Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) provides protection for law enforcement information the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Exemption 7(C) is the law enforcement counterpart to the privacy protection afforded under Exemption 6. (See Exemption 6 for discussions of the primary privacy-protection principles that apply to both exemptions.)

The Supreme Court has noted that the language of Exemption 7(C) "is in marked contrast to the language in Exemption 6, pertaining to 'personnel and medical files,'" with Exemption 7(C) more broadly protecting personal privacy by omitting the word "clearly" and substituting the "would constitute" standard for "could reasonably be expected to" standard. Indeed, the "strong interest' of individuals, whether they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity'" has been repeatedly recognized.

4 Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Dunkelberger v. DOJ, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that public official's privacy interest was "not insubstantial" because while public officials "may have a somewhat diminished privacy interest," public officials "do not surrender all rights to personal privacy when they accept a
In order to determine whether Exemption 7(C) protects against disclosure, courts require that agencies engage in the following four-step analysis: first, determine whether the "records or information [are] compiled for law enforcement purposes" (for further discussion of threshold requirements, see Exemption 7);5 second, determine whether there is a significant privacy interest in the requested information; third, evaluate the requester’s asserted FOIA public interest in disclosure; and finally, if there is a significant privacy interest in nondisclosure and a FOIA public interest in disclosure, balance those competing interests to determine whether disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."6 (See Exemption 6 for further discussion of four-step analysis.)

Privacy Considerations

Under the balancing test that traditionally has been applied to both Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), the agency must first identify and evaluate the nature and extent of the privacy interest implicated in the requested records.7


6 See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 746 F.3d at 1091-96 (utilizing four-step analysis to balance "not insubstantial" privacy interest against a "weighty public interest"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 394 F. Supp. 3d 111, 116-17 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting similarity of analysis to Exemption 6 except that Exemption 7(C) "establishes a lower bar for withholding material" (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 746 F.3d at 1091 n.2)).

7 See, e.g., Higgs v. U.S. Park Police, 933 F.3d 897, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding district court erred in not evaluating potential privacy interests prior to analyzing plaintiff’s public interest since the court had postulated that criminal investigation records could include information about living and deceased individuals, third parties, law enforcement personnel, and grand jurors); Associated Press v. DOD, 554 F.3d 274, 284 (2d Cir. 2009).
In the case of records related to criminal investigations, courts have long recognized, either expressly or implicitly, that "the mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation." In DOJ v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court stated, "The first question to ask in determining whether Exemption 7(C) applies is whether there is any privacy interest in the information sought.")

8 Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987)); see also Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246, 257 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that individuals associated with murder investigation have privacy interest because of possibility of embarrassment, harassment, and physical danger); Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 286-88 (finding that disclosure of Guantanamo detainees' identities, "both those who have suffered abuse and those who are alleged to have perpetrated abuse" "could subject them to embarrassment and humiliation," and whether detainees would want to voluntarily disclose information publicly is "inapposite to the privacy interests at stake"); Fabiano v. McIntyre, 146 F. App’x 549, 550 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming district court decision protecting names of persons not of investigative interest but associated with investigation of child pornography photographs); Massev v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (highlighting that disclosing identity of private persons in investigatory files "might reveal that they were suspects" which carries stigmatizing connotation); Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1981) ("real potential for harassment and intrusion"); Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("It is difficult if not impossible, to anticipate all respects in which disclosure might damage reputation or lead to personal embarrassment and discomfort." (quoting Lesar v. DOJ, 455 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D.D.C. 1978))); Kortlander v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1013 (D. Mont. 2011) (noting that "[c]ourts addressing Exemption 7(C) have found that the stigma of being associated with a law enforcement investigation, the potential for harassment and potential to prejudice law
Court placed strong emphasis on the propriety of broadly protecting the interests of private citizens whose names or identities are in a record that the government "happens to be storing."\(^9\) It subsequently recognized, in **NARA v. Favish**,\(^{10}\) that law enforcement files often contain information on individuals by "mere happenstance," and it strongly

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\(^9\) 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989); see also id. at 774-75 (declaring that "it should come as no surprise that in none of our cases construing the FOIA have we found it appropriate to order a Government agency to honor a FOIA request for information about a particular private citizen").

\(^{10}\) 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
reinforced the protection available under Exemption 7(C).\(^\text{11}\) Thus, Exemption 7(C) has been regularly applied to withhold references to persons who are merely mentioned in law enforcement files,\(^\text{12}\) as well as to persons of "investigatory interest" to a criminal law enforcement agency.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{11}\) Id. at 166 (noting that "[l]aw enforcement documents obtained by Government investigators often contain information about persons interviewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance"); see also OIP Guidance: Supreme Court Rules for "Survivor Privacy" in Favish (posted 4/9/2004).

\(^\text{12}\) See, e.g., Djenasevic v. EOUSA, No. 18-5262, 2019 WL 5390964, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2019) (per curiam) (finding agencies properly withheld identifying information about "third parties mentioned in those criminal records"); Peltier v. FBI, 563 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s determination that third parties mentioned within released records were properly withheld); Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2000) (withholding names of third parties mentioned in course of investigation); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Gabel v. IRS, 134 F.3d 377, *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (protecting third-party names in Department of Motor Vehicles computer printout included in plaintiff's IRS file); Comput. Pros. for Soc. Resp. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that release of names of any individuals who attended public meeting that attracted attention of law enforcement officials would impinge upon their privacy); Sutton v. IRS, No. 05-7177, 2007 WL 30547, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2007) (finding that third-party taxpayers and IRS personnel have interest in maintaining privacy of their personal information); Fritz v. IRS, 862 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (protecting name and address of person who purchased requester's seized car). But see Balt. Sun v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (D. Md. 2001) (rejecting protection of names and addresses of forfeited property purchasers).

\(^\text{13}\) See, e.g., Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 1164, 1186 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that district court erred "when it ruled that Exemption 7(C) does not protect a privacy interest if an individual was connected to or was of investigative interest for the 9/11 attacks"); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding names of third parties interviewed in course of investigation); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 (finding strong privacy interest in material that suggests person has at one time been subject to criminal investigation); O'Kane v. U.S. Customs Serv., 169 F.3d 1308, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (protecting home addresses of individuals whose possessions were seized by government); Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (protecting suspects' palm and fingerprints, their interviews and discussions with law enforcement officers, and photographs of former suspects and their criminal histories); Comput. Pros. for Soc. Resp., 72 F.3d at 904 (holding potential suspects would have their privacy impinged if names disclosed); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding suspects have "obvious privacy interest in not having their identities revealed"); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding third parties' privacy interests in nondisclosure "potentially greater" than those of law enforcement officers "insofar as disclosure of their names might reveal that they were suspects in criminal investigations"); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 566 (1st Cir. 1993) (reiterating "potential for harassment, reprisal or embarrassment" if FBI disclosed names of individuals investigated); Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (deciding that
Courts have found that privacy interests extend to foreign nationals in addition to private citizens. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that even a convicted defendant retains some privacy interest in the facts of his conviction, but that "those interests are weaker than for individuals who have been acquitted or whose cases have been dismissed." The D.C. Circuit has stressed that "defendants whose prosecutions ended in acquittal or dismissal have a much stronger privacy interest in controlling information concerning those prosecutions than defendants who were ultimately convicted."

"embarrassment and reputational harm" would result from disclosure of taped conversations of individuals with boss of New Orleans organized crime family); SafeCard Servs. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (protecting identities of targets of investigations); Silets v. DOJ, 945 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (protecting associates of Jimmy Hoffa who were subjects of electronic surveillance); Fund for Const. Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Recs. Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (withholding identities of persons investigated but not charged, unless "exceptional interests militate in favor of disclosure"); Garcia v. DOJ, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (protecting names, identities, addresses, and information pertaining to third parties who were of investigatory interest); Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785-86 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (withholding identities of third parties against whom SEC did not take action).

See, e.g., Graff v. FBI, 822 F. Supp. 2d 23, 34 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that "foreign nationals are entitled to the privacy protections embodied in FOIA"); see also Tuffly v. DHS, 870 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that non-citizens formerly detained by ICE pending final determination in their removal proceedings have particularly strong privacy interest in their identities).

ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter ACLU I]; accord Venkataram v. OIP, 590 F. App'x 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (determining that co-conspirator, whose charges were dismissed, "has a 'fundamental interest' in limiting the disclosure of [his criminal] information"); see Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 854 F.3d 675, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that privacy interests of individuals not convicted or not publicly linked with investigation differ greatly from those convicted or who pled guilty); cf. Shapiro v. DOJ, No. 12-313, 2020 WL 3615511, at *31 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (asserting that individuals identified as "having pled guilty" and "[parties] in a civil lawsuit have privacy interests), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 5970640, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020) (appeal pending); Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ, No. 18-1860, 2020 WL 1189091, at *7-11 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (ordering release of docket numbers for cases that resulted in convictions and upholding withholding docket numbers for cases that resulted in acquittal or dismissal); Shapiro v. CIA, 247 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that "[defendant] needs to take the public nature of his or her conviction into account when conducting the balancing" because convicted individual's privacy interest is weaker than individuals who were acquitted or whose cases were dismissed).

ACLU v. DOJ, 750 F.3d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter ACLU II]; see also Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ, No. 18-1860, 2020 WL 1189091, at *9 (D.D.C.
Courts have found that booking photos or "mug shots" may be properly withheld under Exemption 7(C). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press Inc. v. DOJ explained that "[b]ooking photos – snapped 'in the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately after [an individual is] accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties' – fit squarely within [the] realm of embarrassing and humiliating information." The court explained that "[m]ore than just 'vivid symbol[s] of criminal accusation,' booking photos convey guilt to the viewer," and it found that a "disclosed booking photo casts a long, damaging shadow over the depicted individual."

The identities of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel referenced in investigatory files are also routinely withheld, usually for reasons similar to those described by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:

One who serves his state or nation as a career public servant is not thereby stripped of every vestige of personal privacy, even with respect to the discharge of his official duties. Public identification of any of these individuals could conceivably subject them to harassment and annoyance in the conduct of their official duties and in their private lives.

Mar. 12, 2020 (releasing docket numbers for cases that resulted in conviction but not for those that resulted in acquittal or dismissal).

17 See Detroit Free Press Inc. v. DOJ, 829 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that individuals have privacy interest in preventing disclosure of their booking photos under Exemption 7(C)); World Publ'g Co. v. DOJ, 672 F.3d 825, 827-32 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that agency properly withheld mug shots after balancing sensitive nature of such photographs with requester's failure to show how release would inform public about operations of government); Karantsalis v. DOJ, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (same).

18 829 F.3d at 482 (quoting Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503).

19 Id.

20 Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); see, e.g., Hulstein v. DEA, 671 F.3d 690, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2012) (protecting names and signatures of DEA agents); Moore v. Obama, No. 09-5072, 2009 WL 2762827, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2009) (per curiam) (protecting names and a phone number of FBI employees); Fabiano v. McIntyre, 146 F. App'x 549, 550 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming withholding of names and telephone numbers of FBI Special Agent, FBI support employees, and non-FBI federal employee); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1999) (protecting identities of nonfederal law enforcement officers); Manna v. DOJ, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding law enforcement officers have substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of names, particularly when requester held high position in La Cosa Nostra); Davis v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that "undercover agents" have protectable privacy interests); Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1981) ("It is not necessary that
Moreover, agencies’ redaction of the identities of law enforcement personnel who perform clerical or administrative duties with respect to requested records are routinely upheld as courts recognize that the access these employees have to information regarding official law enforcement investigations creates a unique privacy interest. Indeed, courts have held that identities of both clerical personnel and investigators are properly withheld as a routine matter under Exemption 7(C), even when they take part in a highly publicized harassment rise to the level of endangering physical safety before the protections of 7(C) can be invoked.”; Stahl v. DOJ, No. 19-4142, 2021 WL 1163154, at *8 n. 7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (finding privacy interest in visual depiction of BOP staff providing involuntary medical treatment to inmate convicted of terrorism because "[t]he staff here face more than harassment and embarrassment – they face reprisals and retaliation"); Sai v. TSA, 315 F. Supp. 3d 218, 262 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding TSA properly redacted local law enforcement identifying information); Rojas-Vega v. USCIS, 132 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding protection of "phone numbers, email addresses, names, signatures, and initials of . . . INS agents" appropriate), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); O’Keefe v. DOD, 463 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (protecting identities of DOD investigators); cf. Lissner v. U.S. Customs Serv., 241 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding disclosure of physical description of state law enforcement officers does not implicate privacy interests because agency already released officers’ identities); Fowlkes v. ATF, 139 F. Supp. 3d 287, 293 (D.D.C. 2015) (determining name of judge presiding over grand jury must be disclosed as Exemption 7(C) does not afford such broad protection).

21 See, e.g., Burke v. EOUSA, No. 15-1151, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44854, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2018) (finding names of FBI support personnel withholdable because defendant adequately explained privacy interests at stake and plaintiff did not contest withholdings); Rojas-Vega, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 20 (finding withholding "the names, email addresses and phone numbers of . . . government employees who performed administrative, clerical, or support functions" appropriate); Council on Am.-Islamic Rel. v. FBI, 749 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1120-21 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (upholding agency’s redaction of support personnel); Skinner v. DOJ, 744 F. Supp. 2d 185, 210-11 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that names and identification of law enforcement support staff were properly withheld); Fischer v. DOJ, 596 F. Supp. 2d 34, 47 (D.D.C. 2009) (upholding Exemption 7(C) to protect agency employees, including support personnel, as "[t]he D.C. Circuit has consistently held that Exemption 7(C) protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records"); see also Schotz v. DOJ, No. 14-1212, 2016 WL 1588491, at *5 (D.D.C. April 20, 2016) (determining direct office and cellular phone number of BOP attorney was properly redacted).
investigation.22 Likewise, courts customarily protect direct contact information for law enforcement investigators and administrative personnel.23

22 See Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding protection of investigators' names); Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d 964, 977-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding names of FBI agents involved in investigation of crash of TWA Flight 800 were protected from disclosure and noting "courts have recognized that agents retain an interest in keeping private their involvement in investigations of especially controversial events"); Anderson v. BOP, No. 18-617, 2018 WL 6573282, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2018) (noting that "[t]he D.C. Circuit has consistently held that exemption 7(C) protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records, including investigators . . ." (quoting Lewis v. DOJ, 609 F. Supp. 2d 80, 84 (D.D.C. 2009))); Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 204, 216-17 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that "government investigators and employees 'have a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of matters that conceivably could subject them to annoyance or harassment in either their official or private lives'" (quoting Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); Wichlacz v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 938 F. Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. Va. 1996) (protecting names of Park Police officers who investigated suicide of former Deputy White House Counsel, as well as psychiatrists who were listed on paper found in his wallet, because disclosure would cause "onslaught of media attention" and could cause camera crews to "besiege" their workplaces and homes), aff'd per curiam, 114 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Stone v. FBI, 727 F. Supp. 662, 663 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990) (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and clerical employees who participated in investigation of assassination of Robert F. Kennedy), aff'd per curiam, No. 90-5065, 1990 WL 134431 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1990); cf. Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that agency had not adequately defended categorical rule for withholding identities of low-level FBI Special Agents under Exemption 6).

23 See Ecological Rts. Found. v. EPA, No. 19-980, 2021 WL 535725, at *28 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2021) (protecting personal security detail agents' email addresses because they have a "substantial privacy interest in their direct contact information"); Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Mueller, 453 F. Supp. 3d 139, 156-58 (D.D.C. 2020) (upholding redactions of names and contact information for Special Counsel's Office personnel and other law enforcement personnel due to sensitive and high-profile nature of records) (Exemption 6 & 7(C)); Schotz, 2016 WL 1588491, at *5 (determining direct office and cellular phone number of BOP attorney was properly redacted); Rojas-Vega, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 20 (protecting phone numbers and email addresses of INS agents and support staff). Compare Sai I, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 262-63 (holding that TSA did not show there was a substantial privacy interest in certain clerical and administrative employees' contact information as well as employee names and contact information in policy documents) (Exemption 6), with Sai v. TSA, 466 F. Supp. 3d 35, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2020) (withholding names and contact information under Exemption 6 as agency declaration identified "position held by the relevant employee, the role played by that employee, the substance of the underlying agency action, [and] the nature of the agency record at issue" (quoting Sai I, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 262)).
Courts routinely have found protectable privacy interests in the identities of individuals who provide information to law enforcement agencies. Consequently, the names of witnesses and other identifying information have been held properly protectable under Exemption 7(C). Courts have generally found that trial testimony does not

24 See, e.g., Stalcup v. CIA, 768 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding significant privacy interest in identity of eyewitness who provided information to FBI because their privacy interest is "at its apex" when he or she is involved in a law enforcement investigation); Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (protecting informants' identities); Schiffer v. FBI, 78 F.3d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (protecting names of persons who provided information to FBI); Comput. Pros. for Soc. Resp., 72 F.3d at 904-05 (protecting names of informants, including name of company that reported crime to police, because disclosure might permit identification of corporate officer who reported crime); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1994) (protecting informants' identities); McCutchen v. HHS, 30 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (protecting names of individuals alleging scientific misconduct); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1993) (protecting identities of witnesses and third parties involved in criminal investigation of maritime disaster); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (declaring that disclosure of names of cooperating witnesses and third parties, including cooperating law enforcement officials, could subject them to "embarrassment and harassment"); Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 1479, 1489 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding privacy interest in disclosure of source's identity because disclosure "might subject [source] to unnecessary questioning or harassment by those who look unfavorably upon law enforcement officials or by private litigants in civil suits incidentally related to the investigation"); KTVY-TV, a Div. of Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (withholding interviewees' names as "necessary to avoid harassment and embarrassment"); Cleary v. FBI, 811 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding disclosure would subject "sources to unnecessary questioning concerning the investigation [and] to subpoenas issued by private litigants in civil suits incidentally related to the investigation"); Cuccaro v. Sec'y of Lab., 770 F.2d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "privacy interest of . . . witnesses who participated in OSHA's investigation outweighs public interest in disclosure"). But see Cooper Cameron Corp. v. OSHA, 280 F.3d 539, 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (rebuffing idea of retaliation against employees who gave statements to OSHA investigator, and ordering disclosure of source-identifying content of statements in part because identifiable employee-witnesses' names already had been released in separate civil proceeding and there was no evidence of retaliation by employer against employee-witnesses in course of civil proceeding).

25 See Sorin v. DOJ, 758 F. App’x 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (upholding agency protection of names, professional history, educational history, and financial information of potential witnesses in criminal investigation and employees not interviewed during internal investigation of company that were later acquired by federal government for criminal investigation); Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975-77 (reversing district court and holding that eyewitnesses in investigation of crash of TWA Flight 800 have cognizable privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names to avoid unwanted contact by plaintiff and other entities); Coulter v. Reno, 153 F.3d 605, *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (protecting names of witnesses and of requester's accusers); Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (protecting notes and phone messages concerning witnesses); L&C Marine Transp., Ltd. v. United States, 740 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "employee-
eliminate Exemption 7(C) protection. 26 Similarly, courts have found privacy protection for individuals identified as potential witnesses. 27

witnesses . . . have a substantial privacy interest”); Antonelli v. Sullivan, 732 F.2d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“[The requester] has mentioned no legitimate need for the witnesses’ phone numbers, and we can well imagine the invasions of privacy that would result should he obtain them.”); Jarvis v. ATF, No. 07-00111, 2008 WL 2620741, at *12 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (protecting "names and specifics of those who gave evidence in the investigation" due to risk of "impassioned acts of retaliation directed by Plaintiff through the agency of others, even though he is now in prison"); Farese v. DOJ, 683 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D.D.C. 1987) (protecting names and number of family members of participants in Witness Security Program, as well as funds authorized to each, because disclosure "would pose a possible danger to the persons named" or "might subject those persons to harassment"). But see Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 545, 554 (holding names of three employee-witnesses exempt yet ordering release of source-identifying content of their statements).

26 See Hawkins v. DEA, 347 F. App’x 223, 225 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that testifying at requester’s trial "did not wholly extinguish [witnesses’] privacy interests"); Jones, 41 F.3d at 247 (holding fact that law enforcement employee chose to testify or was required to testify or otherwise come forward in other settings does not amount to waiver of personal privacy); Burge v. Eastburn, 934 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming refusal, under Exemption 7(C), to confirm or deny existence of information in FBI files regarding individuals who testified at plaintiff’s murder trial); Black v. DOJ, 69 F. Supp. 3d 26, 37 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding testifying witness had “compelling privacy interest” in records concerning that testimony), aff’d No. 14-5256, 2015 WL 6128830, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2015) (per curiam); Melville v. DOJ, No. 05-0645, 2006 WL 2927575, at *9 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2006) (emphasizing that privacy interest of law enforcement personnel or other third parties mentioned in responsive records is not diminished by fact they may have testified at trial); Boyd v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 99-2712, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25921, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that plaintiff’s assertion that informant and others who testified at his criminal trial waived their right to privacy by testifying is “simply wrong”). But see Linn v. DOJ, No. 92-1406, 1997 WL 577586, at *5 (D.D.C. May 29, 1997) (finding no justification for withholding identities of witnesses who testified against requester at trial) (Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F)).

27 See Sorin, 758 F. App’x at 33 (mentioning substantial privacy interest in professional, educational, and financial information of potential witnesses obtained in criminal investigation); Stalcup, 768 F.3d at 73 (emphasizing that the “mere possibility of being called as a witness” does not mean privacy is abdicated); Kowal v. DOJ, 490 F. Supp. 3d 53, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2020) (protecting names of potential witnesses in ATF investigatory records); North v. DOJ, 774 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that agency properly withheld names of potential witnesses in grand jury proceeding); Rosenglick v. IRS, No. 97-747, 1998 WL 773629, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1998) (“the chance of revealing the names of potential witnesses . . . counsels against forced disclosure”).
Moreover, courts have repeatedly recognized that the passage of time will not ordinarily diminish the privacy protection afforded by Exemption 7(C). This has been found even in instances in which the information was obtained through past law enforcement investigations that are now viewed critically by the public.

Relatedly, in Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court found that substantial privacy interests can exist in personal information even though the information has been made available to the general public at some place and point in time. Applying a

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28 See, e.g., Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Confidentiality interests cannot be waived through . . . the passage of time."); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256 (deciding that passage of forty-nine years does not negate individual's privacy interest); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 566 n.21 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding effect of passage of time upon individual's privacy interests to be "simply irrelevant when a FOIA requestor is unable to suggest any public interest in the disclosure of names that would reveal what the government is up to"); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that passage of more than thirty years irrelevant when records reveal nothing about government activities); Keys v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 337, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that passage of forty years did not "dilute the privacy interest as to tip the balance the other way"); Stone v. FBI, 727 F. Supp. 662, 663 n.1 664 (D.D.C. 1990) (explaining that FBI Special Agents who participated in investigation over twenty years earlier, even one as well known as RFK assassination, "have earned the right to be 'left alone' unless an important public interest outweighs that right"); cf. Schrecker v. DOJ, 349 F.3d 657, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Schrecker II] (approving FBI's use of "100-year rule," which presumes that individual is dead if birthdate appeared in documents responsive to request and was more than 100 years old, to determine if subject of requested record is still alive and has privacy interest). But see Davin v. DOJ, 60 F.3d 1043, 1058 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that for some individuals, privacy interest may become diluted by passage of over sixty years, though under certain circumstances potential for embarrassment and harassment may endure).

29 See King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming district court finding that "McCarthy era" investigation strengthened third-party privacy interests); Campbell v. DOJ, 193 F. Supp. 2d 29, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that "the persons who were involved in [investigation of 1960s writer and civil rights activist] deserve protection of their reputations as well as recognition that they were simply doing a job that the cultural and political climate at the time dictated"); Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("The target of a McCarthy era investigation may . . . deserve greater protection, because the connection to such an investigation might prove particularly embarrassing or damaging.").

30 DOJ v. Reps. Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770-71 (1989) (finding "substantial" privacy interest in rap sheets even though they contain information previously disclosed to public); accord Lane v. Dep't of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that "notions of privacy in the FOIA exemption context encompass information already revealed to the public"); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 296-97 (noting that "[c]onfidentiality interests cannot be waived through prior disclosure or the passage of time").
"practical obscurity" standard, the Supreme Court observed that if such items of information actually "were 'freely available,' there would be no reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to [them]." In fact, the "practical obscurity" concept embraced by the Supreme Court expressly recognizes that the passage of time may actually increase the privacy interest at stake when disclosure would revive information that was once public knowledge but has long since faded from memory. There have been times, however,

31 See Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 757-71 (recognizing certain events may "have been wholly forgotten," and noting that information in requested compilation, even though publicly available in various places, was "hard-to-obtain" and "web of federal statutory and regulatory provisions" limited its disclosure).

32 Id. at 764; see also Eil v. DEA, 878 F.3d 392, 400 (1st Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that privacy interests of convicted physician’s living former patients did not diminish due to prior introduction of records as trial exhibits); Prison Legal News v. EOUSA, 628 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding "strong privacy interest" in video and photographs where "images are no longer available to the public; they were displayed only twice (once at each [defendant’s] trial); only those physically present in the court room were able to view the images; and the images were never reproduced for public consumption beyond those trials"); Fiduccia v. DOJ, 185 F.3d 1035, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting FBI records reflecting information that is also available in "various courthouses"); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that clear privacy interest exists with respect to names, addresses, and other identifying information, even if already available in publicly recorded filings (citing DOD v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994) (Exemption 6))); McGehee v. DOJ, 800 F. Supp. 2d 220, 233 n.6 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting "it is clear that in our Circuit a privacy interest may be implicated by 'practically obscure' information"); Harrison v. EOUSA, 377 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting names and addresses of criminal defendants; case captions and numbers; attorney names and addresses; and case initiation, disposition, and sentencing dates even though information could be found by searches of public records); Billington v. DOJ, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that "agency is not compelled to release information just because it may have been disclosed previously"), aff’d in pertinent part, 233 F.3d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 30 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding third party’s privacy interest not extinguished because public may be aware he was target of investigation).

33 See Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 767 ("[O]ur cases have also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even where the information may have been at one time public."); accord Rose v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that "a person’s privacy may be as effectively infringed by reviving dormant memories as by imparting new information") (Exemption 6), aff’d, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DHS, 736 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding "that the passage of time has not diluted the privacy interest at stake and, if anything, has actually increased [the] privacy interest as the events surrounding the . . . prosecution have faded from memory"); Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr., Inc. v. CIA, 903 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that passage of thirty or forty years "may actually increase privacy interests, and that even a modest privacy interest will suffice" to protect identities); cf. NARA v.
when courts have found that the information at issue was not "practically obscure." 34 (For further discussion, see Exemption 6, Information in the Public Domain and Practical Obscurity. )

Courts have held that an individual's Exemption 7(C) privacy interest likewise is not extinguished merely because requesters might, on their own, be able to "piece together" the identities of third parties whose names have been protected. 35 Similarly,

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34 ACLU I, 655 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that "unlike the rap sheet information in Reporters Committee," docket information compiled into single list by agency from cases pertaining to various individuals was "not practically obscure" on grounds that docket information contained only small amount of information regarding individual's criminal history rather than compilation, there was no "web of statutory or regulatory policies obscuring that information," and no "logistical difficulty in gathering" the information); Gawker Media, LLC v. FBI, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108-12 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (requiring release of names mentioned in investigation of tape recording, made publicly available at one point in time); CNA Holdings, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 07-2084, 2008 WL 2002050, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2008) (ordering production of documents when plaintiff demonstrated that documents at issue were filed in courthouse and DOJ failed to show that documents were no longer publicly available); Lardner v. DOJ, No. 03-0180, 2005 WL 758267, at *17 n.30 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (rejecting agency argument that names of unsuccessful pardon applicants were analogous to rap sheets in Reporters Committee and finding "[i]t would stretch Reporters Comm, well past recognition to apply it to a case where information is sought that does not compile sensitive information, but might only remind one of public but sensitive information") (Exemption 6).

35 Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Carpenter v. DOJ, 470 F.3d 434, 440 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that privacy interest of subject is not terminated even if his identity as an informant could arguably be determined from another source); Ford v. West, 149 F.3d 1190, *3(10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (holding fact that requester obtained some information through other channels does not change privacy protection under FOIA); L&C Marine Transp., Ltd. v. United States, 740 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1984) ("An individual does not lose his privacy interest under 7(C) because his identity . . . may be discovered through other means."); Butler v. Dep't of Lab., 316 F. Supp. 3d 330, 336 n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that witnesses' names and addresses should be released because they "almost certainly' already [had] been identified by name in discovery in [individual's] wrongful death case, and many have been deposed"); Laws, Comm. for C.R. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 07-2590, 2008 WL 4482855, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding one's privacy interest in potentially embarrassing information is not lost "by the possibility that someone could reconstruct that data from public files"); Schoenman v. FBI, 573 F. Supp. 2d 119, 149 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Plaintiff's claim that he personally 'knows' that the individual at issue would not object to the release of his name is legally irrelevant."); Master v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (D.D.C. 1996) (protecting subjects of investigative interest even though plaintiffs allegedly know their names),
courts have found that publicity regarding a matter does not eliminate privacy interests in preventing further disclosures\textsuperscript{36} or preventing disclosures of related information.\textsuperscript{37} Courts have further held that an inadvertent failure to redact information regarding a third party does not eliminate the individual's privacy interest.\textsuperscript{38}

36 See, e.g., Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding fact that CIA or FBI may have released information about individual elsewhere does not diminish individual's "substantial privacy interests"); Bast v. DOJ, 665 F.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that previous publicity amounting to "journalistic speculation" cannot "vitiate the FOIA privacy exemption"); Berger v. IRS, 487 F. Supp. 2d 482, 502 (D.N.J. 2007) (finding that agency's prior release of list of third parties' names contacted during investigation does not allow for further disclosure of identifying information), aff'd on other grounds, 288 F. App'x 829, 834 (3d Cir. 2008); Swope v. DOJ, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that individual's awareness that telephone conversation is being monitored does not negate privacy rights in further disclosure of personal information); Odle v. DOJ, No. 05-2711, 2006 WL 1344813, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) (finding that public's knowledge of subject's involvement in trial does not eliminate any privacy interest in further disclosure); Thomas v. Off. of U.S. Att'y for E. Dist. of N.Y., 928 F. Supp. 245, 250 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that despite public disclosure of some information about attorney's connection with crime family, he still retains privacy interests in preventing further disclosure). But cf. Grove v. CIA, 752 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 1990) (ordering FBI to further explain Exemption 7(C) withholdings in light of highly publicized nature of investigation and fact that CIA and Secret Service released other records pertaining to same individuals).

37 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 171 (holding that "the fact that other pictures had been made public [does not] detract[] from the weighty privacy interests" in remaining pictures); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. NARA, 876 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (determining "distinct" privacy interest in contents of subject's investigation files although existence of Independent Counsel investigation into subject was public knowledge); Karanta\lis v. DOJ, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that agency's publishing of driver's license photograph did not eliminate individual's privacy interest in his mug shot); Kimberlin v. DOJ, 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reasoning that merely because subject of investigation acknowledged existence of investigation – thus precluding Glomar response – does not constitute waiver of subject's interest in keeping contents of OPR report confidential); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that "public availability" of accused FBI Special Agent's name does not defeat privacy protection in substance of FBI's internal investigation); Parker v. DOJ, 214 F. Supp. 3d 79, 88 (D.D.C. 2016) (determining former AUSA and other named individuals retained a substantial privacy interest in undisclosed records related to OPR investigation even if certain other information had been publicly disclosed).

38 See, e.g., Broward Bulldog, Inc., 939 F.3d at 1186 (explaining that agency errors in redacting information do not undermine application of Exemption 7(C)); Canning v. DOJ, 567 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that agency's inadvertent failure to redact does not strip third party of privacy interests); Billington v. DOJ, 69 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137
Courts have found that death diminishes, but might not eliminate, an individual’s privacy interest. The D.C. Circuit approved the FBI’s methods for determining whether individuals are presumed living or dead in Schrecker v. DOJ. As described in Schrecker, the FBI took several steps to determine whether an individual mentioned in a record was alive or dead, including looking up the individual’s name in Who Was Who, employing its "100-year rule" (which presumes that an individual is dead if their birthdate appears in the responsive documents and they would be over 100 years old), reviewing previous FOIA requests (institutional knowledge), searching the Social Security Death Index (when the social security number appears in the responsive documents), and utilizing other "internal" sources. When these methods failed to reveal that an individual was alive, the FBI utilized other means to determine their status.

(D.D.C. 1999) (deciding that disclosure of unredacted records due to administrative error did not "diminish the magnitude of the privacy interests of the individuals" involved).


40 349 F.3d at 663-65 (pointing to FBI’s use of online database Who Was Who; 100-year rule; previous FOIA requests; "internal sources;" and Social Security Death Index searches where individual's social security number appeared in responsive records as reasonable search methods); see also Davis v. DOJ, 460 F.3d 92, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (clarifying that court’s holding in Schrecker II did not purport to affirm any set of search methodologies as per se sufficient); Johnson v. EOUSA, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (approving agency’s inquiries concerning subject of request, and refusing to establish "brightline set of steps for an agency" to determine whether he or she is living or dead).

41 Schrecker II, 349 F.3d at 663-66.
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deceased, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FBI’s use of Exemption 7(C).42 In Davis v. DOJ,43
the D.C. Circuit analyzed a request for audiotapes and determined that the steps outlined
in Schrecker were insufficient when analyzing the tapes, as there is "virtually no chance
that a speaker will announce" any personal identifiers during an oral conversation.44 The
court concluded that in determining whether an agency has made a reasonable effort to
ascertain whether an individual is deceased, courts must consider several factors,
specifically "the likelihood that it will yield the sought-after information, the existence of
readily available alternatives, and the burden of employing those alternatives."45

In Schoenman v. FBI, the District Court for the District of Columbia analyzed a
situation where the Navy was unable to ascertain whether certain individuals were alive
or dead, and found that the agency had taken reasonable steps in compliance with D.C.
Circuit precedent to determine whether these individuals were deceased, and so
appropriately protected their identities.46 The court noted that the Navy explained that

42 Id. at 665; accord Frankenberry v. FBI, 567 F. App’x 120, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding
that FBI made reasonable efforts to determine life status of individuals upon whose behalf it
claimed privacy interest by "cross-referencing information from prior FOIA requests and
internal records"); Shapiro, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 66 (relying on Schrecker II to determine FBI
met its obligation to determine "life status" by checking names "against a current list of
deceased individuals" and using "information within the file itself"); Piper v. DOJ, 428 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2006) (relying on Schrecker II to find FBI’s use of the 100-year rule
as reasonable), aff’d, 222 F. App’x 1, 1 (D. C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Peltier v. FBI, No. 03-
905, 2005 WL 735964, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005) (finding FBI made reasonable
efforts to determine life status via methods expounded in Schrecker II); cf. Shapiro, 2020
WL 3615511, at *31 (noting plaintiff's failure to even mention the possible public interest in
disclosing requested names and, regarding plaintiff's objection concerning FBI failing to
ascertain life status of certain individuals, holding that "Plaintiff's failure to identify a public
interest in disclosure . . . is . . . fatal").

43 460 F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

44 Id. at 104.

45 Id. at 105 (remanding "to permit the agency an opportunity to evaluate the alternatives,
and either to conduct a further search [to determine whether individuals were deceased] or
to explain satisfactorily why it should not be required to do so"); cf. Davis v. DOJ, No. 88-
agency’s use of speaker’s birth dates in searches of Google, obituaries, general circulation
newspaper, law database, crime story compilation site, and five sites related to genealogy
which included automatic Social Security Death Index searches).

46 575 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D.D.C. 2008) (advising agency that "it is required to make
efforts to ascertain an individual’s life status before invoking a privacy interest in connection
with FOIA Exemption 7(C)"); see also Schoenman v. FBI, 576 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.D.C.
2008) (approving efforts to determine whether FBI legal attaché was alive or dead, and even
though no determination was reached, upholding redaction of name).
it normally uses either the birth date and applies the "100-year rule," or uses a social security number to consult the list of deceased persons published by the Social Security Administration. The records at issue in Schoenman did not contain birth dates or social security numbers, so the Navy conducted further research on the internet using the third parties' names as they appeared in the records. Regarding a former employee name, the Navy contacted the repository for personnel information for former employees; the Office of Personnel Management, which is responsible for federal civil retired pay; and the Association of Retired Naval Investigative Service Agents. The Navy also conducted numerous searches, including several news searches via LEXIS-NEXIS for obituaries, searches in two human resources databases used by the Navy personnel department, and a search of the AUTO-TRACK database, which is a general public records database.

Additionally, individuals can have a survivor privacy interest in information about a deceased loved one contained in law enforcement records. In these situations, the focus is on the harm that releasing the information would cause living relatives, not harm to the deceased's reputation. (For further discussion, see Exemption 6, Practical Obscurity and Survivor Privacy.)

Finally, in FCC v. AT&T, Inc. the Supreme Court unanimously held that "the protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to

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47 Schoenman, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 178.
50 Id.
51 See NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165-67 (2004) (finding that personal privacy can encompass more than information about oneself and protecting death-scene photographs from investigation into Deputy White House Counsel's apparent suicide on basis that deceased's family members have the right "to direct and control disposition of the body of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased family member's remains for public purposes"); Sikes v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 896 F.3d 1227, 1237-40 (11th Cir. 2018) (following reasoning in Favish to withhold admiral's suicide note to wife under Exemption 7(C)).
52 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166 (noting that deceased's relatives "seek to be shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased"); ACLU II, 750 F.3d 927, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that family members have interest in "avoiding increased scrutiny" from release of deceased loved one's docket information); Outlaw v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 815 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1993) (ordering release of twenty-five-year-old photographs of murder victim where defendant failed to show existence of surviving relatives or that they would be offended by disclosure).
corporations." 53 Previously in that case, the Court of the Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a corporation may have personal privacy interests because the Administrative Procedure Act defined the word "person" to include corporations, and, therefore, the adjectival form "personal" would also include corporations. 54 In reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court explained that "[a]djectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always." 55 Citing various examples, 56 the Court noted that such adjectives sometimes "acquire distinct meanings of their own." 57 The Court found that Exemption 7(C) presented such an instance, and that because the word "personal" was not defined by Congress, it should be given its ordinary meaning, which "refers to individuals" but not to corporations. 58

On the other hand, where disclosure concerning the financial makeup of a closely held corporation or small business would reveal the owner's personal finances, courts have found that the owner may have a personal privacy interest in such information. 59 This expectation of privacy can be diminished, however, with regard to matters in which that individual is acting in a business capacity. 60

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53 562 U.S. 397 at 409-10 (2011); see also OIP Guidance: Supreme Court Rejects Argument that Corporations Have 'Personal Privacy' Interests (posted 3/2/2011); cf. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 572 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Exemption 6 is applicable only to individuals.").


55 FCC, 562 U.S. at 402.

56  See id. at 402-03 (comparing "crab" with "crabbed," "corn" with "corny," and "crank" with "cranky").

57  Id.

58  Id. at 403.

59  See, e.g., Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. HHS, 554 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that D.C. Circuit has "recognized substantial privacy interests in business-related financial information for individually-owned or closely-held businesses") (Exemption 6); Multi Ag Media LLC v. USDA, 515 F.3d 1224, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding privacy interest in data concerning farms because disclosure would reveal private personal financial information of owners) (Exemption 6); see also Campaign for Fam. Farms v. Glickman, 200 F.3d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 2000) ("An overly technical distinction between individuals acting in a purely private capacity and those acting in an entrepreneurial capacity fails to serve the exemption’s purpose of protecting the privacy of individuals.") (Exemption 6).

60  See, e.g., Doe v. FEC, 920 F.3d 866, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding trust had no personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) and trustees had minimal privacy interests); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (D. Or. 1998) (concluding that cattle owners who violated federal grazing laws have "diminished expectation of privacy" in their names when that information related to their commercial
Public Interest

Under the traditional Exemption 7(C) analysis, once a privacy interest has been identified and its magnitude has been assessed, it is balanced against the magnitude of any recognized public interest that would be served by disclosure. In NARA v. Favish, the Supreme Court explained that in order to balance the interests "and give practical meaning to the exemption, the usual rule that the citizen need not offer a reason for requesting the information must be inapplicable." Instead, the Supreme Court held that unless a requester shows "that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one" and that "the information is likely to advance that interest," an invasion of privacy is necessarily unwarranted in the Exemption 7(C) context.

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61 See Schiffer v. FBI, 78 F.3d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that once agency shows privacy interest exists, court must balance it against public’s interest in disclosure); Comput. Pros. for Soc. Resp. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that after privacy interest found, court must identify public interest to be served by disclosure); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that once agency establishes that privacy interest exists, that interest must be balanced against value of information in furthering FOIA’s disclosure objectives); Church of Scientology Int’l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding case because district court failed to determine whether public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns); Thomas v. Off. of U.S. Att’y for the E. Dist. of N.Y., 928 F. Supp. 245, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (observing that since personal privacy interest in information is implicated, court must inquire whether any countervailing factors exist that would warrant invasion of that interest); OIP Guidance: Supreme Court Rules for "Survivor Privacy" in Favish (posted 4/9/2004) (discussing balancing of privacy interests and public interest); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7 ("FOIA Counselor: Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C): Step-by-Step Decisionmaking").

62 NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004); see also Graff v. FBI, 822 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2011) (recognizing "special burden" on requester in Exemption 7(C) context and noting "it would be inefficient and impractical, and ultimately, unfair to the requesters, to depend upon the government to guess what the requesters had in mind and to catalogue the possible public reasons for disclosure"); Lewis v. DOJ, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that "[i]t is the requester's obligation to articulate a public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual's privacy interest, and the public interest must be significant" (citing Favish, 541 U.S. at 172)).

63 541 U.S. at 172; see also Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 1164, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019) ("And we reiterate that there is a difference between public curiosity and the type of
In DOJ v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court, highlighting the strong privacy interests protected under Exemption 7(C), found that a third party’s request for law enforcement records pertaining to a private citizen categorically invades that citizen’s privacy, and where a request seeks no official information about a government agency, the privacy invasion is unwarranted. Accordingly, where a request seeks information that categorically implicates an individual’s privacy interest, and the requester has failed to assert a cognizable public interest that can outweigh a personal privacy interest under Exemption 7(C”); Tuffy v. DHS, 870 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that names of ICE detainees would not add significantly to already available information and names would not be likely to advance that interest because public already has access to substantive portions of ICE material); Prison Legal News v. EOUSA, 628 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that because alleged public interests already satisfied by materials viewed and reported on by media related to trial, any "incremental addition" to public knowledge was outweighed by privacy interest); Stahl v. DOJ, No. 19-4142, 2021 WL 11163154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (noting that while "the public has a right to be informed about what actions the government takes," it does not necessarily follow that "the public has a right to be informed of who in the government takes those actions"); Humane Soc’y Intl v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 394 F. Supp. 3d 67, 78 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that disclosure of names of hunters would not advance significant public interest because plaintiff’s argument based on misconduct by hunters was speculative and names of hunters would not themselves advance any public interest in agency’s monitoring of licenses); Behar v. DHS, 403 F. Supp. 3d 240, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding identity of visitors to presidential candidate under Secret Service protection "would not advance public understanding of how the USSS spends taxpayer funds, vets visitors, conducts background checks or any other USSS function" and would "reveal only who met with [the candidate] at a given time"); Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 85 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that “[w]hile the Court agrees that the public has a significant interest in learning about any misuse of criminal informants by the FBI, [plaintiff] has failed to explain how that interest would be advanced by the release of the names and identifying information of all individuals mentioned in [the] file”); OIP Guidance: Supreme Court Rules for "Survivor Privacy" in Favish (posted 4/9/2004) (discussing public interest standard adopted in Favish, as well as required "nexus" between requested information and public interest asserted); cf. Wessler v. DOJ, 381 F. Supp. 3d 253, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding a "significant public interest" in the disclosure of medical records for prisoners who died in pretrial custody of USMS); Mattachine Soc’y of Wash., D.C. v. DOJ, 267 F. Supp. 3d 218, 228 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding public interest in release of records naming government employees targeted by Executive Order, but names would be replaced with unique alphanumeric markers that would serve as index).

64 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989); see also Martin v. DOJ, 488 F.3d 446, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("The Supreme Court has observed that the statutory privacy right protected by Exemption 7(C) is not so limited as others.” (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762)); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 3-7 ("OIP Guidance: Privacy Protection Under the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee Decision" & "FOIA Counselor: Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C): Step-by-Step Decisionmaking") (discussing mechanics of privacy-protection decisionmaking process employed under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).
interest, courts have upheld agencies' use of Exemption 7(C) to categorically protect such information, without the need to conduct a search. Once a requester identifies a public interest in the requested information, however, an agency may be required to search for and review records in order to affect the balancing required under Exemption 7(C).

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65 SafeCard Servs. v. SEC, 926 F. 2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); accord Thomas v. DOJ, 260 F. App'x 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that "[t]he Supreme Court has held as a categorical matter that a third party's request for law-enforcement records about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's privacy"); Fiduccia v. DOJ, 185 F.3d 1035, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting categorically records concerning FBI searches of houses of two named individuals); see, e.g., Patino-Restrepo v. DOJ, No. 17-5143, 2019 WL 1250497, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 2019) (per curiam) (finding that requester "has not produced 'evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred,' . . . which would outweigh the 'substantial' privacy interests at stake" and therefore affirming district court holding that "the Department of State properly declined to review thousands of pages of records related to third parties without sufficient information to verify their identities"); Reep v. DOJ, No. 18-5132, 2018 WL 6721099 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2018) (finding "appellant's conclusory assertions of government misconduct do not constitute the 'compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity' required to overcome the categorical exemption from disclosure of personal identifying information of law enforcement personnel" (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 854 F.3d 675, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2017))); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 854 F.3d at 681-82 (categorically protecting names of FBI and other government personnel as well as names of private individuals who had never been publicly implicated in investigation); Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that agency "was correct in declining to search" for records pertaining to certain third parties because it "would have added only information that [the court has] concluded is protected by Exemption 7(C)"); Boyd v. DOJ, 475 F.3d 381, 388-89 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that Exemption 7(C) protected information pertaining to third party even where "Glomar" response was improper and that it was unnecessary to find out whether government actually had the requested information); Blanton v. DOJ, 64 F. App'x 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (protecting identities of third parties contained in FBI files categorically, including those assumed to be deceased); Nation Mag. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (restating that portions of records in investigatory files which would reveal subjects, witnesses, and informants in law enforcement investigations are categorically exempt (citing SafeCard)); Schoenman v. FBI, 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 159 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting SafeCard for proposition that names and addresses of private individuals can be categorically protected under Exemption 7(C), but noting that "the same categorical conclusion does not necessarily apply under Exemption 6").

66 See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 854 F.3d 675, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting agency's categorical denial of investigatory records related to investigation of member of Congress and fourteen specified individuals, since connecting this information to names "could add much, or not at all, to the public's understanding of how the Government carried out its investigation"); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 840 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting agency's categorical denial of request for investigatory records pertaining to member of Congress where agency had been specifically directed by Congress to investigate particular project, and stating that "the American public
Under Reporters Committee, the public interest recognized under the FOIA is specifically limited to the FOIA's "core purpose" of "shed[ding] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties." Accordingly, information that does not reveal the operations and activities of the government does not satisfy the public interest requirement. As a result, with the exception of the situation discussed below regarding death row inmates, courts have rarely recognized any public interest in disclosure of information sought to assist someone in challenging their conviction. Indeed, a FOIA has a right to know about the manner in which its representatives are conducting themselves and whether the government agency responsible for investigating and, if warranted, prosecuting those representatives for alleged illegal conduct is doing its job); see also Bonilla v. DOJ, No. 10-22168, 2011 WL 122023, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2011) (rejecting categorical withholding and finding that "[d]efendant has not met its burden of showing the type of record requested by Plaintiff would not reveal any 'official information' about a government agency"); cf. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 854 F.3d 675, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (declining to categorically protect individuals publicly identified in investigation and instead applying balancing test because privacy interests of individuals who have not been convicted in connection with investigation differ from those of individuals who were convicted or pled guilty for their roles); Kimberlin v. DOJ, 130 F.3d 944, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (eschewing categorical rule of nondisclosure for OPR files, and suggesting use of case-by-case balancing test involving consideration of "rank of public official involved and the seriousness of misconduct alleged"); Davin v. DOJ, 150 F.3d 1043, 1060 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that "government must conduct a document by document fact-specific balancing"); Konigsberg v. FBI, No. 02-2428, slip op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. May 27, 2003) (refusing to apply categorical rule to records on informant who allegedly was protected from prosecution by FBI, based upon exceptional circumstances presented); Balt. Sun v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 n.5 (D. Md. 2001) (declining to accord categorical protection to third parties who purchased federally forfeited property because risk of harassment, annoyance, or embarrassment is low).

67 DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989); see also McGehee v. DOJ, 800 F. Supp. 2d 220, 234 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that "the relevant question" in public interest analysis "is not whether the public would like to know the names . . . but whether knowing those names would shed light on the [agency’s] performance of its statutory duties"); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (concluding that questionnaire responses by court-martial members were properly withheld because "information contained therein sheds no light on the workings of the government").

68 See Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 773 (finding that purpose of FOIA "is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various government files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct").

69 See, e.g., Watters v. DOJ, 576 F. App’x. 718, 724 (10th Cir. 2014) (determining that plaintiff "offers nothing to suggest that disclosure would contribute to public’s understanding of Defendants’ activities; instead, he asserts his own personal interest in securing his release"); Hawkins v. DEA, 347 F. App’x 223, 225 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that
requester's private need for information in connection with litigation has been found to play no part in determining whether disclosure is warranted.\textsuperscript{70}

Significantly, in 2011 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that there was a "substantial" public interest "in knowing whether [an agency] is withholding information that could corroborate a death-row inmate's claim of innocence."\textsuperscript{71} In Roth v. DOJ, the court held that the requested information would advance that interest where the requester "show[ed] that a reasonable person could

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"a prisoner's interest in attacking his own conviction is not a public interest"); Peltier v. FBI, 563 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that "a prisoner may not override legitimate privacy interests recognized in Exemption 7(C) simply by pointing to the public's interest in fair criminal trials or the even-handed administration of justice"); Thomas v. DOJ, 260 F. App'x 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding no public interest as plaintiff was "seek[ing] to learn about prosecutorial misconduct, not the [agency's] misconduct"); Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2000) (ruling that requester's wish to establish his own innocence does not create FOIA-recognized public interest); Hale v. DOJ, 973 F.2d 894, 901 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding no FOIA-recognized public interest in death-row inmate's allegation of unfair trial), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993); Landano v. DOJ, 956 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no public interest in disclosure of identities of individuals involved in murder investigation because such release would not shed light on how FBI fulfills its responsibilities), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 508 U.S. 165; Clifton v. U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 591 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that "plaintiff's Brady argument is both misplaced and ineffective" because it "does not give [the] Court any factual basis upon which to conclude that the plaintiff's interest in the information outweighs the third parties' legitimate interest in keeping the images of their fingerprints private").

\textsuperscript{70} See Sorin v. DOJ, 758 F. App’x 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (finding that plaintiff's stated public interest of preparing an accurate manuscript for their prosecution was "not relevant" and that the plaintiff failed to show that government impropriety occurred); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he] mere possibility that information may aid an individual in the pursuit of litigation does not give rise to a public interest."); Del Rio v. Miami Field Off. of the FBI, No. 08-21103, 2009 WL 2762698, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding that "[a] FOIA litigant's private interest in obtaining materials for personal reasons plays no part in the required balancing of interests"); Sakamoto v. EPA, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding no public interest in disclosure of documents sought for use in plaintiff's employment discrimination case); Garcia v. DOJ, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that request seeking information in furtherance of private litigation falls outside "the ambit of FOIA's goal of public disclosure of agency action"). But see United Am. Fin., Inc. v. Potter, 667 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that "the potential use of [the responsive records] in a potential civil suit does constitute a recognized public interest under Exemption 7(C)"); Butler v. DOJ, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (ordering identities of supervisory FBI personnel disclosed because of "significant" public interest in protecting requester's due process rights in his attempt to vacate sentence).

\textsuperscript{71} Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
believe that the following might be true: (1) that the [subjects of the request] were the real killers, and (2) that the [agency was] withholding information that could corroborate that theory."\textsuperscript{72} The D.C. Circuit, after finding that the requester had made such a showing in the case, ordered the government to reveal the existence of any records connecting three individuals with a specific criminal investigation.\textsuperscript{73}

In \textit{NARA v. Favish}, the Supreme Court addressed the showing necessary to demonstrate a public interest in disclosure where government wrongdoing is alleged.\textsuperscript{74} Noting that "[a]llegations of misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard to disprove,'"\textsuperscript{75} it ruled that a FOIA requester relying on such a public interest must do more than assert a "bare suspicion" and instead "must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged government impropriety might have occurred" before there will "exist a counterweight on the FOIA scale to balance against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested records."\textsuperscript{76} (See also further discussion of \textit{Favish}'s privacy-protection principles under Exemption 6.)

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at 1180-81.

\textsuperscript{73} Id. at 1181-82.

\textsuperscript{74} 541 U.S. 157 (2004).

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 175 (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998)).

\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 174-75; see, e.g., Patino-Restrepo v. DOJ, No. 17-5143, 2019 WL 1250497, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 2019) (per curiam) (upholding district court finding that plaintiff had not produced evidence of government impropriety sufficient to outweigh substantial privacy interests because plaintiff failed to show pattern of government misconduct in plaintiff's prosecution or evidence of blatant Brady violation); Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding plaintiff had "not come close to meeting the demanding Favish standard"); \textit{CASA de Md., Inc. v. DHS}, 409 F. App’x 697, 700-01 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding Favish misconduct standard satisfied because "CASA submitted affidavits from thirteen of the arrestees which all suggested that government agents arrested them without first obtaining any information about their immigration status and ignored non-Latino day laborers"); \textit{Peltier v. FBI}, 563 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (emphasizing that requester's production of evidence that government improprieties might have occurred only establishes public interest that must then be weighed); \textit{Associated Press v. DOD}, 554 F.3d 274, 289 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding plaintiff's argument "squarely foreclosed by Favish" as no evidence of abuse was produced); \textit{ACLU v. DOD}, 543 F.3d 59, 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting, as government misconduct was conceded, that public interest in disclosure of photographs depicting prisoner abuse by government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was "strong"); \textit{vacated & remanded on other grounds}, 558 U.S. 1042 (2009); \textit{Boyd v. DOJ}, 475 F.3d 381, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (agreeing that agency correctly applied Exemption 7(C) as plaintiff failed to make "'meaningful evidentiary showing" as required by Favish (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 175)); see also \textit{Oguaju v. United States}, 288 F.3d 448, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that "bald accusations" of prosecutorial misconduct are insufficient to establish public interest), \textit{vacated & remanded}, 541 U.S. 970, \textit{on remand}, 378 F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reaffirming prior decision); \textit{Spirko v. USPS}, 147 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
In the seminal case of *Stern v. FBI*, the D.C. Circuit established guidelines to differentiate between employees in this context, holding "that the level of responsibility held by a federal employee" and the type of wrongdoing committed by that employee "are appropriate considerations" in this privacy analysis. Courts have found that disclosure must serve a public interest that is greater than the strong privacy interests of these employees and for lower level employees in particular, privacy protection is still often afforded. (For further discussion, see Exemption 6, FOIA Public Interest, Public Servant Accountability.)

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77 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

78 Id. at 92-94 (protecting identities of lower-level employees, who were found only to be negligent, but ordering disclosure of identity of higher-level official who knowingly participated in cover-up); see also, e.g., Perlman v. DOJ, 312 F.3d 100, 107-09 (2d Cir. 2002) (ordering release of extensive details concerning IG investigation of former INS general counsel who was implicated in wrongdoing, and enunciating five-factor test to balance government employee’s privacy interest against public interest in disclosure, including employee’s rank, degree of wrongdoing and strength of evidence, availability of information, whether information sheds light on government activity, and whether information is related to job function or is personal in nature), vacated, 541 U.S. 970 (2004), aff’d on remand, 380 F.3d 110 (2d. Cir. 2004); Homick v. DOJ, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994) (holding even though subject’s potential mishandling of funds already known to public, “confirming . . . federal criminal investigation brushes the subject with an independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing”).

79 See Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1234-36 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that protection of "low-level" employees "who committed serious acts of misconduct" was proper, as disclosure of their names "would shed little light on the operations or activities of
Courts have held that no public interest exists in federal records that pertain to alleged misconduct by state officials. Moreover, the identity of the requester is irrelevant in assessing any public interest in disclosure.

Courts have found a distinction between the public interest that can exist in an overall subject that relates to a FOIA request and the public interest that might or might not be served by disclosure of the particular records that are responsive to a given FOIA request. For example, Courts have protected identities of "low-level [agency] inspectors who engaged in misconduct in performing slaughterhouse inspections," since inspectors were not "high-level employees" and it was not "well-publicized scandal"; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. USDA, No. 06-930, 2007 WL 1720136, at *6 (D.D.C. June 11, 2007) (protecting identities of "low-level [agency] inspectors who engaged in misconduct in performing slaughterhouse inspections," since inspectors were not "high-level employees" and it was not "well-publicized scandal"); Jefferson v. DOJ, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2003) (protecting details of IG investigation of government attorney-advisor with no decisionmaking authority as employee whose rank was not so high that public interest in disclosure could outweigh personal privacy interest in learning of any investigated alleged misconduct).


See Hawkins v. DEA, 347 F. App’x 223, 224 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that "the identity of the requesting party and the motivation for a FOIA request are irrelevant"); Ford v. West, 149 F.3d 1190, *3 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (holding that plaintiff’s prior EEO successes against agency do not establish public interest in disclosure of third-party names in this investigation); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that identity of requesting party and use that party plans to make of requested information have "no bearing on the assessment of the public interest served by disclosure"); Stone v. FBI, 727 F. Supp. 662, 668 n.4 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that court looks to public interest served by release of information, "not to the highly specialized interests of those individuals who understandably have a greater personal stake in gaining access to that information"); aff’d, No. 90-5065, 1990 WL 134431 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1990) (per curiam). But cf. Manna v. DOJ, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995) (deciding that although court does not usually consider requester’s identity, fact that requester held high position in La Cosa Nostra is certainly material to protection of individual privacy).
request. The key consideration is whether there is a nexus between the disclosure of the particular record portions at issue and an identified public interest. If a requester demonstrates this nexus, courts have found a cognizable public interest in disclosure of the requested information.

82 See ACLU of N. Cal. v. DOJ, No. 04-4447, 2005 WL 5886354, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005) (ruling that "it was not sufficient for the plaintiffs to show [public] interest in only the general subject area of the request"); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DOD, 355 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that "[t]he fact that [the requester] has provided evidence that there is some media interest in data mining as an umbrella issue does not satisfy the requirement that [it] demonstrate interest in the specific subject of [its] FOIA request").

83 See, e.g., Peltier v. FBI, 563 F.3d 754, 765-66 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding Exemption 7(C) redactions because court was "not convinced that there is a substantial nexus" between request and requester’s asserted public interest, and finding that any public benefit from disclosure is "too uncertain and remote"); KTVY-TV, a Div. of Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (rejecting assertion that "the public interest at stake is the right of the public to know" about controversial event, because on careful analysis particular record segments at issue "do not provide information about" that subject); Lopez v. EOUSA, 598 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that agency’s Vaughn Index demonstrates that disclosure of specific information withheld is not likely to advance any significant public interest, "even if the plaintiff could establish that the public has a significant interest in the material he is seeking"); Seized Prop. Recovery, Corp. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 502 F. Supp. 2d 50, 59 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding no "appropriate nexus" between disclosure of names and addresses of individuals whose property is seized and public interest in how Customs performs its duties); see also Halloran v. VA, 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989) (observing that "merely stating that the interest exists in the abstract is not enough; rather, the court should have analyzed how that interest would be served by compelling disclosure").

84 See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding valid public interest where requesters sought to show nature, effectiveness, and intrusiveness of government’s policy regarding warrantless cell phone tracking, and specifically noting that "plaintiffs are not (or at least not only) seeking to show that the government’s tracking policy is legally improper"); Wessler v. DOJ, 381 F. Supp. 3d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding release of records concerning conditions of confinement for federal pretrial detainees held in state, local, and private prison facilities with which USMS contracts to house those detainees would advance the public understanding of USMS's monitoring of care provided to detainees in these facilities which "is a core responsibility of USMS, as set forth on USMS's own website"); BuzzFeed, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 17-7949, 2019 WL 1114864, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2019) (finding valid public interest when "[t]he information sought by Plaintiff would shed light on the misconduct of managerial-level government employees, how that misconduct affected their abilities to fulfill their professional responsibilities, and the impact that misconduct had on the operation of the Office"); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 840 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding public interest in request for investigatory records pertaining to member of Congress and noting that as requester "made it very clear . . . it is not arguing that [agency] engaged in misconduct . . . it is not correct that Plaintiff must provide compelling evidence of any such conduct"); Fams. for Freedom v.
Balancing Process

If a court finds that there is no public interest in disclosure and there is a privacy interest in the requested material, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held "[w]e need not linger over the balance; something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time."85

If a court finds that a public interest qualifies for consideration under Reporters Committee,86 the court then analyzes whether the public interest in disclosure is sufficiently compelling to, on balance, outweigh legitimate privacy interests.87 When the


85 Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Exemption 6) [hereinafter NARFE]; see also Garza v. USMS, No. 18-5311, 2020 WL 768221, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2020) (per curiam) (finding defendant "properly [withheld] personally identifiable information of individuals involved with [plaintiff's] criminal investigation . . . [because] [plaintiff] has not demonstrated any public interest in disclosure that would outweigh . . . privacy interests."); Beck v. DOJ, 997 F.2d 1489, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (observing that because request implicates no public interest at all, court "need not linger over the balance; something . . . outweighs nothing every time" (quoting NARFE, 879 F.2d at 879) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 566 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that court "need not . . . dwell upon the balance" where no public interest is implicated); Cole v. FBI, No. 13-01205, 2015 WL 4622917, at *3 (D.D.C. July 31, 2015) ("The Court concludes, however, that it need not reach the step of balancing private and public interests because [plaintiff] has not provided sufficient evidence of any public interest to be balanced."); King v. DOJ, 586 F. Supp. 286, 294 (D.D.C. 1983) ("Where the requester fails to assert a public interest purpose for disclosure, even a less than substantial invasion of another's privacy is unwarranted.")., aff'd, 830 F.2d 210 (D.D.C. Cir. 1987).


87 See, e.g., Schoenberg v. FBI, 820 F. App'x 609, 610 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (finding privacy interest outweighed public interest because "[w]hile the public has an interest in the SSA's improper behavior . . . [plaintiff] offers no evidence of official misconduct."); Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 1164, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that public would have
public interest is found to outweigh the privacy interest at stake, courts have found that release of third-party information is justified.88

some interest in how government investigated leads concerning 9/11 attacks, but noting that this interest did not outweigh individuals' significant privacy interests "in not being associated with a major terrorism investigation"; Lahr v. NTSB, 560 F.3d 964, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that where "only way that [third parties] mentioned . . . would have public value is if [they] were contacted directly by the plaintiff or by the media is insufficient to override the witnesses' and agents' privacy interests, as the disclosure would bring about additional useful information only if direct contacts, furthering the privacy intrusion, are made"); Associated Press v. DOD, 554 F.3d 274, 284-91 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing district court ruling and finding that Guantanamo detainees have substantial privacy interest that is not outweighed by any minimal public interest that might be served by disclosure); Associated Press v. DOJ, 549 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff failed to demonstrate how disclosure of John Walker Lindh's commutation petition "would in any way shed light on the DOJ's conduct" in order to warrant disclosing "private, personal information" contained in petition); Adamowicz v. IRS, 552 F. Supp. 2d 355, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding plaintiffs' asserted public interests "too speculative to overcome the well-recognized, weighty privacy interests of IRS personnel and third-parties"); Schrecker v. DOJ, 74 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding requester's "own personal curiosity" about names of third parties and agents insufficient to outweigh privacy interests), rev'd on other grounds, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding "minuscule privacy interest" in identifying sellers in multiple-sales gun reports in comparison to public interest in scrutinizing ATF's performance of its duty to enforce gun control laws and to curtail illegal interstate gun trafficking); cf. Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. v. DOJ, No. 18-1860, 2020 WL 1189091, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (finding no nexus between number of records at issue and weight of public interest in disclosure).

88 See, e.g., Bartko v. DOJ, 898 F.3d 51, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding public interest in disclosing OPR records of prosecutorial misconduct because matter was of public record, attorney was a supervisory official, and there was public interest in knowing how investigation was conducted); ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 1-4, 12-15, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding release appropriate because, while convicted defendants maintained small but cognizable privacy interest in aggregated docket information pertaining to 255 criminal cases in which warrantless cellular phone tracking was utilized by the government, there was "significant public interest in disclosure" that would result from derivative use of information, especially in light of widespread media, congressional, and judicial interest in the issue); Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Dep't of Lab., 280 F.3d 539, 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (viewing "general public interest in monitoring" a specific OSHA investigation as sufficient to overcome employee-witnesses' privacy interests against employer retaliation); Rosenfeld v. DOJ, 57 F.3d 803, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (ordering agency to release names of subjects of investigation after finding public interest in "knowing whether and to what extent the FBI investigated individuals for participating in political protests, not federal criminal activity" outweighed privacy interests); Providence J. Co. v. Dep't of Army, 981 F.2d 552, 567-69 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding public interest in disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations against senior officials outweighed privacy interests); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 394 F. Supp. 3d 111, 118
In *Reporters Committee*, the Supreme Court emphasized the appropriateness of "categorical balancing" under Exemption 7(C) as a means of achieving "workable rules" for processing FOIA requests. In so doing, it recognized that entire categories of cases (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that "balance . . . tilts in favor of disclosure" for records concerning FBI relationship with former British intelligence operative, because records could allow the public to evaluate the FBI’s performance of its law-enforcement duties and disclosure would not make public for the first time operative’s affiliation with law enforcement); *Buzzfeed, Inc. v. DOJ*, No. 17-7949, 2019 WL 1114864, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2019) (balancing (1) rank and level of responsibility, (2) degree of wrongdoing and strength of evidence, (3) access to information, (4) shedding light on government activity, and (5) relation to job function to find there was public interest in release of attorney names in investigatory report concerning consensual affair between supervisor and subordinate in U.S. Attorney’s Office); *ACLU of Ariz. v. DHS*, No. 15-00247, 2018 WL 1428153, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2018) (finding public interest in disclosing names of federal employees accused of misconduct, as request was targeted at specific accused employees which could shed light on patterns of behavior and determine whether appropriate investigation was conducted by agencies); *Lindsey v. FBI*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Even a modicum of public interest may suffice to warrant disclosure, if public acknowledgments by [the third party] have vitiated the claimed privacy interests in this matter."); *Eberg v. DOD*, 193 F. Supp. 3d 95, 117-18 (D. Conn. 2016) (finding public interest "significant" in release of records naming third party in sexual assault, equal employment opportunity, and sexual harassment complaints as "gender-based obstacles to success in the military, and issues of gender discrimination have long been a matter of strong public concern"); *Fams. for Freedom v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.*, 797 F. Supp. 2d 375, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding "substantial public interest in knowing whether the expectations and requirements articulated in the memoranda reflect high-level agency policy" greater than privacy interests of authors and recipients of memoranda); *Hidalgo v. FBI*, 541 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering disclosure of records reflecting any misconduct in agency's relationship with third-party informant as case was "atypical" and "plaintiff has made enough of a showing to raise questions about possible agency misconduct"); *Lardner v. DOJ*, No. 03-0180, 2005 WL 758267, at *17 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (finding that release of identities of unsuccessful pardon applicants would shed light on government’s exercise of pardon power in "important ways"); *Homick v. DOJ*, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 19-20, 22-23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (finding public interest in misconduct satisfying *Favish* standard warranted ordering disclosure of names of FBI and DEA Special Agents, and of state, local, and foreign law enforcement officers); *Bennett v. DEA*, 55 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 1999) (ordering release of informant’s rap sheet after finding "very compelling" evidence of "extensive government misconduct" in handling "career" informant); *Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that public interest in knowing how government enforces and punishes violations of land-management laws outweighs privacy interests of cattle trespassers who admitted violations) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); cf. *Buzzfeed, Inc.*, 2019 WL 1114864, at *9-10 (finding no public interest in information concerning unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct and upholding redaction of this information).

can properly receive uniform disposition "without regard to individual circumstances; [when] the standard virtues of bright-line rules are thus present, and the difficulties attendant to ad hoc adjudication may be avoided."90 This approach, in conjunction with other elements of Reporters Committee and traditional Exemption 7(C) principles, subsequently led the D.C. Circuit in SafeCard Services v. SEC to largely eliminate the need for case-by-case balancing in favor of "categorical" withholding of individuals' identities in law enforcement records.91

In SafeCard, the plaintiff sought information pertaining to an SEC investigation of manipulation of SafeCard stock, including "names and addresses of third parties mentioned in witness interviews, of customers listed in stock transaction records obtained from investment companies, and of persons in correspondence with the SEC."92 Recognizing the fundamentally inherent privacy interest of individuals mentioned in any way in law enforcement files,93 the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiff's asserted public interest – providing the public "with insight into the SEC's conduct with respect to SafeCard" – was "not just less substantial [but] insubstantial."94 Based upon the Supreme Court's endorsement of categorical rules in Reporters Committee, it then further determined that the identities of individuals who appear in law enforcement files would virtually never be "very probative of an agency's behavior or performance."95 It observed that such information would serve a "significant" public interest only if "there is compelling evidence that the agency . . . is engaged in illegal activity."96 Consequently,

90 Id. at 780. But see Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Dep't of Lab., 280 F.3d 539, 553 (5th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that statements to OSHA by employee-witnesses are "a characteristic genus suitable for categorical treatment," yet declining to use categorical approach).

91 See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. DOJ, 939 F.3d 1164, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2019) (disagreeing with district court's finding that "an individual assessment is always necessary to support every redaction made under Exemption 7(C)" and that "categorical balancing is appropriate" when the public and private interests for withheld information are the same (quoting Nadler v. DOJ, 955 F.2d 147, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1992))).

92 939 F.3d at 1205.

93 Id. (recognizing privacy interests of suspects, witnesses, and investigators).

94 Id.

95 Id.

96 Id. at 1206; see also Kuzma v. DOJ, 692 F. App'x 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (determining that requester's assertion that disclosing names of individuals involved in investigation will reveal government mishandling of one case is not enough); Oguaju v. United States, 288 F.3d 448, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that "exposing a single, garden-variety act of misconduct would not serve the FOIA's purpose of showing 'what the Government is up to'" (quoting DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
the D.C. Circuit held that "unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is [categorically] exempt from disclosure."97

The D.C. Circuit subsequently cautioned, however, that "a categorical approach is appropriate only if 'a case fits into a genus in which the balance characteristically tips in one direction.'"98 The D.C. Circuit balanced the privacy and public interests in a case where the record at issue consisted of aggregated docket information pertaining to 255 criminal cases in which warrantless cellular phone tracking was utilized by the

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97 SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1206; see also Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2000) (adopting SafeCard approach). But see Balt. Sun v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 n.5 (D. Md. 2001) (determining that "plaintiff need not provide compelling evidence of government wrongdoing in light of the inapplicability of the categorical rule of SafeCard" to this case; deciding that "[a] more general public interest in what a government agency is up to is sufficient here").

98 Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added by D.C. Circuit)) (finding that case-by-case balancing approach that considers rank of public official involved and seriousness of misconduct alleged appropriate in place of categorical approach); see, e.g., Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding balancing approach, not categorical approach, appropriate because "where the FOIA requester has surmounted the fairly substantial hurdle of showing that a reasonable person could believe that the FBI might be withholding information that could corroborate a death-row inmate’s claim of innocence, the balance militates in favor of fuller disclosure"); Nation Mag. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that "[b]ecause the range of circumstances included in . . . categorical rule do not 'characteristically support' an inference that all material in law enforcement files which names a particular individual is exempt from disclosure to third parties, a more particularized approach is required"); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DHS, 598 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that records concerning agency’s handling of immigration matters not appropriate for categorical handling because balance between private and public interests in records requested "is a much closer call" and defendant must conduct "an assessment of each responsive document to determine whether it is exempt").
government.\(^99\) After finding that convicted defendants maintained a small but cognizable privacy interest in this information, the court found a "significant public interest in disclosure" that would result from the derivative use of the information, and noted the widespread media, congressional, and judicial interest in the issue.\(^100\) As a result "of the strength of the public interest . . . and the relative weakness of the privacy interests at stake," the court concluded that the balance tilted in favor of disclosure.\(^101\)

As with Exemption 6, when applying Exemption 7(C), courts have required agencies to address whether they could redact the documents to protect individual privacy interests, while releasing the remaining information.\(^102\) (See further discussion of privacy redaction under Exemption 6, Balancing Process.)

\(^99\) ACLU v. DOJ, 655 F.3d 1, 1-4 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

\(^100\) Id. at 12-15.

\(^101\) Id. at 16.

\(^102\) See, e.g., Sorin v. DOJ, 758 F. App’x 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (upholding withholding of documents under Exemption 7(C) based on DOJ’s assertion that "redaction could not adequately protect the identity of witnesses because their testimony concerned their specific roles at the company under investigation"); Ocasio v. DOJ, No. 17-5005, 17-5085, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16147, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (per curiam) (finding government’s declaration and Vaughn Index provided sufficient justification for withholding documents in their entirety by demonstrating no further information could be segregated for release); Stahl v. DOJ, No. 19-4142, 2021 WL 1163154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (holding that agency personnel must explain "why they cannot edit the video to obscure the identities of BOP staff, just as they could redact a written document"); Am. Immigr. Council v. ICE, 464 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that "there is no genuine dispute that the government can adequately protect whatever minimal privacy interests the detainees have in their birthdates by redacting the date but not the month and year, because the agency has not identified any harm that would flow from a more limited disclosure, and the statute requires that reasonably segregable portions of records should be provided"); Maydak v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 325 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering release of prisoner housing unit information, but withholding inmate names and register numbers because agency did not proffer evidence that released information could be used to identify inmates); Canning v. DOJ, No. 01-2215, slip op. at 19 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2004) (finding application of Exemption 7(C) to entire documents rather than to personally identifying information within documents to be overly broad); Prows v. DOJ, No. 90-2561, 1996 WL 228463, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1996) (concluding that rather than withholding documents in full, agency simply can delete identifying information about third-party individuals to eliminate stigma of being associated with law enforcement investigation); Aldridge v. U.S. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 00-131, 2001 WL 196965, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2001) (deciding that privacy of IRS employees could be adequately protected by redacting their names from recommendation concerning potential disciplinary action against them); Laws. Comm. for Hum. Rts. v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding middle ground in balancing of interest in disclosure of names in INS Lookout Book on basis of
The "Glomar" Response

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained that "[a] 'Glomar' response to a FOIA request, [i.e., when an agency does not acknowledge whether records responsive to the request exist] is permitted in that rare situation when either confirming or denying the very existence of records responsive to a request would 'cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exception.'"103 For purposes of Exemption 7(C), the D.C. Circuit found that "[t]he question . . . is whether disclosing even 'the existence or nonexistence of the requested records' is itself information protected by Exemption 7(C)."104 The D.C. Circuit has held that acknowledging the existence of records that would reveal that named individuals were investigated "go[es] to the heart of the privacy interest that Exemption 7(C) was designed to protect."105 Indeed, "'[t]here can be no clearer example of an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy than to release to the public that another individual was the subject of [a law enforcement] investigation.'"106

Courts have found a Glomar response appropriate when responding to targeted requests for documents regarding alleged government informants,107 trial witnesses,108 "ideological exclusion" provision against individuals' privacy interest by ordering release of only occupation and country of excluded individuals).

103 Bartko v. DOJ, 898 F.3d 51, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (concluding that Glomar response was inappropriate because records did not satisfy law enforcement threshold of Exemption 7 and agency had not demonstrated that "there would be a single answer to every balancing of interests" involved) (quoting Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

104 Id.; see also Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "even acknowledging that certain records are kept would jeopardize the privacy interests that the FOIA exemptions are intended to protect").

105 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH, 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting PETA v. NIH, 853 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154-59 (D.D.C. 2012)).


108 See, e.g., Oguaju v. United States, 288 F.3d 448, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (approving Glomar response to request for any information on individual who testified at requester's trial when requester provided no public interest rationale), vacated & remanded, 541 U.S. 970, on
subjects of investigations, or individuals who may merely be mentioned in a law enforcement record.

For a Glomar response to be effective, it must be employed universally in situations where mere acknowledgment of records would reveal exempt information, even where no responsive records actually exist, because, as one court has noted "[i]f a Glomar response is provided only when . . . records are found, the response would in fact be useless because
it 'would unsurprisingly be interpreted as an admission that . . . responsive records exist.'\textsuperscript{111}

Courts have limited agencies' use of Glomar in a variety of circumstances. A request that does not sufficiently "target" the subject of the request is not appropriate for a Glomar response.\textsuperscript{112} An agency may not be able to utilize the Glomar response where the subject of a request has already been publicly associated with agency law enforcement matters that would otherwise justify a Glomar response.\textsuperscript{113} Courts have held that a Glomar response is inappropriate once it is determined that an informant's status has been officially confirmed.\textsuperscript{114} The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected an agency's use of Glomar even where the underlying subjects had never been associated by the agency with a specific investigation, when it found an overriding public

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  \item \textsuperscript{111} Moore v. FBI, 883 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting agency declaration and noting agency provided "reasonable explanation" for invoking Glomar regardless of whether responsive records existed) (Exemptions 1 and 3).
  \item \textsuperscript{112} People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH, 745 F.3d 535, 544-45 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding the Glomar response inappropriate when "the request, broadly construed, encompasses documents relating to \textit{any} ensuing investigation," and not investigation targeted to specific individual).
  \item \textsuperscript{113} See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that subject's public statements that he had been, but was no longer, under investigation, made Glomar response inappropriate); see also Kimberlin v. DOJ, 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting prosecutor's public acknowledgment that he was subject of disciplinary proceedings "undoubtedly does diminish his interest in privacy: the public already knows who he is, what he was accused of, and that he received a relatively mild sanction" and so Glomar response inappropriate); cf. Lindsey v. FBI, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2017) (requiring defendant to provide more information to justify Glomar response after third party acknowledged information because "the fact that the \textit{government} has not acknowledged a potentially personal piece of information, does not mean that the \textit{third-party's} acknowledgment of that information has no bearing on the private-public interest balancing test underlying the FOIA exemptions at issue") (citing Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 746 F.3d at 1092).
  \item \textsuperscript{114} See Pickard v. DOJ, 653 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that agency could not refuse to confirm or deny records pertaining to third party where "the government . . . intentionally elicited testimony from [the third party] and several DEA agents as to [the third party's] activities as a confidential informant in open court in the course of official and documented public proceedings"); Boyd v. DOJ, 475 F.3d 381, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Where an informant's status has been officially confirmed, a Glomar response is unavailable, and the agency must acknowledge the existence of any responsive records it holds."); North v. DOJ, 810 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting Glomar response where requester produced trial transcripts in which government referred to third party as informant, and that third party testified regarding his cooperation agreement with government).
\end{itemize}
interest in knowing whether the individuals who were the subject of the request were the actual perpetrators of a crime for which the requester was convicted and on death row.115

For a request that seeks non-law enforcement records as well as law enforcement records, or which seeks acknowledged law enforcement files as well as unacknowledged files, courts have upheld agencies' use of a "bifurcated" or two-pronged approach in its response, i.e., using Glomar for part and addressing and processing separately other records that are located.116

115 Roth v. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

116 See, e.g., Jefferson v. DOJ, 284 F.3d 172, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow Glomar response to request for OPR records concerning AUSA because agency did not bifurcate for separate treatment its non-law enforcement records); Nation Mag., Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 894-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (deciding that Glomar response is appropriate only as to existence of records associating former presidential candidate with criminal activity), on remand, 937 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that Glomar response as to whether candidate was subject, witness, or informant in law enforcement investigation appropriate after agency searched law enforcement files for records concerning candidate's acknowledged efforts to assist agency); Burke v. DOJ, 96-1739, 1999 WL 1032814, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1999) (finding no need to bifurcate request that "specifically and exclusively" sought investigative records on third parties). See generally FOIA Update, Vol. XVII, No. 2, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: The Bifurcation Requirement for Privacy 'Glomarization'") (providing guidance on how agencies should handle requests for law enforcement records on third parties).