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Thursday, May 14, 2020

William "Bill" Johnson

NAPO's Executive Director and General Counsel

William "Bill" Johnson serves as Executive Director of the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc. ("NAPO") in Alexandria, Virginia. Johnson has served as NAPO's Executive Director since January 2002. He also serves as legal counsel to the Association. As NAPO's Executive Director, Johnson is responsible for the day to day operations of the largest trade association in the United States representing active duty law enforcement officers. He also presents written and oral testimony before Congress, and frequently meets with Members of Congress as well as cabinet-level appointees in the presidential administration.

Johnson is also responsible for the writing and filing of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court and various appellate courts around the country. He is a frequent speaker and moderator at law enforcement and legal education seminars. Johnson holds the Certified Association Executive or "CAE" credential, awarded by the American Society of Association Executives. He is a registered federal lobbyist.

Johnson is a former law enforcement officer and prosecutor, having served with a small police department in Maine, and, after attending law school, the Miami, Florida State Attorney's Office. Johnson was responsible for prosecuting a wide range of felony cases and also served as the designated prosecutor for cases involving mentally ill defendants, where competency and/or sanity claims were at issue. He has also served as a law clerk to an Article I federal judge; a basic civil law teacher for inmates nearing release at a men's correctional institution; and an instructor for Miami-area police academies and for new prosecutors at the State Attorney's Office.

A native of Chicago, Johnson received his undergraduate degree in organizational behavior and management from Brown University, and his law degree from Georgetown University. He holds a postgraduate certificate in nonprofit leadership and management from Michigan State University. Johnson is also a graduate of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy. He is admitted to the Virginia, Florida, Maine, District of Columbia, and United States Supreme Court bars. He and his wife, Katherine, are the parents of four adult children.

The National Association of Police Organizations represents some 1,000 professional police associations and units and 241,000 sworn officers throughout the United States. NAPO serves its members through the advancement of federal legislation and policy, legal advocacy, and education.

NAPO Priorities for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
Panel on Retention of Officers
May 14, 2020

Statement of William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National Association of Police Organizations

My name is William Johnson and I serve as Executive Director of the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO). I am submitting this statement today on behalf of NAPO, representing over 241,000 active and retired law enforcement officers throughout the United States. NAPO is a coalition of police unions and associations from across the nation, which was organized for the purpose of advancing the interests of America's law enforcement officers through legislative advocacy, political action and education.

There has perhaps never been such a challenging time in our nation's history to be a law enforcement officer. The crimes and physical dangers, assaults and risks have always been with us. The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial includes the names of officers killed in the line of duty as far back as 1786. The equally detrimental psychic toll taken on officers and their families as a result of confronting human misery and evil day after day for years, is also as old as human history. But today, as opposed to earlier epochs in our country's history, many elected officials, academicians and media personalities vociferously and doggedly identify the police as part of society's problems. Even during the extraordinarily violent times of the Prohibition Era, or during the societal unrest of the 1960s, elected officials and the media supported the efforts of American law enforcement to restore and maintain public order and safety.

Unfortunately, as recent history shows, public figures and mass media seem to have found it politically expedient, or a means to garner attention, by deliberately and falsely painting officers as brutal, racist and corrupt. When the occupant of the highest elected office in the land in the previous administration routinely tossed about phrases such as "we all know that," or "we need to acknowledge that," or "our history shows that," officers and the U.S. criminal justice system are biased, racist, and flawed, or that they are historic oppressors of American citizens, other elected and appointed officials, and the media, took their cue, and cynically and opportunistically jumped in.

The resultant environment within which officers are today called to serve has thus been shaped in such a way as to threated disastrous consequences for the recruitment, and especially the retention, of qualified officers. The findings and recommendations of this panel, and this Commission, therefore, will be of vital importance to the retention, safety and efficacy of our nation's police forces, and the public they serve.

Officer Mental Health and Wellness
One area of great concern that results from this working environment is officer mental health and wellness, and this directly relates to the development and retention of well-qualified and healthy

officers. Officers are forced to deal with a career's worth of human misery, wickedness and sorrow. The abused child, the adolescent rape victim, the mother killed by a drunk driver, the baby hit by stray bullets, the grandmother beaten half to death for a few dollars. These are not stories in the news for the officers involved. They do not have the luxury of turning away, they have to respond to the situation and take responsibility for it. This is what passes for "normal" in their work world. The work that officers do each day and the environments in which they are placed take a huge toll on the human mind, body, and soul. Many of our officers suffer from PTSD.

According to Blue H.E.L.P., 228 current or active duty officers died by suicide in 2019, well over the 128 officers that were killed in the line of duty last year. In 2018, there were 172 officer suicides. 60 officers have taken their own lives so far this year. These are just the numbers that are reported and tracked. Many officers are reluctant to seek help, especially through services offered by their agency. They worry about confidentiality, fear that admitting their need for help will jeopardize their employment or believe the mental health specialists provided will not understand what they are going through, what they have experienced.

Every officer in this nation should have access to a peer mentoring program. One cannot overstate the importance of confidential, peer mentoring services to supporting officers' mental health and wellness. These services must have the buy-in of the rank-and-file officers and their representative organizations and cannot be seen as controlled by management in order to be truly successful. Peer-led counseling services are a way for officers to address their mental health concerns before they escalate and ensure they get the help they need.

I will not go into great detail about the merits and best practices of peer mentoring programs as part of a department's or agency's officer safety and wellness program as the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) released two excellent reports covering these issues in March of 2019: *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress* and *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Programs: Eleven Case Studies*. The COPS Office worked closely with NAPO and law enforcement organizations and agencies across the country on these two reports they should be mandatory reading for the Commission.

Recommendations 13, 14, 15, and 18 from the *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress* regarding peer mentoring programs are vital ones that NAPO urges the Commission to include in its final recommendations on Officer Safety, Health and Wellness:

Recommendation 13[1]: Support the expansion of peer support programs to ensure all officers have access to this important wellness service.
Recommendation 14[2]: Support the expansion of peer programs to include broader health and wellness, not just critical incident stress.
Recommendation 15[3]: Support alternative models to agency-specific peer programs, such as through regional collaborations or labor organizations.
Recommendation 18[4]: Improve legislative privacy protections for officers seeking assistance from peer crisis lines and other peer-support services.

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[1] *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress*, p. 32
[2] *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress*, p. 33
[3] *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress*, p. 33

We cannot stress enough the importance of **Recommendation 18** from the *Report to Congress*. Officers are public servants. Unless the strictest privacy standards are established and maintained, an officer's mental health care, including that through peer mentoring services, can be discoverable on the public record, used in court proceedings, or affect their employment. Officers feel more comfortable admitting their concerns and asking questions and are more likely to take advantage of mental health services when they know they will be confidential.

NAPO strongly supports Recommendation 18 and the need to enact legislation that makes all communications made by officers to crisis counseling services (including peer services), and all records related to the communications, confidential.

<u>Further Recommendation</u>: **Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to expand the privileges section (Rule 501) to exclude from introduction into evidence in federal proceedings statements made by an officer in the context of critical incident peer debriefs and peer-involved mental health care for officers involved in highly stressful situations.**

Supporting the mental health of officers and providing resources and services they will use to preserve and protect their mental health and wellness not only saves lives, but it helps agencies retain experienced officers who might otherwise burn out or turn away from policing due to the mental stresses of the job. This is a vital issue that cuts across and impacts all the work of the Commission.

<u>Public Perception of Law Enforcement and Officer Rights</u>
Another area of concern that impacts officer retention is the public perception of law enforcement and the laws they enforce. NAPO sincerely appreciates the opportunity to work with the Commission, the Department's COPS Office, the Attorney General and other appropriate stakeholders to advance the goal of safer encounters, and a conscious, higher public satisfaction with America's officers and agencies. The Attorney General has expressed great concern regarding how common it has become for persons in contact with the police to resist, obstruct, interfere, thwart and even attack officers. Mr. Barr said he would like to see the public encouraged to "comply, *then* complain." NAPO has noted that in Florida, departments have had success engaging the community by utilizing the services of community leaders to educate their particular constituencies or congregations to do just this. Confrontations and obstruction go down, so long as the citizen believes that a complaint the next day will be treated seriously and evaluated fairly.

In addition to supporting community education programs such as "comply, *then* complain", we urge the Commission to recommend protecting officers' rights and ensuring officers' Constitutional rights are protected during both workplace and critical incident investigations.

It should come as no surprise that American law officers, like any other human beings, are likely to treat others the way they themselves are treated. We rightfully demand that officers treat others with impartiality, fairness, equity and justice. We expect officers to engage in dialogue and to do their best to consider all sides of a situation before making a judgement. Yet if officers are deprived of these same fundamental indicia of respect and worth in their own workplaces, we cannot reasonably expect them to exhibit and provide these qualities to the public they serve once they walk out the precinct doors.

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[4] *Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act Report to Congress,* p. 36

There is a serious need for the implementation of minimal national standards and procedures to guide both state and local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement officers during internal investigations, administrative hearings, and evaluation of citizen complaints. Too often law enforcement officers are subjected to the first-blush reaction of their department or the expediencies of local politics during internal investigations and administrative hearings.

NAPO strongly recommends enacting a national "Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights". Please see the Law Enforcement Officer's Procedural Bill of Rights Act, which establishes officer due process rights and the attached fact sheet on this proposal.

In this current environment particularly, agencies are more likely to attract and retain officers if the officers know that their due process rights are protected and they will not lose their jobs or their reputations for politically expedient reasons.

As respect for law enforcement and the retention of officers go hand in hand, **NAPO reiterates our recommendation that the Commission publicly support the legitimate workplace and adjudicative rights of officers.**

Collective Bargaining
The right to collectively bargain is another workplace right that helps ensure officer retention. While many public safety agencies benefit from a productive partnership between the agency and employees, many other agencies are not able to. Currently, many states do not allow public safety employees the fundamental right to bargain with their employers. History shows that denying workers the right to bargain collectively causes poor morale, the waste of resources, unsafe and inadequate working conditions, and low productivity. Ultimately, it is the public's safety and security that is jeopardized by such poor working conditions for officers.

NAPO recommends that the Commission supports granting all law enforcement officers in all 50 states the right to discuss workplace issues with their employers. We support the **Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act** as it would provide a framework for such discussions, while respecting the right and flexibility of states to write their own laws for public sector workers. The public safety is best protected through effective partnerships between first responders on the front lines and the agencies that employ them. The right to collectively bargain ensures that public safety officers can meet with local officials to discuss how they do their jobs and how best to protect the public.

Please see the attached studies and reports in support of public safety collective bargaining and officer due process rights: *Collective Bargaining Can Reduce Turnover and Improve Public Safety, American Police Unions: A Hindrance or Help to Innovation, Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium, and Police Reform from the Bottom Up: Officers and Their Unions as Agents of Change.*

Increased Penalties for Crimes against Law Enforcement
Providing increased protections for officers' lives is essential to officer recruitment and retention. Law enforcement officer assaults, injuries, and deaths have increased sharply in recent years. According to a January 2019 report from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), 2018 saw a 24 percent increase in the number of officers shot and killed compared to 2017. 28 officers were shot in ambushes or premeditated, calculated assaults.

Increased penalties make important differences in the attitudes of criminal towards public safety officers and can ensure protection for the community. NAPO supports enacting new federal criminal provisions to address (1) the assault and murder of federally funded state or local law enforcement officers, such as those officers whose agencies receive aid from DOJ or DHS; and (2) the assault and murder of state and local officers engaged in the protection of federally recognized civil rights, such as those officers attacked while safeguarding political demonstrations or protests. We believe there should be increased penalties for those who harm or target for harm public safety officers by making the murder or attempted murder of a state or local police officer an aggravating factor in sentencing determinations.

Expand Officer's Right to Carry under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA)
To further promote the protection of officers, NAPO supports the **LEOSA Reform Act,** which would ensure the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) is more fairly and broadly implemented. In a time when law enforcement officers are being targeted for violence simply because of the uniform they wear, allowing officers to carry their firearms off-duty for the protection of themselves, their families and our nation's communities is important to ensuring they feel safe in their position. We believe that officers who feel they are able to protect themselves and their families are less likely to leave the job due to safety concerns.

Retirement Benefits
A recent study by the National Institute on Retirement Security (NIRS), entitled *State and Local Employee Views on Their Jobs, Pay and Benefits,* demonstrates that retirement and health benefits are closely tied to job satisfaction. NIRS broke out the data further by profession and created fact sheets on law enforcement and their views on their jobs and retirement benefits.

Protecting and preserving public pension plans is a top priority for NAPO. This is not a labor issue; it is a public safety issue. Cities, such as Palm Beach, Florida, who have downgraded their pension plans or switched to 401(k)-style plans have seen qualified, trained officers leave for other jurisdictions that provide traditional pension benefit plans. They also find it harder to recruit new officers to replace those who have left. Protecting the benefits these officers were promised is one of the best ways of ensuring officer retention and increase recruitment.

In addition to protecting public pensions, NAPO strongly urges the Commission to support the repeal of the Social Security Government Pension Offset (GPO) and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). The GPO and WEP were meant as "leveling" responses for the Social Security program, but in their application only serve to hurt public safety officers and their spouses. Repealing both the GPO and WEP would help preserve the retirement security of those who selflessly serve and protect our communities. Please see the attached fact sheet for more information about these detrimental provisions.

NAPO also supports a First Responders Tax Relief Package consists of the Supporting America's First Responders Act (H.R. 5342), the Putting First Responders First Act (H.R. 2560 / S. 1278), and the Public Safety Retirees Healthcare Protection Act (H.R. 4897). These provisions would help protect retired officers' and families' financial security and thus serve to improve the retention of qualified and experienced officers.

I appreciate the opportunity to share these insights with you, and urge you to carefully consider them moving forward, as the Commission's recommendations will greatly impact our officers, their families, and the American public whom they serve.

Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium

The State of Knowledge

Jeremy M. Wilson, Erin Dalton, Charles Scheer,
Clifford A. Grammich

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RAND Center on Quality Policing

A RAND INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT CENTER

COPS

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Preface

Maintaining the police workforce level is one of the most salient challenges facing law enforcement today. In the long run, both the supply of and demand for qualified officers are changing in a time of increasing attrition, expanding law-enforcement responsibilities, and decreasing resources. These contribute to the difficulties that many agencies report in creating a workforce that represents the demographics of their communities, that is committed to providing its employees the opportunity for long-term police careers, and that effectively implements community policing.

These difficulties, perhaps surprisingly, have persisted through recent recessionary times and may become more challenging as the economy improves. Department resources have continued to decrease and responsibilities to increase, with agencies being asked to do more police work with fewer resources. Some agencies report staffing shortages (a small number still claim continuing drops in applications). Others question whether the long-term commitment of applicants and current officers will persist in times of economic improvement.

To help address these challenges and provide lessons for the law-enforcement community, this monograph does not offer any new data but rather summarizes for police practitioners lessons on recruiting and retaining diverse, effective workforces. It provides a means for local officials to identify what has been tried elsewhere and what might be applicable in their own communities. It is a broad analysis of issues confronting many agencies and how these have developed over time. Each agency will face unique circumstances that it must consider in workforce planning; this monograph can provide guidance on relevant lessons learned elsewhere. Focusing specifically on recruitment and retention, this guide does not address other key personnel planning issues, such as specific ways of determining staffing need, allocation of staffing resources, distribution of staff attributes and qualities, and opportunity costs and implications of implementing recruiting and retention strategies on other parts of the

organization, which are also important to development of an effective, efficient workforce. Challenges might vary by agency, especially by local conditions confronting each agency.

This monograph builds on other resources the RAND Center on Quality Policing has developed with the support of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, particularly a Web-based recruitment and retention clearinghouse (see RAND Corporation, 2010). This monograph also builds on a national summit of police recruitment and retention, also supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, held at RAND in June 2008 (for the report, see J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a; for the briefings, see COPS, undated[a]). It should be of interest to policymakers and researchers concerned with understanding and responding to police personnel challenges.

The RAND Center on Quality Policing provides research and analysis on contemporary police practice and policy. By determining what practices are most cost-effective and results-oriented, the center's work helps law-enforcement agencies across the United States make better operational decisions and consistently perform at their best. For more information on the center, visit its website, http://cqp.rand.org/, or contact the center's director, Greg Ridgeway, at Greg_Ridgeway@rand.org. For more information on this monograph or the Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse, write to Jeremy Wilson, the lead author and director of the Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse, at jwilson@msu.edu.

Letter from the Director

Dear Colleagues,

One of the greatest challenges law enforcement agencies face is the recruitment and retention of officers. This has been true throughout law enforcement history, as agencies strive to maintain an effective workforce. This topic is of special interest to the COPS Office, not only because much of our grant funding is geared towards the hiring of officers, but also because the recruitment, selection, and retention of officers is one of the most important elements to advancing community policing within an agency. The COPS Office has impacted the field in this area by promoting the "Hiring in the Spirit of Service" program to recruit and select law enforcement officers that reflect a more service-oriented field.

In an effort to further advance the endeavors of the COPS Office, we partnered with the RAND Corporation to develop this guidebook on police recruitment and retention. The RAND Corporation has a proven track record in the research and analysis of numerous criminal justice issues, including recruitment and retention. From an analysis of promising practices in the field, the RAND Corporation developed this guidebook to summarize the strategies that are currently being used, so other agencies can benefit from these efforts.

This publication discusses the challenges law enforcement agencies face in the retention of seasoned officers as well as the recruitment of new officers to the force. Forces that have expanded the mission of their police agencies—and the resulting demand for officers—illustrate the need for increased emphasis in retention and recruitment. After a review of the challenges, potential solutions are presented that are results of promising practices research and analysis. These solutions can be adapted to specific situations and conditions so that an agency can tailor their efforts to be most effective in their own local environment.

This report expands the body of knowledge related to recruitment and retention and we hope it is helpful for agencies in their workforce planning efforts. It will be of particular interest to both law enforcement executives and managers who are responsible for recruitment, retention, and workforce planning.

Bernard K. Melekian, Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

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Summary

Maintaining the police workforce level is continually one of the greatest challenges facing law-enforcement agencies. One indication of this challenge is the recent appropriation of $1 billion to the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to help stabilize law-enforcement positions. The program received more than 7,000 applications requesting more than $8 billion to support nearly 40,000 sworn-officer positions.

To help address these challenges and provide lessons for the law-enforcement community, the COPS office provided support to the RAND Center on Quality Policing to compile information on promising practices for police recruitment and retention. These are available at the Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse website (RAND Corporation, 2010). This monograph summarizes for police practitioners lessons evident in these materials on maintaining diverse, effective workforce levels.

A Metaphor for Police Staffing Challenges

Diminishing sources of recruitment, increasing causes for attrition, and broadening police responsibilities all shape questions of workforce supply and demand. To conceptualize and delineate the distinct forces at work, we use the metaphor of a bucket (see Figure S.1 on page xvii).

In this metaphor, the size of the bucket represents the absolute need for police officers. The water level, which rises and falls with accession and attrition over time, frequently does not fill the bucket because the demand for officers exceeds the ability to meet it due to resource or other limitations. The difference between the need and the current level represents unmet demand for officers. The authorized or allocated level of officers, representing the number of officers for which an agency is budgeted, is usually between the current level of officers and demand for them and is politically determined by such variables as workload, service orientation, and available resources.

Figure S.1
The Bucket Metaphor and Demand for Police Officers

Need/Demand

Allocation

Unmet demand

Staffing deficit

Current level

Three forces can affect the bucket and the "water" in it. First, officers might be "leaked" through a hole in the bucket caused by attrition. Attrition can result from several sources. Budget crises might cause jurisdictions to reduce their number of officers. Organizational characteristics might become unappealing to officers who decide to pursue work elsewhere. A pending wave of baby-boom generation retirements threatens to reduce experience levels of police departments across the nation. Increasing numbers of military call-ups are requiring more officers for longer periods of time on nation-building and other military duties. Finally, younger generations of workers might be more likely than older ones to change careers to find the work they like best. Understanding these and other sources of retention problems is critically important. It is far more costly and time-consuming to recruit an officer than to retain one. Reducing retention problems can alleviate much of the need for recruiting.

Second, new officers might be less likely to flow from the "faucet" of supply into the bucket than they once were. Changing generational preferences mean that not only might younger workers be more likely to change careers once entering policing—they might be less likely to enter policing at all. Furthermore, increasing levels of illicit drug use, of obesity, and of debt have led to decreases in the qualified applicant pool (Derby, 2008). Expanded skill requirements for police work further constrict the pool of qualified applicants. While many applicants (e.g., the college-educated) can meet these requirements, there is also competition from other sources for them. Just as budget crises can lead to increased attrition, so also can they lead to reduced salaries and benefit packages that are less likely to

attract candidates to policing. Departments might also fail to take full advantage of electronic media in their recruiting efforts.

Third, the capacity of the bucket is expanding as police work broadens, creating the demand for more "water" to fill it. The adoption of community policing has broadened the duties of police agencies, which increases the number of functions police undertake, especially for larger departments. Increased emphasis on homeland security has also widened the responsibilities of local police officers, increasing the demand for them. Finally, as a result of globalization, technological advancement, and greater awareness, the scope of crime the law-enforcement community must now address continues to grow. In sum, local police roles have expanded to include not only benign order-maintenance duties, such as answering noise complaints and solving neighborhood disputes, to new, occasionally militaristic roles, such as counterterrorism, information-sharing, and immigration enforcement.

Filling the Bucket: How Can Police Agencies Improve Recruitment and Retention?

There is little that local police agencies can do to limit the scope of their work and the subsequent demand for officers. Nevertheless, there are some practices they can adopt to improve recruitment and retention and, hence, their ability to meet the demand for services.

First, planning, analysis (including analysis of demographic trends), and surveys and interviews with officers about job satisfaction can help agencies understand their prospects for attracting and keeping officers. Second, agencies can reduce turnover by offering realistic job previews to candidates and requiring contracts with new employees. Third, agencies can attract and retain candidates by enhancing compensation and other benefits. Fourth, agencies can increase retention through greater employee engagement, including efforts to increase employee input in decision making and other evaluation and feedback opportunities. Improving organizational effectiveness through better hiring and management practices can improve the agency's image not only with employees but also with the community.

Research on recruitment and retention is evolving and still has some significant gaps. Local agencies will need to identify what has been learned elsewhere and apply the lessons to their specific problems. This guide can provide a means for local officials to identify what has been tried elsewhere and what might be applicable to their own situations.

Abbreviations

CBR	chemical, biological, and radiological
COPS	Community Oriented Policing Services
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
PCSO	Pinal County Sheriff's Office
PERF	Police Executive Research Forum
RSS	really simple syndication
SWAT	special weapons and tactics

Introduction

In early 2009, Congress appropriated $1 billion for the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), for the COPS Hiring Recovery Program to help stabilize law-enforcement positions. The COPS office received a staggering 7,272 applications for this program requesting $8.3 billion to support more than 39,000 sworn-officer positions throughout the United States (COPS, 2009a). These statistics highlight two glaring facts: The need for police officers is great, yet the ability to support the officers is limited.

While recent recessionary conditions have mitigated some of these problems for some agencies, others report staffing shortages (a few even report continuing drops in applications), and still others report concern that they might not be able to retain candidates once economic conditions improve. Police agencies generally have not applied known and demonstrated tenets of personnel management to their occupation. Researchers have provided few empirical lessons about what works and what does not in recruiting and retaining officers, leaving gaps on topics of concern to law-enforcement officials. Law-enforcement agencies typically lack the time, resources, and expertise to collect and assess data and to develop lessons for their own personnel planning needs.

Objective and Approach

This monograph synthesizes research about promising practices for recruitment and retention, focusing on empirical studies. We explain what is known about various strategies, drawing heavily on the policing literature but supplementing that by highlighting the effectiveness of these strategies in the military, medicine, education, business, and other professions. This monograph does not present original research but can help local officials—each of whom will face unique circumstances— identify what has been tried elsewhere and might be applicable to their own communities. While, as noted, some gaps remain in the literature,

and some of the literature is based more on anecdote than empirical research, we trust that this review can help local officials understand what is and is not known. The resources summarized in this monograph are drawn from those compiled for the Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse website (RAND Corporation, 2010).

Outline

In the next chapter, we introduce the recruiting and retention challenges confronting police organizations, using the metaphor of a bucket to delineate the issues and circumstances involved in understanding the problem and changes in the organizational context of policing. We use the bucket metaphor in subsequent chapters to illustrate how staffing challenges arise and how police organizations can respond to them. Chapter Three summarizes what is known about retaining personnel. Chapter Four highlights lessons about recruiting personnel. We choose to discuss retention first to highlight three facts: It is far more costly and time-consuming to recruit an officer than to retain one; improving retention can alleviate the need to recruit; and retention issues are frequently overshadowed by discourse about recruitment. The final chapter summarizes the most-promising recruitment and retention practices based on current research.

The Dynamic Police Staffing Challenge: The Bucket Metaphor

Diminishing sources of recruitment, increasing causes for attrition, and broadening police responsibilities all shape questions of workforce supply and demand. To conceptualize and delineate the distinct forces at work, we use the metaphor of a bucket (Figure 2.1). In this metaphor, the size of the bucket represents the absolute need or demand for police officers, which will vary by agency based on workload determinants and service objectives.

The Bucket Metaphor and Demand for Police Officers

The water inside the bucket represents the current level of police strength. The water level varies over time with accession and attrition and frequently does not fill the bucket because the demand for officers exceeds the ability to meet it (due to resource and other limitations). The difference between the need and the current level represents the true unmet demand for police officers.

Usually somewhere between the current level of officers and the demand for them is the authorized or allocated level of officers. This represents the number of officers for which an agency is budgeted. A somewhat artificial

Figure 2.1
The Bucket Metaphor and Demand for Police Officers

threshold, the allocation level is politically determined by such variables as workload, service orientation, and available resources.

The staffing deficit is the difference between the allocated and actual levels of police strength. Actual staffing levels rarely rise above allocated levels, although this can occur when an agency is building up capacity in anticipation of attrition. The bucket metaphor visually illustrates that an agency can, in fact, be understaffed when it is operating with its full complement of allocated officers.

Three forces can affect the bucket and the amount of water in it. 1) Officers might be "leaked" through a "hole" caused by attrition. 2) New officers might be less likely to "flow" from the "faucet" of new supply. 3) The bucket might expand as police work broadens. These issues might not affect every agency equally or in the same magnitude, but there is evidence of them affecting at least some agencies both in the short and long terms. Every agency has its own unique circumstances that must be considered in workforce planning.

The Hole in the Bucket Is Widening

Much of the difficulty police agencies face in maintaining their workforce levels is a product of attrition. To be sure, attrition can be positive, as when a department replaces retiring officers with younger, more-skilled ones, or when it loses those who are not committed to being effective, high-performing officers. Nevertheless, attrition can be a problem when it occurs in waves, such as with past hiring booms ultimately resulting in large proportions of staff retiring within a short time of one another. This causes the attrition hole in the bucket to widen, making it increasingly difficult to maintain the actual level of officers, or the water in the bucket.

Figure 2.2 highlights some contributors to the widening of the hole in the bucket: baby-boom generation retirements, changing generational preferences, budget crises, military call-ups, and organizational characteristics.

Figure 2.2
Attrition Is Widening the Hole

Baby-boom
retirements

Changing
generational
expectations

Budget crises

Military
call-ups

Organizational
characteristics

Baby-Boom Generation Retirements

Baby-boom generation officers on the cusp of retirement are the greatest pending concern. Officers of this generation are beginning to retire, and the number of retirements is likely to grow considerably in the next few years as the number of officers eligible for retirement increases significantly.

This pending wave of retirements is already affecting departments. In the early 2000s, New York City faced an exodus of officers who had 20 or more years of service, prompting the department to offer retention bonuses and incentives ("NYPD Facing a Flood of 20-and-Out Retirees," 2000). By the end of the decade, facing the additional challenge of paying pensions that the city budget could not afford, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed abolishing the "20-and-out" rule in his 2009 budget as a way to end the out-migration (Bloomberg, 2009). In Chicago, an early retirement option is expected to increase, from just more than 500 to nearly 900, the deficit of officers below the overall authorized level of 13,500, a problem exacerbated by the department's need to wait for federal funding before scheduling new academy classes (Spielman, 2009). Likewise, the proportion of retirement-eligible officers in Edmonton, Alberta, is expected to increase from less than 10 percent in October 2009 to nearly 20 percent by 2014; this challenge is expected to recur in 2030 as those hired through recent aggressive recruiting become eligible to retire (Edmonton police official, 2009).

The recent downturn in the economy might delay some of these retirements and expand the applicant pool, but retirement requirements and pension reforms will eventually affect all departments and, perhaps, threaten services. In Vallejo, California, for example, recent police retirements coupled with the economic downturn have sparked community concern about the viability of public services (Wolf and Rohrs, 2008). In Boston, changes in pension benefits partially attributable to the economic crisis have led to increased retirement applications across several municipal services (Levenson and Slack, 2009). In Macon, Georgia, early retirement options might debilitate an already thin police force (Womack, 2009). All these trends are widening the hole in the metaphorical bucket, making it difficult to replenish the supply of officers, and even creating a "brain drain" among the most experienced.

Similar trends are evident in other fields, a result both of impending retirements of older workers and of changes in life and career goals of younger ones (Edwards, 2007; Losey, 2005; Graig and Paganelli, 2000). Yet, these trends appear to have affected retention more strongly in policing than in other fields (Taylor et al., 2006; Orrick, 2008a). Increases in law-enforcement turnover have also resulted from police salaries that are lower than private-sector ones, competition with military recruiters, a negative public perception of law enforcement, and lack of interest in policing by younger Americans entering the work force (Jordan et al., 2009; Pomfret, 2006; Egan, 2005; Tulgan, 2000). An increasing number of police are leaving the service prematurely, compounding the macro social trends and their bearing on the police profession (Jordan et al., 2009). Of greater concern are the reportedly low levels of career and organizational commitment of police officers in the United States (Frost, 2006), similar to that in Australia and New Zealand (Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). Low organizational commitment has been seen as an antecedent of a decision to voluntarily leave an organization (Frost, 2006). Yet, other researchers—using evidence that points to fallacies in Bureau of Labor statistics, increasing workforce productivity, baby boomers' willingness to work longer than previous generations, the influx of younger generations into the workforce, and increases in life expectancy—contend that attrition and turnover are not as chronic a problem as social trends would indicate (Edwards, 2007; Graig and Paganelli, 2000; Pikitalis and Morgan, 2003).

Police studies of attrition demonstrate constancy in turnover across multiple locales. Rather than decreasing as a result of turnover, in California, between 1985 and 2005, the number of police officers increased from 63,694 to 84,443 (Switzer, 2006). Transfers to other agencies were fairly stable over the same period, between 3 and 5 percent annually. A survey of 205 North Carolina sheriffs' departments of varying size found steady turnover (12.7 percent) and vacancy (5.5 percent) rates, with 28.6 percent of agencies surveyed noting either a significant or slight increase in turnover rates (Yearwood, 2003).

Retention changes with economic conditions. In times of relative prosperity, other careers and positions might pull officers away from police work with higher salaries and easier work. In times of economic decline, officers might be less likely to leave departments due to concerns about better job security, but departments might be forced to lay off or furlough employees in the wake of budget cuts.

Changing Generational Preferences and Expectations

Retention also changes with generational preferences. Younger generations of workers might have less organizational commitment than older ones, with many even changing careers (Wheeler, 2008; Twenge and Campbell, 2008).

The changing nature of work has had a pronounced effect on attrition in policing. The movement toward knowledge work, currently transforming career paths, might be reshaping career expectations in law enforcement. The evolution of "boundary-less" careers has required workers to move between employers to gain knowledge and competencies that will enhance expertise and employability (Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). This shift heightens the challenges that police organizations face in retention and succession planning. In Australia and New Zealand, researchers found that police organizations are no longer limited to their traditional crime-detection and law-enforcement functions (Dupont, 2003). They are being reshaped into, among other things, knowledge brokers, social-service referrers, or problem solvers. This transformation might intensify turnover in law enforcement due to unanticipated realities and unfulfilled expectations.

Younger workers might also change jobs more often than older ones, especially in metropolitan areas with diverse economies, in an effort to find the work they like best (Wheeler, 2008; Twenge and Campbell, 2008). This creates difficulties for police departments, which invest considerable time and resources in selecting and training officers, only to have them leave after a short term.

Budget Crises

Decreasing financial support to cover officer salaries has contributed to widening the hole in the bucket through resulting limits both on funding positions and on providing competitive salaries and benefits. Two extreme cases of the effects this can have on retention are evident in New Orleans and San Diego. In New Orleans, many police officers relocating their families to Houston after Hurricane Katrina joined the department there or another elsewhere that offered higher pay and benefits than New Orleans had (see box, facing page). In San Diego, uncompetitive wages and salary freezes led many police officers to seek better opportunities elsewhere, including a lead detective with 21 years on the force who applied for a patrol position in the neighboring community of Chula Vista (Manolatos, 2006).

The recent economic downturn has punctuated this problem. Many communities are struggling to cover the expenses of their police workforces and have responded with tactics ranging from hiring freezes and cancellations of academy classes to furloughs and even layoffs. Officials in Prospect Heights, Illinois, even closed the police station to the public and assigned the police chief and command staff to patrol shifts (J. Byrne, 2009). Those agencies that can hire report a spike in applications and improved ability to hire officers, but some practitioners have raised concerns about the willingness of those who are now pursuing positions to commit to a long-term policing career (DeLord, 2009). The Macon, Georgia, police chief warned that an early retirement option might drain his department of more-experienced and knowledgeable officers (Womack, 2009). Johnstown, Pennsylvania, struggles to replace experienced command staff on an already "depleted roster" (Faher, 2009).

REBUILDING AFTER A CRISIS AND A CATASTROPHE: NEW ORLEANS

As it did on most other elements of the city, Hurricane Katrina had a profound effect on the New Orleans Police Department. In the storm's aftermath, Warren Riley (2008), superintendent of the department, told a RAND summit on recruitment and retention, most officers were homeless, their families had been displaced, and, in some cases, they had to deal with the loss of loved ones. Often, Riley said, "[o]fficers were stranded in flooded police stations, trapped in attics, and in some cases, on rooftops."

The wounds the department suffered proved to be deep and lasting for some time after the storm. "The media coverage following the storm was extensive and often not very positive when it came to the Police Department," Riley said. "It made [the department] appear to be a losing team." The subsequent bleeding of the department would last for some time. From the time of the hurricane until the end of 2005, the department would have 165 separations, with 147 related to officer actions or lack of performance following the storm. Losses would continue past the immediate aftermath of the storm, particularly among lower ranks. Not until 2007 would department hiring exceed separations (see Figure 2.3 on page 10).

By then, separations had claimed one-third of the prestorm force. Complicating matters for the department was the fact that, even before the storm, its staffing level was nearly 8 percent below its allocated level. A year after the storm, its staffing level was nearly 12 percent below its allocated level, even though the budgeted allocation of officers had decreased by nearly one-sixth (see Table 2.1 on page 11).

Although the storm had wounded the department deeply, in some cases, it might have been more a trigger for departures than a cause of them. Over time, New Orleans police salaries and benefits had come to lag those of many other cities (Rostker, Hix, and Wilson, 2007; J. Wilson, Rostker, and Hix, 2008). For nearly all ranks, RAND researchers found that New Orleans' officer pay lagged that of Houston, where many residents relocated at least temporarily after the storm. Officers above the rank of sergeant could earn about $30,000 more per year in Houston than in New Orleans (see Table 2.2 on page 11).

The city faced budget constraints that limited its options for improving recruitment and retention. Fortunately, RAND researchers found, there were several low-cost initiatives the city could take to make its compensation packages more attractive to new officers. While New Orleans police salaries were low, their pensions were generous. Shifting money from pensions to salaries could, in the near term and at

Continued

Figure 2.3
New Orleans Police Department Hires and Separations,
2004 to 2007

no net cost, make the department more attractive to new recruits. Likewise, RAND researchers suggested increasing the frequency of promotional boards, passing only enough officers to fill expected vacancies, to allow talented officers to rise through the ranks more quickly and to create a climate of continual learning.

For the medium term, RAND researchers suggested two low-cost options: converting appropriate jobs from officers to civilians and developing proactive recruiting efforts, such as after-school and summer employment for students interested in police work. Much of the recruiting work done by officers comprised recruiting those who had already volunteered and using the Internet and other tools to conduct background checks, tasks that civilian specialists could perform. For the long term, RAND researchers suggested offering housing to officers as an incentive for a commitment to years of service.

The city government acted quickly to implement many of the recommendations. "The mayor," Riley said, "and the city council…immediately bought into it, and it was smooth sailing from there." State law prohibited shifting pension resources to salaries, but the city still substantially increased officer pay and devised several education incentives. These recommendations helped cut department attrition, which averaged 11 officers per month before Katrina, to five officers per month.

Table 2.1
Budgeted and Actual New Orleans Police Officer Levels, Before and After Hurricane Katrina

Level	August 2005	October 2006	Change (%)
Budgeted	1,885	1,600	−15
Actual	1,742	1,421	−18

SOURCE: Stephanie M. Landry, New Orleans Police Department, as cited in Rostker, Hix, and Wilson (2007).

NOTE: Data for 2005 are current as of August 21, 2005. Data for 2006 are current as of October 24, 2006.

Table 2.2
New Orleans and Houston Police Department Salary Comparison, 2006

	Annual Base Salary Without Benefits ($)		
		Houston	
Rank	New Orleans	Minimum	Maximum
Police recruit	30,732	29,164[a]	
Police officer 1[b]	33,111	36,022	50,039
Police officer 2	34,797		
Police officer 3	36,570		55,235
Police officer 4	38,433	51,114	
Police sergeant	42,449	61,784	67,362
Police lieutenant	45,734	69,354	75,606
Police captain	53,750	75,421	86,613
Police major	58,633		

SOURCES: Stephanie M. Landry, New Orleans Police Department, as cited in Rostker, Hix, and Wilson (2007); City of Houston (undated).

[a] Recruits with a bachelor's degree earned up to $33,784 during academy and field training.

[b] A police officer 1 with a bachelor's degree in Houston earns more than $47,000 the first year after the probationary period, including an equipment allowance, shift/weekend pay, and bilingual pay. After one year of service, a New Orleans officer receives $3,600 in annual state supplemental pay. All New Orleans officers also receive an annual uniform allowance of $500.

A pattern is emerging: Agencies are increasingly offering early retirements to save costs and trim budgets, but the same budgets do not allow for hiring high-quality candidates—or any candidates at all—to replace those leaving. Limited resources have resulted not just in fewer positions but in attrition of officers from existing positions.

Military Call-Ups

Military call-ups represent another leak in the bucket. The United States has become increasingly involved in nation-building and peacekeeping missions (Dobbins et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2005; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009b). The most recent examples of this include Afghanistan and Iraq. This causes the hole in the police staffing bucket to widen because many police officers serve as military reservists and have been called to active duty. During the 12-month period ending June 30, 2003, 21 percent of local police departments and more than 94 percent of agencies serving a population of at least 100,000 had full-time sworn personnel who were called up as full-time military reservists, with call-ups averaging three officers per department and ranging from one to 74 (Hickman and Reaves, 2006a). Such call-ups pose not just manpower but fiscal challenges; federal law requires that health benefits of these officers be maintained and their positions held until they return (Hickman, 2006).

Organizational Characteristics

Organizational characteristics can also affect attrition. Officers can choose to leave a department for a number of organization-related reasons, including the characteristics of their immediate supervisor, lack of career growth, unmet job expectations, inadequate feedback, insufficient recognition, or lack of training (Orrick, 2008a, 2008b; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a).

The Faucet (Supply) Is Tightening

Just as trends in attrition are making it difficult to retain police officers, the supply of qualified potential officers might be diminishing. That is, the supply faucet might be tightening (see Figure 2.4). Among contributors

to this phenomenon are a general decrease in the qualified applicant pool, changing generational preferences, increased competition, expanded skill requirements, uncompetitive benefits, and organizational characteristics.

Decrease in Qualified Applicant Pool

As noted earlier, the generations replacing the baby-boomers now retiring are smaller. Exacerbating this problem are cohorts of young persons who do not meet the minimum requirements for becoming a sworn officer. Raymond et al. (2005) contend that it is becoming more difficult for the general population to meet minimum qualifications, such as a clean criminal record, little to no drug use, good physical health, and financial stability. Several key statistics support their claim:

- About half of all 12th-graders report having smoked marijuana, and one in four has used some illicit drug *other* than marijuana by the end of the 12th grade, levels of prevalence that are above those of the early 1990s (Johnston et al., 2008).

- Over the past three decades, the obesity rate has more than doubled for adolescents 12 to 19 years of age and has more than tripled for children ages 6–11 (Sturm et al., 2007).

Figure 2.4
The Shrinking Supply Is Reducing the Flow

- From 1992 to 2001, credit-card debt among Americans 18 to 24 years
  of age rose 104 percent to an average of nearly $3,000 per person (in
  2001 dollars); the average indebted youth spends almost 30 percent
  of his or her income on debt maintenance (Draut and Silva, 2004).
  Younger generations, from which police departments would normally
  draw recruits, have higher amounts of debt than youths of previous
  decades (Draut, 2008). In some departments, outstanding debt
  can disqualify applicants, as it is interpreted as an indicator of bad
  judgment and a proclivity toward corruption.

Education trends matter too. In the past decade, the percentage of persons
25 to 29 years of age holding college degrees has remained virtually
unchanged (Planty et al., 2008). Yet, the length of time to complete a
degree has increased as the number of enrollees who complete their degree
has decreased (Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner, 2007; Dynarski, 2005).
These trends and the increasing costs of college can affect a graduate's
career choice. An educated worker might meet law enforcement's
increasing education standards but also has more job prospects, in turn
making recruiting them into police work more competitive (Bound,
Lovenheim, and Turner, 2007).

Changing Generational Preferences

The militaristic nature of police work, with its emphasis on hierarchy and
formality, and the sacrifices that officers must make, from maintaining
certain appearances (e.g., no beards or tattoos) to erratic schedules and
long shifts, to placing themselves in harm's way, is also likely to discourage
applicants. This same cultural shift has driven military propensity
downward since the early 1980s and is compounded in younger
generations as realities of military structure conflict with differing
youth attitudes about the nature of work (Bowyer, 2007; DoD, 2003; M.
Wilson et al., 2000). Moreover, changes in generational values regarding
off-duty life have been seen as affecting recruiting (Brand, 1999), whereas
the flexibility and emotional control sought by younger generations
appears inconsistent with traditional paramilitary police environments
(Harrison, 2007; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press,
2007). Less than half of American youths consider a police department

or agency a "desirable" or "acceptable" place to work—more than those who view military service that way but fewer than those who view corporations, schools, or other government agencies that way (Sackett and Mavor, 2003). Furthermore, those entering the workforce today expect to have more-rapid advancement opportunities (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a) and to have a better balance between work and family (Scrivner, 2008). The youngest generation of workers has shown marked preferences toward extrinsic work values, such as prestige, changing tasks, social and cognitive aspects of work, and flexibility (Lawsson, 2009; Lyons, Duxbury, and Higgins, 2005). Many of these career expectations cannot be met in law enforcement.

Increased Competition

As noted earlier, local police agencies look to fill their ranks from a subset of the population that meets minimum qualifications, including a clean criminal record and good physical health. Nevertheless, they are not alone in searching for such candidates. The military, federal and state police agencies, private security firms, and other first-responder agencies recruit similar individuals, and opportunities with them have grown, particularly since the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. The expansion of a security-industrial complex since the attacks has funneled money and personnel into increased private security positions (De Rugy, 2006; Kondrasuk, 2004), spurred demand for fire protection (Frawley, 2006), and stimulated national efforts and capital for security and defense contracting (Makinen, 2002). Military enlistments have increased, particularly among more-educated recruits (Kane, 2005). As a result, the labor market for such public services has become much more competitive. The greater compensation and benefits that other public service agencies can offer exacerbate the problem of competition for local police (Raymond et al., 2005; Rostker, Hix, and Wilson, 2007).

Although recent economic conditions seem to have relieved some competition for applicants, local police agencies still compete for many of the same recruits, particularly as they lure officers and potential recruits away from sister agencies and communities. In recent years, agencies have launched several incentives to attract officers, ranging from

signing bonuses and moving expenses to health-club memberships and mortgage discount programs. They have also sought recruits hundreds or even thousands of miles away. In the 12-month period preceding June 2008, the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., conducted recruiting trips to Fort Campbell and Fort Knox in Kentucky; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Albany, New York; Columbus, Ohio; Tidewater, Virginia; and Oak Creek, Wisconsin (Lanier, 2008). The Arlington County Police Department in Virginia sought recruits as far away as Puerto Rico, albeit with little success (see box, *Recruiting Among Competitors: Arlington County [Virginia] Police Department*).

Expanded Skill Requirements

As in other industries (Rich, 2010), the changing nature of police work might also restrict the flow of eligible recruits. Police agencies face growing, more-complex problems in increasingly diverse communities, and policing work has become much more community-oriented. Such changes expand the skills required of police officers. Officers must now be able to work closely with different people, including being able to communicate, collaborate, and interact with a diverse set of stakeholders; have strong analytical, problem-solving, critical and strategic thinking, and technology skills; and be culturally competent (Miller, 2008; Raymond et al., 2005; Scrivner, 2006, 2008; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a). Scrivner (2008) also notes the need for officers to focus on service, values, multiple dimensions of performance (not just arrests), and outcomes. These changes call for recruitment efforts to be even more selective, thereby reducing the supply of qualified candidates.

Uncompetitive Benefits

Just as budget crises can widen the hole in the bucket, so too can they tighten the faucet. A key way in which law enforcement limits its supply of qualified applicants is by offering prospective candidates uncompetitive wages and benefit packages (which, as noted earlier, can also contribute to turnover). Officer salaries are not on par with the institutions with which it competes for personnel. In 2003, the average entry-level starting salary was $35,500 for local police officers (Hickman and Reaves, 2006a) and

RECRUITING AMONG COMPETITORS: ARLINGTON COUNTY (VIRGINIA) POLICE DEPARTMENT

When M. Douglas Scott became chief of the Arlington County Police Department, he found a department below its authorized strength of more than 350 officers (Scott, 2008). It was also facing an attrition rate of 10 percent per year. There were several reasons for this. In addition to the usual lures away, such as other employment or a return to school, the department, because it is located near the heart of the Washington metropolitan area, must compete with federal law-enforcement agencies in addition to neighboring agencies. The department also has an older force, with about one in seven currently serving also eligible for retirement. Complicating its recruiting efforts, Scott said, was a requirement of 60 college credit hours for new hires, with no waiver for military or other police service.

To maintain its numbers and increase its diversity—minority officers comprise 22 percent of the force and female officers 17 percent—the department has tried a variety of strategies. Among the more successful ones have been partnering with local criminal-justice programs, administering monthly exams, offering recruitment bonuses to employees, establishing a recruiting team, and developing recruitment efforts and websites. Some efforts, such as outreach to the Washington-area gay community, were controversial among some residents but not county leaders. Other efforts have been less successful, including a recruiting trip to Puerto Rico, job fairs far removed from the jurisdiction, a cadet program, and venues, such as parades and county fairs, not designed for recruitment. Successful retention initiatives have included increasing salary and retirement benefits. As a result of these efforts, the department was able to reach its authorized strength of 366 officers in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

$32,200 for deputies (Hickman and Reaves, 2006b). According to 2008 Bureau of Labor Statistics data, mean annual wages for all local police and sheriffs' patrol officers, at $52,480 per year, appear competitive with other public service occupations (such as firefighters and correctional officers), but they lag behind other possible professional occupations, such as physical therapists ($74,410 per year), physical- and social-science occupations ($64,280), landscape architects ($64,000), electrical engineers ($85,350), computer-science occupations ($74,500), and construction management ($89,770) (BLS, 2009).

In the past decade, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, benefits and compensation costs were 51.4 percent higher for public than private employees, a figure that had increased steadily throughout the decade (McDonnell, 2002, 2005, 2008). But, looking closer at the discrepancy, wage and work differentials between careers in state and local government (which includes other public service professions) were the main source of the gap: Unionization rates and health-care program participation were seen as driving the discrepancy (McDonnell, 2008). Yet, the perception persists among upper-level police management that the reactive nature of salary and benefit improvements has resulted in a reduced ability to compete with private employment, which is viewed as providing a more attractive lifestyle (Domash, 2002).

Organizational Characteristics

Other organizational characteristics can also limit the supply of prospective qualified officers. The image of law enforcement as a career or of a particular agency, residency policies, length and complexity of the hiring process, and opportunities for advancement and special assignments are just some of the organizational factors that can influence interest in law enforcement (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a). Many of these organizational obstacles might affect minority candidates disproportionately (Wright, 2009). All create additional difficulties for police agencies and can change over time.

The Bucket (Demand) Is Expanding

While the staffing-loss hole in the bucket is widening from increased attrition and the flow replenishing it is shrinking from a reduced supply of qualified officers, the demand for officers is increasing the size of the bucket (see Figure 2.5). Without remedy, this serves to exacerbate the true unmet demand for police service (see Figure 2.1 on page 3).

The increasing demand for police officers largely originates from an expansion of their responsibilities. This is perhaps most vividly apparent regarding their roles in community policing, homeland security, and emerging crimes.

Figure 2.5
Expanding Duties Increase the Demand for Police Officers

Community Policing

The adoption of community policing has broadened the duties of police agencies. In the past two decades, most police agencies have embraced some form of community policing (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000; J. Wilson, 2006; Zhao, Lovrich, and Thurman, 1999). Since 1995, the COPS office (undated [b]), which is the federal agency tasked with advancing community policing, has invested $12.4 billion in community policing, enabling more than 13,000 state, local, and tribal agencies to hire more than 117,000 police officers and deputies. Fifty-eight percent of all local police departments, employing 82 percent of all officers, used full-time community policing officers during 2003, as did 51 percent of all sheriffs' offices, employing 70 percent of all deputies (Hickman and Reaves, 2006a, 2006b).

Community policing increases the number of functions police undertake, particularly for larger departments. Hickman and Reaves (2006a) found that most police agencies in jurisdictions of at least 25,000 residents work with citizen groups to develop community policing strategies, with four-fifths of those in jurisdictions of at least 100,000 having citizen police academies. Such proactive activities require time and resources in addition to those needed for traditional police responsibilities, such as maintaining law and order, preventing crime, and enforcing traffic

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HIRING FOR COMMUNITY NEEDS: OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

The Oakland Police Department has traditionally faced a hire-and-freeze cycle, under which the department would hire when able but would see its staff dwindle during a hiring freeze (Poulson, 2008). In the early 2000s, for example, the department hired enough officers to boost its number of officers to 740 but, under a hiring freeze, saw this dwindle to 680.

This cycle changed in the wake of an increase in overall violence and in homicide specifically (J. Wilson, Cox, et al., 2007; J. Wilson and Cox, 2008). In 2004, Oakland voters passed the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act, or Measure Y. This required the city to invest $19 million annually in violence prevention and community policing.

The sudden new demand for officers created difficulties for the department. For example, the community policing component of Measure Y alone required the department to hire at least 63 new officers. Further complicating department hiring was a consent decree requiring personnel for internal affairs, evolving policing requirements, and an ineffective shift schedule resulting in absenteeism rates as high as 40 percent for patrol officers.

Oakland's mayor ultimately sought to boost the department to 803 officers. This required the department to recruit and train 342 officers in just two years (both for new positions and to replace retiring officers). To do so, the department launched several recruitment, training, and retention initiatives. It launched a $1 million saturation advertising campaign, as well as a website, provided regular email updates to applicants, and streamlined its process so that it could hire a candidate passing a background examination within three weeks. It accepted candidates from other, unaffiliated academies. It paid $1,000 to officers who recruited and mentored a new recruit through the first few months on the job. It also boosted pay and adopted a new shift schedule calling for seven 12-hour shifts in a two-week period. As of the end of June 2010, 776 officers work for the department, but 80 of them have received layoff notices as the Oakland City Council attempts to manage a $30.5-million budget deficit (Kuruvila, 2010).

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regulations. In Oakland, California, for example, this required a ten-year, multimillion-dollar voter initiative to address community policing, violence prevention, and fire and paramedic services (see box, *Hiring for Community Needs: Oakland, California*).

Agencies have sought to meet increased demand in several ways. Some agencies might delay police responses and cut special units, while others rely on cameras and other technologies to do the jobs that absent officers would normally fulfill (C. Fischer, 2009; Wiegler, 2008). The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, which will blanket the city of New York with video cameras, has coincided with widespread attrition in the New York City Police Department, which has no pending plans to fund or hire additional officers (Winston, 2009).

Homeland Security

Increased emphasis on homeland security has also widened the responsibilities of local police officers, increasing the demand for them. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, local police have been asked to perform additional patrol and surveillance, gather and analyze counterterrorism intelligence, conduct risk and threat assessments, participate in various task forces, coordinate and communicate with other agencies, undergo new training and exercises, construct and contribute to fusion centers, formulate new policies, and update mutual-aid agreements and response plans for chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR)–related incidents (Davis et al., 2006; Raymond et al., 2005; K. Riley, Treverton, et al., 2005).

Homeland security duties for local police have also included an expanded role in immigration enforcement. As K. Riley, Treverton, et al. (2005) explain, before the September 11, 2001, attacks, many departments had explicit policies not to arrest and detain someone whose only crime concerned immigration status. Federal policy has since sought more participation of local agencies in immigration enforcement, although some are resisting this. Congressional authorization in 1996 of local agencies to act in immigration-enforcement capacities has also pushed smaller agencies into roles of a more global nature (Khashu and Malina, 2009).

Emerging Crimes

As a result of globalization, technological advancement, and greater awareness, the scope of crime the law-enforcement community must now address continues to grow. Over the past decade, police agencies have

had to respond to emerging crimes, such as human trafficking, identity theft, cybercrime, and fraud, and take on roles, such as counterterrorism and internal security, usually reserved for the military (Kraska, 2007). Human-trafficking task forces have gained increasing worldwide attention as a local response to the global problem of trafficking in persons; such a strategy relies heavily on international cooperation, information-sharing, and a reconsideration of the local role of police (U.S. Department of State, 2009). Cybercrime and the related problems of intellectual-property theft and fraud are likely to increase, requiring local agencies to train officers to counter this new and evolving threat (FBI, 2008). In sum, local police roles evolved through the community policing era to include benign order-maintenance duties, such as answering noise complaints and solving neighborhood disputes, to new, occasionally militaristic roles, including counterterrorism, information-sharing, and immigration enforcement (Kraska, 2007).

The Weakened Economy

Recent economic changes have had mixed effects on police staffing. In this time of rising unemployment, agencies with the resources to hire officers have been inundated by applications, thereby permitting greater selectivity and, potentially, a more qualified applicant pool. A wave of applicants for six positions in Ventura, California, came from industries as diverse as software and mortgage (Scheibe, 2009). Agencies in states with more-severe and long-term economic shifts are receiving applicants seeking to move from manufacturing to service positions (Goeller, 2009). In Raleigh, North Carolina, applications for police positions more than doubled after the 2008 recession hit, despite the pessimism of command staff that the department's true staffing need might still never be met (S. Chambers, 2009). New York City has seen a flood of applicants to its shrinking department, including those from investment banking, an apparently new source of recruits (Schmidt, 2009).

Police leaders, however, question the long-term commitment of these candidates to their organization, particularly as jobs become more plentiful in other sectors (DeLord, 2009). Concerns about applicants' motivations, which arose in the burst of recruiting following the September 11, 2001,

terrorist attacks, have matured into a crisis of confidence among recruiters and command staff about the quality of recruits (Domash, 2002; S. Chambers, 2009). Hiring standards remain the same for inexperienced candidates in areas where the economy has led to increases in applicants (Madrid, 2009). Having more applicants to screen increases the cost and substantive difficulty of assessing and selecting the best candidates for the job. More applications do not necessarily mean more qualified applicants; as one police executive warned, "You can't just hire anybody" (Codispoti, 2009).

At the same time, a weakened economy can also exacerbate staffing problems. Assuming a steady demand for police work, resource shortfalls that lead to furloughs, layoffs, and hiring freezes will expand both the staffing deficit and the true unmet demand for police service (see Figure 2.1 on page 3). Economic problems also highlight the uncertainty of the environments in which police departments must operate. Violent- and property-crime levels decreased during the recessionary year of 2008 (FBI, 2009). Such a decrease can be attributed partly to policing strategies that must continue in order to stave off potential increases but that constricting resources will make difficult to maintain (Camper and Brown, 2008; Moore, 2009).

Police staffing cuts resulting from the recession have occurred in jurisdictions ranging in size, geography, and organization from Santa Rosa, California (McCoy, 2009), to Gwinnett County, Georgia (Fox, 2009), to Toledo, Ohio (Rice, 2009), to Cook County, Illinois, to Sacramento, California (Johnson, 2008). Indeed, a 2008 survey by PERF (C. Fischer, 2009) revealed that 63 percent of responding agencies were preparing plans for funding cuts, with 31 percent of the cuts aimed at funding for sworn personnel, even after many of the agencies already made cuts to staffing via overtime reductions (62 percent), sworn-officer and civilian hiring freezes (27 and 53 percent, respectively), diminished recruit classes (34 percent), reducing employment levels through attrition (24 percent), furloughs (10 percent), and layoffs or forced retirements (7 percent).[1] Budget deficits are also causing cuts among police

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1. The sampling frame for and response rate of this survey is not evident in the report, so the generalizability of these findings is unclear.

programs. For example, in addition to 132 sworn-deputy layoffs (after just saving 70 positions), the Sacramento Sheriff's Department grounded its helicopters, cut problem-oriented police units, and returned special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and canine officers to patrol to manage cuts to the department (R. Lewis, 2009). San Francisco police are skeptical that they can afford to fill existing foot-patrol positions, much less add recommended new ones (Sward, 2008). More broadly, the PERF (C. Fischer, 2009) survey indicated that 29 percent of responding agencies anticipated discontinuing special units (e.g., street crimes, narcotics, and community policing units). Such service cuts could intensify the workload of remaining police and increase the true level of unmet demand for police service.

While the economy has made it more difficult for police organizations to meet their workforce needs, the long-term systemic changes highlighted in this chapter suggest that staffing challenges will remain an issue even after the economy improves. Past hiring booms and freezes will create difficulties as they ripple through the organization over time—from field training and promotion to personnel budget consumption and retention. Resulting uneven distributions in the workforce can cause significant administrative challenges even in organizations that are fully staffed.

Conclusion

Police agencies face a threefold challenge in meeting the demand for officers: Attrition is increasing, sources of new recruits might be decreasing, and the demand for their work is expanding.

Attrition might increase as a result of the following:

- baby-boom generation retirements. In some agencies, large proportions of officers are near or eligible for retirement and could lead to a sharp decrease in staffing levels.

- military call-ups. A substantial number of agencies have officers who serve in military reserve forces; their deployment not only drains staff but also poses fiscal challenges through maintenance of benefits for them.

- changing generational expectations. Younger workers might have less organizational commitment than older ones and seek to change jobs more often in "boundary-less" careers.

- budget crises. Decreasing financial support to cover officer salaries limits some agencies' ability to prevent their officers from going to other agencies or even leaving the field.

- organizational characteristics. Immediate supervisors, career growth opportunities, recognition, and feedback can all affect whether an officer will stay or leave.

There are also several causes to diminishing sources of new officers. Some of these are similar to those contributing to attrition. They include the following:

- a decrease in the qualified applicant pool. Large numbers of youths have used drugs, are out of shape, or have excessive debt.

- changing generational preferences. Similar to those that might get younger workers to leave the profession, changing generational preferences might lead younger workers to seek nonmilitaristic or more-flexible work.

- increased competition. The military, federal and state police agencies, private security firms, and other first-responder agencies recruit similar individuals, and competition for them has grown in the past decade.

- expanded skill requirements. Police work increasingly requires a broad range of skills that not all candidates might have.

- uncompetitive benefits. Police salaries lag behind those for many professions, although benefits and compensation for public employees have increased faster than those for private ones in the past decade.

- organizational characteristics. The image of a law-enforcement agency and the opportunities it offers, as well as the length and complexity of its hiring process, can all affect how many recruits might be attracted.

The potential for increased attrition and reduced supply makes it increasingly difficult for police agencies to meet the expanding demand for their services. There are three principal causes of this expanding demand:

- community policing. The adoption of community policing has increased the number of functions local agencies must undertake, functions that require time and resources in addition to those for traditional police responsibilities.

- homeland security. In the past decade, local police have been asked to perform additional patrol and surveillance, gather and analyze counterterrorism intelligence, conduct risk and threat assessments, and participate in many interagency task forces.

- emerging crimes. As a result of globalization, technological advancement, and greater awareness, the scope of crime that local agencies must address has expanded to include emerging crimes, such as human trafficking, identity theft, and cybercrime.

Further complicating these issues—especially recruitment and retention efforts—has been a weakened economy of recent years, reducing or restricting the options available to local agencies. In the next two chapters, we discuss in more depth what local agencies can do to retain and recruit officers. Because retention can reduce the need for recruitment, we focus on it first.

Retention: Plugging the Hole in the Bucket

"Our people are our most important asset" is a frequently used phrase in police management. This saying magnifies why employee turnover is an important issue facing police organizations. Crucial issues related to employee turnover include its consequences for an organization, what it indicates about organizational health and functioning (e.g., the efficiency of personnel management and planning), and the changing nature of modern-day policing. In this chapter, we place issues of police turnover in context by examining what is known about retaining officers, as well as experiences from other fields that might support different approaches to officer retention.

What Is Turnover?

Turnover occurs when an employee leaves an organization. It is costly and challenges organizational stability (Mueller and Price, 1989). There are two major types of turnover, each with its own effects (Edwards, 2007; T. Lee and Mitchell, 1994; Hom and Griffeth, 1994). Understanding each can help provide an approach to targeting the problem and reducing its costs (Kacmar et al., 2006). The first type of turnover is *involuntary turnover*, occurring when an employer terminates the working relationship with an employee (i.e., the employee is not leaving voluntarily). The second is *voluntary turnover*, occurring when an employee chooses to leave an organization. Other labels for involuntary turnover include *planned*, *desired*, *functional*, and *unavoidable turnover*; those for voluntary turnover include *unplanned*, *undesired*, *dysfunctional*, and *avoidable turnover* (Edwards, 2007).

Within these two broad types of turnover, there are many variations. For example, terminations, while a form of involuntary turnover, are not unavoidable (Ahlrichs, 2000). Terminations generally reflect bad hiring or bad management; both are avoidable and critical to improve. Such distinctions, and measures for them, can help identify the best ways

to address retention problems. Yet most agencies that measure turnover combine voluntary and involuntary turnover in one measure—that is, they assess total employee separation as a proportion of total employees in the organization. Alternatively, organizations might assess avoidable turnover as total employee separations less unavoidable turnover as a proportion of total employees. Organizations might also assess turnover by length of service; position in the organization, zone, or district; age; race; ethnicity; gender; and cohort. Table 3.1 offers several ratios that can be used alone or in combination to understand organizational turnover.

Effects of Turnover

Turnover has both positive and negative effects on an organization and its employees. Allowing agencies to rid themselves of poor performers is often good and helps the organization advance, introduce new ideas, increase productivity and performance, and facilitate change (Ahlrichs, 2000; Birati and Tziner, 1995; Hom and Griffeth, 1994; McEvoy and Cascio, 1987; Williams and Livingstone, 1994). Even some transfer of good employees elsewhere can help an organization; if a transferred employee performs well in a new position, then the original employer's reputation is enhanced (Orrick, 2008a). Employee transfers might also enhance contacts and networks in both agencies. At the same time, the loss of experienced

Table 3.1
Summary of Example Employee Turnover Ratios

Type of Turnover	Formula
Overall	Number of separations ÷ number of employees
Avoidable	(Number of separations – unavoidable separations) ÷ number of employees
Involuntary	(Number of separations – voluntary separations) ÷ number of employees
Recent hire	Number of separations of employees with <2 years of experience ÷ number of employees with <2 years of experience
Cohort	Number of new hires this month ÷ number of new hires still on the job in 6 months

personnel can adversely affect an organization in both reputation and costs. Tsang and Zahra (2008, p. 1441) call this "organizational forgetting," resulting in the "deterioration of an organization's knowledge base."

Curiously, law-enforcement agencies rarely examine the costs of turnover, perhaps because turnover costs are rarely identified by a line item in a department's budget. Even those departments estimating costs tend to focus on the short-term costs of replacing an officer and ignore organizational investments that have compounded over the years. Orrick (2002, 2008a) describes the comprehensive costs of police turnover, suggesting a wide-ranging set of costs beyond the obvious recruitment costs, as summarized in Table 3.2 on page 30.

Police employee success is a function of officer experience and ability to make sensible decisions with little supervision or oversight (Frost, 2006; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1988). By reducing the number of officers with experience, turnover inhibits effective decision making. It diminishes the strength and cohesion a department gains by having experienced staff, and that cannot be replaced over time. Agencies with higher turnover and less experienced officers suffer reduced productivity and more-frequent complaints (Orrick, 2002). The cost of training sworn police officers is substantial, particularly in comparison to other fields (New South Wales Council on the Cost of Government, 1996). The high level of organizational and job-specific knowledge required of police officers also means that high turnover can impair organizational performance and service delivery while replacement personnel are selected and trained.

Other fields experience similar problems. These include "brain drain" following voluntary separations that reduce performance levels and increase operational risks (Birati and Tziner, 1995; Mobley, 1982; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee, and Eberly, 2008). While these costs are difficult to quantify, they are just as real as salaries and training costs. Economic conditions can make them more pronounced: The offer of early retirement coupled with an inability to hire new officers, both resulting from fiscal difficulties, promises to accelerate the "brain drain" (Faher, 2009; Womack, 2009).

Table 3.2
Summary of Costs Associated with Police Turnover

Cost Category	Cost Example
Recruitment	Advertising Recruiters' salaries Bonuses
Selection	Tests Review-board salaries Investigator salaries Medical, psychological, and drug screening
New employee	Payroll and computer personnel New uniforms and equipment
Training	Orientation and field training Recruit salaries and benefits Field-trainer salaries Supervision In-service training
Operating	Overtime to cover vacancies Loss of productivity as employee departs Increased further turnover Peer disruption Disruption or loss of community relationships Disruption of department operations Lower morale Missed deadlines
Intangible	Loss of knowledge and experience Peer disruption Disruption or loss of community relationships Disruption of department operations Lower morale Missed deadlines

One effort to quantify the costs of turnover suggests that replacing an officer with three years experience costs more than twice his or her annual salary (Orrick, 2002). These costs can substantially differ by levels of training provided to an officer, salary and benefits paid, and selection procedures for new officers. At one extreme, in 2003, it cost approximately $100,000 for Los Angeles and $250,000 for the federal government to train new law-enforcement officers (Frost, 2006). More typically, in 2009, it cost approximately $58,000 to select, hire, and train a new officer, a still substantial expense whose magnitude is attributable in part to selection

and training processes that are unique to policing (Copeland, 2009). In contrast to those in many other fields, police selection procedures include background investigations, medical examinations, interviews, psychological assessments, drug screening, physical agility tests, and department-specific training.

Agencies might be able to improve retention by experimenting with strategies from other fields (Tadwalkar and Sen, 2005). Reducing turnover can help mitigate recruiting difficulties resulting from a smaller pool of qualified applicants or shifting generational preferences (Hom and Griffeth, 1994; Copeland, 2009).

Is Turnover a Particularly Difficult Problem for Law Enforcement?

While turnover can pose many problems for police agencies, its extent, particularly in comparison to that in other professions, is unclear. Several studies have identified attrition of officers as a major problem facing police departments (Frost, 2006; Harris and Baldwin, 1999; NIJ, 1992; Webster and Connors, 1988; Gettinger, 1984). Yet, despite the significant and well-placed concern about police turnover, other research indicates that turnover in police agencies is lower than in other sectors. Annual voluntary turnover rates are regarded as excessive when they surpass the 10-percent mark in law-enforcement or correctional agencies (Doerner, 1995). These are lower than the rates for teachers, at 17 percent (Planty et al., 2008). Overall, turnover rates for state and local government positions, including police and sheriffs' patrol officers, are only about a third of that for all (nonfarm) jobs (BLS, undated).

A British study of turnover in police agencies found an increasing number of resignations and transfers but a comparatively low turnover rate of 6 percent for policing as a whole (Christine Cooper and Ingram, 2004). Average labor turnover across all sectors was 18 percent in 2000 and 2001; staff turnover was 15 percent in central government and 16 percent in local government. Analysis of data from Australian and New Zealand police jurisdictions also found a low level of turnover from 1999 to 2003. Benchmarking data showed that total turnover of sworn officers was

lower in Australian police organizations than for employees in Australian public-sector organizations and comparable to turnover of employees in international public-sector organizations (Lynch and Tuckey, 2004).

U.S. research shows similarly low turnover rates in a variety of police agencies. A study of police turnover in Vermont found an average statewide turnover rate of 6 percent between 2001 and 2006 (Litcher, Reister, and Mason, 2006). A 2004 study of North Carolina found that attrition ranged from 0 to 87 percent, with an average of 14 percent (Yearwood and Freeman, 2004). In Prince William County, Virginia, the turnover rate in 2004 was 13 percent—double the 2003 rate (Kearns, 2007). Turnover rates in Chesterfield County, Virginia, have fluctuated between 4 and 6 percent in recent years (Edwards, 2007). Orrick (2008a) found that the average turnover ranged from 5 to 21 percent. A 2001 survey reports that 72 percent of respondents indicate that retention constitutes a crucial policing problem, with 54 percent reporting that the problem had grown (L. Lee, 2001).

Although turnover rates appear lower in police agencies than in many other sectors, police-officer turnover can carry greater costs than turnover elsewhere because of the expense of selecting and training officers.

Police turnover is higher and more challenging for small municipal departments than for county or state agencies (McIntyre, 1990). A 1999 study found turnover in smaller departments (i.e., those serving fewer than 50,000 persons) to be 7 percent, compared to 5 percent in larger agencies (Koper, Maguire, and Moore, 2001). Similarly, smaller agencies in North Carolina reportedly had an attrition rate (18 percent) twice that of their larger counterparts (Yearwood, 2003).

Officers in smaller agencies also have differing career paths from those in larger ones. For example, two-thirds of officers departing smaller agencies do so with less than five years of service, compared to just one-third of those at larger ones (Hoffman, 1993).

Who Leaves, and When Do They Go?

Recent research distinguishes among those who exit the profession. In particular, it suggests that young persons and new officers, as well as women and minorities, leave policing in disproportionate numbers.

K. Riley, Turner, et al. (2005) found that more than one-third of officers who left the Cincinnati force had less than one year of service and that nearly two-thirds who left had less than five years. Haarr (2005), using a panel survey of 446 recruits entering Arizona police academies, found that 13 percent dropped out before completing the academy and an additional 22 percent dropped out during field training or before completing their first year on a force. Nearly all the separations in Cincinnati and Arizona were voluntary. Yearwood and Freeman (2004) found an average length of stay of 34 months in North Carolina police departments. Lynch and Tuckey (2008) also found that young officers (i.e., those no more than 31 years of age) were more likely to leave policing than those in later stages of their career. They also found some difference between men and women in attrition, although length of service could also affect this relationship. There is also some churn among early career officers. While the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (Switzer, 2006) found that more than three in four officers work for only one agency in their career, it also found that, among those who transfer, 25 percent do so within 1.3 years and 50 percent do so within 3.2 years. After the first year, the average annual number of officers who leave is fairly stable (about 2 percent).

Lynch and Tuckey (2004) found that women most likely to leave New Zealand police forces were between 25 and 39 years of age. A longitudinal study of 125 recruits in Britain also found female officers more likely to resign than males, and younger recruits more likely to resign than older ones (Fielding and Fielding, 1987). Though most research finds gender differences in police retention, there are some exceptions. Haarr (2005) found that, although the number of women entering police work is small, there was no statistically significant difference between males and females in the rate of dropout from police work.

Regarding race and ethnicity, Doerner (1995) found that 48 percent of white officers and 51 percent of black officers hired in a five-year study period (1981–1986) left the Tallahassee Police Department and that black officers were more likely than white officers to depart involuntarily during their field-training phase. Haarr (2005) found statistically significant differences in rates of dropout *among* racial and ethnic minorities, with Latino and Native American officers having significantly higher dropout rates than African American recruits.

Officers leaving later in their careers might do so for reasons that accumulate over time, as Christine Cooper and Ingram (2004) found in a study of ten British agencies. Buzawa (1979) found a nonlinear relationship between experience and job satisfaction in the Detroit and Oakland (Calif.) police departments. Buzawa, Austin, and Bannon (1994), in addition to confirming this relationship, found patrol officers more dissatisfied than others with their jobs, particularly regarding supervision and advancement and promotional opportunities, and some decrease in satisfaction over time. Police agencies, if facing a wave of retirements, might seek to retain officers through a variety of policies, including deferred-retirement-option programs offering some tax breaks (Orrick, 2008a). Yet, as Tadwalker and Sen (2005) write, retention and turnover programs should be more than targeted prevention strategies. Properly designed, they can address early- and midcareer reasons officers leave and reduce turnover at all stages of a career.

Why Do Officers Leave?

T. Lee and Mitchell (1994, p. 31) portray voluntary turnover as a "complex process whereby individuals assess their feelings, personal situation, and work environment, and over time, make decisions about staying or leaving an organization." Similarly, Christine Cooper and Ingram (2004) found that officer decisions to leave often took place over a considerable period of time and did not result from one decisive event. Curiously, nearly half of those who left indicated that they would consider returning to the force, giving further credence to the contention that the turnover decision is a complex psychological process—and possibly pointing to ways police agencies could improve retention.

No overarching theory on why officers leave is evident in existing research, but the five main influences Lynch and Tuckey (2004) identify as influencing turnover point to a tentative model (Figure 3.1). The five main influences are (1) the pull of other opportunities; (2) actual and potential compensation; (3) personal characteristics and demographic factors; (4) organizational health, policy, and culture; and (5) employee needs. All contribute, albeit unequally, to turnover. By our tentative model, these influences all determine job satisfaction and organizational commitment (or lack thereof), which, in turn, might lead to exit. Research generally supports job satisfaction and organizational commitment as critical antecedents to turnover (Hom and Griffeth, 1994; Tett and Meyer, 2006). In the next sections, we review each of these influences and how agencies might address them.

Other Opportunities

Orrick (2008a) has pointed to economic factors as strong external forces that influence the turnover decision. Officers might leave for perceived better economic opportunities. Opportunities from outside the profession might push an officer from it; better opportunities in the profession might pull officers to them in a form of "cannibalism" within the field (DeLord, 2009). To counter other opportunities, Orrick (2008a) suggests that departments maintain conditions to minimize the

Figure 3.1
Conceptual Model of Determinants of Attrition

"push" from outside the profession and to enhance the "pull" of their own agency. The economic recession of 2008 and 2009 might stabilize how other opportunities push officers from the field or pull them elsewhere within it. Nevertheless, the impact of external economic trends merit further research to determine their full effect on turnover.

Compensation

Compensation includes not only salary and benefits but also viable career ladders, adequate training and equipment, and perceptions by officers that a policing career will afford a good life. To be sure, managers view salary and benefits as the biggest element of compensation affecting turnover. Yearwood and Freeman (2004) found that nearly half of North Carolina agencies attribute at least 70 percent of their attrition to compensation issues driving officers to other departments or professions. Furthermore, as Branham (2005) notes, inadequate compensation can contribute to feelings of devaluation that grow into more-potent reasons for leaving.

Inadequate compensation also enhances the influence of other factors on turnover, such as promotional opportunities and procedural justice (Rostker, Hix, and Wilson, 2007). Indeed, a study of 20,000 workers from 18 industries found that between 80 and 90 percent of employees decide to leave an organization for reasons other than money (C. Lee, 2006). Such reasons include their job, their manager, and the culture and environment of their work. As Christopher Lee (2006, p. 53) notes,

> pay is usually a symptom of other things not going well. When employees complain about pay, they are usually indirectly indicating that they are not happy with their work situation. Pay is a lightning rod issue as it is more tangible than poor management and lack of appreciation.

Although the issue of compensation is paramount to understanding sources of employee turnover, it can distract from other substantive and more deeply embedded issues, such as organizational culture, leadership, and employee engagement.

Why might managers perceive compensation to be the cause of turnover more than is actually the case? Orrick (2008a) notes several possible reasons.[1] First, officers might cite pay as the reason for leaving to keep good relations with their department. Second, using compensation as an absolute for leaving appears simple for the officer who wants to leave, making the process quick and free of additional trauma. Third, attributing attrition to compensation allows management to avoid addressing other problems or conflicts.

As long as employees view compensation as fair in comparison to others in the same organization and to others in the field, it will not be the most significant contributor to turnover. To enhance salary fairness, police agencies must modernize their pay and benefit structures (Orrick, 2008a). Addressing perceived fairness can be difficult in times of economic stress and resulting wage freezes and furloughs ("Even Cops Losing Their Jobs in Recession," 2009; Sward, 2008).

Officers might also seek fairness in promotions and career growth, issues directly intertwined with salary and affecting employee engagement. Rostker, Hix, and Wilson (2007) note that the New Orleans Police Department's infrequent promotion opportunities and inability to give pay increases hindered officer motivation and retention. Orrick (2008a) claims that career opportunities might be more important to younger generations of employees who seek immediate gratification. Buzawa, Austin, and Bannon (1994) also suggest that lack of promotional opportunity leads to increased job dissatisfaction over time. In small agencies, there is not much room for specialization, and recruits must wait their turn for higher-level assignments; in larger agencies, there is greater task specialization, which can lead to boredom and feelings of being trapped by skill sets (Orrick, 2008a; Haarr, 2005). This problem can affect even new recruits. As Haarr (2005) notes, new recruits might think that the job they were hired to do is exciting but, once on the job, find that many of its daily duties are mundane. Job scheduling might

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1. The work of Orrick, the public safety director for the city of Cordele, Georgia, is useful for being among the few to address these issues—hence our heavy reliance on it in several places in this monograph. Nevertheless, we caution the reader that some of his insights are based on experience or anecdotes rather than systematic research.

contribute to these realizations. Some might also expect more flexibility allowing for work-family balance and self-initiated work partnerships, as well as quicker advancement opportunities.

Differences between expectations and realities can quickly lead to turnover if not addressed early. When first entering the force, those ultimately resigning and those staying did not differ in their attitudes regarding job pay, status, or security, but, by the end of the first year, resigners reported greater dissatisfaction with these and less commitment to police work (Fielding and Fielding, 1987). Resigners also expressed greater dissatisfaction with the amount of paperwork, social isolation, and the public image of the job.

Officers without proper training can also become discouraged. Employees today expect frequent training opportunities to improve their abilities. Without such training, they can lose confidence (Orrick, 2008a). Many officers now also consider equipment to be part of their "compensation"; the chief of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police in particular has noted that, given limits on recruiting resources, providing updated equipment to officers can help attract and retain them (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a). Officers often cite frustration about not having adequate or functional equipment to perform their jobs. This too can lead to turnover (Orrick, 2008a).

Personal Characteristics

Personal characteristics, such as education and personality traits, can also affect turnover (Christine Cooper and Ingram, 2004), although how is sometimes unclear. Research on the effects of education, for example, is inconsistent—showing, in different cases, a positive, negative, or no relationship with job satisfaction (Dantzker, 1994; Frost, 2006; Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). Griffin, Dunbar, and McGill (1978) found that all police officers surveyed in a southwestern police department were satisfied with their jobs regardless of their education level and that job satisfaction remained constant across educational levels. Subsequent research has found that the relationship between educational attainment and job satisfaction varies by department (Buzawa, 1984; Dantzker, 1993).

Regarding personality traits, Drew, Carless, and Thompson (2008) found that those with high anxiety are more likely to exit, while those who are tough-minded and venturesome are less likely to do so. They found no relationship between turnover and one's openness to experience. Nor did they find a relationship between turnover and one's agreeableness. Such findings could help in developing a typology of police turnover, fusing explanatory theories from diverse fields and using policing as the potential landscape of evaluating turnover conditions (Hom and Griffeth, 1994).

Organizational Issues

Organizational health, policy, and culture are powerful predictors of employee turnover. These issues include organizational function, generational competence, supervision and leadership, bureaucracy, fairness, and openness and transparency.

There is considerable evidence that organizational dysfunction increases turnover. Orrick (2008a) suggests that many law-enforcement agencies are characterized by "silo management styles"—that is, they are tall, rank-heavy, and hierarchical organizational structures requiring compliance with policies, procedures, rules, and regulation enforcement. Fry and Berkes (1983) trace the influence of this management style on policing from the industrial age and its requirements for rigid organization. Such a structure can hinder growth (Auten, 1981; Fry and Berkes, 1983) and produce frustrations that increase turnover, especially among younger officers (Orrick, 2008a). Edwards (2007) suggests that younger generations lack the ability to succeed in the "silo," the paramilitary organizational environment endemic to many police agencies. Others suggest that such a structure prevents police organizations from fulfilling career needs of younger generations (Brand, 1999; M. Fischer, 2006; McCafferty, 2003).

Employees might also leave organizations because of poor supervision and leadership (Christine Cooper and Ingram, 2004; Lynch and Tuckey, 2004; Orrick, 2008a, 2008b). The relationship that immediate and midlevel supervisors have with their employees often has the most influence on an officer's decision to stay or leave a department. As Orrick (2008b) said, "people don't quit jobs, they quit bosses." Among supervisor

behaviors that Orrick (2008a) suggests contribute to officer attrition are setting poor examples, indecisiveness, unfairness, being overly critical or not sharing credit for work, and poor communication. Loss of trust and confidence in senior leaders also adversely affects retention, especially to the extent that leaders embrace traditional management models and fail to communicate their vision to employees. This indicates the importance of training supervisors to mentor employees, and determining whether police bureaucracy might discourage good candidates from applying for supervisory positions (COPS, 2009b).

Policies and procedures can also affect a police officer's attitudes, behaviors, and feelings toward organization and self (Frost, 2006; Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, 1994; Patterson, 1992; Violanti and Aron, 1995). Some researchers suggest that employees will be more satisfied with decisions if they perceive the processes used for making them to be fair (Frost, 2006; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Procedural justice has been linked to organizational commitment (Folger and Konovsky, 1989), job satisfaction, loyalty, and employee evaluation of supervisor and organization (Frost, 2006). Given the importance of organizational fairness to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and retention, law-enforcement agencies can create a satisfied and committed workforce with minimal cost through the use of procedurally fair policies. This is especially true for younger recruits, who have a heightened perception of organizational fairness and distributive justice (Brand, 1999; Frost, 2006).

Organizational openness and transparency are also critical to procedural fairness. Employees who are invited to participate in decision making are more likely to find the process fair (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Officers of today will become less satisfied and committed to organizations that are less open and transparent and do not allow for input and feedback (Lambert, 2003).

Employee Needs

Employee needs include feedback and recognition, a stimulating work environment, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and connectedness. A thorough understanding of employee needs can help organizations understand why some employees leave, particularly when a sound reason is not evident.

Orrick (2008a) suggests that recruits today have more higher-order needs of belongingness, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization. As curious and nebulous as such needs might seem to police management, departments must meet them if they expect to retain younger officers. Orrick further suggests that employee turnover is an emotional issue and that workers quit because they feel that their need for trust, hope, worth, or competence is not being met. Other researchers concur that meeting these needs might be more salient for younger generations of workers than for previous generations (Brand, 1999; M. Fischer, 2006; McCafferty, 2003).

Similarly, employees want to know how they are performing, and providing frequent feedback is crucial to a contented and high-performing workforce (Orrick, 2008a). Lack of feedback can also lead to serious mistakes, which can degrade confidence, morale, and job satisfaction. Positive reinforcement or recognition can improve performance and increase job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Unfortunately, good performance often goes unrewarded, while considerable time and energy is spent critiquing poor performance.

Building on the concept of job satisfaction, Reiser (1974) proposed a theoretical link between police turnover and burnout caused by job stress accumulating over time. In a study of Memphis police officers who voluntarily resigned from police work between 1975 and 1980, Sparger and Giacopassi (1983) concluded that veteran officers voluntarily resigned because of "burnout" resulting from the culmination of occupational frustrations and dissatisfactions related to traditional authoritarian management styles, organizational policies, departmental politics, lack of appreciation for their efforts, the system of internal discipline, pay and fringe benefits, relations with civic officials, court policies, and community expectations. They also cited the influence of intense on-the-job situations, a lack of self-fulfillment in higher-order needs, family considerations, and the conduct of co-workers. More recently, Dick (2000) analyzed clinical data from therapy with police officers who were under stress and considering leaving the police force and cited "epiphenal events" as causing emotional exhaustion and burnout. Such events lead officers to conclude that the organization stands in the way of their ability to make their desired, positive contribution through work.

Other research suggests that employees leave after realizing they are no longer committed to the organization or the career path. Diminishing job satisfaction leads workers to question their commitment to the organization or their career, which precipitates the decision to leave it (Frost, 2006; Lambert and Hogan, 2009; Jaramillo, Nixon, and Sams, 2005). Job satisfaction plays a crucial role in retention, often extending the concept to include job embeddedness, including, as Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, and Erez (2001) suggest, formal and informal connections with other persons on and off the job (including co-workers, community members, and family), an element of fit (that is, employee perceptions of compatibility with the work environment), and sacrifice (the perceived loss of material or psychological benefits that might be forfeited by leaving a job). Workers who are embedded in their jobs are less likely to leave than those who are not.

What Can Agencies Do to Prevent Turnover?

Unfortunately, the research on what agencies can do to reduce turnover appears to rely more on anecdotal accounts than on empirical analysis. Nevertheless, in this section, we highlight existing knowledge about several strategies, citing evidence where it exists, but cautioning that each strategy should be considered critically, given the lack of rigorous analyses. These strategies can be generally be classified in one of five categories (see Table 3.3): (1) planning and analysis, (2) reducing the financial impact of turnover, (3) enhancing compensation and perks, (4) employee engagement strategies, and (5) improving organizational effectiveness. Many practices cross these categories.

Planning and Analysis

Conduct an Evidence-Based Analysis of Department Retention Needs. While there is some federal government data collection and analysis for police personnel planning (Wilson, 2006), the law-enforcement community can also draw on data compiled and analyses conducted for other professions to gauge applicability to its own work. For example, the U.S. military has conducted national studies on generational preferences,

Table 3.3
Means of Limiting the Effects of Turnover

Strategy Category	Strategy
Plan and analyze	Conduct evidence-based analysis of retention needs.
	Know employees and their needs.
	Advocate for staff.
	Conduct exit and "stay" interviews.
Reduce financial impact	Use realistic job previews.
	Consider assessment-center methods in hiring and promoting.
	Hire pretrained or precertified employees.
	Think twice about service contracts.
Enhance compensation and perks	Define "compensation" broadly.
	Pay employees what they are worth.
	Offer apprentice salary during training.
	Offer education incentives.
	Create an incentive "portfolio."
	Use career ladders.
	Consider offering perks—but wisely.
	Investigate job flexibility.
Engage employees	Understand what engagement is and how to do it.
	Allow employees to experience others' duties through work diversity.
	Provide job shadowing.
	Give employees a voice in decision making.
	Allow for meaningful employee feedback.
	Recognize employee success.
	Mentor beyond field training.
Improve organizational effectiveness	Communicate goals routinely and effectively.
	Be fair and transparent in all aspects of policy.
	Reduce unnecessary bureaucracy.
	Select and maintain effective leaders.

attitudes, perceptions, and broad demographic change over time in order to identify changing career preferences in the armed services. Such data can also yield insights on changes that will affect law enforcement (Miller, 2008). For example, agencies can incorporate local demographic and market trends, as well as project the retirement-eligible portion and

potential attrition rates of their workforces, to develop retention and succession plans and task forces. Such task forces have existed at least since the early 2000s, including in four California departments (L. Lee, 2001). As agencies traditionally conduct needs assessments to determine which changes are appropriate for their specific needs, they can apply evidence-based analyses of needs to map approaches for reducing turnover.

Know Your Employees and Their Needs. Organizations can develop a dynamic understanding of their workforces by conducting regular surveys about employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment. These results might assist in improving not only short-term retention but also long-term job and organizational commitment. These surveys should attempt to differentiate among groups, including women, minorities, ranks, generations, new employees, and near-retirees. Knowing employees and their individual needs intimately is a hallmark of a proactive human-resource department and can lead to targeted problem-solving when retention becomes a problem (Haggerty, 2009). Following other accountability models commonplace in modern policing (e.g., CompStat in New York City), agencies should consider holding individual supervisors and managers accountable for retaining their staff, establishing stronger at-stake relationships between supervisor and line officer (Lim et al., 2009; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a).

Go Beyond "Knowing" to Advocating for Your Staff. Even though human capital is the most important and expensive asset for police agencies, few agencies have devoted resources to understanding it. The best place to start understanding it is within the organization, where direct supervisors can communicate with upper management about potential problems. It is important to identify at-risk employees, lest hidden problems lead to turnover (Haggerty, 2009; Orrick, 2008a). Officers might tell other officers or their supervisors that they are looking to leave the organization, and they might contemplate leaving for some time (Christine Cooper and Ingram, 2004). Key transitions leading to attrition can include the birth of a child, children graduating from high school or college, divorce, and separation of a close friend from the department. Knowing of such events can perhaps help departments assist officers in times of personal transition. Agencies should communicate with officers exhibiting prolonged frustration or

disappointment after being passed over for promotion and explain why the promotion cycle might have been unsuccessful for them, making the experience a foundation for future success. Officers requesting much time off might also be indicating risk for turnover that their department can address (Haggerty, 2009). Officers might request meetings with human resources to view their record or to discuss retirement options, but real outreach efforts by immediate supervisors to establish support systems for officers can provide valuable opportunities to promote retention.

Conduct Exit and "Stay" Interviews, Integrating the Results into Long-Term Planning. Exit interviews can yield information on turnover. Lynch and Tuckey (2004) recommend that these interviews be conducted by an independent person away from the work site and that the data be kept anonymously and separately from individual employee records. Exit interviews can also be used to educate employees about how they can come back to the agency. Stay interviews, or interviews with current employees aimed at exploring the reasons they stay with the organization, can be a more proactive approach to achieving the same goal of improving retention (Herman, 2005). These approaches can help agencies understand the reasons for turnover, retain good relationships with former employees, and signal current employees that their retention is important. Despite the information they can offer, few agencies undertake exit interviews (Taylor et al., 2006). Furthermore, less than 30 percent of California departments use employee input to address retention, and only 15 percent have a written plan to improve officer retention (L. Lee, 2001). Planning and analysis with the guidance of a human-resource specialist can yield data and information to address turnover problems.

Reducing the Financial Impact of Turnover

Use Realistic Job Previews for Interested Applicants Up Front. A realistic job preview includes a number of strategies to cut through impressionistic and unrealistic expectations of careers and give glimpses into the true nature of the work performed. For example, the Idaho State Police attempts to demystify the policing career by providing, on its recruitment website, examples of daily duties and responsibilities expected of its troopers (Idaho State Police, undated). The International

Association of Chiefs of Police's "Discover Policing" website features realistic vignettes, interviews, and commentary to provide interested applicants with not-so-glamorous views of real police work (IACP, undated). These could be incorporated into department recruitment strategies along with job announcements and observation opportunities (such as ride-alongs and job shadowing) that accurately depict the work. Round-table discussions could also improve recruits' sense of career paths. Candid videos describing progression from the academy to the beat to detective work to leadership positions might also be useful. Such techniques might be appropriate not only for attracting new hires but also for retaining officers.

Unrealistic expectations might result in internal (recruitment) or external (media reports) difficulties. Realistic job previews can help not only adjust expectations but also save departments money. Companies that use these strategies saved an average of approximately $711 per employee (Kickul, 2002; Phillips, 1998)—savings that would likely be higher in policing, given the costs of finding and training new officers. This approach to providing realistic job expectations also has morale benefits. Employees who feel misled about job expectations might compensate by withholding work or commitment to the organization (Kickul, 2002; Meglino, Ravlin, and DeNisi, 2000). Such sense of betrayal can also fuel further turnover (Becker and Dale, 2003; Pitt and Ramaseshan, 1995).

Consider Assessment-Center Methods in Hiring and Promoting. After establishing an applicant pool, law-enforcement agencies go to great lengths to assess candidates for initial hiring or promotion. Many police departments use written entrance or promotional exams, as well as an assessment center. An assessment center is where a series of exercises is conducted in which each participant demonstrates skills to a group of observers, or assessors, who rate the candidates. The International Congress on Assessment Center Methods has established certain standards including an analysis of job specifications, classification of behaviors, multiple assessment approaches, and job-related simulations (Moses and Boehm, 1975). Substantial evidence suggests that using an assessment-center approach improves hiring practices, raises morale, and leads to an applicant pool with a more comprehensive view of job

expectations (B. Chambers, 2002; LaHuis, 2005; Riggio, Mayes, and Schleicher, 2003). However, as we discuss in the next chapter, some contend that the career needs and goals of new generations of recruits might be incompatible with assessment-center methods (DeCicco, 2000; Orrick, 2008a; Taylor et al., 2006).

Hire Pretrained or Precertified Employees. Many police agencies hire candidates who have already completed some professional training or law-enforcement certification either with prior employers or at their own individual expense. The extent of such pretraining, and agencies' willingness to hire individuals with such training, varies widely (International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training, 2005). Agencies might realize a variety of benefits from recruiting pretrained officers. Recruits with prior military training tend to have lower attrition during agency training, higher retention, and higher training readiness (Golfin, 2006). Productivity might increase as agencies fill vacancies more rapidly with candidates who have acute knowledge and skills (Viney, Adamson, and Doherty, 1997). Shifting recruitment selection from organization to candidate can also strengthen personal job fit over time (N. Anderson and Cunningham-Snell, 2000). Such cities as Oakland, California, have begun recruiting pretrained candidates as part of their overall hiring strategy to bring the department to full staffing (Poulson, 2008). Pretrained officers might undergo abbreviated academy sessions in which initial basic training need not be offered, saving training costs for the department (Haggerty, 2009). Agencies might also use differential compensation to attract the best pretrained officers (Kowal, Hassel, and Hassel, 2008).

Although offering some financial benefits to departments, hiring pretrained candidates can also pose risks. Departments should not expect candidates to have dramatically improved performance when the quality of previous training is unknown (Viney, Adamson, and Doherty, 1997). They should also ensure that their own training is not redundant (Golfin, 2006) and focuses on agency-specific needs (R. Byrne, 2001). Hiring pretrained candidates who are attractive to other agencies can also escalate short-term turnover (R. Byrne, 2001). Many agencies have cultural fears of hiring pretrained candidates that can be overcome with

an understanding of the risks and benefits of hiring such candidates (Golfin, 2006).

Think Twice About Service Contracts. Police departments might also require contracts of new hires so as to reduce direct costs of employee turnover (Orrick, 2008a). Under some service contracts, new hires leaving the agency within three years of initial employment must reimburse prorated training expenses to the agency. Agencies might also use such contracts when sending an employee to long-term or expensive training. Nevertheless, their use has not been shown to reduce turnover—only to lessen the financial risk associated with hiring new employees (Orrick, 2008a), though research in policing is limited. Mestemaker (1991) found little benefit of a career-based Air Force service requirement program on retention. A program service commitment in exchange for signing and retention bonuses, designed to retain health-care employees in nursing residency, met with mixed results, including a 50-percent retention rate after two years (Olson et al., 2001). Because these contracts might contradict worker expectations of flexibility, organizations should consider them carefully (Lawler, 2005; Perrons, 2000).

The use of loyalty contracts has decreased in part because of globalization and increasing workforce skills (Lawler, 2005) and the belief that written contracts cast doubts on informal, trusting relationships (often referred to as *psychological contracts* between employer and worker). Workers find such contracts unattractive because they can limit mobility and often diminish trust between management and employees (Flood et al., 2001; Lawler, 2005).

Enhancing Compensation and Other Benefits

Define "Compensation" Broadly. Although, as noted, research suggests that compensation often masks other reasons for leaving an organization, it and other benefits are powerful motivators for retention. Higher or well-timed salary adjustments, more-frequent promotions, visible career ladders, housing allowances, take-home cars, on-site child care, health-club memberships, and job flexibility are some of the benefits that can help improve retention. Officers might compare such benefits across agencies and might transfer to agencies with better benefit packages.

Currently, most police departments follow a one-size-fits-all approach to compensating employees, meaning that all entering recruits, for example, are offered the same salary and benefit package; younger workers might reject this model and look for options that better suit their needs (Edwards, 2007). Lavigna (2005, p. 150) explains:

> Compensation must be used strategically to make the most difference. This means abandoning systems that rely on rigid across-the-board raises. Managers should be able to use their discretion (within guidelines) to hire above the minimum and give raises and bonuses for good performance and retention.

Fairness, rather than the level of compensation, is more important for retention (Edwards, 2007). Money itself is not enough to engage all generations of employees (Edwards, 2007). Commitment and loyalty, especially of younger workers, to an organization cannot be "bought" (Brand, 1999; M. Fischer, 2006; McCafferty, 2003). The challenge is to find nonmonetary ways to motivate and engage workers. Today, benefit flexibility or a cafeteria-style approach is an option many companies have tried, allowing options while keeping costs down (Edwards, 2007).

Pay Your Employees What They Are Worth. Increased compensation can also be effective, especially if it is well timed. The literature is sparse on this issue, but well-placed and well-timed longevity pay, most likely coupled with other benefits to meet individual needs, might reduce turnover. Longevity pay can boost retention of long-term, highly skilled and experienced personnel. Although there are direct costs to such pay, their benefits likely outweigh the costs of turnover. These increases should be timed to the agency's key attrition points. A similar approach, called a *retention bonus*, is being used effectively within the Lehigh Valley Health Network. This program pays bonuses from $3,000 to $5,000 at specified times to reward employees who stay with the hospital (Edwards, 2007). These bonuses have led to low turnover rates and an abundance of applicants, landing the hospital on both *Fortune*'s 100 Best Companies to Work For and *U.S. News and World Report*'s Best Hospitals list.

Offer Apprentice Salary During Training. Apprentice salaries might be well below market rate but rapidly increase above market average as the officer gains experience, training, and credentials. This approach is effective as a retention tool and helps to attract trained officers from other departments (Orrick, 2008a). In light of developments in such cities as Portland, Oregon, where new hires are placed into a "preacademy," and apprenticeship and mentorship roles are developed even prior to enrollment, apprenticeship positions with pay are beginning to emerge as innovative strategies (Glanville, 2009).

Offer Educational Incentives. Educational incentives might be tied to mandatory service commitments as a posthire payback mechanism (Jackson et al., 2003). Carter and Sapp (1992) found that offering educational incentives might have been a pivotal moment in the professionalization of modern law enforcement by linking police practitioners to higher educational goals and expectations. Roberg and Bonn (2004) claim that tying educational incentives to recruitment efforts has multiple benefits beyond retention. Outside of policing, Moyle et al. (2003) found that educational incentives offered to enhance job satisfaction among nurses would also establish long-term relationships between nurses and hospitals. Strategies that embed tuition and educational incentives in apprenticeship contexts can help not only retain workers but also create solid linkages between school-based learning and career pathways (Cantor, 1997). The benefits of such outreach accrue by establishing linkages between personal educational fulfillment and mandated post-training service (Plecki et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2003).

Create an Incentive Portfolio. Creating a portfolio of incentives, including compensation, bonuses, and loan and tuition reimbursement, can help improve retention (Kowal, Hassel, and Hassel, 2008). It can also benefit initial recruitment by targeting specific candidate populations, such as, college-educated applicants through loan repayment programs, for example. What separates these strategies from simply offering perks or buffet-style enticements is that the portfolio is generally tied to long-term candidate recruitment for specific groups (Kowal, Hassel, and Hassel, 2008).

Use Career Ladders. A career ladder can provide for vertical promotional advancement in an organization. It might take many forms. Career ladders can consist of establishing regular and open advancement and promotional opportunities, testing for open positions, and still other substantive steps allowing employee career advancement. Career laddering can also constitute internal structural changes to organizations, allowing employees freer access to upper rungs of a ladder of achievement (Prince, 2003; Sochalski, 2002). These opportunities can also have symbolic meaning, fostering professionalism by allowing for promotional advancement and responsiveness to employee needs and career ambition and reinforcing feelings that employees are engaged in a bona fide career (Bacharach, Conley, and Shedd, 1986; Staiger, Auerbach, and Buerhaus, 2000). Visible career ladders show employees multiple pathways to organizational success.

Both the formal and abstract characteristics of career ladders can positively affect employee perceptions of organizational commitment, professional orientation, and tangible opportunity for personal and professional improvement. Sochalski (2002) found that career ladders helped attract certified nurses not currently working in the profession back to the field. Fitzgerald (2006) found similar advancement opportunities to have benefits in retail and industrial work. Next-generation salary steps in many career ladders are integral in attracting 21st-century employees (Risher, 2002). Within policing, Orrick (2008a) suggests a dual-career track based on operational abilities (e.g., officer I, II, III) rather than supervision. This would supplement laddering with salary advancement based on nontraditional abilities. The Pasadena (California) Police Department's civilian career ladder provides employees mobility within the organization ("Q & A Chief Bernard Melekian," 2009). Career laddering disrupts the inertia inherent in many social-service organizations that can limit impressions of personal and career advancement (Rosenholtz, 1986; Spuck, 1974).

Agencies that adopt career ladders as a recruitment technique might strengthen the links between entry-level positions and future advancement opportunities. Some organizations have experimented with job zones based on education, experience, and projected growth metrics derived from needs assessments of targeted organizational growth (Prince, 2003).

Supplemental management training for ladder climbers has been used to strengthen preparation of entry-level employees (Prince, 2003; Robinson, Murrells, and Clinton, 2006).

Consider Offering Perks—But Wisely. For the private sector, perks might be seen as a key retention (and recruitment) tool. Perks might be categorized as soft (e.g., ease of commute, challenge of work) or hard (e.g., flexible scheduling and promotional opportunities) (Shilling, 2004). For example, some of Google's benefits include on-site physician and dental care, free massage and yoga, free meals, a three-week vacation in the first year of employment, free recreation, an on-site car wash and dry cleaner, an on-site fitness facility, flexible work hours, and casual dress for nearly every employee (Switzer, 2006). Just as educational incentives can increase job satisfaction and human and social capital, so too can perks (Holtom, Mitchell, and Lee, 2006; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, and Erez, 2001). Employee perceptions of these perks might be more directly related to positive organizational culture than to the actual benefits received. Perks should be integrated into a larger employee-retention plan to be most effective (Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, and Erez, 2001). Do note, however, that perks distributed to the entire organization with little discussion of their intent can be detrimental to an organization (Sigler, 1999).

Some research disputes the increase in productivity attributed to perks. Hausknecht, Rodda, and Howard (2008) call perks "investments" and relate them to longevity but found that they affected long-term employment for less than 10 percent of respondents in their survey. Some perks, such as profit-sharing in the private sector, can be altered to focus on group performance or adapted to other settings. Police departments, for example, can give a unit a day off for a job well done or increase its budget to reward exceptional performance. While not all private-sector benefits might be transferable to the public sector, the public sector can still offer unique perks (e.g., low-interest mortgage loans for officers).

Investigate Job Flexibility as a Plan with Multiple Personnel Benefits. Job flexibility—including such strategies as working from home, telecommuting, alternative scheduling, job-sharing, and staggered work hours—is gaining popularity in multiple work environments (Hill

et al., 2001). The perception that such strategies allow for a better work and family balance is an attractive concept to workers and is supported by a host of empirical research on work-life balance and its influence on public health and individual happiness (Aronsson, 1999; Hill et al., 2001; Levin-Epstein, 2006; Sparks et al., 1997; Swanberg, 2005). As such, the impact of flexibility on job and overall company performance has been positive (Kogi, 1997; Perrons, 2000; Sánchez et al., 2007). M. Anderson and Gobeil (2003) found that, in 67 percent of cases, job flexibility strategies were "very effective" in improving employee retention in child-welfare service positions. Richman et al. (2008) note that both formal and informal flexibility boost retention times, particularly when seen as a product of organizational commitment to employee work-life balance. Eaton (2003) found that job-flexibility policies not only had a positive impact on overall retention but also helped attract young, family-oriented job prospects. A consistent theme in research on job flexibility concerns the obstacles to implementation that, if overcome, can offer a wide variety of benefits, including greater employee retention.

Increasing the availability of flexible work options, such as flexible hours, alternative work schedules, job-sharing, and part-time employment, allowing for employee choice in work structure is strongly related to reducing turnover (Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). Alternative work schedules also reduce sick time, absences, and overtime. Job-sharing, in which two employees hold a position together, require more employees and equipment, as well as organizational commitment to innovative job scheduling, and might not be desirable to all (Hill et al., 2001; Richman et al., 2008). Nevertheless, job-sharing and part-time scheduling have boosted retention of highly qualified nurses (O'Brien-Pallas, Duffield, and Alksnis, 2004) and information-technology and library-science professionals (Stanley, 2008).

For police, Pierce and Dunham (1992) found significant improvements in scheduling of personal activities after a departmental change from a forward-rotating eight-hour-shift schedule to a 12-hour compressed shift schedule. Agencies should identify what flexible scheduling and sharing options are already in place, identify employees' general and individual needs, examine what comparable agencies are providing, and then try to

meet employees' group and individual needs and improve worker access to flexible work practices (Switzer, 2006; Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). Departments implementing flexible work practices will need to promote them among staff and train management to implement flexible solutions in each work area.

The organizational commitment to this strategy must be high in order to regulate the myriad administrative, payroll, benefit, and compensation issues that arise with job flexibility (Best, 1981). The organization might wish to conduct a preliminary feasibility study to determine costs and benefits of such a program (Meier, 1979).

Employee Engagement

Employee engagement refers to a number of strategies organizations might pursue to help employees balance work and career—what literature terms *life-task relationships* (Cartwright and Holmes, 2006; Jamrog, 2004). All strategies employed by organizations to address worker needs can be engaging. Employee-engagement strategies often emphasize affective outcomes, such as resolving employees' emotional needs, restoring trust, and increasing confidence that organizations care about their workers (Towers Perrin, 2003). *Engagement* in this sense means embracing an overall idea that companies have a responsibility to regulate employee self-efficacy, trust, and well-being.

Understand What "Engagement" Means and How to Create It.
Employee engagement includes enhancing the diversity of work, allowing officers to have a voice in decisions, providing feedback, recognizing their achievement, creating opportunities to build cohesion, and instituting mentoring programs. The concept has shown success when applied to policing: The Santa Cruz Consolidated Emergency Communication Center experiences 1-percent turnover in an industry with an average attrition rate of 17 percent (Switzer, 2006). Its success is attributed to a willingness to try different approaches, listening to employees, engaging them in planning and decision making, and recognizing good behavior.

Allow Employees to Experience Others' Duties Through Work Diversity. Assignment rotation can be a valuable way to provide opportunities for officers and deputies to experience special duties, thereby enhancing the diversity of their work (S. Lewis, Kagan, and Heaton, 2000; Palmer et al., 1998). Rotational assignments might be an employment incentive for younger employees entering law enforcement, but there are benefits for senior officers as well. Senior officers transferred for short periods might allow officers to break out of professional ruts while promoting cross-functional knowledge and experience. Similarly, cross-training might also increase job satisfaction and commitment to the organization (Davenport, Thomas, and Cantrell, 2002; Kirpal, 2004; Palmer et al., 1998).

Provide for Job Shadowing with New Hires and Beyond. Job shadowing can expose officers to other units, build their future aspirations, and create camaraderie among officers across shifts and duties. It might also enhance a deeper understanding for the integrated duties all have in the department, as when an inexperienced patrol officer shadows court security, narcotics enforcement, and investigating officers. Pairing new hires with mentors in shadowing and supervised contexts can strengthen skill development, coaching, organizational bonds, and occupational socialization (COPS, 2009b). It also inculcates a broader organizational mission with associated strategies for enhancing commitment and work progress (Luthans and Jensen, 2005). Shadowing and mentoring opportunities expand the organizational role in employee engagement by providing a supportive peer for new hires who might be simultaneously a leader and partner (Gunnels-Perry, 2007). Morgan and Kritsonis (2008) suggest that these relationships are crucial and essential and should be established immediately after hire.

Give Employees a Voice in Decision Making. When employees believe that they have a voice that can influence organizational decisions, it deepens their commitment to the organization and encourages ongoing feedback, creating a continuous, positive dialogue. Supervisors should listen to their officers and have personal one-on-one contact whenever possible. Police departments can increase officer input and feedback through carefully crafted surveys about organizational effectiveness

(Cartwright and Holmes, 2006; Towers Perrin, 2003). This type of input can be effective so long as the department is willing to act on the results. The chief of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department, for example, claims that allowing officers to be more engaged with their work helped halve attrition rates (see box, *Improving Recruitment and Retention Through Employee Engagement*).

Allow for Employee Feedback, and Make it Meaningful. Providing feedback is critical, especially for younger-generation workers. A 360-degree evaluation, in which workers are evaluated by managers, colleagues, subordinates, and clients, has shown promise in integrating employee feedback in meaningful ways. Several studies (Hazucha, Hezlett, and Schneider, 1993; London and Wohlers, 1991; A. Walker and Smither, 1999) indicate that the use of 360-degree evaluation helps improve performance by maximizing the utility of feedback for promotions, advancement, and compensation. Orrick (2008a) states that feedback should be timely, specific, and job related. Supervisors should be as specific as possible about strategies officers can use to improve performance. Positive behaviors can be modeled in training and demonstrations with other officers. Research consistently shows a strong relationship between feedback and organizational commitment (Cangelosi, Markham, and Bounds, 1998; Eskildsen and Nussler, 2000; Saari and Judge, 2004).

Discussing positive and negative performance with employees should not be postponed until a formally scheduled performance appraisal but should be reviewed immediately. Samuel Walker (2006) found that performance evaluation procedures in policing have been criticized and that there is insufficient research to support their utility and efficacy as a feedback mechanism. A 1977 Police Foundation study found that performance appraisals did not adequately reflect police work and generally provided inflated assessments of officer performance (Landy, 1977). A 1997 report found that little progress had been made in improving on these failures in the 20 years since the Landy report (Oettmeier and Wycoff, 1997). Providing feedback is essential, but confining it to procedural evaluations might prove to have little effect on officer self-efficacy and turnover.

> # IMPROVING RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION THROUGH EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT
>
> The Washington Metropolitan Police Department, with approximately 3,800 officers, is among the largest in the nation. In addition to facing many of the same challenges that other large urban agencies do, the department, given its jurisdiction in the nation's capital, has several unique responsibilities requiring personnel with a wide variety of skills and interests. Maintaining this staff, according to Cathy Lanier (2008), chief of the department, requires a focus on both recruitment and retention.
>
> To make itself more appealing to new recruits, the department seeks to instill a sense of pride in its history, portraying itself as providing an environment in which recruits will want to work. The department benefits, Lanier claims, both from the opportunities it can offer as a large department and from its unique location.
>
> Lanier claims that, when she became chief, the department had a monthly attrition rate of about 20 officers but that allowing officers to be more engaged with their work cut that rate nearly in half (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a). One example of employee engagement Lanier cites is a website on "chief concerns," permitting officers to anonymously suggest ways to make their job easier and improve the department. The chief publicly recognizes suggestions that the organization has implemented, encouraging officers to make further suggestions. Lanier contends that officers who are more engaged are more likely to stay with the agency.

Recognize Employees' Successes. Behavior that is recognized is more likely to be repeated. Orrick (2008a) contends that employee recognition is a process, not a singular event, and can occur at many levels: direct supervisors, upper-level management, and the community or other authorities can all participate in recognizing officer success. Letters of commendation, achievement, and recognition, as well as simple thank-you notes, can help show that good work has been recognized. Other more-elaborate approaches include conducting morale or pride meetings, which allow for social interaction and improving communication, trust, and identification with fellow employees (Orrick, 2008a). Budgeting for small tokens can reinforce good behavior, creating additional rewards for the agency while supporting positive morale within the department. Posting compliments of the department and officers can provide encouragement

for the whole department. Having high-performing officers meet with and be recognized by external city officials can promote the department as a whole while recognizing individuals and units and publicize the good work of the department to others in the community (Orrick, 2008a). Even gathering informally to celebrate birthdays or anniversaries, host team-building activities (such as sports contests), or watch sporting events can offer opportunities to recognize success (Stairs et al., 2006).

The keys to effective recognition are timeliness (Kim, 2005), sincerity (Luthans, 2000), selectivity (Del Bueno, 1993; Luthans, 2000), and substance (Enz and Siguaw, 2000). These are crucial, as improper implementation can backfire by creating or contributing to a culture of phony praise, indiscriminate recognition, and meaningless ceremony. Effective recognition, by contrast, can build a more-meaningful connection between employee and management that is rooted in organizational culture (Lloyd Morgan, undated; Rust et al., 1996). Orrick (2008a) also suggests that these strategies can positively influence employees from different generations, all of whom desire individual recognition and engagement.

Mentor Officers Beyond the Field Training Experience. Private-sector companies have long mentored new employees, with such practices regarded as the cornerstone of any organizational commitment to employee retention in multiple fields (Butler and Felts, 2006; Hegstad and Wentling, 2004; Ingersoll and Smith, 2003; Musser, 2001; Smith and Ingersoll, 2004). Peer mentorship can promote a wide variety of long-term goals, including collegial relationships among employees (Smith and Ingersoll, 2004), professional development and on-the-job skill retention (Greene and Puetzer, 2002), employee engagement (Kickul, 2002), occupational socialization (Hurst and Koplin-Baucum, 2003), and positive morale, loyalty, and job satisfaction (Ingersoll and Smith, 2003). These strategies are particularly helpful in establishing strong relationships between beginning employees and experienced mentors for minority workers (Friedman and Holtom, 2002; Musser, 2001; COPS, 2009b) and in difficult-to-fill positions in rural areas. While mentoring programs can be relatively inexpensive tools to retain employees, their success depends on the professionalism and confidentiality practiced by those involved, as well as the department's commitment to training mentors (L. Lee, 2001; Switzer, 2006).

There is little empirical research on the effectiveness of mentoring programs in police organizations. Orrick (2008a) identifies some intervening and confounding variables that complicate the assessment of mentoring programs. These include the subjective nature of mentoring (making it hard to quantify), the specificity of individual goals, and varied levels of mentor and mentee experience, commitment, and ability. Agencies can track participants, surveying their satisfaction and monitoring them over time. Field training evaluation structures can be extended to mentoring.

Research in other fields shows that mentoring can succeed. A one-year longitudinal quasi-experiment on the effectiveness of a formal mentoring program at a Fortune 100 corporation found that employees who participated in the program reported significantly higher levels of job satisfaction than did a control group without a mentor (Seibert, 1999). Similarly, a study of mentoring programs for new teachers found that those with mentors from the same subject field, who participated in such activities as planning and collaboration with other teachers, were less likely to move to other schools or to leave the teaching occupation after their first year (Smith and Ingersoll, 2004). Other research finds the likability of, and satisfaction and contact with, mentors was higher when protégés perceived themselves to be more similar to their mentors. Actual race pairing was related to protégé perceptions of the amount of career support and to how well mentors liked protégés (Ensher and Murphy, 1997).

Improving Organizational Effectiveness

Police departments must hire well, promote well, provide comprehensive training, and hold leaders accountable (Orrick, 2008a) by:

- communicating departmental goals routinely and effectively
- being fair and transparent in all aspects of departmental policy
- reducing unnecessary bureaucracy
- selecting and maintaining an effective management and supervisory staff.

A major reason for turnover is the perceived quality of supervision. The relationship that immediate and midlevel supervisors have with their officers has the most influence on an officer's decision to stay or leave the department (Orrick, 2008a, 2008b). The way police departments select supervisors and leaders, often by longevity or superior performance in operational positions (as opposed to management potential), results in poor supervisory training and mentorship for police supervisors, as well as disconnection from line-level officers.

A study of resignations and transfers in ten United Kingdom police forces found that, when asked about ways to improve the service, respondents emphasized the need to increase support from all levels of management, as well as reduce paperwork and bureaucracy (Christine Cooper and Ingram, 2004). Officers' perceptions that management was unfair and ineffective at all levels led to increased resignations and transfers. A study of police in Australia concluded that departments should focus on improving management style and communication, as well as provide training for supervisors and managers on key management topics (Lynch and Tuckey, 2004). Effective law-enforcement leadership development programs improve the leader's ability to achieve organizational goals that serve the public and enhance their ability to develop individuals, teams, and the organization for the future (Moriarty 2009; Orrick, 2008a).

Conclusion

Improving retention can not only boost department morale but also save costs for replacing personnel. Among the costs associated with turnover are those for recruiting, selecting, and training new employees, and those associated with loss of productivity and knowledge. These costs, especially those for recruiting and training, can be higher for police agencies than for other employers.

To improve retention, departments should understand who is likely to leave, when they are likely to leave, and their reasons for doing so. Younger officers, other new officers, and women and minority officers leave policing in disproportionate numbers. Officers might leave for many reasons, including the following:

- other opportunities elsewhere

- better compensation, including salary, benefits, viable career ladders, and adequate training and equipment

- personality traits and characteristics, with those having high levels of anxiety being more likely to leave

- organizational issues, such as supervisory practices

- employee needs for feedback and recognition, a stimulating work environment, and job satisfaction.

Agencies can undertake a wide variety of initiatives to improve retention or to minimize the detrimental effects of attrition. These include planning and analysis of employee needs, reducing the financial impact of attrition, enhancing compensation and perks, engaging employees to improve the agency, and improving organizational effectiveness through open communication and fair and transparent practices.

Few of these strategies have been empirically tested. Little but anecdotes is known about many of them. The application of these strategies must be evaluated empirically to determine whether they actually improve officer retention. Surveying officers pre- and posthire, conducting analyses of departmental attrition data, collecting data about supervisor and management impressions of these programs, or evaluating the workplace environment in a qualitative manner might indicate success or room for improvement. There is also little discussion across agencies regarding the different strategies each has employed and the prospects for success they see in their own organizations. To date, the literature is rich with ideas, many of which have showed promise in other fields. Police departments can begin to experiment with these and other strategies but should incorporate mechanisms to assess their effectiveness.

Recruitment: Filling the Bucket

Throughout the 2000s, police-officer recruitment has concerned police executives and administrators from agencies of varying size and locale. Early in the decade, the nation's largest agencies, including those in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, reported problems recruiting qualified applicants (Butterfield, 2001). Half of all agencies and two-thirds of those serving at least 50,000 residents also reported staffing problems stemming from a lack of qualified applicants (Koper, Maguire, and Moore, 2001). In 2004, California police chiefs identified recruitment and retention as their second-most pressing issue, trailing only funding (California Police Chiefs Association, 2004) and reflecting concerns of earlier years (California Police Chiefs Association 1994, 2001). Even as recent economic conditions have led to an increased number of applications, police departments might still find a shortage of applicants qualified for their work (Castro, 2009; Chambers, 2009).

Identifying sources of the recruiting challenge remains problematic because symptoms might vary by jurisdiction. Nevertheless, departments can identify dimensions and categorize them as external to policing, such as economic and social conditions and work-life changes, or specific to the profession or specific departments, such as low pay or benefits. Many of these issues are evident in our bucket metaphor. In this chapter, we focus on the recruitment challenge in policing and on detailing specific strategies evident in the literature from several disciplines for recruiting the best available candidates.

The recruitment challenge appears to be deepening over time, as generational preferences and conceptions of work and career change, and as other trends work to reduce the pool of qualified applicants. Whereas agencies have had historical difficulties recruiting women and minority applicants, their inability to grapple with generational differences has shown the profession to be underprepared for the rapidly changing and uncertain economic and social landscape (Jordan et al., 2009; Orrick, 2008a; J. Wilson

and Grammich, 2009a). Previously unconsidered issues, such as the pull of more-lucrative careers and negative images of policing, might further deplete the applicant pool, particularly as the economy improves over time (Cavanagh, 2003; Koper, Maguire, and Moore, 2001; Flynn, 2000).

The recruitment challenge is a product of several rapidly changing trends, which departments appear ill-prepared to address, in the way police recruiters and potential applicants view each other. Missing organized recruitment programs, objectives, or strategies, police departments have placed themselves at a growing disadvantage in recruiting qualified officers, losing them to other industries and fields at a quickening rate (Scrivner, 2006; Taylor et al., 2006).

Concerns about recruiting minorities and women that dominated police recruitment discussions decades ago have now expanded to concerns that the profession is failing to market itself to a new generation of workers (COPS, 2009b). Personnel costs comprise 75 to 85 percent of police department budgets, underscoring the importance of hiring, recruiting, and selecting the best candidates, even in uncertain times (Orrick, 2008a; White and Escobar, 2008). Agencies have little guidance for recruitment strategies, so difficulties persist. Jordan et al. (2009) found that only one in five agencies had targeted recruitment strategies for women and minorities. White and Escobar (2008, p. 120) lament police agencies' unwillingness to "sell themselves" when recruiting for diversity. As the diversity and breadth of the communities that agencies serve expands, agencies might face difficulties in recruiting officers for positions that are increasingly complex, require new competencies, or require interaction with communities whose needs they do not always know or understand.

Many departments have answered the recruiting challenge by expanding their recruitment efforts. Orrick (2008a) illustrates why recruitment programs, selection processes, and screening techniques are essential in a broader, proactive plan. Facing mounting uncertainty about staffing deficiencies, organizations should first assess their needs. In this chapter, we describe how to create and use such an assessment to construct a recruitment strategy that meets individual agency needs, how to improve selection and recruiting processes, and how these strategies might help

departments navigate the recruitment challenge. We begin by briefly reviewing the history of police recruitment.

Police Recruitment Practices: Past and Present

In 1931, the National Committee on Law Observation and Enforcement (commonly known as the Wickersham Commission), appointed by President Herbert Hoover to study enforcement of Prohibition, detailed advances needed in the professionalization of policing, including the elimination of the spoils system for recruitment and hiring (Alpert, 1991; S. Walker, 1997). As police agencies moved toward merit-based hiring in the 1940s and 1950s, the dual problems of liability for law-enforcement behavior and increasing concerns over discrimination in police work fueled the use of more-scientific methods, such as psychometrics and standardized psychological testing in recruitment (Fyfe et al., 1997; Hogue, Black, and Sigler, 1994). These culminated in the formation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in 1967, which sought to implement Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines in the hiring of law-enforcement officers (Scrivner, 2006). The LEAA aligned selection methods with perceived job duties to create more-valid external analyses of demonstrated skills for police work. By the end of the 1960s, agencies nationwide used scientific and career-specific methods of testing, evaluating, and examining potential recruits on the basis of departmental perceptions of what one needed to know to be a good police officer.

This system was challenged in the mid-1970s, when Goldstein (1977) examined what police did on patrol. He found that most officer time in uniform was spent in human-service roles, such as helping citizens, negotiating disputes, or interacting with diverse community members in nonenforcement roles. The skills required for this work were incompatible with those for which recruits were screened, trained, and tested. This realization led to a reorientation of police work toward community policing. The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies put forth recommendations for diversifying personnel to reflect the community (White and Escobar, 2008), although selection practices remained inconsistent with the new police role into the 1980s.

Evaluation processes might either "select out" candidates (that is, discern flaws in a candidate, disqualifying him or her from a position) or "select in" candidates (that is, identify positive qualities that make an applicant an attractive candidate). Controversies over the two approaches and their merit have persisted since the advent of the community-policing era (Scrivner, 2006). It is unclear what skills agencies should identify in "selecting in" candidates, given rapid changes in community needs and demographics (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police et al., 2000; Woska, 2006). The "selecting out" or hurdle process of recruitment remains attractive because many agencies cling to an outdated perception of the police role (Scrivner, 2006).

Nevertheless, rigidity is giving way to some experimentation and innovation. The Community Policing Consortium, through its Hiring in the Spirit of Service program, has sought to align hiring practices with individual agency needs regarding officer duties and skills. The results might help agencies attract a wider range of officers for open positions (Scrivner, 2006). The use of assessment centers and hurdle approaches might be incompatible with career needs and goals of new generations of recruits (DeCicco, 2000; Orrick, 2008a; Taylor et al., 2006). At best, the current climate of police recruitment consists of a lack of uniformity, little widespread use of data or research to guide recruitment efforts, and a fragmented approach to understanding the crisis and planning a response to it (Orrick, 2008a; Scrivner, 2006; White and Escobar, 2008).

How these fractured approaches have affected recruiting in recent years is unclear. Strawbridge and Strawbridge (1990) provided one of the first systematic efforts to describe the recruitment environment across jurisdictions, surveying 72 local police departments with 500 or more sworn officers about their recruiting, screening, and training practices. Among their findings was the need for a computerized database to facilitate communication about best practices given societal changes and resource limitations.

Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders (1995) conducted a second survey of 60 of these agencies in 1994. They found decreasing use of television for recruiting, of maximum age requirements, of preemployment standards,

and of state subsidies for training. They also found increased use of intelligence tests, psychological reviews, and duration of academy training and little change in probationary periods.

Taylor et al. (2006) conducted a national survey of nearly 1,000 agencies in 2002, including 32 of those in the earlier survey by Strawbridge and Strawbridge. They found little evidence to accept or reject hypotheses of a growing "cop crunch" but did find that some of these agencies had developed a severe shortage of officers, with more than 10 percent of their allocated slots vacant. They also found that many agencies had developed targeted recruiting strategies for minority, female, veteran, college-grad, and experienced candidates, but that they had difficulties in hiring sufficient numbers of female and minority candidates.

Determining Staffing Needs

Agencies must prepare themselves for hiring by first assessing their staffing needs (Switzer, 2006). There has been little analysis on the determination of staffing needs, despite the belief that empirical analyses of organizational needs would have widespread benefit. Police needs assessments have their roots in patrol allocation formulas of the pre–community policing era, when patrol manpower and risk formulas relied heavily on crime activity and calls for service as standard measurements of patrol saturation (Larson, 1978; Metropolitan Atlanta Crime Commission, 1977). As policing has grown more complex, staffing analyses have evolved as well. The Delaware State Personnel Office (2002) recommended the use of internal assessments prior to hiring and training law-enforcement employees. The National Institute of Corrections (Liebert and Miller, 2001) published a guidebook for corrections facilities that assisted facilities in conducting staffing analyses. Orrick (2008a) has also supported the use of needs analysis in determining hiring levels. In an applied example, the Pinal County (Ariz.) Sheriff's Office (PCSO) conducted an internal staffing analysis that examined such topics as patrol deployment, attrition rates, and scheduling policy to determine future hiring needs (PCSO, 2008). These and other strategies form a broad organizational needs assessment that can help shape the hiring process. The steps we

discuss in this section, derived from organizational-assessment literature on strategic planning, might help focus and set the parameters for a strategic hiring plan. Many of these strategies can be performed internally, without external assistance.

Develop an Assessment Team. Staffing decisions and processes involve the input of community, government, and department stakeholders. Involving them in an assessment team invigorates hiring with input from those affected by hiring decisions. Departments might also wish to consider using outside agencies or private companies to assist with the needs assessment, which will come at a cost but can add expertise, objectivity, and independence. Orrick (2008a) suggests that assembling the assessment team could be as crucial in the hiring process as enacting the hiring plan itself. By choosing a team that represents all stakeholders in the hiring process, the department can assess its true needs and make more-comprehensive decisions about staffing.

Identify Budget and Source of Revenue. Analyzing available revenue is seen as a final step in conducting a needs assessment of hiring in corrections (Clem, Krauth, and Wenger, 2000) but might be better used as an initial step in police staffing assessments. Evaluating resources can help departments realistically determine their true capacities for personnel expansion (Clem, Krauth, and Wenger, 2000).

Specify Organizational Goals and Values. Hiring criteria differ by region and organizational setting (Kahanov and Andrews, 2001). There might also be variation within a single department, with upper management, training staff, and line-level officers all having different ideas. Defining candidate characteristics should be a deliberate process. It might involve the creation or reiteration of a value or mission statement communicating a department's core beliefs (Switzer, 2006). Crafting the "ideal" candidate should be tied closely to organizational goals and mission and help establish criteria the department will use to hire (Orrick, 2008a).

Use Benchmarks to Determine True Staffing Need. Despite the use of data-driven peer comparisons to determine police behavior in such areas as police growth and personnel expenditures, benchmarks

determining staffing needs have not improved on informal peer comparisons (Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber, 1997). A few analyses have used hard data: The PCSO analysis used five other agencies of comparable size, patrol strength, and demography for a staffing comparison (PCSO, 2008). Similarly, a Canadian policing human-resource study used computer models to project attrition rates and models to predict police staffing requirements (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police et al., 2000). Using benchmarks for staffing needs requires data collection and analysis, but these could be data readily available to most departments, including those on demographics, budgetary outlays, political structure, crime trends, calls for service, and community needs (Koper, Maguire, and Moore, 2001; Orrick, 2008a). The benchmarks could then be adjusted for qualitative differences, such as by emphasis on discretionary time for community policing and problem-solving projects. Additionally, a performance- or workload-based assessment can be conducted for an individual agency to estimate the number of officers required to meet workload demands (Shane, 2007; Fritsch, Liederbach, and Taylor, 2009). Such models can empirically account for discretionary and relief (e.g., authorized leave) time, as well as work schedules and minimum staffing requirements. It is common for agencies to consult with staffing experts to conduct these analyses, although various staffing software programs are available to assist those that prefer to conduct such analyses internally.

Integrate the Community in the Hiring Process. In addition to department stakeholders, including community input can better inform decisions on external issues (Switzer, 2006). Community members can help ensure that hiring reflects not only community needs but also community characteristics. Orrick (2008a) sees community input as crucial to determining standards for hiring. Scrivner (2006) recognizes the essential input of minority community members for establishing ethnic diversity in a department. The city of St. Paul, Minnesota, as part of a program to reduce racially biased policing, worked with the community to determine a list of characteristics (e.g., enthusiastic, fair, possessed of good judgment, tenacious, respectful, compassionate, unafraid to engage the community) that ideal candidates should possess (McDevitt, Farrell, and Wolf, 2008). Without a clearer picture of community character and an assessment of the needs of special populations in a department's

jurisdiction, benchmark comparisons might omit community viewpoints not reflected in raw data. Community leaders, seeing that the department is inclusive of community input and needs, might "recruit" for the department by speaking positively of careers with it (Haggerty, 2009; Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006).

Attracting Candidates: Considerations

Organizations must consider several issues for attracting candidates. First, they should understand the function of research and data-gathering in the personnel selection process (Switzer, 2006; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police et al., 2000; Chien and Chen, 2008). This can inform each aspect of the process by examining it as a larger endeavor of matching individual talents to departmental goals and objectives. Second, they should craft recruitment goals that reflect an ethic that is visible to applicants (McKay and Avery, 2005; Orrick, 2008a). Decision rules about qualities of good candidates should spring from the department's climate as revealed in the earliest stages of the needs assessment and be linked to the attraction strategy. Third, when examining strategies for attracting candidates, departments should remember that the relative success of strategies might depend on budget, departmental commitment, personnel resources for recruitment, and departmental effectiveness in targeting specific subgroups that the agency seeks to recruit.

There might be synergies among these strategies (Switzer, 2006). When the community and department stakeholders have formed a partnership, identified hiring resources and needs, and used research to inform their work, the hiring process might flow more smoothly, with specific strategies that "work" for the department arising from the outflow of ideas, philosophy, and planning.

Attracting Candidates: Internal Strategies

The best recruiters for a department are often its own personnel (Baker and Carrera, 2007; Haggerty, 2009). Building professional networks within the department to support recruitment can enhance community

outreach efforts by making recruitment an overall philosophy rather than a task to be performed. Internal strategies that emphasize interaction, relationship-building, and partnerships with the public can enhance perceptions of diversity and boost hiring of women and minorities (Taylor et al., 2006; COPS, 2009b). Without a climate that reflects legitimate and credible organizational beliefs, recruitment for diversity can be seen as false and might even increase turnover (McKay and Avery, 2005). Having a department-wide outlook that emphasizes recruitment potential in public interactions can help overcome negative or unrealistic impressions of what police work entails and contribute to a larger strategic recruitment plan. Recruiting can become a part of the department's everyday interactions with the public (Baker and Carrera, 2007; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police et al., 2000).

Build Employee Referral Networks. Referrals by family, friends, and employees strongly influence individual decisions to apply for careers in public service (Baker and Carrera, 2007; Switzer, 2006; Slater and Reiser, 1988; Yearwood, 2003). Relationship-based recruiting can also dispel myths about police work and build associations across different groups (Baker and Carrera, 2007). Applicants who are referred and sponsored by an existing employee are more likely to complete the hiring process (Barber, 1998).

Two important influences on the decision to apply for police positions are department reputation and exposure to the variety of tasks that police perform; these can be solidified with employee referrals and community activism (Baker and Carrera, 2007; Slater and Reiser, 1988). Personal referrals can also provide a realistic portrayal of how a law-enforcement career affects family life (Ryan et al., 2001). To boost referrals, departments should consider compensation and other incentives for them (Switzer, 2006; Haggerty, 2009; Lachnit, 2001). Relationship-based and employee referral strategies help increase applicant pools and provide balance to other recruitment strategies, such as online processes, that lack human interaction.

Create a Department Recruitment Unit. A recruitment unit can be separate from recruitment teams that perform hiring needs assessments or be linked interdepartmentally (Geis and Cavanagh, 1966; Orrick, 2008a;

Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006). Recruitment units oversee internal and external strategies devoted to recruitment, such as testing, advertising, coordinating outreach programs, media relations, and recruiting events (New York City Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 2008). By establishing such a unit, departments can better ensure that recruitment efforts reflect the department's needs, goals, and philosophies and enhance the credibility and openness of recruitment efforts (Breaugh and Starke, 2000). Departments should consider structuring the team and mentoring team members so as to best improve quality and efficacy; this can include integrating background investigative and personnel staff into the recruitment team (Switzer, 2006; Lim et al., 2009). Departments should also consider using incentives for recruiting-team participation and success (Switzer, 2006; Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006).

Look Within the Department for Potential Recruits. Referral networks might consider a department's civilian staff for sworn positions, a strategy that would create "feeder" networks of existing employees (Ridgeway et al., 2008). Auxiliary and reserve ranks have frequently been used as an internal personnel resource (Yearwood, 2003). Because such employees are already part of the organization, this process reduces hiring costs, time, and procedures (Jordan et al., 2009).

Conduct an Internal Assessment of Employee-Engagement Strategies. Google, the Internet search-engine company, publishes a list of benefits called the "I bet you don't have that where you work" list (Sullivan, 2005). The list details Google's employee-engagement strategies, which range from perks (on-site dry cleaning, a wine club, and yoga classes) to more-traditional benefits (flexible hours, vacation benefits, and health counseling). Police agencies should ask themselves what they present that will attract the best possible officers. Police chiefs should ask themselves, "Why would I want to work for this department?" (McKeever and Kranda, 2000). Conducting an inventory of benefits can be the first step in assessing those that work best in attracting candidates, those that are weak, and how they appear from the applicant's perspective. This is a crucial step in department marketing and outreach efforts (Orrick, 2008a). An inventory of benefits can also bolster department pride in recruiters who speak to candidates. The inventory could be

conducted both to attract candidates and to prevent turnover (Switzer, 2006; Jordan et al., 2009; Sullivan, 2005).

Attracting Candidates: Outreach Strategies

Departments have used myriad outreach strategies over time to attract candidates. Though there is minimal research on their effectiveness, to attract candidates, departments have used such tools as advertise-and-wait, "word of mouse" social networking, traditional job fairs, and proactive community partnerships.

Use Internet Media in a Variety of Forms. Increasing use of the Internet has lured agencies seeking to attract officers. The interactive potential of Internet media has increased beyond simple advertising, and it continues to do so in ways that outpace empirical study (Russell, 2007). Websites have been seen as the top tool in attracting qualified applicants (Switzer, 2006). Internet presence should maximize department resources. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) recruitment website contributed to an increase in recruitment during a fiscal year in which advertising budgets were cut (Lim et al., 2009). The democratic properties of the Internet have helped smaller agencies compete with larger ones for candidates (McKeever and Kranda, 2000). Nevertheless, use of the Internet only to place advertisements online and without any overall marketing strategy can be ineffective (Yearwood, 2003).

Many organizations have failed to jump the digital divide to best reach new generations of technologically savvy applicants. More than two-thirds of companies responding in one survey had never used social-networking sites in recruitment efforts, although nearly half said they searched such sites for information on applicants ("MySpace," 2006).

Contemporary Internet tools (referred to as Web 2.0) have magnified the importance of "word-of-mouse" tactics that new generations expect in their job search (Van Hoye and Lievens, 2007; Verhoeven, Mashood, and Chansarkar, 2009). Social-networking sites, such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter (along with law-enforcement networking sites, such as Officer.com and Police Link), have not only increased in use but represent the social cornerstone of many young persons' lives

(Russell, 2007). These websites enable connections across audiences, including high-school and college students and graduates, military personnel, professionals, former and current law enforcement, police supervisors, and job searchers from other fields ("MySpace," 2006; Van Hoye and Lievens, 2007; Verhoeven, Mashood, and Chansarkar, 2009). Podcasts, blogs, and "really simple syndication" (RSS) feeds have increased job-seekers' sophistication, allowing them to process growing amounts of information and network more efficiently (Kolbitsch and Maurer, 2006; Martin, Reddington, and Kneafsey, 2009; Orrick, 2008a).

The Internet's overall effect on police recruiting varies, but agencies using it have been able to present their organizations in ways that influence applicants (Cable and Yu, 2006), dispel negative images (Ellis et al., 2005; Orrick, 2008a; Syrett and Lammiman, 2004) and transmit positive ones (Ellis et al., 2005; Verhoeven, Mashood, and Chansarkar, 2009), showcase their technological abilities (Charrier, 2000), and place recruiting efforts in contexts that resonate with new generations of applicants (Gubbins and Garavan, 2008). Despite the generational differences that might separate police command staff from young recruits, using Internet media could sell policing in messages that are heard very personally in a medium that previous generations might find impersonal (COPS, 2009b).

Use Electronic Media Other Than the Internet. Electronic recruitment techniques are not confined to blogs and websites. Gaming and other visual technology can also help attract new generations of recruits. Many simulation-based video games mimic interactive problem-solving activities, such as probing and telescoping, exploratory analysis, and critical thinking (Harrison, 2007). Beyond games, the use of emotional video clips in a structured, reality-show format can also help attract candidates (Lim et al., 2009). Interactive electronic media restructure traditional communications with workers, which could be a boon to departments with advanced technological capabilities (Ellis et al., 2005; Harrison, 2007). Yet, use of electronic media can present a paradox: If emotional vignettes of police life are used to attract candidates, specifically where department diversity and work life are represented, the department must ensure that such representations and "simulations" are consistent with the realities of police work in their department.

Brand Your Department and Your Profession. The message transmitted through advertising media constitutes the "brand" that applicants see and the identity that agencies give themselves. In the first episode of the LAPD's Internet-based recruitment video series, a variety of images designed to present information to recruits include a black female police sergeant, a diverse workforce of Hispanic and Asian officers, and fast-paced and adventurous police work (LAPD, undated). These and other branding images attempt to foster a deep, emotional attachment to the department and its supposed values (in this case, opportunities for advancement and diversity for minority populations) through the use of a reality-based film clip directed to a younger audience (Orrick, 2008a; Sartain and Schumann, 2006). Aside from marketing a department image or philosophy, branding also sells the profession of policing by aligning positive impressions of police work with applicants who might feel a "calling" to human-service careers (Ellis et al., 2005; Scrivner, 2006; Slater and Reiser, 1988; COPS, 2009b). In the LAPD video, segments display officers attempting to calm disputes, dealing with family problems, and working closely with community members in emotionally charged situations as much as they display traditional "crime-fighter" images (LAPD, undated). These reality-based images are expected to resonate with Internet-savvy and video-oriented applicants who are seen as socially aware, brand-loyal, and susceptible to cause branding (Syrett and Lammiman, 2004). Branding in this way must be sincere and emotionally consistent with police work, or the department runs the risk of appearing out of touch with its intended audience (McKay and Avery, 2005; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a).

Use Community Liaisons to Reach Potential Recruits. Community liaison efforts have been a cornerstone of many community-policing strategies for decades, with notable impact on recruitment of diverse populations (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). These liaisons need not be involved in direct recruitment efforts. Liaisons could be any employees conducting community outreach, especially with targeted populations. Liaisons can be embedded in many ways. The Detroit Police Department's Recruiting Ambassadors program uses not only departmental employees but also community representatives for its recruitment effort, with incentives for community "ambassadors" to help recruit (Scrivner,

2006; Haggerty, 2009). Liaisons are often a critical part of outreach efforts to reach diverse populations but can also reflect diversity within the department in the eyes of potential candidates (Switzer, 2006). Liaison visibility and subsequent community relationships can enhance recruitment efforts with female candidates (Donnelly, 2005; Harrington, 2000) and in traditionally hard-to-reach ethnic and religious communities, such as Arab Americans (OJP, 2008), and other isolated urban populations (Cunningham and Wagstaff, 2006).

Open Department Doors and Allow On-Site Visits. Community policing can improve community visibility and, in turn, bolster recruitment efforts (Haggerty, 2009). When community partnerships are merely superficial, they risk alienating applicants who might be aware of hypocrisy in branding and advertising when such activities are inconsistent with realities of the job (Syrett and Lammiman, 2004). Outreach must be meaningful, genuine, and reflect a departmental desire to build true relationships with future employees (Baker and Carrera, 2007; Switzer, 2006; McKeever and Kranda, 2000). Realistic job-preview strategies, by providing accurate representations of the department, can influence a candidate's interest in an organization (McKay and Avery, 2005). Making outreach partnerships sincere requires going beyond traditional public appearances and might require imaginative techniques, such as site visits, to enhance connections with targeted populations (McKay and Avery, 2006). Such tactics can enhance applicant interest beyond initial attraction stages (Breaugh, 2008; Rynes, Bretz, and Gerhart, 1991) and might be particularly important for recruiting female and minority candidates when such persons occupy important positions within the agency (Avery and McKay, 2006; COPS, 2009b). Nevertheless, site visits that expose work climate, employee demographics, and physical environments that differ from department recruitment media can reduce interest (Breaugh, 2008). Agencies should make the interactions between candidates and staff meaningful and take the time to introduce important individuals within the department to the applicants.

Attend Career and Job Fairs. Face-to-face interaction and fostering human connections can make recruitment more meaningful and personal for both the department and applicants (Whetstone, Reed, and

Turner, 2006). Many of these opportunities are available through local college and university placement offices and in military and civilian settings (Orrick, 2008a). Attending job and career fairs is often an expense for the department involving travel and creative marketing techniques for mixed results, although maximizing these opportunities can pay off in departmental visibility and recruit targeting (Switzer, 2006; Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006; Yearwood, 2003). One potential benefit for departments attending such events is gaining firsthand insight on employment trends and overall staffing outlook in peer agencies; one drawback is that job fairs are largely limited to applicants currently looking for work (Breaugh, 2008).

Consider the Greater Value of Youth Programs in Recruiting. Explorer programs, internships through local schools, cadet academies, and mentorships with youth foster special relationships between young adults and departments (Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006; Yearwood, 2003). From the development of the Department of Justice's Police Corps in the mid-1990s through the diffusion of similar scholarship, education, and training programs nationwide, youth outreach efforts have been a tradition of law-enforcement organizations.

Nevertheless, for many reasons, these efforts often produce few results for recruiting. Most youths entering policing decide prior to their high-school graduation to do so (Switzer, 2006; Slater and Reiser, 1988). Consequently, results for recruitment efforts vary widely (Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006; Yearwood, 2003). Costly and time-intensive efforts, such as Explorer programs, might misdirect resources that could be used to entice undecided youths.

Beyond identifying specific candidates, such programs brand the profession for young persons in the community (Presman, Chapman, and Rosen, 2002; Ridgeway et al., 2008). They might also acquaint the department with newer generations of applicants, including their work-life preferences, expectations, and career visions. By forging partnerships with a wide variety of youth, the value of such programs might extend beyond recruiting. At the same time, such programs help those already contemplating a police career develop qualifications within a police organization (COPS, 2009b).

Target Second-Career Applicants, but Assess and Train Them Appropriately. With the economic downturn of the late 2000s, some police departments noted an increase in applicants seeking a second career in policing, emerging from fields as diverse as automobile manufacturing, steel fabrication, marketing, and business administration (Crowe, 2009; Currier, 2009). The Virginia State Police noted a surge in applications of individuals laid off from private-sector jobs in 2009, a trend that appeared to normally follow economic downturns (Sidener, 2009). The increase in second-career applicants presents opportunities for departments to expand their workforce to include individuals with prior experience in diverse careers, but the diversity does not end with these applicants' previous career choices. Individuals with prior careers outside law enforcement might present unique challenges by having differential training needs and abilities, previous work experience, levels of commitment, competing work values, familiarity with and attachment to wide varieties of perceived job benefits and rewards, and concepts of professionalism. Many of their attitudes toward work have been learned and ingrained through previous career experience, and organizations should be cautious in measuring the advantages and challenges of such candidates (COPS, 2009b).

The professional development of second-career police-officer candidates requires transferring previous career experience in a manner that suits both the department and the candidate's unique needs. In the field of education, a profession with many second-career applicants, several principles of learning guide the transfer of outside professional experience to new career paths. Extracting appropriate practical and professional expertise from previous career experience, adapting it to new work dimensions, and integrating these new employees into the organization to maximize their expertise, poses numerous challenges (Bolhuis, 2002; Tigchelaar, Brouwer, and Vermunt, 2010). Second-career applicants have different motivations and values, which can simultaneously invigorate and strain organizations unfamiliar with their special needs, and their levels of commitment might be used to organizational advantage (Pennington, Congdon, and Magilvy, 2007). In medicine, second-career applicants have been attractive because their life experiences and successes, as well as their perceived maturity, might enhance organizational mission with

other applicants (Kohn and Truglio-Londrigan, 2007). Models of career transitions have described the potential effects of integrating second-career workers as mutually transformative, with organizations offering experienced persons previously unattainable potential for actualization in exchange for experience and maturity (Cary Cooper and Torrington, 1981; Bandow, Minsky, and Voss, 2007).

One solution to the complexities of hiring individuals with diverse previous experiences is to diagnose how their values fit with the organization. Schein's model of career anchors can be used to examine values and career priorities among workers from different fields and to assess their self-perceptions of talents, abilities, and values from prior experience (Danziger, Rachman-Moore, and Valency, 2008; Schein, 1990). For example, a second-career applicant with technical competence might struggle with service-oriented components of police work. An individual who seeks challenges might thrive on constant stimulation and not fit well in smaller agencies with limited opportunities. This model might help determine where training for second-career applicants should be focused. For example, for a former social worker appearing to be strong in public-service aspects of the job, training might best be focused on technical and tactical issues.

Supplying Candidates: Opening Up the "Faucet"

Some law-enforcement agencies have decided to "open the faucet" of supply by eliminating many traditional restrictions. Easing qualifications and hiring restrictions have often proved politically volatile and attracted criticism for being short-sighted (Maki, 2008; Spolar, 2009). For many agencies, the short-term concern for filling "empty chairs on test day" (Domash, 2002, p. 34) can be remedied by relaxing requirements. Yet, this leaves the challenge of finding qualified candidates while leading to charges that departments are lowering hiring standards.

Some agencies have sought to "open the faucet" by relaxing residency restrictions. This can negatively influence public perceptions of the police by leading to admission of applicants who have little knowledge of the communities they are to serve (DeMasi, 2003; Murphy and Worrall, 1999; Spolar, 2009). Some agencies have also eased educational requirements,

rekindling debate about the desirability of degreed candidates as officers. Departments might also ease educational requirements to compensate for any exclusionary effect resulting from traditional barriers for minority and female applicants (Decker and Huckabee, 2002; White and Escobar, 2008). Some have relaxed minimum age requirements to attract more candidates, raising concern about the readiness of younger applicants for police work (Taylor et al., 2006). The Memphis (Tenn.) Police Department simultaneously lowered both its educational and residency requirements in 2007 and 2008 but has conducted no assessment of subsequent effect on recruitment (Maki, 2008). Some agencies have become more tolerant of experimental drug use, bad credit history, and minor arrest records to attain larger numbers of applicants (W. Lee, 2005; Taylor et al., 2006; Woska, 2006). Often, relaxing such restrictions interferes with the department's ability to build community confidence in the quality of its officers (Katz, 2000; Decker and Huckabee, 1999). At the same time, it can be seen as a rejection of the screening-out approach of candidate selection. Because of the potential organizational, political, and social ramifications of relaxed restrictions for departments and the communities they serve, before employing them, departments should carefully consider their effect on recruiting, as well as the signal they send about hiring standards.

Selecting Candidates

Often, the process of candidate selection becomes confused with the exercise of attracting applicants (Breaugh, 2008; Ellis et al., 2005). For the candidate, the selection process requires patient navigation of physical, mental, and aptitude screening examinations, interviews, and meetings and submitting to a thorough background investigation. The crucial task for agencies is to use selection methods that reveal the best possible recruits for department needs (Cavanagh, 2003; Scrivner, 2006).

Because screening and selection play pivotal roles in narrowing a large, generalized pool of interested persons to a manageable cohort of applicants, agencies often examine their selection procedures to ensure that the testing and screening process is consistent with what they seek

in new officers (Searle, 2006). Efficiency, accuracy, and fairness are but a few of the concerns for departments in structuring this crucial task in the recruitment process. Yet, departments have changed their selection procedures very little since a 1973 review of police selection procedures by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards (Doerner, 1998; Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders, 1995), even as departments seek to increase recruiting among women and minorities (Lim et al., 2009; J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a).

Possible reasons for the relative stagnation of reforms of the selection process include the need for agencies to pattern their selection procedures after state mandates (Bradley, 2005), an overall practitioner attachment to more-reactive models of selection (Scrivner, 2006), and the difficulty in modifying a procedure without incentives to do so (Tuomey and Jolly, 2009). Community policing and generational differences have driven reexaminations of the selection process by forcing departments to rethink what specific characteristics they seek in their officers (DeCicco, 2000; Scrivner, 2006).

Although alternatives, such as the assessment center, to traditional hurdle approaches of selection have blossomed, evidence on them is mixed (DeCicco, 2000; Kolpack, 1991; Reuland and Stedman, 1998). Scores on assessment-center examinations are positively correlated with academy and patrol performance (Hogarty and Bromley, 1996; Dayan, Kasten, and Fox, 2002; Pynes and Bernardin, 1992) and supervisor performance (Ross, 1980) in preliminary empirical tests.

Nonetheless, when considering the challenge of recruiting qualified applicants from younger generations, departments should consider restructuring the process to account for both applicant perceptions and departmental goals. Applicants' top two reported frustrations about the selection process were the length of time and impersonality of the procedure, items that departments can correct (Switzer, 2006). Some agencies are also considering restructuring the order of selection tasks to ensure a diverse applicant pool and cut costs by eliminating unnecessary and redundant screening procedures (Haggerty, 2009). In structuring a departmental protocol for selecting the best candidates, departments should consider aligning selection procedures with what they consider

to be important job dimensions (Scrivner, 2006). For example, if a department identifies residency as one of the most important job dimensions for applicants, screening for applicants' residence proximity would take place before that for most skills and abilities.

As selection procedures are subjected to closer scrutiny, predicting candidate success at various stages of the recruitment process (even in the training academy) has become increasingly important. The Las Vegas (Nev.) Police Department recently adopted a testing program designed to maximize department time and resources by processing only applicants who display a high probability (85 percent) of completing the process (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a). The LAPD has similarly streamlined its selection process to use predictive models (Lim et al., 2009). As agencies increasingly use predictive models, traditional hurdle approaches are slowly being infused with more-empirically based selection processes, especially for targeted populations of recruits.

Screening Processes. Since the early 1970s, the structure of police screening procedures has revolved around three basic tests: physical agility testing, psychological testing, and a medical examination (Ash, Slora, and Britton, 1990; Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders, 1995). The exact prevalence of these screening procedures for police-candidate selection is unknown, but some studies indicate that they are used in about 90 percent of agencies (Ash, Slora, and Britton, 1990; DeCicco, 2000; Ho, 1999; Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders, 1995). Yet, despite the dominant emphasis on these screening procedures, they have shown widely varying predictive value in determining success with a number of outcome measurements (White, 2008). Their chief effect is often to select out applicants from further consideration, meaning that tighter or more-rigorous selection processes will reduce the number of applicants.

Interview Procedures. Personal interviews are used in more than 95 percent of police agencies' selection efforts (Hickman and Reaves, 2006a). Interview processes are beginning to incorporate diverse stakeholders to examine for a broader "cultural fit" (J. Wilson and Grammich, 2009a), including values and beliefs consistent with department and community mission. Such interviews often take the form of an "oral board" protocol (Doerner, 1998). Some researchers have warned against relying heavily

on oral-board interview techniques for reasons ranging from the lack of training for many interview board members, to the use of ambiguous and invalid rating dimensions (Gaines and Kappeler, 1992). Nevertheless, some studies indicate that newer generations of recruits have been able to perform better on oral portions of the selection process than on written examinations, which might indicate the need for pretesting and access to practice written testing by computer (Whetstone, Reed, and Turner, 2006). The assessment-center approach has also been effective in yielding task-specific interview questions, shifting interview focus from standard question-and-answer format to interactive simulations and roleplay (Hogarty and Bromley, 1996; Dayan, Kasten, and Fox, 2002).

Background Investigations. Traditionally, background investigations and character references have formed the backbone of police selection techniques (Fulton, 2000; Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders, 1995; Smelson, 1975). In early use, such studies correlated background problems with after-hire disciplinary issues (Cohen and Chaiken, 1972). Background investigations have proliferated in use as a screening tool, often being conducted at multiple stages by different levels of the organization (Ridgeway et al., 2008). The extent of these investigations in probing a candidate's background varies by locale and can often involve a lifetime criminal history check, a credit-bureau report, and examinations of close associates from the recent to the distant past (DeCicco, 2000; New York City Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 2008).

Younger generations pose unique challenges to such investigations. Applicants from these generations can be remarkably candid in disclosing personal information, but their impressions of what constitutes "character" might be startlingly different from those of evaluators (Russell, 2007; Verhoeven, Mashood, and Chansarkar, 2009). For instance, social-networking sites often display photographs of applicants in poses that older generations might think inappropriate. In the Internet age, conducting background investigations on candidates, especially those for whom computer use often constitutes a social reality, can be inherently problematic for law-enforcement agencies because of the sudden transparency with which younger generations are living their

lives.[1] Similarly, financial background information on candidates might be of decreasing value in an era of increasing economic difficulties.

Recent research shows that biographical information gained from background investigations is of limited help in predicting subsequent officer termination (Brennan et al., 2009). As such, departments should proceed with caution and not place undue emphasis on a technique that appears to be steadily losing favor, especially for new generations of recruits, for whom transparency is assumed.

Predicting Future Success in Applicants

Closely related to the issue of electronic background investigation is electronic surveillance for the purposes of human-resource selection and its negative effect on recruiting as a whole. Recent research has indicated that a wealth of personal data about candidates can be obtained simply by searching the Internet for names, nicknames, email addresses, street addresses and looking at candidates' social-networking profiles (Searle, 2006). This power is increasing exponentially with the proliferation of electronic media and outpaces empirical study of its impact on recruitment efforts.

Yet, preliminary research shows that with such ability comes equal responsibility for the human-resource professional. Worries that such sensitive information might compromise individual freedom and privacy and adversely affect candidate selection have resonated with those concerned with civil liberties and organizational justice (Chapman and Webster, 2003; M. Harris, Van Hoye, and Lievens, 2003; Truxillo, Steiner, and Gilliland, 2004). The Internet age has changed the selection game in ways that are still unclear for both job-seekers and agencies looking for qualified applicants.

What is apparent is that traditional methods of selection might be losing reliability in the absence of more-current data analysis on new generations

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1. Such transparency can also affect officers on the force. In one case, a Sandy Springs, Georgia, officer was fired for his Facebook postings, including one in which he divulged the possibility of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) drug seizure. See "Cop Says Facebook Postings Got Him Fired" (2009).

of applicants and their changed career expectations, conflicting notions of privacy, and sustained cynicism about invasive and lengthy application processes. Placing these new recruits in uniform based on selection techniques that might not only be obsolete but also be seen as invasive and irrelevant could be counterproductive. Recent research demonstrating that personal demographic and background information (such as age, gender, and race) can predict police academy performance (White, 2008) appears not only to be contradicted by empiricists' inability to link academy performance to patrol behaviors but also to be in widespread disagreement about what qualities might best befit "good police officers" (Sanders, 2003). A more-proactive approach for selection would use department-specific benchmarks and performance measurements for determining what specific selection processes are a good fit for the department and keeping departmental needs assessments current for staffing.

Conclusion

Many of the core problems that police agencies face in recruiting have worsened in the past decade, even as changing economic conditions have led to temporary fluctuations in the numbers of recruits. Changing generational tastes for police work, increased prevalence of disqualifications (such as drug use or physical unfitness), and greater competition from other organizations (such as the military) have helped restrict the pool of qualified applicants. Further complicating recruiting efforts is the fragmented approach many agencies take to recruiting.

Nevertheless, agencies can take several modest steps to make their recruiting more effective. First, assessing their staffing needs can help shape a more-effective recruiting approach. This can include developing an assessment team, identifying budget and sources of revenue for recruiting, specifying organizational goals and values that recruits should have, and integrating the community in the hiring process.

Both internal and external strategies might help departments attract candidates. Internally, departments can build employee referral networks, create a recruitment unit, identify potential recruits from auxiliary or reserve ranks, and assess the effectiveness of their employee-engagement

strategies (e.g., identify reasons employees should want to work for the agency). Externally, departments can use Internet and other electronic media, brand the department and its work within the community, use community liaisons to reach potential recruits, allow on-site visits, attend career and job fairs, and target both youth programs and second-career applicants. Such external marketing efforts should take care to ensure that agency work is portrayed realistically; portrayals of work that do not match the reality can cause the department to appear insincere in its efforts to engage.

Departments might also wish to expand their recruitment possibilities by opening wider the "faucet" of supply for recruits. Such efforts can include relaxing age, education, or residency requirements and becoming more tolerant of experimental drug use, bad credit history, or minor arrest records. Such initiatives, however, might raise concerns about the quality of recruits. Departments might also wish to expand their supply of candidates by revamping their screening processes, interview processes, and background investigations. At the same time, streamlined selection processes, particularly those aided by electronic media, should be cautious about applicant freedom and privacy, as well as about identifying characteristics of applicants likely to have success.

The Most-Promising Practices for Maintaining Police Workforce Levels

In some ways, recruitment and retention are more of an art than a science. Empirical evidence on what appear to be promising practices is often lacking. Nevertheless, in concluding this work, we note several practices we have discussed that can affect multiple areas of recruitment and retention—and perhaps be of greatest promise to police agencies. Table 5.1, on page 88, groups these practices into five categories, as presented earlier, and cites some relevant research on each. In this chapter, we also discuss the potential benefits and difficulties in them.

The benefits of *planning and analysis* can include understanding the depth and nature of the turnover problem. Gathering information on the problem might also identify issues that the organization can address to reduce turnover. The difficulty of planning and analysis lies in the organizational commitment required for it and to recognize the problem.

The benefits of *reducing the financial impact* of turnover include demonstrated long-term savings, as well as the opportunities the practices offer to dissolve myths about policing to applicants and to obtain a deeper understanding of the applicant pool. The difficulty of these practices is that they, too, require departmental resources. Offering realistic job previews, for example, can be labor intensive. Contracts might also conflict with generational career preferences and disrupt traditional relationships with employees.

The benefits of *enhancing compensation and other benefits* include their demonstrated effects on improving retention by meeting immediate employee needs, as well as its reinvigoration of the organization through promotions. The potential difficulty of this strategy is the costs they impose, and the success that might vary, in part, by confidence recipients have in the longevity of such programs.

Table 5.1
Practices and Relevant Research for Improving Police Recruitment and Retention

Practice	Relevant Research
Planning and analysis	
Analyze demographic trends, workload indicators, perceptions and attitudes toward law enforcement, and agency recruitment and retention patterns	J. Wilson and Grammich (2009a); Miller (2008); Orrick (2008a); Lim et al. (2009)
Survey officer job satisfaction and organizational commitment	
Conduct exit and stay interviews	
Identify and intervene with at-risk employees	
Reducing the financial impact	
Offer realistic job preview and extended ride-alongs	Orrick (2008a); Kowal, Hassel, and Hassel (2008); Kickul (2002); Phillips (1998)
Contracts with new employees	
Employ pretrained officers	
Provide apprentice salaries	
Use part-time staff	
Enhancing compensation and other benefits	
Increase and offer flexibility in compensation	
Give longevity pay increases	
Provide quality training and state-of-the-art equipment	
Offer tuition and relocation reimbursement	Prince (2003); Anderson and Gobeil (2003); Eaton (2003); Hill et al. (2001); Stanley (2008); Meier (1979); O'Brien-Pallas, Duffield, and Alksnis (2004)
Allow job flexibility and sharing	
Create alternative or compressed work schedules	
Provide multiple career ladders	
Offer other perks, such as on-site child care, fitness facilities, and take-home cars	

Employee engagement	
Implement practices to enhance compensation	
Increase employee input in decision making	Lloyd Morgan (undated); Cartwright and Holmes (2006); Towers Perrin (2003); Jamrog (2004); Butler and Felts (2006); Hegstad and Wentling (2004); Ingersoll and Smith (2003); Musser (2001); Smith and Ingersoll (2004)
Offer evaluation and feedback opportunities	
Offer collaborative work and mentoring opportunities	
Offer job shadowing, rotating assignments, and cross-training	
Recognize exceptional work	
Improving organizational effectiveness	
Analyze recruitment and retention patterns	
Survey job satisfaction	
Intervene with at-risk employees	
Conduct exit and stay interviews	Lloyd Morgan (undated); Cartwright and Holmes (2006); Towers Perrin (2003); Jamrog (2004); Butler and Felts (2006); Hegstad and Wentling (2004); Ingersoll and Smith (2003); Musser (2001); Smith and Ingersoll (2004)
Improve hiring practices	
Pick the right supervisors and train them in management techniques	
Evaluate performance	
Eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy	
Fire unsuitable staff	
Improve communication	

The benefits of *employee engagement* include demonstrated benefits of proper implementation for retention and the ties such practices can build between the employee and the agency, as well as between the agency and the community. The potential difficulty of this strategy is the need to implement more than symbolically and the potential costs in technology and restructuring of work.

The benefits of *improving organizational effectiveness* include better quality of supervision and leadership and improved training, which can help managers deal effectively with agency problems and even boost public perceptions of the department. The potential difficulty of this strategy is that it requires department commitment to developing better managerial staff. It requires sending managers for specialized training and might require an overhaul of the promotion process to appoint more-talented and more-capable individuals, as well as expensive potential changes in organization structure.

This guide does not address other key issues, such as specific ways of determining staffing need, allocation of staffing resources, distribution of staff attributes and qualities, and opportunity costs and implications that implementing recruiting and retention strategies has on other parts of the organization, which are also important to development of an effective, efficient workforce. Challenges might vary by agency and, especially, by local conditions confronting each agency.

The issues, and potential solutions we identify, will not apply to all agencies. Rather, our purpose was to provide a broad analysis of issues confronting many agencies and how these have developed over time. Each agency will face unique circumstances that it must consider in workforce planning.

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The supply of and demand for qualified police officers are changing in a time of increasing attrition, expanding law-enforcement responsibilities, and decreasing resources. These contribute to the difficulties that many agencies report in creating a workforce that represents community demographics, is committed to providing its employees the opportunity for long-term police careers, and effectively implements community policing. This book summarizes lessons on recruiting and retaining effective workforces.

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Collective Bargaining can Reduce Turnover and Improve Public Services in Colorado

Executive Summary

Since 2009, there has been a growing problem in Colorado with increasing employee turnover, programs operating with short staffing forcing employees to work extensive overtime, and low morale that jeopardizes vital public services. The growing turnover is complicated by the difficulty filling authorized positions. Research shows that collective bargaining for public sector employees, coupled with labor management partnerships, has been effective at improving agency performance and reducing employee turnover.

High turnover makes it hard to provide quality service to residents, reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of state agencies, puts a strain on state workers, and burdens taxpayers. **Based on a careful review of research on turnover costs,[1] replacing the 4,268 workers who left state government in FY 2017-18 conservatively cost taxpayers $48 million.[2]** Research shows that allowing state employees to negotiate with their employer through a collective bargaining process for better pay, benefits, and working conditions will help lower turnover rates, save taxpayers millions, and improve services.

In 2007, Governor Bill Ritter, Jr. signed Executive Order D 028 07, creating voluntary labor-management partnerships to improve the delivery of public services. While there are examples of labor-management collaboration addressing individual workplace problems, overall the partnerships have been limited in their breadth and scope. This is largely because compensation issues were not permitted in partnership discussions, and state agencies were not required to participate in, or enter into, labor-management discussions to improve public services. Finally, employees who participate in labor-management discussions lack protection from employer retaliation for their participation. As a result of all these factors, the partnerships have had limited impact, and state employee retention continues to suffer. The resulting short staffing, and constant turnover costs the state tens of millions of dollars annually and diminishes the quality of public services.

Multiple studies have shown that collective bargaining improves pay and benefits.[3] More competitive compensation, especially in the form of secure retirement benefits, aids in employee recruitment and retention. In addition, it has been shown that collective bargaining helps close the wage gaps faced by women and people of color by promoting equal pay for equal work while increasing job and workplace satisfaction.[4] Collective bargaining is a necessary foundation that can improve the effectiveness of labor-management partnerships. This paper addresses how collective bargaining, when combined with labor-management partnerships, creates synergies that more effectively address the growing problems of high turnover, understaffing, and wage disparities.

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1   There are Significant Costs to Replacing Employees, Heather Boushey and Sarah Jane Glynn,Center for American Progress, November 16, 2012, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/CostofTurnover0815.pdf
2   This is based on a turnover rate of 14.7 percent and 28,875 classified workers with a statewide average wage of $57,270 as reported in the Fiscal Year 2017-18 Workforce Report.
3   Mishel, Lawrence. "Unions, inequality and faltering middle class wages." Economic Policy Institute. Aug. 29, 2012. www.epi.org/publication/ib342-unions-inequality-faltering-middle-class/
4   How today's unions help working people: Giving workers the power to improve their jobs and unrig the economy, multiple authors, Economic Policies Institute, August 24, 2017. https://www.epi.org/publication/how-todays-unions-help-working-people-giving-workers-the-power-to-improve-their-jobs-and-unrig-the-economy/

Growing turnover and difficulty filling positions cost the state and threaten the delivery of public services for Coloradans

EMPLOYEE TURNOVER & UNDERSTAFFING

One of the critical issues facing Colorado state government is the high turnover rate among state employees. As the state economy and labor market have improved over the past decade, workers have had increasingly more options for private sector employment. At the same time, high vacancy rates in many state agencies, particularly in already high-stress jobs, have put additional strain on existing state workers. As a result, the turnover rate among Colorado state employees has been growing.

As Chart 1 below shows, the overall turnover rate among classified employees in Colorado state government has increased by 73 percent over the past 10 years, growing from 8.5 percent in FY 2008-09 to 14.5 percent in FY 2017-18. It is up by 46 percent since the Colorado economy began to recover from the Great Recession in FY 2010-11.

Chart 1 – Overall Turnover Rate in Colorado State Government – FY 2008-09 – FY 2017-18

Source: FY 2013-14 and FY 2017-18 Workforce Reports, Department of Personnel

Lola West, Chaplain, *Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo*

"There are gaping holes right now in our mental healthcare delivery system. And when there are holes like that, people fall through those cracks. When someone with a mental illness does harm to a lot people in our community, that's a terrible cost for the people of Colorado."

"I see staff members that are working overtime. They have to work mandatory overtime. A lot of times they're working 16 hours or 18 hours because we're so short of staff."

"We need a stronger voice in what's going on in the state. We're the ones that know how to solve some of the problems we're facing."

The two state agencies with the largest number of classified employees—Corrections and Human Services—also have among the highest turnover rates in state government. Human Services with a turnover rate of 23 percent is the second highest and Corrections, at 18 percent is the fourth highest. Both agencies have been the site of several labor-management partnerships, an indication that the partnerships in their current form are insufficient at stemming growing turnover rates.

A review of publicly available data on state employee turnover finds that the turnover rate in the Colorado Department of Human Services is the third highest among similar agencies in other Western states. Turnover rates in the Colorado Department of Corrections were comparable to those found in the other Western and border states.[5]

Other large state agencies with turnover rates above the state agency average include Revenue (16.1 percent) and Health Care Policy and Financing (15.9 percent). Table 1 below shows the turnover rates for the four largest state agencies representing 70 percent of the total number of state classified workers.[6]

Table 1 – Four largest state agencies, turnover rates for FY 2017-18 and vacancy rates at 6/28/18

Agency	Average number of employees	Turnover rate FY 2017-18	Vacancy Rate 6/28/18
Corrections	6,037	18%	12%
Human Services	4,885	23%	18%
Higher Education	4,676	10%	n.a.
Transportation	2,940	11%	14%
All state agencies	29,034	14.7%	20%

Source: Department of Personnel, FY19-20 Joint Budget Committee Hearing

In addition to retaining current staff, state agencies are finding it hard to recruit staff to fill open positions. According to the Department of Personnel, as of June 28, 2018, the vacancy rate across all state agencies was 20 percent, meaning one out of every five authorized positions in state government was vacant. The fourth column of table 1 shows the vacancy rates for the four state agencies with the most classified employees.

Table 2 - Turnover and vacancy rates among high stress positions in state agencies

Position	Agency	Turnover FY 2017-18	Vacancy Rate 6/28/2018
Security Officer I	Department of Human Services	38%	16%
Nurse I	Department of Corrections	33%	40%
Client Care Aides II	Department of Human Services	29%	14%
Nurse I	Department of Human Services	28%	19%
Security Officer I	Department of Corrections	26%	9%
Transportation Maintenance Worker I	Department of Transportation	19%	12%

Source: Department of Personnel, FY19-20 Joint Budget Committee Hearing

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5   Author's review of data on state employee turnover rates in AZ, CA, ID, KS, NE, NM, MT, OR, WA. NV and UT did not have data accessible online and OR presented data in a way that made it hard to compare with other states.
6   Department of Personnel, FY19-20 Joint Budget Committee Hearing, January 15, 2019, https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/fy2019-20_perhrg.pdf

As shown in Table 2, Colorado also faces a challenge keeping workers in positions where high turnover may not only be costly, but potentially dangerous. Turnover rates are high for security officers in the state's adult prisons, and in the youth corrections facilities, nurses who care for veterans in the state's nursing homes, client care aides who help residents in the state's mental institutions, and transportation maintenance workers who plow snow and repair state highways.

Table 2 also shows that within these agencies, the positions with high turnover rates also have high vacancy rates.[7] Because many of the authorized positions are vacant, workers currently in these jobs are stretched thin, which likely contributes to a vicious cycle of turnover contributing to overwork, which in turn increases turnover.

This issue has been particularly acute within the Department of Corrections where, due to low staffing levels, many corrections officers are required to work double shifts, sometimes on short notice. The amount of overtime paid by the department to cover these open positions has increased by 84 percent over the past three years going from $10.7 million in 2016 to $19.7 million in 2018.[8]

This year the department has asked the Joint Budget Committee for additional funding to raise the wages for Correction Officer I and II positions along with Correctional Support Trade Supervisors as a way of stemming the high turnover rates in these critical jobs. Considered the first line of defense within the prison system, these positions are vital to preventing attacks on staff and inmates, and in keeping contraband from entering the prisons.[9]

High turnover and increased vacancies put strains on remaining workers, hurt agency performance, and cost taxpayers money. A review of research on the costs of employee turnover found that it costs employers 20 percent of an employee's annual salary to replace them.[10] These costs include direct costs such as overtime, temporary staffing to cover the open position, and costs associated with advertising the open position, interviewing and screening of applicants to fill the position, and training for the new employee. In addition, some studies attempt to measure indirect costs such as lost productivity as the new person learns the job, resulting in reduced quality, errors, and waste. Because only two of the 11 studies included in the analysis attempt to estimate indirect costs, the 20 percent figure is a conservative estimate.[11]

Based on this 20 percent figure, it cost $48 million to replace the 4,268 workers who left state government in fiscal year 2017-18.[12]

Rana Gonzales, Planned Care Liaison, *Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo*

"I've been working at the hospital for 15 years and this is the worst I've seen it. We don't have the tools or the training to help those patients progress on, thus being stuck in our hospital system."

"Because we're so understaffed, what happens is we don't give our patients the best care that they need. "

"If we work together, we have that voice to help us achieve that same goal to have our hospital and our state workers provide the best care possible for our patients. We know what the solutions are to make a better Colorado and a better place for all of our citizens."

"Our state is facing a crisis. And the only way to solve that is to let the state workers have a strong voice. "

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7   Ibid.
8   Colorado corrections officers concerned low staffing is creating unsafe conditions, Channel 7 News, January 30, 2019. https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/investigations/colorado-corrections-officers-concerned-low-staffing-creating-unsafe-conditions ,
9   Department of Corrections, Staff Budget Briefing, FY 2019-20, December 20, 2018. http://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/fy2019-20_corbrf.pdf
10   There are Significant Costs to Replacing Employees, Heather Boushey and Sarah Jane Glynn, Center for American Progress, November 16, 2012, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/CostofTurnover0815.pdf
11   Ibid.
12   The cost is based on a turnover rate of 14.7 percent and 28,875 classified state workers with a statewide average wage of $57,270 as reported in the FY 2017-18 Workforce Report.

EMPLOYEE WAGES & INEQUALITIES

An important factor driving high turnover is state employees' lower pay and modest benefits. Colorado's Annual Compensation Report FY 2019-20 finds that state employees' total compensation is 9 percent below that of workers with similar jobs in the state, or, in the case of jobs specific to state government, that of similar workers in other states. [13]

The report finds that state employees' base salary, $66,181, is 7 percent below the market median.[14] This is especially low considering that 62 percent of state government employees in Colorado have a bachelor's degree or more education and Denver is a high cost of living area.[15] Unusually for public-sector workers, Colorado state employees' benefits are also less generous than those of comparable workers, mostly due to retirement benefits that are 17 percent below the market median. Colorado state employees are not covered by Social Security, and their pension benefits do not come close to matching the Social Security and other retirement benefits received by comparable workers, a gap widened by benefit cuts and increased employee contributions enacted in 2018.[16]

The average annual salary for classified state employees was $57,270 in fiscal year 2017-18.[17] To put this wage level into context, we can compare it to the income a family would need to afford a modest, yet adequate standard of living as determined by the Economic Policy Institute's Family Budget Calculator. This standard varies by family composition and location and includes the cost of housing, transportation, health care, basic necessities and childcare, if there are children in the family. [18]

Almost half of classified workers (45.2 percent) live in the Denver Metro Area. The income needed to support a single adult with one child in the Denver Metro area is $71,977 per year according to the Budget Calculator. A single, classified state employee with one child, earning the average salary would not come close to supporting the basic costs of supporting her family.[19]

In addition to the below-market wages detailed above, wages paid to Colorado's classified workers vary significantly by race. According to data from the FY 2017-18 Workforce Report shown in Table 3 below, the average salary of white state employees is 16.9 percent higher than that of African Americans, and 18.3 percent higher than that of Latinx state employees. Thus, employees of color are even more likely than white non-Hispanic employees to be paid less than they need to support a family in the Denver area.

Table 3 – Colorado Classified State Employees Average Salaries by Race and Ethnicity

Race/Ethnicity	Average Salary	% Below White Salaries
White	$60,969	
African American	$52,160	16.9%
Latino	$51,528	18.3%
American Indian or Alaska Native	$52,845	15.4%
Asian	$60,063	1.5%
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander	$52,428	16.3%
Two or more races	$51,894	14.9%
Race/Ethnicity not Indicated	$45,432	34.2%

Source: FY 2017-18 Workforce Report, Colorado Department of Personnel

13   State of Colorado Annual Compensation Report. https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dhr/fy-2019-20-annual-compensation-report
14   Ibid.
15   Economic Policy Institute analysis of 2014-2018 American Community Survey microdata accessed through IPUMS USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org; and Bureau of Economic Statistics Regional Price Parities by Metropolitan Statistical Area for 2016 (most recent available), accessed through https://www.bea.gov/data/prices-inflation/regional-price-parities-state-and-metro-area. The share of private-sector wage-and-salary workers with a bachelor's degree or more education is much lower (32 percent), though the pay comparison cited is with similar workers, not a cross section of private sector workers.
16   State of Colorado Annual Compensation Report. https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dhr/fy-2019-20-annual-compensation-report
17   FY2019-18 Workforce Report, Workforce data for the state of Colorado, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oBVtFvlMS8_fgIY_P0F93hl-CYM8pGFbM/view
18   Economic Policy Institute, Family Budget Calculator, https://www.epi.org/resources/budget/
19   Budget Calculator annual costs for a family with one adult and one child in the Denver-Aurora-Lakewood Metro Area, https://www.epi.org/resources/budget/

Academic Research Finds that Collective Bargaining Reduces Turnover and Improves Public Services

INCREASED JOB PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVED PUBLIC SERVICES

Most of the research on the role that employee organizations and unions play in affecting the performance of organizations, in the private and public sectors, are centered around their role in giving workers an opportunity to affect decisions that involve their jobs. Referred to as "employee voice," many studies find that efforts to provide workers with more input in and control over their jobs results in greater commitment and better performance. This is particularly relevant in reducing employee turnover, a problem facing Colorado state government.

Numerous studies have found that unions are associated with lower quit rates and employee turnover. One study of U.S. adults who responded to an email survey found that "union membership reduces employees' intention to leave their jobs and provides evidence that the 'voice' face of unions matter." [20]

Another study focusing on workers in call centers in Germany and the U.S. found that union call centers in the U.S. had lower turnover rates than non-union call centers. The authors noted that this was consistent with past research on union effects in the U.S.[21] A study of turnover within state government found that "state employees who are represented by unions and are better paid are less likely to quit."[22]Another study focusing on turnover in the federal government found that providing employees with a voice in agency operations reduced turnover.[23]

Other researchers have examined the role that unions play in relation to implementing High-Performance Work Practices (HPWP), such as those envisioned under the Labor Management Partnerships allowed under Colorado's Executive Order. One study found that union membership complements HPWP, resulting in greater balance between agency efficiency, equity, and the role of employees in decision making when these practices are implemented in the presence of unions.[24]

High Performance Work Practices

High Performance Work Practices (HPWP)[25] are actions that have been shown to improve organizations' ability to recruit, retain and empower employees to provide high quality services. These practices emphasize employee involvement and trust. Components include: (1) Engaging staff by communicating with employees about the organization's mission, sharing information, and involving employees in decision making. (2) Recruiting highly qualified employees, providing them with extensive training, and identifying career opportunities and pathways for current employees to advance. (3) Empowering frontline workers, providing job security, protecting employees from repercussion for speaking up about problems, issues and concerns, reducing status distinctions across employee roles and formalizing teams. (4) Aligning leaders with these practices by linking management training to organizational needs, identifying and developing future leaders, and linking a portion of leaders' compensation to successful accomplishment of departmental goals.

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20   The Impact on Union Membership on Intent to Leave: Additional Evidence on the Voice Face Unions, Steven E. Abraham, Barry A. Friedman and Randall K. Thomas, Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, December 2005, Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 201-213, https://link.springer.com/journal/10672/17/4/page/1

21   Collective Bargaining and High-Involvement Management in Comparative Perspective: Evidence from U.S. and German Call Centers, Virginia Doellgast, King's College London Industrial Relations (2008), 47(2), 284-319. https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2232&context=articles

22   A Model of Voluntary Turnover in State Government, Sally Coleman Selden, Donald P. Moynihan, Review of Public Personnel Administration, April 1, 2000, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0734371X0002000206

23   Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Pay: Evidence from the Public Workforce Soo-Young Lee Andrew B. Whitford *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Volume 18, Issue 4, 1 October 2008, Pages 647–671, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum029

24   Balancing Efficiency, Equity and Voice The Impact of Unions on High-Performance Work Practices on Work Outcomes, Dionne M. Pohler and Andrew A Luchak, ILR Review, September 12, 2014, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793914546295

25   High-Performance Work Practices in CLABSI Prevention Interventions, Appendix 1. Definitions of High-Performance Work Practices. August 2015. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. August 2015 http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/cusp/clabsi-hpwpreport/clabsi-hpwpap.html

Another found that unions play a positive role on the effective adoption of HPWP, leading to increased organizational competitiveness and ensuring that employees benefit from their adoption.[26] Researchers also found that when public officials and union leaders entered into cooperative arrangements (collective bargaining), it resulted in improvements in the delivery of public services and the quality of work life.[27] Indeed, public sector dispute resolution procedures and joint labor–management initiatives to reform work have been shown to function well.[28]

Because unions provide workers with a right to have a union representative involved in accident and fatality investigations, they give workers a role in protecting their own safety while on the job. Research also suggests that unions result in safer workplaces because workers are more likely to report safety issues, injuries and near misses without fear of retribution.[29] For example, a recent study of construction firms in Canada found that unionized construction firms had lower lost time claims rates, indicating that they were safer work environments.[30]

Critics of collective bargaining for public sector workers claim that it will result in large wage increases that will drive up state government costs. However, research on the effects of public sector collective bargaining finds that it has resulted in relatively small increases in public employee pay, with workers covered by collective bargaining agreements having wages 5 to 8 percent higher than those who are not. Studies show that, on balance, public sector workers are undercompensated when compared to their counterparts in the private sector.[31]

Studies also show that unions and collective bargaining help close racial and gender wage gaps. Collective bargaining agreements are transparent, correct salary discrepancies and lay out clear standards for promotions and raises. Collective bargaining has been found to lift wages of Black and female workers closer to those of white and male workers.[32]

26   Union Impact on the Adoption of High-Performance Work Practices, Carol Gill, Human Resources Management Review, Volume 19, Issue 1, March 2009, pages 39-50, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053482208000648?via%3Dihub
27   Public Sector Collective Bargaining and the Imperative for Service Delivery: An Overview, Jonathan Brock and David B. Lipsky, in Going Public, The Role of Labor Management in Delivering Quality Government Services, Employees Relations Association, 2003, https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/786/
28   The New Great Debate about Unionism and Collective Bargaining in U.S. State and Local Governments, David Lewin, Jeffery H. Keefe, Thomas A. Kochan, ILR Review, October 1, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391206500401
29   For an overview, see Josh Bivens et al. "How today's unions help working people; Giving workers the power to improve their jobs and unrig the economy," Economic Policy Institute Report, August 24, 2017.
30   Protecting Construction Worker Health and Safety in Ontario, Canada: Identifying and Union Safety Effect, Benjamin C. Amick, III, Shei-lah Hogg-Johnson, Desiree Latour-Villamil, Ron Saunders, Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Volume 57, Issue 12, December 2015, pages 1337-1342, https://journals.lww.com/joem/Fulltext/2015/12000/Protecting_Construction_Worker_Health_and_Safety.14.aspx
31   Lewin, Keefe, and Kochan 2012.
32   How Today's Unions Help Working People: Giving Workers the Power to Improve Their Jobs and Unrig the Economy, Economic Policy Institute, August 24, 2017, https://www.epi.org/publication/how-todays-unions-help-working-people-giving-workers-the-power-to-improve-their-jobs-and-unrig-the-economy/

Labor management partnerships and collective bargaining are synergistic ways to address the growing problems of high turnover, understaffing, and wage disparities.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gives most private sector workers the ability to form unions and collectively bargain with their employers. However, the NLRA does not cover workers in the public sector, who are governed by state and local laws. Almost half of all workers (48 percent) covered by a union contract in the U.S. are public sector workers.[33]

State laws governing collective bargaining by public employees have various provisions and exemptions that make it hard to easily summarize what is allowed in all states. However, a detailed 2014 analysis found that 34 states and the District of Columbia allowed state workers to collectively bargain over conditions of employment, in most cases including wages.[34]

Colorado is one of only 16 states in the U.S. that does not allow for some form of collective bargaining for all state employees, though exemptions exist for certain categories of workers. State law allows firefighters to form unions and collectively bargain. While there are no state statutes that specifically allow police officers to collectively bargain, the firefighter statute mentions that other employees and police have the right to collectively bargain in several local jurisdictions. [35] Teachers gained the right to collective bargaining through case law.[36]

Collective bargaining requires state agencies to negotiate with employees who have gained the right of representation, and, through this process, to reach an enforceable contract. Negotiations include all the factors that affect agency performance, including wages, and allow managers and workers to focus on key issues and get to solutions faster. Collective bargaining would expand on the positive, but rather limited success of the Labor–Management Partnerships by ensuring that worker voices are heard and help shape agency operations and the delivery of services. Based on research, collective bargaining for state employees will improve the quality and effectiveness of services provided to Coloradans.

Positive but limited success through Labor–Management Partnerships in Colorado

The experience in Colorado shows that the Labor–Management Partnerships authorized under Executive Order D 028 06 can have positive effects on agency operations and the delivery of services. However, because agency participation is voluntary, their effect has been limited and netted only one agency–wide partnership.

Labor–Management Partnerships have brought management and labor representatives together to focus on important issues of concern to both groups, resulting in changes that have resolved problems and improved performance. They also allow managers the opportunity to gauge employee morale within the unit and assess how changes in services, procedures, and work expectations are being received by staff.

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33   How today's unions help working people: Giving workers the power to improve their jobs and unrig the economy, multiple authors, Economic Policies Institute, August 24, 2017. https://www.epi.org/publication/how-todays-unions-help-working-people-giving-workers-the-power-er-to-improve-their-jobs-and-unrig-the-economy/

34   Regulation of Collective Bargaining in the States, Milla Sanes and John Schmidt, Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2014, http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf

35   C.R.S. 29-5-212 (1) and Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States

36   Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976)

Labor–Management Partnerships can improve government services and achieve efficiencies. The partnerships can be created on a statewide, occupational group, or departmental basis. However, partnerships cannot be used to affect total employee compensation, reduce the authority of department heads to manage their departments, or permit binding arbitration. Strikes, work stoppages, or work slow-downs are expressly prohibited.[37]

When they function effectively, these partnerships can help to solve problems, improve internal operations and procedures, increase employee commitment, reduce employee turnover, improve services, and cut costs. However, the effectiveness of the partnerships is limited by the fact that agencies must voluntarily agree to engage in them and that important issues, such as staffing levels and wages, are off the table. As a result, the voice of workers in influencing agency operations and how services are provided, which research shows improves overall performance and reduces turnover, is limited. While the Executive Order gives employees the right to form an employee organization, it does not require the state agencies to form partnerships and come to the table to discuss issues with the employees. As a result, several agencies have never engaged at either the agency or unit level, and others have delayed participation or implementation of recommendations. These issues could be addressed through collective bargaining.

For example, the Department of Corrections worked with Colorado WINS, the certified employee organization, on a proposed labor-management partnership for several months in 2009. However, the groups could not come to agreement and the recommendations were never implemented. Other agencies such as the Department of Revenue and the Office of Information Technology developed Memorandums of Understanding to guide discussions in several areas with the goal of developing a formal partnership. However, no partnership was ever effectuated in either agency.

There are several Employee Management Committees (EMC) currently operating at the unit level within state agencies. There are seven operating within the Department of Human Services, which has a formal partnership, and one each within the Department of Corrections and Department of Revenue, which do not have formal partnerships. As discussed below, many of these efforts have successfully resolved problems and improved agency performance.[38]

Many times, the EMCs provide an opportunity for both sides to review operations and discuss problems. For example, nurses at the Grand Junction Regional Center raised a concern through the EMC that they were left out of decisions about where patients were placed after receiving treatment and the services patients received after being discharged. Management of the Center saw the value in having input from nurses and is working to change procedures to ensure that nurses are consulted in these decisions. Both sides agree that this will result in better care for patients.

An EMC met over several years to address difficulties in recruiting and retaining nurses and other staff at the Ft. Logan and Pueblo Mental Health Institutes. One of the problems both sides recognized was that the starting pay of new staff members sometimes exceeded the pay of experienced staff members. As a result of the partnership, Colorado WINS and the Department of Human Services secured increased funding from the Joint Budget Committee to increase salaries for direct care workers at the Mental Health Institutes, resulting in some improvement in retention rates for staff at these facilities.[39]

In another example of an EMC working to identify and address staffing issues, members of the EMC within the Department of Youth Services are studying the qualifications required for agency staff. After the Department of Personnel relaxed the experience and training requirements for new hires, turnover in the first year of employment increased. The EMC members are considering either reinstating previous requirements or implementing other actions to reduce turnover rates among new staff.

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37   Executive Order D 028 07 http://www2.cde.state.co.us/artemis/goserials/go4113internet/2007/go41132007028internet.pdf
38   Information on the number of Labor Management Partnerships in state agencies was provided by CO WINS.
39   Information on the activities of EMCs in state agencies was provided by CO WINS.

Recommendations for Policy Makers: Authorize Collective Bargaining for State Employees and Expand Labor-Management Partnerships

Colorado is facing a growing problem with its state employee workforce. Turnover rates are increasing and it is becoming harder to fill open positions. Turnover is costly to taxpayers and has a detrimental effect on the quality of public services provided to state residents. Solving these problems will require ongoing and dedicated involvement from agency leaders and employees. Because they know how services are provided and see the problems up close, front line workers are a source of commonsense ideas for improving operations.

The Executive Order creating Labor–Management Partnerships was a step in the right direction. However, because these partnerships are voluntary on the part of agencies and important issues such as compensation and staffing are off the table, their effectiveness has been limited. Furthermore, turnover continues to grow in agencies where there have been a Labor–Management Partnerships, suggesting that these partnerships alone are not effective in addressing this critical problem.

Granting collective bargaining rights to state employees would strengthen Labor-Management Partnerships, expand their use to all state agencies and allow agency managers and workers to fully engage in solving problems affecting agency operations and performance.

Collective bargaining has also been shown to reduce racial and gender pay gaps. As one of the largest employers in Colorado, the state government should take the lead and serve as a model for other public and private sector employers in addressing these disparities.

Academic research shows that the combination of collective bargaining and High Performance Work Practices such as Labor-Management Partnerships has resulted in improved operations, better services and lower turnover rates. Collective bargaining will ensure that state employees have a voice in agency operations and can contribute to efforts to provide quality services to state residents. Ultimately, this should improve agency performance and lead to efficiency gains that will result in taxpayer savings.

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
American Police Unions: A Hindrance or Help to Innovation?

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American Police Unions: A Hindrance or Help to Innovation?

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In response to the crises of the 1960s, police departments in the United States embarked upon great change in their policies, operations, and programs. This literature, however, has largely neglected the duality of the role of police unions in the adoption of new programs and practices. Learning about the key actors in the innovations process, however, is crucial to understanding how organizational change emerges. This article builds upon previous research to understand the effects of police unions on the adoption of innovation. Findings indicate that police unions may actually promote rather than hinder the implementation of new innovation.

Keywords: police, unions, community policing, innovation

The innovations literature has gained attention within criminal justice as way to understand the adoption and dissemination of new programs and practices. First popularized in the 1940s, the innovations literature emerged as an explanation for why some new farming techniques were adopted quickly while others took years to spread, if at all (Rogers, 2003). This literature has since been used to explore the adoption of other innovations such as technological advancements (Kidder, 1981, 1997), the adoption of hate crime legislation in the United States (Walker, 1966) as well as police practices (King, 2000; Klinger, 2003; Weiss, 1997).

Specifically, this framework has been used to better understand why some police practices have longevity while others die out quickly (cf. King, 2000; Wilson, 2005). One area that has been only recently included in the innovations research and is deserving of consideration is the role of key constituencies and their influence on adoption of new programs and policies (Burruss & Giblin, 2009). Institutional theory provides a framework from which we can begin to think about important actors both internal and external to police agencies. According to institutional theory, key constituencies may include national actors like professional organizations and community actors like religious leaders. It is impossible to think about police work in the United States, however, without acknowledging the importance of

unions particularly in large departments. Yet, the role of police unions in the adoption process has been absent from the innovations research (Walker, 2008) and only considered as a minor influence in the institutional theory literature (Burruss & Giblin, 2009).

The omission of police unions is particularly detrimental to our understanding of the adoption of innovation. Unions are an important presence in policing, particularly in reference to the adoption of innovation. They are found in 41% of all police agencies in the United States employing 71% of all officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006) and are a defining influence setting the tone for recruitment and selection, patrolling and performance standards among other activities. Given this influence of police unions on these myriad activities, they would also affect the adoption of an innovation such as community-oriented policing (COP) (Walker, 2008).

COP was adopted in response to problems that emerged during the 1960s and was meant to reinvigorate and revolutionize American policing. It was accompanied by a great deal of government financial support. Regardless of this support, COP has not been evenly adopted across organizations, and little is known about what makes some agencies more innovative than others (Willis & Mastrofski, 2011). This paper builds upon previous research to understand the influence of police unions on the adoption of innovation. In the sections that follow, the innovations literature, institutional theory, and the history of unions are first reviewed. Next, the union literature is used in conjunction with the existing police innovations literature and the institutional

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theory framework to construct a conceptual model. The model is then tested through cross-sectional analysis using archival data.

INNOVATION

In policing research, innovation has been defined as programs and policies that are new to policing as well as strategies that can improve the efficiency, accuracy, and effectiveness of agencies (Sever, Garcia, & Tsiandi, 2008). According to this definition, innovations do not have to be new or revolutionary—only new to policing or to an individual agency. Given that this can cover a wide range of policies and practices, it is difficult to identify what is innovative and how to measure its adoption and subsequent implementation (King, 2000).

The innovations literature gives us insight into the characteristics of communities that are open to the adoption of new programs and policies. For example, evidence suggests that wealthier communities are more likely to adopt innovations than those lacking resources (Rogers, 2003). Diversity and residential mobility are also believed to increase the likelihood of adoption. Communities that are not centralized due to ethnic or economic heterogeneity may not be organized enough to form opposition to changes made by the police department (Morabito, 2010). Agency characteristics such as the availability of slack resources and slack resources can affect the adoption of new innovations by police agencies (Morabito, 2008). This research, however, does not tell the whole story; it neglects the motivations for police agencies' selection of these innovations in the first place.

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Increasingly, scholars have relied on institutional theory to explain this selection process. Institutional theory states that organizations change in response to external constituencies rather than to achieve technical excellence or greater efficiency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Through the process of organizational isomorphism, organizations become more similar to others in the same field. There are two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In the private sector where competition exists, all firms are likely to adopt new innovations that will improve performance and profitability. In a noncompetitive field such as public service where effectiveness is hard to measure, the process of isomorphism does not necessarily make organizations more efficient—just more similar. This process occurs because unlike in private sector organizations, it is difficult to measure the bottom line (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004), so new innovations are likely to be adopted without rigorous evaluation modeled after organizations that are

viewed as the most successful (Burruss & Giblin, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

If this is the case, external constituencies are important influences on the types of innovation selected for adoption. Institutional theory focuses mainly on the authority that these organizational level forces exert—these are groups *outside* of the agency (Burruss & Giblin, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These institutional pressures are important and do influence the adoption of innovation (Burruss & Giblin, 2009). For example while police chiefs are internal leaders, they are affected by external influences. For example, evidence suggests that police chiefs who are members of national organizations (Skogan & Hartnett, 2005), attend conferences and read academic literature (Weisburd & Lum, 2005) are more likely to adopt innovations than their counterparts who do not engage in these activities.

If belonging to national organizations affects change at the executive level, it should also affect change for rank and file. Police unions are often considered to be and are in some respect internal entities (Crank, 2003) representing officers in a particular organization—a *local* constituency—therefore considered to be relatively powerless in the innovation selection process from an institutional theory framework approach (Burruss & Giblin, 2009). On the other hand, they are often tied to national networks. For example, the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) represents 2000 police bargaining units (www.napo.org) representing an external constituency, which according to institutional theory means that they could affect the selection of innovation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). To understand their role in the innovations process, it is important to understand the history of police unions.

THE POLICE LABOR MOVEMENT

In 1919, the American Federation of Labor opened its membership to police through issuance of a charter to the Boston Police department. The commissioner subsequently, suspended the officers involved in the labor movement sparking a strike by Boston police officers (Burpo, 1971). In four days, the strike was over and officers who participated in the strike were not reinstated but benefits and working conditions were improved (Burpo, 1971). The angry response to the strike slowed the unionization movement among the police.

The relationship between unions and police continued to sour. In the 1930s, the relationship was marked by police violence against strikers (Walker, 1977). Police wanted to maintain the status quo and to do so they broke strikes in other industries—often using violence.[1] Because of these incidents and initial problems with organizing, the labor

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[1]For an in-depth discussion of the development of the labor movement in American policing, please see Burpo (1971) or Walker (1977).

movement did not embrace the police into its ranks. Instead fraternal and benevolent organizations stepped in to fill the void so that police officers could represent their own interests (Burpo, 1971). Unionization among police officers took hold in 1962, when President Kennedy legalized collective bargaining at the federal level opening the door for unionization at the local level. At the same time, benevolent and fraternal organizations were recognized as formally representing patrol officers (Shelley & Crow, 2001). For example, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) began as such an organization and is now the largest police union in the United States with more than 325,00 members (www.fop. net). These organizations engage in collective bargaining to negotiate conditions (Doerner & Doerner, 2010). The common issues that are negotiated include: salary, vacation, training, residence requirements, sick leave overtime, promotions and disciplinary procedures (Briggs, Zhao, Wilson, & Ren, 2008). The negotiation process as well as the terms of the collective bargaining agreement are important (Walker, 2008) and are related to supplemental pay of officers (Briggs et al., 2008; Doerner & Doerner, 2010), to clearance and to arrest rates (Mas, 2006).

Educational and other incentives are also benefits of unionization (Doerner & Doerner, 2010) and usually negotiated by union leadership. The additional pay awarded for overtime, court duties or advancing education can supplement salaries and be lucrative for patrol officers. Sixty-eight percent of agencies with 100 or more officers offer some type of incentive pay (Hickman & Reaves, 2001). While this may be an important benefit to rank and file, examining the effects of incentive pay on the adoption of innovation or any other outcome may present difficulties. Doerner and Doerner (2010) found that unlike the other terms of police contracts, there is little variation across time in the incentive pay because these benefits tend to be consistent throughout the years as negotiated by union leadership.

While there exists limited research on the influence of police unions, we do know more about private sector unions. Based on research conducted on private industry, there is mixed evidence as to the effect of unions on the adoption of innovation. In a recent review of innovation studies, Menezes-Fihlo and Van Reenen (2003) recount mixed effects: in some studies, unions have negligible influence whereas in others they negatively affect the adoption of innovation. Other research suggests that unions are not opposed to the adoption of innovations when it is good for the well-being of the firm (Tauman & Weiss, 1987). Even in the private sector, the true influence of unions on innovation is far from settled and that the direction of the union effect is still considered to be an empirical question (Menezes-Filho & Van Reenen, 2003).

In the public sector, unions might support innovation because they are also interested in the success of the organization as long as their employment is not threatened (Page, 2011). Most police officers select their vocation based on an altruistic desire to contribute to the common good (c.f. Van Maanen, 1973; White, Cooper, Saunders, & Raganella, 2010). This means that police officers might be invested in the image of their agency as well as that of the profession as a whole. What makes a positive image, however, is difficult to determine in public service. Value work does not easily translate into economics (Crank, 2003) and it is unclear if unions in the private sector inform the public sector where efficiency, effectiveness and the bottom line are much more difficult to measure. While little empirical evidence of the role of unions in the adoption of innovation is available—particularly in public service, there is a starting point for this type of inquiry. There is a growing body of literature about the adoption and diffusion of police innovation (c.f. King, 2000; Morabito, 2008).

POLICE INNOVATION

This paper examines an important innovation in American policing: COP. COP has been characterized as a major shift in American policing emerging as a re-legitimizing strategy for police departments criticized for being aloof and ineffectual during the 1960s and 1970s (Crank, 2003). During the 1990s, the federal government distributed more than 8 billion dollars providing grants to local police departments to promote this adoption through hiring. In 2000, 68% of local police departments, employing 90% of all officers, had a community-policing plan of some type (Hickman & Reaves, 2001). While many municipal police agencies adopted the COP label, not all put the core elements of the approach: problem solving, partnerships and organizational change, into practice.

The government influence and the influx of money may account for the popularity of community policing during the 1990s but doesn't fully explain why some agencies more rigorously adopted COP than others (Skogan, 2004). COP provides the opportunity for citizens and institutions in disadvantaged jurisdictions to come together with the police to address problems of crime, lack of services and fear—problems that are important to citizens (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). COP is a major departure from the previous professional movement which relied on police as expert with little input from or consideration of the community.

It is unclear if COP has improved the overall performance of police agencies (Mastrofski, 2006). The flexibility of the community policing philosophy makes evaluation difficult because implementation looks different in every agency in which it is adopted. COP creates additional work for patrol officers while potentially limiting promotion opportunities though a reduction in the organizational hierarchy particularly of middle managers (Skogan, 2004). COP forced agencies to alter their mission and standard operating procedure—in effect changing performance measures.

This change was initially met with resistance by police officers who refused to support the changes (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994) and great efforts were made to win the hearts and minds of police officers in an effort to implement the philosophy but it is not clear that this goal was ever achieved.

Based on the institutional theory framework, unions should have no influence on the adoption of COP if they are considered to be a local or internal constituency (Burruss & Giblin, 2009). Patrol officers may dislike new programs and unions provide a voice for these officers (Skogan, 2008). Unions would be expected to dislike any innovation that conflicts with this preference (Walker, 2008). The analysis that follows will explore whether unions have an effect on the adoption of COP by police agencies.

Hypothesis: Unions have an effect on the adoption of innovation across police agencies.

THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

A conceptual model is presented here that presents an alternate view of the role of unions than currently specified in the institutional theory framework. Using the innovations and union literature, the type of relationship between unions and the innovations is hypothesized. From existing research, we are unsure what if any influence unions might have on the adoption of COP across police departments.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The present study draws a national sample of 1655 police jurisdictions of varying size and composition in a cross-sectional investigation using data combined from the 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Surveys (LEMAS)[2] and the 2000 U.S. Census.[3] Analyses include all municipal police departments that respond to 911 calls. Departments without primary law enforcement responsibilities were removed from the sample.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variable in this investigation is the extent to which COP is adopted. Due to the popularity of COP

coupled with its sometimes dubious adoption,[4] it is not feasible to measure whether police agencies *were* practicing COP. Instead, the *extent* to which agencies indicate that they were practicing COP can be measured. Here, the measure of COP is a rank ordered additive index created using data from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey (LEMAS) and based upon the theoretical COP literature (Cordner, 2001; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).

This index includes the following questions taken directly from LEMAS:

"Does the Agency Have a Formal Community Policing Plan?"
"Do New Officers Receive Community-Policing Training?"
"Do Citizens Receive Community-Policing Training?"
"Does Agency Encourage Problem Solving Projects?"
"Is Problem Solving Included in Performance Evaluations?"
"Does Agency Conduct a Citizen Academy?"

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Union Variables

Two measures were created to capture the extent to which union activity may influence organizational outcomes. All data are secured from LEMAS. The first measure is called "Collective Bargaining" and includes collective bargaining for police employees. The second measure is an additive index called "Incentives." Incentives include the availability of supplemental pay.

Community Characteristics

To measure income level/socio-economic status, U.S. Census data are used to create a measure of jurisdiction-level structural disadvantage. The U.S. Census asks respondents: 1. If the household has received public assistance, 2. If a single woman with related children heads the household, and 3. If the household income places it below the poverty line. The three indicators are standardized to create a proportion based on population so that for example poverty in one jurisdiction can be compared to poverty in another jurisdiction regardless of population size and called "Structural Disadvantage."

To capture the stability of a jurisdiction, a measure of the proportion of residents that are living in the same house as they were five years ago will be employed (c.f. Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson, 1988). This variable called "Population Stability" is created using U.S. Census data. The proportion of the population that is non-white is also included as a contextual variable. Finally, region is included.

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[2]The year 2003 is the most recent available LEMAS data set. LEMAS data of 2007 have been collected but not yet released.

[3]The use of LEMAS data does limit some of our understanding of the nuances of innovation. For example, there are different levels of sophistication in terms of technology (Sever et al., 2008). Similarly, community policing can involve a multitude of strategies and activities that can be implemented differently in departments depending upon community needs. LEMAS data, however, offer a glimpse into police activity across a wide range of police agencies.

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[4]As noted early, more than 90% of police agencies serving populations larger than 25,000 report adopting COP (Hickman & Reeves, 2001).

TABLE 1
Full Model: Community Policing

Model	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Std. error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	1.920	.727		2.641	.009
Region	.054	.040	.060	1.350	.178
Structural disadvantage	−.699	.412	−.096	−1.695	.091
Residential stability	**.561**	**.201**	**.125**	**2.785**	**.006**
Incentive pay	.114	.060	.086	1.907	.057
Collective bargaining	**.081**	**.040**	**.086**	**2.004**	**.046**
Budget	−9.216E-5	.000	−.052	−1.285	.199
Ethnic heterogeneity	**.251**	**.105**	**.133**	**2.391**	**.017**
Vertical differentiation	.061	.057	.045	1.066	.287
Size	1.239E-5	.000	.062	1.499	.134
Functional differentiation	**.024**	**.004**	**.272**	**6.135**	**.000**
Age of organization	**−.001**	**.000**	**−.098**	**−2.185**	**.029**

Note: Bold items indicate that p < .05.

To capture these differences, region was coded as west (1) and not-west (0).

Organizational Complexity

Vertical differentiation gives an approximation of the height of the organization providing information about the formal structure of the agency and can be measured using pay differential (Maguire, 2003).[5] This information is secured from LEMAS. The next measure of organizational complexity is functional differentiation. This is a measure of the number of special units that are involved in agency operations (Maguire, 2003). Because this investigation involves agencies of varying size serving a wide range of populations, the measure of functional differentiation also includes agencies that have designated personnel rather than an entire unit. An additive index was created to capture this construct.

The size and budget are indicators of the availability of slack resources that are often integral to the adoption or implementation of new innovation (Morabito, 2008). LEMAS data are used to measure both of these constructs. Respondents were asked how many full-time sworn officers their agency had been authorized to hire during the current fiscal year. This number is included as an indicator of the size of the agency. Budget was recoded to normalize for the population size. Age of agency is included as a measure of time (King, 2009).[6] LEMAS asks the year that the agency was created as part of the survey. To calculate this variable,

the year the agency was created was subtracted from the year 2003 when LEMAS data were collected.

FINDINGS

To measure the effects of unionization on the implementation of COP, two regressions are run. The first is a restricted model that excludes the influence of unions and the second is a full model that includes measure of their influence. A comparison is made of the two models. This approach has been used in other research to determine the relative influence of particular factors of interest (c.f. Bennett, 1984).

In the full model (Table 1), the adjusted R^2 is .216 which the F statistic suggests is a statistically significant explanation of the model. The union variables are important. The measure of collective bargaining is significant while the measure of incentive pay is not. Surprisingly, collective bargaining is positively correlated with the implementation of more COP. Incentive pay is also positively correlated with innovation but is not a significant predictor. Region is unrelated to this innovation.

Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between functional differentiation and the implementation of innovation. This relationship is somewhat counterintuitive as the COP literature suggests that the presence of special units and the resulting differentiation is not an environment in which community policing can flourish (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). From an innovations perspective, something different may be at work. In this case, functional differentiation may serve as a proxy for prior innovativeness meaning that agencies that are more differentiated may be so because they have previously adopted new programs resulting in the formation of special units.

Finally, both indicators of slack resources are insignificant in this model. The age of the organization has a small but

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[5]Specifically, as suggested by Maguire (1997) vertical differentiation is measured as follows: Vertical differentiation (Height) = (Salary of Chief − Salary of Entry Officer)/Salary of Entry Officer.

[6]This investigation tried to control for this by including the age of the agency in the analysis (King, 2009). This approach, however, ignores fluctuations in agency practices that can only be captured by multiple data points.

TABLE 2
Restricted Model

Model	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Std. error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	2.265	.718		3.155	.002
Region	.077	.039	.085	1.947	.052
Structural disadvantage,	−.842	.406	−.116	−2.075	.039
Residential stability	.592	.199	.132	2.972	.003
Budget	−6.950E-5	.000	−.039	−.969	.333
Ethnic heterogeneity	.260	.104	.138	2.502	.013
Vertical differentiation	.059	.056	.044	1.057	.291
Size	1.214E-5	.000	.061	1.467	.143
Functional differentiation	.026	.004	.298	6.811	.000
Age of organization	−.001	.000	−.116	−2.612	.009

Dependent variable: COP index.
Note: Bold items indicate that p < .05.

significant influence on the adoption of community policing. Even though the coefficient is negative, meaning less COP is implemented— it could be that age of the organization is representative of political capital that older agencies have more of, rather than more tangible resources and can possibly be thought of as a measure of slack resources.

Restricted Model

The restricted model for community policing has an adjusted R^2 of .205 which the F statistic also suggests is a significant explanation of the implementation of COP (Table 2).

There are some changes when we remove the union variables from the model. First, a negative and significant relationship between disadvantage and innovation emerges. Residential mobility remains significant. This means that the presence of these antecedents of social disorganization may likely hinder the adoption of innovation. Ethnic heterogeneity o remains constant in its relationship with the adoption and the implementation of innovation. The measures of slack resources—size and budget— also remain constant even without the introduction of the union variables. Region continues to be an insignificant predictor of implementation.

Determining Relative Significance

Next, the question of whether the addition of the union variables adds significantly to the model. The introduction of measures of unionization increases the explanatory power of the model. What is unclear, however, is whether the increase is statistically significant.

Figure 1 provides the formula used to determine if the restricted model significantly differs from the full model, where df_1 = difference in number of independent weights in the full and restricted models and $df_2 = N$ minus the number

$$F = \frac{(R_F^2 - R_R^2)/df_1}{(1 - R_F^2)/df_2}$$

FIGURE 1   Test of the relative influence of unions.

of independent weights in the full model (Namboodiri, Carter, & Blalock, 1975). These additional analyses indicate that the introduction of indicators of collective bargaining and pay incentives do add to the statistical power of the model.

DISCUSSION

This paper explored the relationships between unions and the adoption of innovation. The findings indicate that unions do affect the implementation of COP. Based on the literature, it was not completely surprising to find that union presence does affect the implementation innovation in police agencies. It is surprising that there appears to be a positive relationship between unions and implementation. This relationship holds even when controlling for regional differences. Accordingly, this discussion is devoted to understanding these results.

It was expected that union activity would be correlated with the implementation of innovation just not in a positive direction. Skogan (2008) sums up what is perceived to be the prevailing attitude: that police prefer to do what they "signed up for" and this may not include many of the new innovations that potentially create more work for officers. Yet perhaps there is an alternative viewpoint. The last 50 years have been marked by great innovation in policing (Weisburd & Lum, 2005). Crisis created the need for new strategies and practices. It could be argued that this need for

new innovation to battle poor public image may have also influenced the police union. The final perspective, however, is that perhaps unions are not resistant to change. Rather, they could act as a stabilizing force in an environment of frequent leadership changes in both the organization and local politics. In this case, unions may also be acting as external and centrist forces. Unions could be gathering information from national outlets and recognize the value of new innovations such as COP.

The findings from this study should cause us to question what we think we know about unions. Unions are not solely local organizations and should be considered in a dual role as both internal and external actors. We need to more carefully examine their role in not only the adoption of innovation but within the institutional theory framework. Furthermore, while this research is far from conclusive, it will provide the groundwork for future research on understanding the innovation adoption and implementation processes.

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Introduction: The role of the ranks and file and police unions in police reform

Monique Marks and David Sklansky

The dominant mindset of police departments, police reformers, and police scholars—the dominant mindset, in short, of nearly everyone who thinks about policing and its problems—is, and always has been, that policing needs strong, top-down management. Good police officers are police officers who follow rules. Rank-and-file organizing is an obstacle to reform and sits uneasily beside the rule of law. Police departments are famously bureaucratic because they are necessarily bureaucratic. Even strong advocates for organized labor often lose some of their enthusiasm when it comes to law enforcement. It was not a great surprise, for example, when the International Labor Organisation (ILO) upheld, in 2003, the Argentine government's determination to curtail the right of the police to unionise and bargain collectively (ILO 2003)—notwithstanding the ILO's general commitment to freedom of association and collective bargaining as basic employment rights for employees in any democratic society (see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).

And yet suggestions have been made off and on for decades that rank-and-file police officers should have a greater collective voice in shaping the nature of their work. Sometimes the argument has sounded in management theory: participation in departmental decision-making will make officers more engaged and more committed, will lessen their opposition to reform, and will infuse managerial judgments with localized, hands-on knowledge of the day-to-day realities of policing. At other times the argument has sounded in civics: police are citizens and should be awarded the same rights as other citizens; police are most likely to respect and protect citizen rights if they themselves are afforded those rights—not only rights to speech and free association, but also rights to bargain collectively, and to fair and impartial adjudication of disciplinary allegations and workplace grievances. Democratic policing, it has been suggested, should entail a measure of workplace democracy for police officers (see Sklansky 2008; Marks and Fleming 2006b; Birzer 1996).

Those ideas are still outside the mainstream, but there are reasons to think they may be coalescing and gathering strength. A growing number of police executives borrow heavily from the rhetoric and practices of managers in other service sectors (Kiely & Peek 2002), and many of the ideas to which they are attracted call for greater flexibility, less hierarchical rigidity, and more openness to "bottom up" processes of decision-making. Police managers and leaders increasingly demonstrate "a predilection for articulating new philosophies, concepts and approaches to the provision of policing 'services'"; policing, some argue, now "meets the criteria of a 'performance culture', offers 'best value', advocates 'partnerships' with the communities policed, supports the

development of a new legal and political culture with 'human rights' at its core and is confident in its 'professionalism'" (Adlam 2002).

A familiar range of political, economic and social changes in policing have cast doubt on previously accepted managerial practices. Community oriented policing calls for more localized and flexible decision-making, which in turn requires recognizing and encouraging greater responsibility and initiative from police officers who work directly with communities (Goldstein 1979; Deukmedjian 2003). New governance arrangements throughout the industrialized world are less bureaucratic (or at least claim to be), and emphasize "partnerships" and "networks" (Fleming & Rhodes 2005). And public sector organizations are expected, increasingly, to have the virtues traditionally expected of large businesses: cost-effectiveness, financial accountability, objectively measured efficiency, and even competition and the marketization of services (Davies & Thomas 2001; Murphy 2004; O'Malley & Hutchinson 2006; Vickers & Kouzmin 2001). As one scholar puts it:

> Police executives are no longer managers of continuing organizational growth and service expansion, they are now confronted with inexorable political demands to find ways to cut costs, increase efficiency, improve productivity and demonstrate what is called "value for money". Pressured to abandon traditional quasi-military, bureaucratic police management models for more contemporary and efficient private-sector service management philosophies and strategies, modern police executives must now provide business-based planning models, argue the cost efficiency of various policing strategies and promote radical organizational change
> (Murphy 2004:2).

Faced with these challenges, police leaders, particularly in English-speaking, established democracies, are increasingly voicing scepticism about traditional, paramilitary organizational structures in law enforcement. A new, "soft HR discourse" emphasizes "a more relaxed, informal, caring and supportive organisation" (Davis & Thomas 2001:8). A range of police services have introduced "team leadership programmes" in an effort to let employees share their experiences and exchange ideas for improving how their jobs are structured (O'Malley & Hutchinson 2007).

Australian police leaders, by way of example, have for some years now been declaring a "new era" in law enforcement management. At a recent police leadership conference, John Murray, the then Chief Police Officer of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), argued for "a more democratic style" of police management (2002:15). He explained that:

> ...police leaders across the developed world have been forced to examine the appropriateness and efficacy of [the] traditional model for at least two reasons. The first is its inflexibility and consequently inability to meet the demands of efficiency effectiveness in an environment described as volatile as any competitive market... The second is the experience of many police leaders that the autocratic style of leadership and the strict enforcement of rules associated with the traditional model is at odds with the expectations of a modern workforce (Ibid.).

The AFP has in fact "flatten[ed]" its organizational structure, in an effort to extend "the concept of empowerment ... to all areas of the organization" and to "increase the

authority and decision making power of members from the lowest level up" (*Ibid.*:17). Along similar lines, "corporate governance committees" in the Victoria Police now formulate policy, set performance targets and budget priorities, and monitor organisational behaviour (Victoria Police 2004/2005). And in the United Kingdom, recruitment, selection and training of senior police officers has been completely revamped in an effort to foster "transformational leadership," marked by "participation, consultation and inclusion" (Sivestri 2007:39).

Old assumptions and new directions

All of these "developments" in policing management and organizational restructuring need to be taken with a grain of salt. Most of the evidence suggests that "traditional," "hierarchical," "authoritarian" styles of management persist in policing. (Silvestri 2007:54). Bureaucratic and even autocratic ways of doing things are "alive and well in police organizations" (Fleming & Rhodes 2005:194).

This is the case in both liberal democracies and within more authoritarian countries. It is plainly the case in South Africa, for example, where police leaders have reverted to extremely authoritarian management approaches. While a crucial component of the democratization of the South African Police in the mid 1990s was rank demilitarization, in recent years there has been a complete reversion to militarized ranking (and training) systems. At a symbolic level, the public police in South Africa have shifted from referring to themselves as a "service" to insisting that they be called the South African Police Force. The ranks of the police in South Africa today mirror those of the military, with the leader of the police taking on the title of "General" (see Marks and Wood 2010). All this has been defended in the name of enhancing discipline and effectiveness; the reformative programmes of community policing and more participatory management techniques which were viewed as crucial in the shift to "democratic policing" in South Africa have gone by the wayside.

Clifford Shearing provides an explanation for this easy slide into militarization within police organizations, even in police organizations that aspire to be innovative:

> ...resistance to change on the part of traditional police managers is not simply a blind, thoughtless clinging to the known and familiar...Rather it is a statement that the business of management must be concerned with enabling managers to control rank-and-file members at a distance by shaping the inner being of the officers who will be making discretionary decisions. Seen from this perspective, the resistance of traditional managers to the remedial approach is a claim that policing traditions require a style of management that focuses on the identities of rank-and-file officers as 'regulatory regimes' that can be used to control the existence of discretion (1992:22).

Rank-based authority is viewed by police managers as freeing them from the obstacles associated with "dissent, equivocation [and] debate" (Murray 2002:7), and there is a long tradition of thinking this kind of managerial freedom is especially important in policing.

Part of the explanation, particularly in the United States, is historical. At the very point in the twentieth century when interest in workplace democracy reached its zenith

—the late 1960s and early 1970s—American police departments seemed peculiarly inhospitable places for experiments in participatory management. Police officers at that time were almost uniformly white, male, and politically reactionary. Rank-and-file organizing was in fact on the rise, but it took unappealing and often frightening forms. Especially in the United States, a surge in police unionism in the United States was closely linked with fierce opposition to outside oversight, open contempt for civilian authorities, orchestrated brutality against political protesters, vigilante attacks on Black militants, and active membership far-right organizations. As a result, the very scholars and community activists who might otherwise have been most sympathetic to calls for participatory management of law enforcement agencies instead concluded that democracy required tight, top-down control of the police (Sklansky 2008).

By the end of the 1970s, when policing was among the most heavily organized of all public occupations, police unions had joined "the mainstream of American trade unionism," devoting the bulk of their attention to working conditions, job security, and the "bread-and-butter ... issues that have been near and dear to the hearts of U.S. trade unionists for decades" (Delaney & Feuille 1987: 301). But by then the damage had been done. The frightening forms taken by police activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s had dulled the appetite of virtually all scholars and police reformers for bringing workplace democracy to law enforcement. Even after the close of the 1980s, when community policing replaced politically insulated, technocratic "professionalism" as the reigning orthodoxy of police executives and police reformers alike, the "dominant form of policing" continued "to view police officers as automatons" (Goldstein 1990: 27).

It still does today. Encouraging patrol officers to be thoughtful and creative about their work is often said to be part of community policing, and even more so of problem-solving policing, but too often this means little more than placing additional discretion in the hands of individual officers. And the victory of community policing over technocratic, top-down professionalism is itself less than fully secured: recent calls for "intelligence-led policing" and "predictive policing" are, to a considerable extent, calls for a return to something very like the old, much maligned "professional model" (Sklansky 2011). Policing managerial strategies meant to simultaneously build accountability, team work and efficiency such as Compstat have often proved to be extremely top-down in nature (Eterno & Silverman 2006).

Some of the renewed enthusiasm for the professional model has to do with the worldwide economic downturn and the consequent tightening of public service budgets. Those pressures have given additional impetus to preexisting concerns in policing circles for "performance," "efficiency," and "value for money" (Murphy 2004; Gascón & Fogelsong 2010)—concerns that often lead practitioners and scholars, for better or worse, to view traditional, authoritarian patterns of police management more sympathetically. And police unions themselves have had varying, sometimes even contradictory responses to efforts to bring participatory management and other forms of shared workplace decision-making to policing. For all of these reasons, traditional, authoritarian patterns of police management are today competing with a range of less centralized, less hierarchical managerial ideas. What is apparent, however, is that space has been cleared for formulating new workplace arrangements as police leaders along with police unions and other rank-and-file associations struggle to respond to the changes around them (Paoline, Myers & Worden 2000; Kiely & Peek 2002; Marks 2007).

This book grows out of an international, cross-disciplinary conference on "police reform from the bottom up," hosted in 2006 by the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and co-sponsored by the Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice, the Center for the Study of Law and Society, and the Regulatory Institutions Network at Australian National University. Aimed at reexamining the role of rank-and-file officers and their representatives in police reform, the conference brought together a stellar collection of police scholars, police unionists, police executives, and representatives of identity-based police associations. The participants included well-established academics, justly famed for their path-breaking studies of policing, along with superb younger scholars, bringing fresh perspectives to old controversies.

The discussions in Berkeley were wide-ranging and spirited. There were many areas of disagreement—over the potential for police unions to adopt progressive agendas; over the ability of academics to fully grasp the daily realities of policing; over the degree to which police forces remain racist, sexist, and homophobic; and over the best ways to take advantage of the collective insights of rank-and-file officers.

The Berkeley conference was purposely comprised of academics and practitioners who shared at least some skepticism about the necessity and wisdom of rigid, top-down management in policing, but not all participants were equally resolute about increasing the individual and collective rights of the police. Nor were all the participants equally convinced about the possibility for reform from below or even from within police organizations. There was skepticism voiced, too, about the capacity for police unions to be forces for reform, rather than obstacles. For their part, some of the police unionists at the roundtable criticized existing policing scholarship as uninformed and simplistic. Nonetheless there was also striking consensus on a range of important points. Both the points of common agreement and the areas of disagreement are well illustrated in the contributions to this book.

The rank-and-file as change agents

The first and most important point of consensus is the extraordinary potential of bottom-up approaches to police reform. Outside of policing, three overlapping arguments are commonly made for involving employees in workplace decision-making: it heightens morale and commitment, it develops democratic skills and habits, and it makes for better decisions (see for example Wilms 1996). Each of these arguments can be applied to law enforcement and may, in fact, acquire special force in this context (Sklansky 2008) The morale of officers, and their commitment to the rule of law, are abiding problems in the policing of democratic societies, and the limited experience we have with participatory management in law enforcement suggests that here, as in other sectors, giving employees a say in the shaping of their work strongly increases their job satisfaction and their attachment to the organization's mission.

These points are pursued, in different ways, by each of the chapters in the first part of this book, addressing the potential of police rank-and-file as change agents. In their separate chapters, David Bayley, David Thacher and Hans Toch each emphasize how police decision-making could be improved by securing what John Dewey (1927: 217) would have called the "diffused and seminal intelligence" of the police rank-and-file. Bayley calls it "craft knowledge," Toch calls it "street knowledge," and Thacher calls it "context-specific, situated knowledge." It includes not only the kind of micro-level

sociological understanding all good officers acquire about their beats, but also, as Bayley and Toch each make clear, a hands-on feel for best practices, innovative ideas for improving those practices, and a thorough, nuanced understanding of their fellow officers—who can be trusted, who shirks responsibility, who cuts corners, who is prone to violence. Thacher argues, moreover, that line officers can collectively offer not only richer and more nuanced *answers* to central problems of policing, but distinctive and important *questions*—questions different than, and complementary to, the ones typically posed by police executives and typically pursued by scholars.

Bayley notes a handful of successful experiments involving the rank-and-file in police policy-making, in communities that include Madison, Houston, Toronto, Newport News, and Oakland. Yet Bayley makes no bones about his belief that most police reform is initiated from the top or from the outside. Toch expands on the oldest of these experiments, the one in Oakland, in which he himself was involved (see Toch & Grant 2005), and he also discusses a similar, more recent initiative in Seattle. The best way to build on these efforts, and to pursue the broader possibilities suggested by Thacher, may be through cooperative ventures between police scholars and police practitioners—more systematic attempts to foster the kind of collaboration that Toch pursued in Oakland several decades ago.

That at least is the suggestion of the remaining two chapters in Part One, each of which draws extensively on a case study of academic-police collaboration. One, by Jennifer Wood, Jenny Fleming, and Monique Marks, discusses an approach to conducting research with the police in Victoria, Australia, that taps into the knowledge of those police that are the "doers." Wood, Fleming and Marks explore the practical and normative importance of harnessing the dynamism of police officers at all levels in forging new practices and new ways of thinking within police organizations.

This is also a theme explored in the final chapter in Part One, by Brigitte Steinheider and Todd Wuestewald, discussing an experiment with "shared leadership" in the police department of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. Steinheider, an academic psychologist, and Wuestewald, the police chief in Broken Arrow, collaborated in developing and assessing the program, which has many points in common with the Austrian and British initiatives described earlier. It also resembles isolated, pioneering experiments with participatory management in policing carried out decades ago in the United States, notably in Oakland, California, in the 1970s (Toch & Grant 2005) and in Madison, Wisconsin, in the 1980s (Wykoff & Skogan 1994). But the Broken Arrow initiative was in some ways more thoroughgoing. While Wuestewald, as chief, retained control over operational, day-to-day decision-making, policy formulation is largely delegated to an employee steering committee.

It is an open question how broadly the results from Broken Arrow can be generalized—particularly to larger, more diverse cities and larger, more embattled police forces. But at a minimum the Broken Arrow initiative highlights a series of important questions that must be confronted in any effort to foster "bottom up" police reform, and it suggests some possible answers. First, how can rank-and-file participation in decision-making be harnessed while maintaining appropriate space for managerial flexibility and prerogative?

Broken Arrow provides one model for resolving this conflict—letting the chief decide what issues should be delegated to the "leadership team," but making the team's resolution of those issues binding. There may, of course, be other ways to strike this balance—some involving more radical challenges to management prerogative. Second,

what role, if any, should scholars and research institutions play in devising, implementing, and assessing new modes of police management? Again, the Broken Arrow initiative provides an intriguing model that may or may not work elsewhere. Third—a matter to which we will return momentarily—what role should police *unions*, and other organizations of rank-and-file officers, play in a system of "shared leadership"? In Broken Arrow, as in Madison, the police union was brought into the process of participatory management, with union officers sitting on the policymaking committee. Again, there may be other models—purposely preserving the oppositional character of police unions, for example, or drawing more heavily on identity-based police associations. Finally, if police departments and their subunits are viewed as laboratories where theories are tested, new practices are experimented with, and grounded policies are developed, how can those theories, practices, and policies best be evaluated and, where appropriate, exported to other police agencies?

Police unions and police reform

Part Two of this book focuses on one of the issues raised by the Broken Arrow experiment: the role of police unions in police reform. Management-structured exercises in participatory decision-making may compete to some degree with another path toward greater democracy within police organizations: clearing space for collective representation of rank-and-file officers. As Roy Adams suggests in his chapter, basic labor rights, including the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, can pose a profound challenge to traditional managerial prerogatives in police organizations. But affording police these basic rights, Adams argues, is important not simply because police are both workers and citizens, but also because it sensitizes the police to the importance of these rights for other groupings.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, police in most Western democratic countries have campaigned for their right to unionize and to bargain collectively. And indeed, in recent decades police unions "have become an increasingly prominent feature of the modern agency and its environment of interested parties" (Magenau & Hunt 1989:547). Despite initial resistance to the unionization of police - even in western liberal democracies - police unions have been remarkably successful in achieving benefits for their members (DeLord et al 2008). Their success has been achieved using what Freeman and Medoff (1984) would refer to as the "monopoly face of unionism": the face that focuses on raising wages over and above the market value and achieving above par conditions of service. Police unions in many countries enjoy membership levels of almost 100%, and they have become prominent "insiders" in the formulation of policing practices (Finnane 2002).

It is worth noting that while the trade union movement across the world is in decline, the police union movement is expanding, gaining strength, and slowly becoming more co-ordinated. Remarkably, these trends can be observed even in countries and regions still characterized by authoritarian rule. Southern Africa offers a particularly striking example. In February 2007, a group of Swaziland police officers came together—in violation of the law—to form a police union. Unsurprisingly, the Swaziland government refused to recognize the union and threatened its organizers with arrest (Nxumalo 2007). Also unsurprisingly, the police unionists turned for strategic and legal advice to South Africa's Police and Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), the region's oldest and most

firmly established police union, something of a signifier throughout Southern Africa for the possibilities of attaining social and labor rights for the police. At roughly the same time, the Mauritian Police Association approached POPCRU for assistance and support in their efforts to gain collective bargaining rights similar to those enjoyed by workers in other sectors, both public and private. These Southern African initiatives, while audacious for the region, are mirrored by efforts by police officers around the globe to increase their social and labor rights.

Since September 2006 police unions from Europe, North America, South Africa and Australasia have linked efforts through the International Council of Police Representative Associations (ICPRA). The ICPRA essentially operates as a network, and its member organizations have offered advice and support, for example, to the nascent police union in Swaziland, as well as to police officers from the Guardia Civil in Spain, whose rights have been limited by the Spanish government. The ICPRA is a significant network. The ICPRA was started by the Canadian Police Association (CPA) and now has approximately 1.5 million members affiliated through national police associations and federations. ICPRA membership includes police unions from four continents, speaking over 30 languages, connected through ICPRA. In 2010 the ICPRA was approached by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to develop a proposal for an initiative aimed at assisting police in countries which are in the process of democratizing to form robust police representative organizations. The UNDP is keen to support and partner in such initiatives in order to "test out" whether the democratization of police organizations impacts positively on democratic policing agendas.

Regional and international networks of police unions remain loosely constituted, however, in part because police unions themselves vary widely in their activities, their powers and privileges, and their understanding of their own roles. As Berry, O'Connor, Punch and Wilson explain, the nature of police unionism has been shaped by a range of factors that themselves vary from place to place. These factors include police and labor legislative frameworks; the national labor-management climate; broad police reform programs; the self-perception and external status of police officers as laborer or professionals; and the alliances that local police unions have struck with community groups and the broader trade union movement.

Partly as a result of these varying influences, and partly because members of police unions often are pulled in one direction as police officers and a different direction as unionists, police unions have reacted in complicated and sometimes contradictory ways to efforts to reform police management. They have campaigned for less authoritarian approaches to management, while at the same time opposing the importation of private sector mentalities and techniques. Police officers want to be consulted, they want to be included in organizational decision making and they want their individual contributions to be recognized. Yet, at the same time, police officers at all ranks attach cultural significance to police organizations as havens of discipline, restraint and authority.

In his contribution to this book, Samuel Walker describes the diversity of police unions in the United States as a microcosm of the fragmentation of the public police more broadly. At times, US police unions have pushed for democratic reform not just of the internal management of their agencies but also of police practices on the street. More often, however, they have been obstacles to reform: contesting civilian oversight bodies, for example, or stalling innovative reform projects. In a chapter complementing

Walker's, Mark Finnane argues that state police unions in Australia have become more and more alike, mounting similar challenges, adopting similar strategies, and mouthing similar rhetoric. Paralleling what Walker describes in the United States, though, Finnane observes that while police unions occasionally have been forward looking, for the most part their campaigns have been inward-looking and defensive.

As significant repositories and transmitters of law enforcement culture, police unions have the potential to refashion that culture, and policing along with it. But police unionists have been inclined to take their bearings—structurally, culturally, and normatively—from within the police organization (Marks 2007). There may be moments of dissidence but these are not often sustained. The primary identity of a police union member is as a police officer, not as a trade unionist or a social activist. For the most part, police unions have been fiercely protective both of officers' rights and of the professional distinctiveness of the public police; as a result, they have often served as insular and defensive upholders of the more traditional characteristics of police culture (Reiner 1992).

Police unions will always present a challenge from below, but since union members identify themselves primarily as police officers so too their union culture will always have a strong affinity with the parent culture of the police organization. Managers have experimented with new ways of governing police organizations (Wood & Dupont 2006), but police union leadership has been much less inclined to step into the vanguard of reform. Even so, there is nothing inevitable about the cultural influence of police unions, and simply branding them as "conservative," is a good deal too simplistic, particularly given their steady resistance to orthodox hierarchies. And when they stand up, as they not infrequently do, for the integrity of public policing as a form of public service, their voice can resonate with progressive voices emanating from a range of other public service trade unions and community based organizations.

The discussion of Britain's Black Police Association in the jointly authored chapter by Jan Berry, Greg O'Connor, Maurice Punch and Paul Wilson underscores the growing importance of identity-based associations of police officers, and the dramatic impact these organizations can have on the internal dynamics of law enforcement agencies. This is not a development limited to the United Kingdom. POPCRU's success owes something to its original status as an organization chiefly of *black* police and correctional officers, fully committed to the struggle against racial oppression in South Africa (Marks 2006). In the United States, organizations of minority police officers, women police officers, and—more recently—gay, lesbian and transgendered police officers have loosened up the internal politics of police forces, have made manifest the absence of a unified "police position" on a range of controversial issues affecting law enforcement, and have opened up reform possibilities previously blocked by monolithic police opposition. There are signs, too, that competition with identity-based associations may be pushing police unions to be more inclusive, more forward-thinking, and more open to proposals for police reform (Sklansky 2008).

Police culture, police organization and the possibility of change

The changing demographics within police organizations may offer a measure of hope on another score, as well. One longstanding ground for concern about giving police officers a larger, collective voice in the shaping of their work has been the police

occupational culture, long identified as a site of a host of intersecting and reinforcing pathologies, including racism, sexism, paranoia, intolerance, and violence. There are signs that the growing diversity of police workforces has made the workplace culture within police organizations less monolithic, more vibrant, and friendlier to democratic values (Sklansky 2008). But there are grounds for continued concern about the police organization culture, and there are reasons to think that police organizations and police culture still pose serious obstacles to enlisting rank and file officers in police reform.

These lingering obstacles, and countervailing grounds for hope, are the subjects taken up, in different ways, by each of the three chapters in the third and final part of this book, each written by an extraordinarily influential scholar of policing. Jerome Skonick, in his chapter, focuses on the lingering pathologies of organizational culture, revisiting his own, formative work on this subject (Skolnick 2011), and offering reasons for skepticism about the extent to which the culture has truly changed. The following chapter, by Wesley Skogan, catalogs the hurdles facing any effort at police reform—but especially, perhaps, one based on ideas that come from the bottom, rather than the top, of the law enforcement power structure.

Skogan reminds us, though, that police unions have not always been obstacles to reform. They have offered important support, for example, for community policing in Chicago—a process Skogan has studied in great detail (e.g., Skogan 2006). That experience underscores the capacity, as yet largely unrealized, for police unions and other associations of frontline officers, to be progressive voices for change. Yet there are examples of police unions that have given voice to progressive ideas and have been at the forefront of struggles for equality and justice. When POPCRU was formed in South Africa, its key objective was to tackle (at great cost to their individual members) police brutality and racism. The European Confederation of Police (an association of police unions across Europe) is committed to fairness and equal opportunities within the police service and has charted a democratic policing pathway (Eurocop 2004). The New South Wales Police Association in Australia played a critical role in assisting the Royal Wood Commission's investigation into police corruption. The New South Wales Police Association have also made extensive submissions supporting forward looking change in the New South Wales Police including calls for integrity testing and greater external oversight (Fleming and Lewis 2002).

If most police unions remain less progressive than these examples, that reality may owe something to the way in which rank-and-file officers have been frozen out of departmental decision-making (Kelling & Kliesmet 1996). There are grounds for hope, therefore, that giving officers a larger, collective voice in the shaping of their work may help make not only individual officers but also their bargaining representatives more invested in the overall goals of police reform—at least, again, under the right circumstances. As Marks and Fleming (2006b) remind us, it is important to bear in mind, that the face that police unions present is highly contingent on the political opportunity structures at the local, national, and global level; the characteristics of union members and supporters; the extent to which unions are viewed as valuable within networks of influence; the vision of union leaders; and the frameworks of international regulatory organizations, including the ILO.

While the dominant view may be that the ideal type police occupational culture dims the possibility of progressive police reform from the bottom up, there are aspects of police culture which might indeed spur on forward looking agendas. The shared

normative assumption held by many police officers that the world "out there" is a place of incivility could provide the impetus for unions to try develop violence reduction programmes within communities in order to make police work less onerous. And perhaps police work is an especially good place for experiments in workplace democracy, precisely because of the ways in which democratic practices lie latent in much of what we have long valued as good police work. At least this is the view defended by William Ker Muir in his contribution to this volume. Muir's chapter is animated by some of the same spirit found in his classic study of street level policing and the paradoxes of power in a democratic society (Muir 1977), and it closes this book with what we hope is a justified measure of optimism.

Towards a new research agenda

Collectively, the chapters in this book highlight a range of important questions for future research. We have already touched on most of these questions, but they bear repetition and reemphasis.

First, much remains to be learned about participatory management in policing—its successes, its failures, and its untapped possibilities. Steinheider and Wuestewald rightly invite tests of the Broken Arrow model in other police agencies. But other models deserve consideration or reconsideration, too—some implemented by innovative police leaders decades ago but now largely forgotten, others developed in sectors outside policing, and still others, no doubt, as yet unnoticed by scholars. Nor should we assume that past and present efforts, in policing or in other workplace environments, have exhausted the possible ways of structuring participatory management in policing. On the contrary: the tradition of rigid, top-down management remains so powerful in policing, and scholars and outside activists have so rarely mounted serious challenges to that tradition, that the possibilities for "bottom up" reform in policing remain largely unexplored. Fridell (2004) concludes, having conducted a large study of American police agencies very recently, that there has been little "de-layering" within police organizations in the years since the adoption of community policing' hierarchy and top-down control persist. Having said this, as Wood, Marks and Fleming explore in their chapter, it would seem that in Australia the leadership of the Victoria Police, through the nexus project, are committed to team management, partnership approaches to policing, and bottom up solving of policing problems.

There is no avoiding the difficulty of reconciling strong leadership with participatory forms of management, or the murky issue of the limits of "team leadership" in an organization that is operationally dependent on discipline and command responsiveness. But those limits may be far less restrictive than we generally think. Much of the current thinking about best practices in law enforcement, in fact, stresses the need for knowledge generation, responsiveness, and community networking at the bottom of police organizations. Then, too, the potential links between various forms of democracy inside police agencies and the democratic behavior of police officers on their beats deserve more attention than they have received. All of this suggests that policing scholars might profitably pay more attention to localized experiments with participatory management in policing, and to the possibilities for narrowing the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of new management approaches in policing.

It seems clear that bottom-up police reform, when successful, is rarely if ever entirely bottom-up. Rather it depends in part on enlightened leadership and on constructive engagement with outsiders. Bayley, Muir, Skolnick, and Toch all note the important role that progressive police chiefs have played in the handful of American departments that have systematically involved rank-and-file officers in policy-making. Wood, Fleming and Marks find the same thing in Victoria, Australia where innovation in management styles can be linked very directly to the visionary thinking of Commissioner Christine Nixon. The question we are left with as researchers is what happens to these management innovations when forward thinking chiefs exit?

Second, as Walker argues in his chapter, research on police unions remains embarrassingly thin. Given the large and growing role of police unions, it is surprising how little we know about how they operate; how similar or dissimilar they are; how they influence and are in turn shaped by workplace cultures in policing; how they alternately obstruct, facilitate, and redirect reform initiatives; and how they navigate the new fields of pluralized governance within which the police operate, and the simultaneous (even contradictory) pressures on the police to remilitarize and to perform as corporate entities. Berry, O'Connor, Punch and Wilson are right to suggest that unions and employee associations deserve much more attention in the analysis of current changes and future possibilities in policing. Finnane's chapter invites us to find out more about how committed the police unions (in Australia and beyond) are to change and to test out empirically whether or not there is a convergence of police union strategy and rhetoric within and across national boundaries. And Roy Adams plausibly suggests that the belief by many police leaders and policy makers that awarding police basic labor rights will lead to civil disorder and to a breakdown in police discipline may be unfounded; he sensibly calls for more research on the actual relationship between police labor rights on the one hand, and police effectiveness and respect for civil rights on the other.

Third and finally, running through much of this book is a broad set of questions about how the kinds of connections that police scholars, and their academic institutions, can profitably forge with police practitioners and *their* organizations—a broad set of questions, that is to say, about making real the aspiration to combine "police practice and research." The chapter by Steinheider and Wuestewald both discusses and illustrates the potential benefits of a partnership between a police department and a university. Police reform, Steinheider and Wuestewald suggest, can be locally and internally driven with academic researchers providing support, a different knowledge base, and methods for analysis and assessment. These are not novel claims, and the kind of collaboration found in the Broken Arrow initiative, although rarer than it should be, is far from unprecedented (Toch & Grant 2005). Bayley credits most of the successes of American police reform to the openness that law enforcement agencies have shown to outside researchers and to the proposals those researchers have developed, often in collaboration with innovative leaders inside policing.

Recently there has been somewhat of a surge in interest, globally, in the importance of developing research partnerships between police and academic researchers that are based on mutual respect for the knowledge that each partner brings to the collaboration—including, in particular, attention to needs and the insights of frontline officers. Two special criminology journal issues have been devoted to this particular topic. In 2010 Karim Murji was the guest editor of a special issue of *Policing* entitled "Academic-Police Collaborations – Beyond 'Two Worlds'". In his introduction, Murji states

that the objective of the special issue is for contributors "to reflect on their working relationships with the police in various jurisdictions, offering pointers about 'what works' in terms of methods, processes, and practices. All take a realistic view about what can be achieved and none try to oversell collaboration as a 'quick fix'" (2010: 92).

The *Policing* special issue follows a special issue of *Police Practice and Research* in 2009 (volume 11, number 2) which aims to break out of what it sees as a "dialogue of the deaf". Murji (2010) contends that discussions on police-academic collaborations have become somewhat of a sub-field of police studies. In both of these special issues, contributors have tried to configure ways in which police and academics can collaborate in ways that benefit both academics and the police, in terms of identifying relevant problems and solutions to policing dilemmas. But getting police and academic researchers to collaborate on somewhat equal terms is not a simple task given the radically different world outlooks (regarding valid knowledge and evidence) between academics and police practitioners. In this book, Wood, Fleming and Marks address the complexity of this research partnership. They make clear that the initiative in Victoria owes much of its success to its purposeful, systematic facilitation of collaboration between academic researchers and rank-and-file officers. And Thacher suggests that rank-and-file officers could have a large and positive effect on police reform simply by helping researchers reshape the kinds of questions they ask.

In contrast, there have been virtually no examples of partnering between academic institutions and police unions. Doubtless this reflects in part a large barrier of mutual mistrust. Scholars view police unions as reactionary, narrow-minded, inflexible bastions of law-and-order conservatism. Unions see academics as arrogant, ivory tower pontificators, insensitive to the reform weariness of police officers or to the real-world constraints that union leaders face in addressing the concerns of their members. We hope this book will help foster research partnerships between police unions and academics. The chapters of this volume illustrate both the robustness and the diversity of the police union movement; they show, too, the key role unions and other associations of rank-and-file officers have come to play in shaping police reform agendas. Forward-thinking police unionists recognize that scholars can help them address, in more reflective and proactive ways, the needs and concerns of their members in the ever-changing field of policing. The chapter in this book by Berry, O'Connor, Punch, and Wilson is, among other things, a provocative, pioneering model for this kind of collaboration.

The Berkeley conference that gave rise to this book was itself exciting and important, in large part, because of the links it forged and the conversations it opened up among scholars, police executives, police unionists, and representatives of identity-based police associations. We hope this volume demonstrates to its readers what the roundtable made clear to its participants: that "bottom up" processes of police reform offer enormous, largely untapped possibilities—but also enormous, largely unexplored challenges —in the continuing effort to make law enforcement fairer, more effective, and more consistent with democratic values; that police unions and other associations of rank-and-file officers have become indispensable, unavoidable, and poorly understood participants in the formulation of police policies and practices; and that police research and police practice both stand to gain from new, more systematic, and more cooperative efforts to understand the police workplace, its management, its increasingly manifold cultures, and its potential to participate in its own transformation.

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The human right of police to organize and bargain collectively

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The right to organize and bargain collectively is a well-established international human right. It is a right that is, however, withheld from police in several jurisdictions based on the theory that to allow police to unionize may threaten the internal security of the state. The available evidence indicates, however, that the fear and the restrictions flowing from it are of little merit and thus are undeserving of support.

Introduction

The right to organize and bargain collectively is a fundamental human right. What that means, according to the international human rights consensus, is that it is a right that is possessed by human beings solely as a function of their humanity (Howard & Donnelly, 1987). Human rights may neither be created by nor denied by governments or employers or other organs of society. Since police are human beings they have a fundamental right to organize and bargain collectively but it is a right that is neither well understood, nor well protected and enforced in many jurisdictions (Adams, 2006c). Police bargaining rights are commonly withheld or suppressed based on theory and emotional fears that have meager empirical support. There is, moreover, emerging evidence and thought that police are likely to act in a manner more consistent with democratic principles if they are treated with the dignity and respect called for by international human rights norms.

The human right to organize and bargain collectively

The right to organize and bargain collectively is a derivative from the broader right to free-dom of association which has been recognized as a fundamental right since early in the twentieth century (Adams, 2006c). Freedom of association was reaffirmed as a fundamental right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was proclaimed in 1948. The UDHR was a very general document that needed to be expanded and interpreted in order to provide useful guidance regarding legitimate rights-compliant behavior to states and other societal actors. Within the international system, the agency with the mandate to carry out that function is the International Labor Organization (ILO).

The ILO is a supra-national agency composed of states and representatives of trade unions and employer organizations (Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, & Swepston, 1996). Once a year delegates meet in Geneva to legislate global standards in the form of conventions and recommendations. State members are duty bound to consider those instruments with a view towards making them effective via domestic legislation. But

freedom of association, from which the right to organize and bargain collectively is derived, is included in the ILO constitution binding all members to respect those rights whether or not they have ratified the relevant conventions or legislated the pertinent recommendations.

There are two main conventions relevant to these rights: numbers 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize) and 98 (The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively). Although the language of those conventions does not apply directly to non-ratifying countries, the ILO has set up a Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) whose job it is to interpret the constitutional requirement. It does so by hearing complaints alleging violation of freedom of association. In rendering opinions about such allegations it is guided both by the language of Conventions 87 and 98 and by the jurisprudence that has accumulated over the years as a result of its decisions on past cases. By this process, all member states are, de facto, required to respect and implement the clauses of the two conventions. With respect to the right to organize and bargain collectively, as Rubin (2005, p. 120) notes, there is little difference between the responsibilities of states who have ratified the relevant conventions and those who have not. Over the years the CFA has issued opinions on over 2500 cases creating a rich jurisprudence. Those who want guidance on the responsibilities of the relevant parties in a wide variety of circumstances need only consult this body of jurisprudence.

Key principles

'All workers whatsoever' according to the language of Convention 87, have a right to organize, to select leaders, to develop a program to defend and forward their interests, and to make demands on their employers. In such circumstances employers have a duty to recognize and negotiate in good faith with their employees' representatives with a view towards arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to issues raised. Should negotiations fail the employees have a right to organize a campaign designed to produce concessions including withdrawing their labor in concert – in short they have the right to strike (Adams, 2006a). States have a responsibility to protect and promote these rights and duties and ensure that they are effectively honored.

That is the minimum on which workers everywhere should be able to rely. Needless to say these rights are not universally honored nor effectively protected but possession of rights and their enforcement are separate issues.

Balancing rights

There are many rights that are considered to be human rights and, as a result, in particular circumstances they may collide with each other. In such cases a 'balance' needs to be worked out and, in the international system, the ILO is considered to be the appropriate agency to fulfill that function with respect to labor rights. Thus, for example, all workers have a default right to strike but a strike by workers in certain key positions in society would put at risk the wellbeing of many people. For example, if all nurses or doctors refused to work the result might well be the loss of innocent lives. For people filling jobs considered to be essential for the public welfare the ILO has established that they may organize and bargain collectively but if that process reaches impasse the State should ensure that instead of the strike, they have an alternative dispute resolution mechanism available such as binding arbitration (Bartolomei de la Cruz et al., 1996). In short, the right to strike, which is considered by the CFA to be an essential aspect of the right to organize and bargain

collectively, may be withheld from some workers in order to ensure the right of citizens to the uninterrupted availability of essential services. But the ILO's list of essential jobs is short and the continuing right to organize and bargain meaningfully of those in those jobs is protected.

The International Labor Organization and police labor rights

Within the ILO orbit, despite the 'all workers whatsoever' clause in Convention 87, there is one class of employees that states may, without offending their commitment to the Organization, deny entirely the right to organize and bargain collectively: police and the military. The official justification for this exclusion is that unionization might compromise the responsibilities that police and the military have for the 'external and internal security of the state' (Rubin, 2005, p. 126; see also International Labour Office, 1994, p. 27). The ban on strikes that applies to other 'essential' workers is not considered a sufficient guarantee of the required services.

With respect to police, however, there is little evidence that a total prohibition of unionization and collective bargaining is necessary in order to ensure the state's internal security. Police are, in fact, permitted to unionize and bargain collectively in several countries. Police unionism is common, for example, in Europe, Australasia, Canada, the USA, and South Africa (Marks & Fleming, 2006).[1] Many of these countries are among the world's most highly advanced. Permitting police to organize in these countries, obviously, has not compromised the internal security of the state.

The South African case is notable in that it is a country in transition in which the authorities might be expected to be more apprehensive about the supposed hazard of independent unionism than those in countries more settled politically. However, a robust police union movement has not destabilized the South African state but has, it appears, become part of an emerging democratic culture (Marks & Fleming, 2006).

The Canadian case

The situation in Canada is of special note because it provides a naturally existing test of the validity of the concern. Police generally across the country are permitted to organize and bargain collectively. In some provinces police are permitted to strike but in others impasses are required to be settled by reference to conciliation and arbitration (Forcese, 1980; Kinnear, 1998). The one exception is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (Lynk, 2006; MacKay, 2003). The RCMP is a federal police force but also provides police services to several provinces and municipalities on contract. About half of RCMP officers are assigned to municipal policing duties but while their counterparts are permitted to organize and bargain, they are not (Kinnear, 1998).

A Federal Government Order-in-Council issued in 1918 (P.C. 1918 – 2213) forbade members of the RCMP from becoming 'a member of or in any wise associated with any Trades Union Organization ...' Contravention of that regulation was 'cause for instant dismissal.' The rationale for the exclusion was a fear that unionization would result in 'divided loyalty' between officers' allegiance to their fellow members and their required obedience to superiors. The government wanted to ensure that the officers remained loyal and obedient to their commanding officers. This fear was of particular concern in relation to labor unrest. The government was concerned that the officers might refuse to obey a command to subdue labor uprisings (MacKay, 2003, p. 18).

The period in which the Order was issued was one of serious labor unrest in several countries. Inflation stemming from the cost of World War I eroded the purchasing power of workers who organized in protest. In some countries labor demonstrations grew into general revolution and the fall of monarchies in Russia, Germany, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Adams, 1995). In the USA the Seattle General Strike and the Boston Police Strike of 1919 and in Canada the Winnipeg General Strike, which also occurred in 1919, were all interpreted by some observers as radical events that might spark similar widespread social upheaval (Juris & Feuille, 1973; Schrag, 1992). Although the Winnipeg General Strike came after the Order-in-Council of 1918, in conjunction with the Boston Police Strike, it no doubt helped to perpetuate the fears that gave rise to the Order (Kinnear, 1998). In Winnipeg city police joined the strikers and put themselves under the command of the strike committee. Although little violence and disorder occurred in that case, in Boston the strike resulted in broadly publicized looting and violence (Schrag, 1992). The combination of these events helped to cement in the minds of policymakers fear of an unlikely conjunction of events that would result in general disorder putting at risk the security of the state.

In the 1960s and 1970s, public sector employees in Canada grew militant and pressured governments to extend full collective bargaining rights to them and most were successful. Within the RCMP a movement began to form a union but it was not successful (Forcese, 1980). The 1918 Order-in-Council had been reinforced in 1945 with the adoption by Parliament of the *Rules and Regulations for the Government and Guidance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Force of Canada*.[2] In 1967 the *Public Service Staff Relations Act* granted bargaining rights to most federal employees but explicitly excluded members of the RCMP (Lynk, 2006). In response to a growing consensus that public sector employees have a right to organize and growing pressure from within the ranks of the RCMP for representation, Order-in-Council 1918 – 2213 was rescinded in 1974. However, instead of replacing it with genuine, independent collective bargaining similar to that of other essential workers and provincial and municipal police officers, it was replaced instead by a Staff Relations Representative Program. The program which provides for consultation between government officials and RCMP representatives is entirely controlled and regulated by the government (Lynk, 2006). Although it has been accepted by many RCMP officers (MacDougall, 2000), it provides for no impasse resolution devise. In short, it does not meet ILO independence standards and members of the RCMP continue to agitate for genuine, ILO-compliant legislation (see, e.g., *Delisle v. Canada*, 1999; Kinnear, 1998; Adams, 2007b).

Although fears about the possible ill effects of 'divided loyalty' continue to provide the justification for the government refusal to recognize the right of RCMP officers to ILO-compliant unionization,[3] 'divided loyalty' is not an issue with respect to unionized provincial and municipal police. Although there have been many actual and threatened police strikes, the breakdown of civil order has not happened or has been quickly restored when it has occurred such as during the Montreal Police Strike of 1969.[4] Since the events in the post-World War I era there have been few incidents in which the 'security of the state' might credibly have been said to be seriously threatened (Forcese, 1980; Lynk, 2006).

The inevitable conclusion from these considerations is that the rationale for the denial by government of the right to organize and bargain collectively of police officers is without empirical support. A set of circumstances might conceivably appear in which the worst fears of police unionism opponents would materialize. But the same might also be said about the radicalization of any class of workers. Labor-inspired revolutions occurred in Russia, Germany, and Austria in the World War I era, and in more recent years in Poland and South Africa, not because of the disloyalty of the police and military but rather because of mass labor uprisings against fatally flawed governments. Good government, responsible to the

general welfare, would appear to be the best defense against labor unrest and social upheaval. Even if police services are deemed to be essential (and that case has not been convincingly made) there would appear to be no substantial reason why police cannot be effectively regulated in a manner similar to other essential workers – that is, by permitting them to organize and bargain collectively but substituting binding arbitration for the right to strike. The suppression of the human right of police to independently organize and bargain collectively stems largely from emotional fears based on imagined scenarios that are unlikely to materialize.

In North America the quashing of the rights of police to organize and bargain collectively is made easier as a result of conventions under which collective bargaining is regarded as an ordinary political issue rather than a human right (Adams, 2006b). Although the right, as discussed above, has been heralded internationally as a human right on the same plane with the right to equality regardless of color, sex, or religion, the right to freedom from forced labor, the right of children to freedom from exploitation, the right to a fair trial, the right to vote, and other fundamental rights, in Canada and the USA it has not been recognized as an equivalent human right.[5] Despite having promised solemnly in the international arena to protect and promote collective bargaining as a human right both Canadian and American governments remain formally neutral regarding its exercise. Nor do they object when employers actively oppose unionization and collective bargaining as they would if voices were raised against employment equity or in support of child or forced labor (Adams, 2006b).

Their position with respect to the exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively stems from a conception of the employment relationship that is, as I have recently argued, at sharp odds with the conception inherent in the work of the ILO and the international human rights community (Adams, 2006a, 2006b). In North America the default employment relationship is an individual one between the employee or prospective employee and the employer, commonly an enterprise of some size. The enterprise is seen to have a right to offer the prospective employee terms that may be accepted or rejected. The employee may also negotiate for terms better than those offered but, as many observers have noted, the bargaining power of the worker in most instances is likely to be much inferior to that of the corporation and thus the negotiations are likely to be very one sided. But there is another, less often remarked, problem with this default conception. The human resource policies of nearly all enterprises of any size are, today, rationalized and standardized. Terms and conditions are applied to classes and thus cannot be individually negotiated. For example, in most cases every employee covered by the firm's pension plan is subject to common regulations and may not individually negotiate variations.

With respect to unionization, the dominant corporate attitude in Canada and the USA is that if, in the words of Wal-Mart's *Manager's Toolbox for Remaining Union-Free*, employees are satisfied with the way that they are being managed, there is no need for a union (Adams, 2005). In short, the availability of unionization is like an insurance policy against bad management. If managers treat employees with respect and provide them with fair and equitable conditions they should not turn to an outside intermediary to represent their interests. The relationship between management and employees is conceived of as a unitary one. There is a single social system in which those involved have different, but not adversarial, roles. When the union enters, this social system is shattered to be replaced by a whole new adversarial regime. An 'outside organization' is said to come between management and workers. To unionize is to engage in a sort of rebellion against the established order. It is conceived of as a radical rejection of managerial competence.

This vision has taken such firm root that, although surveys indicate that the large majority of workers want workplace representation, many are unwilling to act on that desire for fear that the result will be worse employment relations. In 2003, in the USA, the Hart survey organization asked a sample what they believed was the 'biggest disadvantage to having a union.' Some 38% of the respondents said 'having worse relations between employees and management …' (Freeman & Rogers, 2006, p. 17).

The ILO's vision is entirely different from the one promoted by management interests. From the ILO's perspective, collective bargaining is a necessary element of all democratic, human rights respecting societies. It is the economic counterpart to political democracy and thus collective bargaining for all workers for whom it is relevant should be society's goal. Working under rules unilaterally imposed (even if they are substantively acceptable) is, it is hypothesized, also bad for political democracy. Being compelled to function within autocratic structures on a daily basis may well make workers more likely to tolerate non-democratic processes in society as a whole. One study of the relationship between unionization and political participation in the USA found a positive link between union membership and likelihood to vote (Radcliff, 2001). With respect to police specifically, the case has recently been made by Marks and Fleming (2006) that unionized police are more likely to respect the rights of citizens and less likely to resort to tactics that offend basic rights.

In addition to fostering acceptance of undemocratic political practices, working within autocratic enterprise governance systems also compromises one's dignity. One's material welfare as well as sense of self-worth is closely connected to one's salary, benefits, job security, promotional opportunities, and personal relationship with fellow workers. If all of those features of one's life are removed from one's control then one is in a position that is not much advanced from that of slaves or serfs (Adams, 2006c). In such circumstances, it has often been remarked, labor is treated not as human but rather as a commodity in the production process. Although a benevolent employer or market forces may result in acceptable material rewards the personal indignity of being subject, unilaterally to the will of another, to be regarded as a thing, adheres. One assertion behind the idea of collective bargaining as a human right is that such a status is unacceptable in any decent society. Human dignity requires that human beings maintain control of their lives; it requires that they do not acquiesce to situations in which key aspects of their lives are unilaterally imposed upon them by others. Human beings in respectful relationships naturally negotiate issues of mutual concern. From this perspective, the absence of collective bargaining in any employment situation is prima facie problematic. The goal of any society that embraces the notion of collective bargaining as a human right is near universal collective representation. However, in both Canada and the USA as well as many other countries, conventions have taken hold that justify autocratic enterprise governance and thus weaken democratic norms.

Conclusion

If a strong global norm is to be established in support of respect for human rights then the default behavior with respect to any group of citizens must be compliance. Only in those situations where clear evidence of a clash of rights exists may constraints be legitimately applied. With respect the right of police to organize and bargain collectively, that evidence does not exist. Instead, the outlawing of police unionism is based on theory and emotional fears that are poorly supported by the empirical record. The formal justification for treating police differently from other 'essential' workers is that independent police organization may

compromise the stability of the state. That justification is apparently based on imagined scenarios that the record indicates are highly unlikely to occur. There are very few examples of situations where police, organized or otherwise, have failed to uphold the integrity of the state. Instead, the empirical record suggests that treating police with dignity and respect by recognizing and bargaining in good faith with their chosen representatives is good public policy. Both theory and available evidence suggests that doing so may well strengthen rather than weaken democratic norms.

Acknowledgement

Notes

1. In its 1994 survey of the state of Freedom of Association in the world, the ILO mentioned that legislation in all of the following countries permitted police to unionize and bargain collectively: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, UK, and the USA (Rubin, 2005, p. 126). However, the classification of some of these countries is questionable. For example, the Police Federations in the UK are established and closely regulated by law and would not seem to meet the ILO test of independence. In the US State Department's annual review of human rights some of the African countries on the list (Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi) are identified among those who legally forbid police unionism.
2. *Rules and Regulations for the Government and Guidance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Force of Canada* (1945) 79 *Canada Gazette* 1577, s. 31(a).
3. As a result of the *Delisle v. Canada* decision (op. cit.) the Commissioner of the RCMP in 2003 removed the explicit prohibition against officers being members of independent associations and associations have formed in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec (Lynk, 2006, pp. 27–28 and 73). However, with government approval, RCMP management continues to recognize the SRR as the exclusive mechanism for establishing terms and conditions of employment (Lynk, 2006, p. 73). As a result, as Lynk notes 'While these groups show that the mere act of coming together in association can and has occurred to some extent, they also show how very far they are from any meaningful freedom of association, particularly when judged against other police associations and unions' (2006, p. 73). The legal situation changed substantially in Canada in 2007 when the Supreme Court interpreted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as containing a right to bargain collectively that applies directly to governments. Subsequent to the decision, the RCMP management once again rejected a request from an independent association of RCMP officers for recognition for bargaining purposes. In response the association has filed a court case that has not yet been settled (see Adams 2007b).
4. Disruption and rioting did result from a police strike in Montreal in 1969 but order was quickly restored. See http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-1805-12238-10/on_this_day/conflict_war/twt. Moreover, the strike was a wildcat strike which means that it occurred without the sanction of either law or internal union requirements. Throughout history, wildcat strikes have frequently occurred in situations where there was no official union or bargaining procedure in effect. Thus, although outlawing unions might make the occurrence of a wildcat strike less likely, it is not an effective method of prevention.
5. In law the situation changed significantly when in 2007 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized collective bargaining to be both a constitutional right and a human right. In a decision generally unexpected by the legal community it overturned 20 years of jurisprudence during which the Court deferred to legislatures on labor issues (see Supreme Court of Canada, 2007 and Adams 2007a).

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State & Local Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights

Law Enforcement Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act

Background: Throughout the country, many states lack coherent guidelines and procedures for law enforcement departments to follow to protect law enforcement officers' due process rights.   Sworn law enforcement officers are held to an extremely high standard of personal and professional conduct, due to the enormous responsibilities they exercise.   However, many officers are denied the same basic due process rights that all other citizens enjoy.   In approximately fifty percent of the states, officers enjoy some legal protections against false accusations and abusive conduct.   However, this leaves hundreds of thousands of officers with limited or no due process or who face limitations or retaliation when exercising these rights.

In addition, sometimes individuals are reluctant to file a complaint against an officer, perceiving correctly or incorrectly that management will not take the complaint seriously and conduct an inquiry.   Often departments lack any guidelines and procedures for handling and investigating complaints, thus raising doubts about officer accountability.

If enacted into law, the "Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights" would provide officers with the following:

- Officers would have the right to engage in civic activity and would not be prohibited from running for elective office because of their profession.
- Departments would have to establish effective procedures for receipt, review, and investigation of law enforcement and other complaints against law enforcement officers.
- If disciplinary action is foreseeable, officers would be notified of the investigation, the nature of the alleged violation, the eventual outcome of the inquiry, and the recommendations made to superiors by the investigators.
- Questioning of a law enforcement officer would be conducted at reasonable times, preferably while the officer is on duty, unless exigent circumstances apply.
- Questioning of the law enforcement officer would take place at the offices of those conducting the investigation or at the place where the officer reports to work, unless the officer consents to another location.
- A single investigator would question officers, and the officer would be informed of the name, rank, and command of the officer conducting the investigation.
- Officers could not be threatened, harassed, or promised rewards to induce the answering of any question.
- Officers under investigation would be entitled to have legal counsel or any other individual of their choice present at the questioning.
- Officers would be entitled to a hearing, notification in advance of the date of the hearing, and access to transcripts and other relevant documents and evidence generated by the hearing. The officer would also be entitled to be represented by legal counsel or another representative at the hearing.
- Officers could obtain declaratory or injunctive relief in state or federal court for violations of this law, including retaliation for the exercise of these or any other rights under federal, state, or local law.
- Officers would have the opportunity to comment in writing on any adverse materials placed in his or her personnel file.
- There would be defined 'just cause' factors to be considered by the hearing officer or board for an officer to be found guilty or liable for disciplinary action; and mitigating factors would also be noted, which could reduce the severity of the disciplinary action.
- This law would only preempt those provisions in state, county, or municipal laws, which provide lesser officer protection, but would not preempt those providing equal or greater protection.

NAPO'S Position: NAPO recognizes a serious need for the implementation of standards and procedures to guide both state and local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement officers during internal investigations, administrative hearings, and evaluation of citizen complaints. Too often law enforcement officers are subjected to the whim of their departments or local politics during internal investigations and administrative hearings.   NAPO also supports the implementation of standards to guide law enforcement agencies in developing and operating a fair and effective investigative process. Individuals should have the right to file a complaint, to have the complaint investigated, and to be informed of its final disposition, including learning the outcome of the investigation and any resulting disciplinary action.

Consequently, NAPO has actively fought for the enactment of this legislation since 1990. In consultation with attorneys representing law enforcement officers, NAPO has worked tirelessly with Congress and other national interest groups to support this legislation.

Protecting Public Safety Officers' Social Security Benefits

The Social Security Fairness Act

Background: In the 1980s, Congress enacted the Government Pension Offset (GPO) and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) because it was concerned Social Security paid unintended benefits to workers who had spent most of their careers in "non-covered" jobs. However, these formulas go too far and penalize workers with split careers who contributed a great deal to Social Security but retired under their "non-covered" pensions.

GPO reduces public employees' Social Security spousal or survivor benefits by two-thirds of their public pension, and often leads to negative effects on law enforcement officers' retirements. If a spouse who paid into Social Security dies, the surviving public safety officer would normally be eligible for half of the deceased's benefit. However, if the surviving law enforcement officer had not been paying into Social Security while working, the GPO requires that this amount be offset by two-thirds of the survivor's pension, eliminating most or all of the payment. Because of their profession, many law enforcement officers do not pay into Social Security; however, if they had not served at all, they would receive the full allotment of the spousal survivor benefit.

In addition to GPO, public safety employees are also adversely affected by WEP. Although most law enforcement officers retire after a specific length of service, usually while in their early to mid-fifties, many look for new opportunities to serve their communities. Yet, when they retire from a non-Social Security paying job and move to one that does pay into Social Security, they are penalized by WEP. Instead of receiving their rightfully earned Social Security retirement benefit, their pension heavily offsets it, thus vastly reducing the amount they receive.

GPO and WEP were intended to be "leveling" responses, but their result has been to hurt public safety officers. Nine out of ten public employees affected by GPO lose their entire spousal benefit, even though their spouses paid into Social Security for many years. WEP causes hard-working public safety officers to lose the benefits they earned themselves, thus punishing those who selflessly serve and protect our communities.

Law enforcement officers and public employees across the United States are concerned about their retirement security and the impact of GPO and WEP. While NAPO continues to advocate for full repeal of the GPO and WEP, we understand there are significant fiscal challenges associated with this effort. We therefore worked closely with other public sector organizations to find common ground on meaningful and effective WEP reform – the Public Servants Protection and Fairness Act – which would protect the hard-earned retirement of our officers.

The Social Security Fairness Act would repeal the GPO and WEP formulas currently used to calculate Social Security benefits.

NAPO Position: The loss of income caused by GPO and WEP is a financial strain on law enforcement officers and their families, an additional strain that those who spent their careers on the front lines protecting our nation's communities do not need. By significantly scaling back and reducing Social Security benefits for law enforcement officers, as GPO and WEP do, officers and their families are shut out from even the modest retirement that Social Security benefits can provide.

Sheriff Mark Napier

Sheriff, Pima County, AZ

Sheriff Mark Napier was elected as the 34th Sheriff of Pima County on January 1, 2017. He started his law enforcement career in December of 1981 as a police officer in Iowa. He was hired by the Tucson Police Department in 1987, eventually retiring as a captain. He then served as the Assistant Director for the Glendale Arizona Police Department and worked for the Department of Justice as a peer reviewer on federal grant programs. Sheriff Napier is a decorated law enforcement leader. He has received the Medal of Merit twice, the Medal of Service, the Chief of Police Citation of Excellence, the Unit Medal, the Retirement Medal and the Magnus Leadership Medal. He serves as a member of the Executive Committees of the Arizona Joint Terrorism Task Force, Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and Major County Sheriffs of America and is also a member of Unified Command of the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats. He is currently the elected Vice President of both the Major County Sheriffs of America the Arizona Sheriffs Association. Sheriff Napier holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Social Psychology from Park University and a Master's Degree from Boston University in Criminal Justice. For the past 15 years, he has taught for the online Masters of Criminal Justice Program at Boston University. He has been married to wife Marlene for 36 years and has four adult children, one of which is a current Tucson Police Officer, and two grandchildren

A Discussion of the Implementation of a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) under President Trump's Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice

Presented by:
Mark D. Napier
Sheriff – Pima County Sheriff's Department

Introduction

As you know, the last time there was a Presidential Commission to examine law enforcement and the administration of justice was under President Johnson's administration in 1967. A byproduct of the efforts of that Commission was the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was a U.S. federal agency established pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. It was a part of the U.S. Department of Justice. The LEAA was responsible for administering the federal funding to state and local law enforcement agencies. It administered the funding for educational programs, research, state planning agencies, and local crime initiatives. The LEAA was abolished in 1982. This sticks in my mind at a personal level, as I became a law enforcement officer in December of 1981.

In the strongest terms possible, I urge consideration of reestablishment of an LEAA as part of the current efforts of the Commission. The original concept was given birth out of the turbulent times of the 1960's. There was distrust of law enforcement and an increase in violence. Further, there was the recognition that steps needed to be undertaken to professionalize the nation's local law enforcement. Finally, we understood that research needed to be conducted both at the academic and practitioner level into how to best implement law enforcement's effort to control crime and the ability of the criminal justice system to administer justice at a macro level. This was a good idea in 1968 and for the very same reasons is a good idea in 2020.

Funding a new LEAA will provide the platform for addressing many current challenges facing law enforcement. Among these, and perhaps the most challenging, is recruiting and retention. This is a national problem that must be addressed. We know that society looks to law enforcement for very different services presently. We have been called upon to address mental health issues in our communities and confront dangerous drug addiction with the associated overdoses. We are largely ill equipped to address these things in a meaningful way. Law enforcement leadership hungers for unbiased research that will help guide best practices so that we may more effectively lead our personnel and provide service to our community. The millennial generation officer is fundamentally different from the baby boom generation officer. Yet, we still recruit, train and attempt to retain them in the same manner. This is not working. Finally, we have to confront law enforcement officer mental health and wellness issues. The rising incidence of law enforcement suicide is shocking. We are killing ourselves at 3 to 5 times that rate that criminals are killing us. A commitment to a new LEAA can address these challenges.

Under the prior LEAA was the LEEP (Law Enforcement Education Program). This program allowed approximately 100,000 law enforcement officers to obtain undergraduate and graduate

degrees at more than 1,000 institutions of higher learning. Well-rounded formal education is more critical now to the function and professionalism of law enforcement than it ever has been. LEEP was an excellent program under the prior iteration of LEAA. It must be a part of its rebirth.

I recommend the President's Commission adopt the following with a commitment by the government for sustained funding over a ten-year period. To implement solutions without commitment to sustain them will neither inspire confidence in them nor make them effective.

Challenges: Recruitment, retention, professionalization

Recommendation: LEAA – LEEP Law Enforcement Education Program

This program would reimburse law enforcement personnel of state, local and county agencies 75% of the cost of tuition for course work in pursuit of an undergraduate or graduate degree at any accredited institution of higher learning. The program would be administered by the LEAA under the LEEP, meaning that requests for reimbursement would be made directly to the LEAA and then disbursed directly to the law enforcement personnel. This would be reported on IRS form 1099-MISC. This ensures no interference or lack of support by the personnel's agency or local governing body.

Through a simple IRS rule change, the remaining 25% of tuition costs and the cost of books/supplies would be reported on the personnel's tax return and subject to a "Life Long Learning" tax credit, even if the individual did not itemize deductions. Thereby, the net costs of pursuing education would be at/near zero. Personnel would have to claim the reported reimbursement as income (1099-MISC), which would be subject to tax during that reporting year. This would have a nominal impact.

Participating personnel would file an initial application for acceptance into the program part of which would be an affidavit stating that in consideration for participation in the program he/she would remain employed by a state, local or county law enforcement agency for a period of three (3) years following the final reimbursement payment. This assures the system of some return on investment. Additionally, the longer personnel maintain employment in law enforcement the less likely they are to make a complete career change. Obtaining a college degree while working fulltime as a law enforcement officer is now feasible. Nearly all institutions offer degrees completely on-line.

This program would be very attractive to millennials and those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds as it provides a near no cost method to obtain a college degree. This would obviously have a very positive impact on recruiting. The burden of college debt is overwhelming this generation and is not sustainable. I can think of no other single effort that would have greater impact on law enforcement's ability to recruit personnel. Further, those personnel would be highly motivated to provide sustained good service as doing so would be the pathway to a college degree while making a living as a law enforcement officer. The broader benefit would be making higher education available to those to whom it might otherwise be unavailable.

This program would also have a positive impact on retention. Assume an officer spends four years obtaining an undergraduate degree and then is required to remain in the field for an additional three years. He/she now has at least seven (7) years in this career field. By this time, compensation is generally competitive as it increases over time with tenure. Personnel

are also becoming eligible for promotion and special assignments outside patrol duties. With time, personnel are less likely to leave and the nature of employment in law enforcement becomes somewhat more attractive.

The impact on professionalization of our personnel should be obvious. A workforce with formal education better meets the aforementioned challenges faced by law enforcement personnel and evolving societal expectations. Education enhances perspective on complicated issues that increasingly transcend traditional law enforcement interventions. An educated law enforcement officer also engenders more community confidence/support. He/she is better able to communicate with a diverse population and has an increased understanding of social strains, racial inequities and disparities in the criminal justice system.

There are substantive and compelling reasons that we should reestablish the LEAA with a commitment to LEEP.

Challenges: Best Practices, Criminal Justice Research, Officer Wellness

Recommendation: LEAA Research Grant Program

There is inadequate funding for substantive research into the development of best practices for law enforcement leaders confronting modern policing challenges. Additionally, there is very limited research into officer wellness, causes of officer suicide and suicide prevention. The LEAA should make available substantive funding over a period of ten years for meaningful law enforcement research.

Problematic in past research efforts is the fact that these are often guided by academic institutions or public policy think tanks. While perhaps well-intended efforts the research results often are somewhat divested from operational realities and recommendations could be difficult/impractical for law enforcement leadership to actually implement. The LEAA Research Grant Program should require any funded research be a collaborative effort between an academic institution and law enforcement leadership. No one entity could apply for funding on its own. This would require academic institutions and public policy think tanks to engage practitioners to ensure that the products of any research are practical, meaningful and organizationally feasible. On the other side, this would require law enforcement leadership to collaborate with others to bring an academic foundation and credibility to research findings and implementation recommendations. This has to be a collaborative effort. One working without the other is simply ineffective.

Research funded under this LEAA program would have to yield concrete recommendations. Too often, research has left us to consider the deliverable report or recommendations as interesting, perhaps even compelling, but lacking in actionable items that have expected follow up. An even worse outcome is that the research is slanted by political and/or social ideologies. In other words, research in search of a predetermined answer. Thoughtful required collaboration between academics and practitioners should address some of these concerns. All research must yield actionable recommendations the implementation of which is tracked over time. If you do not have unbiased research that yields actionable recommendations, what is the point?

Under this program, research could be focused on the following areas:

- Best Practices
    - Address of racial disparities in the criminal justice system
    - Control of gun violence
    - Outreach and communication to minority communities
    - Law enforcement relations with minority communities
    - Criminal justice reform
    - Control and suppression of violent crime
    - Drug enforcement and education
    - Address of the opioid crisis
    - Border security and immigration issues at a local level
    - Hiring, recruiting and retention
    - Domestic violence intervention and education
    - Policing special populations
    - Women in law enforcement
- Officer Wellness
    - Suicide risk factors and prevention
    - Mental health resources for law enforcement
    - Removal of the stigma associated with seeking mental health treatment in law enforcement
    - Expectations of millennials in law enforcement
    - Support for families of law enforcement officers

All research conducted in these areas would require a collaborative effort of academics and practitioners to be funded. Research reports, findings and recommendations would be co-branded.

Under this program, special consideration should be given to mid and small sized law enforcement agencies. These are often left out of this type of research and little thought given to a best practices model for that type of agency. Dominated by most research is a focus on larger agencies with significant resources. Recommendations involving the development of task forces, focus groups and deployment of personnel may be realistic for an agency with 1000 sworn members, but completely unrealistic for an agency of 50 sworn members. Smaller law enforcement agencies have very real crime control problems that affect their communities. Perhaps it is not as dramatic as a rise in homicides or as compelling as gang violence. However, these problems are impactful to the quality of life in that community that law enforcement is expected to address.

Finally, grant applications under this program must be streamlined enough that smaller agencies with less staff resources could submit a successful application. On three separate occasions, I served as a Peer Reviewer for the Department of Justice on federal grant programs. I continually saw awards being recommended for very large agencies. This was primarily because the agency had capable grant writers on staff. The complexities of the grant application process to some degree excluded smaller and less sophisticated agencies from any chance of being successful due to complexity of the solicitation and the strict scoring requirements for funding recommendations. If this program is viewed as simply another effort to dump resources to large agencies it will not enjoy the support it could. We need to remember that large agencies are not the norm. Most law enforcement agencies are in fact relatively small.

Closure

I feel very strongly that part of the President's Commission final report must include a recommendation for the reestablishment of a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This concept paper is simply an illustration of how the LEAA and LEEP might focus its efforts. It would be a travesty to have 50 years pass since the last Presidential Commission and miss one of the previous commission's most important contributions to the law enforcement community. The LEAA and LEEP are needed now as much, if not more, than it was then.

Of significant benefit to our current efforts would be the lessons learned from the prior LEAA. It is clear that it was not as successful as it might have been. We benefit now from the many autopsies of the prior LEAA shortcomings. Among these is the *LEAA/OJP Retrospective: 30 Years of Federal Support to State and Local Criminal Justice (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996).* I have attached this document to my written testimony for review. This retrospective outlines some of the controversies associated with the prior LEAA. Among these were politics, funding approaches, planning and relevance to state and local needs. All of these controversies and corresponding shortcomings are entirely avoidable. This new effort must be disentangled from partisan politics, bureaucratic complexities and the inadequacy of a block grant funding approach. We need to ensure that both the research efforts of LEAA and the administration of LEEP are not grounded in Washington, DC but rather in response to the needs of main street law enforcement agencies across the country.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Commission and to provide this written testimony. Let us not miss the opportunity to do something truly important.

Sheriff Mark D. Napier
Pima County Sheriff's Department
Vice President Major County Sheriffs of America
Vice President Arizona Sheriffs' Association
Executive Committee Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Vice Chair Executive Committee Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration

LEAA/OJP Retrospective

30 Years of Federal Support to State and Local Criminal Justice

SUMMARY

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U.S. Department of Justice

July 11, 1996
Washington, DC

Foreword

One of the things every institution should do from time to time is look back. During the snowy days of the federal government shutdown in early 1996, I had the opportunity to step back from the hectic day-to-day pace of the Justice Department and do some thinking about the roots of my agency -- the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) -- back to the "LEAA days." And as I mulled over the history of federal crime control assistance to state and locals, I contemplated the quote on the front of the National Archives building across from OJP -- "What is Past is Prologue." As we head into the 21st Century, it seemed critical to me that those of us in criminal justice should step back and reflect on the 30-year history of this program through OLEA, LEAA, OJARS and OJP, and to contemplate the lessons those experiences hold for the future.

Over the following months, my staff and I put together a plan for a one-day Retrospective to bring back earlier leaders of the program to share with us insights about their successes, what they would have done differently, and what advice they would offer us for the future. The result was a session held on July 11, 1996 in Washington, D.C., attended by some 50 former administrators, deputies and regional directors of the program. Representation included persons from both Republican and Democratic Administrations and from virtually every era since the founding of OLEA in 1966. One thing that struck me during the session was that -- despite those differences -- the participants almost uniformly shared a common optimism, the belief that government **can** take steps to successfully address the problems of crime affecting our country.

This publication contains a summary of the observations offered during that July day and "lessons learned" from the earlier federal

initiatives to assist state and local crime-fighting efforts. As Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick noted that day when she joined us for lunch, no government agency can wisely chart its future without looking back at its past.

I offer my thanks to a number of people for their help in making July 11 a rich and productive experience -- the OJP Bureau Heads, who took time from their hectic schedules to join me for this "day of history"; Mike Dalich, my Executive Assistant and a veteran of the early LEAA days, who took the laboring oar in organizing the session and tracking down the past leaders of the program; Frank Hartmann of the Kennedy School at Harvard for his superb job in moderating the day's discussions; and Ed Connor and his staff at the Institute for Law & Justice for their skilled work in handling management and logistics. But most of all, I want to express my appreciation to the "alumni" of the LEAA, OLEA, OJARS and OJP program who took the time to travel to Washington to share their thoughts with us on how the "feds" can best help state and local governments reduce crime and improve criminal justice. It is clear to me from those July 11 discussions that -- even for those who have been gone from the program for nearly 30 years -- their spirit of dedication and public service still burns bright.

Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice

February, 1997

LEAA/OJP Retrospective: Executive Summary

The 1996 budget of $2.7 billion for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) was the largest since the agency's predecessor, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), was created by the 1968 Safe Streets Act. What has been learned over the past 30 years that can benefit today's OJP? What are the most important roles for the federal government in reducing crime and violence? What organizational changes are needed to work more efficiently toward the goal of building a safer society? These questions drove the discussion at a recent meeting of 52 past and present LEAA and OJP administrators. Called together by Assistant Attorney General Laurie Robinson, they attacked the job at hand with enthusiasm and candor, recalling mistakes and lessons learned, as well as successes. By the end of the one-day meeting, participants had reached general agreement in several areas:

- OJP should tackle the difficult job of setting priorities based on the knowledge that criminal justice agencies alone cannot solve crime problems. In fact, OJP should be a standard bearer, actively reinforcing this message to all of its stakeholders—the Congress, state and local agencies, researchers, the public.
- OJP should strengthen its emphasis on planning and enlist agency and community representatives at the state and local levels to help shape the OJP agenda.
- OJP should be organized as a single agency. It is difficult to achieve consistency and continuity in programming — or to have a real impact by leveraging its resources to best address crime — with its current fragmented statutory structure.

Based on their collective experience and knowledge, the majority of meeting participants also agreed that the most important roles for OJP are to:

- Assist and more vigorously oversee state and local criminal justice planning. Staff should be planning experts, and OJP should provide a well developed technical assistance program.
- Emphasize research, evaluation, and development. OJP needs to sponsor more "tier one" research and evaluation, demonstrate intellectual leadership, and convince the Congress of the importance of such research.
- Improve the flow of information to the public, to state and local agencies, and to the Congress.
- Use discretionary grants to encourage experimental approaches, help support programs that have proven effective, and fill in the gaps in state programming.

Background on the Meeting: Past as Prologue

On July 11, 1996, a group of 52 experienced former and current Department of Justice criminal justice program administrators were called together by Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Laurie Robinson, head of the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), to take a hard look at the past, with an eye to the future. Twenty-eight years before, the Safe Streets Act of 1968 had created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), the first comprehensive federal program designed to provide funding to the states—primarily through block grants—to reduce crime. Fourteen years later, LEAA closed its doors.

Even so, it is not entirely accurate to talk of the "demise" of LEAA, as many participants pointed out. First, although LEAA experienced problems that could not be overcome during its lifetime, it can be credited with many accomplishments that still have a major impact on crime control today. Second, the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 created separate agencies to perform many of the functions associated with LEAA. Finally, with the 1994 Crime Bill, federal funding for state and local crime control came more than full circle—a record $2.7 billion in 1996 and $3.2 billion in 1997 were provided for OJP.

Today, six Presidential appointees administer OJP programs. One is the Assistant Attorney General who heads OJP and who also administers the Violence Against Women Act, Drug Court, and Corrections programs and the Executive Office for Weed and Seed. In addition, Presidential appointees direct each of OJP's agencies: National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). Altogether, there are over 600 OJP employees, compared to a high of 800 who worked for LEAA in its Washington, D.C. and regional offices—but up from some 300 just two years ago.

Participants at the July 11 meeting included former LEAA administrators as well as current OJP agency directors. Their challenge was to use the "1,800 years of collective wisdom and adult experience represented around the table" to develop a series of lessons that could be passed on to the next generation of administrators. As AAG Robinson explained, "The inscription on the National Archives building serves as a reminder that the past is prologue to the future. It is important to look back as we chart the course for the 21st Century." With this in mind, participants were asked to "first review what has been accomplished, what has been learned, and what might have been done differently; and second, make recommendations about where we should be going."

LEAA: Contributions and Controversies

During the discussion that followed, participants provided many specific examples of accomplishments under LEAA. At the same time, they offered insights about controversial aspects of the program and about the political climate that prevailed during their tenure.

Contributions

There was general agreement that, among its most significant accomplishments, LEAA:

- Encouraged for the first time state-level planning in criminal justice by spurring the formation of criminal justice state planning agencies (SPAs).

- Contributed to law enforcement professionalism by providing higher education opportunities. The Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) enabled 100,000 students to attend more than 1,000 colleges and universities. A significant majority of current criminal justice leaders around the country are LEEP alumni.

- Laid the foundation for the development of standards for police, courts, and correctional agencies.

- Encouraged the use of targeted strategies (for example, the establishment of career criminal units in prosecutors' offices).

- Launched the victim witness movement, encouraging prosecutors and other parts of the criminal justice system to undertake victim-witness initiatives.

- Enabled technological advances, including the development of bulletproof vests and forensic applications of DNA technology.

Participants also noted some of OJP's accomplishments in the 1980s, particularly in the area of research. For example, OJP has:

- Continued to emphasize technology; supported development of detection scanners and magnetometers to help combat domestic terrorism; and conducted research on less-than-lethal weapons.

- Encouraged new policing strategies (for example, through its work with Harvard University on police problem solving and community policing).

- Encouraged a major study of human development and criminal careers through a partnership with the MacArthur Foundation.

- Developed the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) survey and drug testing program to help local governments to track and develop strategies to combat illegal drugs.

- Encouraged alternative dispute resolution strategies.

Controversies

Politics. Several participants recalled that political leaders who were elected on "law and order" platforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s took a special interest in LEAA. But later in the decade, priorities changed among members of Congress and the Executive Branch, and LEAA eventually came under fire. One participant characterized LEAA as "a victim of a more general loss of public confidence in the Executive Branch following Watergate." Others said LEAA administrators were either unaware of, or unwilling to believe, the intent of Congress and the President to disband the agency. Staff public information efforts were not good, they said; administrators did not have a strong network on the Hill, and LEAA administrators "began lobbying too late." There was considerable agreement with the assessment that "trouble came to LEAA when it lost its handle on the political process."

Funding Approaches. Several participants discussed the use of a block grant approach for providing federal funds to the states (which Congress opted for in the 1968 Safe Streets Act) versus other types of aid. Federal funding under LEAA, said some attendees, was seen as a "blank check" rather than as seed money with definite time limits; and LEAA failed to require states to assume their share of costs.

As one participant summarized it, "In 1968, there was a very small, sincere band of people who wanted to stop crime by next Thursday, but there were very few guidelines for doing this. After a while, block grants gave way to an increase in discretionary and categorical grants." Some participants did not see the wisdom in awarding small grants, while many others felt small grants to creative people were worthwhile. "It is not necessary to award $600 million to one contractor to effect change," said one participant. Effective uses of grants in the $10-15,000 range were cited: helping states develop training standards, encouraging the entry of women and African Americans into policing, and facilitating local community policing and problem solving efforts. Other attendees noted that in the early 1970s, the discretionary grants program also energized federal employees. Ideas generated at the federal level included the one-day-one-trial jurors program, initiatives to combat sexual abuse of children, and Free Venture Prison Industries program.

Mission and Organizational Issues. Some participants emphasized the agency's original crime control mission, which, along with crime prevention, drove policy at LEAA. But as one member of the group observed, "When the original legislation is compared to subsequent re-authorizations, a shift can be observed from reducing crime to developing models and demonstration programs." Administrative changes at LEAA accompanied the shift toward categorical and discretionary grants, with the agency evolving "from a simple to an increasingly complex and increasingly bureaucratic organization." At the same time, "LEAA's proximity to the Attorney General and to the Congress got lost."

Planning. LEAA's experiences with planning—and more importantly, the implications of those experiences for today's OJP—was a particular concern for many participants. Several noted that because LEAA placed a heavy emphasis on planning, "when LEAA failed, the conclusion on the Hill was that planning failed." Some felt LEAA was not a good test because "there was no real planning expertise on staff." As another group member put it, "There was an increasing disrespect for planning because we didn't do it very well." Others believed this judgment was too harsh, noting that LEAA encouraged the development of state criminal justice planning agencies. LEAA often used its regional offices to involve state and local agencies in planning; and it encouraged a greater reliance among planners on research and statistics. LEAA should take at least partial credit, they said, for fostering such organizational changes as civilianization in police organizations and the adoption of strategic planning by many law enforcement agencies.

Relevance to State and Local Needs. With the creation and expansion of LEAA, said some participants, came a false sense of confidence that "the federal government has all the answers," a notion that was resented at the state and local levels. Further, many of the smaller states did not perceive LEAA as particularly relevant to their needs and were not concerned when the program ended. There was also a belief by some that the program was too controlled by law enforcement, resulting in a lower priority for efforts by other criminal justice agencies.

Several participants, however, felt the emphasis on law enforcement was not misplaced and had long-lasting, positive effects. Police have played, and will continue to play, an important leadership role, they said. For example, they noted, police are speaking out in favor of some gun control measures and have worked hard toward achieving a more racially integrated workforce, with African Americans making up 11.5 percent of today's police officers. In addition, local law enforcement officers have shown they can help families when they are trained in crisis intervention to handle family situations with sensitivity.

OJP Today: Continuing Issues and New Challenges

Current OJP administrators struggle with some of the same core issues that faced LEAA—political uncertainties, changes in funding approaches, a need to reach out to many different stakeholders. At the same time, today's OJP is working with a different set of resources. In the plus column: more funding, a broader base of research results on which to build, and new partners from other agencies and disciplines who share common objectives. In the minus column: an organizational structure described as "inelegant" at best and a continuing need for programming to be driven more by research and evaluation and less by a perceived need for quick solutions.

Politics. There was considerable discussion about how difficult it is to address underlying contributors to crime — family breakdown, poor schools, unemployment— when political candidates continue to tout solely justice system approaches. As one former administrator expressed it, "We always must have a crime bill and it always calls for more penalties, more of a criminal justice model, more 'after the fact.' Administrators are sometimes able to fit in other types of programs, but the money isn't there." Others asserted that some components of the criminal justice system—law enforcement, for example—have come to think of OJP money as an entitlement.

Funding Approaches. Because grants have gone in and out of favor with Congress over many years, most participants felt that debates about block grants versus other funding approaches would continue. Some believed that Congressionally-mandated funding categories ("earmarks") discourage innovation and strategic long-term programming, while others were more concerned about accountability when block grant approaches are used. Moreover, OJP today must manage numerous separate funding streams created by Congress for agency functions (e.g., Weed and Seed). This makes it even harder to integrate programs at the state and local levels.

Policy and Research. In the view of many participants, criminal justice policy is not influenced by research to the extent it should be. Despite the knowledge gained over the past 30 years, there is a significant need for more criminal justice research and, particularly, for more evaluation. At the same time, it is difficult for government to attract the best researchers or the best management talent; and there is still little real Congressional investment in criminal justice research when compared to areas like health or defense.

Mission and Organizational Structure. Some participants questioned whether agency functions had actually changed much since the days of LEAA. As one former administrator said, "A case can be made that we just changed the boxes or moved the boxes around." A related concern was the selection and confirmation of OJP agency directors, a process that can leave OJP agencies operating for up to two years without a confirmed director. Even when all director positions are filled, the current structure involving six Presidential appointees forces a reliance on personalities to make it work.

In considering OJP's structural defects and strengths, several questions were raised: Should the current OJP offices be part of a consolidated agency? Should the entire agency be part of the Department of Justice? Should the statistical and research functions (BJS, NIJ) be separate? Are there missing pieces, or existing pieces that should be somewhere else?

Planning. Taking a lesson from LEAA, most participants felt that effective state and local criminal justice planning should be a continuing priority for OJP. An important challenge for OJP today, they said, is to find new ways to involve state and local stakeholders in the planning process.

Constituencies. One participant noted that much of the discussion about LEAA was related to "constituency building" and that there was a continuing need to strengthen relationships with all of OJP's constituents. At the federal level, this included the President; other agencies within the Department of Justice; other federal agencies, including those without criminal justice functions; and Congress. Similarly, constituency building at the state and local levels is vital. Some participants felt that closing the LEAA regional offices had a negative impact on that agency's ability to build state and local constituencies. Further, while LEAA had strong linkages to big cities, it did not have the same relationship with suburban and rural areas. OJP needs to continue to be inclusive, reaching out to professional groups and national research organizations, as well as state and local agencies.

Role of the Federal Government

What should the federal government's mission be with regard to crime? As this question was discussed, several themes emerged. A majority of participants agreed that the federal government should (1) address underlying causes of crime, (2) support top flight research, and (3) ultimately reduce crime and control criminal activity. The group also noted the government's responsibility to help families of officers killed in the line of duty.

Address Underlying Contributors to Crime

Many participants felt strongly that it was time to develop policy based on the clear evidence that criminal justice agencies alone can never solve crime problems. "The political rhetoric is bankrupt," said one former LEAA official, "but who will stand up and say the emperor has no clothes?" Another reminded the group that "the current Attorney General wanted to bring together all social services to focus on crime." "We have missed the boat," he said, "by focusing on crime control through justice agencies or diversion through justice-controlled agencies." Related recommendations included the following:

> "Bring together an open-minded, multi-disciplinary group to discuss whether the criminal justice/law enforcement model is what we want, or whether we should develop a medical/prevention model. We may then make a decision on it and stick with it."

> "Make a much more broadly-based attack on crime, including health, education, non-government institutions. The attack should be from the bottom up through a regional planning process and, at the same time, from the top down with Presidential leadership."

Many participants also emphasized the need to approach crime prevention in new ways. For example, consider the costs to the states of redistributing money for juvenile probation into job training; challenge universities to redesign teacher training and enable teachers to educate people who fall out of the public education system; tackle the enormous job of strengthening families. In short, "It's not all about getting equipment to cops."

Support Top Flight Research

Another primary role for the federal government should be to support research, evaluation, and development. Moreover, these should be top flight, "first tier" efforts. "We need to develop a critical mass of knowledge," said one participant. "For example, why do some of 'the unloved' become productive members of society while others become criminals?" Another stated that "intellectual leadership is the number one responsibility of government . . . but intellectual federal leadership on justice 'in the large' is missing from the portfolio."

Several participants stressed the importance of being able to conduct research over the long term. Although elected officials are often impatient when there are no "overnight" results and answers, enough time must be allowed to produce reliable evaluation results. LEAA determined it takes at least four to six years to fund, implement, and evaluate a major program.

Reduce Crime and Control Criminal Activity

Many participants were concerned that OJP not lose sight of goals for reducing and controlling crime. In summarizing the morning's discussion, one participant said it was clear that "OJP should be in the business of providing all kinds of support to state and local jurisdictions to reduce crime." Several others felt strongly that "the government can establish peace on the streets and in the community, so parents can focus on their children."

How OJP Can Rise to the Challenge

The final task for participants was to propose specific ways in which OJP can be in a better position to refine and accomplish its mission.

Organizational Structure. First, specific attention was given to the organizational issues raised earlier, with the following results:

- A show of hands revealed almost unanimous agreement that OJP should, indeed, remain in the Department of Justice.

- Almost all attendees recommended that OJP be reorganized as a single agency under one Presidential appointee.

- About two-thirds of participants agreed that OJP should re-establish a regional presence. For example, OJP should consider establishing regional advisory councils and provide some funding for travel, conferences, reports, etc. OJP should also continue to take advantage of Internet capabilities to improve the flow of information to its constituents.

- Some participants recommended putting all grant management functions together.

- A minority of participants supported removing research and statistical functions from the Department of Justice to insure objective contributions to a national agenda.

Funding Approaches. The participants as a group did not take a position favoring any one approach to funding state and local programs. Rather, they stressed the importance of providing information—especially research and evaluation results—that enables Congress and state and local administrators to make sound policy decisions. In addition, many participants advocated the use of discretionary grants for specific purposes: to support programs that have proved successful; to fill in gaps in state programming; and perhaps most important, to encourage experimental approaches with "the freedom to fail" (something the states usually cannot afford to do).

Constituencies. Virtually all participants agreed that OJP should make a concerted effort to know and develop its constituencies (some preferred the term "stakeholders"). It is critical to "find sources of sustained leadership," and "build a network of champions." More specifically, OJP should:
- Continue to build bridges with the rest of the Department of Justice, although it was noted that these ties are stronger than at any time since the earliest LEAA days.
- Talk to the states, not simply to encourage their partnership, but to gain their input into policy development. Determine what they need from the federal government and continue to build a "customer service" model.

- Do a better job of getting information out to the public; improve the public information function and serve as an information clearinghouse.

Planning. Many participants strongly recommended that OJP "return to the idea of planning" and "emphasize criminal justice planning and analysis at the local and state levels." Moreover, some recommended that OJP more vigorously oversee state-level planning, with receipt of funding dependent on an acceptable planning process.

OJP should also help the states with planning. More specifically, the agency should:
- Ensure that its own staff includes planning experts.
- Operate a well-developed technical assistance program.
- Draw from private industry to help develop the agency's planning expertise.
- Help the criminal justice community learn from corporate America, particularly with regard to the re-engineering process.

Research and Development. Several recommendations were made for ways in which OJP could better fulfill its role as a sponsor of and advocate for "first tier" research and development. These included:
- Sell the importance of research to the Congress.
- Sustain a research focus on juvenile crime.
- Analyze the past 30 years of federal government involvement in delinquency and juvenile justice research and programming, and involve other agencies in the process.
- Be in the forefront with regard to state of the art literature.
- Serve as an incubator for research and demonstration projects to test hypotheses.
- Continue research on less-than-lethal weapons.
- Expand the collection and dissemination of statistics.
- Facilitate the exchange of knowledge by enabling practitioners and researchers to routinely come together.

Beyond the Meeting

Participants at the July 11 meeting felt strongly that one of the most effective ways OJP can provide leadership to the field is by demonstrating consistency and continuity in its own programs. A "varsity team," such as a bipartisan group of former LEAA and OJP officials, they said, should educate Congress about the most appropriate agency mission, objectives, and organizational structure for fulfilling this leadership role. First steps should include presenting to a broader audience the results of the LEAA/OJP Retrospective meeting and holding additional consultations to follow up on the recommendations made and challenges presented.

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Agenda
LEAA/OJP Retrospective

Thursday, July 11, 1996

8:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.	**Registration and Coffee Service**

9:00 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. **Welcome, Opening Remarks, and Introduction of Participants**

Laurie Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

Moderator: **Francis X. Hartmann**

Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

9:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. **Where Have We Been?**
Reflections on the LEAA/OJARS/OJP Programs

Patrick V. Murphy, Associate Administrator, Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, 1968 - 1969

Jerris Leonard, Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1971 - 1973

Donald Santarelli, Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1973 - 1974

Henry Dogin, Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1978 - 1979

Robert Diegelman, Acting Director, Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics, 1980 - 1982

James (Chips) Stewart, Director, National Institute of Justice, 1982 - 1989

Laurie Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs 1993 - Present

12:15 p.m.-1:30 p.m. **Luncheon**

Keynote Address: Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C.

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1:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. **Synthesis of Morning Discussion**

Sally T. Hillsman, Deputy Director, National Institute of Justice
Office of Research and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

Price Foster, Professor, Justice Administration, University Liaison for the
Urban Mission, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
formerly Director, LEAA's Law Enforcement Education Program

2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. **Where Should We Be Going?**
**Moderated Discussion, Involving All Participants, on the Federal Criminal
Justice Role**

Moderator: **Francis X. Hartmann**, Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy
and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. **Synthesis of Afternoon Discussion**

John Greacen, Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Albuquerque, NM
formerly Associate Director, National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice

David Tevelin, Director, State Justice Institute, Alexandria, VA
formerly LEAA's Office of General Counsel

4:30 p.m. - 4:45 p.m. **Closing Remarks**

Laurie Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

LEAA/OJP Retrospective

Credit: Twin Lens Photo

Participants: *(front row, left to right)* W. Powers, J. Stewart, L. Robinson, G. Holden, C. Lauer, M. Beckman ; *(second row, left to right)* J. Nadol, J. Devine, G. Trubow, M. Dalich, S. Hillsman, S. Bilchik; *(third row, left to right)* R. Diegelman, R. Sui, A. Hopkins, T. Kirkpatrick, P. Foster, R. Goffus, P. Wormeli, G. Bohlinger, H. McQuade; *(fourth row, left to right)* D. Tevelin, N. Gist, B. Ewing, J. Shealey, J. Gregg; *(top row, left to right)* C. Work, W. Pomeroy, D. Santarelli, P. Murphy, P. Haynes, J. Jemilo, F. Hartmann and J. Travis.

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Michael Harrison

Baltimore Police Department

Michael Harrison was sworn in as the Baltimore Police Department's 41st Commissioner on March 12, 2019. Before coming to Baltimore, Commissioner Harrison served the New Orleans Police Department for nearly 28 years. He joined the NOPD in 1991 and moved steadily through the ranks. Among his many assignments, he was the supervisor of the Public Integrity Bureau, Assistant Commander of the Seventh District, Commander of the Specialized Investigations Division, and Commander of the Seventh District. In 2014, he was appointed Superintendent and served in that role for four years.

Commissioner Harrison honorably served eight years with the Louisiana Air National Guard. He received a Bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of Phoenix and a Masters of Criminal Justice from Loyola University New Orleans. He is also a graduate of the Senior Management Institute for Police, as well as Northwestern University's School of Police Staff and Command, and also graduated from the F.B.I's National Executive Institute. Additionally, he is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major City Chiefs Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives and the Law Enforcement Immigration Task Force. In 2019, he was appointed to the board of directors of the Police Executive Research Forum.

Commissioner Harrison has been married to his high school sweetheart since 1992. They have two adult children and are now proud residents of Baltimore.

Commissioner Harrison Remarks Before the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice

Chairman Keith, Vice Chairman Sullivan and Members of the Commission, my name is Michael Harrison and I am the Commissioner of the Baltimore Police Department (BPD). I thank you for your invitation to participate in this panel and present to you this afternoon.

Background

The BPD is currently in the midst of confronting numerous challenges, including addressing historic levels of violent crime and complying with a federal consent decree. These enormous undertakings are being made with a Department that is not at full strength or capacity.

The data shows that the reasons why officers leave the department are as various as the stages of their careers in which they are departing. Some of the reasons given are deeply personal and cannot be addressed by the Department or the City, such as the health, family issues or relocation. However, there are other reasons which are deeply rooted cultural problems within the organization that can be addressed. We must enact a targeted approach to make progress on this issue every day. This afternoon, the focus of my testimony will be changing the culture of a law enforcement organization so that we can better retain more police officers for longer.

Working Conditions

The most common issues that I hear about when I speak with officers are the state of the facilities they work in, the conditions of vehicles the drive, and the age of the technology and equipment that they use every day. Improving these conditions is a cornerstone of my 5-year Departmental Transformation and Improvement Plan because it speaks to the culture of the department and whether the officers feel the department is making the right investments in their well-being.

Facilities

With respect to facilities, the BPD has made a lot of progress in a little over a year. Just last week we completed the move of our police training academy from a deteriorating and functionally obsolete former middle school to an upgraded and rehabilitated building on the campus of the University of Baltimore. The staff of the training academy are now operating in a much-improved working environment that will enable them to deliver professional, adult learning, and scenario-based instruction. Our police academy is the front door of our department, and where our officers must train every year, so making it a world class facility is very important to changing the culture of the agency.

We've also just recently signed a new lease to for a public safety facility that will house our Central District police station. The Central District's former station was in such bad condition that we decided to shut it down and move those officers to temporary space in police headquarters. The Central District will now have a permanent home when they move into a state-of-the-art facility later this year.

Our next step is going to be finding a facility improvement solution for each remaining district station and continuing to find the financial resources to continue investing in improved facilities for all our personnel.

Vehicles

When it comes to vehicles, I know from personal experience the frustration of officers idling up to an hour or more to start their days because they are waiting for keys from other officers who are returning from the outgoing shift. Moreover, another problem we face is the age of our current fleet. Because our vehicles have not been replaced on a regular schedule, many are out of service for maintenance for prolonged periods of time.

To address these and a myriad of other issues with our fleet, we have engaged local civic and business leaders, who have experience managing their own large fleets to do a review of our operations. They have developed recommendations that we are now implementing that will streamline and create greater efficiencies in our fleet management. Once fully implemented we believe we can free up greater resources that can be reinvested back into the fleet and result in more vehicles that are in better condition.

Police cars are the "mobile office" for our patrol officers. We must have continuous investment and reinvestment through a dedicated fleet replacement program to ensure that our vehicles are maintained well and are not aging out.

Technology

BPD has been primarily operating as a paper-based organization. Police reports in many cases are still handwritten or typed on electric typewriters. This is inefficient on so many levels and has a harmful effect on morale for our Department. We must put the best tools available in the hands of our officers to make the job as impactful as possible and less time consuming. It again shows in a tangible way that the department is looking out for its members and doing what it needs to in order to improve working conditions.

Next month, we will be finalizing a contract for a new records management system that will be foundational for how we operate and will bring the BPD into the digital age. By doing so it will allow for better case management, greater ability to make connections between cases, increased intelligence sharing, as well as the redirection of manpower back to front line policing.

We are also refreshing our officers' outdated computers with new workstations and new computers in the cars. While we are rebuilding our IT infrastructure, we are also enhancing our investigation tools and increasing the number of license plate readers while also launching a pilot phase of an aerial investigation research program (the first of its kind in the country).

Burden Reductions

While we improve officer's physical working environment and the tools that we give them to carry out their duties, we must not lose sight of also what we have them doing throughout their day. A

new records management system and other technology will help lighten the amounts of paperwork and reduce the number administrative functions that need to be performed, but there are also ways to rethink the job itself. With innovations like online reporting, 311 call centers, and telephone police reporting, there are ways to completely relieve the burden of certain types of calls from the patrol officers' duties.

In addition to this, we are also formed a burden reduction review committee made up of officers and supervisors who will convene to see if there are additional ways to eliminate unnecessary and time-consuming administrative burdens that pull our officers away from being available to respond to higher priority incidents.

Upward Mobility and Career Path

As working conditions are the number one reason our officers give as to why they leave the Department, it is followed by career advancement and the quality of supervisors as the number two and three reasons respectively.

To begin with, there should be a formalized and accessible promotional process for those interesting in serving at the command level, and opportunities to apply should be posted prominently and often. BPD has implemented this change recently and now allows for applications to serve as Captain or Major along with a full review of their record and an interview conducted by a panel of executive staff. This process is open, competitive and evaluations are based on merit and ability. The result will not only give our officers a path to advance in their career but also help us find the best candidates for these positions and bolster confidences among the rank and file in the command staff that are selected for promotion

In addition to reforming the promotional process, we must also ensure that we are cultivating our workforce once they are in these positions. Through philanthropic support, we have been able to send up-and-coming commanders to nationally recognized law enforcement management programs such as the FBI National Academy and the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Policing. We have also provided regular professional development and management seminars for all of command staff from leading outside experts.

However, this type of training is not just limited to our commanders. We have invested and expanded our training academy and its personnel to provide some of the leading law enforcement curriculum in the country to all of our recruits and officers. Moreover, we have set our homicide detectives on a schedule to attend courses in basic and advance training in death investigation. Most of the detectives had only previously received on the job training as opposed to any formalized coursework. Ultimately, the focus and investment on education and training of our workforce will in the long run increase their performance, their ability for career advancement, and will help make the organization stronger and more efficient.

Structure of Pay

Maintaining a competitive pay structure is also important especially when compared to surrounding jurisdictions. Suburban areas typically have smaller departments, with greater

financial resources and better working conditions as compared to departments that serve larger urban communities. We are currently reviewing how we can make our pay more competitive, where the structure values and incentivizes longevity and addresses issues such as pay compression between ranks. This is perhaps one of the more difficult to challenges to address because of its immediate and long-term costs. It is also an issue that generally will need to be negotiated with our labor organizations. However, we will keep looking for ways to make the structure of pay more equitable and close the pay gap with other departments to remain competitive and improve retention.

Conclusion

I read extensively on some of the great executives in policing, military, government and business. One of my favorite executives that I have studied is Jack Welch, the late Chairman and CEO of General Electric. His philosophy on changing culture within an organization was that it could not be done through mere words alone or some poster with catchphrases that we put up in the lobby. It is only changed by actions and behavior. I completely agree. As illustrated by these examples in my testimony, we must taken action and make progress within our organization and to do so quickly in order to build confidence among our members.

However, despite the strides that BPD has made, there is still much more to be done. We will keep working through all of the Department's needs and issues so that we can continue to perpetually move forward. Each of these successes is a signal to our officers that we are serious about changing the culture through our investments in and professionalization of this organization. By doing so, we can improve both the recruitment and retention of our officers as we create a department where they want to start, build and finish a career.

My recommendation to the Commission on Law Enforcement would be for this body to advocate for more resources to implement the kinds of working conditions improvement and technological advancements that large police departments critically need in order to change the environment in which our officers operate so we can retain them for longer.

For more information about our Departmental Transformation Plan, please visit the agency's website at www.baltimorepolice.org.

Again, thank you for your attention this afternoon and I welcome any questions you may have.

Sylvia M. Moir

Chief in Tempe, AZ Police Department

A California native, Chief Moir has over 30 years of local police practice. She was the Chief of the El Cerrito Police Department from 2010 until her appointment as the Police Chief in Tempe, Arizona. Chief Moir spent most of her early career with the Sacramento Police Department where she served in every division of the department and gained operational, training, managerial, and strategic experience, which influences her consistently. She was the Incident Commander on hundreds of planned and spontaneous events, a trainer in several policing subjects, and a member of the Sacramento Police Honor Guard. She completed rigorous training with the US Army Old Guard at Fort Myer, VA and Arlington National Cemetery.

She currently serves on the Executive Board of the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police, is the President of the Police Executive Research Forum, is an Executive Fellow for the Police Foundation, on the Community Policing Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, a member of the Law Enforcement Immigration Task Force, and on the Law Enforcement Council for the U.S. Humane Society. As the Chief of El Cerrito, California Governor Jerry Brown appointed Chief Moir to the Commission on California Peace Officer Standards and Training for two terms, and she served on the Executive Committee for the California Police Chiefs Association.

In 2019, Chief Moir participated in TED\ˣSoMa's Modern Campfire series, where she discussed the complexity of modern-day policing and the importance of practicing mindfulness in the profession. During the talk, Chief Moir spoke about the impact of mindfulness on her leadership, her employees, and the community they serve.

Chief Moir holds a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from California State University, Sacramento, a Master of Arts in Organizational Management, and a Master of Science degree from the Naval Postgraduate School - Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

She is married, lives in Tempe, and enjoys reading, hiking, competing in marathons, and passionately cheering on the Boston Red Sox and the Chicago Bears.

May 12, 2020

<u>**Introduction**</u>
Good afternoon, Chair Keith, Vice Chair Sullivan, and Commissioners. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you about police officer retention and to represent the committed professionals of the Tempe Police Department. I am Sylvia Moir and I serve as the police chief in Tempe Arizona.

In my testimony, I hope to provide an uncontaminated perspective on the law enforcement officer retention struggle and the efforts, many edgy and unique, that are being undertaken to combat the problem. In our time today, I will describe what has been discovered broadly, what approaches we have taken specifically in Tempe, and what may be nationally implemented in our effort to retain police officers in the service of their communities.

<u>**What has been discovered broadly**</u>

Law enforcement agencies have reported that despite salary and benefit improvements, retaining police officers remains a challenge. As a result of a national survey and a physical convening of police representatives in late 2018, The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) identified five key findings in the law enforcement retention problem. [1]

1. Rethink and realign incentives-
    a. In 1997, there were primarily 3 generations in the workforce. As of 2017, there are now 5, with Millennials soon to be the majority and Generation Z now entering the workforce.
    b. With newer generations entering the workforce, their needs and motivations are often different than preceding generations.
    c. Agencies need to ensure their incentives appeal to these changing needs and motivations.
    d. PERF's survey showed that the most common retention strategies used by agencies were:
        i. Professional development opportunities
        ii. Increased overtime opportunities
        iii. Opportunities to work temporarily in a variety of positions.
        [NOTE: See Table 1]
    e. Some of the most common incentives may not resonate with younger officers. For example, at PERF's meeting a young officer noted that increased overtime opportunities were not an incentive. She would rather spend her time outside of work serving on local community boards and volunteering at her daughter's school.
    f. More flexible scheduling systems were much lower on the list of incentives offered, but this option was more popular among the younger officers at PERF's meeting.

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[1] Police Executive Research Forum. 2019. *The Workforce Crisis, and What Police Agencies Are Doing About It.* Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

g. Given increased housing and schooling costs, student loan forgiveness and housing assistance were also mentioned as incentives attractive to the younger workforce. PERF's survey showed that these two incentives were infrequently used for recruitment purposes and were relatively new incentives, with most agencies that offered these incentives only adding them within the past 10 years.

2. Broaden officers' experiences and skill-building options-
   a. Officers may not see working the same beat/patrol schedule as a long-term option. Introducing opportunities to broaden officers' experiences can help expose officers to other areas of the department.
   b. New opportunities and opportunities for skill-building can help officers stay more engaged with their department.
   c. Example programs:
      i. Phoenix, AZ Police Department – piloting a program to provide officers with 80 hours each year that they can use for temporary assignments or to shadow other members of the department. The 80 hours can be used all at once or throughout the year depending on staffing needs.
      ii. Metropolitan DC Police Department – Police for Tomorrow Program is for officers with less than 1 year on the job. It includes a monthly lecture series at Georgetown University with guest speakers. It also involves a mentoring program and a community service project.
      iii. Informal programs: mentoring, temporary assignments, shadowing of other department members.

3. Focus on career planning and development early on in an officer's career-
   a. PERF's survey found that 70% of voluntary resignations reported in a 12-month period ending August 31, 2018 occurred within the first 5 years of the officers' careers. [NOTE: See Table 2]. When they leave their agency, many are leaving the policing profession entirely.
   b. This shows that retention programs are needed that reach officers within the first 5 years of their career.
   c. Career planning opportunities and development plans can help officers envision a long-term career for themselves with their agency.

4. Promote work-life balance-
   a. Work-life balance is important but can be difficult to achieve in a profession that needs to be responsive to the community 24/7.
   b. Creative shift scheduling can help officers have a sense of control over their schedules and provide for a more even distribution of time off.
      i. Arlington County, VA created a days-off system whereby everyone gets full weekend off twice a month. Officers do not have the same days off permanently, but it is not based on seniority.
      ii. Roanoke County, VA allows evening/midnight shifts to work 4/10s (day shift works 5/8s). They give individual squads the flexibility to set their own schedules for a 20-

day period within their assigned shift while a sergeant ensures the entire shift is covered.

5. Focus on officer wellness-
    a. There is a recognition that officer wellness encompasses more than physical health, but also mental and emotional well-being of officers.
    b. Healthier officers are more productive officers.
    c. Successful agencies are starting wellness programming in the Academy and continuing it throughout an officer's career.
        i. Clearwater, FL Police Department has a structured wellness program that has checkpoints at the 2, 10, and 20-year benchmarks in officers' careers.

Vital approaches undertaken in Tempe

The methods employed in Tempe began with recognition of key factors in law enforcement. First is that sworn law enforcement officers possess a unique identity given their governmental authorities and employing specific coping mechanisms for the rigors of the high stakes work they carry out. Second is that organizational culture and climate matter. Lastly that the normative way of approaching employee development as changing and fixing individual deficiencies was limiting and fundamentally negative. The tactic in Tempe was borne out of an appreciative inquiry construct and recognition that entrants into policing today want something individualized to suit their uniqueness.

1. The Tempe Police Development Plan -
    a. The development plan process is quite simply an ongoing interaction and exploration that forms the basis for the living and guiding document for the employee.
    b. The employee answers 11 key questions that begin with education, training, roles in the organization, expertise, skills, then uncovers what makes the officer uncomfortable, where the officer gains information, how the officer acts as a teammate, their leadership ethos, and description of their reputation.
    c. The approach allows officers to have open discussions with their supervisor about their current work, their career goals and triggers the social dynamic of the supportive organizational climate. It also provides an opportunity to strengthen the contribution of the employee in a plan distinct from the employee appraisal system.
    d. There is no cost for this program.

2. The Tempe Police Advisor Program -
    a. This program connects a tenured officer with a new-hire with the intent of providing support and guidance. The advisor and new officer are joined while the new hire enters the pre-academy and their connection remains through the first year of service at a minimum.
    b. The advisor guides the new officer through understanding the police culture, the climate of the organization, and adjusting the distinctiveness of the law enforcement profession.
    c. The advisor serves as a sounding board who supplements the training and acclimatization of the new officer.

d. There is no cost for this program as advisors volunteer.

3. The Tempe Police Human Performance Team –
    a. Synchronization of specialty support to address much of what impacts an officer; financial, spiritual, physical, psychological, medical (specific to first responders).
    b. All officers have department issues iPhones – given access to a variety of screened APP's including for law guidance, policy, our chosen leadership and management platform, agency specific for mental health support, and meditation.

4. Tempe Police created equity in testing –
    a. We adjusted the application and testing process for specialty assignments with input from labor and officers across the organization.
    b. This diminished the perception of institutional cronyism and emphasized fairness.
    c. There is no cost for this initiative.

What can be nationally implemented?

Suggestions for national implementation must start with an appreciation for reframing the source of incentive ideas to include an openness to what today's officers want in their organization and the profession. The strategies include:

1. Explore the organizational climate; what daily life looks like and sounds like. Make alterations that are people centered, give employees voice, and place dignity and respect at the core.
2. Acknowledge that the high-stakes and complex environment of police officers requires different efforts to fortify officer wellness.
3. Identify and eliminate conditions that give rise to where supervisors default to a norm of identifying and solving deficiencies in employees, rather create a document like the development plan described above to empower officers to be part of their career success.
4. Evaluate options for officers to serve in a temporary duty assignment to experience other assignments.
5. Consider an advisor program pairing tenured officers with new hires.
6. Explore and evaluate flexible scheduling.
7. Examine testing processes to create equity in action.

I encourage this commission to consult the PERF guide footnoted for deeper descriptions of specific recommendations.

This concludes my testimony.

This written testimony is the product of a collaboration between Sylvia Moir of the Tempe Police Department and Sarah Mostyn of PERF. We encourage the President's Commission members tasked with authoring content for the Chapter on Recruiting and Retention to consult the document entitled: *The Workforce Crisis, and What Police Agencies Are Doing About It.* Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2019.

Table 1:

PERF WORKFORCE SURVEY

Does your agency employ any of the following strategies for RETENTION of officers/deputies? (select all that apply)

N = 412

Number of agencies reported

Strategy	Number
Professional development opportunities	352
Increased overtime opportunities	247
Opportunities to work temporarily in a variety of...	234
Pay increase at service milestones	231
Pay increase for college degree	201
Relaxed residency requirements	170
Participation in DROP (Deferred Retirement Option...	108
More flexible scheduling systems (e.g., not based strictly...	104
Offering promotional examinations on a more frequent...	101
Reducing time-in-grade requirements for eligibility for...	73
Flexible retirement/pension options	57
Other	53

Table 2:

PERF WORKFORCE SURVEY

Voluntary resignations during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2018, by YEARS OF SERVICE

Years of Service	Percentage
Under 1 year	28.8%
1-5 years	40.3%
6-10 years	15.3%
11-15 years	8.1%
16 or more years	7.5%

N = 310 agencies
3,708 voluntary resignations