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Issue Paper
LEBANON
RECONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY
November 1995

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GLOSSARY

FRC
: Fatah Revolutionary Council

ICRC
: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDF
: Israeli Defence Forces

LF
: Lebanese Forces

NERP
: National Emergency Rehabilitation Programme

PFLP--GC
: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command

PLO
: Palestine Liberation Organization

SLA
: South Lebanon Army

UNIFIL
: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNRWA
: United Nations Relief and Works Agency

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is intended to serve as an update on reconstruction and the security situation in Lebanon. It

follows four earlier DIRB reports on Lebanon: *Lebanon: The Political Situation since the October Elections* (Mar. 1993), *Lebanon: Chronology of Significant Events April 1975 September 1992* (Oct. 1992), *Lebanon: Aoun's Departure* (Nov. 1990), and *Lebanon: Aoun's Departure Chronology* (Nov. 1990).

Following the end of Lebanon's crippling 15-year civil war in 1990, the small country of 3 to 3.5 million [No official census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932 because of the potentially volatile issue of political power and confessional balance (United States Department of State Jan. 1994). At the end of the civil war the estimated population breakdown in Lebanon was: Shi'as 32 per cent, Maronites 24 per cent, Sunnis 21 per cent, Druzes 7 per cent, others 16 per cent, for an overall balance of about 60 per cent Muslims and 40 per cent Christians (FIDH May 1994a, 6).] has embarked on an ambitious reconstruction that has involved efforts to disarm the many warring militias, rebuild Lebanon's devastated infrastructure, and resettle the 500,000-750,000 Lebanese internally displaced by the war (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 5, 7; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131-8; United States Department of State Jan. 1994; FIDH May 1994a, 7; *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.Dec. 1994, 47). Many stresses remain, including the conflict with Israel in south Lebanon, the continuing presence and influence of the Syrian military, the unresolved status of the Palestinian refugees, and the ongoing reliance on a fragile and potentially volatile system of confessional balance in political and administrative structures. This paper will discuss the political and economic context of Lebanon's post-civil war reconstruction and the forces contributing to security and human rights concerns.

2. POLITICAL SITUATION

2.1 Brief Background

La lettre hebdomadaire de la FIDH provides a summary of the devastation wrought by Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, which brought onto Lebanese soil Syrian, Israeli and Iranian forces, unleashed Lebanese and Palestinian paramilitaries, and paralyzed the state; brought wars of influence between many different communities; killed 170,000 people--some 5-6 per cent of the population, including 40,000 children--disabled 100,000, displaced many more, and exiled upwards of 1 million people all around the world (FIDH May 1994a, 7).

By the late 1980s Lebanon had two governments, Christian and Muslim, vying for control, the Christians holding east Beirut, and the Muslims west Beirut (*Europa* 1994, 1799). The 1989 Taif agreement attempted to begin the difficult process of Lebanese national reconciliation: constitutional amendments would adjust the country's confessional balance so that half the National Assembly's seats would be reserved for Muslims and half for Christians, the number of deputies to the National Assembly would be increased, and militias in the country would be disarmed (*Europa* 1994, 1799; United States Department of State Jan. 1994; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131, 32). However, a revolt by General Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian who was commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Army, led to further fighting between Christian and Syrian forces, and amongst Christian forces themselves, before Aoun's downfall in October 1990 (*Europa* 1994, 1799; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 6; see also IRBDC Nov. 1990, 1-2). Since then there has been a period of consolidation of Syrian influence over Lebanon reflected in a series of accords between the two countries (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; FIDH May 1994a, 9; *Al-Hayah* 24 Mar. 1995; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 4). Under the Taif and subsequent agreements Syrian troops were to have withdrawn to the Bekaa Valley on the eastern frontier with Syria by mid-1992, but at time of writing they remain in much of the country (Moukheiber 17 Aug. 1995; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7, 8; FIDH May 1994a, 9). Syrian interest in Lebanon has deep historical, political and geographical roots, and observers report that the Syrian military presence will not be withdrawn until complex peace negotiations have been worked out with Israel concerning, among other issues, the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, the status of Palestinians, and the future of the Golan Heights (Hallée Apr. 1993, 65-71; Figuié 1994, 119; *The Lebanon Report* June 1995a, 5).

In Lebanon, Christian groups largely boycotted the 1992 elections for the National Assembly (*Europa* 1994, 1800; *Keesing's* 1994, R140). Rafik Hariri, a Saudi businessman born in Lebanon, became the prime minister on a platform of rebuilding Lebanon's economy, and has launched an ambitious reconstruction plan which has attracted considerable international funding (*Europa* 1994, 1801; United States Department of State Jan. 1994; IPS 10 Feb.

1995). The disarming of militia groups has been largely accomplished apart from some major exceptions: the Iranian-backed Hizbollah and its allies, and the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army (SLA), who are fighting in Israeli-occupied south Lebanon (HRW 1995, 297; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; *The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15; *The Lebanon Report* Jan. 1993, 6; *Europa* 1994, 1801). As well, during the disarmament, militia groups were reported to have retained small arms, and many were suspected of having cached heavier weaponry (*The Lebanon Report* Jan. 1993, 5-6; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 4-5). Lebanese officials are also concerned about the level of weaponry reportedly in Palestinian refugee camps, which are for the most part outside government control (*The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1994a, 12; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134).

The civil war forced many Lebanese to seek refuge within their religious or confessional groups in particular areas of the country (Figuié 1994, 267; Harik 1994, 45, 50; *ZipRep* 15-28 Feb. 1995, 3). According to Gérard Figuié, a former UN official and French ambassador in Beirut, many Christians fled areas in the north such as the Akkar Plain and Tripoli, which are now dominated by Sunnis, although in general the north remains Christian under Syrian control. According to his 1994 report, East Beirut is a Maronite Christian area, and West Beirut is Shi'a. The Chouf mountain has become majority Druze, and Jezzine, on the border of the south, has a concentration of Christians under Israeli influence. Also, in the Bekka Plain, Ba'albek is a Shi'a centre while Zahlé is mainly Christian (Figuié 1994, 267). The Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon reports that even after the end of the war in 1990, this process of confessional "compartmentalization" has continued to grow. The Assembly notes as an example "massive sales of land in the Bekka, the Shouf and Aley by Christians who had fled from these regions during the war and do not believe it is safe to return home" (*ZipRep* 15-28 Feb. 1995, 3).

Areas of control or influence exerted by the various security forces and militias are described in section 3. These forces include Lebanese and Syrian security forces, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and its militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Shi'a militias, including Hizbollah and Amal, and some anti-Arafat Palestinian militias. Lebanese human rights attorney Ghassan Moukheiber explains that within the areas controlled by all these groups, individuals who are in political accord with the dominant group in the area are generally not in danger (17 Aug. 1995). The exception comes in areas of south Lebanon where military skirmishes and shelling often result in accidental casualties (ibid.). Individuals opposed to the group controlling their particular area, however, can run into serious trouble, according to Moukheiber, sometimes even for relatively low-profile activities, depending on the situation (ibid.). In addition, people who try to flee a particular area for political reasons but who leave family behind risk retaliation against their relatives, according to Moukheiber (ibid.). However, in general travel to most areas of the country outside the Israeli-dominated southern "security zone" has become quite routine, according to Dr. Judith Harik, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. She reports a free flow of individuals, even to previously difficult areas, with Christians visiting Ba'albek for the first time and Muslims travelling to the famous cedars of Mount Lebanon (4 Sept. 1995). Young men are often questioned at checkpoints, however, and asked to produce car and identity documents, with checkpoints usually manned by either Lebanese or Syrian soldiers (ibid.).

2.2 Lebanese-Syrian Relationship

Syrian influence in Lebanon extends to military, political, and economic spheres of life (*The Lebanon Report* 2 Feb. 1994a, 4; *The Independent* 20 Aug. 1992; *MEI* 26 Aug. 1994b, 19, 20; FIDH May 1994a, 13; HRW 1995, 297; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131). A series of security agreements between the two countries in the early 1990s legalized the presence of the 30,000-40,000 Syrian troops now in Lebanon, and allowed for close cooperation between Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services (AI 4 Feb. 1992, 1-9; FIDH May 1994a, 18; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b; *Jane's Intelligence Review* 1 Mar. 1995). Thus the June 1991 Lebanese-Syrian Cooperation Pact states that "The security of Lebanon is the security of Syria, and Syria's security is part of Lebanon's" (qtd. in AI 4 Feb. 1992, 1). Further, the pact provides for cooperation between the security apparatuses of the two countries

> to exchange information of concern to either country with respect to the entry, movement and residence of foreigners, to fight crime and to apprehend and deter those responsible for such offences,

and to fight terrorism, drug-trafficking and political conspiracies (ibid., 2).

In political matters, the Lebanese government often consults with Syrian leaders, and is said to follow Syria's will concerning the prosecution of the war with Israel and negotiations of the possible peace (VOA 25 May 1995; *The Lebanon Report* 2 Feb. 1994a, 4; *MEI* 26 Aug. 1994a, 9). Political ties are so close, apparently, that when Basil al-Asad, the son of and heir apparent to the Syrian president, died in January 1994, the Lebanese parliament was suspended for five days, and Lebanon observed three days of national mourning with elaborate commemorations (*The Lebanon Report* 2 Feb. 1994a, 4). The two countries have also initiated at least one large joint economic project, and some 50,000 Syrians now legally work in Lebanon, many of them taking over low-wage jobs previously held by Palestinians (*MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 8, 9; ibid. 13 May 1994, 20; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a). The Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon claims that several hundred thousand Syrians now work in Lebanon illegally, driving the Lebanese unemployment rate to 32 per cent (*ZipRep* 1-30 Apr. 1995, 1, 4; ibid. 1-15 Feb. 1995, 2).

Syrian military presence in Lebanon is said to extend to all areas not controlled by Israel, with particular strength in the Bekaa Valley (Moukheiber 17 Aug. 1995; FIDH May 1994a, 9; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 11). People who are perceived to be in opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, or are considered a threat to the internal order in Syria, reportedly can be subject to sudden and arbitrary arrest by Syrian or Lebanese intelligence officers, ill-treatment, torture, prolonged incommunicado detention, and sometimes even removal to prison in Syria (FIDH May 1994a, 10-14; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 10, 11). Recent Syrian targets in Lebanon include members of the pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party and pro-Arafat Palestinian activists (Moukheiber 17 Aug. 1995; FIDH May 1994a, 14; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1133). Dr. Judith Harik says that the tight Syrian security presence has helped to minimize factional violence; within the context of the peace process, she explains, Syria does not want to have to worry about uncontrolled violence in Lebanon, and in fact wants the country to re-build smoothly. Thus the Syrians are pressuring opponents of their presence with arrests and brief detentions, but no mass assassinations or jailings have been reported even though oposition to the Syrian presence is known to be high (Harik 4 Sept. 1995). Ghassan Moukheiber explains that the number of arrests of Syrian opponents has decreased following a crackdown a few years ago, in reaction to which many people have chosen to keep a low profile (17 Aug. 1995). However, according to Moukheiber, enormous frustration exists among people who are opposed to Syrian policies and yet have no outlet to express their views (ibid.).

2.3 Israel and the South Lebanon "Security Zone"

Israel has maintained a military presence in parts of south Lebanon since 1978 (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 65ff; *The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10; *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994). Augustus Richard Norton, professor of international relations at Boston University, wrote in 1993 that

> Spasms of violence in southern Lebanon involving Israel and its enemies have become the norm, not to mention intra-Lebanese conflicts and Lebanese-Palestinian violence that has often, but not always, been an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Long neglected by the government in Beirut, the south, with its absence of legitimate authority, has acted like a magnet for regional powers intent on engaging Israel without jeopardizing their own borders (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 61).

Israel's "security zone" in south Lebanon is for the most part 10 to 15 kilometres wide and extends along the Israeli-Lebanese border for about eighty kilometres (see map), thus including approximately 800-850 square kilometres, or some 10 per cent of the area of Lebanon (FIDH May 1994a, 8; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 62; Reuters 27 Mar. 1993; AFP 20 Jan. 1995). The population of the zone has been estimated at 150,000-200,000, mostly Shi'a Muslims, while south Lebanon as a whole has a population of about 900,000 (Reuters 27 Mar. 1993; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 61-62; Xinhua 13 Jan. 1994; *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994).

In recent years the conflict in the region has been categorized as a "low-intensity war" by the spokesman

for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Timor Goksel (qtd. in *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994). UNIFIL has maintained a presence in the region since 1978 (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 65, 66). The main combatants are guerrilla groups, many of which come under the umbrella of the Iranian-backed Hizbollah (Party of God) or are anti-Arafat Palestinian factions, and soldiers of the Israeli army or of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army (SLA). The FIDH reported in May 1994 that fighting of some sort occurs most days (FIDH May 1994a, 22). Between July 1994 and January 1995, UNIFIL recorded 87 attacks by guerrilla groups against Israeli and SLA positions, with many other attacks taking place outside UNIFIL's area of observations. These attacks included the use of "roadside bombs, rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles" (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 4). In the same period UNIFIL counted over 16,000 artillery, mortar and tank rounds fired by Israeli and SLA forces in the area, sometimes aimed at villages (ibid.; see also *Foreign Report* 2 Mar. 1995, 3-4). Israeli airstrikes have been commonplace, and at times hit civilian targets (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 4; Radio Lebanon 7 Mar. 1995; ibid. 25 Feb. 1995; *Ha'aretz* 17 Jan. 1995; *MEI* 3 Feb. 1995, 18; ibid. 10 June 1994, 6-7; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134; *Middle East Times* 22-28 Jan. 1995b). As well, guerrillas periodically fire katyusha rockets into northern Israel, both sides thus breaking an agreement [This agreement was required to end the week-long July 1993 Israeli bombardment of villages in southern Lebanon which killed 130-150 civilians, wounded about 500, destroyed or damaged thousands of homes and precipitated the exodus of 300,000-350,000 southerners, many of whom took temporary refuge in Beirut during the crisis (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 3; AI 1994, 193; FIDH May 1994a, 33; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 71).] reached in July 1993 which in principle limited hostilities to non-civilian targets in southern Lebanon (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 71; *The Lebanon Report* Oct.-Nov. 1994a, 16; ibid. Sept. 1994, 11). In April 1995 Hizbollah announced that it would no longer honour the July 1993 agreement protecting civilians in south Lebanon and northern Israel (*The Ottawa Citizen* 1 Apr. 1995, A6).

In February 1995 Israel began a naval blockade which eventually spread to southern ports of Lebanon including Tyre and Saïda (Sidon), and which prohibited fishing vessels from sailing beyond 500 to 1,500 metres from shore (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995d, 10; *'Al Hamishmar* 27 Feb. 1995; *Al-Safir* 22 Feb. 1995; *Libération* 28 Feb. 1995). Many southern fishermen have reported being fired on, having their boats and equipment confiscated, and being arrested, questioned and beaten, and held for some days before being released (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995d, 10; Radio Lebanon 22 Mar. 1995; see also FIDH May 1994a, 22). The blockade has been accompanied by intensified fighting in the south (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995d, 10; Radio Lebanon 22 Mar. 1995; ibid. 7 Mar. 1995; ibid. 4 Apr. 1995; Voice of Lebanon 8 Mar. 1995).

Briefly lifted in March 1995 during a Middle East visit by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the blockade was quickly replaced after the end of the visit (*The Lebanon Report* Apr. 1995a, 11; *Al-Hayah* 24 Mar. 1995; *Al-Ra'y* 12 Mar. 1995). In installing the blockade, Israel was reportedly reacting to tightened security controls by the Lebanese Army on people crossing from the "security zone" into the rest of south Lebanon (UPI 26 Feb. 1995; *Al-Hayah* 3 Feb. 1995a, 63; ibid. 3 Feb. 1995b, 64; *'Al Hamishmar* 27 Feb. 1995; Radio Lebanon 22 Feb. 1995; *Al-Safir* 22 Feb. 1995). Israeli and SLA officials have complained about arrests and detentions by the Lebanese Army of people from the zone suspected of having dealings with Israel or acting as Israeli agents (*Al-Hayah* 3 Feb. 1995a; ibid. 3 Feb. 1995b; *Voice of the South* 22 Feb. 1995). Lebanese authorities imposed the heightened restrictions after a December 1994 car bomb, believed to have been planted by Israeli agents, killed three people, including a Hizbollah official, and injured several others in Beirut's southern suburb, where Hizbollah is headquartered (*MEI* 6 Jan. 1995, 14; *Mena* 6 Jan. 1995; UPI 26 Feb. 1995). This and other similar events have apparently convinced Lebanese, Syrian and Hizbollah authorities that Israeli "sleepers"--Lebanese or Palestinians who are hidden informants and agents--have infiltrated many areas of Lebanese society. A corresponding crackdown on suspects, which includes round-ups and increased surveillance, has been reported (*Foreign Report* 2 Mar. 1995, 3-4; ibid. 19 Jan. 1995, 1-2).

Crossing points between the "security zone" and the rest of south Lebanon are tightly guarded by members of the SLA, Israeli forces and the Lebanese Army. As indicated above, individuals come under close scrutiny and can expect to have their belongings searched (UPI 26 Feb. 1995; *Al-Hayah* 3 Feb. 1995a; ibid. 3 Feb. 1995b; *'Al Hamishmar* 27 Feb. 1995; Radio Lebanon 22 Feb. 1995; *Al-Safir* 22 Feb. 1995; *Country Reports 1994* 1995,

1136). Journalist Giles Trendle, crossing into the "security zone" in late 1993 through the village of Kfar Tebnit near Nabatiyyeh, describes the presence of barbed wire, earth and concrete ramparts, and heavily armed security. Writes Trendle,

> The border gate had just opened and already a stream of people were coming and going. A Druze elder, a veiled Shi'a mother and her children, a Christian family; all had to present a yellow identification paper, printed in both Arabic and Hebrew, to an SLA official in order to enter or leave the zone (*The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10).

The Lebanese Army tightly controls the passage of goods northward through the zone, and inhabitants, the majority of whom are Shi'a, have of necessity formed close economic ties with northern Israel; about 3,000-5,000 Lebanese from the "security zone" work in Israel (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 4; ibid. 20 July 1994, 3; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1136; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 64). As well, a large number work for or in coordination with the Israeli Civil Administration which governs the zone (*The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10). In this respect, sources have indicated that despite the frequent hostilities in the region, much of life in the "security zone" is surprisingly normal, with the local economy functioning fairly well and Israeli pay being comparatively high (ibid.; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993). However, sources also indicate that there is considerable apprehension about what will happen to Lebanese considered to be "collaborators" if and when the Israelis withdraw from the region (*Qol Yisra'el* 26 Feb. 1995; *The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993). Giles Trendle writes:

> The thousands of skilled workers, including doctors, nurses, engineers, and teachers, who have been employed by the Civil Administration, the social services system run by the Israelis and the SLA in the zone, are edgy about how the Lebanese state will view their work (*The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10).

The Lebanese penal code specifically prohibits acts considered aiding an "enemy" country such as Israel; article 285, for example, provides for a sentence of at least one year's imprisonment for doing business, directly or indirectly, with anyone resident in an enemy country (FIDH May 1994a, appendix). According to Ghassan Moukheiber, many people have been summarily tried in military courts in recent years for suspected Israeli collaboration and imprisoned, with or without evidence (17 Aug. 1995).

The SLA militia, which began as a predominantly Phalange Christian movement, now numbers many Shi'a Muslims who have been drawn in for the relatively high rates of pay, or possibly have been forcibly conscripted (*The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994; Reuters 12 Jan. 1994; ibid. 27 Mar. 1993; Xinhua 13 Jan. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994; HRW 1995, 297; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993). For their part, Israeli officials maintain that no Israeli withdrawal from the region will be negotiated unless SLA members are absorbed into the Lebanese Army in the same way that the army absorbed members of other disarming militias (*The Lebanon Report* Feb. 1995, 11; ibid. Dec. 1993, 10; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993). Commentators, meanwhile, have indicated that suspected SLA collaborators will probably be targeted by Hizbollah in the event of an Israeli withdrawal (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995c, 1; ibid. Dec. 1993, 10; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993; see also DIRB 27 June 1994). *Foreign Report*, a weekly published by the Economist Newspaper Ltd., indicated in November 1994 that Hizbollah was pressuring SLA members to desert by threatening to target collaborators who remain in the SLA after a brief period of grace. According to the report, because of the campaign, the Christian village of Rumayash had rebelled against the SLA and refused to supply them with any more recruits (*Foreign Report* 24 Nov. 1994, 6-7). In April 1995, parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, leader of Amal, claimed that the "security zone" was experiencing a large exodus of inhabitants, including the majority population of some towns like Marjeyoun, headquarters of the SLA, and that the population of the zone had dropped to 150,000 (*The Lebanon Report* Apr. 1995b, 7; UPI 1 Mar. 1995).

2.4 Reconstruction Overview

The Hariri government's emphasis on infrastructure rebuilding has brought considerable foreign investment

and an improved economy (IPS 10 Feb. 1995; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 5). After the end of the civil war the government, in cooperation with the World Bank, set up the multi-billion dollar National Emergency Rehabilitation Programme (NERP) which aims at infrastructure reconstruction in many areas, including the electrical, water, telecommunications, sewage, and waste disposal sectors (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 5; United States Department of State Jan. 1994). A council for Development and Reconstruction has also been set up (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 6). Solidere, a private real estate firm of which Prime Minister Hariri himself owns a considerable share, is managing a massive infrastructure renewal project in Beirut (US Dept. of State Jan. 1994; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994b, 20). Share prices in the company, which enjoys a 10-year tax exemption, have risen sharply and much of central Beirut has been razed to make way for the new buildings (*Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994b, 20; FIDH May 1994a, 35-36; *The Middle East* Jan. 1995). As well, a rehabilitation project for Beirut's southern suburb, a poor area which is predominantly Shi'a, has been initiated by the government (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995a, 4).

A number of sources indicate that the reconstruction of Lebanon will take a long time, and that a large proportion of the population is dealing with poverty and social tensions lingering from the civil war (FIDH May 1994a, 30; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994b, 20; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 5). Traffic jams in Beirut are legion reportedly because the telephone system has only been partially restored and thus people travel to meet rather than simply calling; cellular phones are filling some of the gap, for those who can afford them (IPS 10 Feb. 1995; *Middle East Times* 22-28 Jan. 1995a). Electricity is rationed to 12 hours per day in Beirut, and much less in other areas, while the electrical network is being rebuilt (*MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9; FIDH May 1994a, 30). A number of international companies are working to restore 24-hour electrical service throughout the country by the end of 1995, according to government projections (*The Lebanon Report* June 1995d, 13).

According to a May 1994 FIDH report, construction of new housing units is proceeding quickly in some areas, but there have been complaints that buildings are going up without reference to safety codes and without sewage systems (FIDH May 1994a, 34). As well, the FIDH report charges that the government is creating a glut of luxury housing in Beirut while most of the country is facing poverty; about a half million new homes will be needed by the year 2000 according to urban planners (ibid.). Sources also indicate that an environmental crisis is looming with some 80 per cent of the country's underground water reserves having been polluted during the war, and only a small percentage of original forest remaining (ibid., 30; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 13; see also *ZipRep* 16 to 31 Jan. 1995, 2).

An October 1993 United Nations report on the status of reconstruction in Lebanon praises the government for its handling of the July 1993 crisis which saw 350,000 southern residents flee Israeli bombardments and flood into Beirut and its southern suburbs, and Saïda (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 3-4; see also *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 73). According to the report, the government reacted "quickly and resolutely" to the emergency, not only responding well to the immediate needs of the internally displaced, but also following through afterwards with a concerted programme of reconstruction for damaged houses and villages (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 4; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 73). International aid, including US$500 million from the Arab League Council, was combined with internal efforts, not only from government but from other groups such as Hizbollah, which spent some US$50 million on southern reconstruction (ibid.; *The Globe and Mail* 2 May 1995, A8).

A number of countries, including Canada and Japan, have reopened embassies in Beirut; the British Council is planning to reopen theirs in late 1995 (*The Lebanon Report* Feb. 1995, 12; AFP 7 Feb. 1995). For several years the United States maintained a travel ban for Americans wishing to visit Lebanon (Radio Lebanon 1 Mar. 1995; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995b, 4). In September 1994, for example, the US government warned that Lebanon remained an unsafe country for Americans to visit, and that

> no US citizen can be considered safe from terrorist acts. While all of the known American hostages have been released, the organizations which abducted them continue to operate within the country. US passports are not valid for travel to, in or through Lebanon unless special validation has been

obtained. Due to an extremely limited staff and heightened security, the US Embassy in Beirut cannot perform normal consular functions (United States Department of State 6 Sept. 1994; see also United States Department of State Dec. 1994, 23).

However, many Americans of Lebanese origin have apparently been able to travel back to Lebanon within the regulations set up by the US Department of State (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995b, 4). In addition, a September 1995 announcement by President Clinton indicated an easing of travel restrictions for Americans to Lebanon, although written permission is still reportedly required and US airlines are still not allowed to fly directly to Lebanon (VOA 18 Sept. 1995). Britain also reportedly maintains a ban on travel for British tourists to certain areas in Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley, south Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut (Radio Free Lebanon 6 Apr. 1995).

Finally, an issue which is gaining prominence despite the country's reconstruction efforts is the reliance of many militias on profits from the drug trade to finance military activity (United States Department of State Jan. 1994; *Foreign Report* 6 Oct. 1994, 1-2). Past years have seen an increase in hashish, opium and cocaine production in Lebanon, mainly in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley (ibid.). According to *Foreign Report*, Syria is using the almost US$1 billion in revenues to finance its military presence in Lebanon (*Foreign Report* 6 Oct. 1994, 1-2). A March 1995 report by the U.S. Department of State indicates that in 1994 Lebanese and Syrian government efforts to fight the illegal drug trade meant a considerable reduction in the growing of hashish and opium poppies in the Bekaa Valley. However, this crackdown was countered by an increase in the processing of imported narcotics, so that "the number of heroin and cocaine laboratories increased significantly during 1994" (ibid.).

3. SECURITY SITUATION: MILITARY AND POLITICAL GROUPS

3.1 Lebanese Army and Intelligence

After the defeat of General Aoun in 1990, the Lebanese Army came under the command of General Emile Lahoud, and in the following year proceeded with operations aimed at disarming militia groups (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 6; *Europa* 1994, 1800). In March 1995 *Middle East International* estimated the size of the Lebanese Army at 55,000 soldiers, with police and auxiliaries numbering 15,000 (*MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9; see also *Jane's Intelligence Review* 1 Mar. 1995). This estimate is consistent with earlier reports that indicated that the Lebanese Army was rapidly growing through conscription and through incorporation of former militia members (Reuters 16 May 1993; Arab Press Service 20 Sept. 1993; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 8).

Some sources indicate that the Lebanese Army has emerged in recent years as a unified, competent fighting force capable of maintaining order (Reuters 16 May 1993; *MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9). Defense Minister Muhsin Dallul has complained of a shortage of arms and equipment, but claims that "as regards training, the Army has reached the top. With regard to discipline and national fusion, the Army is in a very reassuring condition" (*Al-Hayah* 24 Mar. 1995). A Reuters report from 16 May 1993 says that one instrumental change has been the practice of rotating brigades around the country in order to get away from the traditional influence of local warlords (see also *Jane's Intelligence Review* 1 Mar. 1995). Soldiers are also prohibited from meeting with politicians, and are very visible in the streets, directing traffic and manning checkpoints (Reuters 16 May 1993; *MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 7). *Jane's Intelligence Review* cites senior military officers who maintain that the integration of former militias into the Lebanese Army has gone very smoothly, and that even former Aoun supporters have been welcomed and are able to advance (1 Mar. 1995).

The Lebanese Army works in close coordination with the Syrian Army and together the two forces maintain a presence in most of the country excluding southern areas held by Israel or the SLA, and excluding refugee camps run by Palestinian authorities (*Al-Hayah* 24 Mar. 1995; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 6-7; APS 20 Sept. 1993; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; FIDH May 1994a, 9; HRW 1994, 322; *The Middle East* Oct. 1993). The Lebanese Army reportedly maintains checkpoints on roads leading to major cities and in the cities themselves (AI 4 Feb. 1992, 6; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1136; FIDH May 1994b, 58). In Beirut, the Lebanese Army has

largely taken over as the visible security presence at checkpoints, although the Syrian influence is still assumed to be strong (*MEI* 3 Mar. 1995; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 6-7; see also DIRB 26 Sept. 1994). Lebanese security forces also maintain a presence at the Beirut airport, along with Syrian security officers (AI 4 Feb. 1992, 8; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 14-15; HRW 1994, 322). Checkpoints reportedly are not always kept in fixed locations but can be moved according to security requirements (United Nations 20 July 1994, 3; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 6, 11; see also DIRB 26 Sept. 1994). Lebanese Army checkpoints are also found in many other areas, including those which have come under relatively recent army control, such as the Chouf region south of Beirut, as well as the crossing points along the border with the southern "security zone," and directly outside some Palestinian refugee camps south of Beirut (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.Dec. 1994, 86; *The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994; United Nations 20 July 1994, 3; *Al-Hayah* 3 Feb. 1995b; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993; FIDH May 1994b, 58; *The Jerusalem Report* 9 Mar. 1995; *Jane's Intelligence Review* 1 Mar. 1995). The Lebanese Army reportedly has the freedom to operate in any part of the country outside Israeli and SLA-held areas, but according to *Jane's Intelligence Review* the Syrian military is dominant in the Bekaa Valley, while the Lebanese Army has concentrated its forces in southern Lebanon (1 Mar. 1995).

Reports by FIDH and *Documentation-Réfugié s* indicate that Lebanese government internal security forces are multiplying, and that their strength, duties and areas of control are not very well known (FIDH May 1994a, 13; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 7). FIDH lists seven groups responsible for internal security: the prime minister's intelligence service, the president's intelligence service, the military police, the civilian police, the judicial police, the military security service, and the Second Bureau of the Ministry of Defence (FIDH May 1994a, 13). Lebanese internal security forces work closely with Syrian intelligence (ibid.; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 7; HRW 1995, 297; AI 4 Feb. 1992). The most active of the Lebanese security groups is reported to be the Second Bureau of the Ministry of Defence (ibid.). Numerous human rights abuses are associated with this group: detainees delivered to the Ministry of Defence are often reported to be held incommunicado for several days, ill-treated or tortured, before being released, transferred to other prisons, or sent for trial (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 7; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1133; FIDH May 1994a, 10; HRW 1995, 295). Sources indicate that the most likely types of people who would be sought by Lebanese internal security forces include those from confessional groups who are publicly against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, such as Lebanese Forces (LF) members and pro-Aounist individuals, and those believed to be working for Israel against Lebanon or Syria (FIDH May 1994a, 13-14; ibid. 22 Sept. 1994, 8; HRW 1995, 295; AI 1994, 193-194; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 6). *Country Reports 1994* gives one example of the treatment of certain people publicizing political opposition:

> In September [1994] the Army's intelligence services arrested several individuals for their alleged involvement in authoring and distributing a leaflet opposing Syrian influence in Lebanon. Ministry of Defense security officers reportedly beat the male detainees, hung them by their wrists, and beat them on the testicles during interrogation. The officers reportedly stripped two female detainees of their clothing and insulted them. During the interrogation, security officials did not allow the detainees access to their lawyers. The Government charged the detainees under Article 295 of the Penal Code (campaign aimed at weakening the national feeling or inciting sectarian discord) and Article 125 of the Military Code (conspiracy aimed at a leader's authority or soldier's security). Authorities detained the group for 23 days and then released them. No date has been set for trial (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1133).

According to FIDH, Lebanese security forces act with virtual impunity from prosecution in Lebanon (FIDH May 1994a, 14). A number of sources also indicate that the Lebanese judicial system at times comes under considerable political pressure, and that military courts summarily try a large number of political cases in which little room is allowed for defence (FIDH May 1994a, 14-15; HRW 1995, 295-296; ibid. 1994, 319; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 6-7; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994a; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134).

3.2 Syrian Army and Intelligence

As reported in section 2.2, the Syrian influence in Lebanon is pervasive, with 30,000-40,000 troops stationed in the country, and intelligence officers working both in coordination with Lebanese officials and autonomously (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7; FIDH May 1994a, 13; HRW 1995, 297; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 1-9; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131). Centred in the Bekaa Valley, Syrian forces are said to be present in most regions of the country, except for the occupied south and the Palestinian refugee camps; they are also said to control many major communication routes and to maintain a strong presence in Beirut airport and other ports of entry or exit (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7; HRW 1995, 297; ibid. 1994, 322; FIDH May 1994a, 9; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991, 11-13). In predominantly Christian areas, where opposition to Syria tends to be greater, the presence of uniformed Syrian soldiers is reportedly limited, but these areas are instead said to have a high concentration of plainclothes Syrian intelligence officers (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7).

Syria itself has been in an almost uninterrupted a state of emergency since 1963, and opposition to the government of President Hafiz Al-Asad is not tolerated (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1173-1174). As with the Lebanese security forces, Syrian security is reportedly most interested in targeting and arresting individuals from confessional groups who are suspected opponents of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, or suspected collaborators with Israel (HRW 1995, 297; FIDH May 1994a, 13-14; AI 1994, 193-194; see also section 2.2). Syrian forces maintain their own prisons in Lebanon, which are closed to international inspection (FIDH May 1994a, 18-19; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 7-8). Anjar prison, in the Bekaa Valley on the Lebanese-Syrian border, is the best known (FIDH May 1994a, 18-19; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7). In addition, about 600 Lebanese were being held in prisons in Syria, according to the FIDH team of inquiry which visited Lebanon in March 1994 (May 1994a, 19). The use of torture in Syrian prisons is reportedly common (AI 1994, 281; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1174).

A person apprehended by Lebanese authorities could end up in Syrian hands (FIDH May 1994a, 10-13, 18; AI 4 Feb. 1992, 7; Danish Refugee Council 24 June 1991; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1133, 1134; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7). The FIDH reports that such a person could be sent to the Hotel Beau Rivage in Beirut, the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence coordinator, and then possibly on to Anjar prison (FIDH May 1994a, 18). Many "arrests" are made by men in civilian dress, who might be Lebanese or Syrian agents, and who blindfold detainees before transporting them for interrogation (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 7; FIDH May 1994a, 10-13).

3.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and South Lebanon Army (SLA)

Sources indicate that Israel usually maintains about 1,000 soldiers in the southern "security zone," but that number can be boosted quickly in times of intensified fighting (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131; Reuters 27 Mar. 1993). The South Lebanon Army (SLA), Israel's proxy militia in the "security zone," has between 1,800 and 3,500 members (AFP 20 Jan. 1995; Xinhua 13 Jan. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994; ibid. 17 Apr. 1994; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* 20 Feb. 1994). There have been several reports in recent years of forced recruitment by the SLA, which, as previously stated, began as a mainly Christian Phalange movement but now includes a sizeable number of Shi'a Muslims (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 4; *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994; Reuters 12 Jan. 1994; ibid. 27 Mar. 1993; Xinhua 13 Jan. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994; HRW 1995, 297; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993). In January 1994, for example, a number of press reports indicated that SLA and Israeli soldiers had set up blockades in the western sector of the "security zone" and had taken to surrounding villages and storming houses in order to secure recruits (Reuters 12 Jan. 1994; Xinhua 13 Jan. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994). SLA commander General Antoine Lahd, however, claims that such reports are untrue: the SLA maintains conscription in the "security zone," he says, but those who do not want to serve are let go so as not to pose a security risk (*Manchester Guardian Weekly* 20 Feb. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994). Other reports, nonetheless, indicate that morale among the SLA is quite low for a variety of reasons: the difficult guerrilla war with Hizbollah, the possibility of a withdrawal of Israeli support and protection in the event of peace, and possibly the less than voluntary nature of service for some (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995c, 1; ibid. Dec. 1993, 10; *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994; *MEI* 3 Feb. 1995, 18-19). In order to boost local morale, Israeli political leaders frequently visit the south Lebanon "security zone," and SLA salaries have been substantially increased in recent years, while Israeli authorities are said to be paying considerable compensation to villages damaged in bombing (*The Lebanon Report* Feb. 1995, 11; ibid. Aug. 1994,

11; ibid. Apr. 1995b, 7; *The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994; UPI 14 Jan. 1994; *MEI* 3 Feb. 1995, 18-19).

As reported in section 2.3, the SLA and Israeli forces strictly control the movement of people and goods in the "security zone," while Lebanese Army troops closely check those entering or leaving the zone (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1136; UPI 26 Feb. 1995; *Al-Hayah* 3 Feb. 1995a; ibid., 3 Feb. 1995b; *'Al Hamishmar* 27 Feb. 1995; Radio Lebanon 22 Feb. 1995; *Al-Safir* 22 Feb. 1995; *Middle East Times* 28 Nov. 1993; see also DIRB 27 Sept. 1994).

The SLA maintains a number of prisons in the "security zone," the most notorious of which is the Khiyam prison near the SLA headquarters of Marjeyoun (UPI 1 Mar. 1995; *The Lebanon Report* Feb. 1995, 12; HRW 1995, 297). For a number of years the SLA and Israel have been strongly criticized for the terrible conditions, torture and ill-treatment associated with the Khiyam prison, and for the lack of access given to family members and international humanitarian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (FIDH May 1994a, 22-23; HRW 1995, 297; AI 1994, 194; United Nations 17 Jan. 1995). An estimated 14 prisoners have died from maltreatment at the prison, according to UPI (1 Mar. 1995). In February 1995, however, SLA authorities began allowing weekly family visits, and ICRC officials were able to escort a number of prisoners who were released to mark the Muslim holiday of *'Id al-Fitr* (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995c, 1; ibid. Feb. 1995, 12; *Voice of the South* 22 Feb. 1995; UPI 1 Mar. 1995). About 200 Lebanese prisoners, and an unknown number of Palestinians, remain in Khiyam prison, and human rights groups are still barred from examining the facility (ibid.; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1133-1134). Other SLAIsraeli detention centres in the "security zone" are reportedly located in the towns of Hasbaïya, Marjeyoun, and Bint Jbeil (FIDH May 1994a, 23). According to the Lebanese government, in total over 1,200 Lebanese prisoners are being held in the "security zone" (ctd. in ibid., 22); FIDH estimates another 100 have been sent to Israel for detention, these latter either captured during fighting or taken from villages or off boats (ibid. 24). Human Rights Watch reports that a number of Lebanese detainees have been held by Israel without charge or trial, or detained past the expiration of their sentences under preventative "administrative detention" (HRW 1995, 297).

Israeli security forces reportedly sometimes target opponents outside the "security zone" through assassinations or kidnappings using a range of high technology weaponry, including helicopters and missiles (*The Globe and Mail* 2 May 1995, A8; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1132; *MEI* 6 Jan. 1995, 14). In May 1994, for example, Israeli commandos arrived by air and abducted Mustapha Dirani, a leader of a small resistance group allied with Hizbollah, from the central Bekaa Valley, a region under tight Syrian control. Dirani, who according to Israeli officials was kidnapped to provide information about a downed Israeli pilot, is being held in Israel (*Foreign Report* 26 May 1994, 1-3; *The Lebanon Report* June 1994, 6; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1132). Shortly after this abduction, an Israeli air raid killed at least 30 Hizbollah recruits at a newly established training base close to the Syrian border (*Foreign Report* 9 June 1994, 4; *MEI* 10 June 1994, 6-7). These types of high-profile attacks reveal an extraordinary intelligence network maintained by the Israeli security forces, which, according to *Foreign Report*, includes "hundreds of agents and informers in all walks of Lebanese life" (2 Mar. 1995, 3; see also ibid. 26 May 1994, 1-3; ibid. 6 Apr. 1995, 4-5). Yet other incidents reveal arbitrary attacks by Israeli forces and the SLA on civilian targets, including retaliation against villages following guerrilla strikes (*Foreign Report* 3 Nov. 1994, 2-3; ibid. 31 Mar. 1994, 6). According to a June 1994 *Foreign Report*, "almost every day Israel's air force hits Hizbullah batteries as Israeli reconnaissance planes and drones criss-cross Lebanese air space in search of targets: two men spotted on a motorscooter in the wrong place at the wrong time can warrant a full Israeli air strike" (*Foreign Report* 30 June 1994, 1-2).

3.4 United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL)

In January 1995 the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) had 5,001 soldiers from nine different countries, the largest contributor of which was Norway with 842 (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995). UNIFIL's mandate since it was established in 1978 has been to oversee the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 62). That withdrawal has not yet happened, and UNIFIL has traditionally found its range of operations quite limited for a number of reasons. UNIFIL's headquarters are established in Israeli-controlled

Naqura, and most of its civilian staff and military observers live in northern Israel. Thus supply lines run through Israel, as does the telephone network, and an area of operations run by the SLA down the centre of the "security zone" divides UNIFIL forces geographically (*Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 62-66; *Monde arabe* Oct.-Dec. 1991, 33). Militarily, the force is not equipped to separate warring sides or enforce peace, and indeed can find itself under attack, at times relying on the intervention of Lebanese Army officers to defuse confrontations with armed elements (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 3, 5; Reuters 27 Mar. 1993; *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1993, 66). Over 200 UNIFIL soldiers have died in south Lebanon since 1978 (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 3).

Yet UNIFIL's presence in the south has had a stabilizing effect over the years, and according to a 1991 report UNIFIL contributes US$50-70 million per year to the local economy (*Monde arabe* Oct.-Dec. 1991, 34-37). As well, UNIFIL troops perform many functions: detonating unexploded mines, providing emergency assistance to civilians caught in the war zone, helping to reconstruct damaged villages, escorting farmers to their fields near UNIFIL positions, implementing development projects, and providing medical and dental care (United Nations 23 Jan. 1995, 5).

3.5 Shi'a Factions

3.5.1 Hizbollah

The roots of Shi'a militancy can be traced to radicalism among the socio-economically deprived Shi'a community in Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in south Lebanon led to intense frustration among southern Shi'as and the creation of the first Shi'a militancy, the Movement of the Deprived (Amal), under the leadership of Musa al-Sadr. The early 1980s brought a split in the militancy, and by the time of the Israeli invasion of 1982 Hizbollah had emerged with strong Iranian backing (*Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 35-37; ibid. Winter 1992, 10; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 5; *MEI* 9 Sept. 1994, 16; *The Globe and Mail* 2 May 1995, A8). Hizbollah's traditional goal has been to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and to fight Western influences there, and the group has been associated in the West with suicide bombings and the taking of hostages (ibid.; *The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15; United States Deparment of State Apr. 1995). The last of the Western hostages were released in 1992 under pressure from Syria and the US, and Hizbollah has publicly stated there will be no more abductions of Westerners, but the group has been associated with kidnappings of suspected Israeli collaborators since then (*Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 39; AFP 5 Jan. 1995; *The Lebanon Report* July 1994, 11).

Hizbollah is against the PLO-Israeli accords of September 1993 and has been accused of fighting the war in south Lebanon in order to disrupt the larger Arab-Israeli peace process in the Middle East (*Terrorism and Political Violence* Autumn 1994, 324; AI 1994, 194; *The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1993, 10; United Nations 1 Aug. 1994, 1-2). Iran has traditionally provided Hizbollah's main financial and military support, but according to a variety of sources Hizbollah would not be able to operate freely in Lebanon without the blessing of Syria, which in turn appears to wield considerable influence over Hizbollah's actions (HRW 1995, 297; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4-5; *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 38: *MEI* 26 Aug. 1994a, 9; ibid. 26 Aug. 1994b 19, 20; Israel Foreign Ministry 6 June 1994). According to a *Foreign Report* article of May 1995, Iran's funding of Hizbollah has dropped off, with Iran facing its own economic crisis, and the Iranian leadership apparently unhappy with Hizbollah's recent military performance and with suspected Israeli infiltration of its military operations (4 May 1995a, 1-2). Lebanese government control over Hizbollah, which remains legally armed in order to fight the war in south Lebanon, is said to be limited (HRW 1995, 297-298; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994a). However, Hizbollah officials have cooperated with both Lebanese and Syrian officials in handing over suspected Israeli agents, and Hizbollah is reportedly respectful of Lebanese Army positions in south Lebanon (*Foreign Report* 2 Mar. 1995, 3-4; ibid. 21 July 1994, 4).

Estimates of the number of Hizbollah fighters vary from 300 to 3,500, the disparities possibly due to the loose structure of Hizbollah, which includes many affiliates (*The Toronto Star* 20 Feb. 1994; *Journal of South Asian*

and Middle Eastern Studies Spring 1993, 38, 40; ibid. Winter 1992, 10). Hizbollah is also heavily involved in community, religious and development work, and has a powerful block of elected members in the National Assembly (*The Globe and Mail* 2 May 1995, A8; *MEI* 9 Sept. 1994, 16; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 5; *The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15; *Third World Quarterly* 1993, 327-328). Sources indicate that Hizbollah maintains a strong presence among predominantly Shi'a areas such as West Beirut and the southern suburbs, Ba'albek and the Bekaa Valley in the east, and southern Lebanon (United States Department of State Apr. 1995; *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 28; ibid. Winter 1992, 11-12; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 5; Israel Foreign Ministry 6 June 1994; *Third World Quarterly* 1993, 327).

Hizbollah maintains a strong separation between its political and military wings, reportedly in order to distance the political side from the military operations and to maintain military secrecy (Economist Intelligence Unit 3rd quarter 1993, 11; *Terrorism and Political Violence* Autumn 1994, 308). The military wing is further divided into two sections, the Islamic Resistance, which in coordination with other guerrilla groups is fighting the war in southern Lebanon, and the Jihad Organization, an undercover military wing which goes by several pseudonyms and is reportedly responsible for bombings, assassinations and abductions (*The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 5; *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 41).

Hizbollah has been accused of maintaining its own ad-hoc judicial system in areas under its control (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994a; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 5). The Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon reported in April 1995, for example, that Hizbollah had "arrested" over 30 suspected Israeli collaborators (*ZipRep* 1-30 Apr. 1995, 3). In February 1994, Husayn Awada, a youth who reportedly murdered a mother and her two children, was executed in Ba'albek by the Hizbollah (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994a; HRW 1995, 297; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134). According to Ghassan Moukheiber,

> Hizballah has established an elaborate and organized court structure to complement its military and socio-economic activities and services. These courts rule according to Islamic law and not according to tribal rules and traditions, as is often the case in the Ba'lbakHermel area.... Because of unfortunate government weakness, Hizballah structures still remain outside state control, and those responsible for the Ba'lbak execution remain unprosecuted (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994a).

According to Human Rights Watch, human rights violations associated with Hizbollah include beatings, abductions and summary executions (HRW 1994, 297).

3.5.2 Amal and Islamic Amal

The Shi'a Amal movement (Arabic for "hope") emerged in south Lebanon in the mid-1970s, and by the early 1980s had split into two distinct groups, the mainstream Amal movement, supported by Syria and led by the current parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, and the more radical Islamic Amal, which is affiliated with Iran and Hizbollah, and is led by Hussein Musawi (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4; *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 40; ibid. Winter 1992, 8-10; *The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15). Islamic Amal is centred in Ba'albek and the Bekaa Valley and received considerable help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards until most of the latter group was withdrawn from the Bekaa Valley in 1991 (*The Middle East* Nov. 1994, 15; *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Spring 1993, 40). According to Haleh Vaziri of Georgetown University, Islamic Amal is working towards the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Lebanon, while Amal

> is essentially reformist and has not wished to duplicate the Iranian revolution in Lebanon. Amal's leader acknowledged Lebanon's multi-sectarian character; he bowed to Syrian pressure and accepted the power-sharing arrangement spelled out in the Ta'if agreement (*Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* Winter 1992, 15).

During the civil war, Amal was considered an arm of Syria, and at various times fought against Christians, Palestinians, Communists, and Hizbollah (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4; Xinhua 27 Jan. 1995; *The*

Lebanon Report Apr. 1994, 11). The Syrian connection has been maintained, and although the Amal militia was officially disbanded in 1991, it has kept part of its militia and weaponry, and returned to fighting in south Lebanon in late 1993 with Syrian backing (*Foreign Report* 20 Jan. 1994, 4-5; ibid. 4 May 1995b, 3; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4). The return to fighting has been interpreted as an attempt by Nabih Berri to restore Amal's power base before a possible peace in the area (*Foreign Report* 20 Jan. 1994, 4-5). Like Hizbollah, Amal has bases in Beirut's southern suburbs and in south Lebanon (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 30 Jan. 1995; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4). The rivalry between Amal and Hizbollah was put to rest in 1991, but reportedly became violent again in February 1994 as fighting broke out in several south Lebanon villages, with Hizbollah moving into areas traditionally held by Amal (*Foreign Report* 17 Mar. 1994).

3.6 Palestinian Factions

The many Palestinian factions present in Lebanon are essentially split over the September 1993 PLO-Israeli accord which provided for limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, but which left the future of Palestinians in Lebanon uncertain (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7; *The Middle East* Oct. 1993; AP 11 Apr. 1994; AFP 20 Nov. 1993). Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, signatory to the agreement, has seen his own Fatah party split into pro- and anti-Arafat factions, with incidents of fighting being regularly recorded in Arafat's former stronghold, the large refugee camp at Aïn al-Hilweh near Saïda (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995c, 7; Voice of Lebanon 10 Feb. 1995; ibid. 6 Jan. 1995; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7; AP 11 Apr. 1994; *The Jerusalem Report* 9 Mar. 1995; *MEI* 2 Dec. 1994, 11). In 1991 the Lebanese Army fought Palestinian militias during the disarmament campaign, but much weaponry was maintained by the Palestinian groups (AI 4 Feb. 1992, 3). Widespread arrests of Palestinians took place after the fighting, but the complete disarmament of Palestinian factions remained an ongoing project for the Lebanese Army (AI 4 Feb. 1992, 3; UPI 11 Apr. 1994; AFP 21 Apr. 1994; *The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1994a, 12).

One of the most powerful anti-Arafat factions is a Fatah splinter group called Black September 13 Brigades, led by Munir Maqdah. This group controls a substantial portion of the Aïn al-Hilweh camp, and Maqdah is said to regularly collaborate with Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian authorities (*The Jerusalem Report* 9 Mar. 1995; AFP 20 Nov. 1993). Abu Nidal is the leader of the Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC), another Palestinian group which has fought against Arafat (AI 1994, 194). The FRC has been implicated in several terrorist attacks, including the murders of a number of Jordanian diplomats, the most recent occurring in January 1994, and for which six FRC members received sentences of up to life imprisonment (AFP 11 Feb. 1995; ibid. 21 Apr. 1994). In April 1994 the Lebanese Army closed an FRC base at Aita al-Foukhar in the western Bekaa Valley, seizing 25 truck-loads of armaments and arresting 18 FRC members (AFP 21 Apr. 1994; *The Lebanon Report* May 1994b, 12). The location of the FRC headquarters is secret, with Abu Nidal apparently moving often between Libya and Lebanon (AFP 11 Feb. 1995).

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC), led by Ahmed Jibril, is also strongly opposed to the PLO-Israeli accord (United States Department of State Apr. 1995; *The Middle East* Oct. 1993). This group has been active in the war against Israel and the SLA in south Lebanon, allying with Hizbollah and reportedly receiving support from Syria and Iran (ibid.; *Ha'aretz* 21 Dec. 1994; Voice of Lebanon 21 Jan. 1995; ibid. 20 Jan. 1995; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7). The Israelis have targeted their headquarters in Ni'meh, just south of Beirut, for air raids and bombardments a number of times (Voice of Lebanon 15 Jan. 1995; *The Lebanon Report* Feb. 1995, 12; ibid. Feb. 1994b, 11-12).

According to *Country Reports 1994*, Palestinian groups operate their own "autonomous and arbitrary system of justice" in the refugee camps (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134). Reports indicate that political infighting between Palestinian groups has undermined security in the camps, contributing to rising tension among Palestinians (Reuters 10 Feb. 1995; *Democratic Palestine* Apr.-June 1993, 14; *The Middle East* Oct. 1993).

For a discussion of other issues concerning the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, please see section 4.2.

3.7 Lebanese Forces

The Lebanese Forces (LF) were, during the 1980s, the largest and most powerful Christian militia in Lebanon (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4; Xinhua 31 Mar. 1994; *The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994). They opposed the Syrian and Palestinian presence and fought for a federal Lebanon in which Christians would play a strong role (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4). They also collaborated with the 1982 Israel invasion and became notorious for killing hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps that year (*The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994). In 1991 they were officially disarmed and turned into a political party; however the group retained caches of weapons, and in 1992, 27 members were arrested for allegedly attempting to re-form a militia (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4; *The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994; Xinhua 31 Mar. 1994). In March 1994 the LF was banned by the government apparently in connection with the February 1994 bombing of a Christian Maronite church in Jounieh, north of Beirut, which killed 11 people and injured more than 40 others (HRW 1995, 298; *The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994; *MEI* 15 Apr. 1994, 9). LF offices were raided and many LF members were detained and, reportedly, tortured before some were released (*The The Christian Science Monitor* 8 Apr. 1994; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 4; FIDH May 1994a, 40). A number of top LF members, including leader Samir Ja'ja (Geagea), were charged with the church bombing and with the murder of former leader of the National Liberal party Dany Chamoun and his family in 1990 (*The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1995a, 5; *MEI* 1 Apr. 1994; Reuters 27 Apr. 1995). [A 1991 amnesty law excuses most crimes committed during the civil war, except for massacres and assassinations of political or religious leaders or diplomats (HRW 1994, 320). According to Human Rights Watch, the exceptions to the amnesty law are being used to selectively pursue LF and other opposition members while leaders of pro-Syrian militias possibly guilty of similar acts during the war are being protected (HRW 1995, 296, 320).] Ja'ja and others were found guilty of the Chamoun murders in June 1995; their death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, with observers speculating that a political deal might free the former LF leader if he agrees to leave the country (*The Lebanon Report* July 1995b, 6; *The Independent* 25 June 1995).

Before they were banned, the LF maintained a strong presence in areas in the north, with their headquarters in north Beirut (HRW 1995, 297; Xinhua 31 Mar. 1994).

4. REFUGEES AND THE DISPLACED

4.1 Lebanese Resettlement

In late 1992 the new government created the Ministry for the Affairs of the Displaced, headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 7; FIDH May 1994a, 33; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994a, 6). The civil war had displaced some 70,000 families, 500,000-750,000 people in all (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 7; FIDH May 1994a, 7). According to Ministry figures cited by FIDH, during the war 949 villages or towns throughout the country were displaced, with 83 completely destroyed and 91 partially destroyed (FIDH May 1994a, 32). In all, 35,000-50,000 homes were irreparably damaged in the conflict (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47; *Monde arabe* 1st trimester 1994, 187).

Efforts to return and resettle displaced Lebanese are ongoing, but the task has been complicated by a number of factors, including the need for the Lebanese Army to secure areas, for damaged and destroyed infrastructure to be rebuilt, for squatters to be compensated and relocated, and for funds to be obtained to carry out all these tasks (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47, 86; United Nations 21 Sept. 1994, 33; ibid. 6 Oct. 1993, 7; FIDH May 1994a, 33-34; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994b, 6). During the war many of the displaced went to areas of Beirut and stayed with relatives or squatted in abandoned apartments and buildings (Economist Intelligence Unit 3rd quarter 1993, 12; *Monde arabe* 1st trimester 1994, 186-187). Much of central Beirut has now been razed to make way for reconstruction, and compensation of up to US$5,000 has been paid to families squatting in the area (*Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20; *MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9; ibid. 13 May 1994, 20; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994b, 6; FIDH 24 May 1994a, 35-36; *The Middle East* Jan. 1995). In addition, the Ministry has been giving up to US$9,500 to Lebanese families to help them rebuild their homes; by

the end of 1994 some 7,000 families had been compensated (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47). However, there have been complaints by Christians and Palestinians of unfairness in the pay-outs, and sources indicate that underfunding has slowed the resettlement effort (*ZipRep* 1-31 Dec. 1994, 5-6; *The Lebanon Report* Mar. 1994b, 6; *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20-21; FIDH May 1994a, 33-34; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 7). An estimated US$500 million is required to resettle the displaced in Lebanon (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47).

Reports indicate that some Christians and Druze have been returning to areas abandoned during the war, including the Chouf region south of Beirut and the Metn district north of Beirut (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47, 86; *The Lebanon Report* Oct.-Nov. 1994a, 13; ibid. Aug. 1994, 11). Marilyn Raschka reports in *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* that the Chouf resettlement is taking place gradually, with families choosing to commute from Beirut on weekends to rebuild their properties while waiting for the renewal of essential services, such as electricity, and the reopening of schools (*The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* Nov.-Dec. 1994, 47, 86). In December 1994 the Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon reported that only 15 per cent of all the displaced had been able to return to their homes (*ZipRep* 1-31 Dec. 1994, 5-6), and, as noted in section 2.1, in February 1995 they reported that many Christians were selling their properties in the Chouf, Bekka and Aley regions because they did not believe it was safe to return (ibid. 15-28 Feb. 1995, 3).

4.2 Palestinians

Estimates of the number of Palestinians in Lebanon range from 350,000 to 600,000 (*MEI* 13 May 1994, 19; FIDH May 1994b, 58; *Index on Censorship* Nov.Dec. 1994, 175; IPS 27 Apr. 1995). At the end of June 1994 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) had registered almost 340,000 Palestinians (United Nations 21 Sept. 1994, 32). Not all Palestinians in Lebanon are allowed to be registered with UNRWA, however, only those who originally arrived in 1948-49, displaced by the Arab-Israeli wars, and their descendants (*Revue d'études Palestiniennes* Summer 1993, 56; FIDH May 1994b, 61; *The Middle East* Mar. 1993, 20). Some 48 per cent of registered Palestinians in Lebanon live outside refugee camps and 52 per cent live inside the camps, according to UNRWA (Mar. 1995, 1). All registered Palestinians are allowed to receive international aid, and have a residence card and travel document that is shared with their families (FIDH May 1994b, 61). Palestinians who were in Lebanon in 1949 but did not register at the time got a temporary or permanent resident permit, and eventually a travel document; they have the right to government aid, but not international aid. Palestinians forced to emigrate to Lebanon after 1949, such as during the 1967 war, have no right to residence or travel documents, or government or international aid (FIDH May 1994b, 61). UNRWA began replacing old registration cards in late 1992 with new ones that are to be regularly updated, indicating the family's original village and region in Palestine, present area of residence, identification number, and the names of all those eligible to receive UNRWA benefits. This new registration has raised suspicions that UNRWA is trying to take away the right of return of Palestinians who have temporarily moved out of Lebanon for work purposes (*Revue d'études Palestiniennes* Summer 1993, 38; *Democratic Palestine* April-June 1993, 13; see also *The Lebanon Report* June 1995b, 9).

Palestinians were originally set up in 16 refugee camps spread throughout Lebanon; after the destruction of the civil war, a dozen or so are left, and many of these are in very bad condition, having been partially destroyed during the war (FIDH May 1994b, 56, 60; Reuters 10 Feb. 1995; *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; *Democratic Palestine* Apr.-June 1993, 11; *The Middle East* Mar. 1993, 20). UNRWA began reconstruction of the camps after the war, but in January 1994 the government of Lebanon halted their efforts, and now maintains a policy of discouraging camp reconstruction, as well as curtailing expansion of existing camps and not allowing the creation of new ones (*MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20; *The Lebanon Report* June 1995c, 10; ibid. May 1994a, 7; see also *The Middle East* Mar. 1993, 20). Private efforts to rebuild are reportedly taking place in some areas, but in an atmosphere of great uncertainty over the future of the camps (*The Lebanon Report* June 1995c, 10; *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20).

About 6,000 Palestinian families were displaced at the end of the war, according to UNRWA: "3,000 in the

Sidon area, 1,675 in Beirut, and 474, 464 and 340 in the North, Beqaa and Tyre respectively" (ctd. in *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; see also United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 17; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20). Most of these Palestinians came from camps that had been destroyed during the war, or they were people who had no right to settle in camps in the first place. Many settled in abandoned buildings or makeshift dwellings, and in the past few years have faced an eviction crisis as previous owners return (*MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 17; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20). The government officially provided a maximum of US$5,000 for families squatting in Beirut to ease their eviction, but Rosemary Sayigh reports in *Le Monde Diplomatique* that many Palestinian families did not get the full compensation, and that most Lebanese families had homes to return to, while the Palestinians did not (Oct. 1994a, 20; see also *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20). According to UNRWA, "A new survey in early 1994 showed that 4,175 displaced [Palestinian] families still had not found or been provided with satisfactory housing" (United Nations 21 Sept. 1994, 33).

A number of sources mention the existence of checkpoints at refugee camp entry sites (*Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7; *MEI* 2 Dec. 1994, 11; *The Middle East* Mar. 1993, 20; *The Jerusalem Report* 9 Mar. 1995; DRC 24 June 1991, 9). The Lebanese government has little or no authority in the camps, which are run by Palestinian groups, and which maintain their own prisons and a judicial system that is "arbitrary" according to *Country Reports 1994*, and strongly influenced by the PLO according to *Documentation-Réfugiés* (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1131, 1134; *Documentation-Réfugiés* 1225 Apr. 1994b, 7). Amnesty International, for example, mentions in its 1994 report that in June 1993 the PLO's main faction Fatah released 78 members of the FRC who had been held in prison in Aïn al-Hilweh, leaving 12 others still incarcerated, two of them facing the death penalty (AI 1994, 194).

According to a 1959 decree, Palestinians living outside the refugee camps, who have residence rights, are allowed to change their residence and travel freely in Lebanon as long as they notify Lebanese authorities, while those living in the camps must obtain permission to change camps (FIDH May 1994b, 61; see also DIRB 11 Aug. 1994). However, many Palestinians cannot afford to live outside the camps; those who do often end up in abandoned buildings or living in sprawling residential areas similar to the camps (*MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; ibid. 2 Dec. 1994, 11; FIDH May 1994b, 60, 65).

Palestinians face systemic difficulties living in Lebanon. Work permits are very difficult to obtain for Palestinians, who are considered foreigners in the country: in order to qualify, they must be married to a Lebanese or have been living in Lebanon since before 1954, and working there since before 1960 (FIDH May 1994b, 62). The only sectors that do not require work permits are construction and seasonal work; professions such as law, medicine, pharmacy, and engineering are closed to Palestinians (ibid.; *Revue d'études Palestiniennes* Summer 1993, 58; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 20). In addition, Palestinians do not qualify for social assistance and have no protection from arbitrary dismissal from employment (FIDH May 1994b, 63; *Revue d'études Palestiniennes* Summer 1993, 58-59). As well, in recent years many thousands of Syrians have begun working in Lebanon, competing with Palestinians for low-wage unskilled or semi-skilled work (*MEI* 3 Mar. 1995, 9; *ZipRep* 1-30 Apr. 1995, 4).

Unemployment in Palestinian refugee camps is estimated at 40 per cent; in the largest camp, Aïn al-Hilweh, only 20 per cent of the men have regular employment (*Middle East Report* Jan.-Feb. 1994, 20; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 21; see also FIDH May 1994b, 65). UNRWA, which provides a wide range of social assistance in education, health, emergency relief and other sectors, is facing reductions in its funding, which have meant reduced services (*ZipRep* 16-31 Jan. 1995, 4; *The Lebanon Report* June 1995b, 9; United Nations 6 Oct. 1993, 16-17; ibid. 21 Sept. 1994, 32; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 21). The PLO, another traditional provider of financial support, saw its own resources strained as a result of its pro-Iraqi stance in the Gulf War, and has shifted its priorities after the September 1993 PLO-Israeli accord; social disbursements by the PLO to Palestinians in Lebanon reportedly fell from US$450,000 in 1991 to US$30,000 in 1994 (*ZipRep* 1-31 Dec. 1994, 6; *The Lebanon Report* June 1995b, 8; *Index on Censorship* Nov.Dec. 1994, 175; UPI 13 Oct. 1993; AFP 20 Nov. 1993; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 21).

Lebanese public education is reportedly largely closed to Palestinians, while private education is usually beyond their financial resources (FIDH May 1994b, 64). UNRWA funds 77 schools for Palestinians in Lebanon, which operate "relatively normally" according to UNRWA (United Nations 21 Sept. 1994, 31). One example of the difficulties facing Palestinians, however, is provided by a technical college in Sibline created by the UN for Palestinians but which, due to Lebanese employment restrictions, is usually only able to place its graduates abroad (FIDH May 1994a, 64).

Sources indicate that the government of Lebanon, as well as the majority of Lebanese, are strongly opposed to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, and to the granting of Lebanese citizenship to a sizeable number of Palestinians (*The Lebanon Report* June 1995b, 8; ibid. Dec. 1994b, 5; ibid. May 1994a, 7; AFP 18 Apr. 1994; *Al-Hayah* 27 Mar. 1995). It is believed that the addition of over 300,000 Palestinians, mostly Sunni Muslims, to the Lebanese voting population would upset the delicate confessional balance, and would be opposed by Shi'as and Christians (*The Jerusalem Report* 9 Mar. 1995; *The Middle East* Mar. 1993, 20; AFP 18 Apr. 1994; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 21; *MEI* 13 May 1994, 19). Faris Buwayz, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, has proposed a resettlement solution which would see 20 per cent of Palestinians move to the new autonomous areas in Gaza and Jericho, 25 per cent rejoin their families in other countries, and the rest be absorbed by countries such as Canada, Australia and the Arab Gulf states (*MEI* 13 May 1994, 19; AFP 18 Apr. 1994; *Le Monde Diplomatique* Oct. 1994a, 21; *The Lebanon Report* Sept. 1994, 12). In this light, some sources have commented that the government appears to be encouraging a Palestinian exodus from Lebanon through its restrictive domestic policies, and by making it relatively easy for Palestinians to receive permission to travel to Europe or North America (*The Lebanon Report* Dec. 1994b, 5; *MEI* 13 May 1994, 20; AFP 18 Apr. 1994; FIDH May 1994b, 62).

Within Lebanon, according to *Country Reports 1994*, "Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and harassment by the state security forces, Syrian security forces, the various militias, and rival Palestinian factions" (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1134). The difficulties faced by the Palestinians seem to some only to have been compounded by the PLO-Israeli accord, which might signal the abandonment of many Palestinians in an unwelcoming Lebanon (AFP 20 Nov. 1993; *The Middle East* Oct. 1993; *Middle East Report* Jan.-Feb. 1994, 20; *Al-Hayah* 27 Mar. 1995). The *Middle East Report* sums up their situation this way:

> A once thriving, prosperous and fairly autonomous community now unimaginably impoverished and under unrelenting surveillance and control, Palestinians in Lebanon can do little more than protest. Much hinges upon possible agreements between Israel and Syria and between Lebanon and Israel. Their options minimal, for now, the future holds little except uncertainty and anxiety (*Middle East Report* Jan.-Feb. 1994, 20).

For further information and updates on Lebanon, please consult the REFINFO database and sources available at Immigration and Refugee Board Regional Documentation Centres.

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La fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH), a Paris-based human rights advocacy group, sent four senior members to Lebanon in March 1994 to evaluate the human rights situation. Staying in Beirut, they met with a variety of representatives from the legal profession, former political prisoners, journalists, politicians, NGO representatives, union leaders, human rights activists and others. Their report is wide-ranging and discusses many aspects of the human rights and security situation in Lebanon. FIDH also sent Georges-Henri Beauthier to Lebanon in June 1993 to report on the situation of Palestinians. Beauthier's report comments on the social, historical, political and legal background, and outlines an uncertain future for Palestinians in Lebanon.

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Middle East International is published in London and Washington by Middle East International Ltd. It covers current events, political and security issues in the Middle East and the Arab world.

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