

continuation of the exception for Cuban nationals, could lead to a surge in migration of Cuban nationals seeking to travel to and enter the United States during the period between the publication of a proposed and a final rule.”¹⁰¹ DHS found that “[s]uch a surge would threaten national security and public safety by diverting valuable Government resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities. A surge could also have a destabilizing effect on the region, thus weakening the security of the United States and threatening its international relations.”¹⁰² DHS concluded that “a surge could result in significant loss of human life.”¹⁰³

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any new reporting requirements they impose. The process announced by this notice requires changes to two collections of information, as follows.

OMB has recently approved a new collection, Form I-134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support (OMB control number 1615-NEW). This new collection will be used for the Nicaragua parole process, and is being revised in connection with this notice, including by increasing the burden estimate. To support the efforts described above, DHS has created a new information collection that will be the first step in these parole processes and will not use the paper USCIS Form I-134 for this purpose. U.S.-based supporters will submit USCIS Form I-134A online on behalf of a beneficiary to demonstrate that they can support the beneficiary for the duration of their temporary stay in the United States. USCIS has submitted and OMB has approved a request for emergency authorization of the required changes (under 5 CFR 1320.13) for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, USCIS will immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.

OMB has previously approved an emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13 for a revision to an information collection from CBP entitled Advance Travel Authorization (OMB control

number 1651-0143). In connection with the implementation of the process described above, CBP is making multiple changes under the PRA’s emergency processing procedures at 5 CFR 1320.13, including increasing the burden estimate and adding Nicaraguan nationals as eligible for a DHS established process that necessitates collection of a facial photograph in CBP One™. OMB has approved the emergency request for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, CBP will immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.

More information about both collections can be viewed at www.reginfo.gov.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2023-00254 Filed 1-5-23; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4679-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2022-0001]

West Virginia; Major Disaster and Related Determinations

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of West Virginia (FEMA-4679-DR), dated November 28, 2022, and related determinations.

DATES: The declaration was issued November 28, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated November 28, 2022, the President issued a major disaster declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 *et seq.* (the “Stafford Act”), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of West Virginia resulting from severe storms, flooding, landslides, and mudslides during the period of August 14 to August 15, 2022, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 *et seq.* (the

“Stafford Act”). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of West Virginia.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Public Assistance in the designated areas and Hazard Mitigation throughout the State. Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration for the approved assistance to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Jeffrey L. Jones, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this major disaster.

The following areas of the State of West Virginia have been designated as adversely affected by this major disaster:

Fayette County for Public Assistance.

All areas within the State of West Virginia are eligible for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Deanne Criswell,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2023-00178 Filed 1-6-23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice describes a new effort designed to enhance the security

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

¹⁰² *Id.*

¹⁰³ *Id.*; *accord, e.g.*, Visas: Documentation of Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 5907 (Feb. 4, 2016) (finding the good cause exception applicable because of similar short-run incentive concerns).

of our Southwest Border (SWB) by reducing the number of encounters the border Cuban nationals crossing the border without authorization, as the U.S. Government continues to implement its broader, multi-pronged and regional strategy to address the challenges posed by a surge in migration. Cubans who do not avail themselves of this new process, and instead enter the United States without authorization between ports of entry (POEs), generally are subject to removal—including to third countries, such as Mexico. As part of this effort, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing a process—modeled on the successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) and Process for Venezuelans—for certain Cuban nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner and be considered for a case-by-case determination of parole. To be eligible, individuals must have a supporter in the United States who agrees to provide financial support for the duration of the beneficiary's parole period, pass national security and public safety vetting, and fly at their own expense to an interior POE, rather than entering at a land POE. Individuals are ineligible for this process if they have been ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years; have entered unauthorized into the United States between POEs, Mexico, or Panama after the date of this notice's publication, with an exception for individuals permitted a single instance of voluntary departure or withdrawal of their application for admission to still maintain their eligibility for this process; or are otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable exercise of discretion.

DATES: DHS will begin using the Form I-134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, for this process on January 6, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Delgado, Acting Director, Border and Immigration Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0445; telephone (202) 447-3459 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background—Cuban Parole Process

This notice describes the implementation of a new parole process for certain Cuban nationals, including the eligibility criteria and filing process. The parole process is intended to enhance border security by reducing the record levels of Cuban nationals

entering the United States between POEs, while also providing a process for certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner.

The announcement of this new process followed detailed consideration of a wide range of relevant facts and alternatives, as reflected in the Secretary's decision memorandum dated December 22, 2022.¹ The complete reasons for the Secretary's decision are included in that memorandum. This **Federal Register** notice is intended to provide appropriate context and guidance for the public regarding the policy and relevant procedures associated with this policy.

A. Overview

The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-pronged, regional strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration.² This long-term strategy—a shared endeavor with partner nations—focuses on addressing the root causes of migration, which are currently fueling unprecedented levels of irregular migration, and creating safe, orderly, and humane processes for migrants seeking protection throughout the region. This includes domestic efforts to expand immigration processing capacity and multinational collaboration to prosecute migrant-smuggling and human-trafficking criminal organizations as well as their facilitators and money-laundering networks. While this strategy shows great promise, it will take time to fully implement. In the interim, the U.S. government needs to take immediate steps to provide safe, orderly, humane pathways for the large numbers of individuals seeking to enter the United States and to discourage such individuals from taking the dangerous journey to and arriving, without authorization, at the SWB.

Building on the success of the Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) process and the Process for Venezuelans, DHS is implementing a similar process to address the increasing number of encounters of Cuban nationals at the SWB and at sea, which have reached record levels over the past six months. Similar to Venezuela, Cuba has restricted DHS's ability to remove

individuals to Cuba, which has constrained the Department's ability to respond to this surge.

In October 2022, DHS undertook a new effort to address the high number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB.³ Specifically, DHS provided a new parole process for Venezuelans who are backed by supporters in the United States to come to the United States by flying to interior ports of entry—thus obviating the need for them to make the dangerous journey to the SWB. Meanwhile, the Government of Mexico (GOM) made an independent decision for the first time to accept the returns of Venezuelans who crossed the SWB without authorization pursuant to the Title 42 public health Order, thus imposing a consequence on Venezuelans who sought to come to the SWB rather than avail themselves of the newly announced Parole Process. Within a week of the October 12, 2022 announcement of that process, the number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to under 200 per day, and as of the week ending December 4, to an average of 86 per day.⁴ The new process and accompanying consequence for unauthorized entry also led to a precipitous decline in irregular migration of Venezuelans throughout the Western Hemisphere. The number of Venezuelans attempting to enter Panama through the Darién Gap—an inhospitable jungle that spans between Panama and Colombia—was down from 40,593 in October 2022 to just 668 in November.⁵

DHS anticipates that implementing a similar process for Cubans will reduce the number of Cubans seeking to irregularly enter the United States between POEs along the SWB or by sea by coupling a meaningful incentive to seek a safe, orderly means of traveling to the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter without authorization pursuant to this process. Only those who meet specified criteria and pass national security and public safety vetting will be eligible for consideration for parole under this process. Implementation of the new parole process for Cubans is

³ Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).

⁴ DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of data pulled from CBP Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) December 5, 2022. Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those being paroled in through ports of entry.

⁵ Servicio Nacional de Migración de Panamá, Irregulares en Tránsito Frontera Panamá-Colombia 2022, https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_%20DARIEN_C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf (last viewed Dec. 11, 2022).

¹ See Memorandum for the Secretary from the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Parole Process for Certain Cuban Nationals (Dec. 22, 2022).

² In this notice, irregular migration refers to the movement of people into another country without authorization.

contingent on the GOM accepting the return, departure, or removal to Mexico of Cuban nationals seeking to enter the United States without authorization between POEs on the SWB.

As in the process for Venezuelans, a supporter in the United States must initiate the process on behalf of a Cuban national (and certain non-Cuban nationals who are an immediate family member of a primary beneficiary), and commit to providing the beneficiary financial support, as needed.

In addition to the supporter requirement, Cuban nationals and their immediate family members must meet several eligibility criteria in order to be considered, on a case-by-case basis, for advance travel authorization and parole. Only those who meet all specified criteria are eligible to receive advance authorization to travel to the United States and be considered for a discretionary grant of parole, on a case-by-case basis, under this process. Beneficiaries must pass national security, public safety, and public health vetting prior to receiving a travel authorization, and those who are approved must arrange air travel at their own expense to seek entry at an interior POE.

A grant of parole under this process is for a temporary period of up to two years. During this two-year period, the United States will continue to build on the multi-pronged, long-term strategy with our foreign partners throughout the region to support conditions that would decrease irregular migration, work to improve refugee processing and other immigration pathways in the region, and allow for increased removals of Cubans from the United States and partner nations who continue to migrate irregularly but who lack a valid claim of asylum or other forms of protection. The two-year period will also enable individuals to seek humanitarian relief or other immigration benefits, including adjustment of status pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act, Public Law 89–732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (8 U.S.C. 1255 note), for which they may be eligible, and to work and contribute to the United States. Those who are not granted asylum or any other immigration benefits during this two-year parole period generally will need to depart the United States prior to the expiration of their authorized parole period or will be placed in removal proceedings after the period of parole expires.

The temporary, case-by-case parole of qualifying Cuban nationals pursuant to this process will provide a significant public benefit for the United States, by reducing unauthorized entries along our

SWB, while also addressing the urgent humanitarian reasons that are driving hundreds of thousands of Cubans to flee their home country, to include crippling economic conditions and dire food shortages, widespread social unrest, and the Government of Cuba's (GOC) violent repression of dissent.⁶ Most significantly, DHS anticipates this process will: (i) enhance the security of the U.S. SWB by reducing irregular migration of Cuban nationals, including by imposing additional consequences on those who seek to enter between POEs; (ii) improve vetting for national security and public safety; (iii) reduce the strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the domestic impact of irregular migration from Cuba; (v) disincentivize a dangerous irregular journey that puts migrant lives and safety at risk and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill important foreign policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in the hemisphere.

The Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the process at any point.

B. Conditions at the Border

1. Impact of Venezuela Process

This process is modeled on the Venezuela process—as informed by the way that similar incentive and disincentive structures successfully decreased the number of Venezuelan nationals making the dangerous journey to and being encountered along the SWB. The Venezuela process demonstrates that combining a clear and meaningful consequence for irregular entry along the SWB with a significant incentive for migrants to wait where they are and use a safe, orderly process to come to the United States can change migratory flows. Prior to the October 12, 2022 announcement of the Venezuela process, DHS encountered approximately 1,100 Venezuelan nationals per day between POEs—with peak days exceeding 1,500. Within a week of the announcement, the number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to under 200 per day, and as of the week ending December 4, an average of 86 per day.⁷

Panama's daily encounters of Venezuelans also declined significantly over the same time period, falling some 88 percent, from 4,399 on October 16 to

532 by the end of the month—a decline driven entirely by Venezuelan migrants' choosing not to make the dangerous journey through the Darién Gap. The number of Venezuelans attempting to enter Panama through the Darién Gap continued to decline precipitously in November—from 40,593 encounters in October, a daily average of 1,309, to just 668 in November, a daily average of just 22.⁸

The Venezuela process fundamentally changed the calculus for Venezuelan migrants. Venezuelan migrants who had already crossed the Darién Gap have returned to Venezuela by the thousands on voluntary flights organized by the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama, as well as civil society. Other migrants who were about to enter the Darién Gap have turned around and headed back south. Still others who were intending to migrate north are staying where they are to apply for this parole process. Put simply, the Venezuela process demonstrates that combining a clear and meaningful consequence for irregular entry along the SWB with a significant incentive for migrants to wait where they are and use this parole process to come to the United States can yield a meaningful change in migratory flows.

2. Trends and Flows: Increase of Cuban Nationals Arriving at the Southwest Border

The last decades have yielded a dramatic increase in encounters at the SWB and a dramatic shift in the demographics of those encountered. Throughout the 1980s and into the first decade of the 2000s, encounters along the SWB routinely numbered in the millions per year.⁹ By the early 2010s, three decades of investments in border security and strategy contributed to reduced border flows, with border encounters averaging fewer than 400,000 per year from 2011–2017.¹⁰ However, these gains were subsequently reversed as border encounters more than doubled between 2017 and 2019, and—following a steep drop in the first months of the COVID–19 pandemic—continued to increase at a similar pace in 2021 and 2022.¹¹

Shifts in demographics have also had a significant effect on migration flows. Border encounters in the 1980s and

⁶ Washington Office on Latin America, *U.S.-Cuba Relations: The Old, the New and What Should Come Next*, Dec. 16, 2022, <https://www.wola.org/analysis/us-cuba-relations-old-new-should-come-next/> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

⁷ Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of data pulled from CBP UIP December 5, 2022. Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those being paroled in through ports of entry.

⁸ Servicio Nacional de Migración de Panamá, *Irregulares en Tránsito Frontera Panamá-Colombia 2022*, https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_%20DARIEN_C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf (last viewed Dec. 11, 2022).

⁹ OIS analysis of historic CBP data.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*

1990s consisted overwhelmingly of single adults from Mexico, most of whom were migrating for economic reasons.¹² Beginning in the 2010s, a growing share of migrants have come from Northern Central America¹³ (NCA) and, since the late 2010s, from countries throughout the Americas.¹⁴ Migrant populations from these newer source countries have included large numbers of families and children, many of whom are traveling to escape violence, political oppression, and for other non-economic reasons.¹⁵

Cubans are fleeing the island in record numbers, eclipsing the mass exodus of Cuban migrants seen during the Mariel exodus of 1980.¹⁶ In FY 2022, DHS encountered about 213,709 unique Cuban nationals at the SWB, a seven-fold increase over FY 2021 rates, and a marked 29-fold increase over FY 2020.¹⁷ FY 2022 average monthly unique encounters of Cuban nationals at the land border totaled 17,809, a stark increase over the average monthly rate of 589 unique encounters in FYs 2014–

2019.¹⁸ These trends are only accelerating in FY 2023. In October and November 2022, DHS encountered 62,788 unique Cuban nationals at the border—almost one third FY 2022's record total.¹⁹ The monthly average of 31,394 unique Cuban nationals is a 76 percent increase over the FY 2022 monthly average.²⁰ The first 10 days of December 2022 saw 15,657 encounters of Cubans at the SWB.²¹ In FY 2023, Cuban nationals have represented 16.5 percent of all unique encounters at the SWB, the second largest origin group.²²

Maritime migration from Cuba also increased sharply in FY 2022 compared to FY 2021. According to DHS data, in FY 2022, a total of 5,740 Cuban nationals were interdicted at sea, the top nationality, compared to 827 in FY 2021, an almost 600 percent increase in a single fiscal year.²³

In addition to the increase of Cuban nationals in U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) interdictions at sea and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encounters at the SWB, USBP encounters of Cubans in southeast coastal sectors are also on the rise.²⁴ In FY 2022, DHS encountered 2,657 unique Cuban nationals (46 percent of total unique encounters), an increase of 1,040 percent compared to FY 2021.²⁵ This trend also has accelerated sharply in FY 2023, as CBP has made 1,917 unique encounters of Cuban nationals in the first two months of the FY—almost three-quarters of FY 2022's total.²⁶ Cuban nationals are 72 percent of all unique encounters in these sectors in October and November.²⁷

3. Push and Pull Factors

DHS assesses that the high—and rising—number of Cuban nationals encountered at the SWB and interdicted at sea is driven by three key factors: First, Cuba is facing its worst economic crisis in decades due to the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, high food prices, and economic sanctions.²⁸ Second, the government's

response has been marked by further political repression, including widespread arrests and arbitrary detentions in response to protests.²⁹ Third, the United States faces significant limits on the ability to return Cuban nationals who do not establish a legal basis to remain in the United States to Cuba or elsewhere; absent the ability to return Cubans who do not have a lawful basis to stay in the United States, more individuals are willing to take a chance that they can come—and stay.

Further, in November 2021, the Government of Nicaragua announced visa-free travel for Cubans.³⁰ This policy provided Cubans a more convenient and accessible path into the continent, facilitating their ability to begin an irregular migration journey to the SWB via land routes.³¹ Many such Cuban migrants fall victim to human smugglers and traffickers, who look to exploit the most vulnerable individuals for profit with utter disregard for their safety and wellbeing, as they attempt the dangerous journey northward through Central America and Mexico.³²

i. Factors Pushing Migration From Cuba

There are a number of economic and other factors that are driving migration of Cuban nationals. Cuba is undergoing its worst economic crisis since the 1990s³³ due to the lingering impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced foreign aid from Venezuela because of that country's own economic crisis, high food prices, and U.S. economic sanctions.³⁴ In July 2022, the

¹² According to historic OIS Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, Mexican nationals accounted for 96 to over 99 percent of apprehensions of persons entering without inspection between 1980 and 2000. OIS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, various years. On Mexican migrants from this era's demographics and economic motivations see Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey, and Emilio A. Parrado, "The New Era of Mexican Migration to the United States," *The Journal of American History* Vol. 86, No. 2, 518–536 (Sept. 1999).

¹³ Northern Central America refers to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

¹⁴ According to OIS analysis of CBP data, Mexican nationals continued to account for 89 percent of total SWB encounters in FY 2010, with Northern Central Americans accounting for 8 percent and all other nationalities for 3 percent. Northern Central Americans' share of total encounters increased to 21 percent by FY 2012 and averaged 46 percent in FY 2014–FY 2019, the last full year before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. All other countries accounted for an average of 5 percent of total SWB encounters in FY 2010–FY 2013, and for 10 percent of total encounters in FY 2014–FY 2019.

¹⁵ Prior to 2013, the overall share of encounters who were processed for expedited removal and claimed fear averaged less than 2 percent annually. Between 2013 and 2018, the share rose from 8 to 20 percent, before dropping with the surge of family unit encounters in 2019 (most of whom were not placed in expedited removal) and the onset of T42 expulsions in 2020. At the same time, between 2013 and 2021, among those placed in expedited removal, the share making fear claims increased from 16 to 82 percent. OIS analysis of historic CBP and USCIS data and OIS Enforcement Lifecycle through June 30, 2022.

¹⁶ El País, *The Cuban Migration Crisis, Biggest Exodus in History Holds Key to Havana-Washington Relations*, Dec. 15, 2022, <https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-12-15/the-cuban-migration-crisis-biggest-exodus-in-history-holds-key-to-havana-washington-relations.html> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

¹⁷ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through November 30, 2022.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ OIS analysis of CBP Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) data pulled on December 12, 2022.

²² OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through November 30, 2022.

²³ OIS analysis of United States Coast Guard (USCG) data provided October 2022; Maritime Interdiction Data from USCG, October 5, 2022.

²⁴ Includes Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; and Ramey, PR sectors where all apprehensions are land apprehensions not maritime.

²⁵ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through November 30, 2022.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ The Economist, *Cuba is Facing Its Worst Shortage of Food Since 1990s*, July 1, 2021, <https://>

www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/07/01/cuba-is-facing-its-worst-shortage-of-food-since-the-1990s (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

²⁹ Miami Herald, *As Cubans Demand Freedom, President Díaz-Canel Says He Will Not Tolerate 'Illegitimate' Protests*, October 2, 2022, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article266767916.html> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³⁰ Reuters, *Nicaragua Eliminates Visa Requirement for Cubans*, November 23, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-eliminates-visa-requirement-cubans-2021-11-23/> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³¹ The New York Times, *Cuban Migrants Arrive to U.S. in Record Numbers, on Foot, Not by Boat*, May 4, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/03/world/americas/cuban-migration-united-states.html> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³² CNN, *Cubans are Arriving to the U.S. in Record Numbers. Smugglers are Profiting from Their Exodus*, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/12/americas/cuba-mass-migration-intl-latam/index.html>, May 12, 2022 (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³³ The Economist, *Cuba is Facing Its Worst Shortage of Food Since 1990s*, July 1, 2021, <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/07/01/cuba-is-facing-its-worst-shortage-of-food-since-the-1990s> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³⁴ Congressional Research Service, *Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress*, Sept. 22, 2022, <https://>

Government of Cuba (GOC) reported the economy contracted by 10.9% in 2020, grew by 1.3% in 2021, and is projected to expand by 4% in 2022.³⁵ However, this projected expansion is unlikely to respond to the needs of the Cuban people. Mass shortages of dairy and other basic goods continue to persist, and Cubans wait in lines for hours to receive subsidized cooking oil or other basic goods.³⁶ Deepening poverty, exacerbated by the COVID–19 pandemic, has led to food shortages and rolling blackouts, and continues to batter the economy.³⁷ This combination of factors has created untenable economic conditions on the island that are likely to continue to drive Cubans to travel irregularly to the United States in the immediate future.³⁸

The GOC has not been able to effectively address these issues to date, and has instead taken to repressive tactics to manage public discontent. Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian regime under the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) government, which continues to restrict freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and other human rights.³⁹ The GOC employs arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate critics, independent activists, political opponents, and others.⁴⁰ While the Cuban constitution grants limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, the GOC restricts these freedoms in practice.⁴¹ The government routinely blocks any attempts to peacefully assemble that might result in opposition to, or criticism of, the government.⁴² This was evident when the human rights situation in Cuba began to decline significantly in 2020.⁴³

crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47246 (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

³⁵ Caribbean Council, *Gil Says Economic Recovery Gradual, Inflation Must Be Better Addressed*, Cuba Briefing, July 25, 2022, <https://www.caribbean-council.org/gil-says-economic-recovery-gradual-inflation-must-be-better-addressed/> (last visited Sept. 25, 2022).

³⁶ Washington Post, *In Cuba, a Frantic Search for Milk*, May 21, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/cuba-economy-milk-shortage/> (last visited Sept. 25, 2022).

³⁷ New York Times, *'Cuba Is Depopulating': Largest Exodus Yet Threatens Country's Future*, Dec. 10, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/10/world/americas/cuba-us-migration.html> (last visited Dec. 16, 2022).

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba*, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cuba/> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ Congressional Research Service, *Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview*, Aug. 5, 2022, <https://>

In November 2020, the government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression.⁴⁴ This crackdown, coupled with deteriorating economic conditions (food and medicine shortages and blackouts), led to demonstrations in Havana and throughout the country.⁴⁵

According to a Human Rights Watch report, the GOC also committed extensive human rights violations in response to massive anti-government protests in July 2021 with the apparent goal of punishing protesters and deterring future demonstrations.⁴⁶ The report documents a wide range of human rights violations against well-known government critics and ordinary citizens, including, arbitrary detention, prosecutions without fair trial guarantees, and cases of physical ill treatment, including beatings that in some cases constitute torture.⁴⁷ Several organizations reported countrywide internet outages, followed by erratic connectivity, including restrictions on social media and messaging platforms.⁴⁸

Protests over the challenges of obtaining basic necessities have continued as have heavy-handed government responses. In September 2022, a prolonged blackout caused by Hurricane Ian led to protests in Havana and other cities.⁴⁹ Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel denounced the peaceful gatherings as “counterrevolutionary” and “indecent,” remarking that “[d]emonstrations of this type have no legitimacy.”⁵⁰ Amnesty International received reports of the GOC deploying the military and police to repress these protests as well as reports of arbitrary detention.⁵¹

crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10045 (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Prison or Exile: Cuba's Systematic Repression of July 2021 Demonstrators*, July 11, 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/07/11/prison-or-exile/cubas-systematic-repression-july-2021-demonstrators>.

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2022—Cuba*. See <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cuba>.

⁴⁹ Dave Sherwood, Reuters, Oct. 1, 2022, *Banging pots, Cubans stage rare protests over Hurricane Ian blackouts*, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cubans-havana-bang-pots-protest-days-long-blackout-after-ian-2022-09-30/>.

⁵⁰ Miami Herald, *As Cubans Demand Freedom, President Díaz-Canel Says He Will Not Tolerate 'Illegitimate' Protests*, October 2, 2022, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article266767916.html> (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).

⁵¹ Amnesty International, *Cuba: Tactics of Repression Must Not be Repeated*, Oct. 5, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/cuba-repression-must-not-be-repeated/> (last viewed Dec. 19, 2022).

The government's repression and inability to address the underlying shortages that inspired those lawful demonstrations have generated a human rights and humanitarian crisis that is driving Cubans from the country. On June 2, 2022, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in its 2021 Annual Report stated that no guarantees currently exist for exercising freedom of expression in Cuba.⁵² Although the forms of harassment of independent journalists, artists, activists, and any who question government officials are not new, the 2021 Annual Report notes that they are worsening quickly.⁵³ The government controls formal media and closely monitors and targets perceived dissidents within the artistic community, mainstream artists, and media figures who express independent or critical views.⁵⁴ GOC frequently blocks access to many news websites and blogs and has repeatedly imposed targeted restrictions on critics' access to cellphone data.⁵⁵

Cuba's deteriorating economic conditions and political repression continue to increasingly drive Cubans out of their country. As a result, many have taken dangerous journeys, including through maritime means, often costing their lives at sea and on land while trying to reach the United States.

ii. Return Limitations

Due to the global COVID–19 pandemic, the GOC stopped accepting regular returns of their nationals via U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aircraft after February 28, 2020. The U.S. Government has been engaged in discussions with the GOC to reactivate the Migration Accords, which specify that the United States will process 20,000 Cuban nationals—not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens—to come to the United States through immigrant visas and other lawful pathways, such as the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) program, and that the Cuban government will accept the repatriation of its nationals who are encountered entering the United States without authorization. A limited number of removal flights will not, absent other efforts, impose a deterrent to Cuban nationals seeking to cross, unauthorized, into the United States.

⁵² IACHR, *Annual Report 2021—Chapter IV.B—Cuba*, p.678, June 2, 2022, <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/ia.asp?Year=2021> (last visited Dec. 19, 2022).

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ *Id.*

As a result, the U.S. did not return any Cuban nationals directly to Cuba in FY 2022. In addition, other countries, including Mexico, have generally refused to accept the returns of Cuban nationals, with limited exceptions including Cubans who have immediate family members who are Mexican citizens or who otherwise have legal status in Mexico. In FY 2022, DHS expelled 4,710 Cuban nationals to Mexico, equivalent to 2 percent of Cuban encounters for the year.⁵⁶

Like the Venezuela process, the Cuba process will require a significant expansion of opportunities for return or removal, to include the GOM's acceptance of Cuban nationals encountered attempting to irregularly enter the United States without authorization between POEs.

Returns alone, however, are not sufficient to reduce and divert the flows of Cubans. The United States will combine a consequence for Cuban nationals who seek to enter the United States irregularly at the land border with an incentive to use the safe, orderly process to request authorization to travel by air to, and seek parole to enter, the United States, without making the dangerous journey to the border.

4. Impact on DHS Resources and Operations

To respond to the increase in encounters along the SWB since FY 2021—an increase that has accelerated in FY 2022, driven in part by the number of Cuban nationals encountered—DHS has taken a series of extraordinary steps. Since FY 2021, DHS has built and now operates 10 soft-sided processing facilities at a cost of \$688 million. CBP and ICE detailed a combined 3,770 officers and agents to the SWB to effectively manage this processing surge. In FY 2022, DHS had to utilize its above threshold reprogramming authority to identify approximately \$281 million from other divisions in the Department to address SWB needs, to include facilities, transportation, medical care, and personnel costs.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent \$260 million in FYs 2021 and 2022 combined on grants to non-governmental (NGO) and state and local entities through the Emergency Food and Shelter Program—Humanitarian (EFSP-H) to assist with the reception and onward travel of migrants arriving at the SWB. This spending is in addition to \$1.4 billion in additional FY 2022 appropriations

that were designated for SWB enforcement and processing capacities.⁵⁷

The impact has been particularly acute in certain border sectors. The increased flows of Cuban nationals are disproportionately occurring within the remote Del Rio and Yuma sectors, both of which are at risk of operating, or are currently operating, over capacity. In FY 2022, 73 percent of unique encounters of Cuban nationals occurred in these two sectors.⁵⁸ Thus far in FY 2023, Del Rio and Yuma sectors have accounted for 72 percent of unique encounters of Cuban nationals.⁵⁹ In FY 2022, Del Rio and Yuma sectors encountered over double (137 percent increase) the number of migrants as compared to FY 2021, a fifteen-fold increase over the average for FY 2014–FY 2019, in part as a result of the sharp increase in Cuban nationals being encountered there.⁶⁰

The focused increase in encounters within those two sectors is particularly challenging. Del Rio sector is geographically remote, and because—up until the past two years—it has not been a focal point for large numbers of individuals entering irregularly, it has limited infrastructure and personnel in place to safely process the elevated encounters that they are seeing. The Yuma Sector is along the Colorado River corridor, which presents additional challenges to migrants, such as armed robbery, assault by bandits, and drowning, as well as to the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents encountering them. El Paso sector has relatively modern infrastructure for processing noncitizens encountered at the border but is far away from other CBP sectors, which makes it challenging to move individuals for processing elsewhere during surges.

In an effort to decompress sectors that are experiencing surges, DHS deploys lateral transportation, using buses and flights to move noncitizens to other sectors that have additional capacity to process. In November 2022, USBP sectors along the SWB operated a combined 602 decompression bus routes to neighboring sectors and operated 124 lateral decompression flights, redistributing noncitizens to other sectors with additional capacity.⁶¹

⁵⁷ DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Interested Parties, *DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness* (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-preparedness.pdf.

⁵⁸ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through November 30, 2022.

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ Data from SBCC, as of December 11, 2022.

Because DHS assets are finite, using air resources to operate lateral flights reduces DHS's ability to operate international repatriation flights to receiving countries, leaving noncitizens in custody for longer and further taxing DHS resources. Fewer international repatriation flights in turn exacerbates DHS's inability to return or remove noncitizens in its custody by sending the message that there is no consequence for illegal entry.

The sharp increase in maritime migration has also had a substantial impact on DHS resources. USCG has surged resources and shifted assets from other missions due to this increased irregular maritime migration. In response to the persistently elevated levels of irregular maritime migration across all southeast vectors, the Director of Homeland Security Task Force-Southeast (HSTF-SE) elevated the operational phase of DHS's maritime mass migration plan (Operation Vigilant Sentry) from Phase 1A (Preparation) to Phase 1B (Prevention).⁶² Operation Vigilant Sentry is HSTF-SE's comprehensive, integrated, national operational plan for a rapid, effective, and unified response of federal, state, and local capabilities in response to indicators and/or warnings of a mass migration in the Caribbean.

The shift to Phase 1B triggered the surge of additional DHS resources to support HSTF-SE's Unified Command staff and operational rhythm. For example, between July 2021 and August 2022, Coast Guard operational planners surged three times the number of large cutters to the South Florida Straits and the Windward Passage, four times the number of patrol boats and twice the number of fixed/rotary-wing aircraft to support maritime domain awareness and interdiction operations in the southeastern maritime approaches to the United States. USCG also added two MH-60 helicopters to respond to increased maritime migration flows in FY 2022.⁶³ Moreover, USCG had to almost double its flight hour coverage per month to support migrant interdictions in FY 2022. Increased resource demands translate into increased maintenance on those high demand air and sea assets.

DHS assesses that a reduction in the flow of Cuban nationals arriving at the SWB or taking to sea would reduce pressure on overstretched resources and enable the Department to more quickly

⁶² Operation Vigilant Sentry (OVS) Phase 1B, Information Memorandum for the Secretary from RADM Brendon C. McPherson, Director, Homeland Security Task Force—Southeast, August 21, 2022.

⁶³ Joint DHS and DOD Brief on Mass Maritime Migration, August 2022.

⁵⁶ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset and CBP subject-level data through November 30, 2022.

process and, as appropriate, return or remove those who do not have a lawful basis to stay, or repatriate those encountered at sea while also delivering on other maritime missions.

II. DHS Parole Authority

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with the discretionary authority to parole noncitizens “into the United States temporarily under such reasonable conditions as [the Secretary] may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”⁶⁴ Parole is not an admission of the individual to the United States, and a parolee remains an “applicant for admission” during the period of parole in the United States.⁶⁵ DHS sets the duration of the parole based on the purpose for granting the parole request and may impose reasonable conditions on parole.⁶⁶ DHS may terminate parole in its discretion at any time.⁶⁷ By regulation, parolees may apply for and be granted employment authorization to work lawfully in the United States.⁶⁸

This process will combine a consequence for those who seek to enter the United States irregularly between POEs with a significant incentive for Cuban nationals to remain where they are and use a lawful process to request authorization to travel by air to, and ultimately apply for discretionary grant of parole into, the United States for a period of up to two years.

III. Justification for the Process

As noted above, section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA confers upon the Secretary of Homeland Security the discretionary authority to parole noncitizens “into the United States temporarily under such reasonable conditions as [the Secretary] may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”⁶⁹

A. Significant Public Benefit

The parole of Cuban nationals and their immediate family members under

this process—which imposes new consequences for Cubans who seek to enter the United States irregularly between POEs, while providing an alternative opportunity for eligible Cuban nationals to seek advance authorization to travel to the United States to seek discretionary parole, on a case-by-case basis, in the United States—serves a significant public benefit for several, interrelated reasons. Specifically, we anticipate that the parole of eligible individuals pursuant to this process will: (i) enhance border security through a reduction in irregular migration of Cuban nationals, including by imposing additional consequences on those who seek to enter between POEs; (ii) improve vetting for national security and public safety; (iii) reduce strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the domestic impact of irregular migration from Cuba; (v) provide a disincentive to undergo the dangerous journey that puts migrant lives and safety at risk and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill important foreign policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in the hemisphere and, as part of those efforts, to establish additional processing pathways from within the region to discourage irregular migration.

1. Enhance Border Security by Reducing Irregular Migration of Cuban Nationals

As described above, Cuban nationals make up a significant and growing number of those encountered seeking to cross between POEs irregularly. DHS assesses that without additional and more immediate consequences imposed on those who seek to do so, together with a safe and orderly process for Cubans to enter the United States, without making the journey to the SWB, the numbers will continue to grow.

By incentivizing individuals to seek a safe, orderly means of traveling to the United States through the creation of an alternative pathway to the United States, while imposing additional consequences to irregular migration, DHS assesses this process could lead to a meaningful drop in encounters of Cuban individuals along the SWB and at sea. This expectation is informed by the recently implemented process for Venezuelans and the significant shifts in migratory patterns that took place once the process was initiated. The success to date of the Venezuela process provides compelling evidence that coupling effective disincentives for irregular entry with incentives for a safe, orderly parole process can meaningfully shift migration patterns in the region and to the SWB.

Implementation of the parole process is contingent on the GOM’s independent decision to accept the return of Cuban nationals who voluntarily depart the United States, those who voluntarily withdraw their applications for admission, and those subject to expedited removal who cannot be removed to Cuba or elsewhere. The ability to effectuate voluntary departures, withdrawals, and removals of Cuban nationals to Mexico will impose a consequence on irregular entry that currently does not exist.

2. Improve Vetting for National Security and Public Safety

All noncitizens whom DHS encounters at the border undergo thorough vetting against national security and public safety databases during their processing. Individuals who are determined to pose a national security or public safety threat are detained pending removal. That said, there are distinct advantages to being able to vet more individuals before they arrive at the border so that we can stop individuals who could pose threats to national security or public safety even earlier in the process. The Cuban parole process will allow DHS to vet potential beneficiaries for national security and public safety purposes before they travel to the United States.

As described below, the vetting will require prospective beneficiaries to upload a live photograph via an app. This will enhance the scope of the pre-travel vetting—thereby enabling DHS to better identify those with criminal records or other disqualifying information of concern and deny them travel before they arrive at our border, representing an improvement over the status quo.

3. Reduce the Burden on DHS Personnel and Resources

By reducing encounters of Cuban nationals encountered at sea or at the SWB, and channeling decreased flows of Cuban nationals to interior POEs, we anticipate that the process could relieve some of the impact increased migratory flows have had on the DHS workforce along the SWB. This process is expected to free up resources, including those focused on decompression of border sectors, which in turn may enable an increase in removal flights—allowing for the removal of more noncitizens with final orders of removal faster and reducing the number of days migrants are in DHS custody. While the process will also draw on DHS resources within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and CBP to process requests for discretionary parole on a

⁶⁴ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 6 U.S.C. 202(4) (charging the Secretary with the responsibility for “[e]stablishing and administering rules . . . governing . . . parole”). Cubans paroled into the United States through this process are not being paroled as refugees, and instead will be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis for a significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons. This parole process does not, and is not intended to, replace refugee processing.

⁶⁵ INA sec. 101(a)(13)(B), 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(B), 1182(d)(5)(A).

⁶⁶ See 8 CFR 212.5(c).

⁶⁷ See 8 CFR 212.5(e).

⁶⁸ See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).

⁶⁹ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).

case-by-case basis and conduct vetting, these requirements involve different parts of DHS and require fewer resources as compared to the status quo.

In the Caribbean, DHS also has surged significant resources—mostly from USCG—to address the heightened rate of maritime encounters. Providing a safe and orderly alternative path is expected to also reduce the number of Cubans who seek to enter the United States by sea, and will allow USCG to better balance its other important missions, including its counter-drug smuggling operations, protection of living marine resources, support for shipping navigation, and a range of other critical international engagements.

In addition, permitting Cuban nationals to voluntarily depart or withdraw their application for admission one time and still be considered for parole through the process will reduce the burden on DHS personnel and resources that would otherwise be required to obtain and execute a final order of removal. This includes reducing strain on detention and removal flight capacity, officer resources, and reducing costs associated with detention and monitoring.

4. Minimize the Domestic Impact

Though the Venezuelan process has significantly reduced the encounters of Venezuelan nationals, other migratory flows continue to strain domestic resources, which is felt most acutely by border communities. Given the inability to remove, return, or repatriate Cuban nationals in substantial numbers, DHS is currently conditionally releasing 87 percent of the Cuban nationals it encounters at the border, pending their removal proceedings or the initiation of such proceedings, and Cuban nationals accounted for 23 percent of all encounters released at the border in November 2022.⁷⁰ The increased volume of provisional releases of Cuban nationals puts strains on U.S. border communities.

Generally, since FY 2019, DHS has worked with Congress to make approximately \$290 million available through FEMA's EFSP to support NGOs and local governments that provide initial reception for migrants entering through the SWB. These entities have engaged to provide services and assistance to Cuban nationals and other noncitizens who have arrived at our border, including by building new administrative structures, finding additional housing facilities, and

constructing tent shelters to address the increased need.⁷¹ FEMA funding has supported building significant NGO capacity along the SWB, including a substantial increase in available shelter beds in key locations.

Nevertheless, local communities have reported strain on their ability to provide needed social services. Local officials and NGOs report that the temporary shelters that house migrants are quickly reaching capacity due to the high number of arrivals,⁷² and stakeholders in the border region have expressed concern that shelters will eventually reach full bed space capacity and not be able to host any new arrivals.⁷³ Since Cuban nationals account for a significant percentage of the individuals being conditionally released into communities after being processed along the SWB, this parole process will address these concerns by diverting flows of Cuban nationals into a safe and orderly process in ways that DHS anticipates will yield a decrease in the numbers arriving at the SWB.

DHS anticipates that this process will help minimize the burden on communities, state and local governments, and NGOs who support the reception and onward travel of migrants arriving at the SWB. Beneficiaries are required to fly at their own expense to an interior POE, rather than arriving at the SWB. They also are only authorized to come to the United States if they have a supporter who has agreed to receive them and provide basic needs, including housing support. Beneficiaries also are eligible to apply for work authorization, thus enabling them to support themselves.

5. Disincentivize a Dangerous Journey That Puts Migrant Lives and Safety at Risk and Enriches Smuggling Networks

The process, which will incentivize intending migrants to use a safe, orderly, and lawful means to access the United States via commercial air flights, cuts out the smuggling networks. This is critical, because transnational criminal organizations—including the Mexican drug cartels—are increasingly playing a

key role in human smuggling, reaping billions of dollars in profit and callously endangering migrants' lives along the way.⁷⁴

In FY 2022, more than 750 migrants died attempting to enter the United States across the SWB,⁷⁵ an estimated 32 percent increase from FY 2021 (568 deaths) and a 195 percent increase from FY 2020 (254 deaths).⁷⁶ The approximate number of migrants rescued by CBP in FY 2022 (almost 19,000 rescues)⁷⁷ increased 48 percent from FY 2021 (12,857 rescues), and 256 percent from FY 2020 (5,336 rescues).⁷⁸ Although exact figures are unknown, experts estimate that about 30 bodies have been taken out of the Rio Grande River each month since March 2022.⁷⁹ CBP attributes these rising trends to increasing numbers of migrants, as evidenced by increases in overall U.S. Border Patrol encounters.⁸⁰ The increased rates of both migrant deaths and those needing rescue at the SWB demonstrate the perils in the migrant journey.

Meanwhile, these numbers do not account for the countless incidents of death, illness, and exploitation migrants experience during the perilous journey north. These migratory movements are in many cases facilitated by numerous human smuggling organizations, for which the migrants are pawns;⁸¹ the organizations exploit migrants for profit, often bringing them across inhospitable deserts, rugged mountains, and raging rivers, often with small children in tow. Upon reaching the border area,

⁷⁴ CBP, Fact Sheet: Counter Human Smuggler Campaign Updated (Oct. 6, 2022), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/06/fact-sheet-counter-human-smuggler-campaign-update-dhs-led-effort-makes-5000th>.

⁷⁵ CNN, *First on CNN: A Record Number of Migrants Have Died Crossing the US-Mexico Border* (Sept. 7, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html>.

⁷⁶ DHS, CBP, *Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress*.

⁷⁷ CNN, *First on CNN: A Record Number of Migrants Have Died Crossing the US-Mexico Border* (Sept. 7, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html>.

⁷⁸ DHS, CBP, *Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress*.

⁷⁹ The Guardian, *Migrants Risk Death Crossing Treacherous Rio Grande River for 'American Dream'* (Sept. 5, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-grande-river-for-american-dream>.

⁸⁰ DHS, CBP, *Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress*.

⁸¹ DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Interested Parties, *DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness* (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-preparedness.pdf.

⁷⁰ OIS analysis of CBP subject-level data and OIS Persist Dataset based on data through November 30, 2022.

⁷¹ CNN, *Washington, DC, Approves Creation of New Agency to Provide Services for Migrants Arriving From Other States*, Sept. 21, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-migrant-services-office>.

⁷² San Antonio Report, *Migrant aid groups stretched thin as city officials seek federal help for expected wave*, Apr. 27, 2022, <https://sanantonioreport.org/migrant-aid-groups-stretched-thin-city-officials-seek-federal-help/>.

⁷³ KGUN9 Tucson, *Local Migrant Shelter Reaching Max Capacity as it Receives Hundreds per Day*, Sept. 23, 2022, <https://www.kgun9.com/news/local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day>.

noncitizens seeking to cross into the United States generally pay transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to coordinate and guide them along the final miles of their journey. Tragically, a significant number of individuals perish along the way. The trailer truck accident that killed 55 migrants in Chiapas, Mexico, in December 2021 and the tragic incident in San Antonio, Texas, on June 27, 2022, in which 53 migrants died of the heat in appalling conditions, are just two examples of many in which TCOs engaged in human smuggling prioritize profit over safety.⁸²

Migrants who travel via sea also face perilous conditions, including at the hands of smugglers. Human smugglers continue to use unseaworthy, overcrowded vessels that are piloted by overexperienced mariners. These vessels often lack any safety equipment, including but not limited to: personal flotation devices, radios, maritime global positioning systems, or vessel locator beacons. USCG and interagency consent-based interviews suggest that human-smuggling networks and migrants consider the attempts worth the risk.⁸³

The increase in migrants taking to sea, under dangerous conditions, has led to devastating consequences. In FY 2022, the USCG recorded 107 noncitizen deaths, including presumed dead, as a result of irregular maritime migration. In January 2022, the Coast Guard located a capsized vessel with a survivor clinging to the hull. USCG crews interviewed the survivor who indicated there were 34 others on the vessel, who were not in the vicinity of the capsized vessel and survivor.⁸⁴ The USCG conducted a multi-day air and surface search for the missing migrants, eventually recovering five deceased migrants; the others were presumed lost at sea.⁸⁵

DHS anticipates this process will save lives and undermine the profits and operations of the dangerous TCOs that

put migrants' lives at risk for profit because it incentivizes intending migrants to use a safe and orderly means to access the United States via commercial air flights, thus ultimately reducing the demand for smuggling networks to facilitate the dangerous journey to the SWB. By reducing the demand for these services, DHS is effectively targeting the resources of TCOs and human-smuggling networks that so often facilitate these unprecedented movements with utter disregard for the health and safety of migrants. DHS and federal partners have taken extraordinary measures—including the largest-ever surge of resources against human-smuggling networks—to combat and disrupt the TCOs and smugglers and will continue to do so.⁸⁶

6. Fulfill Important Foreign Policy Goals To Manage Migration Collaboratively in the Hemisphere

Promoting a safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy throughout the Western Hemisphere has been a top foreign policy priority for the Administration. This is reflected in three policy-setting documents: the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy);⁸⁷ the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (CMMS);⁸⁸ and the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection (L.A. Declaration), which was endorsed in June 2022 by 21 countries.⁸⁹ The CMMS and the L.A. Declaration call for a collaborative and regional approach to migration, wherein countries in the hemisphere commit to implementing programs and processes to stabilize communities hosting migrants or those of high outward-migration; humanely enforce existing laws regarding movements across international boundaries, especially when minors are involved; take actions to stop migrant smuggling by targeting the criminals

involved in these activities; and provide increased regular pathways and protections for migrants residing in or transiting through the 21 countries.⁹⁰ The L.A. Declaration specifically lays out the goal of collectively “expand[ing] access to regular pathways for migrants and refugees.”⁹¹

The U.S. Government has been working with the GOC to restart the Cuba Migration Accords. On November 15, 2022, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss the implementation of the Accords and to underscore our commitment to pursuing safe, regular, and humane migration between Cuba and the United States.⁹² These Migration Talks provide an opportunity for important discussions on mutual compliance with the Migration Accords—composed of a series of binding bilateral agreements between the United States and Cuba signed in 1984, 1994, 1995, and 2017—which establish certain commitments of the United States and Cuba relating to safe, legal, and orderly migration.

In September 2022, the U.S. Government announced the resumption of operations under the CFRP program, which allows certain beneficiaries of family-based immigrant petitions to seek parole into the United States while waiting for a visa number to become available. Beginning in early 2023, U.S. Embassy Havana will resume full immigrant visa processing for the first time since 2017, which will, over time, increase the pool of noncitizens eligible for CFRP.⁹³ Approved beneficiaries through this process will enter the United States as parolees but will be eligible to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status once their immigrant visas become available. Also during this period, Cubans may be eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence under the Cuban Adjustment Act.⁹⁴

While these efforts represent important progress for certain Cubans who are the beneficiaries of a family-based immigrant petition, CFRP's narrow eligibility, challenges faced

⁸² Reuters, *Migrant Truck Crashes in Mexico Killing 54* (Dec. 9, 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-idUKKBN2IP01R>; Reuters, *The Border's Toll: Migrants Increasingly Die Crossing into U.S. from Mexico* (July 25, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-from-mexico-idUSLAN2Z247X>.

⁸³ Email from U.S. Coast Guard to DHS Policy, Re: heads up on assistance needed, Dec. 13, 2022.

⁸⁴ Adriana Gomez Licon, Associated Press, Situation ‘dire’ as Coast Guard seeks 38 missing off Florida, Jan. 26, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/florida-capsized-boat-live-updates-f251d7d279b6c1fe064304740c3a3019>.

⁸⁵ Adriana Gomez Licon, Associated Press, Coast Guard suspends search for migrants off Florida, Jan. 27, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/florida-lost-at-sea-79253e1c65cf5708f19a97b6875ae239>.

⁸⁶ See DHS Update on Southwest Border Security and Preparedness Ahead of Court-Ordered Lifting of Title 42, Dec. 13, 2022, <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/update-southwest-border-security-and-preparedness-ahead-court-ordered-lifting-title-42> (last visited Dec. 18, 2022).

⁸⁷ National Security Council, *Root Causes of Migration in Central America* (July 2021), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf>.

⁸⁸ National Security Council, *Collaborative Migration Management Strategy*, July 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.

⁸⁹ *Id.*; The White House, *Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection* (LA Declaration), June 10, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/>.

⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² Department of State, *Migration Talks with the Government of Cuba*, Nov. 15, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/migration-talks-with-the-government-of-cuba-2/>.

⁹³ USCIS, *USCIS Resumes Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program Operations*, <https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscis-resumes-cuban-family-reunification-parole-program-operations>, Sept. 9, 2022 (last visited Dec. 10, 2022).

⁹⁴ Public Law 89-732, Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Nov. 2, 1966, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-80/pdf/STATUTE-80-Pg1161.pdf> (last viewed Dec. 16, 2022).

operating in Cuba, and more modest processing throughput mean that additional pathways are required to meet the current and acute border security and irregular migration mitigation objective. This new process helps achieve these goals by providing an immediate and temporary orderly process for Cuban nationals to lawfully enter the United States while we work to improve conditions in Cuba and expand more permanent lawful immigration pathways in the region, including refugee processing and other lawful pathways into the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries. It thus provides the United States another avenue to lead by example.

The process also responds to an acute foreign policy need. Key allies in the region—including specifically the Governments of Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica—are affected by the increased movement of Cuban nationals and have been seeking greater U.S. action to address these challenging flows for some time. Cuban flows contribute to strain on governmental and civil society resources in Mexican border communities in both the south and the north—something that key foreign government partners have been urging the United States to address.

Along with the Venezuelan process, this new process adds to these efforts and enables the United States to lead by example. Such processes are a key mechanism to advance the larger domestic and foreign policy goals of the U.S. Government to promote a safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy throughout our hemisphere. The new process also strengthens the foundation for the United States to press regional partners—many of which are already taking important steps—to undertake additional actions with regards to this population, as part of a regional response. Any effort to meaningfully address the crisis in Cuba will require continued efforts by these and other regional partners.

Importantly, the United States will only implement the new parole process while able to remove or return to Mexico Cuban nationals who enter the United States without authorization across the SWB. The United States' ability to execute this process thus is contingent on the GOM making an independent decision to accept the return or removal of Cuban nationals who bypass this new process and enter the United States without authorization.

For its part, the GOM has made clear its position that, in order to effectively manage the migratory flows that are impacting both countries, the United

States needs to provide additional safe, orderly, and lawful processes for migrants who seek to enter the United States. The GOM, as it makes its independent decisions as to its ability to accept returns of third country nationals at the border and its efforts to manage migration within Mexico, is thus closely watching the United States' approach to migration management and whether it is delivering on its plans in this space. Initiating and managing this process—which is dependent on GOM's actions—will require careful, deliberate, and regular assessment of GOM's responses to U.S. actions in this regard, and ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.

As noted above, this process is responsive to the GOM's request that the United States increase lawful pathways for migrants and is also aligned with broader Administration domestic and foreign policy priorities in the region. The process couples a meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, orderly means of traveling to the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter irregularly along the SWB. The goal of this process is to reduce the irregular migration of Cuban nationals while the United States, together with partners in the region, works to improve conditions in sending countries and create more immigration and refugee pathways in the region, including to the United States.

B. Urgent Humanitarian Reasons

The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this process will address the urgent humanitarian needs of Cuban nationals who have fled crippling economic conditions and social unrest in Cuba. The GOC continues to repress and punish all forms of dissent and public criticism of the regime and has continued to take actions against those who oppose its positions.⁹⁵ This process provides a safe mechanism for Cuban nationals who seek to leave their home country to enter the United States without having to make the dangerous journey to the United States.

IV. Eligibility To Participate in the Process and Processing Steps

A. Supporters

U.S.-based supporters must initiate the process by filing Form I-134A on behalf of a Cuban national and, if applicable, the national's immediate

⁹⁵ *Id.*; Congressional Research Service, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress, Sept. 22, 2022, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47246>.

family members.⁹⁶ Supporters may be individuals filing on their own, with other individuals, or on behalf of non-governmental entities or community-based organizations. Supporters are required to provide evidence of income and assets and declare their willingness to provide financial support to the named beneficiary for the length of parole. Supporters are required to undergo vetting to identify potential human trafficking or other concerns. To serve as a supporter under the process, an individual must:

- be a U.S. citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident; hold a lawful status in the United States; or be a parolee or recipient of deferred action or Deferred Enforced Departure;
- pass security and background vetting, including for public safety, national security, human trafficking, and exploitation concerns; and
- demonstrate sufficient financial resources to receive, maintain, and support the intended beneficiary whom they commit to support for the duration of their parole period.

B. Beneficiaries

In order to be eligible to request and ultimately be considered for a discretionary issuance of advance authorization to travel to the United States to seek a discretionary grant of parole at the POE, such individuals must:

- be outside the United States;
- be a national of Cuba or be a non-Cuban immediate family member⁹⁷ and traveling with a Cuban principal beneficiary;
- have a U.S.-based supporter who filed a Form I-134A on their behalf that USCIS has vetted and confirmed;
- possess an unexpired passport valid for international travel;
- provide for their own commercial travel to an air POE and final U.S. destination;
- undergo and pass required national security and public safety vetting;
- comply with all additional requirements, including vaccination requirements and other public health guidelines; and

⁹⁶ Certain non-Cubans may use this process if they are an immediate family member of a Cuban beneficiary and traveling with that Cuban beneficiary. For purposes of this process, immediate family members are limited to a spouse, common-law partner, and/or unmarried child(ren) under the age of 21.

⁹⁷ Certain non-Cubans may use this process if they are an immediate family member of a Cuban beneficiary and traveling with that Cuban beneficiary. For purposes of this process, immediate family members are limited to a spouse, common-law partner, and/or unmarried child(ren) under the age of 21.

• demonstrate that a grant of parole is warranted based on significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons, as described above, and that a favorable exercise of discretion is otherwise merited.

A Cuban national is ineligible to be considered for advance authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under this process if that person is a permanent resident or dual national of any country other than Cuba, or currently holds refugee status in any country, unless DHS operates a similar parole process for the country's nationals.⁹⁸

In addition, a potential beneficiary is ineligible for advance authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under this process if that person:

- fails to pass national security and public safety vetting or is otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable exercise of discretion;

- has been ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years or is subject to a bar to admissibility based on a prior removal order;⁹⁹

- has crossed irregularly into the United States, between the POEs, after January 9, 2023, except individuals permitted a single instance of voluntary departure pursuant to INA section 240B, 8 U.S.C. 1229c or withdrawal of their application for admission pursuant to INA section 235(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4) will remain eligible;

- has irregularly crossed the Mexican or Panamanian border after January 9, 2023; or

- is under 18 and not traveling through this process accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, and as such is a child whom the inspecting officer would determine to be an unaccompanied child.¹⁰⁰

Travel Requirements: Beneficiaries who receive advance authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole into the United States will be responsible for arranging and funding their own commercial air travel to an interior POE of the United States.

Health Requirements: Beneficiaries must follow all applicable requirements, as determined by DHS's Chief Medical Officer, in consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, with respect to health and travel, including vaccination and/or testing requirements

⁹⁸ This limitation does not apply to immediate family members traveling with a Cuban national.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A).

¹⁰⁰ As defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Children under the age of 18 must be traveling to the United States in the care and custody of their parent or legal guardian to be considered for parole at the POE under the process.

for diseases including COVID-19, polio, and measles. The most up-to-date public health requirements applicable to this process will be available at www.uscis.gov/CHNV.

C. Processing Steps

Step 1: Declaration of Financial Support

A U.S.-based supporter will submit a Form I-134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, with USCIS through the online myUSCIS web portal to initiate the process. The Form I-134A identifies and collects information on both the supporter and the beneficiary. The supporter must submit a separate Form I-134A for each beneficiary they are seeking to support, including Cubans' immediate family members and minor children. The supporter will then be vetted by USCIS to protect against exploitation and abuse, and to ensure that the supporter is able to financially support the beneficiary whom they agree to support. Supporters must be vetted and confirmed by USCIS, at USCIS' discretion, before moving forward in the process.

Step 2: Submit Biographic Information

If a supporter is confirmed by USCIS, the listed beneficiary will receive an email from USCIS with instructions to create an online account with myUSCIS and next steps for completing the application. The beneficiary will be required to confirm their biographic information in their online account and attest to meeting the eligibility requirements.

As part of confirming eligibility in their myUSCIS account, individuals who seek authorization to travel to the United States will need to confirm that they meet public health requirements, including certain vaccination requirements.

Step 3: Submit Request in CBP One Mobile Application

After confirming biographic information in myUSCIS and completing required eligibility attestations, the beneficiary will receive instructions through myUSCIS for accessing the CBP One mobile application. The beneficiary must then enter limited biographic information into CBP One and submit a live photo.

Step 4: Approval To Travel to the United States

After completing Step 3, the beneficiary will receive a notice in their myUSCIS account confirming whether CBP has, in CBP's discretion, provided the beneficiary with advance authorization to travel to the United

States to seek a discretionary grant of parole on a case-by-case basis. If approved, this authorization is generally valid for 90 days, and beneficiaries are responsible for securing their own travel via commercial air to an interior POE of the United States.¹⁰¹ Approval of advance authorization to travel does not guarantee parole into the United States. Whether to parole the individual is a discretionary determination made by CBP at the POE at the time the individual arrives at the interior POE.

All of the steps in this process, including the decision to grant or deny advance travel authorization and the parole decision at the interior POE, are entirely discretionary and not subject to appeal on any grounds.

Step 5: Seeking Parole at the POE

Each individual arriving at a POE under this process will be inspected by CBP and considered for a grant of discretionary parole for a period of up to two years on a case-by-case basis.

As part of the inspection, beneficiaries will undergo additional screening and vetting, to include additional fingerprint biometric vetting consistent with CBP inspection processes. Individuals who are determined to pose a national security or public safety threat or otherwise do not warrant parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), and as a matter of discretion upon inspection, will be processed under an appropriate processing pathway and may be referred to ICE for detention.

Step 6: Parole

If granted parole pursuant to this process, each individual generally will be paroled into the United States for a period of up to two years, subject to applicable health and vetting requirements, and will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under existing regulations. Individuals may request employment authorization from USCIS. USCIS is leveraging technological and process efficiencies to minimize processing times for requests for employment authorization. All individuals two years of age or older will be required to complete a medical screening for tuberculosis, including an IGRA test, within 90 days of arrival to the United States.

¹⁰¹ Air carriers can validate an approved and valid travel authorization submission using the same mechanisms that are currently in place to validate that a traveler has a valid visa or other documentation to facilitate issuance of a boarding pass for air travel.

D. Scope, Termination, and No Private Rights

The Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the Parole Process for Cubans at any point. The number of travel authorizations granted under this process shall be spread across this process and the separate and independent Parole Process for Nicaraguans, the Parole Process for Haitians, and Parole Process for Venezuelans (as described in separate notices published concurrently in today's edition of the **Federal Register**) and shall not exceed 30,000 each month in the aggregate. Each of these processes operates independently, and any action to terminate or modify any of the other processes will have no bearing on the criteria for or independent decisions with respect to this process.

This process is being implemented as a matter of the Secretary's discretion. It is not intended to and does not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party in any matter, civil or criminal.

V. Regulatory Requirements

A. Administrative Procedure Act

This process is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking and delayed effective date requirements on multiple grounds, and is therefore amenable to immediate issuance and implementation.

First, the Department is merely adopting a general statement of policy,¹⁰² *i.e.*, a "statement[] issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power."¹⁰³ As section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), provides, parole decisions are made by the Secretary of Homeland Security "in his discretion."

Second, even if this process were considered to be a legislative rule that would normally be subject to requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking and a delayed effective date, the process would be exempt from such requirements because it involves a foreign affairs function of the United States.¹⁰⁴ Courts have held that this exemption applies when the rule in question "is clearly and directly involved in a foreign affairs function."¹⁰⁵ In addition, although the text of the Administrative Procedure Act

does not expressly require an agency invoking this exemption to show that such procedures may result in "definitely undesirable international consequences," some courts have required such a showing.¹⁰⁶ This process satisfies both standards.

As described above, this process is directly responsive to requests from key foreign partners—including the GOM—to provide a lawful process for Cuban nationals to enter the United States. The United States will only implement the new parole process while able to return or remove to Mexico Cuban nationals who enter without authorization across the SWB. The United States' ability to execute this process is contingent on the GOM making an independent decision to accept the return or removal of Cuban nationals who bypass this new process and enter the United States without authorization. Thus, initiating and managing this process will require careful, deliberate, and regular assessment of the GOM's responses to this independent U.S. action and ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.

Delaying issuance and implementation of this process to undertake rulemaking would undermine the foreign policy imperative to act now. It also would complicate broader discussions and negotiations about migration management. For now, the GOM has indicated it is prepared to make an independent decision to accept the return or removal of Cuban nationals. That willingness could be impacted by the delay associated with a public rulemaking process involving advance notice and comment and a delayed effective date. Additionally, making it publicly known that we plan to return or remove nationals of Cuba to Mexico at a future date would likely result in an even greater surge in migration, as migrants rush to the border to enter before the process begins—which would adversely impact each country's border security and further strain their personnel and resources deployed to the border.

Moreover, this process is not only responsive to the interests of key foreign partners—and necessary for addressing migration issues requiring coordination between two or more governments—it is also fully aligned with larger and important foreign policy objectives of this Administration and fits within a web of carefully negotiated actions by multiple governments (for instance in the L.A. Declaration). It is the view of the United States that the

implementation of this process will advance the Administration's foreign policy goals by demonstrating U.S. partnership and U.S. commitment to the shared goals of addressing migration through the hemisphere, both of which are essential to maintaining strong bilateral relationships.

The invocation of the foreign affairs exemption here is also consistent with Department precedent. For example, DHS published a notice eliminating an exception to expedited removal for certain Cuban nationals, which explained that the change in policy was consistent with the foreign affairs exemption because the change was central to ongoing negotiations between the two countries.¹⁰⁷ DHS similarly invoked the foreign affairs exemption more recently, in connection with the Venezuela parole process.¹⁰⁸

Third, DHS assesses that there is good cause to find that the delay associated with implementing this process through notice-and-comment rulemaking and with a delayed effective date would be contrary to the public interest and impracticable.¹⁰⁹ The numbers of Cubans encountered at the SWB are already high, and a delay would greatly exacerbate an urgent border and national security challenge, and would miss a critical opportunity to reduce and divert the flow of irregular migration.¹¹⁰

Undertaking notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures would be contrary to the public interest because an advance announcement of the process would seriously undermine a key goal of the policy: it would incentivize even more irregular migration of Cuban nationals seeking to enter the United States before the process would take effect. There are urgent border and national security and humanitarian interests in reducing and diverting the flow of irregular migration.¹¹¹ It has long been recognized that agencies may use the good cause exception, and need not take public comment in advance, where significant public harm would result from the notice-and-comment

¹⁰⁷ See 82 FR 4902 (Jan. 17, 2017).

¹⁰⁸ See 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).

¹⁰⁹ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B); *id.* 553(d)(3).

¹¹⁰ See *Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC.*, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("The ["good cause"] exception excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, where delay could result in serious harm, or when the very announcement of a proposed rule itself could be expected to precipitate activity by affected parties that would harm the public welfare." (citations omitted)).

¹¹¹ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).

¹⁰² 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A); *id.* 553(d)(2).

¹⁰³ See *Lincoln v. Vigil*, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting *Chrysler Corp. v. Brown*, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)).

¹⁰⁴ 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).

¹⁰⁵ *Mast Indus. v. Regan*, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1582 (C.I.T. 1984) (cleaned up).

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., *Rajah v. Mukasey*, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2008).

process.¹¹² If, for example, advance notice of a coming price increase would immediately produce market dislocations and lead to serious shortages, advance notice need not be given.¹¹³ A number of cases follow this logic in the context of economic regulation.¹¹⁴

The same logic applies here, where the Department is responding to exceedingly serious challenges at the border, and advance announcement of that response would significantly increase the incentive, on the part of migrants and others (such as smugglers), to engage in actions that would compound those very challenges. It is well established that migrants may change their behavior in response to perceived imminent changes in U.S. immigration policy.¹¹⁵ For example, as detailed above, implementation of the parole process for Venezuelans was associated with a drastic reduction in irregular migration by Venezuelans. Had the parole process been announced prior to a notice-and-comment period, it

¹¹² See, e.g., *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA*, 682 F.3d 87, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the “good cause” exception “is appropriately invoked when the timing and disclosure requirements of the usual procedures would defeat the purpose of the proposal—if, for example, announcement of a proposed rule would enable the sort of financial manipulation the rule sought to prevent [or] in order to prevent the amended rule from being evaded” (cleaned up)); *DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc.*, 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (“[W]e are satisfied that there was in fact ‘good cause’ to find that advance notice of the freeze was ‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest’ within the meaning of section 553(b)(B). . . . Had advance notice issued, it is apparent that there would have ensued a massive rush to raise prices and conduct ‘actual transactions’—or avoid them—before the freeze deadline.” (cleaned up)).

¹¹³ See, e.g., *Nader v. Sawhill*, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (“[W]e think good cause was present in this case based upon [the agency’s] concern that the announcement of a price increase at a future date could have resulted in producers withholding crude oil from the market until such time as they could take advantage of the price increase.”).

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., *Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC.*, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The [“good cause”] exception excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, where delay could result in serious harm, or when the very announcement of a proposed rule itself could be expected to precipitate activity by affected parties that would harm the public welfare.” (citations omitted)); *Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy*, 728 F.2d 1477, 1492 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983) (“On a number of occasions . . . this court has held that, in special circumstances, good cause can exist when the very announcement of a proposed rule itself can be expected to precipitate activity by affected parties that would harm the public welfare.”).

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Tech Transparency Project, Inside the World of Misinformation Targeting Migrants on Social Media, <https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/inside-world-misinformation-targeting-migrants-social-media>, July 26, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 6, 2022).

likely would have had the opposite effect, resulting in many hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals attempting to cross the border before the program went into effect. Overall, the Department’s experience has been that in some circumstances when public announcements have been made regarding changes in our immigration laws and procedures that would restrict access to immigration benefits to those attempting to enter the United States along the U.S.-Mexico land border, there have been dramatic increases in the numbers of noncitizens who enter or attempt to enter the United States. Smugglers routinely prey on migrants in response to changes in domestic immigration law.

In addition, it would be impracticable to delay issuance of this process in order to undertake such procedures because—as noted above—maintaining the status quo, which involves record numbers of Cuban nationals currently being encountered attempting to enter without authorization at the SWB, coupled with DHS’s extremely limited options for processing, detaining, or quickly removing such migrants, would unduly impede DHS’s ability to fulfill its critical and varied missions. At current rates, a delay of just a few months to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking would effectively forfeit an opportunity to reduce and divert migrant flows in the near term, harm border security, and potentially result in scores of additional migrant deaths.

The Department’s determination here is consistent with past practice in this area. For example, in addition to the Venezuelan process described above, DHS concluded in January 2017 that it was imperative to give immediate effect to a rule designating Cuban nationals arriving by air as eligible for expedited removal because “pre-promulgation notice and comment would . . . endanger[] human life and hav[e] a potential destabilizing effect in the region.”¹¹⁶ DHS cited the prospect that “publication of the rule as a proposed rule, which would signal a significant change in policy while permitting continuation of the exception for Cuban nationals, could lead to a surge in migration of Cuban nationals seeking to travel to and enter the United States during the period between the publication of a proposed and a final rule.”¹¹⁷ DHS found that “[s]uch a surge would threaten national security and public safety by diverting valuable

Government resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities. A surge could also have a destabilizing effect on the region, thus weakening the security of the United States and threatening its international relations.”¹¹⁸ DHS concluded that “a surge could result in significant loss of human life.”¹¹⁹

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any new reporting requirements they impose. The process announced by this notice requires changes to two collections of information, as follows.

OMB has recently approved a new collection, Form I-134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support (OMB control number 1615-NEW). This new collection will be used for the Cuban parole process, and is being revised in connection with this notice, including by increasing the burden estimate. To support the efforts described above, DHS has created a new information collection that will be the first step in these parole processes and will not use the paper USCIS Form I-134 for this purpose. U.S.-based supporters will submit USCIS Form I-134A online on behalf of a beneficiary to demonstrate that they can support the beneficiary for the duration of their temporary stay in the United States. USCIS has submitted and OMB has approved a request for emergency authorization of the required changes (under 5 CFR 1320.13) for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, USCIS will immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.

OMB has previously approved an emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13 for a revision to an information collection from CBP entitled Advance Travel Authorization (OMB control number 1651-0143). In connection with the implementation of the process described above, CBP is making multiple changes under the PRA’s emergency processing procedures at 5 CFR 1320.13, including increasing the burden estimate and adding Cuban nationals as eligible for a DHS established process that necessitates collection of a facial photograph in CBP

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.*; accord, e.g., Visas: Documentation of Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 5907 (Feb. 4, 2016) (finding the good cause exception applicable because of similar short-run incentive concerns).

¹¹⁶ Eliminating Exception to Expedited Removal Authority for Cuban Nationals Arriving by Air, 82 FR 4769, 4770 (Jan. 17, 2017).

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

One™. OMB has approved the emergency request for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, CBP will immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.

More information about both collections can be viewed at www.reginfo.gov.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Implementation of Changes to the Parole Process for Venezuelans

ACTION: Notice

SUMMARY: This notice announces that the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) has authorized updates to the Parole Process for Venezuelans that was initiated in October 2022. The Venezuela process provides a safe and orderly pathway for certain individuals to seek authorization to travel to the United States to be considered for parole at an interior port of entry, contingent on the Government of Mexico (GOM) making an independent decision to accept the return or removal of Venezuelan nationals who bypass this new process and enter the United States without authorization. Pursuant to this notice, the Secretary has removed the limit of 24,000 total travel authorizations and replaced it with a monthly limit of 30,000 travel authorizations spread across this process and the separate and independent Parole Process for Cubans, Parole Process for Haitians, and Parole Process for Nicaraguans (as described in separate notices published concurrently in today's edition of the **Federal Register**). The Secretary also has updated the eligibility criteria for the Venezuela process by including an exception that will enable Venezuelans who cross without authorization into the United States at the Southwest Border (SWB) and are subsequently permitted a one-time option to voluntarily depart or voluntarily withdraw their application for admission to maintain eligibility to participate in this parole process. DHS believes that these changes are needed to ensure that the Venezuela process continues to deliver the already-realized benefits of reducing the number of Venezuelan nationals crossing our border without authorization and the surge in migration throughout the hemisphere and channels migrants into

a safe and orderly process that enables them to enter the United States without making the dangerous journey to the SWB.

DATES: DHS will begin using the Form I–134A, Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, for this process on January 6, 2023. DHS will apply the changes to the process beginning on January 6, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Delgado, Acting Director, Border and Immigration Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528–0445; telephone (202) 447–3459 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background—Venezuelan Parole Process

On October 19, 2022, DHS published a **Federal Register** Notice describing a new effort to address the high number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB.¹ Since the announcement of that process, Venezuelans who have not availed themselves of the process, and instead entered the United States without authorization, have been expelled to Mexico pursuant to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Title 42 public health Order or, if not expelled, processed for removal or the initiation of removal proceedings.

Once the Title 42 public health Order is lifted, DHS will no longer expel noncitizens to Mexico, but rather all noncitizens will be processed pursuant to DHS's Title 8 immigration authorities. The United States' continued operation of this process will continue to be contingent on the GOM's independent decision to accept the return of removal of individuals, including under Title 8 authorities.

Eligibility To Participate in the Process

As described in the October 19 **Federal Register** Notice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented a process—modeled on the successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) parole process—for certain Venezuelan nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner. To be eligible, individuals must have a supporter in the United States who agrees to provide financial support, such as housing and other needs; must pass national security and public safety vetting; and must agree to fly at their own expense to an interior U.S. port of

entry (POE), rather than entering at a land POE.

Individuals are ineligible if they have been ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years or have entered unauthorized into the United States, Mexico, or Panama after October 19, 2022. Venezuelan nationals also are generally ineligible if they are a permanent resident or dual national of any country or hold refugee status in any country other than Venezuela, though per the conforming change described below, they will now remain eligible to be considered for parole under this process if DHS operates a similar parole process for nationals of that other country. Only those who meet all specified criteria will be eligible to receive advance authorization to travel to the United States and be considered for parole, on a case-by-case basis, under this process. The process originally limited the number of Venezuelans who could receive travel authorization to 24,000.

II. Assessment of Venezuela Parole Process to Date

The success of the Venezuela process demonstrates that combining a clear and meaningful consequence for unauthorized entry along the SWB with a significant incentive for migrants to wait where they are and use a lawful process to come to the United States can change migratory flows. Within a week of the October 12, 2022 announcement of that process, the number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to under 200 per day, and as of the week ending December 4, to an average of 86 per day.² The new process and accompanying consequence for unauthorized entry also led to a precipitous decline in Venezuelan irregular migration³ throughout the Western Hemisphere. The number of Venezuelans attempting to enter Panama through the Darién was down from 40,593 in October 2022 to just 668 in November.⁴ DHS provided the new parole process for Venezuelans who are backed by supporters in the United States to come to the United States by

² Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of data pulled from CBP Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) December 5, 2022. Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those being paroled in through ports of entry.

³ In this notice, irregular migration refers to the movement of people into another country without authorization.

⁴ Servicio Nacional de Migración de Panamá, Irregulares en Tránsito Frontera Panamá-Colombia 2022, https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_%20DARI%C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf (last viewed Dec. 11, 2022).

¹ 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).