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EXHIBIT A

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Background

1. Credit Suisse AG was a corporation organized under the laws of Switzerland, and directly and through its parent, subsidiaries and affiliates, operated a global financial services business in more than 50 countries with over 45,000 employees, including 9,000 U.S. employees.¹ In the United States, Credit Suisse AG operated as a financial holding company regulated by the Federal Reserve. Credit Suisse AG, directly and indirectly through branches and subsidiaries, offered private banking and wealth management services to over two million clients, focusing on ultra-high-net-worth and high-net-worth individual clients around the globe, including U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, and resident aliens.

2. Credit Suisse Services AG was a subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG and is now a subsidiary of UBS Business Solutions AG, which itself is a subsidiary of UBS Group AG. Created in response to Switzerland's "Too Big to Fail" regulatory regime, Credit Suisse Services AG provided various services (such as risk, operations, legal, and compliance services) to Credit Suisse AG and other group entities.

¹ In May 2024, Credit Suisse AG merged into UBS AG, a Swiss bank that assumed all of Credit Suisse AG's assets and liabilities and all of its rights and obligations. This merger was the result of UBS Group AG agreeing in 2023 to acquire Credit Suisse Group AG at the request of and with the approval of Swiss, U.S., and other financial regulators to avert Credit Suisse's failure and a potential systemic banking crisis resulting from continued deterioration of Credit Suisse Group AG.

3. Credit Suisse AG Singapore was a branch of Credit Suisse AG.² Credit Suisse Services AG provided services to Credit Suisse AG Singapore.

4. Unless otherwise specifically noted herein, Credit Suisse Services AG, its former sister entity, Credit Suisse AG, its former parent Credit Suisse Group AG, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, including Credit Suisse AG Singapore, collectively will be called “Credit Suisse” or “the Bank.”

II. Credit Suisse AG Singapore’s U.S. Accounts

5. From at least 2014 through at least in or about June 2023, Credit Suisse maintained certain accounts in Singapore on behalf of U.S. taxpayers (the “Legacy Credit Suisse Singapore U.S. Accounts,” as that term is defined in the accompanying Non-Prosecution Agreement). Credit Suisse was aware that U.S. taxpayers had a legal duty to report to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and pay taxes on all of their income, including income earned on Legacy Credit Suisse Singapore U.S. Accounts. Despite being aware of these obligations, Credit Suisse maintained Legacy Credit Suisse Singapore U.S. Accounts where Credit Suisse should have known that certain U.S. taxpayer customers were not complying with their tax obligations or were using their accounts to evade U.S. taxes and reporting requirements.

6. In particular, between 2014 and June 2023, Credit Suisse AG Singapore (“the Singapore booking center”) held undeclared Legacy Credit Suisse Singapore U.S. Accounts, which Credit Suisse AG Singapore knew or should have known were U.S., with aggregate assets under management valued at over \$2 billion.

7. As one example, one such relationship group involved two beneficial owners of

² Credit Suisse AG Singapore was acquired by UBS AG as part of the 2024 merger. It now operates as UBS AG Singapore, a branch of UBS AG [hereinafter, collectively “UBS”].

accounts who were U.S. persons, but who were able to obscure their U.S. status from Credit Suisse by claiming not to be U.S. persons and through strategic use of their given names and anglicized names.

8. The U.S. persons caused their close friend to open an account at Credit Suisse AG Singapore in 2014, listing one of the owners as a power of attorney. Between November 2017 and December 2022, the U.S. persons opened additional accounts, in which as to some they identified themselves as the beneficial owners. The maximum assets under management in the accounts exceeded \$240 million. In early 2023, concerns about this relationship were raised by a Credit Suisse employee who recognized the relationship as potentially U.S. based on prior dealings with the account relationship at a different financial institution. Credit Suisse began an investigation of the relationship group, which UBS continued after the merger. UBS terminated the accounts due to concerns about a hidden beneficial owner relationship and potential U.S. nexus. The results of that investigation indicate that at least one Relationship Manager who managed the accounts had reason to know that the role holders were U.S. persons.

9. UBS's internal investigation revealed that Credit Suisse failed to adequately identify the beneficial owners of accounts, in part because it failed to implement adequate Know Your Client ("KYC") procedures. More broadly, the investigation showed that, in some instances, the Singapore booking center failed to conduct adequate due diligence on the beneficial owners of accounts and those who held signature authority, therefore failing to identify a U.S. nexus. For example, KYC procedures failed to include adequate public record searches. Adequate public record searches of role holders on accounts that the Singapore booking center had documented as non-U.S. persons would have revealed signs of significant U.S. nexuses, including existing U.S.

addresses, Social Security numbers, voter registration, and other pertinent information that could indicate that certain role holders were U.S. persons and the true beneficial owners.

10. The Singapore booking center failed to conduct adequate inquiry about certain U.S. indicia in the accounts, such as instances where the bank accepted directions to make investments through a U.S. bank; transferred funds for the benefit of persons other than the listed beneficial owners; and transferred funds to pay for various expenditures in the U.S. Furthermore, the Singapore booking center failed to act in connection with one of its largest accounts when it received correspondence suggesting that an individual other than the named beneficial owner owned the assets in and controlled the account. Had the Singapore booking center conducted adequate KYC and due diligence, it would have concluded that for certain accounts, individuals other than the documented beneficial owners in fact owned and controlled the accounts. Such individuals included those who held only signature authority or who had no documented relationship to the accounts. Moreover, an adequate KYC review would also have adequately examined the source of the wealth upon opening of the accounts, the purpose of transfers, and control of accounts.

III. Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Cooperation


11. In 2023, during the post-merger integration of UBS AG Singapore and Credit Suisse AG Singapore, UBS became aware of accounts held at Credit Suisse AG Singapore that appeared to be undeclared U.S. accounts. UBS froze some of the accounts, voluntarily disclosed information about identified accounts to DOJ, and cooperated by undertaking an investigation of the identified accounts, some of which were still open. UBS and its counsel proactively conducted a robust, risk-

based review on an accelerated timeline to identify additional potentially undetected Legacy Credit Suisse Singapore U.S. Accounts booked in Singapore, which resulted in the identification of additional such accounts.

SEEN AND AGREED BY:

ERIK S. SIEBERT
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia
U.S. Department of Justice

KAREN E. KELLY
Chief, delegated Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for Criminal Matters
Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice



Kimberly M. Shartar
Assistant United States Attorney




Mark F. Daly
Nanette L. Davis
Senior Litigation Counsel
Marissa R. Brodney
Trial Attorney

5/5/25
Date

5/5/25
Date


After consulting with its attorneys and pursuant to the non-prosecution agreement entered into this day between the defendant, Credit Suisse Services AG, and the United States, I, the designated corporate representative authorized by the Board of Directors, hereby stipulate that the above Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter proceeded to trial, the United States would have proved the same beyond a reasonable doubt.

Date: May 5, 2025


Jaclyn Barnao
UBS Head of Americas Litigation
Authorized Signatory for
Credit Suisse Services AG

We are Credit Suisse Services AG's attorneys. We have carefully reviewed the above Statement of Facts with the Board of Directors. To our knowledge, the Board of Directors' decision to stipulate to these facts is an informed and voluntary one.

Date: May 5, 2025


Mark Filip
Nicolas Thompson
Eric Stupp
Joel Fischer
Counsel for Credit Suisse
Services AG