

## I. The Manafort Investigation -- Overview

The Special Counsel tasked Team M with investigating Paul J. Manafort, Jr. (Manafort) and related individuals with respect to matters assigned by the Acting Attorney General to the Special Counsel's Office. The Team M investigation comprised (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]. Over a million physical documents were collected and reviewed. (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]. Various charges were brought against Manafort and four others as a result of the investigation; guilty pleas and guilty verdicts were obtained against Manafort and three others. One defendant has not been apprehended.<sup>a</sup>

This memorandum focuses on direct and indirect links between Manafort and Russia pursuant to the direction of the Acting Attorney General; it does not address in detail the various criminal charges brought against Manafort and others.

Manafort's ties to the Trump campaign are a matter of public record: he served on the Trump campaign from March to August 2016, first as the convention manager, and as of June 2016, the campaign chairman.<sup>b</sup> Manafort was allowed to resign, rather than be fired, from the campaign in mid-August 2016, following adverse publicity about his political consulting activities in Ukraine. He stayed in touch with various members of the Trump campaign including the candidate after his resignation and periodically during the transition and, at least indirectly, after the inauguration.

Manafort's ties to Russia are more complex. Manafort served from 2006 to 2014 as the key political advisor to the Party of Regions in Ukraine, and its principal

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<sup>a</sup> Various Team M investigative leads were referred to components in the Department of Justice, including the United States Attorney's Offices for the District of Columbia and the Southern District of New York, the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and the National Security Division.

<sup>b</sup> See Judge Jackson's May 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order, denying Manafort's motion to dismiss the charges filed against him on the grounds that the Acting Attorney General exceeded his authority in appointing the Special Counsel. In that Order, Judge Jackson noted that "Manafort was, at one time, not merely "associated with," but the chairman of, the Presidential campaign, and his work on behalf of the Russia-backed Ukrainian political party and connections to other Russian figures are matters of public record. It was logical and appropriate for investigators tasked with the investigation of "any links" between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign to direct their attention to him." *United States v. Manafort*, 1:17-cr-201-1 (D.D.C), Doc. 298, p. 1-2 (Tab 88).

leader, Victor Yanukovich. Yanukovich served as President from early 2010 to February 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests. (b) (5)

Yanukovich fled from Ukraine to Russia in 2014, not to a Western country.

(b) (5)

For example, Manafort communicated with Oleg Deripaska, Rinat Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, Boris Kolesnikov, and Yanukovich. Deripaska is a Russian aluminum magnate (and oligarch) with close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. Manafort performed business and political work for Deripaska dating back to 2005, principally aimed at installing governments beneficial to Deripaska's business interests. Akhmetov, Lyovochkin, and Kolesnikov were Ukrainian oligarchs and politicians involved with both the Party of Regions and the Opposition Bloc. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

The communications, however, also included Manafort's having his campaign deputy Richard Gates periodically send Deripaska (b) (5), through Konstantin Kilimnik, internal Trump campaign polling data. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

On August 2, 2016, (b) (5), Kilimnik travelled from Ukraine to New York to meet in person with Manafort (b) (5)

Manafort described the plan as a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Yanukovich

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<sup>c</sup> Manafort had been introduced to Akhmetov by Deripaska. Akhmetov had a long association with the Party of Regions (b) (5)

believed the plan would need the imprimatur of the U.S. President, and thus it was raised with Manafort as a conduit to Trump. (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (b) (5)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1. Manafort’s Background

Manafort attended Georgetown University and Georgetown University Law School.<sup>2</sup> He has served as a political consultant in the United States and abroad since the early 1980s<sup>3</sup> and was a founding member of the Washington, D.C., firm Black, Manafort, & Stone, as well as various successor entities.<sup>4</sup> In approximately 2009, Manafort formed DMP International (DMI), which carried out Manafort’s international work.<sup>d</sup> Overseas, Manafort and his firms worked for numerous foreign countries and individuals, including principally, Ukraine and the Party of Regions from 2005-2015.<sup>5</sup>

Two Manafort associates played prominent roles in his Ukraine work: Richard W. Gates, III, known as Rick, and Kilimnik. Gates worked at DMI and a predecessor Manafort entity, in 2016, the Trump campaign. On the Trump campaign, Gates rose to the position of Deputy Campaign Chairman and later worked on the President’s Inauguration Committee (the PIC) in a senior position.<sup>6</sup> Kilimnik began working with Manafort in Kiev in 2005, first as a translator and later as the head of DMI’s Kiev office.<sup>7</sup> Kilimnik facilitated Manafort’s communications with Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs and politicians.<sup>8</sup> He has been assessed to have ties to a Russian intelligence service. Kilimnik held no position on the Trump campaign.

2. Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik’s Criminal Prosecutions

In October 2017, a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and Gates, on tax fraud, Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBAR), money laundering, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and false statements charges, and related conspiracies.<sup>9</sup> In February 2018, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a second indictment charging both defendants with tax fraud, FBAR, bank fraud, and bankfraud-conspiracy charges.<sup>10 e</sup> In June 2018, Manafort

<sup>d</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
(b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>e</sup> In January 2018, Manafort and Gates were notified that additional charges would be sought and were asked if they would waive venue so the charges could be

and Kilimnik were charged with attempted obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice in a superseding indictment in the District of Columbia. Those two new counts related to Manafort and Kilimnik's efforts to tamper with two witnesses while Manafort was on bail.<sup>11</sup> After a hearing on June 15, 2018, Manafort's bail was revoked, and he has remained incarcerated since.<sup>12</sup>

In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia pursuant to a plea agreement that required his cooperation.<sup>13</sup> On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on eight of 18 tax, FBAR, and bank fraud/bank fraud conspiracy charges; the jury hung on the remaining counts as to which the jury form indicated the jury had voted 11-1 for conviction.<sup>14</sup> On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to two felony counts in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, wherein he also admitted his liability for all the matters charged in the District of Columbia, as well as the hung counts in the Eastern District of Virginia prosecution.<sup>f</sup> Manafort's plea agreement required his cooperation. He also agreed to the criminal and civil forfeiture of the property traceable to his offenses.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

### 3. Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine

Manafort has served as a paid consultant for Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs and political parties, dating back to at least 2005.<sup>16</sup>

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added to the current D.C. indictment. Manafort declined; Gates agreed, and to avoid multiple indictments alleging the same charges, the indictment against both defendants was sought in the Eastern District of Virginia where venue lies. *See United States v. Manafort*, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.), Doc. 20, p. 4 (Status Report) (Tab 97).


<sup>f</sup> *United States v. Manafort*, 1:17-cr-201-1 (D.D.C.), Doc. 422 (Cooperation Agreement) (Tab 93). Two other persons related to the Manafort investigation were also charged and pleaded guilty. On February 20, 2018, Alex van der Zwaan pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements to the Special Counsel's Office in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001(a)(2), and he was subsequently sentenced on April 3, 2018, principally to a term of thirty days imprisonment. *See United States v. van der Zwaan*, 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C.), Doc. 8 (Tab 95). On August 31, 2018, after an investigation by the Special Counsel's Office, W. Samuel Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that required his cooperation to violating FARA, Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618(a)(2). *See United States v. Patten*, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C.), Doc. 6 (Tab 99). The case was transferred just prior to charging to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. Patten has not yet been sentenced.

a. Deripaska Consulting Work

In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch with a global empire involving aluminum and power companies, among other business interests.<sup>g</sup> Deripaska hired Davis Manafort to develop and implement a strategy aimed at protecting Deripaska’s international business interests by installing political leaders in Ukraine and other nations who would be favorable to his business operations.<sup>17</sup> Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as “political risk insurance,” and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to put friendly political officials in office in countries where he had business interests.<sup>18</sup>

(b)(7)(A) per FBI , (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
(b)(7)(A) per FBI  
(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP



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<sup>g</sup> Manafort was introduced to Deripaska through Rick Davis, Manafort’s then business partner. R. Davis 302, Feb. 8, 2018, p. 7-8 (Tab 64); (b) (5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
(b) (5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP



(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP



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h

(b)(7)(A) per FBI



i

(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP



j

(b)(7)(A) per FBI



(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[Redacted text block]

The Pericles Fund

In approximately 2006, Deripaska apparently invested in a fund created by Manafort and Davis, named Pericles Emerging Market Partners LLP (“Pericles”). The fund ultimately failed and litigation between the parties ensued. According to Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute.<sup>23</sup>

Per Gates, the Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.<sup>24</sup> Deripaska was the sole investor.<sup>25</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]. Gates noted that (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP led to

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<sup>k</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI . (b) (5)  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI  
(b) (5)

<sup>l</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI  
[Redacted text block]

(b) (5)

a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska, and that by 2009, Manafort’s relationship with Deripaska had “dried up.”<sup>27</sup>

Deripaska eventually brought litigation with respect to Pericles, (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

b. Ukraine Political Consulting Work

In or around 2004, Deripaska introduced Manafort to Akhmetov, who hired Manafort as a political consultant for his business interests.<sup>32</sup> (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

In 2005, Akhmetov had Manafort engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions.<sup>35</sup> Manafort guided the Party of Regions back to power and eventually its candidate, Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014.<sup>36</sup> Between 2010 and 2014, Manafort was a close and trusted political advisor to Yanukovych, yielding power and sway in that administration. In addition to providing domestic political consultancy to the Ukrainian party, Manafort conducted a multi-million dollar international lobbying campaign for Yanukovych, which led to some of the criminal charges he pleaded guilty to in September 2018.

c. Kilimnik

Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime Manafort employee.<sup>37</sup> Kilimnik had direct access to Yanukovych and his senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.<sup>38</sup> Emails obtained by the government pursuant to court-authorized search warrants and witness interviews support the FBI’s assessment that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence services.



Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Russia<sup>39</sup> and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.<sup>40</sup> [REDACTED]

(b) (5)

Documentary evidence suggests that Kilimnik was an employee of the Russian government in at least 1997. U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United States with a diplomatic passport in that year.<sup>42</sup> Patten stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment.<sup>43</sup>

In approximately 1998, Kilimnik was hired at the International Republican Institute's (IRI) Moscow office where he did translation work and general office management.<sup>44</sup> Kilimnik worked for IRI until he was terminated in 2005. According to a former associate of Kilimnik's at IRI, Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were too strong.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, the same individual stated that it was well-known at IRI that Kilimnik had links to the Russian government. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI Consulting and worked with Manafort on a public relations campaign for Yanukovich, (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

[REDACTED] Alex van der Zwaan, an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the Ukrainian MFA, stated that that he always thought that Kilimnik was a former Russian spy. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]<sup>m</sup> Indeed, Gates affirmed his suspicion that Kilimnik was Russian intelligence in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.<sup>49</sup> Manafort told interviewers that Kilimnik would sometimes disappear from

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<sup>m</sup> Alex van der Zwaan, has since pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to making false statements (and other matters) to the Special Counsel's Office in interviews with or proffers to the Office. *United States v. van der Zwaan*, 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C.) Doc. 8 (Tab 95).

the office in Kiev to do what Gates humorously referred to at the time as meeting with his KGB handlers.<sup>50</sup>

In February and March of 2014, Russia invaded Crimea. By this time, Hawker's work with DMI had drawn to a close. Kilimnik contacted Hawker about a public relations opportunity for an unspecified Russian government entity that would tout the invasion as a liberation of Crimea.<sup>51</sup> (b) (5)

Kilimnik scheduled a meeting between Hawker and an individual from the Russian government.<sup>53</sup> Hawker attended a meeting in Russia and said he presumed the person he met with was a Russian operative.<sup>54</sup> Hawker submitted a proposal, but because he did not want the work, he priced it outrageously high.<sup>55</sup> n

Manafort has stated that he does not believe Kilimnik to be a spy for the Russian government. Manafort said that Kilimnik translated during meetings between Yanukovych and Manafort wherein delicate matters were discussed and that, although he had heard the rumors about Kilimnik, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP Manafort did not have any concerns that he was a spy.<sup>56</sup>

Kilimnik maintained a close relationship with Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin.<sup>57</sup> Boyarkin is a Russian national and served in the Russian defense attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.<sup>58</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

4. Manafort's Work on the Trump Campaign (March–August 2016)

n (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP . (b) (5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

Manafort served on the Trump campaign from March 29 to August 19, 2016. On March 29, 2016, the campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the campaign “Convention Manager.”<sup>60</sup> On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to Campaign Chairman and Chief Strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the campaign, was appointed Deputy Campaign Manager.<sup>61</sup> On August 19, 2016, Manafort resigned after negative media reports about his political consulting work for a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine.<sup>62</sup>

Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to the candidate.<sup>63</sup> In early 2016, Barrack, at Manafort’s request, suggested to Trump that Manafort join the campaign to manage the Republican Convention.<sup>64</sup> Barrack’s relationship with Manafort dated back to the early 1970s.<sup>65</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]. Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-1990s through their various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 1982 while Stone was working for Trump.<sup>66</sup> Over the years, Manafort saw Trump at various political and social events, including Stone’s wedding and the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions.<sup>67</sup>

(b) (5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Barrack, during a voluntary interview, noted his role in introducing Manafort to the campaign, and also noted that Reince Priebus, then Chairman of the Republican National Committee, supported the idea of Manafort gathering delegates as the convention manager and writing convention rules.<sup>71</sup>

According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.<sup>72</sup> Manafort agreed to work on the campaign without pay; Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be expected to be financially beneficial in the future. (b) (5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. Russia & Ukraine Communications 2016-2018

(b) (5)


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a. Communications in March 2016

In March 2016, Manafort made preparations to announce his appointment to the Trump campaign to Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs. At Manafort's direction, Gates prepared for Manafort's review separate memoranda addressed to Oleg Deripaska, Boris Kolesnikov, Rinat Akhmetov, and Serhiy Lyovochkin. The memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. Gates e-mailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination.<sup>73</sup>

Manafort told Gates that being hired on the campaign would increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately \$2 million he was owed for Ukraine work.<sup>74</sup>

(b) (5)

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Gates explained that Manafort thought the settlement of Deripaska's Pericles lawsuit could be favorably influenced by Manafort's new position on the campaign.<sup>79</sup> Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States and having Manafort in a position inside the campaign might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well.<sup>80</sup> Gates stated that Manafort never told him anything specific Manafort was offering Deripaska.<sup>81</sup>

On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed all the memoranda to Kilimnik as well as the official press announcement relating to Manafort's appointment.<sup>82</sup> Gates at Manafort's direction asked Kilimnik to have the attachments translated and to "send the letter and a copy of the press release to each of the four recipients today."<sup>83</sup> Manafort followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role.<sup>84</sup> Kilimnik replied: "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd operation seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day: "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor<sup>p</sup>, who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."<sup>85</sup>

b. Communications in Spring/Summer 2016

(b) (5)



During the late spring of 2016, Kilimnik continued to collect information on the political situation in Ukraine. (b) (5)



Kilimnik further explained that he planned to be in Washington, D.C., between May 5 and May 8, 2016.<sup>88</sup>

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP



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<sup>p</sup> Viktor is a reference to Victor Boyarkin.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

On May 7, 2016, Kilimnik met with Manafort in New York City.<sup>97</sup> Gates arranged the meeting and purchased Kilimnik's Amtrak tickets from Washington, D.C. to New York.<sup>98</sup> According to Manafort, he briefed Kilimnik on the Trump

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere.<sup>99</sup> Manafort stated that Kilimnik did not ask for anything based upon Manafort's position with the campaign.<sup>100</sup> Kilimnik spoke about Boyko's plan for election participation in the occupied zone of Ukraine.<sup>101</sup> (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

Manafort has alleged that he was willing to brief Deripaska on public campaign matters and gave an example: why Trump selected Pence as the Vice-Presidential

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r (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

running mate.<sup>114</sup> Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere.<sup>115</sup>

c. The August 2, 2016 Meeting

On the evening of August 2, 2016, Manafort met with Kilimnik and Gates at the Havana Club in New York across the street from (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP Trump campaign headquarters in Trump Tower.<sup>116</sup> Gates arrived late to the meeting.<sup>117 118</sup> Manafort and Gates have provided details about the discussion at the meeting, although they are not consistent. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

The relevant chronology leading up to the meeting is as follows. On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.<sup>119</sup> The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.<sup>120</sup> In an email with a subject line: “Black Caviar”, Kilimnik wrote:

I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. . . . It has to do about the future of his country, and is quite interesting.<sup>121</sup>

Manafort identified “the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar” as Yanukovych. He explained that in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent Presidential election. Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately \$30,000 to \$40,000.<sup>122</sup> <sup>s</sup> Manafort’s identification of Yanukovych as “the guy” was consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow when he wrote “I met today with the guy....” As noted, Yanukovych resided in Russia, having fled there after he was deposed in Ukraine. Manafort replied to the email that “Tuesday [August 2] is best . . . Tues or weds in NYC.”<sup>123</sup>

Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow,

<sup>s</sup> Gates stated that he believed the reference to “black caviar” was a reference to Akhmetov, as Manafort had told Gates a story about how he had received a large container of caviar from Akhmetov. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b) (5)



and on that same day, he wrote to Manafort that he needed “about 2 hours” for their meeting “because it is a long caviar story to tell.”<sup>124</sup> Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2<sup>nd</sup> at 7:30 pm, and he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night.<sup>125</sup> (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

Documentary evidence confirms the dinner took place on August 2<sup>nd</sup>. (b)(3), (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED] (b) (5)

[REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b) (5)

After being shown a December 2016 document (discussed below), Manafort admitted that, at the August 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting, Kilimnik discussed a plan that amounted to a means for Russia to take over the eastern part of Ukraine. (b) (5) the plan which would create a semi-autonomous region in eastern Ukraine and have Yanukovich elected to head that region.<sup>130</sup> u (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

That plan was the subject of discussion between Kilimnik and Manafort at least four other times: in December 2016, January 2017, February 2017, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b) (5)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

t (b) (5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP, (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

<sup>u</sup> Notably, Manafort initially did not divulge this conversation, but did so after confronted with a December 2016 document by Kilimnik that set forth the peace plan. (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED] .<sup>132</sup>

(b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Kilimnik goes on to say “All that is required to start the process is a very minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from DT . . . and a decision to authorize you to be a ‘special representative’ and manage this process. With this authority you could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia (BG guarantees your reception at the very top level . . .).”<sup>133</sup> (b)(3), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI  
[REDACTED] .

Kilimnik concluded the December 8, 2016 email by writing that (b)(3), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED] and DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration.” (b)(3), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Manafort stated he met with Kilimnik and Lyovochkin in January 2017 around the Presidential Inauguration at the Westin Hotel in Alexandria, Virginia.<sup>136</sup> w

<sup>v</sup> In about January 2017, Kilimnik told Manafort that Michael Cohen, a private lawyer for President-elect/President Trump, put a Ukraine peace plan on the President-elect/President’s desk. Manafort does not know who was behind the Cohen peace plan. According to Manafort, he told Kilimnik that the peace plan would not go anywhere. When Manafort and Kilimnik last discussed the peace plan in March or April 2017, they discussed who would control the peace plan rather than what the plan was. P. Manafort 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 9).

<sup>w</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] . (b) (5)



(b)(7)(A) per FBI

. (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted]

is available in the classified appendix.

(b)(3), (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted]

(b) (5)

[Redacted text block]

(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted text block]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted text block]

Manafort also stated that at the August 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting Manafort told Kilimnik the state of the Trump campaign and Manafort's plan to win, including polling data and messaging.<sup>153</sup> z (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted text block]

(b) (5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b) (5)

(b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

z (b) (5)

[Redacted text block]

(b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[Redacted]

Finally, Manafort stated that Kilimnik departed first after the Havana Room meeting, and Manafort and Gates did not leave with Kilimnik because Manafort did not want to be seen with Kilimnik in light of the fact that the media was tracking him, and that he did not want them asking why he was meeting with Kilimnik. According to Manafort, his concern was more that Kilimnik was Ukrainian than that he was Russian.<sup>155</sup>

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Gates' Account: Gates was late to the August 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting, and (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Gates was not sure of the date, but confirmed that he attended a meeting at the Havana Club in New York with Manafort and Kilimnik.<sup>158</sup> He stated that Manafort had texted him earlier in the day to let him know that Kilimnik was in New York and they were having dinner and asked him to join. Gates arrived late, and Manafort asked Kilimnik to bring him up to speed. Kilimnik reported that Yanukovych had reached out to Kilimnik through an intermediary to say he wanted Manafort to run his campaign for the presidency in Ukraine, and Manafort declined the offer. Kilimnik also stated that Yanukovych was open to meeting with Manafort in Europe, but Manafort said he could not given his work on the Trump campaign.<sup>159</sup>

(b) (5) [Redacted]

[Redacted]. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Gates stated that the other topics discussed at the meeting were the outstanding funds owed to Manafort by the Opposition Bloc, the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit, and the Trump campaign.<sup>161</sup> As to the Deripaska lawsuit, they discussed the fact that they had not been able to confirm the dismissal. Kilimnik said he was trying to get documentation establishing the dismissal.<sup>162</sup>

With respect to the campaign, Gates said they discussed Manafort's plans, including the battleground states, which Manafort highlighted as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.<sup>163</sup> Gates believed this discussion was an attempt by Manafort to boast about his strategy and to show his prominence.<sup>164</sup> Gates also stated that while Manafort did not explicitly say it, Manafort believed that if he was able to get Trump elected, Manafort would be hired to do foreign campaigns for which Manafort could make a lot of money, and because it might help Manafort

get paid the money he was owed by the Opposition Bloc.<sup>165</sup> According to Gates, the discussion of the battleground states also involved a discussion about polling data, discussed more below.<sup>166</sup>

Finally, Gates stated that because of the press accounts of Manafort's connection to Kilimnik, Manafort did not want to be seen with him. Accordingly, at the conclusion of the meeting, Kilimnik left separately from Gates and Manafort.<sup>167</sup>

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Patten's Account: Patten recalled that during one of Kilimnik's trips to the United States that Kilimnik told him that he went to New York to meet Manafort at a cigar bar. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

Kilimnik said that Manafort also discussed the amount of money the Opposition Bloc owed him and how they could obtain payment.<sup>168</sup>

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI, (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

d. Manafort's Sharing Trump Campaign Polling Data with Kilimnik

Gates stated that at various times during the campaign, beginning in April or early May 2016, Manafort instructed him to provide polling data and other updates on the Trump campaign to Kilimnik through WhatsApp. The data included sensitive polling data from Tony Fabrizio's internal polls for the campaign.<sup>171</sup> aa After sending

aa (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[REDACTED]

this information, Gates deleted these communications.<sup>172</sup> Gates continued sending Kilimnik this information frequently through August, but less so after Manafort left the campaign.<sup>173</sup> (b) (5)

The information Gates sent during this latter time-period included both public polling data and internal Trump-campaign polls.<sup>174</sup> When Manafort left the campaign, Gates' access to polling data was limited, as Fabrizio, who had been brought in by Manafort, was distanced from the campaign.

175

(b) (5)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

Gates did not know why Manafort wanted to send this information to Kilimnik but understood that Kilimnik was passing the information on to Deripaska and Lyovochkin to assist Manafort financially.<sup>178</sup> (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

(b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

bb (b) (5)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP  
[Redacted]

6. Post-Election Meetings and Contacts

(b) (5) [Redacted]  
[Redacted].<sup>183</sup> Manafort said he planned to stay on the “outside,” and thus monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity with Trump and the Administration.<sup>184</sup> cc After Trump was elected, Manafort in fact

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cc After his separation from the campaign in August 2016, Manafort continued to provide advice to various principals; he told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and Trump. R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 12 (Tab 58). (b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.<sup>185</sup>

In January and February 2017, Manafort had two meetings relating to issues in Russia and Ukraine in Madrid, Spain: one with Deripaska associate Georgiy Oganov and a second with Kilimnik. <sup>dd</sup> Oganov is a senior executive at Deripaska's company, (b) (5) [REDACTED], and is believed to report directly to Deripaska.<sup>186</sup>

The first meeting was in January 2017. Manafort initially denied meeting Oganov in January or Kilimnik in February. He eventually admitted both meetings. Manafort said he travelled to Madrid for Telefonica business that he had with a business associate (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI and, during that trip, Manafort and Oganov had a one-hour breakfast meeting with no one else present.<sup>187</sup> Manafort claimed that the meeting with Oganov was set up by his counsel and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit. He claimed that Oganov said that Manafort needed to meet Deripaska to resolve the Pericles lawsuit.<sup>188</sup> Manafort agreed but said he would not travel to Ukraine or Russia for the meeting (b) (5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Notwithstanding the fact that Manafort claimed the meeting was about the lawsuit, prior to the meeting Manafort received text messages to the contrary from a number believed to be associated with Kilimnik.<sup>192</sup> Kilimnik, not Manafort's counsel, had coordinated the meeting, (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. My understanding is that it will be about recreating old friendship and talking about global politics, not about money or Pericles."<sup>193</sup>

On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T. McFarland.<sup>194</sup> McFarland was at that time designated to be Deputy National Advisor and was formally so appointed on January 20, 2017. Manafort's

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(b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

dd (b)(7)(E) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

January 15 email to McFarland stated: “I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month.”<sup>195</sup> Manafort claimed that email related to an issue regarding Cuba.<sup>196</sup> McFarland, who received advice from Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry, appears not to have responded to Manafort.<sup>197</sup>

Manafort had a second meeting in Spain a month later. (b)(7)(A) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

On or about February 25, 2017, Manafort travelled to Madrid and met with Kilimnik. (b) (5)

[REDACTED] Manafort at first claimed that he travelled to Madrid with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI for pleasure and Telefonica business, and did not meet Kilimnik.<sup>200</sup> When told that travel records showed that Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time, Manafort conceded that they must have met.<sup>201</sup> In a later interview, Manafort said that Kilimnik had been putting together background on what was occurring in Kiev because reporters and investigators there were asking questions about Manafort due to the “black ledger” investigation conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau. According to Manafort, they met for an hour and a half at Manafort's hotel and Kilimnik reported that the criminal investigation in Ukraine was going nowhere.<sup>202</sup> (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

[REDACTED]

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Additional information relating to the Manafort investigation is contained in a supplemental submission which is classified.

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<sup>1</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>2</sup> Email, May 18, 2017, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP, and P. Manafort, et al., re Bio [of Manafort] for Comment, DocID: 0.7.3940.190122 (Tab 105).

<sup>3</sup> Email, May 18, 2017, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP, and P. Manafort, et al., re Bio [of Manafort] for Comment, DocID: 0.7.3940.190122 (Tab 105).

<sup>4</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI 302, Aug. 7, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 62); R. Davis 302, Feb. 8, 2018, p. 1-2, 4 (Tab 64); R. Gates 302, July 2, 2014, p. 1 (Tab 54); Email, May 18, 2017, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI, and P. Manafort, et al., re Bio [of Manafort] for Comment, DocID: 0.7.3940.190122 (Tab 105).

<sup>5</sup> P. Manafort, Income by Year, 2005-2015, Prepared by KWC (Tab 191).

<sup>6</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 11, 13 (Tab 58).

<sup>7</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 16, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 20); R. Gates 302, July 2, 2014, p. 1 (Tab 57).

<sup>8</sup> R. Gates 302, July 2, 2014, p. 1 (Tab 57); R. Gates 302, Jan. 31, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 49).

<sup>9</sup> *United States v. Manafort*, 1:17-cr-201-1 (D.D.C), Doc. 13 (Indictment) (Tab 90).

<sup>10</sup> *See United States v. Manafort*, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.), Doc. 9 (Superseding Indictment) (Tab 96).

<sup>11</sup> *United States v. Manafort*, 1:17-cr-201-1 (D.D.C), Doc. 318 (Superseding Indictment) (Tab 92).

<sup>12</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>13</sup> *United States v. Manafort*, 1:17-cr-201-1 (D.D.C), Doc. 205 (R. Gates Plea Agreement) (Tab 91).

<sup>14</sup> *United States v. Manafort*, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va.), Doc. 280 (Jury Verdict Form) (Tab 98).

<sup>15</sup> (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

<sup>16</sup> P. Manafort, Income by Year, 2005-2015, Prepared by KWC (Tab 191); R. Davis 302, Feb. 8, 2018, p. 8 (Tab 64); P. Manafort 302, Sept. 20, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 11); R. Gates 302, Jan. 31, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 49).

<sup>17</sup> (b)(7)(D) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

<sup>18</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 51).

19 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

20 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

21 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

22 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

23 R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 6.

24 R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 6-10 (Tab 51).

25 P. Manafort Dep., Dec. 16, 2015 (Tab 201).

26 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

27 R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 6 (Tab 51).

28 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

29 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

30 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

31 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

32 P. Manafort 302, July 30, 2014, p. 1 (Tab 7).

33 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

34 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP (b) (5) [REDACTED]

35 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5-6 (Tab 8).

36 R. Gates 302, Mar. 16, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 24); R. Davis 302, Feb. 8, 2018, p. 9 (Tab 64); P. Manafort 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 3 (Tab 9); T. Devine 302, July 6, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 65).

37 W. Patten 302, May 22, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 59); K. Kilimnik Visa Records, U.S. Department of State, Accessed Nov. 13, 2018 (Tab 203).

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<sup>38</sup> R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 18-19 (Tab 47); W. Patten 302, May 22, 2018, p. 8 (Tab 59); R. Gates 302, Jan. 31, 2018, p. 4-5 (Tab 49); R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 48); R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 11 (Tab 51).

<sup>39</sup> K. Kilimnik Visa Records, U.S. Department of State, Accessed Nov. 13, 2018 (Tab 203).

<sup>40</sup> K. Kilimnik Visa Records, U.S. Department of State, Accessed Nov. 13, 2018 (Tab 203).

<sup>41</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>42</sup> K. Kilimnik Visa Records, U.S. Department of State, Accessed Nov. 13, 2018 (Tab 197).

<sup>43</sup> W. Patten 302, May 22, 2018, p. 5-6 (Tab 59).

<sup>44</sup> S. Nix 302, Mar. 30, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 61).

<sup>45</sup> M. Lenzi 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 5).

<sup>46</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>47</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>48</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>49</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 13 (Tab 54).

<sup>50</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 16, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 20).

<sup>51</sup> J. Hawker 302, Jan. 9, 2018, p. 13 (Tab 4); Email, Mar. 18, 2014, J. Hawker & B. Tulukbaev, DocID: 0.7.1120.1042301 (Tab 101). Hawker told investigators that the PR opportunity in Russia occurred in 2015. Based on the cited email, it appears that the events occurred in 2014. This is consistent with events in Ukraine at this time.

<sup>52</sup> (b) (5)

<sup>53</sup> J. Hawker 302, Jan. 9, 2018, p. 13 (Tab 4).

<sup>54</sup> J. Hawker 302, Jan. 9, 2018, p. 13 (Tab 4).

<sup>55</sup> J. Hawker 302, Jan. 9, 2018, p. 13 (Tab 4).

<sup>56</sup> P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 8).

<sup>57</sup> R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 18 (Tab 47); W. Patten 302, May 22, 2018, p. 8 (Tab 59).

<sup>58</sup> V. Boyarkin Visa Records, U.S. Department of State, Accessed Nov. 13, 2018 (Tab 197).

<sup>59</sup> (b) (5)

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<sup>60</sup> Press Release, Mar. 29, 2016, “Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort,” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=116591> (Tab 77).

<sup>61</sup> R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 8 (Tab 47); *New York Times*, “Trump Aide Paul Manafort Promoted to Campaign Chairman and Chief Strategist,” May 19, 2016 (Tab 79); *ABC News*, “Timeline of Manafort’s role in the Trump Campaign,” Oct. 20, 2017 (Tab 78).

<sup>62</sup> R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 10 (Tab 47); *Washington Post*, “Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort resigns,” Aug. 19, 2016 (Tab 80).

<sup>63</sup> R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 7-8 (Tab 47); R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 10 (Tab 51); P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 1-2 (Tab 8).

<sup>64</sup> T. Barrack 302, Dec. 12, 2017, p. 3 (Tab 63); *See also* R. Gates 302, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 7-8 (Tab 47) (noting that Barrack and Roger Stone had been lobbying for Manafort to join the Trump campaign).

<sup>65</sup> T. Barrack 302, Dec. 12, 2017, p. 1 (Tab 63).

<sup>66</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 16, 2018, p. 6 (Tab 20).

<sup>67</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 16, 2018, p. 6 (Tab 20).

<sup>68</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>69</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>70</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>71</sup> T. Barrack 302, Dec. 12, 2017, p. 4 (Tab 63).

<sup>72</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 10 (Tab 51).

<sup>73</sup> Email, Mar. 30, 2016, R. Gates to K. Kilimnik re Letters, DocID: 0.7.4730.114431 (Tab 140).

<sup>74</sup> R. Gates 302, February 2, 2018, p. 10 (Tab 51).

<sup>75</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>76</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>77</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>78</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>79</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 11 (Tab 51).

<sup>80</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 12 (Tab 51).

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<sup>81</sup> R. Gates 302, Feb. 2, 2018, p. 12 (Tab 51).

<sup>82</sup> Email, Mar. 30, 2016, R. Gates to K. Kilimnik re Letters, DocID: 0.7.4730.114431 (Tab 140).

<sup>83</sup> Email, Mar. 30, 2016, R. Gates to K. Kilimnik re Letters, DocID: 0.7.4730.114431 (Tab 140).

<sup>84</sup> Email, Apr. 11, 2016, P. Manafort & K. Kilimnik, DocID: 0.7.3940.474433 (Tab 106).

<sup>85</sup> Email, Apr. 11, 2016, P. Manafort & K. Kilimnik, DocID: 0.7.3940.474433 (Tab 106).

<sup>86</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>87</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>88</sup> Email, May 3, 2016, K. Kilimnik to E. Schultz, DocID: 0.7.3940.1288820 (Tab 128).

<sup>89</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>90</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>91</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>92</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>93</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>94</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>95</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>96</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>97</sup> Email, May 6, 2016, K. Kilimnik to K. Kilimnik, DocID: 0.7.3940.1288737 (Tab 124).

<sup>98</sup> Email, May 6, 2016, J. Blackburn to K. Kilimnik, DocID: 0.7.3940.1288734 (Tab 123).

<sup>99</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 11, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 19).

<sup>100</sup> P. Manafort 302, Oct. 11, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 19).



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101 P. Manafort 302, Oct. 11, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 19).

102 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

103 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

104 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

105 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

106 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

107 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

108 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

109 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

110 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

111 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

112 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

113 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

114 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5-6 (Tab 8).

115 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 6 (Tab 8).

116 (b) (5) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

117 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 8).

118 R. Gates AT&T Records for 917-209-7176, ReportAU\_2435109, p. 966-968 (Tab 193).

119 Email, K. Kilimnik, re Plane Tickets to Moscow, DocID: 0.7.3940.1286715 (Translation pending) (Tab 118).

120 Email, July 29, 2016, P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik, re Black Caviar, DocID: 0.7.4249.775592, p. 2 (Tab 134).

121 Email, July 29, 2018, P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik, re Black Caviar, DocID: 0.7.4249.775592, p. 2 (Tab 134).

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122 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 3 (Tab 9).

123 Email, July 29, 2016, P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik, re Black Caviar, DocID: 0.7.4249.779780, p. 2 (Tab 137).

124 Email, July 31, 2016, P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik,, re Black Caviar, DocID: 0.7.4249.779130, p. 2 (Tab 136).

125 Email, July 31, 2016, P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik, re Black Caviar, DocID: 0.7.4249.778082, p. 2 (Tab 135).

126 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

127 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

128 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

129 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

130 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 8).

131 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

132 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

133 Email, Dec. 8, 2016, K. Kilimnik to K. Kilimnik, re Ukraine, DocID: 0.7.3940.1283630, p. 1 (Tab 109).

134 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

135 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

136 (b)(3) [REDACTED] P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 7; P. Manafort 302, Sept. 21, 2018, p. 3; K. Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and 22, 2017 (Tab 183); Text Messages, 2016-2017, K. Kilimnik and W. Patten, p. 1-2 (Tab 189).

137 (b)(3) per FBI, (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]

138 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 21, 2018, p. 3 (Tab 12).

139 (b)(3) per FBI, (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]

140 Email, Feb. 12, 2018, A. Fabrizio to P. Manafort, R. Ward re Poll (Tab 141); Email, Feb. 16, 2018, A. Fabrizio to P. Manafort re Survey (Tab 142).

141 (b)(3) per FBI, (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]

142 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

143 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

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144 (b)(3) [REDACTED]

145 Email, Feb. 21, 2018, R. Ward to P. Manafort, A. Fabrizio, re Survey (Tab 147).

146 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

147 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

148 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

149 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

150 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

151 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

152 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP (b) (5) [REDACTED]

153 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 8).

154 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

155 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 8).

156 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

157 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

158 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 48).

159 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 48).

160 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

161 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 2-5 (Tab 48).

162 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 3 (Tab 48); R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 10 (Tab 54).

163 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 3 (Tab 48).

164 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 48).

165 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 48).

166 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 48).

167 R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 48).

168 W. Patten 302, May 22, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 59).

169 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

170 (b) (5) [REDACTED]

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171 R. Gates 302, Jan. 31, 2018, p. 17 (Tab 49); R. Gates 302, Feb. 7, 2018, p. 15 (Tab 52).

172 R. Gates 302, Jan. 31, 2018, p. 17 (Tab 49).

173 R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 11-12 (Tab 54).

174 R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 11 (Tab 54).

175 R. Gates 302, Feb. 12, 2018, p. 11-12 (Tab 54).

176 (b) (5)

177 (b) (5)

178 R. Gates 302, Sept. 27, 2018, p. 2 (Tab 45).

179 (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

180 (b) (5)

181 (b) (5)

182 (b) (5)

183 (b) (5)

184 P. Manafort, 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 9); R. Gates 302, Jan. 30, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 48).

185 P. Manafort, 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 9).

186 O. Kalashnikova 302, May 17, 2018, p. 4 (Tab 6).

187 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 8).

188 P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 8).

189 (b) (5)

190 (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

191 (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP

192 Text Message, P. Manafort & K. Kilimnik, re Pericles/Meeting, 2016 (Tab 192).

193 Text Message, P. Manafort & K. Kilimnik, re Pericles/Meeting, 2016 (Tab 192).

194 Email, Jan. 15, 2017, P. Manafort, K. McFarland, M. Flynn, DocID: 0.7.3940.776920 (Tab 155).

195 Email, Jan. 15, 2017, P. Manafort, K. McFarland, M. Flynn, DocID: 0.7.3940.776920 (Tab 155).

<sup>196</sup> P. Manafort 302, Aug. 11, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 8).

<sup>197</sup> Email, Jan. 15, 2017, P. Manafort, K. McFarland, M. Flynn, DocID: 0.7.3940.776920 (Tab 155).

<sup>198</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>199</sup> (b) (5) [REDACTED]

<sup>200</sup> P. Manafort 302, Sept. 11, 2018, p. 7 (Tab 8).

<sup>201</sup> P. Manafort 302, Sept. 12, 2018, p. 5 (Tab 9).

<sup>202</sup> P. Manafort 302, Sept. 13, 2018, p. 1 (Tab 10).

<sup>203</sup> (b)(3) per FBI; (b)(5) per OIP [REDACTED]