

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, }  
Plaintiff, }  
v. } Civil Action  
LYMAN GUN SIGHT CORPORATION; } No. 890-56  
W. R. WEAVER; M. JACKSON STITH; }  
JOHN UNERTL; NATIONAL RIFLE }  
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; POPULAR }  
SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.; }  
and HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, INC., }  
Defendants. }

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, United States of America, having filed its complaint herein on February 29, 1956; the defendants having appeared and filed their answers to the complaint denying the material allegations thereof; and the plaintiff and the defendants, by their attorneys, having severally consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and without this Final Judgment constituting evidence or an admission by any party hereto in respect of any such issue;

NOW, THEREFORE, before the taking of any testimony and without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon the consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

I

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter herein and of all the parties hereto. The complaint states a claim upon which relief against the defendants may be granted under Section 1 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce

II

As used in this Final Judgment:

- (A) "Manufacturing defendants" means defendants Lyman Gun Sight Corporation, W. R. Weaver and John Unertl;
- (B) "Publishing defendants" means defendants National Rifle Association of America, Popular Science Publishing Company, Inc., and Henry Holt and Company, Inc.;
- (C) "Scopes" means all telescopic sights, utilizing optical glasses, to be secured or mounted on rifles for the purpose of aiming more accurately than would be possible with metallic sights. Scopes usually contain a reticule in the form of cross hairs, a dot or a post;
- (D) "Manufacturer's suggested prices" means any prices determined by a manufacturing defendant and suggested to any jobber or dealer as prices to be charged by a person or persons other than such defendant on sales of scopes manufactured by such defendant;
- (E) "Consumer advertisements" means any advertisements by a manufacturing defendant in any outdoors magazine or in any sales literature sent directly to consumers which suggest prices to be charged by a person or persons other than defendant on sales of scopes manufactured by such defendant;
- (F) "Person" means an individual, partnership, firm, corporation, or any other legal entity [for the purpose of this definition a manufacturing defendant, its subsidiaries, officers, directors, agents and employees shall be deemed to be one person];
- (G) "Fair trade agreement" means any resale price maintenance contract, or supplement thereto, pursuant to which the resale price of scopes is fixed, established or maintained under state fair trade laws in accordance with either Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended;

facturers thereof and resells them to other distributors or retailers;

(I) "Dealer" means any person who buys scopes from manufacturers or jobbers and retails them to the ultimate consumer;

(J) "Off-list dealer" means any person who, in making sales to ultimate consumers, fails to adhere to manufacturer's suggested prices or prices in manufacturer's consumer advertisements;

(K) "Outdoors magazine" means any periodical having interstate circulation and devoted, principally, to outdoors activities such as marksmanship, hunting and fishing.

### III

The provisions of this Final Judgment applicable to any defendant shall apply to such defendant, its subsidiaries, successors and assigns and to each of its or their officers, directors, agents and employees, and to all persons in active concert or participation with any defendant who shall have received actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

### IV

The manufacturing defendants are jointly and severally enjoined and restrained from entering into, adhering to, maintaining or furthering any contract, agreement, understanding or concerted plan of action with or among themselves, with any publisher of any outdoors magazine, with any jobber or dealer in scopes or with any other person:

- (A) to maintain or stabilize resale prices on scopes;
- (B) to coerce or compel dealers to observe, or adhere to manufacturer's suggested prices or prices in consumer advertisements;
- (C) to coerce or compel jobbers to observe, or adhere to manufacturer's suggested prices or prices in consumer advertisements;
- (D) to refuse to sell scopes to off-list dealers;

(E) to coerce or induce jobbers to refuse to sell scopes to off-list dealers;

(F) to coerce or induce publishers of outdoors magazines to reject advertisements offering scopes for sale by off-list dealers or by any other person;

(G) to establish cooperative means and methods to accomplish the exclusion from outdoors magazines of advertisements offering scopes for sale by off-list dealers or by any other person;

(H) to cause, initiate or enforce boycotts against advertisements for the sale of scopes by off-list dealers or by any other person.

V

The manufacturing defendants are jointly and severally enjoined and restrained from:

(A) coercing or compelling dealers to observe, or adhere to, manufacturer's suggested prices or prices in consumer advertisements;

(B) coercing or compelling jobbers to observe, or adhere to, manufacturer's suggested prices or prices in consumer advertisements for scopes;

(C) coercing or compelling jobbers to refuse to sell scopes to off-list dealers;

(D) coercing or compelling publishers of outdoors magazines to reject advertisements offering scopes for sale by off-list dealers;

(E) establishing cooperative means and methods to accomplish the exclusion from outdoors magazines of advertisements offering scopes for sale by off-list dealers;

(F) causing, initiating or enforcing boycotts against advertisements for the sale of scopes by off-list dealers.

VI

The manufacturing defendants are jointly and severally ordered and directed to cancel forthwith all fair trade agreements to which such defendants are now a party, and any such defendant who is a party thereto shall give notice to plaintiff, within ninety days from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, that such fair trade agreements have been cancelled.

VII

The manufacturing defendants are jointly and severally enjoined and restrained, for a period of seven years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, from entering into, adhering to, or enforcing any fair trade agreement. After this seven year period of time, nothing contained in this Final Judgment shall prevent any manufacturing defendant from entering into, adhering to, or enforcing any fair trade agreement, valid and enforceable in the state where to be enforced, or from taking any lawful action permitted or required by any such fair trade law.

VIII

The manufacturing defendants are jointly and severally enjoined and restrained for a period of two years commencing ninety days from the date of entry of this Final Judgment from:

- (A) publishing any manufacturer's suggested prices, or
- (B) engaging in any consumer advertisements unless any reference therein to prices is limited to suggesting that scopes manufactured by such defendant may be purchased from persons other than defendant for approximately a stated number of dollars and advising that local dealers should be consulted to determine the actual prices for such scopes.

In the event that any manufacturing defendant during the period of seven years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment shall elect (subject to Section VIII herein) to engage in consumer advertisements, such defendant during the time of the publication of such consumer advertisements is ordered and directed either to sell scopes or cause jobbers to sell scopes to any off-list dealer with satisfactory credit standing, who makes application in writing to such defendant, without discrimination as to availability, price, terms and conditions of sale, or credit requirements; provided, however, that nothing contained in this Section IX shall be interpreted to prevent such defendant or a jobber of such defendant from giving to any person, purchasing scopes for resale, functional or quantity discounts otherwise lawful.

X

Each of the manufacturing defendants is ordered and directed within ninety days after the date of entry of this Final Judgment to mail a true and complete copy of this Final Judgment to each jobber and dealer on such defendant's current distribution list for sales or advertising materials relating to scopes, or with whom such defendant has in effect on the date of entry of this Final Judgment a fair trade agreement relating to scopes.

XI

Defendant M. Jackson Stith shall become subject to all provisions in Sections I - X, and XV and XVI of this Final Judgment if and when he either engages in the manufacture of scopes, or sells scopes manufactured exclusively for him which he sells under his own name.

XII

The publishing defendants are jointly and severally enjoined and restrained from entering into, adhering to or claiming any rights under any contract, agreement, understanding or common course of

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conduct with any manufacturer, jobber or dealer of scopes or any  
publisher of outdoors magazines whereby any publishing defendant  
refuses to accept, publish, carry or run advertisements for scopes  
offered by any dealer, jobber, off-list dealer or other person at  
prices less than the manufacturer's list prices therefor, if the  
advertisements otherwise meet the reasonable standards uniformly  
applied by the defendants.

XIII

Each publishing defendant is enjoined and restrained, for a period  
of ten years commencing ninety days from the date of entry of this  
Final Judgment, from refusing to publish or threatening to refuse to  
publish advertisements for scopes from any dealer, jobber, off-list  
dealer or other person advertising such scopes for sale, where the  
advertiser and the advertisements meet the reasonable standards  
uniformly applied by the defendant without regard to the fact that the  
advertiser offers scopes for sale at prices less than the manufacturer's  
list prices therefor.

XIV

Each of the publishing defendants is ordered and directed within  
ninety days after the date of entry of this Final Judgment to mail a  
true and complete copy of this Final Judgment to each off-list dealer  
who has been refused, since March 1, 1949, advertising of scopes by  
such defendant.

XV

For the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment,  
and for no other purpose, and subject to any legally recognized  
privilege, duly authorized representatives of the Department of Justice  
shall, upon the written request of the Attorney General or the Assistant  
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, upon reasonable  
notice to the defendants made to their principal offices, be permitted:  
(a) reasonable access, during the office hours of said defendants, to

all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession of or under the control of said defendants relating to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment; and (b) subject to the reasonable convenience of said defendants and without restraint or interference from them, to interview the officers and employees of defendants, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters. For the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, any defendant, upon the written request of the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and upon reasonable notice made to its principal office, shall submit such written reports with respect to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as from time to time may be necessary for the enforcement of this Final Judgment. No information obtained by the means provided in this Section XV shall be divulged by a representative of the Department of Justice to any person other than a duly authorized representative of such Department except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is a party for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

XVI

Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Final Judgment, for the modification or termination of

any of the provisions thereof, for the enforcement of compliance therewith, and for the punishment of violations thereof.

Dated: Washington, D. C.

November 8, 1957

/s/ F. Dickinson Letts  
United States District Judge

We hereby consent to the making and entry  
of the foregoing Final Judgment.

For the Plaintiff:

/s/ Victor R. Hansen  
Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Max Freeman

/s/ W. D. Kilgore, Jr.

/s/ James L. Minicus

/s/ Baddia J. Rashid

/s/ William H. Crabtree

/s/ Forrest A. Ford

For the Defendants:

Lyman Gun Sight Corporation

W. R. Weaver

By /s/ Rodney J. McMahon  
General Counsel for Lyman  
Gun Sight Corporation

By Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl  
By /s/ Jerryold G. Van Cise

M. Jackson Stith

John Unertl

By /s/ Alan Y. Cole

By /s/ Gerald L. Phelps

National Rifle Association of  
America

Popular Science Publishing  
Company, Inc.

By /s/ J. J. Wilson

By Parker, Duryee, Benjamin,  
Zuning & Malone, Attys.

Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

By /s/ Vincent J. Malone

By Saterlee, Warfield & Stephens

By /s/ Arthur B. Carton, Atty.

By /s/ William E. Stockhausen

/s/ Webb C. Hayes, III

U.S. v. MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA MILK PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

Civil No.: 4482-56

Year Judgment Entered: 1960

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA MILK  
PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4482-56  
11-22-6-C  
1961

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, United States of America, having filed its amended complaint on February 7, 1957, and this Court having entered a Final Judgment on January 22, 1959, with respect to plaintiff's causes of action stated in paragraphs 24 to 29 of such amended complaint, and the plaintiff and defendant having severally consented to the entry of this Final Judgment with respect to the charges of violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act contained in paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the said amended complaint, and without any admission by plaintiff or defendant with respect to any issue therein,

NOW, THEREFORE, upon said consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

I

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the amended complaint and of the parties hereto pursuant to Section 4 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890 entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," commonly known as the Sherman Act; as amended, and paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the amended complaint state claims upon which relief may be granted.

As used in this Final Judgment:

- (A) "Milk" means the raw milk of cows prior to pasteurization;
- (B) "Fluid milk" means pasteurized milk as sold by dealers for consumption in fluid form;
- (C) "Dealer" means any person engaged in the business of purchasing milk and processing, bottling and distributing it in the form of fluid milk;
- (D) "Washington metropolitan area" means the area comprising Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Arlington and Fairfax Counties and the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, Virginia;
- (E) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, firm or other legal entity;
- (F) "Pro rata classification" means the apportionment for classified pricing purposes of all milk received by a dealer in a calendar month in which the dealer has received and routinely commingled milk supplied by both the defendant and another person or persons so that milk supplied by defendant is considered to have been used during such month in each classification in which the dealer may have used milk in the same ratio as the dealer's receipts of milk from defendant bore to the dealer's receipts from all sources;
- (G) "Calendar month" means one calendar month's time or such other length of time as may be customarily utilized as an accounting or billing period.

### III

The provisions of this Final Judgment applicable to the defendant, shall apply also to its officers, directors, employees and agents, and to all other persons in active concert or participation with the defendant who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

The defendant is enjoined and restrained from:

- (A) Coercing or attempting to coerce any person to purchase all or any part of his requirements of milk from defendant or to refrain from purchasing milk from any other producer or supplier not a member of defendant;
- (B) Interfering or attempting to interfere with the sources of supply of milk or fluid milk of any person engaged or seeking to engage in the sale or distribution of milk or fluid milk in the Washington metropolitan area; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit defendant from using fair and reasonable means to obtain suppliers of milk, members or customers;
- (C) Coercing or attempting to coerce any producer or supplier of milk to refrain from selling or offering to sell milk in the Washington metropolitan area, or from selling or offering to sell milk to any dealer selling or proposing to sell fluid milk in said area;
- (D) Coercing or attempting to coerce any dealer to refrain from selling or offering to sell fluid milk in the Washington metropolitan area;
- (E) Boycotting or threatening to boycott any person in order to induce or compel any person to purchase milk from defendant or to induce or compel any person to refrain from purchasing milk from any other producer or supplier not a member of defendant;
- (F) Entering into or carrying out any agreement with any other supplier of milk to fix prices or allocate territories or customers; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit defendant from exercising any right or privilege created by the Clayton Act or the Capper-Volstead Act and not inconsistent with any other subsection of this Final Judgment;

as any person's other than defendant's, the views of defendant concerning the enactment, amendment, repeal or recision of any legislation or regulation affecting defendant, or from remunerating any person who, without disclosing either that he is presenting the views of defendant or that he is being remunerated by defendant, makes representations to a legislative or regulatory body or who, at the express or implied direction or request of defendant, makes representations to any organization or association without making either such disclosure;

(H) Fixing or attempting to fix the price at which any dealer sells or offers to sell fluid milk;

(I) Discriminating in the application of any sales policy between or among its regular dealer-customers who are located in the Washington metropolitan area or who are in competition with one another in any area;

(J) Preventing or attempting to prevent any carrier of milk other than defendant from transporting to the Washington metropolitan area milk of producers or suppliers not members of defendant; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require defendant to permit milk of its members to be carried (i) in the same vehicle with milk of producers or suppliers not members of defendant if the effect is to cause the milk of defendant's members to lose its character as inspected milk under the laws of any of the several states or the District of Columbia, or (ii) in the same tank or compartment with milk of producers or suppliers not members of defendant;

(K) Retaliating or threatening to retaliate against any dealer because such dealer is attempting to obtain or has succeeded in obtaining business of defendant or any dealer-customer of defendant; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit defendant from using fair and reasonable means to retain, obtain or re-obtain business;

(L) Attempting to obtain from the books and records of any dealer-customer any information not reasonably necessary to verify the total

(M) Classifying milk (for purposes of calculating payments due defendant for milk received by a dealer for fluid utilization in the Washington metropolitan area in a calendar month in which the dealer has received and commingled milk supplied both by defendant and by another person or persons) in a manner which results in a larger proportion of the milk supplied by such other person or persons being consigned to a lower value utilization category than the percentage that the milk delivered by such other person or persons is to the total quantity of milk received and so commingled by the dealer in such calendar month; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall apply when defendant makes spot sales of milk to other than its regular customers.

V

For a period of ten (10) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, defendant is enjoined and restrained from:

(A) Entering into or carrying out any agreement with any purchaser of milk in the Washington metropolitan area whereby such purchaser is required to purchase its entire requirements of milk from defendant;

(B) Charging different prices for the same fluid utilization for milk sold to a dealer for resale within any part of the Washington metropolitan area from those charged at the same time for milk sold to a dealer for resale elsewhere within the Washington metropolitan area, unless such different prices are required by any federal or state regulation or order; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the defendant from charging a lower price in good faith to meet the lower price of any competitor or in any situation where competitive bidding is invited by a public agency or institution. In the event milk is being offered by defendant to dealers for Class I use at a price below defendant's then highest price for

Class I utilization, the volume of milk to be sold to any dealer at such lower price may be made proportionate to the percentage that the dealer's purchases of milk from defendant for use in all Class I utilizations bears to the dealer's total purchases for all Class I utilizations during the calendar month in which such lower price milk is delivered;

(C) Conditioning or attempting to condition the sale of milk to any purchaser on his refraining from purchasing milk from any producer or supplier not a member of defendant;

(D) Adopting or using any sales plan or policy with respect to the sale of milk in the Washington metropolitan area by which the price per hundredweight or other unit of measurement or the terms of sale are related to, established by, or contingent upon the proportion of a dealer's purchases from defendant to the dealer's total requirements, or which includes the assignment or use of purchase quotas, minimum purchase requirements or the like; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit defendant from use of pro-rata classification whenever milk is sold to a dealer on a classification-utilization pricing basis or from requiring purchasers to receive upon each delivery a reasonable minimum quantity of milk;

Provided, however, that at the end of five (5) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, defendant may move for modification or termination of any of the subsections of this Section V, which may be granted upon a showing by defendant to the satisfaction of this Court that the pertinent subsection or subsections sought to be modified or terminated have worked or will work an undue hardship upon defendant.

VI

For a period of five (5) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, defendant is enjoined and restrained from:

(A) Refusing, except for good cause (which shall include reasonable terms and conditions), to sell available milk to any dealer for fluid utilization within the Washington metropolitan area. Milk shall be deemed available if it is available at the time specified for delivery unless delivery would interfere with defendant's normal operations or pre-existing contractual obligations;

(B) Offering to make or making any loan to any dealer in the Washington metropolitan area; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit defendant from granting reasonable extensions of credit in the ordinary course of business.

VII

Within one (1) year from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, defendant shall dispose of all assets of Richfield Dairy Corporation and Simpson Bros., Inc., trading as Wakefield Model Farms Dairy, tangible and intangible, acquired by defendant on or about December 6, 1957, pursuant to a contract for the purchase of the capital stock of the said corporations, and replacements therefor. The divestiture herein ordered shall be in good faith and shall require the prior approval of this Court on notice to counsel for the plaintiff. Within sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this Final Judgment defendant shall report to the Court, with a copy served on plaintiff, its efforts to carry into effect the divestiture herein ordered. Further reports shall be made to this Court and the plaintiff every ninety (90) days thereafter and on such other dates as this Court may order. Pending divestiture, defendant shall administer the said assets and replacements therefor in good faith with a view to preserving them in as good condition as possible, ordinary wear and tear excepted.

VIII

For a period of five (5) years from the date of divestiture ordered by this Final Judgment and the Final Judgment entered on January 22, 1959,

defendant is enjoined and restrained from engaging in any phase of distribution or sale of fluid milk within the Washington metropolitan area; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall apply to the distribution or sale of fluid milk to installations maintained by the Armed Services of the United States.

IX

(A) Defendant is enjoined and restrained from acquiring, directly or indirectly, any shares of stock or any assets of, or any interest in, Richfield Dairy Corporation and Simpson Bros., Inc., trading as Wakefield Model Farms Dairy, or Embassy Dairy, Inc., after divestiture as ordered by this Final Judgment and the Final Judgment entered on January 22, 1959. In the event that after divestiture the above-described stock or assets shall be offered for sale at a forced sale or a liquidation proceeding, defendant may acquire such stock or assets if necessary to protect its position as a general creditor; provided, however, that defendant shall again divest itself of such assets thus regained within one year from the date of such acquisition subject to the same terms and conditions under which they were required to be divested under the aforesaid Final Judgments.

(B) Subject to subsection (A) above, defendant is enjoined and restrained, for a period of five (5) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, and except upon notice to plaintiff and approval by this Court, from acquiring directly or indirectly any shares of stock of any corporation or any assets of, or any interest in, the business of any person engaged in the Washington metropolitan area in the sale of milk for resale as fluid milk or in the sale of fluid milk. In the event plaintiff shall object to any such proposed acquisition, the Court may grant permission to make such acquisition upon a showing to the satisfaction of this Court that the acquisition

will not substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the sale or distribution of milk for resale as fluid milk in the Washington metropolitan area or in the sale and distribution of fluid milk in the Washington metropolitan area.

X

For a period of five (5) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, defendant shall promptly give written notice of each establishment of or change in the price of milk for any fluid utilization in the Washington metropolitan area to each dealer who has purchased milk for fluid utilization therein from defendant at any time in the preceding twelve-month period.

XI

(A) Defendant is enjoined and restrained, for a period of five (5) years from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, from entering into or renewing any agreement for the marketing of milk of any person for a term of more than one year unless any such agreement shall on its face be terminable by such person on the annual anniversary thereof by written notice delivered not less than thirty (30) days prior to such date. Each agreement for the marketing of milk now in effect between defendant and any person shall be terminable by such person on the annual anniversary thereof by written notice delivered not less than thirty (30) days prior to such date.

(B) From the date of entry of this Final Judgment until one hundred and twenty (120) days after the disposition by defendant of the assets of Embassy Dairy, Inc., or until April 1, 1961, whichever shall occur later, the membership contract of each producer of milk who supplied milk to Embassy Dairy, Inc., in May 1954, and who is a member of defendant shall be terminable at the option of such producer at any time upon thirty (30) days written notice to defendant.

Defendant shall give written notice of this provision of this Final Judgment to each such producer within ten (10) days from the entry of this Final Judgment.

XII

For the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment duly authorized representatives of the Department of Justice shall, on written request of the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to defendant made to its principal office, be permitted, subject to any legally recognized privilege:

- (A) Access, during office hours of defendant, to all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of defendant relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment;
- (B) Subject to the reasonable convenience of defendant and without restraint or interference from defendant, to interview officers, directors, employees or members of defendant, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

No information obtained by the means permitted in this Section XII shall be divulged by any representative of the Department of Justice to any person other than a duly authorized representative of the Executive Branch of the plaintiff except in the course of legal proceedings in which the United States is a party for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment or as otherwise required by law.

XIII

Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling either of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate

for the construction or carrying out of this Final Judgment, for the modification of any of the provisions thereof, and for the enforcement of compliance therewith and punishment of violations thereof.

Dated: November 22, 1960  
Washington, D. C.

/s/ Alexander Holtzoff  
United States District Judge

We hereby consent to the making and entry of the foregoing  
Final Judgment:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

/s/ Robert A. Bicks  
Robert A. Bicks  
Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Joseph J. Saunders  
Joseph J. Saunders

/s/ W. D. Kilgore, Jr.  
W. D. Kilgore, Jr.

/s/ Paul A. Owens  
Paul A. Owens  
Attorneys, Department of Justice

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

/s/ William J. Hughes, Jr.  
William J. Hughes, Jr.

/s/ Herbert A. Bergson  
Herbert A. Bergson

/s/ Herbert Borkland  
Herbert Borkland

U.S. v. CENTRAL CHARGE SERVICE, INC.

Civil No.: 2259-60

Year Judgment Entered: 1962

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
                                  )  
                                  Plaintiff, )  
                                  )  
                                  )  
                                  v. )                                  Civil Action No. 2259-60  
                                  )  
CENTRAL CHARGE SERVICE, INC., )                                  Filed: March 19, 1962  
                                  )  
                                  Defendant. )

FINAL JUDGMENT

The plaintiff, United States of America, having filed its complaint herein on July 18, 1960, the defendant, Central Charge Service, Inc., having appeared and filed its answer to such complaint denying the substantive allegations thereof; and the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and without admission by any of the parties hereto with respect to any such issue;

NOW, THEREFORE, before the taking of any testimony and without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

I

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter hereof and of the parties hereto. The complaint states claims upon which relief may be granted under Section 3 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies," commonly known as the Sherman Act, as amended.

II

As used in this Final Judgment:

(A) "Defendant" means Central Charge Service, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware;

(B) "Member merchant" means a person who has contracted with a credit company for participation in a central credit service plan;

(C) "Customer" means a person who uses charge account facilities made available at retail stores affiliated with a credit company offering a central credit service plan;

(D) "Central credit service plan" means a service offered by credit companies to member merchants and customers pursuant to which a member merchant agrees to sell and the credit company agrees to purchase, at stipulated discounts from face value, accounts receivable arising from the purchase of merchandise or services from the member merchant by customers whose credit has been approved by the credit company; such customers are entitled to purchase merchandise or services at any of the member merchants; after purchasing such accounts receivable from the member merchants the credit company assumes the risk and responsibility for billing and collecting such accounts directly from the customers;

(E) "Accounts receivable" means those assets of a member merchant consisting of the obligations (usually evidenced by a sales slip signed by the customer) of a customer to pay for merchandise or services purchased on credit;

(F) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, association, firm or other legal entity.

### III

The provisions of this Final Judgment applicable to the defendant shall apply also to each of its subsidiaries, successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees and agents, and to all persons in active concert or participation with the defendant who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

IV

(A) The defendant is enjoined and restrained from, directly or indirectly, entering into, adhering to, maintaining, furthering or claiming any rights under, reviving, adopting or enforcing any provisions of any agreement relating to a central credit service plan which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Final Judgment;

(B) The defendant is ordered and directed to delete from all central credit service plan agreements, and is prohibited from inserting in any such agreement hereafter entered into, any provision that its central credit service plan shall be exclusive in character or that the terms and conditions of the agreement will be affected in the event the member merchant contracts with or has contracted with a competing central credit service plan.

V

The defendant is enjoined and restrained from, directly or indirectly:

(A) Adopting, following, maintaining, furthering or enforcing any policy, plan or course of conduct of accepting or retaining as member merchants only merchants who do not do business with or have not done business with any other central credit service plan company;

(B) Conditioning the making or continuing of, or the terms or conditions of, any central credit service plan agreement upon a member merchant's refraining from entering into, or limiting or agreeing to limit the extent of doing business under, any central credit service plan agreement with any other person;

(C) Conditioning the making or continuing of any central credit service plan agreement upon a member merchant selling to the defendant any specified dollar amount or any specified fractional share or percentage of such member merchant's accounts receivable arising from the sale of goods or service on credit;

(D) Canceling or terminating the affiliation or membership of any member merchant with the defendant's central credit service plan or refusing to do business with any person because of the fact that or the extent to which he does business with any competitor of defendant;

(E) Entering into, adhering to, or claiming any rights under any agreement for the purpose or with the effect of hindering, limiting or interfering with the entrance into, participation in, or advertising affiliation with any central credit service plan by any person, either as a member merchant or otherwise.

VI

The defendant is ordered and directed within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, to mail a copy of this Final Judgment, or the substance thereof approved as to form and content by plaintiff herein, to each member merchant with whom it has entered into a central credit service plan agreement.

VII

The defendant is ordered and directed, within sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this Final Judgment, to file with the Clerk of this Court, with a copy to the plaintiff herein, an affidavit setting forth the fact and manner of compliance with subsection (B) of Section IV hereof and with Section VI hereof.

VIII

For the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, duly authorized representatives of the Department of Justice shall, on written request of the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to the defendant made to its principal office, be permitted, subject to any legally recognized privilege:

(A) Reasonable access, during the office hours of the defendant, which may have counsel present, to all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of the defendant, relating to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment; and

(B) Subject to the reasonable convenience of the defendant, and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers and employees of such defendant, which may have counsel present, regarding any such matter.

Upon written request of the Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, the defendant shall submit such written reports with respect to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as from time to time may be necessary for the purpose of enforcement of this Final Judgment. No information obtained by the means permitted in this Section shall be divulged by any representative of the Department of Justice to any person other than a duly authorized representative of the Executive Branch of the plaintiff, except in the course of legal proceedings for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment in which the United States is a party or as otherwise required by law.

## IX

Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Final Judgment, for the modification or termination of any of the provisions thereof, for the enforcement of compliance therewith, and punishment of violations thereof.

Dated: March 19, 1962

JOHN J. SIRICA

United States District Judge

U.S. v. GREATER WASHINGTON SERVICE STATION ASSOCIATION, INC.

Civil No.: 2053-62

Year Judgment Entered: 1962