Exemption 1

Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information Act protects from disclosure information that has been deemed classified "under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" and is "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 1 The Supreme Court has recognized that the President bears immediate responsibility for protecting national security, which includes the development of policy that establishes what information must be classified to prevent harm to national security. 2 Exemption 1 is the provision of the FOIA which affords protection for such properly classified information. 3

Each President, beginning with President Harry S. Truman in 1951, 4 has issued a new or revised executive order, or adopted a previous President’s executive order, establishing the uniform policy of the Executive Branch concerning the protection of national security information. 5 The executive order provides the procedural and

2 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1988) (discussing responsibility for protecting national security entrusted in the President as Commander in Chief of the military and as head of Executive Branch) (non-FOIA case).
3 See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that Exemption 1 protects information properly classified under national security executive order); Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same); Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 373 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same); Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).
substantive legal framework for the classification decisions of the designated subject matter experts who have been granted classification authority by the President. Exemption 1 does not protect information that is merely "classifiable" – that is, meets the substantive requirements of the current executive order but has not been actually reviewed and classified under it. Exemption 1 protects from disclosure national security information that has been properly classified in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of the appropriate executive order.

The current executive order in effect is Executive Order 13,526. The relevant provisions of this executive order are discussed below.


8 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); see also Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining that agency bears the burden of "demonstrating proper classification under both the procedural and substantive criteria contained in the governing Executive Order") (decided under Executive Order 11,652); Schoenman v. FBI, 841 F. Supp. 2d 69, 80 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating information must be "classified pursuant to the proper procedures and . . . substantively fall within the scope" of the executive order) (decided under Executive Order 13,526).

9 Exec. Order No. 13,526.
Executive Order 13,526

Executive Order 13,526 sets forth the current standards governing national security classification and the mechanisms for declassification. As with prior executive orders, Executive Order 13,526 recognizes both the right of the public to be informed about activities of its government and the need to protect national security information from unauthorized or untimely disclosure.

Section 1.1(a) of Executive Order 13,526 provides four standards that are to be used for classifying information. As detailed in the Executive Order, the following four conditions must be met for information to be originally classified under the order:

1. "an original classification authority is classifying the information;"
2. "the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;"
3. "the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order;" and
4. "the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage."

With regard to the required determination under Section 1.1(a)(4) that disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in harm to national security, courts have consistently recognized that an agency's articulation of such harm must always be speculative to some extent, and to require a showing of actual harm would be judicial "overstepping." Further, Section 1.1(d) establishes a presumption of harm to national security from the unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information.

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11 See Exec. Order No. 13,526 (commenting in introductory statement that "our Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information both within the Government and to the American people," while at the same time noting that throughout history "the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence" and concluding that both "are equally important priorities").


Section 1.4 of Executive Order 13,526 specifies the types of information that may be considered for classification. This section provides that "[i]nformation shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with section

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14 Id. § 1.1(a)(2).

15 Id. § 1.1(a)(3).

16 Id. § 1.1(a)(4); see NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.10 (2010) (emphasizing importance of agency classifier’s ability to identify and describe damage to national security caused by unauthorized disclosure); see also, e.g., Rosenberg v. DOD, 342 F. Supp. 3d 62, 83-88 (D.D.C. 2018) (reviewing agency’s assertions, for variety of records, that disclosure would pose harm to national security, and finding that there would be harm for release of some records but not for others); Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that release of information regarding phone hacking tool, specifically vendor identity and purchase price, could reasonably be expected to cause harm by limiting agency’s ability to gain access to terrorists’ phones in future); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 296 F. Supp. 3d at 126 (finding that "it is eminently logical that publicly disclosing the strengths, weaknesses, and/or changes in the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s] own processes . . . presents a risk that potential targets will alter their behavior to account for the disclosed practices and/or limitations").

17 Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Aftergood v. CIA, No. 98-2107, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135, at *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999) (declaring that "the law does not require certainty or a showing of harm" that has already occurred); ACLU v. DOJ, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30 (D.D.C. 2003) (reiterating that "[t]he test is not whether the court personally agrees in full with the [agency’s] evaluation of the danger—rather, the issue is whether on the whole record the Agency’s judgment objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility in this field of foreign intelligence in which the [agency] is expert" (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982))); cf. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 296 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (finding "that the government’s explanation of the harm that might result from release of the Westlaw printouts, and how such a disclosure could reveal national security information that is not evident from looking at the documents in isolation, is reasonable and sufficient to support its invocation of Exemption 1"); N.Y. Times v. NSA, 205 F. Supp. 3d 374, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that although specific program at issue is no longer operational, disclosure of records regarding program could still pose harm by revealing techniques that agency is still authorized to use and which may be used in other ongoing programs).

18 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.1(d).

19 See id., § 1.4(a)-(h).
1.2 of th[e] order." The information must "pertain[] to" at least one of the following categories:

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;

(b) foreign government information;

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20 See id., § 1.4.

21 See id.; see also ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App’x 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that "'pertains is not a very demanding verb'" and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that "pertains to" be read narrowly for consistency with the FOIA’s purposes because the executive order "has relevance beyond FOIA, and [the court’s] task is not to construe it in light of FOIA’s purposes") (quoting Judicial Watch v. DOD, 715 F.3d 937, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).


23 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(b); see, e.g., Peltier v. FBI, 218 F. App’x 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that disclosure would "reveal an intelligence relationship and could threaten the flow of information" between governments) (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Miller 562 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (finding that disclosure of foreign government information would show that government’s cooperation, capabilities and vulnerabilities, and would lead to negative diplomatic consequences and diminished intelligence capabilities) (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Azmy v. DOD, 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that agency properly classified foreign government information and that disclosure could be expected to "impair DOD's ability to obtain information from foreign governments in the future, who will be less likely to cooperate with the United States if they cannot be confident that the information they provide will remain confidential") (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Wash. Post v. DOD, No. 84-2403, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1988) (protecting foreign military information) (decided under Executive Order 12,356).
(c) intelligence activities, intelligence sources, or methods,\(^{24}\) or cryptology;\(^{25}\)

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;\(^{26}\)

\(^{24}\) Executive Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(c); see, e.g., Schrecker v. DOJ, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (protecting intelligence sources because release would harm national security by "dissuading current and future sources from cooperating") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 1994) (protecting "numerical designators" assigned to national security sources) (decided under Executive Order 12,356); Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 597, 601 (3d Cir. 1990) (protecting information concerning intelligence sources and methods FBI used in investigation of student who corresponded with 169 foreign nations) (decided under Executive Order 12,356); N.Y. Times v. NSA, 205 F. Supp. 3d 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (protecting details regarding the NSA's collection of information and "technical means and analytic methods by which the NSA collected metadata" and other information); Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 892 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99 (D.D.C. 2012) (protecting "actual intelligence activities, sources or methods") (decided under Executive Order 13,526); Singh v. FBI, 574 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that FBI properly classified "numerical designator, which serves as a singular identifier for an intelligence source utilized to provide information on a specific individual or organization determined to be of national security interest") (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Schoenman v. FBI, 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 153, 156 (D.D.C. 2008) [hereinafter Schoenman I] (noting that foreign intelligence sources "can be expected to furnish information only when confident that they are protected from retribution by the absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship with the U.S. government" and finding that disclosure of source information "regardless of whether they are active or inactive, alive or deceased, can reasonably be expected to jeopardize the safety of the source or his or her family") (decided under Executive Order 12,958 as amended); Cozen O'Connor v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 570 F. Supp. 2d 749, 774 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (agreeing that agency had properly classified information received through confidential sources) (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Azmy, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (finding that agency properly withheld "intelligence assessments and conclusions") (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Miller, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (finding that FBI properly classified detailed information provided by human intelligence source, and noting that "[i]n certain parts of the world, the consequences of public disclosure to an individual that has served as a U.S. source are often swift and far reaching, from economic reprisals to possible harassment, imprisonment, or even death") (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended).

\(^{25}\) Executive Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(c); see, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding classification of cryptographic information dating back to 1934 when release "could enable hostile entities to interpret other, more sensitive documents similarly encoded") (decided under Executive Order 12,356); Gilmore v. NSA, No. C92-3646, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7694, at *18-19, (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1993) (finding mathematical principles and techniques in agency treatise protectable under this executive order category) (decided under Executive Order 12,356).

\(^{26}\) Executive Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(d); see, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc., 715 F.3d at 941 (withholding photographs from military operation in Pakistan resulting in death of Osama bin Laden because "all 52 images plainly 'pertain[] . . . to foreign activities of the United States'")
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;  

(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

(decided under Executive Order 13,526); Peltier, 218 F. App’x at 32 (holding that disclosure of foreign government information "would breach express promises of confidentiality made to a foreign government, on which the provision of the information was expressly contingent") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 392 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing that "[e]ven allies could be unpleasantly surprised" by disclosure of CIA espionage information involving one of its citizens) (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Intellectual Prop. Watch v. USTR, 205 F. Supp. 3d 334, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (protecting draft U.S. trade proposals because "disclosure of the U.S.’s evolving negotiating positions could damage other ongoing or future trade negotiations with other countries" but denying the protection of proposals made by the private sector) (decided under Executive Order 13,526); Muttitt v. Dep’t of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 300, (D.D.C. 2013) (protecting information concerning "United States' role in formulating Iraq's proposed hydrocarbon laws and developing Iraq’s oil and gas sector") (decided under Executive Order 13,526); Schoenman I, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (holding that intelligence agency properly classified "deliberative descriptions, commentary, and analysis on [foreign] government and defense establishment" because disclosure would damage "working relationship" and lead to less effective foreign intelligence collection) (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Miller, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 102-04, 107 (finding that declarants had properly demonstrated potential for harm to foreign relations in disclosing information concerning foreign cooperation in plans to evacuate American citizens and an assessment of that foreign government’s military and police capabilities) (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Wheeler v. DOJ, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that "foreign relations between Cuba and the United States remain tenuous at best," and that it would follow that information about persons in Cuba who provided information to the United States could still be very dangerous and, if disclosed, result in "embarrassment or imprisonment, if not death") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); ACLU v. DOD, 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reasoning that "even if the only question was whether to recognize officially that which was informally or unofficially believed to exist, the niceties of international diplomacy sometimes make it important not to embarrass a foreign country or its leaders, and exemptions from FOIA protect that concern as well") (decided under Executive Order 12,958, as amended); Wolf v. CIA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2004) (reasoning that the fact of the CIA’s covert interest in a foreign citizen "could adversely affect relations with a foreign government because that government might believe that the CIA has collected intelligence information on or recruited one of its citizens or resident aliens") (decided under Executive Order 12,958), aff’d in pertinent part & remanded on other grounds, 473 F.3d 370, 377-80 (D.C. Cir. 2007).


28 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(f); see, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981) (protecting "information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons")
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating to the national security; and

(h) development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, courts have recognized that in certain circumstances legal analysis may be protected where its disclosure would reveal information protected under one of these eight classification categories.

(decided under Executive Order 12,065); Abbots v. NRC, 766 F.2d 604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (protecting "the NRC's determination as to the number of attackers a nuclear facility should be able to defend against successfully," because release of this information would allow potential attackers to "compute the size of the assault force needed for optimum results") (decided under Executive Order 12,356); Loomis v. DOE, No. 96-149, 1999 WL 33541935, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1999) (protecting nuclear containment layout plan and referenced document on propagation of radiological requirements and procedures) (decided under Executive Order 12,958), summary affirmance granted, 21 F. App'x 80 (2d Cir. 2001).


30 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.4(h).

31 See ACLU v. CIA, 109 F. Supp. 3d 220, 236 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that legal analysis may warrant protection even though it does not constitute intelligence activity, source, or method by itself, "so long as it pertains to an intelligence activity, source, or method"); see also N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 752 F.3d 123, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2014) (dictum) (noting that in some circumstances, legal analysis may warrant protection even though it does not constitute source or method; for example, where "the very fact that legal analysis was given [regarding a protected operation] . . . would risk disclosure [of that operation]" or where "legal analysis could be so intertwined with facts entitled to protection that disclosure of the analysis would disclose such facts").
As with prior orders, Executive Order 13,526 contains a number of distinct limitations on classification. Specifically, Section 1.7(a) states that information may not be classified in order to:

(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
(3) restrain competition;
(4) prevent or delay the disclosure of information that does not require national security protection.

Executive Order 13,526 also prohibits the classification of "[b]asic scientific research information not clearly related to national security."

Additionally, Executive Order 13,526 reintroduced the requirement that agency classification authorities not classify information if there is "significant doubt" about the need to classify it.

Reclassification of Information

See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7.

Id. § 1.7(a)(1); cf. Billington v. DOJ, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45, 59 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing plaintiff's "unsubstantiated accusations" that information should be disclosed because FBI engaged in illegal "dirty tricks" campaign) (decided under Executive Order 12,958), rev'd in part on other grounds, 233 F. 3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(a)(2); cf., Billington, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that information was classified by FBI to shield agency and foreign government from embarrassment); Canning v. DOJ, 848 F. Supp. 1037, 1047-48 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding no credible evidence that the FBI improperly withheld information to conceal the existence of "potentially inappropriate investigation" of a French citizen, and noting that "if anything, the agency released sufficient information to facilitate such speculation") (decided under Executive Order 12,356).

Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(a)(3).

Id. § 1.7(a)(4).

Id. § 1.7(b).

See id. § 1.1(b). Compare Exec. Order No. 12,958, §1.2(b) (including the language: "If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified."), with Exec. Order No. 12,958, as amended (omitting same language).
Executive Order 13,526 provides that information "may not be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority" unless certain specified conditions are met.\(^{39}\) To do so the agency must make a document-by-document determination that the reclassification is necessary to prevent "significant and demonstrable damage" to national security.\(^{40}\) This determination must be "personally approved in writing by the agency head".\(^{41}\) Further, the agency must determine that the information previously declassified and released "may be reasonably recovered without bringing undue attention to the information."\(^{42}\) The "reclassification action" must be "reported promptly to the Assistant to the President of National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) and the Director of the Office Information Security Oversight Office."\(^{43}\) Finally, if the document is in the physical and legal custody of NARA and has been available for public use, the Executive Order sets out procedures for suspending public access to the document pending approval of the reclassification action by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).\(^{44}\)

**Classifying Information After Receiving a FOIA Request**

Executive Order 13,526 provides that "[i]nformation that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a [FOIA] request for it."\(^{45}\) This provision applies whether the record was never classified or had been declassified pursuant to a specific date or event.\(^{46}\) Such

\(^{39}\) See [Exec Order No. 13526](#), § 1.7(c); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b) (2010) (directive issued by Information Security Oversight Office describing procedures for reclassifying information pursuant to section 1.7(c) of [Executive Order 13,526](#)).

\(^{40}\) [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(c)(1); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b).

\(^{41}\) [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), §1.7(c)(1); NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b).

\(^{42}\) [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(c)(2); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)(1).

\(^{43}\) [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(c)(3); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)(5).

\(^{44}\) See [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(c)(4); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(b)(2).

\(^{45}\) [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(d); see also Darui v. Dep't of State, 798 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (clarifying that documents disclosed to plaintiff during his trial were not disclosed to the public and therefore could be classified after they had been requested under the FOIA).

\(^{46}\) See [Exec. Order No. 13,526](#), § 1.7(d).
post-request classification is permitted only (1) through the "personal participation or under the direction" of designated high-level officials, (2) if the record meets the requirements of the Executive Order, and (3) only on a "document-by-document basis." 47 With regard to the first requirement, "[s]ub-delegation to a subordinate federal official is presumptively permissible, absent affirmative evidence in the original delegation of a contrary intent," and so long as the agency can show that the subordinate official is acting under the direction of the designated high-level official. 48

**Proper National Security Markings**

Executive Order 13,526, requires that each classified document be marked with the appropriate classification level, 49 the identity of the original classification authority, 50 the identity of the agency and office classifying the document, if not otherwise evident, 51 declassification instructions, 52 and "a concise reason for classification" that cites the applicable classification category or categories. 53 In addition, Executive Order 13,526

47 Id.; see also Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affirming post-request classification action of FBI conducted by delegated agency official on records that met requirement of Executive Order 13, 526, after document-by-document review); Muttitt v. Dep’t of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 303 (D.D.C. 2013) (affirming validity of regulation designating specific official "to be the official to classify information on document-by-document basis consistent with" Executive Order 13,526 § 1.7(d)); Judicial Watch v. DOD, 857 F. Supp. 2d 44, 58 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that any classification after receipt of FOIA request was accomplished by review of each record under the direction of CIA Director) (decided under Executive Order 13,526); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that agency official had "power to classify documents" following receipt of FOIA request) (decided under Executive Order 12,958), rev’d in part on other grounds, 276 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

48 Mobley, 806 F.3d at 585 (holding that because the FBI’s sub-delegation order contained an ongoing notification requirement by the sub-delegee to the high-level official, this sub-delegee’s classification decisions qualify as being made "under the direction" of the high-level official).

49 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.6(a)(1); see also id. § 1.2 (authorizing classification at the following levels, and using these descriptive terms: (1) "Top Secret" level, when disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause "exceptionally grave damage to the national security"; (2) "Secret" level, when disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause "serious damage to the national security"; and (3) "Confidential" level, when disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause "damage to the national security").

50 See id. § 1.6(a)(2).

51 See id. § 1.6(a)(3).

52 See id. § 1.6(a)(4).

53 Id. § 1.6(a)(5).
requires agencies to use portion markings to indicate levels of classification within documents, and it encourages the use of classified addenda in cases in which classified information comprises only "a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document." ISOO has issued government-wide guidelines on all the marking requirements. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that markings that appear on a document that was properly classified pursuant to a previous, then-governing executive order, are valid if they satisfy that executive order’s markings requirements.

Multiple courts have held that in order to properly withhold information under Exemption 1, the government must show both that the information was classified under the proper procedures and that the withheld information substantively falls under the Executive Order.

**Duration of Classification and Declassification**

Executive Order 13,526 establishes limitations on the length of time information may remain classified, and procedures for the declassification of older government information.

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54 See id. § 1.6(c).

55 Id. § 1.6(g).


57 See DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that documents classified decades ago under "Clinton/Bush Order" were properly classified because they contained markings required by that order).

58 See, e.g., McGehee v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 3d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that FBI properly classified information pursuant to proper procedures and withheld information substantively fell under Executive Order 13, 526); Int’l Counsel Bureau v. DOD, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that "to show that it has properly withheld information under Exemption 1, an agency must show both that the information was classified pursuant to the proper procedures, and that the withheld information meets the standard for classification"); Schoenman v. FBI, 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that agencies asserting Exemption 1 are required to "show both that the information was classified pursuant to the proper procedures, and that the withheld information substantively falls within the scope of [the applicable] Executive Order") (decided under Executive Order 12,958).


60 Id. § 3.3-3.5.
At the time of original classification, Executive Order 13,526 requires agencies "to establish a specific date or event for declassification based upon the duration of the national security sensitivity."\(^{61}\) The Executive Order provides that information is "automatically declassified" upon reaching that date or event.\(^{62}\) Further, the Executive Order specifies that if the agency is unable to determine "an earlier specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision, unless the original classification authority otherwise determines that the sensitivity of the information requires that it be marked for declassification for up to 25 years from the date of the original decision."\(^{63}\) Executive Order 13,526 provides that "[n]o information may remain classified indefinitely."\(^{64}\)

Executive Order 13,526 contains procedures for declassification, including automatic declassification.\(^{65}\) It also provides for a "mandatory declassification review" program.\(^{66}\)

Finally, the Executive Order states that "[i]t is presumed that information that continues to meet the classification requirements under this order requires continued protection."\(^{67}\) The Executive Order nonetheless recognizes that "[i]n some exceptional cases, . . . the need to protect . . . information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified."\(^{68}\)

\(^{61}\) Id. § 1.5(a); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.12(a)(1) (2010) (establishing guidelines for the duration of the classification).

\(^{62}\) See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.5(a).

\(^{63}\) Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.5(b); see also NARA Classification Directive, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.12(a)(1)(ii).

\(^{64}\) Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.5(d).

\(^{65}\) See id., § 3.1-3.4.

\(^{66}\) Id., § 3.5.

\(^{67}\) Id., §3.1(d).

\(^{68}\) Id.
Applicability of Successive Executive Orders

The issuance of each executive order concerning classification, or the amendment of an existing one, raises the question of the applicability of successive executive orders to records that were in various stages of an administrative proceeding or litigation as of the current executive order's effective date. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has established a rule that the appropriate executive order to apply, with its particular procedural and substantive standards, is the order in effect when "the classifying official acted." Only when "a reviewing court contemplates remanding the case to the agency to correct a deficiency in its classification determination is it necessary" to apply the standards of a superseding executive order. At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has permitted an agency, as a matter of discretion, to reexamine its classification decision under a newly issued or amended executive order in order to take into account "changed international and domestic circumstances." The D.C. Circuit has held, though, that "absent a request by the agency to reevaluate an exemption 1 determination based on a new executive order, the district court may not require an agency to apply the new order" and must instead "evaluate the agency's decision under the executive order in force at the time the classification was made."

Deference to Agency Judgment

69 See Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (addressing "issue of which Executive Order should apply" when documents were classified under one Executive Order which "was supplanted by" a different Executive Order as the case proceeded in litigation); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XVI, No. 2, at 3, 12 ("OIP Guidance: The Timing of New E.O. Applicability").

70 Lesar, 636 F.2d at 480; accord ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 70 n.5 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting that "the propriety of a classification decision is considered under the criteria of the executive order that applied when the decision was made"); Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("A request by the agency to reevaluate an exemption 1 determination based on a new executive order... the court must evaluate the agency's decision under the executive order in force at the time the classification was made.").

71 King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Campbell, 164 F.3d at 31 n.11 (recognizing that when court remands to agency for rereview of classification determination, such review is performed under superseding executive order); Greenberg v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) (applying Executive Order 12,356 to records at issue, but noting that Executive Order 12,958 would apply if court "[found] that the agencies improperly withheld information pursuant to Exemption 1").

72 Baez v. DOJ, 647 F.2d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding agency's classification reevaluation under executive order issued during course of district court litigation); see, e.g., Miller v. U.S. Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1388 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that agency chose to reevaluate under "new Executive Order which [became] effective during pendency of the lawsuit").

73 Campbell, 164 F.3d at 29 (examining provisions of superseding order and finding that it "defines classified information to include information classified under prior orders" and
Courts generally defer to agency expertise in national security cases. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has articulated an expansive standard of deference in national security cases, noting that "little proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible assertion that information is properly classified." Such deference is...

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74 See, e.g., Leopold v. DOJ, 697 F. App'x 9, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating that courts "have consistently granted substantial deference to the government's determination that information has important national security implications, and that the disclosure of such information would have harmful ramifications for national security"); Benjamin v. Dep't of State, No. 16-5175, 2017 WL 160801, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (noting that D.C. Circuit has "consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security" (quoting Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009))); Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that because courts lack expertise in national security matters, they must give "substantial weight to agency statements" (quoting Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); Bowers v. DOJ, 930 F.2d 350, 357 (4th Cir. 1991) (observing that "[w]hat fact . . . may compromise national security is best left to the intelligence experts"); Doherty v. DOJ, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (according "substantial weight" to agency declaration); Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that classification affidavits are entitled to "the utmost deference"); Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 892 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100 (D.D.C. 2012) (recognizing "deferential posture to the executive in FOIA cases involving national security concerns"); Friedman v. U.S. Secret Serv., 923 F. Supp. 2d 262, 276 (D.D.C. 2013) (acknowledging that courts "generally defer to agency expertise in national security matters"); Azmy v. DOD, 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reiterating that agencies have "unique insights" in area of national security); Cozen O'Connor v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 570 F. Supp. 2d 749, 773 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that courts have "neither the expertise nor the qualifications to determine the impact upon national security" and that a "court must not substitute its judgment for the agency's regarding national defense or foreign policy implications" (citing Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); ACLU v. DOJ, 429 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that court must recognize "unique insights and special expertise" of Executive Branch concerning the kind of disclosures that may be harmful); cf. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing deference shown to Executive Branch in national security matters) (Exemption 7(A) case).

75 Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Rosenberg v. DOD, 342 F. Supp. 3d 62, 84 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that defendant's statements "readily satisfie[d] the standard for a plausible and logical explanation for classification"); N.Y. Times Co. v. NSA, 205 F. Supp. 3d 374, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that agency's explanation was "detailed, logical, and plausible" and thus demonstrated that its withholdings fit within Exemption 1); Larson, 565 F.3d at 862 (noting that court need only examine whether agency's classification decision "appears 'logical' or 'plausible'" (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App'x 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that "agency's explanations as to why the records are classified are both logical and plausible"); Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. CIA, 765 F.3d 161, 169 (2d. Cir. 2014) (finding that release of images of Guantanamo...
based upon the "magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake,"76 and it is extended by courts because national security officials are uniquely positioned to view "the whole picture" and "weigh the variety of subtle and complex factors" in order to determine whether the disclosure of information would damage national security.77 Indeed, courts ordinarily are very reluctant to substitute their judgment in place of the agency's "unique insights"78 in the areas of national defense and foreign relations.79 This is because courts have recognized that national security is a

Bay detainee could "logically and plausibly" damage national security because images could be used as propaganda by extremists); Schoenman v. FBI, 841 F. Supp. 2d 69, 82 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding it "both plausible and logical" that disclosure could damage national security); James Madison Project v. CIA, 605 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (commenting that D.C. Circuit rule is "that little proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible assertion that information is properly classified" (citing Morley, 508 F.3d at 1124)); Schoenman v. FBI, 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 153 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); Summers, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (same); cf. DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 195-96 (noting that court "must accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

76 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 927 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985)) (Exemption 7(A) case); see also L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 899-900 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (deferring to judgment of senior Army officers regarding risks posed to soldiers and contractors by enemy forces in Iraq); ACLU v. DOD, 406 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (acknowledging that "one may criticize the deference extended by the courts as excessive," but holding that such deference is the rule).

77 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985); see e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (commenting that "terrorism or other special circumstances" may warrant "heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security") (non-FOIA case); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (explaining that "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs") (non-FOIA case); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928 (rejecting artificial limits on deference, and explaining that "deference depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure – that is, harm to the national security – not the FOIA exemption invoked").

78 Larson, 565 F.3d at 864; see also, Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. U.S. Trade Representative, 718 F.3d 899, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting district court's second guessing of agency's harm judgment and finding that harm to ability of United States to negotiate future trade agreements "is not for us to speculate"); Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (acknowledging agency's "unique insights" in areas of national defense and foreign relations).

79 See, e.g., Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 556 n.9 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that court "not in a position to 'second-guess'" agency's determination regarding need for continued classification of material); Krikorian, 984 F.2d at 464 (explaining that because judges "lack the expertise necessary to second-guess . . . agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case," they must accord substantial deference to an agency's affidavit (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at148)); Hall v. CIA, 881 F. Supp. 2d 38, 64 (D.D.C. 2012) (opining that
"uniquely executive purview"\textsuperscript{80} and that "the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive's judgment" on national security issues.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, in some cases courts have questioned the underlying basis for the agency's classification decision.\textsuperscript{82}

\textquoteright\textquoteleft\textquotedblleft[\textit{t\textquoteright}here will always be a certain level of speculation when assessing the dangers of releasing [classified] information\textquoteright\textquotedblright; \textit{Cozen O'Conner}, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 773 (acknowledging "court must not substitute its judgment for the agency's regarding national defense or foreign policy implications"); \textit{Summers}, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (noting that assessing potential for harm to intelligence source from disclosure "is the duty of the agency, and not the court"); \textit{ACLU v. FBI}, 429 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (D.D.C. 2006) (reasoning that "while a court is ultimately to make its own decision, that decision must take seriously the government's predictions" of harm to national security); \textit{Aftergood v. CIA}, No. 98-2107, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135, at *9-10 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999) (declaring that courts must respect agency predictions concerning potential national security harm from disclosure, and recognizing that these predictions "must always be speculative to some extent").

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies}, 331 F.3d at 927-28; see also \textit{L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC}, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (echoing the belief that national security is "a uniquely executive purview" (citing \textit{Zadvydas}, 533 U.S. at 696)).

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies}, 331 F.3d at 928; see also \textit{Ctr. for Int'l Env'tl. Law}, 718 F.3d at 904 (reversing judgment of district court because "[t]he question is not whether the court agrees in full with the Trade Representative's evaluation of the expected harm to foreign relations" but "whether on the whole record the [agency's] judgment objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility") (quoting \textit{Gardels v. CIA}, 689 F.2d 1100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); \textit{Mobley v. CIA}, 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 51 (D.D.C. 2013) ("To the extent that plaintiffs ask this Court to second-guess the CIA's statements . . . their request is inappropriate"); \textit{ACLU v. Dep't of State}, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 222, (D.D.C. 2012) (recognizing "courts are generally ill-equipped to second-guess the Executive's opinion in the national security context").

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{See King v. DOJ}, 830 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that trial court erred in deferring to agency's judgment that information more than thirty-five years old remained classified when executive order presumed declassification of information over twenty years old and agency merely indicated procedural compliance with order); \textit{ACLU v. FBI}, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (concluding that "the importance of the issues raised by this case" make in camera review necessary); \textit{Fla. Immigrant Advocacy Ctr. v. NSA}, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (granting in camera review "to satisfy an 'uneasiness' or 'doubt' that the exemption claim may be overbroad given the nature of the Plaintiff's arguments"); \textit{Larson v. Dep't of State}, No. 02-1937, 2005 WL 3276303, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2005) (observing that deference "does not mean acquiescence"); \textit{Coldiron v. DOJ}, 310 F. Supp. 2d 44, 53 (D.D.C. 2004) (cautioning that court's deference should not be used as "wet blanket" to avoid proper justification of exemptions); \textit{Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS}, 721 F. Supp. 552, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (reminding that such deference does not give agency "carte blanche" to withhold responsive documents without "valid and thorough affidavit"); subsequent decision, No. 87-Civ-1115, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1990) (upholding Exemption 1 excisions after in camera review of certain documents and classified \textit{Vaughn} affidavit).
The D.C. Circuit has declared that "[w]hen an agency meets its burden through affidavits, in camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate, and in camera inspection is particularly a last resort in national security situations." Further, courts have rejected the notion that additional judicial review should be triggered solely by a requester's unsupported allegations of wrongdoing against the government.

When reviewing the propriety of agency classification determinations, courts have generally accorded little or no weight to opinions of persons other than the agency classification authority, including persons who may have previously maintained some knowledge of the subject matter while employed within the Executive Branch.

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83 Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App'x 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that because plaintiff failed to point to any officially acknowledged, duplicate information, in camera review was unnecessary to determine whether the information was properly withheld); Nat'l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. v. CIA, 402 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (D.D.C. 2005) (declining to conduct in camera review merely "to verify the agency's descriptions and provide assurances, beyond a presumption of administrative good faith, to FOIA plaintiffs that the descriptions are accurate and as complete as possible" (quoting Mead Data Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 262 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1977))).

84 See Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2004) (commenting that "Exemption 1 would not mean much if all anyone had to do, to see the full list of the CIA's holdings, was allege that the agency had some documents showing how he 'exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment'"); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Dep't of Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 3d 410, 422 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding in camera inspection unnecessary without "tangible evidence of agency wrongdoing"); Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 63 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that inconsistency in defendant's declaration "is not evidence of bad faith, nor is it indicative of a general sloppiness in the declassification or review process" (quoting Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); Peltier v. FBI, No. 03-905, 2005 WL 735964, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005) (finding that plaintiff's bare claim that agency classified requested records solely in order to prevent embarrassment does not alone necessitate greater judicial scrutiny).


86 See, e.g., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting opinion of former admiral); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting opinion of former CIA agent); Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209,
In Camera Submissions and Adequate Public Record

Courts have permitted or sometimes required agencies to submit explanatory in camera affidavits in order to protect the national security information that could not be discussed in a public affidavit.\(^87\) In camera affidavits have also been employed when even acknowledging the existence of records at issue would pose a threat to national security and consequently the agency has used the "Glomar response" to neither confirm nor deny the existence of records.\(^88\) In camera affidavits have also been used when "the very

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\(^87\) See, e.g., Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 598-99 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing in camera affidavit in order to supplement public affidavit and describe national security harm); Simmons v. DOJ, 796 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Ingle v. DOJ, 698 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 973 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Stein v. DOJ, 662 F.2d 1245, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 64 (D.D.C. 2013) (accepting in camera declaration when agency "cannot publicly describe these records or articulate the basis for their classification in greater detail" than provided in public declaration); N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("A district court may also conduct in camera review of classified affidavits when national security is at issue."); Eslaminia v. FBI, No. C 99-03249 MHP, 2011 WL 5118520, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (affirming withholdings only after in camera declarations provided sufficient detail to justify use of Exemption 1); Robinson v. FBI, No. 06-3359, 2008 WL 2502134, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2008) (commenting that FBI public affidavits may need to be supplemented with in camera affidavit to fully articulate withholdings for proper review by court); Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2003) (approving the use of an in camera affidavit, noting that "extensive public justification would threaten to reveal the very information for which a FOIA exemption is claimed"); Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 28 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering submission of an in camera affidavit because further description in a public affidavit "would reveal the [very] information that the agency is trying to withhold").

\(^88\) See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (addressing response to request for records regarding Glomar Explorer submarine-retrieval ship, with result that "neither confirm nor deny" response is now known as a "Glomar" response or as "Glomarization"); see also Ctr. for Human Rights & Constitutional Law v. Nat'l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 506 F. App'x 547, 548 (9th Cir. 2013) (remanding case for filing of classified declaration when public declaration "failed to provide 'reasonably specific detail'" that demonstrates harm of acknowledging existence of records); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that court accepted in camera affidavits to explain basis for Glomar assertion); Cozen
association of the identities of the original classifying authorities . . . is itself a classified fact." Courts have held that if an agency submits an in camera affidavit, however, it is under a duty to "create as complete a public record as is possible" before doing so. This public record is intended to provide both a meaningful and fair opportunity for a plaintiff to challenge and an adequate evidentiary basis for a court to rule on an agency's invocation of Exemption 1.

Courts have found that counsel for plaintiffs are not entitled to participate in such in camera proceedings. This was the case even in one unusual situation where plaintiff's counsel had been issued a personnel security clearance for an unrelated purpose. Similarly, in another decision concerning this issue, a court specifically held that a

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89 Mobley v. DOJ, 870 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D.D.C. 2012) (acknowledging that even the "banal information," like date, author, and number of pages, is properly classified).

90 Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013; see also Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that when district court uses an in camera affidavit, even in national security cases, "it must both make its reasons for doing so clear and make as much as possible of the in camera submission available to the opposing party" (citing Lykins v. DOJ, 725 F.2d 1455, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984))); Patterson, 893 F.2d at 600 (explaining that "public submissions represent a good faith effort by the [agency] to provide as much access to the information as possible"); Simmons, 796 F.2d at 710 (affirming that courts "should strive to develop as complete as possible a public record"); Scott v. CIA, 916 F. Supp. 42, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1996) (denying request for in camera review until agency "creates as full a public record as possible").

91 See Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring defendant to provide plaintiff with "a meaningful opportunity to contest, and the district court [with] an adequate foundation to review, the soundness of the withholding" (quoting King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1879))); Coldiron v. DOJ, 310 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that agency "must provide a basis for the FOIA requester to contest, and the court to decide, the validity of the withholding"); ACLU v. DOJ, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2003) (acknowledging that agency affidavits "are entitled to substantial weight," but finding that they "must nevertheless afford the requester an ample opportunity to contest" them).

92 See Salisbury, 690 F.2d at 973 n.3; Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff's counsel not permitted to participate in in camera review of documents arguably covered by state secrets privilege).

93 See El Badrawi v. DHS, 596 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (D. Conn. 2009) (finding that although plaintiff's counsel maintained personnel security clearance, he did not have a "need to know" withheld information, and thus failed to satisfy second requirement for access to classified information).
government employee who requested information and who also held a current "Top Secret" security clearance was properly denied access to classified records concerning himself because Exemption 1 protects "information from disclosure based on the nature of the material, not on the nature of the individual requester."94 In other instances involving voluminous records, courts have on occasion, either by order95 or agreement of the parties,96 had agencies submit samples of the documents at issue for in camera review.

**Glomar Response**

Executive Order 13,526 provides that "[a]n agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its predecessors."97 Known as a Glomar response, this term comes from a series of requests made in the 1970s to the CIA and the Department of Defense seeking access to records showing a connection between the agencies and a ship named the *Glomar Explorer*, which purportedly was being used to recover a sunken Soviet submarine.98 In that case, the agencies would neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records because "such an admission or denial could itself compromise national security."99 Although there "had been a great deal of speculation in the press concerning the nature of the mission" of the *Glomar Explorer*, the agencies described to the court "why official confirmation of the involvement of the particular agencies in question was undesirable."100 Since that time, when agencies neither confirm nor deny the existence of records, the response is referred to as a Glomar response, or Glomarization.


95 See, e.g., Wilson v. CIA, No. 89-3356, 1991 WL 226682, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1991) (ordering in camera submission of "sample" of fifty documents because it was "neither necessary nor practicable" for court to review all 1,000 processed ones).


97 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 3.6(a), 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010); see, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 298 (D.D.C. 2011) (acknowledging that executive order authorizes agencies to refuse to confirm or deny existence or non-existence of requested information whenever fact of its existence is classified) rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013); ACLU v. DOD, No. 09 Civ. 8071, 2010 WL 4449375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2010) (same).


99 Id. at 729-30.

100 Id. at 732.
The use of the Glomar response has been routinely upheld by the courts.\textsuperscript{101} At the same time, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that if an "agency has already disclosed the fact of the existence (or nonexistence) of responsive records," a Glomar response is not appropriate.\textsuperscript{102} The District Court for the District of


\textsuperscript{102} ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that "it strains credulity to suggest that an agency charged with gathering intelligence affecting the national security does not have an 'intelligence interest' in drone strikes, even if that agency does not operate the drones itself," and concluding that such a program had been publicly acknowledged); see, e.g., ACLU v. DOD, 322 F. Supp. 3d 464, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting use of Glomar – which sought to prevent revealing whether CIA had intelligence interest in matter or whether certain individuals had decision-making authority on matter – because White House press secretary made public statements that "clearly disclosed the CIA's intelligence interest in the matter, . . . explicitly acknowledged that the U.S. participated, . . . and that the Director of the [CIA] (explicitly referred to by his title) was in the room when the matter was decided"). But see
Columbia has held that any such disclosure would have to be made in the form of an "official acknowledgement" which "must leave no doubt that the agency possesses the requested records." The court further opined that "[t]he official acknowledgement standard is not [a] 'surely the agency must have it' standard."

The test used by courts to determine whether information has been "officially acknowledged" in the Glomar context is often referred to as the Fitzgibbon test. Under that test, information has been "officially acknowledged" if "(1) the information requested [is] as specific as the information previously released; (2) the information requested . . . match[es] the information previously disclosed; and (3) the information requested . . . already ha[s] been made public through an official and documented disclosure."

The District Court for the District of Columbia has explained how the factors work in the Glomar context:

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103 James Madison Project, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 22, 29-30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (further noting that D.C. Circuit "has provided guidance on this issue in two types of cases: (1) where the existence of responsive records is plain on the face of the official statement, e.g., Wolf, 473 F.3d [370, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007)], and (2) where the substance of an official statement and the context in which it is made permits the inescapable inference that the requested records in fact exist, e.g., ACLU, 710 F.3d at 422").

104 Id. (holding that "none of [the President's] statements or tweets acknowledge the existence of the Synopsis, let alone that he received a copy of it from the FBI," and further that "it does not follow that just because a tweet is an 'official' statement of the President that its substance is necessarily grounded in information contained in government records").


106 ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see e.g., Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Rosenberg v. DOD, 342 F. Supp. 3d 62, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2018) (same); ACLU v. DOD, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 480-81 (holding that although CIA's broader Glomar was not justified a result of official disclosure, court would give CIA opportunity to "assess whether a more targeted Glomar submission may viably be made," because several of ACLU's requests "seek much more specific (and comprehensive) data and records than [the broad information officially disclosed]"); N.Y. Times v. CIA, 314 F. Supp. 3d 519, 527, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that (1) President's "tweet does not confirm the existence of records being requested let alone the program"; (2) President's "statements [to a media outlet] are similarly ambiguous and lack the requisite specificity to be considered an official acknowledgment"; and (3) even if President's "statements officially acknowledge the existence of a covert program to arm and train Syrian rebels, . . . a general acknowledgment of the existence of a program alone does not wholesale waive an agency's ability to invoke Glomar where certain aspects of the program remain undisclosed").
The D.C. Circuit consistently has applied Fitzgibbon's three prongs to evaluate a claim of "official acknowledgment" in the Glomar context. That said, the three prongs of the Fitzgibbon test are not as differentiated in the Glomar context as they are with respect to a withheld document's contents. As the court explained in Wolf: "In the Glomar context . . . if the prior disclosure establishes the existence (or not) of records responsive to the FOIA request, the prior disclosure necessarily matches both the information at issue—the existence of records—and the specific request for that information." In other words, in the Glomar context, the first and second prongs of Fitzgibbon merge into one and the third prong continues to operate independently. Ultimately, then, to overcome an agency's Glomar response when relying on an official acknowledgement, "the requesting plaintiff must pinpoint an agency record that both matches the plaintiff's request and has been publicly and officially acknowledged by the agency."  

For the purposes of this test, courts have held that another agency's statements may not constitute an official acknowledgment. The Second Circuit has found, however, that another agency's disclosures could "bear on the [agency's] position that the mere acknowledgment that it does or does not have possession of documents . . . would harm the national security."  

In a decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia addressing a challenge to compliance with the Executive Order's procedural requirements, the court found that Glomar responses are "intangible forms of classified information that only arise in the context of a response to a request for records." Because an agency is not required to create or maintain a tangible record in response to a FOIA request, the court held that an agency "is not required to establish a declassification timeline in order to properly classify[ ] a Glomar fact." For this particular situation, the court held "that the requirement . . . to establish a declassification timeline is not an absolute prerequisite  

107 James Madison Project, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 21 (internal citations omitted).

108 See, e.g., Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (holding that district court did not err in ruling there had been no official acknowledgment of the document because "[d]isclosure by one federal agency does not waive another agency's right to assert a FOIA exemption" (citing Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Nat'l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 289 (D.D.C. 2012) (same); Valfells v. CIA, 717 F. Supp. 2d 110, 118 (D.D.C. 2010) (determining that disclosure by another agency does not constitute official acknowledgment).

109 Florez v. CIA, 829 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2016) (remanding to District Court where case subsequently settled).


111 Id. at 50.
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Exemption 1

to classifying information." (For declassification requirements see Duration of Classification and Declassification, above).

Compilation of Information

Executive Order 13,526 recognizes that compilations of information maintained by the government, that are themselves unclassified, may be classified "if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that meets the standards for classification under this order [and] is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information." This concept has been widely recognized by courts in Exemption 1 cases.

Relationally, courts have recognized protection for information using a "mosaic theory" approach that considers the consequences of piecing together information

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112 Id.

113 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(e).

114 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. ODNI, 281 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that "unclassified and declassified information in the classified report may maintain a TOP SECRET classification" upon compilation; Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "[w]hen a pattern of responses itself reveals classified information, the only way to keep secrets is to maintain silence uniformly") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. DOD, 831 F.2d 441, 444-45 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing validity of "compilation" theory, and ruling that certain "information harmless in itself might be harmful when disclosed in context") (decided under Executive Order 12,356); Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding classification of compilation of information on army combat units) (decided under Executive Order 12,065); Loomis v. DOE, No. 96-149, 1999 WL 33541935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1999) (finding that safety measures regarding nuclear facilities set forth in manuals and lay-out plans contain highly technical information and that "such information in the aggregate could reveal sensitive aspects of operations") (decided under Executive Order 12,958), summary affirmance granted, 21 F. App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2001); Billington v. DOJ, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that "aggregate result does not have to be self-evident" to qualify for Exemption 1 protection) (decided under Executive Order 12,958), summary judgment granted in pertinent part, 69 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part & remanded on other grounds, 233 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

maintained by the government with information in the public domain. Particularly in national security contexts, courts have recognized that "[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context." Put another way, "'bits and pieces' of data may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when

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116 See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that information that "seems innocuous in the context of what is already known by the public . . . may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (acknowledging "mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering") (decided under Executive Order 12,065); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that "[e]ach individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself" and that "[w]hen combined with other small leads, the [information] could well prove useful for identifying a covert transaction"); Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. Dep't of State, 296 F. Supp. 3d 73, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2017) (accepting State Department's Mosaic argument that "someone knowledgeable of the complex web of U.S. diplomatic relations with other countries could look at a gap in the alphabetical list and predict with a high degree of certainty the country that would fill the gap," and discussing Mosaic approach for other records at issue) (decided under Executive Order 13,526); ACLU v. ODNI, No. 10-4419, 2011 WL 5563520, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) (explaining that releasing case numbers containing geographical prefix "could allow a hostile analyst to create a 'partial mosaic' of the specific intelligence activity, leading to the exposure of actual current activities or methods.") (decided under Executive Order 13,526); Edmonds v. DOJ, 405 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2005) (upholding the agency's Mosaic argument and finding that "[w]hen combined with plaintiff counsel's notes, . . . the five government-withheld documents could prove useful for identifying information gathering methods and activities") (decided under Executive Order 12,968, as amended); ACLU v. DOJ, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.D.C. 2004) (applying Mosaic approach and adopting FBI's explanation that disclosure of statistics, which on their face may appear innocuous, would be harmful to national security when coupled with "information that has already been placed in the public domain (through statutory disclosures, media accounts, etc.") (decided under Executive Order 12,958); Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2003) (accepting that "some information required classification because it was intertwined with the sensitive matters at the heart of the case" and that "in view of the information relevant to this matter that is already in the public arena, they would tend to reveal matters of national security even though the sensitivity of the information may not be readily apparent in isolation") (decided under Executive Order 12,958).

the individual piece is not of obvious importance itself." As a result, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that Exemption 1 "bars the court from prying loose from the government even the smallest bit of information that is properly classified." 

**Waiver of Exemption 1 Protection**

Several courts have addressed the issue of whether an agency has waived its ability to invoke Exemption 1 as a result of prior disclosure of similar or related information. In this regard, courts have held that, in making an argument of waiver through some prior public disclosure, a FOIA "plaintiff bears the burden of identifying specific information that is already in the public domain due to official disclosure." 

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118 Brennan Ctr. for Justice, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)); Shapiro v. CIA, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (same); ACLU v. DOD, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 371 n.4 (same); ACLU v. DOJ, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (same) quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 37); see also ACLU v. ODNI, No. 10-4419, 2011 WL 5563520, at *11 (explaining that "[m]inor details of intelligence information may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests").

119 Abbotts v. NRC, 766 F.2d 604, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (decided under Executive Order 12,356) (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

120 See, e.g., Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that FOIA plaintiff must show that previous disclosure duplicates specificity of withheld material to establish waiver of exemptions, and determining that CIA’s prior disclosure of some intelligence methods employed in Cuba does not waive use of exemptions for all such methods); Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that disclosure made by employee of agency other than agency from which information is sought is not official and thus does not constitute waiver); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65, 71 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling against waiver and rejecting contention that public availability of some information about Terrorist Surveillance Program diminishes government’s argument for classification of remaining information); Azmy v. DOD, 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that although much may now be known by the public about subject, there has been no indication that this specific information has been disclosed); Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 140 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that foreign nation’s knowledge of past U.S. intelligence activities creates general waiver of all intelligence activities related to that nation).

121 Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App’x 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that "burden is on the requester to point to specific information in the public domain that 'appears to duplicate that being withheld' (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C Cir. 2007) (ruling against waiver because plaintiff could not "point to specific information that was previously released and is now withheld"); James Madison Project v. NARA, No. 02-5089, 2002 WL 31296220, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2002) (affirming that the "party claiming that public disclosure prevents withholding the same information bears the burden of showing that the specific information at issue has been officially disclosed"); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reaffirming that burden is on requester and rejecting
Courts have carefully distinguished between a bona fide declassification action or official release on the one hand and an unsubstantiated speculation lacking official confirmation on the other,\(^\text{122}\) refusing to consider classified information to be in the public domain unless it has been officially disclosed.\(^\text{123}\) Courts have also rejected the view that plaintiff's waiver claim as "speculation" where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that specific information had been released into public domain; Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130 (holding that plaintiff bears "the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld"); Nat'l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. v. CIA, 402 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (D.D.C. 2005) (ruling that plaintiff's "bald assertion" of public disclosure interests do not satisfy waiver standard); Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 237 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that plaintiff failed to show that information was in public domain when it merely pointed to other publicly available documents dealing with same general subject matter).


\(^{123}\) See, e.g., Frugone, 169 F.3d at 775 (holding that letter from OPM advising plaintiff that his employment records were in CIA custody is not "tantamount to an official statement of the CIA"); Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that "an agency official does not waive FOIA exemption 1 by publicly discussing the general subject matter of documents which are otherwise properly exempt from disclosure under that exemption"); Abbotts, 766 F.2d at 607 (reasoning that even if the withheld data were the same as an estimate in the public domain, that is not the same as knowing the NRC's official policy as to the "proper level of threat a nuclear facility should guard against"); Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130-31 (observing that a foreign government can ignore "[u]nofficial leaks and public surmise . . . but official acknowledgment may force a government to retaliate"); ACLU v. DOJ, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 300 n.6 (D.D.C. 2011) (declaring that "unauthorized disclosure of classified facts does not officially disclose those facts"); Hiken v. DOD, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (ruling that agency not required to give "official confirmation" that information in public domain is classified); Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 49 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that anonymous leak of information concerning FBI counterterrorism activities did not prevent agency from invoking exemption, because disclosures in tandem would amount to official confirmation of authenticity); Rubin v. CIA, No. 01 CIV 2274, 2001 WL 1537706, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2001) (finding that plaintiff's mere showing that some private publication alleged that CIA maintained files on subject was not evidence of official disclosure and, therefore, agency's Glomar position was not defeated); Schlesinger v. CIA, 591 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D.D.C. 1984) (rejecting contention that CIA prepublication review of former employees' books and articles serves as an official disclosure); cf. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989) (commenting that retired senior naval officer who was "no longer serving with an executive branch department cannot continue to disclose official agency policy" and "cannot establish what is agency policy").
widespread reports in the media about the general subject matter involved are sufficient to overcome an agency's Exemption 1 claim for related records.124

Courts have also addressed the situation where a government agency releases limited information on a subject while retaining additional information on the same subject as classified.125 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that for information to be "officially acknowledged" in the context of Exemption 1, it must: (1) be "as specific as the information previously released"; (2) "match the information previously disclosed"; and (3) "have been made public through an official and documented disclosure."126 The D.C. Circuit has elaborated that [t]his test is quite strict"

124 See Azmy, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99 (finding that although much may now be known by the public about former detainee, there has been no indication that this specific information has been officially disclosed); Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ, 532 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that newspaper article generally referring to existence of records on subject is not specific enough to waive exemptions).

125 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (rejecting contention that public availability of some information about classified Terrorist Surveillance Program diminishes government’s argument for classifying remaining information); Whalen v. U.S. Marine Corps, 407 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that the defendant agency’s prior disclosures on a subject did not constitute a waiver of all information on that subject, and noting that "it seems equally as likely that the government's prior voluminous disclosures indicate diligent respect by the coordinate agencies to Executive Order 12,958 and bolster the defendant's position that it has withheld only that information which it must under the applicable exemptions").

126 Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Morley, 508 F.3d at 1124 (ruling against waiver because plaintiff did not "point to specific information that was previously released and is now withheld"); Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming the rule in Fitzgibbon and the necessity of an "insistence on exactitude" when considering potential waiver of national security information); Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a prior release of photographs similar to those withheld did not waive Exemption 1, because the fact that "some information resides in the public domain does not eliminate the possibility that further disclosures can cause harm to [national security]" (quoting Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 766)); Darui v. Dep’t of State, 798 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2011), (concluding that documents disclosed to plaintiff’s counsel under seal during his criminal trial "does not entitle the public to broad access to classified documents now"); Elec. Frontier Found., 532 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (ruling against waiver because information in public domain is not as specific as information requested). But see N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 752 F.3d 123, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying only two parts of test and stating that "matching" aspect of the test does not require absolute identity because "such a requirement would make little sense," and "[a] FOIA requester would have little need for undisclosed information if it had to match precisely information previously disclosed"); Nat’l Sec. Archive, No. 99-1160, slip op. at 15-16 (D.D.C. July 31, 2000) (ordering CIA to disclose fact that it kept biographies on seven former East European heads of state because Glomar response was waived by CIA’s 1994 admission that it kept biographies on all "heads of state" – a "clear and narrowly defined term that is not subject to multiple interpretations").
and prior disclosure of similar information does not suffice; instead, the specific information sought by the plaintiff must already be in the public domain by official disclosure.\textsuperscript{127} Applying these criteria, the D.C. Circuit has reversed a lower court's disclosure order and held that information published in a congressional report did not constitute "official acknowledgment" of the purported location of a CIA station, because the information sought related to an earlier time period than that discussed in the report.\textsuperscript{128}

In so ruling, the D.C. Circuit did not address the question of whether congressional release of the identical information relating to intelligence sources and methods could ever constitute "official acknowledgment," thus requiring disclosure under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{129} However, the D.C. Circuit had previously considered this question and had concluded that congressional publications do not constitute "official acknowledgment" for purposes of the FOIA.\textsuperscript{130}

Courts have also clarified that "disclosure by one federal agency does not waive another agency's right to assert a FOIA exemption."\textsuperscript{131} In addition, the D.C. Circuit has held that an accidental disclosure through "a simple clerical mistake" does not satisfy prong 3 of the Fitzgibbon test which requires an "official and documented" disclosure.\textsuperscript{132}

The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of waiver in a case that involved the question of whether the public congressional testimony of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq constituted a "waiver" so as to prevent the agency from invoking the FOIA's national security exemption to withhold related records.\textsuperscript{133} The district court had held—after reviewing the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{127} ACLU v. DOJ, 640 F. App’x 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\footnote{128} Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765-66.

\footnote{129} Id.

\footnote{130} See, e.g., Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that inclusion of information in Senate report "cannot be equated with disclosure by the agency itself"); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that publication of Senate report does not constitute official release of agency information); Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA, 988 F. Supp. 623, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), aff’d per curiam, 128 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1997).

\footnote{131} Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that "a foreign government also cannot waive a federal agency's right to assert a FOIA exemption").

\footnote{132} Mobley, 806 F.3d at 584.

\footnote{133} Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11 F.3d 198, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
\end{footnotes}
seven documents at issue in camera – that the public testimony had not "waived" Exemption 1 protection because the "context" of the information in the documents was sufficiently "different" so as to not "negate" their "confidentiality."\textsuperscript{134} The D. C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, grounding its own decision in the fact that the requester "conceded" it could not "meet [the] requirement that it show that [the Ambassador's] testimony was 'as specific as' the documents it [sought] in this case, or that her testimony 'match[ed]' the information contained in the documents."\textsuperscript{135} Acknowledging that such a stringent standard is a "high hurdle for a FOIA plaintiff to clear," the D.C. Circuit concluded that the government's "vital interest in information relating to the national security and foreign affairs dictates that it must be."\textsuperscript{136}

The D.C. Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise in a situation where the government had affirmatively disclosed some information about a classified matter would, in the court's view, give the agency "a strong disincentive ever to provide the citizenry with briefings of any kind on sensitive topics."\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, in an opinion following this D.C. Circuit decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the public "is better off under a system that permits [the agency] to reveal some things without revealing everything; if even a smidgen of disclosure required [the agency] to open its files, there would be no smidgens."\textsuperscript{138}

In a case decided nearly a decade later, the D.C. Circuit once again visited the issue of claimed public disclosure of classified information. The district court had rejected the plaintiff's waiver argument because the documents, while accessible, were not maintained in a public access area and were not likely to have been accessed by a researcher.\textsuperscript{139} The district court had explained that such a "remote possibility of very limited disclosure" was not the type of "widespread" official dissemination capable of defeating an Exemption 1 claim.\textsuperscript{140} Agreeing with this, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the party claiming prior disclosure


\textsuperscript{135} Pub. Citizen, 11 F.3d at 201-03.

\textsuperscript{136} Id.

\textsuperscript{137} Id.

\textsuperscript{138} Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2004); see also ACLU v. DOD, 584 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that general public comment by agency officials on same topic did not waive Exemption 1 protection for more specific information on this topic); N.Y. Times v. DOD, 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 512-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (affirming agency classification of Terrorist Surveillance Program information despite official acknowledgment that program exists). But see Wolf, 473 F.3d at 379 (remanding for determination of whether CIA Director's 1948 testimony before Congress, which was found to constitute "official acknowledgment" of "existence" of requested records, also waived exemption protection for their "contents").

\textsuperscript{139} Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 29 (D.D.C. 2000).

\textsuperscript{140} Id. at 28-29.
must point to "specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld"\textsuperscript{141} to prevent the defendant agency from unrealistically having to bear "the task of proving the negative."\textsuperscript{142} The D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet this burden, and it dismissed plaintiff’s argument that public disclosure occurred because of potential viewing of records by researchers as nothing more than "speculation."\textsuperscript{143}

**Exclusion Considerations**

Finally, the FOIA removes from the requirements of the FOIA records maintained by the FBI, which concern "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism," where the existence of such records is classified for "as long as the existence of the records remains classified information."\textsuperscript{144} (See the discussion of this provision under Exclusions, below.)

\textsuperscript{141} Pub. Citizen, 276 F.3d 634, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

\textsuperscript{142} Id. (quoting Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

\textsuperscript{143} Id.

\textsuperscript{144} 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(3) (2012 & Supp. V. 2017); see also OIP Guidance: Implementing FOIA's Statutory Exclusion Provisions (advising agencies that "given the unusual nature of the exclusion provisions, the limited circumstances in which they apply, and the relative infrequency with which they are employed, any agency considering whether to invoke an exclusion should consult first with the Office of Information Policy" to "help ensure that all aspects of the request and possible excludable records are reviewed and analyzed before determining whether use of an exclusion is warranted") (2012, updated 2/21/2019).