|Date of Issuance||Title||Headnotes|
|02/13/1976||Constitutionality of Bill Creating an Office of Congressional Legal Counsel||
Congressional officers representing the combined power of both houses of Congress—in contrast to officers of either house—who perform significant governmental duties must be appointed as provided in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
The authority to bring a civil action requiring an officer or employee of the Executive Branch to act in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States is an exclusive executive function that must be exercised by an executive officer who must be appointed as provided for in the Appointments Clause and be subject to the President’s unlimited removal power.
|08/05/1976||Appointment of a Federal Judge to the United Nations Delegation||
If this were a matter of first impression, appointing a federal judge to be a representative of the United States to the General Assembly of the United Nations would be inconsistent with the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. However, because of the longstanding practice of appointing federal judges to temporary office in the Executive Branch, and the absence of any explicit constitutional text, it cannot be maintained that such an appointment would be unconstitutional.
|09/01/1976||Constitutionality of Regulatory Reform Legislation for Independent Agencies||
Although there is no constitutional impediment to the bill’s requirement that independent regulatory agencies communicate their legislative and budgetary messages directly to the Congress without first clearing them with OMB, a uniform rule in the opposite extreme—i.e., that no communication from an independent agency may be sent to OMB unless it is simultaneously sent to the Congress—would not adequately protect important interests of the Executive Branch. The congressional access provisions of the bill would not affect the power of the President, or the agency acting on the President’s behalf, to assert executive privilege, because in the absence of express language in the bill, it must be assumed that the bill does not constitute an attempted infringement of the constitutionally based privilege, which is available with respect to those functions of independent regulatory agencies that are of an executive or quasi-executive nature.