Banten equivalent of Ali Imron or Nasir Abas, working to transform those organisations from within, although since top leaders of both were also held at Jakarta police headquarters until early 2007, they were exposed to the same discussions and debate as their JI counterparts. Since the danger of jihadi operations comes as much or more from small groups and splinters as from JI, it would be worth ensuring that these elements are also included as thinking about how to make best use of the Afghan group moves forward.

The challenge now is to try substantive programs, reaching out to JI schools, testing a livelihoods program to see if post-release jobs have any ideological impact and using the Afghan alumni more systematically in prisons as visiting discussion leaders. It is too early to assess progress but at the least people should be thinking about what indicators of progress might be.

⁸⁶ Quinton Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia”, B.A. honours thesis, Australian National University, 2007. Temby notes that the Siliwangi division of the army and Opsus, the covert operations intelligence organisation, were working at cross-purposes in a way that allowed DI to play them off against each other. Opsus also was trying to co-opt DI into the Golkar political apparatus. A major difference in 2007 is that police have no analogous political motivation for their efforts; they would just like to stop terrorist attacks.

V. CONCLUSION

Even as the police are focusing their deradicalisation program on prisoners and ex-prisoners, they are the first to acknowledge that the current state of Indonesian prisons undermines their efforts. It is a telling indictment of the system that they do their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system entirely, because the chances of backsliding are so high.

Choices about isolation or integration are important but they cannot be made outside a broader program of prison reform, particularly an attack on prison corruption, which is very much on the agenda of the new director-general of corrections. More important than choosing between two policies, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.

Deradicalisation programs are important but they will inevitably be trial-and-error in nature; there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons. Within JI alone there are the ideologues, the thugs, the utopians, the followers and the inadvertent accomplices; local recruits from Poso are motivated by very different factors than those who graduate from JI-affiliated schools in central Java.

Much more thought needs to be given to how to evaluate the “success” of deradicalisation programs, because there is a danger that many people deemed to have been deradicalised are those who were never the real problem, or that the reasons individuals renounce violence have nothing to do with police programs. Even if we could measure the number of people deradicalised according to specific criteria, that figure would only have meaning if we had some sense of the number of new recruits and knew that the balance was going in the right direction.

Focusing on the criminals-turned-jihadis in prison is also important. In all the prisons where “ustadz” are held, there is likely to be a small group of such men but it is not clear that anyone is tracking them or turning deradicalisation efforts in their direction. If it is important to design programs to ensure newly released JI members have vocational opportunities, what about the criminal recruits who may, like Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard, turn out to be more militant than their mentors? These men also need to be the focus of special programs and thus far have been left out.

It is hard to set performance goals for deradicalisation because it means so many different things to different people.

But setting such goals for improving prison management is possible, desirable and critically necessary.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 November 2007

APPENDIX B

INDONESIAN PRISONERS AND DETAINEES LINKED TO JIHADISM AS OF OCTOBER 2007

DI	Darul Islam
FPI	Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
RB	Ring Banten, a West-Java based splinter of Darul Islam
TWJ	Jemaah Tauhid wal Jihad, a Bandung-based group
LasJ	Laskar Jundullah, a Makassar-based group
TR	Tanah Runtuh, a JI-affiliated group in Poso but not all members were JI
KOMPAK	loose association of veterans of Ambon and Poso funded by the charity KOMPAK (Crisis Action Committee)
Kayamanya	a Poso group affiliated with KOMPAK

NAME	CRIME	SENTENCE	ORG
CIPINANG PRISON, JAKARTA			
1. Abdul Jabar	JI bombings 2000-2001	20 yrs	JI
2. Abdullah Sunata	Withholding info on Noordin	7 yrs	KOMPAK
3. Achmad Hasan	Australian embassy bombing	death	JI/Noordin
4. Agus Achmad	Australian embassy bombing	4 yrs	RB/DI
5. Ahmad Rofiq Ridho als Ali Zein	Assisting Noordin Top	7 yrs	JI/Noordin
6. Edy Setiyono alias Usman	JI bombings 2000-2001	life ⁸⁷	JI
7. Enceng Kurnia als Arham	Australian embassy bombing	6 yrs	DI
8. Fathurrahman	Assisting Noordin	3.5 yrs	FPI
9. Heri Sigu Samboja	Australian embassy bombing	7 yrs	JI/Noordin
10. Imam Buchori	Assisting Noordin	3.5 yrs	FPI
11. Iqbal Huseini als Reza	Australian embassy bombing	4 yrs	KOMPAK
12. Ismail als. Muh. Ikhwan	Marriott bombing	12 yrs	JI
13. Iwan Dharmawan als Rois	Australian embassy bombing	death	RB/DI
14. Joko Sumanto ⁸⁸	Withholding info on Noordin	4 yrs	JI/KOMPAK
15. Joko Tri Harmanto als Jek	Assisting Noordin	6 yrs	JI/KOMPAK
16. Joni Ahmad Fauzan	Assisting Noordin	4 yrs	JI
17. Masrizal als Tohir	Marriott bombing	10 yrs	JI
18. Solahudin als Miqdad als Chepi	False ID card	3 yrs	KOMPAK
19. Sunarto als Adung	Withholding info on Noordin	7 yrs	JI
20. Syaiful Bahri als Apuy	Australian embassy bombing	10 yrs	RB/DI
21. Taufik alias Dani	Atrium mall bombing 2001	20 yrs	JI
22. Umar Burhanuddin	Australian embassy bombing	3.5 yrs	JI
23. Moh.Nuh	A&W bombing 2006	4.5 yrs	none

⁸⁷ Currently negotiating for reduction to twenty years, in which case remissions process can go into effect.

⁸⁸ May have been released in October 2007.

SALEMBA DETENTION CENTRE, JAKARTA

24.	Salahuddin al-Ayubi	Assisting Noordin Top	7 yrs	JI
25.	Andi Makassar	Attempted murder, Poso	6 yrs	TR

NUSAKAMBANGAN PRISON COMPLEX

26.	Abdul Aziz alis Imam Samudra	Bali I	death	JI
27.	Aly Ghufron alias Mukhlas	Bali I	death	JI
28.	Amrozi	Bali I	death	JI

KALISOSOK PRISON, PORONG, EAST JAVA

29.	Abdullah Umamity	Loki attack, Maluku 2005	life	DI
30.	Agung Hamid	Makassar bombing	life	LasJ
31.	Asep Djaja alias Dahlan	Loki attack, Maluku 2005	life	KOMPAK
32.	Erwin Wakano	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	6 yrs	local
33.	Hardi Tuasikal	Lateri attack, Maluku 2005	12 yrs	local
34.	Hasanuddin Muchtar als Harun	Post-Loki role 2005	9 yrs	DI
35.	Ismael Yamsehu	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	life	local
36.	Muthalib Patty	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	15 yrs	local
37.	Nachrum Wailisahalong als Teddy Gozali	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	15 yrs	local
38.	Ongen Pattimura	Loki attack, Maluku 2005	life	local
39.	Rahmadi alias Suheb	Wamkana, Maluku 2005	15 yrs	JI
40.	Ridwan Lestaluhu	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	12 yrs	local
41.	Rusli Amiludin	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	7 yrs	local
42.	Cholid alias M. Soleh	Lateri attack, Maluku 2005	15 yrs	TWJ
43.	Syamsul Bahri Sangadji	Villa Karaoke, Maluku 2005	18 yrs	local
44.	Zainudin als Nurdin	Wamkana and Loki	20 yrs	DI

KEROBOKAN PRISON, BALI

45.	Abdul Aziz alias Jafar	Bali II	8 yrs	JI/Noordin
46.	Abdul Rauf	Bali I	16 yrs	RB/DI
47.	Achmad Roihan alias Saad	Minor post-Bali I role	9 yrs	JI
48.	Andi Hidayat	Bali I	15 yrs	RB/DI
49.	Andri Octavia	Bali I	16 yrs	RB/DI
50.	Anif Solchanudin	Bali II	15 yrs	Noordin
51.	Dwi Widiyanto alias Wiwid	Bali II	8 yrs	Noordin
52.	Junaedi	Bali I	15 yrs	RB/DI
53.	Moh. Cholily	Bali II	18 yrs	JI/Noordin
54.	Sarjiyo als Sawad	Bali I	life	JI
55.	Abdul Ghoni alias Umar Besar	Bali I	life	JI
56.	Abdul Kadir Maskur	Bali I	15 yrs	JI

KEDUNG PANE PRISON, SEMARANG

57.	Adithya Triyoga	Bali II	6 yrs	Noordin
58.	Agung Setiyadi	Imam Samudra laptop	6 yrs	Noordin
59.	Ardi Wibowo	Bali II	6 yrs	unclear
60.	Beni Irawan	Imam Samudra laptop	5 yrs	unclear
61.	Harry Setya Rahmadi	Bali II	5 yrs	Noordin
62.	Heri Suyatno als Heru Setiawan	Sri Rezeki depot 2003	10 yrs	JI
63.	Joko Ardianto als Luluk	Sri Rezeki depot 2003	10 yrs	JI
64.	Mahmudi Haryono alias Yusuf	Sri Rezeki depot 2003	10 yrs	JI
65.	Muh. Agung Prabowo	Imam Samudra laptop	3 yrs	Noordin
66.	Mustaghfirin	Assisting Noordin	12 yrs	JI/Noordin
67.	Siswanto	Sri Rezeki depot 2003	10 yrs	JI
68.	Sri Pujimulyono	Bali II	6 yrs	JI
69.	Subur Sugiarto	Bali II	life	JI/Noordin
70.	Wawan Suprihatin	Bali II	10 yrs	Noordin

WIROGUNAN PRISON, YOGYA

71.	Muh. Auwal Suhardi	Kauman mosque 2000	2 yrs	DI
72.	Taufiqurrahman als Akram	Kauman mosque 2000	3 yrs	DI
73.	Wahyudiarto als Saifullah	Kauman and Mamasa	5 yrs	DI

CIREBON PRISON

74.	Aman Abdurrahman	Cimanggis bomb class 2004	7 yrs	TWJ
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SUKAMISKIN PRISON, BANDUNG

75.	Iqbaluzzaman	Christmas Eve bombings	20 yrs	DI
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PALEDANG PRISON, BOGOR

76.	Yuli Harsono	Illegal ammo, mil.training	4 yrs	MMI/TWJ
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GUNUNG SARI PRISON, MAKASSAR

77.	Ahmad Rizal als Ical	Palopo bombing 2004	18 yrs	LasJ
78.	Anthon bin Labasse	Makassar bombings 2002	8 yrs	LasJ
79.	Antoni alias Armanto	Makassar bombings 2002	12 yrs	LasJ
80.	Arman bin Abdul Samad	Makassar bombings 2002	18 yrs	LasJ
81.	Haerul	Makassar bombings 2002	7 yrs	LasJ
82.	Herman alias Arman	Palopo bombing 2004	9 yrs	LasJ
83.	Heryanto alias Anto	Palopo bombing 2004	9 yrs	LasJ
84.	Ilham Riadi	Makassar bombings 2002	8 yrs	LasJ
85.	Imal Hamid	Makassar bombings 2002	6 yrs	LasJ

86.	Jasmin bin Kasau ⁸⁹	Palopo bombing 2004	20 yrs	LasJ
87.	Kamaruddin als Komar	Palopo bombing 2004	14 yrs	LasJ
88.	Lukman bin Husain alias Luke	Makassar bombings 2002	7 yrs	LasJ
89.	Masnur bin Abd Latif	Makassar bombings 2002	12 yrs	LasJ
90.	Muhammad Tang	Makassar bombings 2002	7 yrs	LasJ
91.	Mukhtar Dg Lau	Makassar bombings 2002	7 yrs	LasJ
92.	Muliadi alias Umar	Makassar bombings 2002	12 yrs	LasJ
93.	Salamun als Amun	Ambon violence	18 yrs	??
94.	Supriyadi	Makassar bombings 2002	7 yrs	LasJ
95.	Suryadi Masud	Makassar bombings 2002	8 yrs	LasJ
96.	Usman Nuraffan alias Salman	Makassar bombings 2002	12 yrs	LasJ
97.	Wira Hadi	Makassar bombings 2002	19 yrs	LasJ

MEDAENG DETENTION CENTRE, Surabaya

98.	Ahmad Arif ⁹⁰	Explosives possession	3 yrs	JI
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PATOBO PRISON, PALU

99.	Andi Ipong	Murder of Balinese journalist, Poso	9 yrs	TR/JI
100.	Herwadi	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	??
101.	Iswadi Larata	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	??
102.	Jufri alias Breng	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	1 yr	??
103.	Moh. Fadli Barasalim als Opo ⁹¹	Armed robbery	5 th	KOMPAK
104.	Muhrin	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	none
105.	Rasiman alias Man	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	none
106.	Sukirno	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	TR
107.	Sutomo als Ustadz Yasin	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	5 yrs	TR/JI
108.	Yusuf Asapa	Murder of Balinese journalist, Poso	9 yrs	TR/JI

RUTAN MAESE, PALU

109.	Anang alias Papa Enal ⁹²	Rev. Susianti murder, Poso	4 yrs	TR/JI
110.	Imron	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	??
111.	Ma'ruf	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	??
112.	Sarjono als Paiman	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	TR/JI
113.	Upik Pagar	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	TR/JI
114.	Yakub als Faisal	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	1 yr 4 mos	TR/JI

⁸⁹ Escaped September 2007.

⁹⁰ Reportedly will be transferred shortly to Lamongan Prison, East Java.

⁹¹ Opo was not charged with terrorism but with the ordinary crime of robbery, although he has a long history of involvement in jihadi violence, and the robbery was committed as *fa'i*, to raise funds for jihad. The others in his group, who were also arrested and tried, were Rusli Tawil, Syakur, Farid Ma'ruf, Ipet, Iswadi Ma'ruf and Jusman Saehed.

⁹² While Papa Enal was put on the police wanted list for the murder of Protestant pastor Susianti Tinalele, he was only charged for his involvement in the 22 January 2007 shootout in Poso. Police say if he misbehaves after release, they can always resuscitate the murder charge.

AMPANA PRISON

115.	Ibnu als Thoyib	11 Jan. 2007 raid, Poso	4 yrs	TR/JI
116.	Mardiyanto alias Didi	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	TR
117.	Rahmat Duslan als Mat	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	Kayamanya
118.	Rizal alias Inong	Helmi murder, Poso	3 yrs	TR
119.	Syukur alias Ukung	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	4 yrs	TR
120.	Wahyudin als Yuyun	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	none
121.	Wikra Wardana alias Aco	22 Jan. 2007 shootout, Poso	3 yrs	Kayamanya

TANJUNG GUSTA PRISON, MEDAN

122.	Indrawarman als Toni Togar	Xmas Eve bombings/Lippo bank	12 yrs	JI
123.	Purwadi	Lippo bank robbery	10 yrs	JI
124.	Syahrudin Harahap als Aan	Lippo bank robbery	12 yrs	JI
125.	Waluyo als Moh. Aryo	Lippo bank robbery	10 yrs	JI
126.	Ramli als Tono	Lippo bank robbery	10 yrs	JI
127.	Mustafa Harahap als Hendra	Lippo bank robbery	10 yrs	JI
128.	Ramli alias Gogon	Lippo bank robbery	9 yrs	JI

BENGKULU PRISON

129.	Sardona Siliwangi	Marriott bombing assistance	8 yrs	JI
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AMBON PRISON

130.	Ancu Parry	Villa Karaoke attack		
131.	La Ode Rusdy	Villa Karaoke attack		
132.	Sarmin Makiang	Pasar Mardika		
133.	Sultan Qolbi alias Arsyad	Ambon violence	15 yrs	KOMPAK
134.	Said Laisow als Aco	Lateri grenade attack	5 yrs	local
135.	Said Taha Assagaf	Villa Karaoke attack	local	
136.	Kasim Wally ⁹³			
137.	Syarif Tarabubun	Villa Karaoke attack	15 yrs	unclear

JAKARTA POLICE HEADQUARTERS

138.	Agus Jenggot ⁹⁴	Schoolgirl beheading, Poso	–	TR/JI
139.	Ali Imron	Bali I	life	JI
140.	Amril Ngiode alias Aat	Tentena bombing, Poso	–	TR/JI
141.	Ardin	Rev. Susianti murder, Poso	–	TR/JI
142.	Basri	Various Poso attacks	–	TR/JI
143.	Purnama Putra als Usman	Australian embassy bombing	7 yrs	KOMPAK

⁹³ Kasim Wally was a minor when he was arrested, probably aged sixteen, and a junior high school student. Police claimed he was twenty, however, despite entreaties from his parents.

⁹⁴ The trials of Agus Jenggot and the other Poso detainees were ongoing as this report went to press. Prosecutors requested sentences of twenty years for all in mid-November 2007.

144. Ridwan	Poso attacks		TR/JI
145. Tugiran	Armed robbery, Poso	–	TR/JI
146. Utomo als Mubarak	Bali I	life	JI
147. Wiwin Kalahe	Various Poso attacks	–	TR/JI
148. Yudit Parsan	Rev. Susianti murder, Poso		TR/JI
149. Mujadid als Brekele	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
150. Idris als Jhoni Hendrawan	Marriott bombing	10 yrs	JI

BRIMOB HEADQUARTERS, Kelapa Dua Jakarta

151. Ainul Bahri als Abu Dujana	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
152. Arief Saifuddin	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
153. Aris Widodo	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
154. Aziz Mustofa	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
155. Nur Afifuddin als Suharto	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
156. Taufik Kondang alias Ruri	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
157. Zarkasi alias Nuaim alias Mbah	Arrested June 2007	–	JI
158. Ahmad Syahrul Uman	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
159. Amir Achmadi	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
160. Mahfudz Qomari Sutarjo als Ayyasi	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
161. Maulana Yusuf Wibisono als Kholis	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
162. Sarwo Edi Nugroho	Arrested March 2007	–	JI
163. Sikas als Abi Salim	Arrested March 2007	–	JI

NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS

164. Abdul Muis	Kongkoli murder, Poso	–	JI
165. Irwanto Irwano	Schoolgirl beheading, Poso	14 yrs	JI
166. Lilik Purwanto alias Haris	Schoolgirl beheading, Poso	14 yrs	JI

WEST JAKARTA SUBDISTRICT POLICE COMMAND

167. Hasanuddin	Schoolgirl beheading, Poso	20 yrs	JI
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APPENDIX C

RECENT RELEASES OF JIHADI PRISONERS

Note: this list is almost certainly incomplete, even for the two years covered, because releases are rarely reported. Of the 62 listed here, half are JI. As *alumni bui* (ex-prisoners), they generally do not return to formal positions within the JI structure even if they retain significant influence. As a result many areas now have two sets of leaders, the experienced ex-prisoners and the often less experienced formal office-holders untainted by arrest.

DI	Darul Islam
FPI	Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
RB	Ring Banten, a West-Java based splinter of Darul Islam
TWJ	Jemaah Tauhid wal Jihad, a Bandung-based group
LasJ	Laskar Jundullah, a Makassar-based group
TR	Tanah Runtuh, a JI-affiliated group in Poso but not all members were JI
KOMPAK	loose association of veterans of Ambon and Poso funded by the charity KOMPAK (Crisis Action Committee)
Kayamanya	a Poso group affiliated with KOMPAK

NAME	CRIME	SENTENCE	ORG
RELEASED IN 2007 AFTER COMPLETING SENTENCE			
1. Ahmad Sofyan alias Tamim ⁹⁵	Illegal weapons	5 yrs	JI
2. Bagus Budi Pranoto als Urwah	Assisting Noordin	3.5 yrs	JI/Noordin
3. Bambang Setiono	Illegal weapons	7 yrs	JI
4. Bandang alias Haikal	Poso	??	TR
5. Dany Chandra alias Yusuf	Illegal explosives	4 yrs	KOMPAK
6. Fadli Sadama	Assistance to Noordin	??	JI
7. Fajri alias Yusuf	Hiding Achmad Roihan, Palu	6 yrs	JI
8. Fauzan Arif	Illegal weapons, Lampung	5 yrs	JI
9. Firmansyah ⁹⁶	Hiding Achmad Roihan, Palu	5 yrs	JI
10. Herlambang	Hiding Bali I bombers	6 yrs	JI
11. Irun Hidayat	Minor Aus Embassy role	3 yrs	RB/DI
12. Lutfi Hudaeroah alias Ubeid	Withholding info	3.5 yrs	JI/Noordin
13. Makmuri	Assistance to Bali I bombers	7 yrs	JI
14. Moh. Rais ⁹⁷	Marriott	7 yrs	JI
15. Moh. Yunus	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	7 yrs	KOMPAK
16. Mohmad Najib Nawawi	Hiding Bali bombers	7 yrs	JI
17. Mustofa alias Abu Tholut ⁹⁸	Illegal ammo and explosives	7 yrs	JI
18. Nizam Khaleb	Hiding Achmad Roihan, Palu	6 yrs	JI
19. Sudigdoyo	Helping Noordin and Azhari 2003	5 yrs	JI
20. Adrian Ali alias Holis	Christmas Eve bombings	5 yrs	JI
RELEASED IN 2006 AFTER COMPLETING SENTENCE			
21. Abdul Haer	Beteleme attacks, Poso	4 yrs	Kayamanya
22. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	JI activities	30 mos	JI
23. Adi Suryana alias Qital ⁹⁹	JI special forces training	4 yrs	JI

⁹⁵ Former head of military affairs for *wakalah* (subdivision) Jakarta, JI.

⁹⁶ Former head of *wakalah* Palu, JI.

⁹⁷ Was head of JI office, Kandahar, Afghanistan 2000.

⁹⁸ First head of Mantiqi III, central command member, head of special forces.

⁹⁹ Former head of training for Mantiqi II, former member of central command (*markaziyah*).

24.	Ali Maksum als Mad Haji Sun	Poso	??	unclear
25.	Amran bin Mansur	Xmas eve, Marriott (minor roles)	??	JI
26.	Andang alias Ridwan	Beteleme attacks, Poso	??	Kayamanya
27.	Arman alias Iwan	Beteleme attacks, Poso	??	Kayamanya
28.	Azhari Dipo Kusumo	Hiding Ali Imron	6 yrs	JI
29.	Chatib bin Kadri	Hiding Ali Imron	??	unclear
30.	Dadang Surachman	Illegal ammunition	??	DI
31.	Datuk Rajo Ameh	Xmas eve bombings, Riau	3 yrs	JI
32.	Edi Sugiarto	Xmas eve bombings, Medan	11 yrs	unclear
33.	Edi Suprpto Tsalabah ¹⁰⁰	Withholding info on training	3 yrs	JI
34.	Eko Hadi Prasetyo	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	4 yrs	unclear
35.	Farid Podungge ¹⁰¹	Illegal weapons	20 mos	Kayamanya
36.	Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan ¹⁰²	Withholding info, funding Marriott	4 yrs	JI
37.	Hamdan alias Komar	Beteleme attacks, Poso	4 yrs	Kayamanya
38.	Hamzah Baya ¹⁰³	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	6 yrs	unclear
39.	Hasyim alias Acim	Beteleme attacks, Poso	3.5 yrs	Kayamanya
40.	Hence Said Malewa ¹⁰⁴	Illegal weapons	20 mos	Kayamanya
41.	Hendra Yadi	Beteleme attacks, Poso	??	Kayamanya
42.	Heri Hafidin ¹⁰⁵	Hiding Imam Samudra, Bali I	7 yrs	DI/RB
43.	Imam Susanto ¹⁰⁶	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	4 yrs	unclear
44.	Karsidi	Illegal ammo	??	DI
45.	Muhajir bin Aman	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	4 yrs	unclear
46.	Muhamad Rusi alias Mujarot	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	5 yrs	unclear
47.	Munfiatun al-Fitri ¹⁰⁷	Withholding info on Noordin	3 yrs	JI
48.	Munir Ansori	Palopo bombing 2004	2.5 yrs	LasJ
49.	Nyole	Attacks in Mamasa, Sulawesi	??	TR/JI
50.	Puryanto	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	4 yrs, 8 mos	unclear
51.	Samuri Farich Mushofa	JI special forces training	3 yrs	JI
52.	Sirojul Munir	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	5 yrs	unclear
53.	Solihin als Rofi	JI special forces training	3.5 yrs	JI
54.	Solihin Djumpai als Pian	Weapons possession, Poso	2 yrs	Kayamanya
55.	Sofyan Hadi ¹⁰⁸	Hiding Ali Imron, Kaltim	6 yrs	unclear
56.	Son Hadi bin Muhajir ¹⁰⁹	Withholding info on Noordin	4 yrs	JI
57.	Sukastopo	Helping Ali Imron, Kaltim	3 yrs	unclear
58.	Surono	Illegal weapons; acquitted of Marriott	3 yrs	JI
59.	Syafri alias Aco GM	Beteleme attacks, Poso	4 yrs	Kayamanya
60.	Syamsul Bahri bin Hussein	JI special forces training	3 yrs	JI
61.	Usman bin Sef alias Fahim ¹¹⁰	Hiding Noordin and Azhari	3 yrs	JI
62.	Utomo alias Abu Faruq ¹¹¹	JI special forces training	??	JI

¹⁰⁰ Former treasurer, *wakalah* Lampung, JI.

¹⁰¹ Released but re-arrested in 2007 for bombing attempt in Poso in June 2007.

¹⁰² Younger brother of Hambali, detained by U.S. in Guantanamo.

¹⁰³ Former student of Ali Imron's in Lamongan, East Java.

¹⁰⁴ Acquitted of murder of prosecutor Fery Silalahi, a JI crime initially attributed to Hence's group.

¹⁰⁵ Senior figure in Darul Islam/Ring Banten, whose followers robbed a gold store to raise funds for Bali I.

¹⁰⁶ Former student of Ali Imron's, Lamongan, East Java.

¹⁰⁷ Married Noordin in secret ceremony June 2004.

¹⁰⁸ Former student of Ali Imron's in Lamongan, East Java.

¹⁰⁹ Briefly head of *wakalah* East Java, JI.

¹¹⁰ Head of *wakalah* East Java 1999-2003.

¹¹¹ Former head of *wakalah* Lampung.

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 145 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates twelve regional offices (in Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of the Andean region and Haiti.

Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development Research Centre, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for International Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.

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November 2007

APPENDIX E

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