
From: Hur, Robert (ODAG)
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 3:58 PM
To: Rosenstein, Rod (ODAG)
Subject: FW: Invitation from Sec. Nielsen / DHS - Coordinating Federal Election Efforts
Attachments: ETF_S1Memo_Final021918v3c.docx

FYSA. AG and Director Wray will attend.

From: Harmon, Zachary J. (DO) (FBI) [mailto: (b)(7)(E) per FBI]
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 3:48 PM
To: Hur, Robert (ODAG) (b) (6) Gauhar, Tashina (ODAG) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Invitation from Sec. Nielsen / DHS - Coordinating Federal Election Efforts

FYI -- meeting to discuss "roles and responsibilities" teed up by Nielsen now set for 4 pm on Monday, March 5.

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 2:58 PM
To: Harmon, Zachary J. (DO) (FBI) (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Cc (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Subject: FW: Invitation from Sec. Nielsen / DHS - Coordinating Federal Election Efforts

FYI!

From: Thurston, Eliz (b)(6) per DHS
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 1:56 PM
To (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI (b)(3), (b)(6) per ODNI (50 USC § 3024(m)(1)) (b)(3), (b)(6) (50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1))
(b)(6) per State @state.gov> (b)(3) per NSA (Public Law 86-36, Section 6)
Cc: Bryant, Errical (OAG) (JMD) (b) (6)
Subject: Invitation from Sec. Nielsen / DHS - Coordinating Federal Election Efforts

Good afternoon,

Secretary Nielsen recently sent a memo to your agency head on coordinating federal election-related efforts, including the cybersecurity of election infrastructure, countering foreign influence in our election processes, and addressing election fraud. While the memo indicated that the NSC would host a meeting on this issue, they have deferred to DHS.

The meeting has been scheduled for **Monday, March 5** and we would like to invite your principal to attend. I've included meeting details below:

Date:
Monday, March 5
4:00pm – 4:45pm

Location:
National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center

1110 North Glebe Rd, Arlington, VA

Background:

The focus will be on clarifying the federal mission space and determining which federal agencies are lead or supporting in these efforts.

Staff may contact Brandon Wales, Senior Counselor to the Secretary, with questions about the substance of the event: (b)(6) per DHS. Principals are welcome to bring a +1 to the meeting.

Please let me know if your principal is available to attend on March 5th.

Respectfully,

Eliza

Eliza Thurston
Scheduler | Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6) per DHS
Direct (b)(6) per DHS
Cell (b)(6) per DHS



**Homeland
Security**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rex Tillerson
Secretary, U.S. Department of State

Jeff Sessions
Attorney General of the United States

Daniel Coats
Director of National Intelligence

Mike Pompeo
Director, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Christopher Wray
Director, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

Admiral Michael S. Rogers
Director, National Security Agency

COPY: John Kelly
White House Chief of Staff

Mick Mulvaney
Director, Office of Management and Budget

HR McMaster
National Security Advisor

Thomas Bossert
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism

FROM: Kirstjen Nielsen
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

SUBJECT: Coordinating Federal Election-Related Efforts

I am writing to express my gratitude for your organizations' recent engagement in, and ongoing contributions to, the essential work of supporting our State and local partners in ensuring the physical and cyber security of election infrastructure. As I know we all agree, the integrity and security of our Nation's elections is of utmost importance. I especially want to thank you for your continued

participation in the Department of Homeland Security's Election Task Force. Your clear commitment to this mission underscores the critical role that a secure and resilient election system plays in protecting our democracy.

In our role as the Sector Specific Agency for the Election Infrastructure Critical Infrastructure Subsector¹, DHS established the Election Task Force (ETF) in September of 2017 to provide a forum for the effective coordination of U.S. Government activities in support of State and local election officials in securing and protecting election infrastructure. DHS, through the ETF, is working to identify best practices in election infrastructure security and offer tools and capabilities to help State and local election officials manage risk. Activities coordinated by the ETF include implementation of information sharing mechanisms, execution of cybersecurity and physical security engagements, development of analytical products, and other relevant activities and services. The ETF is not intended to supersede or otherwise replace existing statutory and executive responsibilities.²

Your agencies' contributions have helped the ETF to facilitate a series of engagements with election officials. These engagements included briefings last week detailing the landscape of threats facing election infrastructure to Secretaries of State and State Election Directors. Providing this level of understanding about the threat represents a significant milestone in the partnership between Federal, State, and local government. Your continued involvement is central to the ongoing success of the ETF and the security of State and local government election infrastructure.

With statutory and policy direction, DHS's leadership on behalf of the Federal government is clear in this space. However, there are other election-related lines of effort that are often confused or conflated with our election security efforts. We see two additional lines of federal effort related to – but distinct from – our efforts in support of election infrastructure security – namely countering foreign influence in elections, and addressing election and voter registration fraud. I have asked the NSC to convene a cabinet-level meeting in the near future to discuss these three lines of effort and our respective roles and responsibilities. Clarifying federal mission space and determining which federal agencies are lead or supporting in these efforts is vital, so that our partners, and most importantly the American people, understand our approach and goals. As you know, it is critical that we do all we can within the bounds of the Constitution and law to ensure the integrity of our elections and that the American people have confidence that their vote counts and is counted correctly.

Thank you in advance for your continued efforts.

¹ Presidential Policy Directive – 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, defines Sector Specific Agencies as the Federal agency (or agencies) that serves as the Federal interface for a specific critical infrastructure sector and which is responsible for leading a range of activities with respect to strengthening the security and resilience of that critical infrastructure sector or subsector.

² The Election Task Force operates according to three primary goals in support of State and local officials:

1. Identify and understand risk to election infrastructure to inform planning, resourcing, and prioritization of election infrastructure efforts.
2. Provide services to election infrastructure stakeholders to help reduce both cyber and physical risk to State infrastructures, ensure access to actionable threat information, and maintain situational awareness of trends across the sector.
3. Mature the organization of the Election Infrastructure Subsector to ensure a representative and effective security-informed partnership.