Exemption 3

Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act incorporates into the FOIA certain nondisclosure provisions that are contained in other federal statutes. Prior to the enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009,¹ Exemption 3 allowed the withholding of information prohibited from disclosure by another federal statute provided that one of two disjunctive requirements were met: the statute either "(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."² Courts held that a statute fell within the exemption's coverage if it satisfied either of its disjunctive requirements,³ although courts did not always specify under which subpart of Exemption 3 a statute qualified.⁴ The OPEN FOIA Act of 2009

¹ Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2184; see also FOIA Post, "Congress Passes Amendment to Exemption 3 of the FOIA" (posted 3/10/10).


³ See Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1984); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

renumbered what used to be referred to as subparts (A) and (B) of Exemption 3,\(^5\) to subpart (A)(i) and (A)(ii),\(^6\) respectively, but did not change the substance of those requirements.\(^7\) The OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 then established an additional requirement that any statute "enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, [must] specifically cite[ ] to this paragraph" in order to qualify under Exemption 3.\(^8\) Thus, the text of Exemption 3 now reads as follows:

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— . . . (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . , if that statute— (A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.\(^9\)

Agencies are required each year to list all Exemption 3 statutes that they relied upon during the course of the year in their Annual FOIA Reports.\(^10\) Additionally, the FOIA requires agencies to include in their Annual FOIA Reports "the number of occasions on which each statute was relied upon, a description of whether a court has upheld the decision of the agency to withhold information under each such statute, and a concise description of the scope of any information withheld."\(^11\)

**Initial Considerations**

---


8 123 Stat. at 2184.


10 Id. at § 552(e)(1)(B)(ii); see also FOIA Post, "2008 Guidelines for Agency Preparation of Annual FOIA Reports" (posted 5/22/08).

11 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(1)(B)(ii); see also Office of Info. Policy, DOJ, FOIA Resources (2012) (linking to Exemption 3 resource materials including chart of statutes litigated and found to qualify under Exemption 3 and statutes on which agencies reported having relied as Exemption 3 statutes in prior fiscal years).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that records may be withheld under the authority of another statute pursuant to Exemption 3 "if – and only if – that statute meets the requirements of Exemption 3, including the threshold requirement that it specifically exempt matters from disclosure." In Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. DOJ, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that:

[A] statute that is claimed to qualify as an Exemption 3 withholding statute must, on its face, exempt matters from disclosure. [The court] must find a congressional purpose to exempt matters from disclosure in the actual words of the statute (or at least in the legislative history of FOIA) – not in the legislative history of the claimed withholding statute, nor in an agency's interpretation of the statute.

\[12\] Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. DOJ, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified on other grounds, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 533 F.3d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that, when analyzing statute under Exemption 3, "a court . . . must first determine whether the statute is a withholding statute at all by deciding whether it satisfies 'the threshold requirement that it specifically exempt matters from disclosure'" (quoting Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 734)); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that, "for purposes of qualifying as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, a statute 'must on its face exempt matters from disclosure'" (quoting Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 735)); Zanoni v. USDA, 605 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that "[w]hen determining whether FOIA Exemption (3) applies, the court must first determine whether the statute is a withholding statute . . . that . . . specifically exempt[s] matters from disclosure" by "look[ing] at the language of the statute on its face" (quoting Pub. Citizen, 533 F.3d at 813)).

\[13\] 816 F.2d 730.

\[14\] Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 735; see also Pub. Citizen, 533 F.3d at 813-14; Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 37 (finding that statute failed to qualify as withholding statute under Exemption 3, and opining that "[l]ooking first to 'the plain language of the statute,' there is nothing in the Endangered Species Act that refers to withholding information" (quoting Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers, Inc. v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); Anderson v. HHS, 907 F.2d 936, 950, 951 n.19 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that statute qualified under FOIA Exemption 3 based on plain language of statute in question, and noting that federal regulations, constituting agency's interpretation of statute, are not entitled to deference in determining whether statute qualifies under Exemption 3); Zanoni, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (holding that, "[w]hen determining whether FOIA Exemption (3) applies, the court must first determine whether the statute is a withholding statute . . . that . . . specifically exempt[s] matters from disclosure" by "look[ing] at the language of the statute on its face" (quoting Pub. Citizen, 533 F.3d at 813)). But see Wis. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (looking to legislative history of section 203(a)(1) of International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2006), and determining that statute satisfies Exemption 3's requirements); Meyerhoff v. EPA, 958 F.2d 1498, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1992) (looking to legislative history of withholding statute to determine that statutory amendment did not
In Reporters Committee, the D.C. Circuit noted that the breadth and reach of the disclosure prohibition need not be found on the face of the statute, but that the statute must at least "explicitly deal with public disclosure." For example, in 2002, the D.C. Circuit held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 fails to "qualify as a withholding statute under Exemption 3" because "nothing in [the statute's] language refers to nondisclosure of information." At times, however, the D.C. Circuit, as well as other courts, have not strictly adhered to this requirement that the "congressional purpose to exempt matters from disclosure" be found "in the actual words of the statute," and have looked to the legislative history of the claimed withholding statute in determining whether that statute qualified under Exemption 3.


Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 735 & n.5 (noting that "it may be proper to give deference to an agency's interpretation of what matters are covered by a statute, once the court is satisfied that the statute is in fact an Exemption 3 withholding statute, i.e., that it meets both the threshold test and one prong of the proviso").

Id. at 736; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 37 (observing that "there is nothing in the Endangered Species Act that refers to withholding information").


Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 37-38 (observing that statute's plain language does not refer "to withholding information," and holding that agency's reliance on "legislative history will not avail if the language of the statute itself does not explicitly deal with public disclosure" (quoting Reporters Comm., 816 F.3d at 736)).

Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 735.

See Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 282-85 (looking to legislative history of section 12(c) of Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c) (2006), and section 203(a)(1) of International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2006), and finding that both section 12(c) and section 203(a)(1) qualified under Exemption 3; with regard to section 12(c), where Congress made plain its intent to prevent disclosure of export-application information, and, with regard to section 203(a)(1), where Congress made plain its intent to authorize President to maintain confidentiality provision of Export Administration Act in times of lapse); Meyerhoff, 958 F.2d at 1501-02 (looking to legislative history of withholding statute to determine that statutory amendment did not create new prohibition on disclosure, but rather clarified existing nondisclosure provision); Jones v. IRS, No. 06-CV-322, 2008 WL 1901208, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2008) (concluding that "IRS appropriately denied [plaintiff's] request for Pocket Commission information" pertaining to third-party employee, where IRS determined that reproduction of requested materials would violate 18 U.S.C. § 701 (2006), which criminalizes unauthorized reproduction of official badges, identification cards, and other insignia, but which does not
The D.C. Circuit looked beyond statutory text and considered congressional intent when determining whether a statute that qualified under Exemption 3 at one time should continue to be recognized as an Exemption 3 statute after that statute has lapsed. In that situation, the D.C. Circuit has stated that, although "FOIA undoubtedly demands a liberal presumption of disclosure, . . . [an] unduly strict reading of Exemption 3 strangles Congress's intent." Courts have looked to legislative history for guidance in how to interpret statutory terms or phrases subject to multiple interpretations. Additionally, courts sometimes consider the legislative history of a newly enacted Exemption 3 statute in determining whether the statute is applicable to FOIA requests already pending, or litigation already commenced, at the time the statute was enacted, and have found Exemption 3 statutes to apply retroactively to the requested records.


21 See Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 283 (rejecting as "formalistic logic" argument that agency improperly withheld records pursuant to Exemption 3 statute that had lapsed at time that request was received, and stating that "the touchstone of the Exemption 3 inquiry is whether the statute 'is the product of congressional appreciation of the dangers inherent in airing particular data and incorporates a formula whereby the administrator may determine precisely whether disclosure in any instance would pose the hazard that Congress foresaw'" (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); see also Sinkfield v. HUD, No. 10-885, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35233, at *9 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2012) ("Because plaintiff submitted his request when [41 U.S.C.] § 253b(m) was in effect and both parties treat that provision as the applicable statutory provision, the Court will likewise refer to § 253b(m) as the applicable statute in this Order.").

22 Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 283


In Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, the D.C. Circuit noted that, by its very terms, "Exemption 3 is explicitly confined to material exempted from disclosure 'by statute.'" As such, Exemption 3 generally is triggered only by federal statutes, although the D.C. Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have held that executive orders may trigger Exemption 3 protection when they are issued pursuant to a grant of authority contained in a federal statute. Federal rules of procedure, 2(f) (2006), and concluding that "[t]he legislative history of the bill supports retroactive application of its provisions").

25 See City of Chicago, 423 F.3d at 783 (holding that newly enacted appropriations legislation applies retroactively); Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 280, 284-85 (finding that agency properly relied upon statute to withhold information retroactively, where Congress re-enacted statute during litigation and where court noted that "legislative history indicates that Congress intended to preserve these confidentiality protections when it renewed the [Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c) (2006)] in November 2000"); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USDA, 314 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that agency may rely on National Parks Omnibus Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 5937 (2006), to withhold information, even though statute was enacted after FOIA litigation commenced); Times Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 236 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that agency properly relied upon section 12(c)(1) of Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1) (2006), to withhold information, even though statute had lapsed at time of request, where Congress re-enacted statute during course of litigation); Long, 742 F.2d at 1183-84 (permitting retroactive application where court determined "[t]hat Congress intended the [Economic Tax Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172,] amendment to apply to this litigation is beyond all question"); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 835 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying amended version of Internal Revenue Code to pending case where court determined that no injustice would result); Lee Pharm. v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1978) (same). But see Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 484 F. Supp. 47, 49 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding that in order for information to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 3 there must be an Exemption 3-qualifying statute in effect at the time that the FOIA request in question is filed, and characterizing agency’s reliance on amended version of section 8 of Commodity Exchange Act as "misplaced").

26 603 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

27 Id. at 952.

28 See id. (finding that the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply do not satisfy this description"); Wash. Post Co. v. HHS, 2 Gov’t Disclosure Serv. (P-H) ¶ 81,047, at 81,127 n.2 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (declaring that "an Executive Order . . . is clearly inadequate to support reliance on Exemption 3"), rev’d & remanded on other grounds, 690 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

29 See Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 283-85 (distinguishing past D.C. Circuit precedent, noting that "[Founding Church of Scientology] is inapposite because the Federal Rules were originated and written not by Congress but by the Supreme Court, whereas the executive
which are promulgated by the Supreme Court, ordinarily do not qualify under Exemption 3.\(^{30}\) When a rule of procedure is subsequently modified and thereby specifically enacted into law by Congress, however, it may qualify under the exemption.\(^{31}\) No court has yet squarely addressed the issue of whether a treaty can qualify as a statute under Exemption 3 in a FOIA case.\(^{32}\)

---

\(^{30}\) See Founding Church of Scientology, 603 F.2d at 952 (noting that "Exemption 3 is explicitly confined to material exempted from disclosure 'by statute,' and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply do not satisfy this description," and holding that Rule 26(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing issuance of protective orders, is not statute under Exemption 3).

\(^{31}\) See, e.g., Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. NARA, 656 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that Rule 6(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, regulating disclosure of matters occurring before grand jury, satisfies Exemption 3’s statute requirement because it was specially amended by Congress); Durham v. U.S. Atty. Gen., No. 06-843, 2008 WL 620744, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2008) (noting that, "[w]hile courts have held that most of the rules contained in the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure do not qualify as a statute for the purposes of [Exemption 3], Rule 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure qualifies because it was enacted by Congress"); Berry v. DOJ, 612 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Ariz. 1985) (determining that Rule 32 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing disclosure of presentence reports, is properly considered statute for Exemption 3 purposes because it was enacted into law by Congress in 1975); see also Cozen O’Connor v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 570 F. Supp. 2d 749, 776 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that "Rule 6(e)(of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) is a statutory mandate that automatically invokes Exemption 3"); cf. Lykins v. DOJ, 725 F.2d 1455, 1462 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that standing order of district court has no nondisclosure effect under FOIA where "[t]here is no indication that the . . . [d]istrict [c]ourt’s order had anything to do with any concrete case or controversy before it").

Once it is established that a statute is a nondisclosure statute and that it meets the standards for qualifying under Exemption 3, courts next examine whether the records in question fall within the withholding provision of the nondisclosure statute.\textsuperscript{33} This, in turn, often will require courts to interpret the scope of the nondisclosure statute.\textsuperscript{34} Courts have been somewhat divided over whether to construe the withholding criteria of the nondisclosure statute narrowly, consistent with the strong disclosure policies specifically embodied in the FOIA,\textsuperscript{35} or broadly, pursuant to deferential standards of general administrative law.\textsuperscript{36} As the Court of Appeals for the Second

\textsuperscript{33} See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (requiring that, to constitute proper withholding under Exemption 3, statute must qualify as proper Exemption 3 statute and records in question must fall within statute’s scope); A. Michael's Piano, Inc., 18 F.3d at 143 (same); Aronson v. IRS, 973 F.2d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); Cal-Almond, 960 F.2d at 108 (same); Fund for Constitutional Gov't, 656 F.2d at 868 (same); Pub. Citizen Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1284 (same).


\textsuperscript{35} See Anderson, 907 F.2d at 951 (taking into account "well-established rules that the FOIA is to be broadly construed in favor of disclosure[" and its exemptions are to be narrowly construed" in determining how to interpret Exemption 3 statute (citing Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1982))); Grasso, 785 F.2d at 75 (concluding "that section 6103 [of Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006),] was not designed to displace FOIA, which itself contains an adequate exception from disclosure for materials protected under other federal statutes," and noting that "that FOIA and section 6103 can be viewed harmoniously through the operation of Exemption 3"); Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting "IRS's contention that [s]ection 6103 [of Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006),] is a self-contained scheme governing disclosure" and noting that "FOIA was designed to encourage open disclosure of public information"); DeLorme Publ'g Co. v. NOAA, 917 F. Supp. 867, 870-71 (D. Me. 1996) (adopting narrow approach to interpretation of Exemption 3 statute rather than apply more deferential standards of general administrative law), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 96-1601 (1st Cir. July 8, 1996).

\textsuperscript{36} See Church of Scientology Int'l v. DOJ, 30 F.3d 224, 235 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that, "unlike actions under other FOIA exemptions, agency decisions to withhold materials under
Circuit observed in *A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC*, "the Supreme Court has never applied a rule of [either] narrow or deferential construction to withholding statutes." Consequently, the Second Circuit declined "to choose sides in the conflict between [its] sister circuits," and instead opted to "follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court in construing withholding statutes, looking to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, in order to determine legislative purpose."

Judicial review under the FOIA of agency assertions of Exemption 3 is generally limited to determinations of whether the withholding statute qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute and whether the records fall within the statute's scope. With respect to subpart (A)(ii) statutes – which permit agencies some discretion to withhold or disclose records – the agency's exercise of its discretion under the withholding statute has been found to be governed not by the FOIA, but by the withholding statute itself.

Agencies and courts ordinarily specify the nondisclosure statutes upon which Exemption 3 withholdings are based, but the District Court for the District of Columbia has on occasion concealed the nondisclosure statute that formed the basis for its ruling that the agency properly invoked Exemption 3, and in one case stated that "national security would be compromised and threats to the safety of individuals would arise" if the court engaged in a specific discussion of the legal basis for Exemption 3's use in that exceptional case.

---

37 18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1994).

38 *Id.* at 144.

39 *Id.*

40 See *Aronson*, 973 F.2d at 967; *Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.*, 830 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also *Cozen O'Connor*, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (noting that, "[u]nlke other FOIA exemptions, Exemption 3's applicability does not depend upon the contents of the documents," and stating that, because "[i]t is the nature of the document, not its contents, that makes it exempt[,] . . . the agency need only show that the documents are within the category of documents specifically exempt from disclosure by the statute").

41 See *Aronson*, 973 F.2d at 966; *Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers*, 830 F.2d at 336.

42 *Simpson v. Dep't of State*, No. 79-0674, 2 Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) ¶ 81,280, at 81,798 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1981) (concluding that Exemption 3 authorized withholding of State Department's "Biographic Register" of federal employees, but declining to "discuss the [in
**Statutes Not Delineated as Subpart (A)(i) (Requiring Withholding) or Subpart (A)(ii) (Establishing Criteria or Designating Matters to be Withheld)**

A wide range of federal laws qualify as Exemption 3 statutes. In the past, courts usually placed emphasis on specifying whether a statute qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute under what is now subpart (A)(i),\(^{43}\) which encompasses statutes that require information to be withheld and leave the agency no discretion on the issue, or to what is now subpart (A)(ii),\(^{44}\) which encompasses statutes that either provide criteria for withholding information or refer to particular matters to be withheld, either explicitly or implicitly.\(^{45}\) Courts do not always specify under which subpart of Exemption 3 a statute...
qualifies, instead simply determining whether a statute qualifies, or does not qualify, as an Exemption 3 statute generally.46

For example, one district court has held that section 7332 of the Veterans Health Administration Patient Rights Statute,47 which generally prohibits disclosure of even the abstract fact that medical records on named individuals are maintained pursuant to that section, but which also provides specific criteria under which particular medical information may be released, satisfies the requirements of Exemption 3, but the court did not specify whether the statute qualifies under subpart (A)(i) or subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.48 Similarly, one district court found that records created by the VA as part of a medical quality-assurance program49 qualify for Exemption 3 protection, without specifying whether the Exemption 3 protection was pursuant to subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii).50 Likewise, "[m]edical quality assurance records created by or for the Department of Defense"51 have also been found to qualify under Exemption 3 generally.52


52 See Goodrich v. Dep't of the Air Force, 404 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50, 51 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that DOD's medical quality-assurance statute, qualifies as Exemption 3 statute protecting "minutes of Credentials Functions meetings and [Medical Practice Review Boards]," but failing to identify statute as qualifying under subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii)); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 107 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that 10 U.S.C. § 1102 qualifies as Exemption 3 statute protecting 'all 'medical quality assurance records,' regardless of whether the contents of such records originated within or outside of a
In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act\textsuperscript{53} qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, but the Fifth Circuit did not state whether that provision qualified under subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, in 2005, one district court held that the confidentiality provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act\textsuperscript{55} qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, but did not designate that statute as qualifying pursuant to subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{56} Other district courts have held that 49 U.S.C. § 114\textsuperscript{57} and 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)\textsuperscript{58} qualify as Exemption 3 statutes because they provide the authority for the Secretary of Transportation and the Undersecretary of the TSA to protect sensitive security information from disclosure, although the courts did not specify under which subpart or subparts the statutes qualified.\textsuperscript{59} One district court has held that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r) may serve as the basis for an agency refusing to confirm or deny whether an individual’s name was on a Federal Watch List, as "Federal Watch Lists constitute 'Sensitive Security Information' that is exempted from disclosure."\textsuperscript{60} (For a


\textsuperscript{54} See Doe v. Veneman, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 2004).


\textsuperscript{57} (2006).

\textsuperscript{58} (2006).


\textsuperscript{60} Skurow, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (finding that "the TSA's Glomar response to plaintiff's FOIA request was entirely proper and squarely within the realm of authority").
further discussion of the use and origin of the "Glomar" response under Exemption 1, see Exemption 1, Glomar Response and Mosaic Approach, above.)

Courts have protected applications and orders for pen registers, as well as evidence derived from the issuance of pen registers.61 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d),62 which provides for nondisclosure of the existence of a pen register or a trap and trace device, "an order authorizing a pen register or trap and trace device is sealed until otherwise ordered by the court and such an order prohibits disclosure of the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device."63 Accordingly, applications and orders for pen registers, the targets of pen registers, and reports generated as a result of pen registers have been withheld pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) and Exemption 3, although courts have not specified under which Exemption 3 subpart 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) qualifies.64 Once the court-ordered sealing order is lifted, however, the statute no longer prohibits release under the FOIA.65 In one case, information acquired through the use

61 See, e.g. Jennings v. FBI, No. 03-1651, slip op. at 11-12 (D.D.C. May 6, 2004) (finding that "[t]his same reasoning [as applied to protect information obtained from authorized wiretap] applies to the evidence derived from the issuance of a pen register or trap and trace device").


63 Jennings, No. 03-1651, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. May 6, 2004).

64 See Brown v. FBI, 873 F. Supp. 2d 388, 401 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "applications and subsequent court orders for pen registers, information regarding the target of pen registers, and reports generated as the result of pen registers" "falls squarely under [18 U.S.C.] § 3123(d)(1)" and "was properly held under exemption 3"); Jennings, No. 03-1651, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. May 6, 2004) (protecting "28 pages of pen register and conversation log sheets" where court determined that, "s[ince the log sheets would by necessity reveal the existence of these [pen register or trap and trace] devices, they are exempt from disclosure by [18 U.S.C. § 3123(d)] and by Exemption 3," but failing to identify under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualified); Riley v. FBI, No. 00-2378, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2632, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2002) (finding that sealed pen register applications and orders were properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3, noting that "18 U.S.C. § 3123 requires that the pen register materials at issue remain under seal," but failing to identify Exemption 3 subpart under which 18 U.S.C. § 3123 qualified); Manna v. DOJ, 815 F. Supp. 798, 812 (D.N.J. 1993) (finding that "two sealed applications submitted to the court for the installation and use of pen registers and "two orders issued by the Magistrate Judge who granted the applications" were properly "protected by [§] 3123(d) and Exemption 3," without identifying whether statute qualified under subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii) of Exemption 3), aff'd on other grounds, 51 F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1995).

65 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (providing that "[a]n order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trade device shall direct that—(1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and (2) the person owning or leasing the line or other facility to which the pen register or a trap and trace device is attached, or applied, or who is obligated by the order to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to
of a pen register was held to be protected from disclosure by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and, as such, was also found to fall under Exemption 3.

In 2005, two district courts held that 10 U.S.C. § 130c, a statute that protects from disclosure certain "sensitive information of foreign governments," qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, but neither court identified the statute as qualifying under subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii) of Exemption 3. Likewise, one district court has determined that the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, a statute which prohibits disclosure of certain information concerning archaeological resources, qualifies under Exemption 3, without specifying under which subpart the Act qualifies. Also, a number of courts

---


69 Id. § 130c(a).


72 Id. § 9(a) (providing that information pertaining to certain archaeological resources "may not be made available to the public" unless "Federal land manager concerned determines that such disclosure would[.] (1) further the purposes of this chapter or the Act of June 27, 1960[, 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c-1], and (2) not create a risk of harm to such resources or to the site at which such resources are located").

have determined that 18 U.S.C. § 798, which criminalizes the disclosure of certain classified information "concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government," qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute without identifying under which subpart 18 U.S.C. § 798 qualifies.

In 2006, one court held that a provision of the Fair Housing Act that protects information concerning ongoing discrimination investigations qualifies as a "disclosure-prohibiting statute," but did not specify either subpart of Exemption 3. Similarly, in 1982, the Supreme Court held that the Census Act, which requires that certain data be (quoting unidentified source), summary affirmance granted, No. 03-5257, 2004 WL 1900562 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2004).

74 (2006).

75 Id.


79 Id.

withheld, is an Exemption 3 statute without specifying under which subpart the statute qualifies. More recently, one district court held that the confidentiality provisions of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 qualify as Exemption 3 statutes inasmuch as the provisions protect from disclosure customers' nonpublic personal information, but the court did not specify whether the provisions qualified pursuant to subpart (A)(i) or (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.

In 2008, one district court held that 18 U.S.C. § 701, which criminalizes unauthorized reproduction of official badges, identification cards, and other insignia, is an Exemption 3 statute without identifying the subpart under which the statute qualifies.

Similarly, in 2009, one district court held that 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3), a statutory provision that prohibits disclosure of National DNA Index System records except under four circumstances, qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute without specifying the subpart under which the provision qualifies. In another case, the same district court determined that section 306(i) of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which pertains to certain records submitted to the advisory committee or to the United States and certain other individuals, also qualifies under

---

83 See Hodes v. HUD, 532 F. Supp. 2d 108, 117 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that agency properly applied Exemption 3 to protect records pertaining to individuals, but also finding that "[agency] may not invoke Exemption 3 to withhold from disclosure information associated with commercial entities").
84 (2006).
87 See Moore v. Nat'l DNA Index System, 662 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that, because requester did not fall within statutorily enumerated categories, "the FOIA forbids disclosing to [requester] the records he seeks").
Exemption 3 without clearly identifying the subpart or subparts under which the section qualifies. 89

In 2011, one district court found that 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(A), 90 a provision of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 prohibiting the disclosure of information provided to a special master of the court in a proceeding on a petition without written consent of the person who submitted the information, qualified as an Exemption 3 statute. 91 The court did not specify whether it considered 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(A) to qualify under subpart (A)(i) of Exemption 3, based on the provision’s prohibition on disclosure of the information, or subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3, based on the criteria for withholding, specifically, failure to provide written consent of the individual who submitted the information. 92

In 2012, one district court held that 7 U.S.C. § 2018(c), 93 which calls for regulations to limit the disclosure of certain information provided by certain applicants to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and provides that "[a]ny person who publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by Federal law . . . any information obtained under this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both," 94 qualifies "as a withholding statute under [E]xemption 3" without identifying the Exemption 3 subpart under which the statute qualifies. 95 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit left undisturbed the district court’s finding that 7 U.S.C. § 2018(c) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, but found that the district court erred in its determination that the records sought by plaintiff qualified for withholding under that statute. 96

89 See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 866 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding portions of e-mails between agency employee and member of private sector qualified under 19 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(1) and was "appropriately withheld under Exemption 3(b)," but quoting subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii) of Exemption 3).


92 See id.


94 Id.


96 Argus Leader Media v. USDA, 740 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that dollar amounts collected by retailers participating in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) did not qualify for withholding because such information was not submitted by
Subpart (A)(i): Statutes Requiring Withholding

Many statutes have been held to qualify as Exemption 3 statutes under the exemption's first subpart, (A)(i), which "requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue."  A primary example is Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulates disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury. Courts have found that this rule satisfies the basic "statute" requirement of Exemption 3 because Rule 6(e) was amended by Congress in 1977. It is well established that "Rule 6(e) embodies a broad sweeping policy of preserving the secrecy of grand jury material regardless of the substance in which such material is contained."  

100 Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 556 (D.D.C. 1981); see also Leon v. United States, 250 F. App'x 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that "Rule 6 establishes a presumption of nondisclosure of Grand Jury materials" and concluding that district court properly dismissed complaint where "[requester's] complaint does not allege any ground for disclosure of Grand Jury materials under Rule 6(e)(3)"; Cozen O'Connor, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (declaring that "[Rule 6(e)] is not discretionary"; rather, Rule 6(e) "covers not just grand jury transcripts, but all matters that could tend to reveal what occurred or was occurring in the grand jury, including identities of witnesses, questions asked by prosecutors or grand jurors, testimony of witnesses, or anything that could reveal the course of the investigation"); Tel. Publ'g Co. v. DOJ, No. 95-521-M, slip op. at 16-18, 26-27 (D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1998) (citing Exemption 3 together with Rule 6(e) as partial basis for protecting information related to grand jury, including correspondence between U.S. Attorney's Office and nongovernment attorneys pertaining to grand jury, even where correspondence was not
Defining the parameters of Rule 6(e) protection, however, is not always a simple task and has been the subject of much litigation. In *Fund for Constitutional Government v. NARA*, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the scope of the secrecy that must be afforded grand jury material "is necessarily broad" and that, consequently, "it encompasses not only the direct revelation of grand jury transcripts but also the disclosure of information which would reveal 'the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of the testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of the jurors, and the like.'" Subsequent to the *Fund for Constitutional Government* decision, many courts have adopted approaches similar to that of the D.C. Circuit, and have protected an array of information pertaining to grand jury proceedings pursuant to Exemption 3.

Shown to grand jury and evidence notebooks were created by local police at direction of AUSA, because disclosure would "probably . . . reveal too much about evidence presented to the grand jury"; *Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury*, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1998) (permitting agency to withhold transcripts of conversations that were taped during course of FBI investigation and were subsequently subpoenaed by grand jury); *McQueen v. United States*, 179 F.R.D. 522, 528-30 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 1998) (holding that all matters occurring before grand jury are protected even if records predate grand jury investigation), aff’d per curiam, 176 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).

---

101 656 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

102 Id. at 867, 869 (quoting *SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc.*, 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

103 See *Murphy v. EOUSA*, No. 14-5044, 2015 WL 3688318, at *1, 6 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 2015) (affirming district court’s action and finding that agency properly protected the dates and times of day that the grand jury met, and the grand jury foreperson’s name and signature pursuant to Exemption 3); *Sanders v. DOJ*, No. 10-5273, 2011 WL 1769099, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (per curiam) (holding that "the district court correctly held that the government properly withheld the grand jury transcript [that] . . . would reveal ‘such matters as the identities . . . of witnesses . . . , the substance of testimony, [and] the . . . questions of jurors’") (quoting *Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group Ltd. v. United States*, 534 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); *Covington v. McLeod*, No. 09-5336, 2010 WL 2930022, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2010) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s action and finding that agency properly protected grand jury minutes and third party’s proffer statement pursuant to Exemption 3); *Leon v. United States*, 250 F. App’x 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that "Rule 6 establishes a presumption of nondisclosure of Grand Jury materials" and concluding that district court properly dismissed complaint where "[requester’s] complaint does not allege any ground for disclosure of Grand Jury materials under Rule 6(e)(3)"); *Peltier v. FBI*, 218 F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding "grand jury subpoenas, information identifying grand jury witnesses, information identifying records subpoenaed by the grand jury, and the dates of grand jury testimony" properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3); *United States v. Kearse*, 30 F. App’x 85, 86 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that Rule 6(e) prohibits FOIA disclosure of grand jury transcripts); *Rugiero v. DOJ*, 257 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2001) (protecting grand jury transcripts, exhibits, and identities of witnesses); *Church of Scientology Int’l v. DOJ*, 30 F.3d 224, 235 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting
In its scrutiny of the scope of Rule 6(e) in *Senate of Puerto Rico v. DOJ*, however, the D.C. Circuit held that neither the fact that information was obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, nor the fact that the information was submitted to the grand jury, is sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant the conclusion that disclosure is necessarily prohibited by Rule 6(e). Rather, an agency must establish a nexus that "documents identified as grand jury exhibits, and whose contents are testimonial in nature or otherwise directly associated with the grand jury process, such as affidavits and deposition transcripts, ordinarily may be withheld simply on the basis of their status as exhibits"); *McDonnell v. United States*, 4 F.3d 1227, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1993) (protecting "[i]nformation and records presented to a federal grand jury[,] . . . names of individuals subpoenaed[,] . . . [and] federal grand jury transcripts of testimony," and recognizing "general rule of secrecy" with regard to grand jury records); *Silets v. DOJ*, 945 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that "identity of witness before a grand jury and discussion of that witness' testimony" are exempt from disclosure, as they "fall[] squarely within" Rule 6(e)’s prohibition); *Gatson v. FBI*, No. 08-6348, 2012 WL 1033345, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012) (finding that agency properly asserted Exemption 3 and Rule 6(e) to withhold "identifying information of individuals on the grand jury, such as company names and employees served with a federal grand jury subpoena [sic]"); *Kortlander v. BLM*, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1015-17 (D. Mont. 2011) (holding that "grand jury documents or information obtained from grand jury subpoenas will reveal the nature of the information before a federal grand jury including interviews of witnesses disclosing information in confidence about documents obtained through grand jury subpoenas, grand jury exhibit lists, and e-mail documents obtained through grand jury subpoenas," and finding such materials properly withheld under Exemption 3); *Blackwell v. FBI*, 680 F. Supp. 2d 79, 93 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that agency properly asserted Exemption 3 and Rule 6(e) to protect information that, if disclosed, "would divulge protected aspects of the grand jury investigation including the identity of witnesses and the scope, length, direction, and strategy of the investigation"), aff’d on other grounds, 646 F.3d 37 (D.C. Cir. 2011); *Bretti*, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (finding "grand jury records" properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and Rule 6(e); *Thompson v. EOUSA*, 587 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding grand jury transcript and grand jury exhibit properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and Rule 6(e)); *Kishore v. DOJ*, 575 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting grand jury subpoenas, names and other identifying information pertaining to individuals subpoenaed to testify before grand jury, and information identifying records subpoenaed by grand jury); *Singh v. FBI*, 574 F. Supp. 2d 32, 45 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting "identities of witnesses and the records subpoenaed by a grand jury" pursuant to Exemption 3); *Peav v. DOJ*, No. 04-1859, 2006 WL 1805616, at *2 (D.D.C. June 29, 2006) (holding that agency properly protected grand jury investigation request and referral, prosecutor’s recommendation based on grand jury’s investigation, and unsigned grand jury indictment; however, agency failed to show whether segregability requirements were met); *Brunetti v. FBI*, 357 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105 (D.D.C. 2004) (protecting "grand jury subpoenas, names and identifying information of the individuals named in the subpoenas, records subpoenaed by the grand jury, and the dates of grand jury meetings").

*See* id. at 584; *see also Wash. Post Co. v. DOJ*, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that record created before grand jury was impanelled did not independently reveal anything
between the release of that information and "revelation of a protected aspect of the grand jury's investigation." As the D.C. Circuit explained in Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. v. United States, "the government may not bring information into the protection of Rule 6(e) and thereby into the protection afforded by 

---

106 Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 584; see also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating district court's finding that U.S. Marshals Service properly withheld category of records where agency "has failed to demonstrate disclosure would 'tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury's investigation'" (quoting Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 582)); Lopez v. DOJ, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349-51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that agency "failed to meet its burden of demonstrating some 'nexus between disclosure [of date of prosecutor's preliminary witness interview] and revelation of a protected aspect of the grand jury's investigation'" (quoting Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 584)); Peay, 2007 WL 788871, at *3-4 (finding "names and other identifying information of individuals subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, [and] information identifying specific records subpoenaed by the grand jury" properly protected, but also holding that agency "has not . . . explained how the disclosure of the dates the grand jury convened would tend to reveal a 'secret aspect' of the grand jury investigation and therefore is not entitled to summary judgment on the redacted dates"); Homick v. DOJ, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (protecting "names and identifying information of grand jury witnesses," but ordering disclosure of information that agency described only as "type of records subpoenaed by the grand jury," because agency failed to meet its burden of showing how such information "is exempt from disclosure"); LaRouche v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 91-1655, 2000 WL 805214, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2000) (observing that "there are several documents for which the required nexus between the information withheld and a protected interest has not been demonstrated," and ordering release of information (e.g., location of grand jury proceedings, case number) for which agency failed to demonstrate sufficient nexus); Tel. Publ'g, No. 95-521-M, slip op. at 11 (D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1998) (requiring that agencies show nexus between disclosure of withheld information and impermissible revelation of grand jury matters to invoke protection of Exemption 3); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 27-28 (finding that nexus was established because releasing transcripts of taped conversations would show "direction or path the Grand Jury was taking").

107 534 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Exemption 3, simply by submitting it as a grand jury exhibit."\textsuperscript{108} Further, as the D.C. Circuit emphasized in \textit{Washington Post Co. v. DOJ},\textsuperscript{109} the required nexus must be apparent from the information itself, and "the government cannot immunize \[it\] by publicizing the link."\textsuperscript{110}

Courts have required agencies to adequately document and support their determinations that disclosure of the records in question would reveal a secret aspect of the grand jury proceedings.\textsuperscript{111} Additionally, in order to document and support agencies' determinations, agency FOIA personnel necessarily must be afforded unrestricted access to grand jury-protected information.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{108} Id. at 732 (noting that "[a] contrary holding could render much of FOIA's mandate illusory, as the government could often conceal otherwise disclosable information simply by submitting the information to a grand jury").

\textsuperscript{109} 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 100.

\textsuperscript{111} See, e.g., Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1113 (finding that agency failed to adequately meet its burden of demonstrating that certain withheld records would "tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury's investigation"); Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1349-51 (refusing to endorse categorical withholding of dates of preliminary witness interviews under Rule 6(e) and finding that the agency failed to demonstrate a "nexus between disclosure and revelation of a protected aspect of the grand jury's investigation"); Peay, 2007 WL 788871, at *3-4 (holding that while the agency properly withheld "identifying information of subpoenaed individuals and records," it failed to "explain[] how the disclosure of the dates the grand jury convened would tend to reveal a 'secret aspect' of the grand jury investigation"); Maydak v. DOJ, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23, 42 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that court could not determine whether agency properly invoked Exemption 3 where neither Vaughn Index nor agency's declaration described specific records withheld); LaRouche, 2000 WL 805214, at *7-8 (holding that agency affidavit demonstrated nexus between disclosure and revelation of secret aspects of grand jury for most records withheld under 6(e), but ordering release where agency failed to demonstrate nexus); Hronek v. DEA, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1276 (D. Or. 1998) (requiring agency to resubmit Vaughn Index and explain how disclosure of subpoenas would "compromise the integrity of the grand jury process"), aff'd, 7 F. App'x 591 (9th Cir. 2001); Sousa v. DOJ, No. 95-375, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9010, at *10-11 (D.D.C. June 19, 1997) (holding that supplemental Vaughn Index adequately demonstrated that disclosure of grand jury witness subpoenas, AUSA's handwritten notes discussing content of witness testimony, evidence used, and strategies would reveal protected aspects of grand jury investigation); Kronberg v. DOJ, 875 F. Supp. 861, 867-68 (D.D.C. 1995) (ordering grand jury material released where prior disclosure was made to defense counsel and where government had not met burden of demonstrating that disclosure would reveal inner workings of grand jury).

\textsuperscript{112} See Canning v. DOJ, No. 92-0463, 1995 WL 1073434, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1995) (finding that FOIA officers are "among those with approved access to grand jury material" and that agency's FOIA officer therefore properly reviewed withheld documents in case at hand); see also DOJ, \textit{Fed. Grand Jury Practice} 70 (Oct. 2008) (recognizing that grand jury
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Church of Scientology International v. DOJ,\footnote{30 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 1994).} took a different approach from the D.C. Circuit and established different standards for certain categories of grand jury records.\footnote{Id. at 235-36.} In Church of Scientology International, the First Circuit found that "documents identified as grand jury exhibits, and whose contents are testimonial in nature or otherwise directly associated with the grand jury process, such as affidavits and deposition transcripts, ordinarily may be withheld simply on the basis of their status as exhibits."\footnote{Id. at 235; see also Rugiero, 257 F.3d at 549 (holding that "documents identified as grand jury exhibits or containing testimony or other material directly associated with grand jury proceedings fall within [Exemption 3] without regard to whether one of the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions allows disclosure" but that "[d]ocuments created for reasons independent of a grand jury investigation do not," without acknowledging that many grand jury exhibits are created for "reasons independent" of grand jury investigation); Church of Scientology Int'l, 30 F.3d at 235 n.15 (dictum) (finding that it is "reasonable for an agency to withhold any document containing a grand jury exhibit sticker or that is otherwise explicitly identified on its face as a grand jury exhibit, as release of such documents reasonably could be viewed as revealing the focus of the grand jury investigation").} The First Circuit "distinguish[ed] such materials from business records or similar documents 'created for purposes independent of grand jury investigations, which have legitimate uses unrelated to the substance of the grand jury proceedings," noting that "[a]lthough these documents, too, may be subject to nondisclosure under Exemption 3 if they are grand jury exhibits, the government needs to provide some basis for a claim that releasing them will implicate the secrecy concerns protected by Rule 6(e)."\footnote{Id. Church of Scientology Int'l, 30 F.3d at 235.} With regard to any other materials "simply located in grand jury files,"\footnote{Id. at 236.} however, the First Circuit rejected a position that the secrecy concerns protected by Rule 6(e) are automatically implicated.\footnote{Id.; cf. Foster v. DOJ, 933 F. Supp. 687, 691 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (protecting twenty-seven page prosecution report that "identifies grand jury witnesses, reveals the direction, scope and strategy of the investigation, and sets forth the substance of grand jury testimony" where "[e]ach page contain[ed] a 'grand jury' secrecy label").}
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, protecting the financial disclosure reports of certain government employees, meets the requirements of subpart (A)(i). Another provision of the Ethics in Government Act, providing for the disclosure of financial disclosure reports of certain other government employees only when particular requirements were met, was also found to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute under subpart (A)(i). Where it was uncontested that the requester did not comply with the requirements of the Ethics in Government Act, the district court held that "the [agency] properly withheld the record pursuant to Exemption 3," noting that "[t]he requester cannot use the FOIA to circumvent the express requirements of the [Ethics in Government Act]."


120 Meyerhoff v. EPA, 958 F.2d 1498, 1500-02 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that agency properly withheld "conflict of interest records under Exemption 3" and specifying that statute "qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3(A)(i)] because it leaves no discretion to the agencies on whether the confidential reports can be disclosed to the public"); see also Seife v. NIH, 874 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that agency properly applied Exemption 3 and section 107(a) of Ethics in Government Act to withhold "Form 450s," noting that "[section] 107(a)(2) . . . leaves no discretion to agencies as to whether they may reveal the contents of the Form 450s," thus referencing language of subpart (A)(i) without specifically stating that section 107(a) qualifies under that subpart of Exemption 3); Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that "EOUSA properly withheld the two Conflict of Interest Certification reports under Exemption 3 [and section 107(a) of the Ethics in Government Act]," and holding that "[t]he Ethics in Government Act requires that these reports remain confidential and leaves the EOUSA no discretion on the issue," thereby tracking language of subpart (A)(i) of Exemption 3 without expressly stating that statute qualifies as subpart (A)(i) statute specifically), renewed motion for summary judgment granted in part on other grounds, 699 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2010); Glascoe v. DOJ, No. 04-0486, 2005 WL 1139269, at *1 (D.D.C. May 15, 2005) (protecting AUSA's "confidential conflict of interest certification" based on nondisclosure requirement of section 107(a) of Ethics in Government Act, but failing to identify under which subpart section 107(a) qualifies).


122 See Church of Scientology v. IRS, 816 F. Supp. 1138, 1152 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (noting statute's requirement that in order to obtain access requester must provide "a written application stating 'the person's name, occupation and address; the name and address of any other person or organization on whose behalf the inspection or copy is requested; and that such person is aware of the prohibitions in obtaining or use of the report.'" (quoting Ethics in Gov't Act § 205(a))), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 93-8431 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1993).

123 Id.
Sections 706(b) and 709(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964\(^{124}\) have also been held to meet the subpart (A)(i) requirement because they allow the EEOC no discretion to publicly disclose matters pending before the agency.\(^{125}\) Similarly, a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act,\(^{126}\) the statute governing records pertaining to Currency Transaction Reports and monetary instruments transactions, has been found to meet the requirements of subpart (A)(i),\(^{127}\) although in some cases courts have not specified which subpart of Exemption 3 they were applying.\(^{128}\) Additionally, the District


\(^{125}\) See Frito-Lay v. EEOC, 964 F. Supp. 236, 240-43 (W.D. Ky. 1997) (recognizing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) as withholding statute under FOIA, and finding that agency properly applied 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) and FOIA Exemption 3 to withhold requestor's charge file); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 722 F. Supp. 180, 184 (D.N.J. 1989) (determining that "[sections] 706(b) and 709(e) [of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e),] fall within Exemption 3 of the FOIA and prohibit the EEOC from disclosing the requested information to the plaintiff," and expressly rejecting argument that statute did not qualify under subpart (A)(i) of Exemption 3); see also Crump v. EEOC, No. 3:97-0275, slip op. at 5-6 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 1997) (finding that agency met its burden of demonstrating records were properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3, through 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), but failing to identify under which Exemption 3 subpart § 2000e-5(b) qualifies); cf. EEOC v. City of Milwaukee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (noting that "any member of the public making a FOIA request" for materials at issue in this non-FOIA dispute "will be denied access, because Exemption 3 incorporates confidentiality provisions of sections 706(b) and 709(e)").


Court for the District of Columbia upheld an agency's determination that "28 U.S.C. § 652(d) [2006] qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute because it requires a district court to 'prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications,'" noting that "the ban on disclosure of these communications evidences a congressional determination that they 'ought to be kept in confidence.'"  

The International Investment Survey Act of 1976 has been held to be what is now denominated as a subpart (A)(i) statute as have two Consumer Product Safety Act provisions that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found to satisfy subpart (A)(i)'s nondisclosure requirements inasmuch as "[e]ach of these statutes, in the language of Exemption 3, 'requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue.'"

Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia determined that a provision of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act "requires the withholding [of] unaggregated..."
data pertaining to individual farmers, ranchers, and other providers of data . . . 'in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue.'\textsuperscript{136}

A provision of the Antitrust Civil Process Act,\textsuperscript{137} which exempts from disclosure under the FOIA transcripts of oral testimony taken in the course of investigations under that Act,\textsuperscript{138} has been held to qualify as a subpart (A)(i) statute.\textsuperscript{139} Also, a section of the Transportation Safety Act of 1974,\textsuperscript{140} which states that the NTSB shall withhold from public disclosure cockpit voice recordings associated with accident investigations, was found to fall within subpart (A)(i) of Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{141} Similarly, information contained in the SSA's "Numident system," which was obtained from death certificates provided by state agencies, has been held exempt on the basis of subpart (A)(i) on the grounds that the language of the statute\textsuperscript{142} "leaves no room for agency discretion."\textsuperscript{143} Additionally, one district court has held that section 1619 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,\textsuperscript{144} which pertains to agricultural and geospatial information, qualifies as a subpart (A)(i) statute inasmuch as "[section 1619] leaves no discretion to the agency as to disclosure of this type of information."\textsuperscript{145}


\textsuperscript{138} See id.

\textsuperscript{139} See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. DOJ, No. 80 Civ. 6612, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1981) (protecting transcripts of oral testimony under Exemption 3).

\textsuperscript{140} 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2006).

\textsuperscript{141} McGilvra v. NTSB, 840 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Colo. 1993).

\textsuperscript{142} 42 U.S.C. § 405(r) (2006).

\textsuperscript{143} Int'l Diatomite Producers Ass'n v. SSA, No. 92-1634, 1993 WL 137286, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1993), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 93-16204 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1993).


\textsuperscript{145} Zanoni v. USDA, 605 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237-38 (D.D.C. 2009) (determining that agency properly applied Exemption 3 to protect National Premises Information Repository information); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USDA, 626 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that "GPS coordinates are exempt from disclosure under FOIA because [§] 8791 meets the requirements of Exemption 3, [and] applies to the GPS coordinates at issue," without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualifies); Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185-88 (D. Or. 2012) (assuming without deciding that section 1619 qualifies under Exemption 3 without identifying under which subpart, and ultimately concluding that agency improperly withheld information under section 1619).
In a decision construing the application of the identical Exemption 3 language of the Government in the Sunshine Act\(^\text{146}\) to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Act, the D.C. Circuit held that two provisions of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Act\(^\text{147}\) allow no discretion with regard to the release of the Board's proposed recommendations, thereby meeting the requirement of subpart (A)(i).\(^\text{148}\)

**Subpart (A)(ii): Statutes Establishing Criteria for Withholding or Referring to Types of Matters to be Withheld**

Traditionally, most Exemption 3 cases have involved what is now termed subpart (A)(ii), which provides for the withholding of information prohibited from disclosure by another federal statute if that "statute . . . establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."\(^\text{149}\) In other words, where ":[subp]art A[(i)] [of Exemption 3] embraces only those statutes leaving no room for administrative discretion to disclose,"\(^\text{150}\) federal statutes allowing for administrative discretion may qualify under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3, provided that the statute "either limit[s] discretion to a particular item or to a particular class of items that Congress has deemed appropriate for exemption, or . . . limit[s] it by prescribing guidelines for its exercise."\(^\text{151}\)

For example, a provision of the Consumer Product Safety Act\(^\text{152}\) has been held to set forth sufficiently definite withholding criteria for it to fall within the scope of what is now subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\(^\text{153}\) Likewise, the provision which prohibits the Consumer Product Safety Commission from disclosing any information that is submitted to it pursuant to section 15(b) of the Act\(^\text{154}\) has been held to meet the


\(^{147}\) § 315(a), (g), 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a), (g)(3) (2006).


\(^{150}\) Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1984).

\(^{151}\) Id.


Section 777 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which governs the withholding of certain "proprietary information,"\footnote{156}{19 U.S.C. § 1677f (2006).} has been held to refer to particular types of information to be withheld and thus to be a subpart (A)(ii) statute.\footnote{157}{See Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1527, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1988).} Section 12(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act\footnote{158}{45 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006).} refers to particular types of matters to be withheld – specifically, information which would reveal employees’ identities -- and thus has been held to satisfy subpart (A)(ii).\footnote{159}{See Ass’n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nat’l Ass’n of Retired & Veteran Ry. Employees v. R.R. Ret. Bd., No. 87-117, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 1991).} Similarly, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(2),\footnote{160}{Id. (2006).} a provision of the Postal Reorganization Act which governs the withholding of "information of a commercial nature . . . which under good business practice would not be publicly disclosed,"\footnote{161}{Id.} has been held to refer to "particular types of matters to be withheld" and thus to be a subpart (A)(ii) statute.\footnote{162}{See Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. USPS, 356 F.3d 588, 589, 597 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that agency properly withheld "quantity and pricing" information related to contract for which requester was unsuccessful bidder); Reid v. USPS, No. 05-294, 2006 WL 1876682, at *5-9 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2006) (finding customer's postage statements and agency’s daily financial statements properly protected); Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. USPS, No. 03-2384, 2004 WL 5050900, at *5-7 (D.D.C. June 24, 2004) (holding that agency properly withheld pricing and rate information, methods of operation, performance requirements, and terms and conditions from transportation agreement with FedEx); Robinett v. USPS, No. 02-1094, 2002 WL 1728582, at *5 (E.D. La. July 24, 2002) (finding that agency properly withheld job-applicant information under 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(2) because it falls within agency’s regulatory definition of "information of a commercial nature"); see also Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. USPS, 742 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80-83 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding Pay for Performance program information properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(2), without identifying under which Exemption 3 subpart § 410(c)(2) qualifies); cf. Carlson v. USPS, 504 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (assuming "without deciding that 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(2) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute," but ultimately determining that requested records fell outside statute's scope); Fair Political Practices...} Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d),\footnote{163}{Id.} a provision of the...
Federal Victims' Protection and Rights Act governing the disclosure of information that would identify children who were victims of certain crimes or witnesses to crimes against others, has been held to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute because it "establishes particular criteria for withholding."\(^{164}\)

Section 12(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979,\(^ {165}\) governing the disclosure of information from export licenses and applications, authorized the withholding of a sufficiently narrow class of information to satisfy the requirements of subpart (A)(ii) and thus qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute.\(^ {166}\) Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has found that section 203(a)(1) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,\(^ {167}\) a statute "enacted . . . out of concern that export controls remain in place

\(^{163}\) (2006).

\(^{164}\) Tampico v. FOUSA, No. 04-2285, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2005).


\(^{166}\) See Wis. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 282-84 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ruling that agency properly withheld export license application information under "comprehensive legislative scheme" through which expired Exemption 3 statute, section 12(c)(1) of Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1), continued in operation by virtue of section 203(a)(1) of International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)); see also Times Pub'l'g Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 236 F.3d 1286, 1289-92 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); Afr. Fund v. Mosbacher, No. 92 Civ. 289, 1993 WL 183736, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1993) (holding that protection under Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1), was properly applied to agency denial made after Act expired in 1990 and before its subsequent re-extension in 1993); Lessner v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 827 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1987) (construing statute as effective in 1987 and determining that statute qualified under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3); cf. Durrani v. DOJ, 607 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that "[22 U.S.C. §] 2778(e) [(2006)] . . . , by incorporation of the Export Administration Act[, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1),] . . . exempts from FOIA disclosure "information obtained for the purpose of consideration of, or concerning, license applications under [the Export Administration Act]. . . unless the release of such information is determined by the [Commerce] Secretary to be in the national interest," without acknowledging that Export Administration Act had lapsed).

without interruption" and intended "to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the export regulations promulgated under the [Export Administration Act]" during any periods of time where the provisions of the Act are allowed to lapse, also qualifies under Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, courts have held that DOD's "technical data" statute,\textsuperscript{169} which protects technical information with "military or space application" for which an export license is required, satisfies subpart (A)(ii) because it refers to sufficiently particular types of matters.\textsuperscript{170} Likewise, the Collection and Publication of Foreign Commerce Act,\textsuperscript{171} which explicitly provides for nondisclosure of shippers' export declarations, qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute under subpart (A)(ii).\textsuperscript{172}

One district court has determined that a provision of the Procurement Integrity Act,\textsuperscript{173} which prohibits the disclosure of certain source selection information, is a statute qualifying under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{174} That Procurement Integrity Act

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{168}] Wis. Project, 317 F.3d at 282-84.

\item[\textsuperscript{169}] 10 U.S.C. § 130 (2006).


\item[\textsuperscript{171}] 13 U.S.C. § 301(g) (2006).


\item[\textsuperscript{174}] See Legal & Safety Employer Research, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. Civ. S001748, 2001 WL 34098652, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2001) (dictum) (explaining that "Congress limited agency discretion to withhold information to[] 'source selection information,' then carefully identified documents that make up source selection information," and concluding that "court is satisfied that [41 U.S.C. §] 423 is a nondisclosure statute under Exemption 3, subsection [(A)(ii)]," but ultimately rejecting Exemption 3 applicability where records at issue did not fall within scope of nondisclosure provision (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)); see also Raher v. BOP, No. 09-526, 2011 WL 2014875, at *4, 6-7 (D. Or. May 24, 2011) (assuming without deciding that 41 U.S.C. § 423 is an Exemption 3 statute, and acknowledging that "Exemption 3 does not protect bid or proposal information from disclosure postaward based on § 423 and its implementing regulations unless it 'pertains to another procurement' or 'is prohibited by law'" (internal quotation unattributed)). But see Pikes Peak Family Hous., LLC v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 673, 680-81 (Cl. Ct. 1998) (rejecting argument that Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423, prohibited release of the information in question, construing phrase "other than as provided by law" as necessarily allowing disclosures in civil discovery) (non-FOIA case); cf. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152 n.139 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that comparable language in Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006), interrelates with FOIA so as to render any
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
provision at issue -- encompassing pre-award contractor bids, proposal information, and source selection information -- prohibits disclosures only "other than as provided by law," and also provides that it "does not . . . limit the applicability of any . . . remedies established under any other law or regulation."\footnote{175}{41 U.S.C. § 423(h).}

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has ruled that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,\footnote{176}{See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2006).} protecting court ordered wiretaps, was a statute qualifying under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\footnote{177}{See Lam Lek Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1991).} In Lam Lek Chong v. DEA,\footnote{178}{929 F.2d 729.} the D.C. Circuit, finding that the statute "clearly identifies intercepted communications as the subject of its disclosure limitations," held that "Title III falls squarely within the scope of subsection (B)'s second prong, as a statute referring to 'particular matters to be withheld.'"\footnote{179}{Id. at 733 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)).} Following the D.C. Circuit's Lam Lek Chong decision, a number of courts have recognized Title III as an Exemption 3 statute.\footnote{180}{See Mendoza v. DEA, No. 07-5006, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22175, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2007) (per curiam) (finding "information obtained by a wiretap" properly protected pursuant to "FOIA Exemption 3" without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualified); Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 553-54 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "wiretapped recordings obtained pursuant to Title III . . . are ordinarily exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3" with no mention made of Exemption 3 subpart under which statute qualified, but ultimately holding that Exemption 3 protection was waived when FOIA requester identified specific tapes that had been played in open court by prosecution as evidence during criminal trial); Willis v. FBI, No. 98-5071, 1999 WL 236891, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 19, 1999) (unpublished disposition) (citing Lam Lek Chong for proposition that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, "and holding that "Title III communications 'fall squarely within the scope of Exemption 3' of the FOIA" (quoting Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Manna v. DOJ, 815 F. Supp. 798, 811-12 (D.N.J. 1993) (determining that analysis of audiotapes and identities of individuals conversing on tapes obtained pursuant to Title III are protected under Exemption 3); Payne v. DOJ, No. 96-30840, slip op. at 5-6 (5th Cir. July 11, 1997) (protecting tape recordings "obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act," and holding that Title III communications 'fall squarely within the scope of Exemption 3 of the FOIA' (quoting Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Manna v. DOJ, 815 F. Supp. 798, 811-12 (D.N.J. 1993) (determining that analysis of audiotapes and identities of individuals conversing on tapes obtained pursuant to Title III are protected under Exemption 3), aff'd on other grounds, 51 F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1995); Manchester v. DEA, 823 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (ruling that wiretap applications and derivative information fall within broad purview of Title III), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision);
The Supreme Court has held that section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which required the Director of the CIA to protect "sources and methods," clearly refers to particular types of matters to be withheld and thus comes within the ambit of subpart (A)(ii). In some instances, section 102(d)(3) even provides a basis for withholding.

---

Docal v. Bennsinger, 543 F. Supp. 38, 43-44 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (relying upon entire statutory scheme of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 in protecting "written accounts of phone calls monitored pursuant to several wire intercepts," but not distinguishing between Exemption 3 subparts); cf. Smith v. DOJ, 251 F.3d 1047, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that audiotapes of telephone calls made by inmate on monitored prison telephone were not "interceptions" within scope of Title III and thus were withheld improperly).

---


182 Id.

183 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (finding that "[s]ection 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which calls for the Director of Central Intelligence to protect 'intelligence sources and methods,' clearly 'refers to particular types of matters,' and thus qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3" (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(ii))); see also, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 72-75 (2d Cir. May 21, 2012) (finding records related to CIA's use of waterboarding and photographs of high-value detainee were properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and the National Security Act of 1947, without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualifies); ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 619, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing "the National Security Act . . . as an exemption statute under exemption 3" and finding that agency properly asserted Exemption 3 and the National Security Act to withhold transcripts of Combat Status Review Tribunals and documents detainees submitted in connection with those hearings); Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that agencies properly protected "information relating to 'intelligence sources and methods,'" but failing to specify Exemption 3 subpart under which statute qualifies (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)))); Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that agency properly protected "intelligence sources and methods along with other internal information" pursuant to Exemption 3, without identifying Exemption 3 subpart pursuant to which statute qualifies, but ultimately reversing grant of summary judgment on other grounds); Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that CIA properly withheld two "President's Daily Briefs" prepared during President Johnson's term of office, but failing to identify Exemption 3 subpart under which statute qualifies); Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming that release of CIA's five-volume compendium of biographical information on "Cuban Personalities" in its entirety would reveal intelligence sources and methods, despite plaintiff's allegation that CIA previously released some of same information, and recognizing that "the National Security Act of 1947 . . . meets the two criteria of Exemption 3," but failing to clarify whether "two criteria" referred to Exemption
for an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records because to do so would reveal intelligence sources or methods.\textsuperscript{184} (For a further discussion of the use and

\textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("affirm[ing] the district court's holding that the existence or nonexistence of records about [Columbian presidential candidate assassinated in 1948] is itself classified information and protected from disclosure by Exemptions 1 and 3 of the FOIA," but "revers[ing] the district court . . . to the extent that it held that the existence of Agency records about [the candidate] was not officially acknowledged by the CIA in testimony before the Congress"); Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. CIA, No. 99-10327, 2000 WL 180923, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition), aff'd No. 3-98-CV-0624, 1999 WL 118796, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999) (deferring to CIA Director's determination that to confirm or deny existence of any agency record pertaining to contract negotiations between U.S. oil company and foreign government would compromise intelligence sources and methods, while noting that "Director [of Central Intelligence]"s determination in this regard is almost unassailable" and that "[a]bsent evidence of bad faith, the [CIA]'s determination 'is beyond the purview of the courts'" (quoting Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1989))); Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that CIA properly refused to confirm or deny existence of records concerning plaintiff's alleged employment relationship with CIA despite allegation that another government agency seemed to confirm plaintiff's status as former CIA employee); Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA, 128 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1997), aff'd 988 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding agency's "Glomar" response proper because acknowledgment of records would present "danger of revealing sources"); Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that agency properly refused to confirm or deny existence of records concerning deceased person's alleged employment relationship with CIA); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding agency's "Glomar" response to request on foreign national because acknowledgment of existence of any responsive record would reveal sources and methods); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Amnesty Int'l v. CIA, No. 07 Civ. 5435, 2010 WL 5421928, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010) (finding that "[t]he CIA's Glomar responses with respect to both categories . . . are appropriate under exemption 3 'because it would reveal intelligence sources and methods protected by the [National Security Act]'"); American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding CIA's "Glomar" response to requests for DOJ memorandum specifying interrogation methods that CIA may use against top Al-Qaeda members and "directive signed by President Bush

origin of the "Glomar" response under Exemption 1, see Exemption 1, Glomar Response and Mosaic Approach, above.)

In December 2004, Congress enacted section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and thereby established the Director of National Intelligence as the authority charged with protecting intelligence sources and methods. Additionally, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act amended the National Security Act of 1947 by transferring a number of duties previously assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence. Subsequent to the enactment of that statute, courts have held that the statute continues to provide protection of the CIA's intelligence sources and methods. Furthermore, courts addressing the issue have determined that the new Director of National Intelligence is charged with the same duties and responsibilities as the Director of Central Intelligence.

granting the CIA the authority to set up detention facilities outside the United States and/or outlining interrogation methods that may be used against detainees"); Pipko v. CIA, 312 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678-79 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding that CIA properly refused to confirm or deny existence of records responsive to first-party request). But cf. ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (declining to uphold CIA's "Glomar" denial of request for DOJ memorandum interpreting Convention Against Torture, because acknowledgment of its existence does not implicate intelligence sources or methods).


186 Id.

187 Id. § 1071.

188 See, e.g., Berman, 501 F.3d at 1137-38, 1140 (finding that CIA properly withheld Presidential Daily Briefing reports where disclosure would have revealed protected intelligence sources and methods); Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378, 380 (agreeing with agency that "disclosure of information regarding whether or not CIA records of a foreign national exist would be unauthorized under Exemption 3 because it would be reasonably harmful to intelligence sources and methods," but reversing and remanding "to the extent that [the district court] held that the existence of Agency records about [candidate] was not officially acknowledged by the CIA in testimony before the Congress"); Lahr v. NTSB, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (protecting CIA's intelligence sources and methods under 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)); Nat'l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. v. CIA, 402 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting CIA's intelligence sources and methods documented in 2004 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq).

189 See Wolf, 473 F.3d at 377 n.6 (explaining that "structure and responsibilities of the United States intelligence community have undergone reorganization" and, "[a]s a consequence, the duties of the CIA Director are described as they existed at the time of Wolf's FOIA request in 2000," and also noting that, "[u]nder the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, . . . the new Director of National Intelligence is similarly required to 'protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure'"
Likewise, many courts have found that section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, which protects from disclosure intelligence sources and methods and "the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the CIA,\(^{190}\) meets the requirements of subpart (A)(ii),\(^{191}\) and one district court has found (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1))); see also Berman, 501 F.3d at 1140 n.1 (stating that "[t]he change in titles and responsibilities has no impact on this case" (citing Wolf, 473 F.3d at 377 n.6)).

\(^{190}\) 50 U.S.C. § 403g (2006) (codified as amended by §§ 1071(b)(1)(A), 1072(b), 118 Stat. at 3690-93, replacing "Director of Central Intelligence" with "Director of National Intelligence").

\(^{191}\) See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 72-75 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding records concerning waterboarding to be properly protected pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3 and CIA Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, but failing to identify pursuant to which Exemption 3 subpart CIA Act qualifies); Larson, 565 F.3d at 865 n.2 (recognizing CIA Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, as qualifying statute under Exemption 3, stating that statute "exempts the CIA from any laws that require disclosure of [certain CIA information]," and noting that "[requester] does not contest the applicability of this exemption to withhold internal CIA organizational data in the [intelligence] cables"); Minier, 88 F.3d at 801 (protecting names of CIA agents); \textit{N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ}, Nos. 11 Civ. 9336 & 12 Civ. 794, 2013 WL 50209, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013) (recognizing 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) as "an exempting statute within the meaning of Exemption 3" and finding that "[t]o the extent that [the requester] seeks information regarding the CIA's participation, if any, in the Government's targeted killing program, that information is properly withheld under Exemption 3 and the CIA Act," but noting that "the CIA Act's prohibition on the disclosure of intelligence sources or methods would apply to the targeted killing program itself, but not to the withheld legal analysis"); ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 (D.D.C. 2012) (observing that "[section 6 of CIA Act] . . . has been recognized in this Circuit as a legitimate source for exemption under FOIA Exemption 3," without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section 6 qualifies, and finding that agency properly withheld "information pertain[ing] to methods that the agency used to collect foreign intelligence" pursuant to Exemption 3); Hall v. CIA, 881 F. Supp. 2d 38, 66 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "deceased former employees still fall within the plain language of [§] 403(g) as having been 'employed' by the CIA" and "hold[ing] that the CIA has properly supported its [§] 403(g) withholdings under exemption 3," without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualifies due to the requester's concession that the statute qualifies under Exemption 3); Subh v. CIA, 760 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting agency's assertion that "[t]he CIA Act . . . "establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld,' and thus absolutely protects information regarding the CIA's organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed" (quoting Exemption 3)); Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421, 441-42 (D.N.J. 2007) (protecting responsive records where disclosure "could reveal . . . the names and locations of internal CIA components"), aff'd on other grounds, 541 F. 3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008); Lahr, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (protecting names of CIA employees); Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 167-68 (same); Blazy v. Tenet, 979 F. Supp. 10, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding that CIA properly "withheld . . . facts about the organization, its functions and personnel" pursuant to Exemption 3 and noting that "what has been deleted
that section 6 meets the requirements of subsection (A)(i). In some instances this statute has also been found to provide a basis for an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records. Also, the identities of Defense Intelligence Agency employees have been held to be protected from disclosure pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 424, and personally identifying information regarding certain members of the

includes intelligence sources or methods, polygraph information, names and identifying information with respect to confidential sources, employees' names, component names, building locations and organization data); Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA, 988 F. Supp. 623, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) qualifies as "exemption statute[] for the purpose of [Exemption 3]," and finding that CIA properly applied 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) and Exemption 3, where "CIA . . . demonstrated that being forced to disclose the information the plaintiffs request would compromise its intelligence gathering methods" and "could cause a confrontation with the Dominican Republic or the disruption of foreign relations" and "would destroy the future usefulness of this [unconfirmed CIA field] station, should it in fact exist," and where "CIA . . . demonstrated that even denying the existence of this station could jeopardize national security"), aff'd per curiam, 128 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1997).

192 See Roman v. NSA, Nos. 09-2947, 09-4281, 09-3344, 09-2504, 09-5633, 2012 WL 569747, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012) (finding that "section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, which requires the CIA to protect from disclosure 'the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency,'" is "properly within the bounds of Exemption 3 because it leaves no discretion on the issue of whether the information should be withheld from the public" (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(g))).

193 See Moore v. FBI, 883 F. Supp. 2d 155, 165 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "CIA properly relied upon the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [in conjunction with FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3] . . . to support its Glomar response"); Makky, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42 (finding that CIA may properly "decline[] to state whether there are any documents in its possession responsive to [plaintiff's] request, as doing so could reveal intelligence methods and activities, or the names and locations of internal CIA components . . . . if its affidavits provide adequate justifications for why it refuses to confirm or deny the existence of documents"); Roman v. Daily, No. 97-1164, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6708, at *11-12 (D.D.C. May 11, 1998) (finding that "CIA therefore properly responded to plaintiff's requests concerning its personnel and any spy satellite programs by neither admitting nor denying the existence of such information"), appeal dismissed per curiam, No. 99-5083, 1999 WL 506683 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 1999); Earth Pledge Found., 988 F. Supp. at 627-28 (finding that agency's refusal to "confirm[] or deny[] the existence of contacts with dissidents" was proper, in light of "danger of revealing sources, detailed in the CIA's public papers," and "additional information, [submitted] in camera, that convinces this Court that disclosure of the information requested by the plaintiffs would jeopardize intelligence sources").

 armed forces and certain DOD and U.S. Coast Guard employees has been held to be protected pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 130b.\(^{195}\) Similarly, section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959,\(^ {196}\) pertaining to the organization, functions, activities, and personnel of NSA, has been held to qualify as a subpart (A)(ii) statute.\(^ {197}\) Some courts have held

---


\(^{(197)}\) See Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that "examination of [s]ection 6 and its legislative history confirms the view that it . . . satisfies the strictures of Subsection [(A)(ii)]"); see also ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 72-75 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding "records related to the CIA's use of waterboarding and the photograph [of high-value detainee"] properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and section 6); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. NSA, 678 F.3d 926, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (recognizing that "[s]ection 6 . . . is a statute qualifying under Exemption 3" and finding that the agency's Glomar response to request for records concerning NSA activities was proper, but not specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section 6 qualifies (quoting Founding Church of Scientology, 610 F. 2d at 828)); Houghton v. NSA, 378 F. App’x 235, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (acknowledging section 6 as statute qualifying under Exemption 3 and finding that agency’s Glomar response to request for records concerning requester was proper, but not identifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section 6 qualifies); Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d 964, 985 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that agency properly protected computer simulation program and data inputted therein pursuant to section 6 and Exemption 3, without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section qualifies); Larson, 565 F.3d at 868-69 (recognizing "[s]ection 6 as an Exemption 3 statute . . . provid[ing] absolute
that section 6 can provide a basis for an agency's refusal to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records.\textsuperscript{198} (For a further discussion of the use and origin of the "Glomar" response under Exemption 1, see Exemption 1, In Camera Submissions and Adequate Public Record, above.)

A provision of the Atomic Energy Act, prohibiting the disclosure of "restricted data" to the public unless "the data . . . can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security,"\textsuperscript{199} refers to particular types of matters -- specifically, information pertaining to atomic weapons and special nuclear material\textsuperscript{200} -- and thus has been held to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute as well.\textsuperscript{201} Similarly, section 207 of

\textsuperscript{198} See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 934-35 (affirming district court's determination that NSA's refusal to confirm or deny the existence of cybersecurity-related communications between NSA and Google, Inc. was proper); Houghton, 378 F. App'x at 238-39 (finding that agency's Glomar response to request for records concerning requester was proper); Roman, 2009 WL 303686, at *1, 5-6 (noting that "it is clear by the plain language of both FOIA Exemption 3 and [section] 6 . . . that [the agency] appropriately invoked the Glomar response" for "request . . . seeking the satellite time logs focused on New York and New Jersey from January 1985 through January 1991 and the total amount of hours a satellite was focused on those states").

\textsuperscript{199} 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a) (2006).

\textsuperscript{200} Id. § 2014(y) (defining "restricted data").

\textsuperscript{201} See Meeropol v. Smith, No. 75-1121, slip op. at 53-55 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 1984) (finding that agency properly protected "certain information involving nuclear-weapons design and gaseous diffusion technology" that "clearly constitutes 'Restricted Data' because it pertains to the design and manufacture of atomic weapons and its release would cause 'undue risk to the common defense and security'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y), 2162(a)), aff'd in relevant part & remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
the National Park Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which sets forth criteria for the Secretary of the Interior to apply when exercising discretion about release of "[i]nformation concerning the nature and specific location of [certain] National Park System resource[s]," including resources which are "endangered, threatened, rare, or commercially valuable," has been found to be within the scope of subpart (A)(ii).

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a portion of the Patent Act satisfies subpart (A)(ii) because it identifies the types of matters -- specifically, patent applications and information concerning them -- intended to be withheld. Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has suggested that the Juvenile Delinquency Records Statute, which generally prohibits disclosure of the existence of records compiled pursuant to that section, but which does provide specific criteria for releasing the information, qualifies as a subpart (A)(ii) statute.

---


203 Id.

204 Id.


In addition, 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4), the portion of the Civil Service Reform Act concerning the confidentiality of certain labor relations training and guidance materials,\textsuperscript{210} has been held to qualify as a subpart (A)(ii) withholding statute,\textsuperscript{211} as has 5 U.S.C. § 7132,\textsuperscript{212} a Civil Service Reform Act provision which limits the issuance of certain subpoenas.\textsuperscript{213} Similarly, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the "Smith-Mundt Act")\textsuperscript{214} has been found to qualify as a subpart (A)(ii) statute insofar as it prohibits the disclosure of certain overseas programming materials within the United States.\textsuperscript{215} While the Smith-Mundt Act originally applied only to records prepared by the former USIA, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998\textsuperscript{216} applied the relevant provisions of that statute to those programs within the Department of State that absorbed USIA’s functions.\textsuperscript{217}

Section 8 of the Commodity Exchange Act,\textsuperscript{218} which prohibits the disclosure of business transactions, market positions, trade secrets, or customer names of persons under investigation under the Act, has been held to refer to particular types of matters and thus to satisfy subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{219} Likewise, the D.C. Circuit has held

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[211] See NTEU v. OPM, No. 76-695, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. July 9, 1979); see also Dubin v. Dep't of the Treasury, 555 F. Supp. 408, 412 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding that "5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) is a statute within the meaning of [s]ection (b)(3) of the FOIA, and the Labor Relations Report are [sic], therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)," but failing to identify 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) as qualifying pursuant to subpart (A)(i) or subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3), aff'd, 697 F.2d 1093 (11th Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision).
\item[212] (2006).
\item[213] See NTEU, No. 76-695, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. July 9, 1979).
\item[215] See Essential Info., Inc. v. USIA, 134 F.3d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that Smith-Mundt Act qualifies as nondisclosure statute even though "it does not prohibit all disclosure of records but only disclosure to persons in this country").
\item[217] Id. (abolishing "[USIA] (other than the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau)," 22 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006), transferring USIA functions to Department of State, 22 U.S.C. § 6532 (2006), and applying Smith-Mundt Act to USIA functions that were transferred to Department of State (22 U.S.C. § 6552(b)) (2006)).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that a provision of the Federal Aviation Act, relating to security data the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the safety of travelers,\textsuperscript{220} similarly shields that particular data from disclosure under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{221} The D.C. Circuit also held that section 306(h) of the Convention on Cultural Property Act\textsuperscript{222} qualifies under Exemption 3 "[b]ecause it authorizes the President or his designee to close [Cultural Property Advisory Committee] meetings otherwise required to be open . . . and "provides 'particular criteria' for deciding on such closures."\textsuperscript{223}

Further, the Federal Technology Transfer Act\textsuperscript{224} contains two provisions that have been found to qualify under Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{225} Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(A), which prohibits federal agencies from disclosing "trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential" obtained from "non-Federal part[ies] participating in [] cooperative research and development agreement[s],"\textsuperscript{226} has been found to qualify under Exemption 3.\textsuperscript{227} Additionally, another provision of that statute, 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(B), which allows federal agencies the discretion to protect for five years any commercial and confidential information that results from Cooperative Research And Development Agreements with nonfederal parties,\textsuperscript{228} has also been held to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{221} See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
\textsuperscript{222} 19 U.S.C. § 2605(h).
\textsuperscript{223} Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep't of State, 641 F.2d 504, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Exemption 3).
\textsuperscript{225} See id.
\textsuperscript{226} Id. § 3710a(c)(7)(A).
\textsuperscript{227} See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. NIH, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2002) (deciding that agency properly withheld royalty rate information under 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(A), and noting that scope of Federal Technology Transfer Act's protection is "coterminous with FOIA Exemption 4"); see also DeLorme Publ'g Co. v. NOAA, 917 F. Supp. 867, 871-72 (D. Me. 1996) (noting that "the [Federal Technology Transfer Act] is an Exemption 3 statute," but finding that "raster compilations [i.e. compilations of agency's nautical charts] created after [agency] entered into the joint research and development agreement with [agency's private partner]" were not obtained from private party and thus did not fall within scope of 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(A)), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 96-1601 (1st Cir. July 8, 1996).
\textsuperscript{228} 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(B).
Additionally, a provision of the Witness Security Act of 1984, which authorizes the Attorney General to "disclose or refuse to disclose" certain information regarding individuals involved with the Witness Security Program, has been found to qualify under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3. Likewise, a National Construction Safety Team Act provision that precludes the National Institute for Standards and Technology from releasing information received during the course of an investigation if the Institute Director determines that disclosure might jeopardize public safety has also been found to qualify under subpart (A)(ii).

**Statutes Both Requiring Withholding and Establishing Criteria or Deliniating Particular Matters to be Withheld**

Some statutes have been found to satisfy both Exemption 3 subparts by "requir[ing] that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue" and "establish[ing] particular criteria for withholding or refer[ring] to particular types of matters to be withheld." For example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and other district courts have held that section 222(f) of...
the Immigration and Nationality Act\(^{236}\) sufficiently limits the category of information it covers -- records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas and permits to enter the United States -- to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute under subpart (A)(ii),\(^{237}\) and other district courts have held that section 222(f) qualifies under subpart (A)(i),\(^{238}\) while the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the District Court for the District of Columbia have held that the section satisfies both Exemption 3 subparts.\(^{239}\) In addition, many courts, including some in the aforementioned circuits, have acknowledged that section 222(f) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute while declining to identify the statute as qualifying under subpart (A)(i) or subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3.\(^{240}\) In some instances, this statute has been recognized as an Exemption 3 statute, but the particular records at issue were found not to fall within its scope.\(^{241}\)


\(^{239}\) See Medina-Hincapie v. Dep't of State, 700 F.2d 737, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983); accord Durrani v. DOJ, 607 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that "[a]lthough it permits discretion by the Secretary of State to disclose information under certain circumstances, [8 U.S.C. § 1202(f)] 'qualifies as a disclosure-prohibiting statute under both subsection (A)(i) and [subsection] [(A)(ii)] of Exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA,'" and finding that agency properly applied Exemption 3 to three documents pertaining to determination regarding issuance or refusal of visa or permit to enter United States (quoting Perry-Torres v. U.S. Dep't of State, 404 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 (D.D.C. 2005))); Perry-Torres v. U.S. Dep't of State, 404 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143-44 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that "[s]ection 222(f) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f),] qualifies as a disclosure-prohibiting statute under both subsection (A)(i) and [(A)(ii)] of Exemption ]3" and concluding that records pertaining to denial of plaintiff's visa application located at American Embassy were properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3).

\(^{240}\) See Schoenman v. FBI, 573 F. Supp. 2d 119, 144 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that agency properly withheld telegram pertaining to third party's visa application pursuant to Exemption 3, but not specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section 222(f) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f), qualified); Perry-Torres v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 04-1046, 2006 WL 2844357, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (same); Badalamenti v. U.S. Dep't of State, 899 F. Supp. 542, 547 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that "Defendant has adequately established the applicability of this statutory exemption to the marginal notes at
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that section 301(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act\(^\text{242}\) qualifies under both subparts of Exemption 3.\(^\text{24}\) First, the Tenth Circuit held that section 301(j) qualified under subpart (A)(i) in that its "prohibition against disclosure is absolute and applies to any information within its scope."\(^\text{24}\) In addition, the Tenth Circuit determined that section 301(j) met the requirements of subpart (A)(ii) because it "is specific as to the particular matters to be withheld."\(^\text{24}\) By contrast, the D.C. Circuit found that another portion of

---

\(^{241}\) See Immigration Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 12 Civ. 1874, 2012 WL 5177410, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2012) (finding that "§ 1202(f) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 because it refers to particular types of confidential matter to be withheld," therefore paraphrasing language of subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3, but ultimately determining that record withheld did not "fall under the category of documents that the statute withholds" inasmuch as "[i]t is not a document that pertains to the issuance or refusal of a visa because there is no past or pending visa application"); Mantilla v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 12-21109-CIV, 2012 WL 4372239, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2012) (finding that "[section] 222(f) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f), explicitly precludes from disclosure documents related to the issuance or refusal of visas, but does not apply to visa revocations"); Guerra v. United States, No. C09-1027, 2010 WL 521613, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2010) (stating that "section [222(f)] is an exemption from [FOIA] . . . requests under Exemption []3," but finding that "[w]ithout some legal authority to broaden the reach of this statutory language, the Court cannot find or assume that waiver applications fit within the 'narrow compass' of the § 1202(f)," which protects "records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States"); El Badrawi v. DHS, 596 F. Supp. 2d 389, 393-94 (D. Conn. 2009) (acknowledging 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) as Exemption 3 statute protecting documents "pertain[ing] to the issuance or refusal of a visa," without specifying subpart, but determining that "reliance on Exemption 3 to withhold documents relating to visa revocation was improper" and ordering release of that withheld information).


\(^{243}\) Anderson v. HHS, 907 F.2d 936, 950-51 (10th Cir. 1990).

\(^{244}\) Id. at 950.

\(^{245}\) Id.
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not qualify under either subpart of Exemption 3 because it does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of records.

Likewise, many courts have found that section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, which protects from disclosure intelligence sources and methods and "the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the CIA, meets the requirements of subpart (A)(ii), and one district court has found

\[246\)
\[247\]
\[248\]
\[249\]

\[246\] § 520, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h).


\[248\] 50 U.S.C. § 403g (2006) (codified as amended by §§ 1071(b)(1)(A), 1072(b), 118 Stat. at 3690-93, replacing "Director of Central Intelligence" with "Director of National Intelligence").

\[249\] See, e.g., Larson, 565 F.3d at 865 n.2 (recognizing CIA Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, as qualifying statute under Exemption 3, stating that statute "exempts the CIA from any laws that require disclosure of [certain CIA information]," and noting that "[requester] does not contest the applicability of this exemption to withhold internal CIA organizational data in the [intelligence cables]"; Minier, 88 F.3d at 801 (protecting names of CIA agents); N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, Nos. 11 Civ. 9336, 12 Civ. 794, 2013 WL 50209, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013) (recognizing 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) as "an exempting statute within the meaning of Exemption 3" and finding that "[t]o the extent that [the requester] seeks information regarding the CIA's participation, if any, in the Government's targeted killing program, that information is properly withheld under Exemption 3 and the CIA Act," but noting that "the CIA Act's prohibition on the disclosure of intelligence sources or methods would apply to the targeted killing program itself, but not to the withheld legal analysis"); Subh v. CIA, 760 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting agency's assertion that "[t]he CIA Act ... 'establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld,' and thus absolutely protects information regarding the CIA's organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed" (quoting Exemption 3)); Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421, 441-42 (D.N.J. 2007) (protecting responsive records where disclosure "could reveal ... the names and locations of internal CIA components"), aff'd on other grounds, 541 F. 3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008); Lahr, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (protecting names of CIA employees); Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 167-68 (same); Blazy v. Tenet, 979 F. Supp. 10, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding that CIA properly "withheld ... facts about the organization, its functions and personnel" pursuant to Exemption 3 and noting that "what has been deleted includes intelligence sources or methods, polygraph information, names and identifying information with respect to confidential sources, employees' names, component names, building locations and organization data"); Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA, 988 F. Supp. 623, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) qualifies as "exemption statute[] for the purpose of [Exemption 3]," and finding that CIA properly applied 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) and Exemption 3, where "CIA ... demonstrated that being forced to disclose the information the plaintiffs request would compromise its intelligence gathering methods" and "could cause a confrontation with the Dominican Republic or the disruption of foreign relations" and "would destroy the future usefulness of this [unconfirmed CIA field] station, should it in fact exist," and where "CIA ... demonstrated that even denying the existence of this station
that section 6 meets the requirements of subsection (A)(i).\footnote{Roman v. NSA, Nos. 09-2947, 09-4281, 09-3344, 09-2504, 09-5633, 2012 WL 569747, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012) (finding that "section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, which requires the CIA to protect from disclosure 'the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency,'” is "properly within the bounds of Exemption 3 because it leaves no discretion on the issue of whether the information should be withheld from the public" (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(g))).} In some instances this statute has also been found to provide a basis for an agency refusing to confirm or deny the existence of records.\footnote{Moore v. FBI, 883 F. Supp. 2d 155, 165 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "CIA properly relied upon the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 [in conjunction with FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3] … to support its Glomar response"); Makky, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42 (finding that CIA may properly "decline[] to state whether there are any documents in its possession responsive to [plaintiff’s] request, as doing so could reveal intelligence methods and activities, or the names and locations of internal CIA components . . . . if its affidavits provide adequate justifications for why it refuses to confirm or deny the existence of documents"); Roman v. Daily, No. 97-1164, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6708, at *11-12 (D.D.C. May 11, 1998) (finding that "CIA therefore properly responded to plaintiff’s requests concerning its personnel and any spy satellite programs by neither admitting nor denying the existence of such information"), appeal dismissed per curiam, No. 99-5083, 1999 WL 506683 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 1999); Earth Pledge Found., 988 F. Supp. at 627-28 (finding that agency’s refusal to "confirm[] or deny[] the existence of contacts with dissidents" was proper, in light of "danger of revealing sources, detailed in the CIA's public papers," and "additional information, [submitted] in camera, that convinces this Court that disclosure of the information requested by the plaintiffs would jeopardize intelligence sources").}

## Tax Return Information

The United States Supreme Court and most appellate courts that have considered the matter have held either explicitly or implicitly that section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code could jeopardize national security,\footnote{See ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 72-75 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding records concerning waterboarding to be properly protected pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3 and CIA Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, but failing to identify pursuant to which Exemption 3 subpart CIA Act qualifies); ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242, 245 (D.D.C. 2012) (observing that "[section 6 of CIA Act] … has been recognized in this Circuit as a legitimate source for exemption under FOIA Exemption 3" without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart section 6 qualifies, and finding that agency properly withheld "information pertaining to methods that the agency used to collect foreign intelligence" pursuant to Exemption 3); Hall v. CIA, 881 F. Supp. 2d 38, 66 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "deceased former employees still fall within the plain language of [§] 403(g) as having been 'employed' by the CIA" and "hold[ing] that the CIA has properly supported its [§] 403(g) withholdings under exemption 3," without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualifies due to the requester’s concession that the statute qualifies under Exemption 3); Cerveny v. CIA, 445 F. Supp. 772, 775 (D. Colo. 1978) (same).}
Revenue Code,\textsuperscript{252} which affords confidentiality to tax returns and tax return information,\textsuperscript{253} satisfies what is now known as subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3 as it refers to particular matters to be withheld.\textsuperscript{254} The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have further reasoned that section 6103 qualifies under what is now subpart (A)(i) to the extent that a person generally is not entitled to access to tax returns or return information of other taxpayers.\textsuperscript{255} Finally, several courts have determined that section 6103 qualifies as an exempting statute under Exemption 3 without identifying which subpart of Exemption 3 it satisfies.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{252} (2006).

\textsuperscript{253} See Ryan v. ATF, 715 F.2d 644, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (characterizing 26 U.S.C. § 6103 as statute containing "the confidentiality provisions of the Internal Revenue Code").

\textsuperscript{254} See, e.g., Aronson v. IRS, 973 F.2d 962, 964-65 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that "[t]he relevant exception [to the tax statute], read together with the rest of the statute, both 'refers to particular types of matters to be withheld' (namely, 'taxpayer identity information') and 'establishes particular criteria for withholding' (namely, that the IRS may consider release only where it would help notify taxpayers of refunds due, and, even then, only to the media)" and thus qualifies under subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3, and concluding that IRS lawfully exercised discretion to withhold street addresses pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(m)(i) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010))); DeSalvo v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1988) (determining that "[b]ecause section 6103 both establishes criteria for withholding information and refers to particular types of matters to be withheld, it satisfies the requirements of [Exemption 3]"); Grasso v. IRS, 785 F.2d 70, 77 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding return information properly protected pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103 and subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3); Long v. IRS, 742 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that 26 U.S.C. § 6103 qualifies as proper withholding statute pursuant to subpart (A)(ii) of Exemption 3); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).

\textsuperscript{255} See DeSalvo, 861 F.2d at 1221 n.4 (noting that "section 6103(a)'s general prohibition on disclosure may also be viewed as an exempting statute under FOIA section 552(b)(3)(A)(i)"); Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that "[t]hese nondisclosure provisions of § 6103 meet the requirement of [subsection (A)(i)] to Exemption 3 . . . so that a person . . . is not entitled to access to the tax return or return information of other taxpayers"); Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574, 578 n.6 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that inasmuch as "language of [26 U.S.C.] § 6103 contains a mandatory requirement that returns and return information be withheld from the public . . . the statute meets the § 552(b)(3)(A)([i]) criterion"); see also Hull v. IRS, 656 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that "[section] 6103[] generally prohibits the disclosure of 'returns and return information'" (quoting Grasso, 785 F.2d at 75)).

\textsuperscript{256} See Adamowicz v. IRS, 402 F. App'x. 648, 652 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding tax return information properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and 26 U.S.C. § 6103 without specifying under which Exemption 3 subpart statute qualifies); Stebbins v. Sullivan, No. 90-5361, 1992 WL 174542, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 1992) (per curiam) (protecting address of third party taxpayer pursuant to Exemption 3 and 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), but not identifying under which Exemption 3 subpart); Long v. IRS, 891 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
Specifically, section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "returns and return information shall be confidential," subject to a number of enumerated exceptions.\(^{257}\) Courts have determined that a wide array of information properly may be withheld pursuant to Exemption 3 and section 6103.\(^{258}\)

check sheets and zip code information exempt from disclosure pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) and Exemption 3, but not specifying subpart, and noting that deletion of taxpayers' identification does not alter confidentiality of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 information; \(^{257}\) 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a).

Inasmuch as the statute defines tax return information as "[certain information] or any other data, received by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary," the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that section 6103 applies only to tax return information obtained by the IRS, not to any such information maintained by other agencies that was obtained by means other than through the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. One district court has found taxpayer's alleged audit); Choure v. IRS, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200-02 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (copy of certified mail log pertaining to plaintiff, where mail log also pertained to "other taxpayers who received Statutory Notices of Deficiency from the IRS"); Leveto v. IRS, No. 98-285E, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5791, at *21-22 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2001) (information identifying third-party taxpayers); Helmon v. IRS, No. 3-00-CV-0809-M, 2000 WL 1909786, at *2-4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2000) (magistrate's recommendation) (third-party "return information" despite requester's claim that she was administrator of estate of third party and was legally entitled to requested information, where proof of requester's relationship to deceased did not satisfy standard established by IRS regulations), adopted in pertinent part, No. 3-00-CV-0809-M, 2000 WL 33157844 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2000); Wewee v. IRS, No. 99-475, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20285, at *14-15 (D. Ariz. Oct. 13, 2000) (magistrate's recommendation) (third-party tax return information, including individual and business taxpayer names, income amounts, and deductions), adopted in pertinent part, No. 99-475, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3230 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2001); Allnutt v. DOJ, No. Y98-1722, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4060, at *37-38 (D. Md. Mar. 6, 2000) (magistrate's recommendation) (third-party taxpayer information, even though IRS collected information as part of investigation of requester), adopted in pertinent part, 99 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D. Md. 2000), and renewed motion for summary judgment granted, No. Y98-1722, 2000 WL 852455 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2000), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Allnut v. Handler, 8 F. App'x 225 (4th Cir. 2001); Murphy v. IRS, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183-84 (D. Haw. 1999) (third-party return information, despite requester's argument that he had "material interest" in information), appeal dismissed, No. 99-17325 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 17, 2000); Barnes v. IRS, 60 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900-01 (S.D. Ind. 1998) ("transcripts containing a variety of tax data concerning third party taxpayers"). But see Long v. IRS, No. 08-35672, 2010 WL 3677445, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2010) (determining that data contained in cells of two, "the product of a combination of two taxpayers' data," had been "reformulated and amalgamated" and therefore did not constitute return information as defined by § 6103(b)(2), and consequently remanding in part); Kamman v. IRS, 56 F.3d 46, 49 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding appraisal of jewelry seized from third-party taxpayer and auctioned to satisfy tax liability was not "return information").


260 See Ryan v. United States, 74 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 1996) (non-FOIA case) (finding that "[s]ection 6103 of Title 26 protects only information filed with and disclosed by the IRS, not all information relating to any tax matter"); Stokwitz v. United States, 891 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1987) (identifying "the central fact evident from the legislative history, structure, and language of section 6103 (including the definitions of 'return and return information') [is] that the statute is concerned solely with the flow of tax data to, from, or through the IRS").
protection appropriate when the information was collected by another agency pursuant to an agreement with the IRS\textsuperscript{261} and another district court has suggested that another agency's assertion of section 6103 may be appropriate if the agency could "supply a declaration with sufficient detail to determine whether the IRS has appropriately directed the [agency] to withhold [certain] information."\textsuperscript{262}

Although infrequently addressed in FOIA cases involving section 6103, one district court stressed that "FOIA's segregability rule requires an agency [to] disclose non-exempt portions of a document so long as the information is not 'inextricably intertwined with exempt portions,'"\textsuperscript{263} and ordered that the agency "disclos[e] employees' names . . . , along with any other information contained in the . . . documents that can be segregated from the taxpayer data."\textsuperscript{264} Other courts have found that the FOIA's segregation requirement does not apply to cases involving requests for tax information of third parties, which "are . . . entirely exempt from disclosure."\textsuperscript{265}

As the D.C. Circuit explained in Tax Analysts v. IRS,\textsuperscript{266} "the Internal Revenue Code protects the confidentiality of tax returns and return information, such as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{261} See Davis, Cowell & Bowie, LLP v. SSA, No. C 01-4021, 2002 WL 1034058, at *1, *4-5, *7 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2002) (concluding that information submitted to SSA was properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3 and 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and noting that "information from the W-2 and W-3 forms constitutes return information" where "W-2 and W-3 forms from which information is sought . . . [are] collected pursuant to the authority granted to the IRS to collect taxes," and where, "[i]n exercise of that authority, the IRS has entered into a compact with the SSA jointly to receive the tax returns"), vacated as moot, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{262} Rosenfeld v. DOJ, No. C 07-3240, 2010 WL 3448517, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{263} Vento v. IRS, No. 08-159, 2010 WL 1375279, at *4 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
\item \textsuperscript{264} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Surgick v. Cirella, No. 09-3807, 2012 WL 1067923, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (noting that "even if [agency] were to redact identifiers from the documents at issue, such redaction is insufficient to deprive the requested documents of their protected status under [s]ection 6103), dismissed, No. 09-3807, 2012 WL 1495422 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2012); see also Hull, 656 F.3d at 1196 (finding that "although FOIA provides an agency must disclose any reasonably segregable non-exempt information, the IRS has demonstrated all of the requested information is exempt" and observing that "'[t]he mere deletion of identifying material will not cause the remainder of the return information to lose its protected status, and document-by-document examination to determine the possibility of redaction for that purpose is therefore unnecessary'" (quoting Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
\item \textsuperscript{266} 350 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
\end{itemize}
taxpayers' source of income, net worth, and tax liability," but "[a]t the same time, the Code requires the IRS to disclose certain information." Additionally, courts have held that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e) and 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7), individuals are not entitled to obtain tax return information regarding themselves if it is determined that release would impair enforcement of tax laws by the IRS.268 As the Court of Appeals for

267 Id. at 104 (noting that IRS is required "to disclose all tax exemption determinations – whether [it] grant[s], den[ies], or revoke[s] the exemption").

268 See Currie, 704 F.2d at 531 (concluding that agency properly protected "internal agency memoranda reflecting the direction and scope of the investigation of the appellants' tax liability, memoranda of interviews with witnesses and confidential informants, draft affidavits of confidential informants, correspondence with state law enforcement agency and other third parties, information received from third parties relating to financial transactions with the appellants, federal tax returns of third parties, and IRS personnel's notes and work papers concerning the scope and direction of the investigation" pursuant to Exemption 3); Batton v. Evers, No. H-07-2852, 2008 WL 4605946, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2008) (determining that IRS properly withheld certain tax return information pertaining to plaintiff and various third parties where "IRS contends that the release of these documents would impair an ongoing civil tax examination of the plaintiff" and "would impede the IRS'[s] ability to collect any taxes owed by the plaintiff"); Radcliffe v. IRS, 536 F. Supp. 2d 423, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (protecting documents "generated or compiled during the identification and examination of plaintiff's tax returns for possible fraudulent offshore credit card activity" and rejecting argument that because "the records consist mainly of credit card account information gathered by Credomatic, not the IRS," they should not be considered "return information," noting that "it does not matter that the information was gathered by Credomatic, since it was received by the IRS"); Arizechi v. IRS, No. 06-5292, 2008 WL 539058, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2008) (finding that defendants properly applied Exemption 3 to protect tax records pertaining to the plaintiff where "delegate of the Secretary has determined that disclosure of the documents at issue in this case would seriously impair tax administration" and where "records identify the specific activity that is the focus of their investigation"); George, 2007 WL 1450309, at *8 (determining that release of interview notes associated with plaintiff's case "would allow Plaintiff to alter his sources of income, assets, and relationships with other individuals and entities in attempt to circumvent tax liability" and "would seriously impair federal tax administration by releasing documents the IRS is using in its ongoing investigation"); Cal-Trim, Inc. v. IRS, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2007) (protecting interview notes, case history notes, and other records associated with plaintiff's case pursuant to Exemption 3 and 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7) where agency showed that "release of this information would constitute a serious impairment to federal tax administration"); Warren v. United States, No. 1:99CV1317, 2000 WL 1868950, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2000) (concluding that release of return information to taxpayer would inhibit investigation of taxpayer and impair tax administration); Youngblood v. Comm'r, No. 2:99-CV-9253, 2000 WL 852449, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2000) (declaring that special agent report was properly withheld where "disclosure of the [special agent report] would seriously impair Federal tax administration"); Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. 98-1112, 1999 WL 282784, at *2-3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 1999) (finding that disclosure to taxpayer of IRS-prepared "checkspread" charting all checks written by taxpayer over two-year period would seriously
the Eleventh Circuit explained in Currie v. IRS,269 "[t]o qualify for exemption under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7), the IRS must demonstrate that
two criteria have been met: (1) the documents must constitute 'return information' as
defined by 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), and (2) disclosure [must] seriously impair federal tax
administration."270 Information that would provide insights into how the IRS selects
returns for audits has regularly been found to impair the IRS's enforcement of tax
laws.271 One district court concluded that section 6103(e)(7) did not authorize an agency
to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of tax records, despite the fact that any
responsive records would likely be exempt under from FOIA disclosure.272

Impair tax administration, notwithstanding IRS agent’s disclosure of "checkspread" to
taxpayer during interview; Brooks v. IRS, No. 96-6284, 1997 WL 718473, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 28, 1997) (upholding protection of revenue agent’s notes because release "would
permit Plaintiff to ascertain the extent of [IRS's] knowledge and predict the direction of [its]
examination"); Holbrook v. IRS, 914 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (protecting IRS
agent’s handwritten notes regarding interview with plaintiff where disclosure would
interfere with enforcement proceedings and hence seriously impair tax administration).

269 704 F.2d 523.
270 Id. at 531.
271 See Gillin v. IRS, 980 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that differential
function scores, used to identify returns most in need of examination or audit, are exempt
from disclosure); Long v. IRS, 891 F.2d at 224 (finding that computer tapes used to develop
discriminant function formulas protected); Sutton, 2007 WL 30547, at *3-4 (holding
discriminant function scores properly exempt from disclosure); Coolman v. IRS, No. 98-
permits IRS to withhold discriminant function scores), summary affirmance granted, No.
(considering that discriminant function scores were properly withheld under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103(b)(2), even where scores were seventeen years old, because IRS continued to use
scores in determining whether to audit certain tax files); Wishart v. Comm’r, No. 97-20614,
protectible), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Cujas v. IRS,
No. 1:97CV00741, 1998 WL 419999, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1998) (recognizing that
requester was likely to disseminate information about his discriminant function score, "thus
making it easier for taxpayers to avoid an audit of their return[s]"); aff’d per curiam sub
nom. Cujas v. Internal Revenue, 162 F.3d 1154 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision);
scores properly exempt); Lamb v. IRS, 871 F. Supp. 301, 304 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(D) (providing that no law "shall be construed to require the
disclosure of standards used . . . for the selection of returns for examination . . . if the
Secretary [of the Treasury] determines that such disclosure will seriously impair . . .
enforcement under the internal revenue laws").
9, 2012) (noting that "[t]he Glomar response has . . . been invoked . . . where information
speaking to the existence of an investigation would compromise the investigation," and
Section 6105 of the Internal Revenue Code\textsuperscript{273} governs the withholding of tax convention information such as bilateral agreements providing, for example, for the exchange of foreign "tax relevant information" with the United States and "mutual assistance in tax matters."\textsuperscript{274} The Ninth Circuit and one district court have held that section 6105 qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute.\textsuperscript{275}

The D.C. Circuit several decades ago rejected the argument that the tax code "displaced" the FOIA, ruling instead that the procedures in section 6103 for members of the public to obtain access to IRS documents do not duplicate, and thus do not displace, those of the FOIA.\textsuperscript{276}

**FOIA-Specific Nondisclosure Statutes**

With the passage of the Open FOIA Act,\textsuperscript{277} all statutes enacted after 2009 that are intended by Congress to operate as Exemption 3 statutes must specifically cite to the

---


\textsuperscript{274} Id.

\textsuperscript{275} See Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. IRS, No. 09-35618, 2010 WL 3611645, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010) (finding that information exchanged between United States and Russia qualified as tax convention information and was therefore properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and 26 U.S.C. § 6105) (unpublished disposition); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 217 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27-29 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that IRS properly withheld under Exemption 3 international tax convention records considered confidential under such conventions); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2001) (protecting record created by IRS to respond to foreign tax treaty partner’s request for legal advice, because record consisted of tax convention information that treaty requires be kept confidential), aff’d in part, rev’d & remanded in part on other grounds, 294 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Vento, 2010 WL 1375279, at *4 (stating that "26 U.S.C. § 6105 . . . requires non-disclosure of information exchanged pursuant to tax conventions" but failing to make determination about propriety of agency’s assertion where plaintiffs conceded that documents may be withheld pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6105).


\textsuperscript{277} Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2184; see also FOIA Post, "Congress Passes Amendment to Exemption 3 of the FOIA" (posted 3/10/10).
Exemption.\textsuperscript{278} Prior to this statutory mandate there were examples of nondisclosure statutes that specifically stated that they prohibited disclosure under the FOIA and, when such statutes were challenged, courts found that they qualified as Exemption 3 statutes.\textsuperscript{279}

The most common form of such FOIA-specific nondisclosure statutes direct that certain particular information, often information that is provided to or received by an agency pursuant to that statute, "shall be exempt from disclosure" under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{280} For instance, section 21(f) of the FTC Act\textsuperscript{281} provides that certain investigative materials received by the FTC and "provided pursuant to any compulsory process under this subchapter or which is provided voluntarily in place of such compulsory process shall

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{280} See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1314(g) (2006) (providing that "[a]ny documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony provided pursuant to any demand issued under this chapter shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5"); 31 U.S.C. § 5319 (2006) (providing that "a report [filed under Bank Secrecy Act] and records of reports are exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5"); see also FOIA Post, "Agencies Rely on Wide Range of Exemption 3 Statutes" (posted 12/16/03) (discussing "disclosure prohibitions that are not general in nature but rather are specifically directed toward disclosure under the FOIA in particular").
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
not be required to be disclosed under section 552 of Title 5." 282 This statute has been determined to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute. 283 Similarly, a provision of the Antitrust Civil Process Act states that "[a]ny documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony provided pursuant to any demand issued under this chapter shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5." 284 One district court has determined that the statute qualifies as a proper withholding statute pursuant to Exemption 3. 285 Likewise, 31 U.S.C. § 5319, 286 a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act, requires that reports pertaining to monetary instruments transactions be made available to certain agencies and organizations, but provides that "a report [filed under the Act] and records of reports are exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5." 287 Courts addressing the question of whether 31 U.S.C. § 5319 qualifies under Exemption 3 have concluded that it does. 288

282 Id.

285 Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. DOJ, No. 80 Civ. 6612, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1981).
287 Id.
Additionally, two district courts have recognized section 303B(m) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, which provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), a proposal in the possession or control of an executive agency may not be made available to any person under section 552 of Title 5," as a statute qualifying under Exemption 3. Similarly, two district courts have held that a nearly identical disclosure provision, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(g), which provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), a proposal in the possession or control of an agency named in section 2303 of this title may not be made available to any person under section 552 of title 5," also qualifies under Exemption 3.

(finding information from Treasury Enforcement Communications System and Currency and Banking Retrieval System properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and 31 U.S. § 5319); Vennes v. IRS, No. 5-88-36, slip op. at 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 1988) (protecting currency transaction reports and records pertaining to currency transaction reports pursuant to Exemption 3 and 31 U.S. § 5319), aff'd, 890 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision).


290 Id.


293 Id. § 2305(g)(1).

294 See Roman v. NSA, Nos. 09-2947, 09-4281, 09-3344, 09-2504, 09-5633, 2012 WL 569747, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012); Margolin, 2011 WL 1303221, at *6; Chesterfield
A less common form of such FOIA-specific nondisclosure statutes provide that agencies "may withhold from disclosure" information which "would be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5." In 2012, one district court found that one such provision, 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(1), "should be read as permitting an agency to withhold under FOIA Exemption 3 any information that is not required to be disclosed on the Form 450," and concluded that the agency properly applied Exemption 3 and 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(1) to protect "letter designations reflecting whether a financial interest on a waiver determination is that of a[n employee's] spouse or dependent child."

**Nondisclosure Results Under Appropriations Acts**

Congress has at times enacted legislation that achieves an Exemption 3 effect in an indirect fashion -- i.e., by limiting the funds that an agency may expend in responding to a FOIA request. The first such statute enacted was section 630 of the Agricultural, Rural Development, and Related Agencies Development Act, 1989, which states that "none of the funds provided in this Act may be expended to release information acquired from any handler under" the Act. When section 630 was tested in *Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA*, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether this statute had the effect of triggering Exemption 3, but the Ninth Circuit did observe that "if Congress intended to prohibit the release of the list under FOIA -- as opposed to the expenditure of funds in releasing the list -- it could easily have said so." 

**Notes and Citations**

295 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(1) (2006) (providing that "a copy of any determination granting an exemption under subsection (b)(1) or (b)(3) [from application of penalties for acts affecting personal financial interests determined to constitute bribery, graft, or conflicts of interest] shall be made available to the public," but exempting from this disclosure requirement "any information contained in the determination that would be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5").

296 Id.


299 Id.

300 960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992).

301 Id. at 108 (dictum) (opining on whether section 630 is "explicit" enough to qualify as Exemption 3 statute).
More recently, during the course of litigation in *City of Chicago v. U.S. Department of the Treasury*,\(^\text{302}\) Congress enacted three appropriations bills that specifically prohibited ATF from using appropriated funds to comply with any FOIA request seeking records relating to the contested firearms sales databases that are maintained by ATF.\(^\text{303}\) The first of these laws was enacted shortly before the scheduled oral argument before the Supreme Court, whereupon the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit disclosure order that was on appeal and remanded the case for the lower court to consider the effect of this newly enacted provision.\(^\text{304}\) By the time the case reached the circuit court for consideration on remand, Congress had enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, that likewise prohibited ATF’s use of appropriated funds to disclose the same type of firearms database information,\(^\text{305}\) and as a result, both appropriations laws were taken into consideration by the Seventh Circuit.\(^\text{306}\)

On remand, the appeals court determined that although both appropriations bills prohibited ATF from expending federal funds on retrieval of the information, there was no "irreconcilable conflict" between prohibiting such expenditure and granting plaintiff access to the databases.\(^\text{307}\) While ATF’s petition for rehearing en banc was pending, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005,\(^\text{308}\) which likewise prohibited the use of appropriated funds to disclose the same type of firearms database information, but added an appropriations rider providing that such data "shall be immune from judicial process."\(^\text{309}\) The Seventh Circuit granted ATF’s petition for rehearing en banc and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the impact of this new

---

\(^\text{302}\) 384 F.3d 429 (2004), vacated, 423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005).


\(^\text{304}\) DOJ v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229, 1229 (2003); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Vacates and Remands in ATF Database Case" (posted 3/25/03).

\(^\text{305}\) 118 Stat. at 53.

\(^\text{306}\) City of Chicago, 384 F.3d at 431-32 (noting that "both parties to the litigation have rebriefed their arguments" due to enactment of 2003 and 2004 appropriations legislation).

\(^\text{307}\) Id. at 435-36 (ordering ATF to provide plaintiff access to databases through use of court-appointed special master).

\(^\text{308}\) 118 Stat. at 2859-60.

\(^\text{309}\) Id.
On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit held that this new language "exempts from disclosure [firearms] data previously available to the public" and that, as such, the new law qualified as an Exemption 3 statute.

Following the City of Chicago litigation, courts continue to recognize the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, as an Exemption 3 statute. Additionally, appropriations acts for subsequent fiscal years have continued to include both language prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to disclose this information and language providing that such data "shall be immune from judicial process." One district court that found ATF properly protected Firearms Trace System database information pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, and Exemption 3 of the FOIA, acknowledged that a new appropriations statute had been enacted, but continued to apply the 2005 statute where the subsequent year's appropriations statute, the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2295-96 (2005), with 118 Stat. at 2859-60.


311 City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2005).


One court found that the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, did not meet the requirements of Exemption 3, as amended, inasmuch as it did not expressly reference Exemption 3 as required for all statutes enacted after the OPEN FOIA Act. Subsequent to that, however, the same district court rejected this reasoning, finding instead that the 2005 and 2008 appropriations acts served as permanent prohibitions on disclosure, and therefore the only question remaining was whether subsequent appropriations acts repealed the language of the 2005 and 2008 acts, and, in that case, finding trace information properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3.

---

314 Muhammad, 2007 WL 433552, at *2 n.1 (noting that "[a] 2006 rider was passed which adds that the information 'shall be inadmissible in evidence, and shall not be used, relied on, or disclosed in any manner, nor shall testimony or other evidence be permitted based upon such data, in any civil action pending on or filed after the effective date of this Act (including the District of Columbia) or Federal court,'" but ultimately applying 2005 version of statute because Court determined that "[t]he language of the 2005 Act was not altered in any other respects and the additional language [in 2006 rider] does not appear to be applicable to the circumstances here") (quoting 119 Stat. at 2295-96)).

315 See McRae, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (finding that agency "properly withheld all information derived from the Firearms Trace System Database" pursuant to Exemption 3 and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005; Skinner, 2010 WL 3832602, at *16 (finding "Firearm Trace Reports" properly protected pursuant to Exemption 3 and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005. But cf. Caruso v. ATF, No. 10-6026, 2011 WL 669132, at *3 & n.1 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that "[t]here does not appear to be a specific cite to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) and the appropriations bill [for fiscal year 2010] appears to have been enacted in December of 2009 and the Open FOIA Act appears to have been enacted in October 2009 possibly negating the applicability of the exemption to this case," but ultimately determining that "the appropriations bill . . . does not preclude disclosure [of the records maintained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923]" where the court found that "§ 923(g) actually requires copies of the records to be provided to the licensee"), motion for reconsideration granted & previous order affirmed in pertinent part, No. 10-6026, 2011 WL 6736059 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2011).


"Operational Files" Provisions

A closely related but somewhat different form of statutory protection is found in special FOIA provisions that Congress has enacted to cover the "operational files" of individual intelligence agencies. For example, the CIA Information Act of 1984 provides that "[t]he Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency from the provisions of section 552 of Title 5 (Freedom of Information Act) which require publication or disclosure, or search or review in connection therewith." The CIA Information Act established the CIA as the first intelligence agency to obtain such exceptional FOIA treatment for its "operational files." To the extent that the issue has been addressed in litigation, courts have recognized the CIA Information Act as a qualifying statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA.


319 Id. § 431(a).

320 See id. § 431; see also FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 4, at 1-2 (noting that underlying principle of CIA Information Act of 1984 is to free "CIA of the burden of processing FOIA requests for" records that "would be almost entirely withholdable anyway, upon application of the FOIA's national security exemption, Exemption 1, together with the CIA's other statutory nondisclosure provisions under Exemption 3"); FOIA Post, "FOIA Amended by Intelligence Authorization Act" (posted 12/23/02) (commenting on similar rationale underlying 2002 FOIA amendment, which made exception to FOIA's "any person" rule in certain circumstances for requests received by "elements of the intelligence community").

321 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167, 174 n.19 (1985) (dictum) (characterizing CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as "exempt[ing] the [CIA]'s 'operational files' from disclosure under the FOIA"); Wolf v. CIA, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) (recognizing that the "CIA Information Act permits the CIA to designate certain files as 'operational files' and exempt those files from the FOIA provisions requiring 'publication or disclosure, search or review,'" and rejecting as moot "plaintiff's challenge to the adequacy of the CIA's search[ed] on its alleged failure to search the operational files" (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 431(a))); Aftergood v. Nat'l Reconnaissance Office, 441 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44 (D.D.C. 2006) (recognizing that CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as statute "which . . . provides a mechanism by which operational files can be exempted from the FOIA's search and review requirement"); see also ACLU v. DOD, 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (acknowledging that CIA Information Act "authoriz[es] a general exemption for operational files from FOIA search and review requirements," but ultimately "declin[ing] to find that [CIA's] operational files warrant any protection from the requirements of FOIA" where court determined that CIA had not adhered "to the statutory authority for exempting operational files").
Following the enactment of the CIA Information Act, Congress enacted similar "operational files" statutes pertaining to records maintained by three other intelligence agencies: the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. These special statutory protections are modeled after, and quite similar to, the CIA Information Act. For example, 50 U.S.C. § 432a provides that "[t]he Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Reconnaissance Office from the provisions of section 552 of title 5 which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith."  

Of the three "operational files" statutes regarding the records of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, only the statute pertaining to the National Reconnaissance Office has been challenged in court. The one district court that has addressed the effect of this statute in the FOIA context concluded that "[t]he [National Reconnaissance Office] Director and the [Director of National Intelligence] are empowered by [50 U.S.C.] § 432a to exempt [National Reconnaissance Office] files both from disclosure and from the FOIA's search and review procedure so long as the files in question satisfy the definitions of 'operational files' contained in the statute."  

**Statutes Found Not to Qualify Under Exemption 3**

Certain statutes have been found to fail to meet the requisites of Exemption 3. For instance, in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. DOJ, the Court of Appeals held that the statute was not an "Exemption 3" statute.  

---


323 See id. § 432a (authorizing special "operational files" treatment for National Reconnaissance Office).

324 See id. § 432 (authorizing special "operational files" treatment for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency); see also FOIA Post, "Agencies Rely on Wide Range of Exemption 3 Statutes" (posted 12/16/03).

325 See 50 U.S.C. § 431; Aftergood, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.8 (noting that "[50 U.S.C.] § 432a was modeled on [50 U.S.C.] § 431, and much of § 432a's language is substantially identical to corresponding provisions of § 431").


327 See Aftergood, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 46.

328 Id.


Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the statute governing the FBI's release of criminal record information, commonly referred to as "rap sheets," does not qualify under Exemption 3 because the statute does not expressly prohibit the records' disclosure. Specifically, the Reporters Committee court found that the statute failed to fulfill subpart (A)(i)'s requirement of absolute withholding because the statute, which "gives the Department discretion, apparently unbounded, to withhold records from authorized government officials who disseminate the records to the public," implies that "it might also give the Department discretionary authority to withhold such records directly from the general public" and, in fact, the FBI had exercised such discretion by its inconsistent manner of releasing rap sheets to the public. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit noted that "[e]ven if [28 U.S.C. §] 534 met Exemption 3's threshold requirement ('specifically exempted from disclosure') it would not appear to satisfy either prong[, subpart (A)(i) or subpart (A)(ii),] of the exemption's proviso."

Likewise, the Copyright Act of 1976 has been held to satisfy neither Exemption 3 subpart because, rather than prohibiting disclosure, it specifically permits public inspection of copyrighted documents. The D.C. Circuit has also held that section 520 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is not an Exemption 3 statute because it does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of records. Similarly, a provision of the

332 Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 736 n.9.
333 Id.; see also Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. FBI, No. C-3-85-815, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 1993) (citing Reporters Comm. for proposition "that [28 U.S.C.] § 534 does not specifically exempt rap sheets from disclosure," and concluding rap sheets in question were not exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 3).
334 Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 736 n.9 (quoting Exemption 3).
336 See St. Paul's Benevolent Educ. & Missionary Inst. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 822, 830 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see also FOIA Update, Vol. IV, No. 4, at 3-5 ("OIP Guidance: Copyrighted Materials and the FOIA") (emphasizing that Copyright Act should not be treated as Exemption 3 statute and advising that copyrighted records should be processed in accordance with standards of Exemption 4); accord Gilmore v. DOE, 4 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922-23 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (alternate holding) (protecting copyrighted computer software pursuant to Exemption 4).
Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6), has been found not to qualify because the broad discretion afforded the Postal Service to release or withhold records is not sufficiently specific. Similarly, section 1106 of the Social Security Act has been found not to be an Exemption 3 statute because it gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services wide discretion to enact regulations specifically permitting disclosure.

Likewise, in 2008, the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the argument that section 210(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 qualified as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, noting that "[the statute] does not mandate the withholding of any particular type of information," and remarking that, if the court were to adopt the agency's interpretation of the statute, the agency "would have unbridled discretion regarding all information obtained by a subpoena." That same district court determined that section 10(d) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act does not qualify as an Exemption 3 statute where withholding of the information in question is entirely discretionary under that Act. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the early warning disclosure provision in the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act does not qualify as an Exemption 3 statute because it does not specifically exempt data from disclosure.

---


340 See Church of Scientology v. USPS, 633 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6), which "permits the Postal Service total discretion" regarding disclosure of its investigatory files, not to be Exemption 3 statute because it provides "insufficient specificity" to allow its removal from "impermissible range of agency discretion to make decisions rightfully belonging to the legislature").


A particularly difficult Exemption 3 issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in 1988. In analyzing the applicability of Exemption 3 to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act\(^349\) and Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,\(^350\) each of which governs the disclosure of presentence reports, the Supreme Court held that they are Exemption 3 statutes only in part.\(^351\) The Court found that they do not permit the withholding of an entire presentence report, but rather only those portions of a presentence report pertaining to a probation officer's sentencing recommendations, certain diagnostic opinions, information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, and information which, if disclosed, might result in harm to any person, and that "the remaining parts of the reports are not covered by this exemption, and thus must be disclosed unless there is some other exemption which applies to them."\(^352\) To the extent that this issue has arisen since the 1988 decision, courts have followed the Supreme Court precedent.\(^353\)

Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the Trade Secrets Act\(^354\) is an Exemption 3 statute,\(^355\) most courts confronted with the issue have held that the statute does not meet the requirements of Exemption 3.\(^356\) Significantly, in 1987, the


\(^{352}\) Id. at 11; see also FOIA Update, Vol. IX, No. 2, at 1-2.

\(^{353}\) See, e.g., Showing Animals Respect & Kindness v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 730 F. Supp. 2d 180, 198 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, as establishing that "any information in a presentence report that relates to confidential sources, diagnostic opinions, and other information that may cause harm to the defendant or to third parties is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3" in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(c)(3)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (2006), and finding that "to the extent the . . . [r]eport [at issue] contains this information, [agencies] are justified in withholding it").


\(^{356}\) See, e.g., Anderson, 907 F.2d at 949 (finding that "broad and ill-defined wording of [18 U.S.C.] § 1905 fails to meet either of the requirements of Exemption 3"); Acumenics Research & Tech. v. DOJ, 843 F.2d 800, 805 n.6, 806 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding "no basis" for business submitter’s argument that Exemption 3 and 18 U.S.C. § 1905 prevent disclosure of information that is outside scope of Exemption 4) (reverse FOIA suit); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
D.C. Circuit issued a decision that definitively resolved the issue by holding that the Trade Secrets Act does not satisfy either of Exemption 3's requirements and thus does not qualify as a separate withholding statute. First, the D.C. Circuit found that the Trade Secrets Act's prohibition against disclosure is not absolute, as it prohibits only those disclosures that are "not authorized by law." Because duly promulgated agency regulations can provide the necessary authorization for release, the agency "possesses discretion to control the applicability" of the Act. The D.C. Circuit found that the existence of this discretion precludes the Trade Secrets Act from satisfying subpart (A)(i) of Exemption 3. Moreover, the court held that the Trade Secrets Act fails to satisfy the first prong of subpart (A)(ii) because it "in no way channels the discretion of agency decisionmakers." Indeed, as the court concluded, this lack of statutory guidance renders the Trade Secrets Act susceptible to invocation at the "whim of an administrator." Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that the Act also fails to satisfy the second prong of subpart (A)(ii) because of the "encyclopedic character" of the material within its scope and the absence of any limitation on the agencies covered or the sources of data included. Given all these elements, the court held that the Trade Secrets Act does not qualify as an Exemption 3 statute. This followed the Department of Justice's stated policy position on the issue. The D.C. Circuit's decision on this issue is consistent with the legislative history of the 1976 amendment to Exemption 3, which reveals that the Trade Secrets Act was not intended to qualify as a nondisclosure statute under the exemption and that any analysis of trade secrets and commercial or financial information should focus instead on the applicability of Exemption 4.

NRC, 750 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); see also FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 3, at 3 ("OIP Guidance: Discretionary Disclosure and Exemption 4").

358 Id. at 1138.
359 Id. at 1139.
360 Id. at 1138.
361 Id. at 1139.
362 Id.
363 Id. at 1140-41.
364 Id. at 1141.
Lastly, at one time there was uncertainty as to whether the Privacy Act of 1974 could serve as an Exemption 3 statute. When a conflict arose among the circuits that considered the proper relationship between the FOIA and the Privacy Act, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve the issue. These cases later became moot, however, when Congress, upon enacting the CIA Information Act in 1984, explicitly provided that the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute. Subsequent to this, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in these cases.


