

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA  
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
 ) Criminal No. 1:12-cr-00172  
 Plaintiff, )  
 ) **PLEA AGREEMENT**  
 v. )  
 )  
 DAVID E. McMASTER, )  
 )  
 Defendant. )

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States of America, by Timothy Q. Purdon, United States Attorney for the District of North Dakota, Denis J. McNerney, Chief, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, United States Department of Justice, and Fraud Section attorneys Robert Zink and Jack B. Patrick (collectively, “the United States”), and defendant, DAVID E. McMASTER, and defendant’s attorney, James J. Belanger, hereby agree to the following:

1. Defendant acknowledges the Information charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.
2. Defendant has read the charge and defendant’s attorney has fully explained the charge to defendant.
3. Defendant fully understands the nature and elements of the charged crime.
4. Defendant will voluntarily plead guilty to the Information.
5. The parties agree this Plea Agreement shall be filed and become a part of the Court record and be governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c). The parties specifically agree that Rule 11(c)(1)(C) does not apply. If the United States makes the non-binding recommendations specified in this Plea Agreement, then defendant acknowledges this agreement will have been

fulfilled. Except as provided in Rule 11(c)(5), the Court's refusal to accept any or all terms of the Plea Agreement does not give defendant a right to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

6. Defendant DAVID E. McMASTER will plead guilty because defendant is in fact guilty of the charge contained in the Information. In pleading guilty to the Information, defendant DAVID E. McMASTER acknowledges and believes that if this matter were to proceed to trial the United States could prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:

a. Defendant was the vice president in charge of operations of American Mortgage Specialists, Inc. ("AMS").

b. Scott N. Powers was the chief executive officer and president of AMS. Powers was the defendant's supervisor at AMS.

c. AMS was in the business of originating residential real estate mortgage loans to borrowers in Arizona and other states and then selling the loans to institutional investors, including J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo. AMS obtained funding for the loans by selling participation interests in the loans to financial institutions, including BNC National Bank ("BNC").

d. BNC was a national bank with headquarters in Bismarck, North Dakota and offices in several states, including Arizona. BNC was a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines. BNC's holding company was also a recipient of approximately \$20,000,000 in federal funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"). The holding company injected approximately \$18 million of the TARP funds into BNC.

e. On or about October 30, 2006, BNC entered into a loan participation agreement with AMS to provide funding for loans originated by AMS. BNC was a 100 percent participant in the AMS loans, that is, BNC provided all of the funding on loans to the borrowers in

which BNC participated. Under its initial agreement with BNC, the maximum principal amount outstanding on the aggregate of all loans at any time during the participation term was \$25 million, rising in later agreements to \$27.5 million. Under its agreements and understandings with AMS, BNC could require AMS to repurchase loans when the loans did not sell by the loan maturity date and if AMS did not get an extension. AMS also was required by its agreements and understandings with BNC to provide financial information to BNC, including periodic financial statements, and AMS was required to maintain certain minimum tangible net worth and to meet certain financial ratios. AMS was also required to disclose any change in the status of the loan collateral.

f. BNC provided funding for each loan via a wire of funds from a “funding” account at BNC in Bismarck, North Dakota. When loans were sold to investors, the funds were to be wired from the investors, often bundled together as one wire for several loans, to a “purchase” account held at BNC in North Dakota and AMS was to send a “pay down” email to BNC notifying it of the sales. The pay down emails provided the loan number, the borrower’s name, and the amount of the funds wired for the loan purchase. BNC used the pay down information to calculate the loan participation principal, interest and fees owed to BNC and to calculate additional amounts where a loan sale was insufficient to cover amounts due from AMS. Based in part on the AMS pay down emails which identified loans that had been sold to investors, BNC sent monthly reports to AMS listing what BNC understood were the outstanding loans held for sale.

g. By October 2007, AMS began to experience cash shortages. To cover its deficit, DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott N. Powers caused AMS to send false information to BNC in order to continue to obtain mortgage loan funding from BNC. Without this funding, AMS would have shut down operations. In particular, DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott N. Powers caused

employees of AMS to delay notification to BNC that loans had sold, waiting at times months after the loans had been sold to investors, until funds from new loan sales had been received in sufficient amounts to make “lapping” payments that would appear to match the dollar amounts reported in the pay down emails for the earlier-sold loans. At times, it would take a greater number of newly sold loans to cover the dollar amounts shown in the fraudulent pay down emails for the earlier-sold loans. Meanwhile, AMS used funds received from the earlier-sold loans to pay for the operations of AMS and to provide benefits to DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott N. Powers, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in salary, bonuses and payments for personal expenses.

h. When BNC inquired as to why specific loans – usually the oldest loans – had not sold, DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott N. Powers would provide and cause to be provided to BNC false and misleading explanations to divert further scrutiny and then would cause pay down emails to be sent requesting pay downs on those loans, giving the impression that those loans had just sold.

i. The pay down emails were drafted by DAVID E. McMASTER, who then sent them to an AMS employee or an employee of an AMS affiliate and directed the employee to send them to BNC in Bismarck, North Dakota. At times, generally when he was on vacation or otherwise unavailable to monitor the incoming investor wires from new loan sales, DAVID E. McMASTER sent an employee a list of “priority” pay downs, describing the order in which to pay down those loans in specific amounts based on the dollar amount of funds received from new sales and the balance in the purchase account. At times during and as part of the conspiracy, DAVID E. McMASTER also falsely inflated the dollar amount of the loan sales reported in the pay down emails, which created the appearance of a greater gains on the sales of loans, including instances

where there was actually a loss on the sale. The false pay down emails also included requests for BNC to pay down hundreds of thousands of dollars of loans made to POWERS and McMASTER, funded by BNC. DAVID E. McMASTER kept Scott N. Powers fully apprised of the true status of the loans and actions taken to carry out the fraud.

j. DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott N. Powers also provided other materially false and misleading information to BNC about AMS' operations and financial condition. For example, DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott E. Powers caused an AMS employee to send financial statements to BNC which overstated AMS's cash-on-hand in order to reach the minimum requirements in its financial covenants with BNC and which further created the appearance that AMS had liquid assets of over \$1 million when, in fact, cash actually available to AMS was significantly below that amount. The financial statements also disguised and "buried" under marketing and advertising expenses \$55,000 per month in payments that AMS was making under installment agreements with the IRS regarding a delinquency in unpaid payroll taxes. From his discussions with BNC, DAVID E. McMASTER knew that one of the material facts in BNC's decision in agreeing to loan funding arrangement was that AMS had resolved its payroll tax delinquency.

k. As the fraud continued and as BNC continued to fund loans, the loss to BNC continued to grow. In addition, DAVID E. McMASTER and Scott Powers used BNC funds to make hundreds of thousands of dollars in loans to themselves and used diverted funds to pay off the loans. By on or about April 20, 2010, only a handful of loans actually remained to be sold, totaling less than \$1 million, rather than the approximately \$27 million of loans for which BNC had advanced funds to AMS and had not been repaid. The resulting loss to BNC proximately caused by the fraud was

approximately \$26 million. As a result of the fraud, BNC incurred losses which exceed the \$20,000,000 that BNC received from TARP and BNC did not then make its required TARP dividend payments to the United States Department of Treasury between February 2010 and December 2011.

7. Defendant understands the charge carries the following maximum penalties:

Imprisonment:	30 years
Fine:	not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss
Supervised Release:	5 years
Special Assessment:	\$100

Defendant agrees to pay to the Clerk of United States District Court the \$100 special assessment on the day of sentencing.

8. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty defendant surrenders rights, including:

a. The right to a speedy public jury trial and related rights pertaining thereto, as follows:

(i) A jury would be composed of 12 lay persons selected at random. Defendant and defendant's attorney would help choose the jurors by removing prospective jurors "for cause," where actual bias or other disqualification is shown; or by removing jurors without cause by exercising peremptory challenges. The jury would be instructed that defendant is presumed innocent and that it could not return a guilty verdict unless it found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(ii) If trial were held without a jury then the judge would find the facts and determine whether defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(iii) At a trial, whether by a jury or judge, the United States is required to present witness testimony and other evidence against defendant. Defendant's attorney can confront

and examine them. In turn, the defense can present witness testimony and other evidence. If witnesses for defendant refuse to appear voluntarily, defendant can require their attendance through the subpoena power of the Court.

(iv) At trial, defendant has a privilege against self-incrimination; thus, defendant can decline to testify. No inference of guilt can be drawn from defendant's refusal to testify. Defendant can choose to testify, but cannot be required to testify.

b. Defendant has a right to remain silent. However, under terms of the Plea Agreement, the Judge will likely ask defendant questions about defendant's criminal conduct, to ensure that there is a factual basis for defendant's plea.

9. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty defendant gives up all of the rights set forth in the prior paragraph, and there will be no trial. Defendant's attorney has explained these rights, and consequences of defendant's waiver.

10. The Court shall impose a sentence sufficient to comply with purposes set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act. In doing so, the Court shall consider factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and must consult and take into account the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (USSG). Defendant understands that the United States will fully apprise the District Court and the United States Probation and Pretrial Services Office of the nature, scope, and extent of defendant's conduct, including all matters in aggravation and mitigation relevant to the issue of sentencing. The United States expressly reserves the right to appeal from an unreasonable sentence.

11. This Plea Agreement is binding only upon the United States Attorney for the District of North Dakota and the Fraud Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice. It

does not bind any United States Attorney outside the District of North Dakota, nor does it bind any state or local prosecutor. They remain free to prosecute defendant for any offenses under their jurisdiction. This Plea Agreement also does not bar or compromise any civil or administrative claim.

12. Defendant understands the United States reserves the right to notify any local, state, or federal agency by whom defendant is licensed, or with whom defendant does business, of defendant's conviction.

13. The parties agree that the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for defendant's conduct is 7 (USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1)).

14. The parties agree that the following upward adjustments are applicable in this case:

- An upward adjustment of 22 levels for a loss exceeding \$20 million but less than \$50 million. (USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L)).
- An upward adjustment of 2 levels for an offense involving sophisticated means. (USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c)).

The parties have not reached an agreement regarding whether or not the following upward adjustments are applicable in this case:

- An upward adjustment of 4 levels for an offense which substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution. (USSG § 2B1.1(b)(15)(B)(I)).
- An upward adjustment of 4 levels for the defendant's role in the offense as an organizer and leader of the criminal activity. (USSG § 3B1.1).

15. If the defendant demonstrates a genuine acceptance of responsibility for this offense up to and including the time of sentencing, consistent with USSG § 3E1.1, the United States agrees

to recommend at sentencing a 2-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to USSG § 3E1.1(a). If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under USSG § 3E1.1(a) and the offense level determined prior to the operation of USSG § 3E1.1(a) is level 16 or greater, the United States further agrees to move for an additional 1-level downward adjustment pursuant to USSG § 3E1.1(b) for timely notifying the United States of defendant's intention to enter a guilty plea, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court and the United States to allocate their resources efficiently.

16. Neither the Court nor the Probation Office are parties to the Plea Agreement. Neither the Court nor the Probation Office are bound by the Plea Agreement as to determining the guidelines range. The Court may impose a reasonable sentence anywhere within the statutory range. The Court may depart from the applicable guidelines range if the Court, on the record, states factors not contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to justify the departure. Both parties reserve the right to object to any departure. See USSG § 1B1.1, comment.(n.1) (defines "departure"). There may be other adjustments the parties have not agreed upon.

17. Forfeiture Obligations. The defendant agrees to forfeit all interests in any asset that constitutes the proceeds of his offense that the defendant owns or over which the defendant exercises control, directly or indirectly, as well as any property that is traceable to, derived from, fungible with, or a substitute for such property. The assets subject to forfeiture in this case include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a money judgment of \$28,564,470.46, representing the total proceeds generated by the defendant and his co-conspirator's crimes.

The defendant understands that the forfeiture of assets is part of the sentence that must be

imposed in this case. The defendant agrees to consent to the entry of orders of forfeiture for such property and waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and 43(a) regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, announcement of the forfeiture at sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment. The defendant agrees to waive all interests in the asset(s) in any administrative or judicial forfeiture proceeding, whether criminal or civil, state or federal. The United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota and the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice agree to recommend to the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section that any monies obtained from the defendant through forfeiture be transferred to the Clerk to distribute to the victim(s) of the offense in accordance with any restitution order entered in this case.

The defendant agrees to identify all assets over which the defendant exercises or exercised control, directly or indirectly, within the past six years, or in which the defendant has or had during that time any financial interest in the manner requested by the United States. The defendant agrees to take all steps as requested by the United States to obtain from any other parties by any lawful means any records of assets owned at any time by the defendant. The defendant agrees to undergo any polygraph examination the United States may choose to administer concerning such assets and to provide and/or consent to the release of the defendant's tax returns for the previous six years.

The defendant further agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory challenges in any manner (including direct appeal, habeas corpus, or any other means) to any forfeiture carried out in accordance with this Plea Agreement on any grounds, including that the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine or punishment. The defendant also waives any failure by the Court to advise the

defendant of any applicable forfeiture at the time the guilty plea is accepted as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(J).

The defendant agrees to take all steps as requested by the United States to pass clear title to forfeitable assets to the United States, and to testify truthfully in any judicial forfeiture proceeding. The defendant understands and agrees that all property covered by this agreement is subject to forfeiture as proceeds of illegal conduct and substitute assets for property otherwise subject to forfeiture. The defendant acknowledges that failing to cooperate in full in either the forfeiture or the disclosure of assets constitutes a breach of this Plea Agreement.

18. At sentencing, the United States will

(a) recommend that defendant be ordered to pay restitution to BNC National Bank in an amount to be determined; and,

(b) recommend that defendant be ordered to pay a fine in an amount not inconsistent with an applicable advisory Guidelines (fine) range.

19. Defendant acknowledges and understands that if defendant violates any term of this Plea Agreement, engages in any further criminal activity, or fails to appear for sentencing, the United States will be released from its commitments. In that event, this Plea Agreement shall become null and void, at the discretion of the United States, and defendant will face the following consequences:

(1) all testimony and other information defendant has provided at any time to attorneys, employees, or law enforcement officers of the government, to the Court, or to the Federal grand jury, may be used against defendant in any prosecution or proceeding; and (2) the United States will be entitled to reinstate previously dismissed charges and/or pursue additional charges against defendant and to use any information obtained directly or indirectly from defendant in those additional prosecutions.

Nothing in this agreement prevents the United States from prosecuting defendant for perjury, false statement, or false declaration if defendant commits such acts in connection with this agreement or otherwise.

20. Defendant acknowledges the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2259 and 3663A, which require the Court to order restitution to any victim of the offense, unless the Court determines that restitution would not be appropriate. Defendant agrees to pay restitution upon such terms as may be ordered by the Court. Defendant further agrees to grant the United States a wage assignment, liquidate assets, or complete any other tasks the Court finds reasonable and appropriate for the prompt payment of any restitution or fine ordered by the Court.

21. The United States agrees that USSG § 1B1.8 is applicable to defendant. Any information provided by the defendant, other than that charged in the Information, in connection with defendant's assistance to the United States, including debriefing and testimony, will not be used to increase defendant's Sentencing Guideline level or used against defendant for further prosecution, if in the opinion of the United States Attorney defendant has met all of defendant's obligations under the Plea Agreement and provided full, complete, and truthful information and testimony. However, nothing revealed by the defendant during defendant's debriefings and testimony would preclude defendant's prosecution for any serious violent crimes.

22. Defendant's Waiver of Appeal. Defendants have a right to appeal their conviction and sentence (Judgment), unless they agree otherwise. Appeals are taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (appellate court), pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742(a). The appellate court has ruled that defendants can waive (give up) their right to appeal. Defendants often waive their right to appeal as part of a plea agreement and in exchange for

concessions by the United States. The appellate court will enforce such waivers.

Defendant and defendant's attorney acknowledge they have fully reviewed and fully discussed the record in this case and all issues that may be raised on appeal. They have fully discussed defendant's right of appeal and the consequences of waiver. Defendant has decided to waive any right of appeal, except as may be provided herein.

By signing this agreement, defendant voluntarily waives defendant's right to appeal the Court's Judgment against defendant; and, absent a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant waives all rights to contest the Judgment in any post-conviction proceeding, including one pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. Defendant reserves only the right to appeal from a sentence that is greater than the upper limit of the Court-determined Sentencing Guidelines range.

Defendant understands that the United States was motivated by defendant's willingness to waive any right of appeal when the United States chose to offer defendant terms of a plea agreement. In other words, the United States was willing to offer certain terms favorable to defendant in exchange for finality. Defendant understands and agrees this case will be over once defendant has been sentenced by the Court. Defendant agrees that it will be a breach of this agreement if defendant appeals in violation of this agreement. The United States will rely upon defendant's waiver and breach as a basis for dismissal of the appeal. Moreover, defense counsel may reasonably conclude and inform the appellate court that an appeal is wholly frivolous. Defense counsel may then move to withdraw, citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 529 (2000). Defendant agrees an appeal in violation of this agreement should be dismissed.

By signing this agreement, the defendant further specifically waives defendant's right to seek

to withdraw defendant's plea of guilty, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(d), once the plea has been entered in accordance with this agreement. The appellate court will enforce such waivers. The defendant agrees that any attempt to withdraw defendant's plea will be denied and any appeal of such denial should be dismissed.

23. The Fraud Section and the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota will not contact any other state or federal prosecuting jurisdiction and voluntarily turn over truthful information that the defendant provides under this agreement to aid a prosecution of the defendant in that jurisdiction. Should any other prosecuting jurisdiction attempt to use truthful information the defendant provides pursuant to this agreement against the defendant, the Fraud Section and the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota agree, upon request, to contact that jurisdiction and ask that jurisdiction to abide by the immunity provisions of this plea agreement. Prior to turning over any information, the Fraud Section or United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota will contact undersigned counsel for the defendant in order to permit the defendant the opportunity to contact the requesting jurisdiction and speak with that jurisdiction about its request. The parties understand that the prosecuting jurisdiction retains the discretion over whether to use such information.

24. The undersigned attorneys for the United States and the attorney for defendant agree to abide by the provisions of Rule 32(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The attorneys acknowledge their obligation to use good-faith efforts to resolve any disputes regarding the Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) through a presentence conference or other informal procedures.

25. Defendant acknowledges reading and understanding all provisions of the Plea

Agreement. Defendant and defendant's attorney have discussed the case and reviewed the Plea Agreement. They have discussed defendant's constitutional and other rights, including, but not limited to, defendant's plea-statement rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

AGREED:

TIMOTHY Q. PURDON  
United States Attorney


DENIS J. McINERNEY  
United States Department of Justice  
Chief  
Criminal Division, Fraud Section

Dated: 9/20/12


BY: 

ROBERT ZINK  
Trial Attorney  
JACK B. PATRICK  
Senior Litigation Counsel  
Criminal Division, Fraud Section

Dated: 9/19/12

  
DAVID E. McMASTER  
Defendant

Dated: 9/19/2012

  
JAMES J. BELANGER  
Attorney for Defendant