Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. DOJ, No. 20-3517, 2024 WL 4227635 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2024) (Contreras, J.)
Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. DOJ, No. 20-3517, 2024 WL 4227635 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2024) (Contreras, J.)
Re: Request for records concerning agency’s handling of FOIA’s foreseeable harm requirement and related training for asylum officers
Disposition: Granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees; awarding plaintiff $49,465.61 in attorney fees, $10,000.00 in fees-on-fees, and $402.00 in costs
- Attorney Fees, Eligibility: “The Court concludes that [plaintiff] has not proved its eligibility for attorney’s fees with respect to the documents it sought in its First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action.” “[T]he catalyst theory turns on whether a plaintiff’s lawsuit ‘substantially caused’ the agency to release documents.” “Although an agency’s sudden acceleration in processing a FOIA request ‘may’ lead to the conclusion that [plaintiff] caused a change in position by the agency, . . . [plaintiff] has failed to meet its burden to prove that the Department sped up its process or ‘that it is more probable than not that the government would not have performed the desired act absent the lawsuit.’” “Indeed, it is not clear that the Department ever sped up its processing of [plaintiff’s] request or otherwise changed its policy.” The court notes that “[defendant’s] affidavit provides evidence that the Department had already begun processing [plaintiff’s] requests when [plaintiff] filed suit, that [defendant] was doing so in good faith, and that the scope of [plaintiff’s] requests was substantial.” “Accordingly, [plaintiff] cannot rely on a change in the Department’s policy to prove it substantially prevailed and that it is eligible for attorney’s fees.”
However, “[t]he Court concludes that [plaintiff’s] limited success with respect to the documents it sought in its Second cause of action is sufficient to show that [plaintiff] has substantially prevailed in the litigation through a court order.” “Although the Court ordered only a small number of documents to be produced, ‘FOIA cases routinely result in the disclosure of a relatively small proportion of the documents originally requested.’” “Even if [plaintiff] received only a ‘relatively small’ number of documents following the Court’s order, . . . [plaintiff] has ‘obtain[ed] court-ordered relief on the merits of its FOIA claim.’” “The Court thus concludes that [plaintiff] has substantially prevailed in the litigation and is eligible for attorney’s fees.”
- Attorney Fees, Entitlement: The court finds that “[plaintiff] abandoned its First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action when it filed its motion for summary judgment.” “Because [plaintiff] reached an agreement with the Department and forwent any additional claim with respect to those causes of action, the Department has not unlawfully ‘withheld’ any documents sought by those causes of action.” “Additionally, the Court held in favor of the Department with respect to [plaintiff’s] Fourth cause of action.” “Because [plaintiff] focuses only on documents relating to its Second cause of action and because it either abandoned or lost with respect to its other claims, the Court concludes that the Department ‘has demonstrated that it had a lawful right to withhold disclosure’ with respect to the documents in [plaintiff’s] causes of action other than its Second cause of action.” “With respect to [plaintiff’s] Second cause of action, the Department ‘does not dispute’ that [plaintiff] ‘may be entitled to some fees for documents released in response to this Court's Orders.’” “Because the Department concedes that [plaintiff] is entitled to fees with respect to the records that [plaintiff] obtained by Court order, the Court need not discuss entitlement with respect to fees sought for the work to obtain those documents.” “Accordingly, the Court turns to whether [plaintiff’s] fee request is reasonable.”
- Attorney Fees, Calculations: First, the court determines that “[it] will apply the rates set by the Fitzpatrick Matrix.” “Although ‘there is no presumption that FOIA cases qualify as complex federal litigation,’ . . . the Department concedes that the ‘[Fitzpatrick] matrix is the one applicable in circumstances like those here’ . . . .”
“Having determined [plaintiff’s] attorney’s hourly rate, the Court turns to the reasonableness of [plaintiff’s] request for fees covering 122 hours of its attorney’s time pursuing the underlying FOIA litigation, totaling $98,647.00.” “[T]he Court concludes that [plaintiff] can recover fees, but that a significant downward adjustment in the amount of fees is warranted.” “Taking the Department’s second argument first, the Court does not consider [plaintiff’s] legal arguments so devoid of substance as to warrant an outright denial of its fee award.” “Although the Court will not compensate ‘duplicative, unorganized, or otherwise unproductive effort,’ . . . [plaintiff’s] efforts were productive enough for the Court to rule in part against the Department . . . .” “The Court notes, however, that [plaintiff] was successful with respect to only some of the documents sought in [plaintiff’s] Second cause of action.” “Accordingly, the Court concludes that hours spent on, and identifiable to, [plaintiff’s] success in obtaining some of the documents it sought in its Second cause of action are reasonable.” “That said, the Court agrees with the Department that awarding [plaintiff] fees for its efforts on unsuccessful claims would be unreasonable.” “Thus, the Court deducts hours attributable to unsuccessful claims from [plaintiff’s] fee award.” “[plaintiff’s] attorney's fee hours log lacks detail and is difficult to parse.” “The fee hours log attached to [plaintiff’s] motion is a long document that appears to have been created in a word processing application.” “It is ordered by date, with time entries listed below each date, and descriptions associated with the time entries.” “To put it mildly, the descriptions associated with the various time entries provide little to no detail.” “Despite the lack of clarity, the Court can identify several entries attributable to unsuccessful claims and motions.” “That said, given the lack of detail in the fee hours log, it appears likely that additional hours were spent on unsuccessful claims even if the Court cannot identify additional misspent hours.” “That brings the Court to the Department's next argument.”
“The Department argues that [plaintiff’s] fee award should be further reduced because its attorney exercised poor billing practices and produced deficient billing records.” “To start, [plaintiff’s] attorney’s fee hours log simply does not describe the attorney’s tasks with enough detail to assess the reasonableness of the hours worked.” “Its descriptions are brief and provide only surface-level explanations of the work done for any given entry.” “[T]he deficient entries leave the Court with a high degree of uncertainty respecting the reasonableness of the hours expended.” “Furthermore, numerous entries appear to be ‘review of secretarial work’ for which [plaintiff’s] counsel is not entitled to fees.” “When faced with inadequate timekeeping records, courts in this district have discounted lump percentages from attorney’s fees awards.” “The lack of detail in [plaintiff’s] billing records here is particularly egregious in comparison to other fee cases in this district.” “In comparable cases involving [plaintiff’s] work on unsuccessful motions, with non-contemporaneous timekeeping, and nondescript records, judges in this district reduced [plaintiff’s] attorney’s fees awards by 40% and 50%.” “The Court concludes that reducing the lodestar award amount by 40% is appropriate here.” “Accordingly, [plaintiff] is entitled to $49,465.61 in fees on its successful claims.”
“Finally, the Court assesses the reasonableness of [plaintiff’s] fees-on-fees request.” “[Plaintiff’s] attorney seeks $35,508.00 for forty-four hours spent preparing the fee motion.” “Although the Department does not specifically oppose the hours spent on the motion, the Court finds that [plaintiff’s] fees-on-fees request is unreasonable.” “This is so because [plaintiff’s] fee hours log for its fees-on-fees request is lacking in sufficient detail in the same way as its fee hours log for the underlying litigation.” “While that alone justifies reducing [plaintiff’s] fees-on-fees award, the Court observes that [plaintiff’s] fees-on-fees request is also equivalent to 36% of the claimed total cost of this litigation – which is disproportionate and excessive.” “Judges in this district have concluded that fees-on-fees equaling even ‘30% of the claimed total litigation costs’ would be excessive.” “Awarding [plaintiff] its fees-on-fees request here ‘would be an “unsupportable windfall.”’” “The Court will thus award $10,000.00 in fees-on-fees.”
“The Department does not oppose [plaintiff’s] request for $402.00 in costs.” “Accordingly, the Court will grant [plaintiff] $402.00 in costs.”