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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
12
                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
                    FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14
                                        No. CR 16-442-CAS-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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              Plaintiff,
                                        PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT JOSE
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                                        SAUCEDO
                   v.
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    CARLOS HERNANDEZ, et al.,
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      [JOSE SAUCEDO]
19
              Defendants.
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              This constitutes the plea agreement between JOSE SAUCEDO
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    ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central
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    District of California and the Department of Justice Civil Rights
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    Division (collectively, "the USAO") in the above-captioned case.
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    This agreement is limited to the USAO and cannot bind any other
    federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement,
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    administrative, or regulatory authorities.
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DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

2. Defendant agrees to:

- a. At the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to Counts One, Three, Four, and Five of the Indictment in <u>United States v. Carlos</u>

  <u>Hernandez, et al.</u>, CR 16-442-CAS, which charge defendant with violations of Title 18 U.S.C §§ 241 (Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights), 1959 (Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering), and 844(f) (Attempted Malicious Damage of Federal Property), and a violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (Fair Housing Act).
- b. Not contest the Factual Basis agreed to in this agreement.
- c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- d. Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- e. Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- f. Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.
- g. Pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and prior to sentencing submits a completed financial statement on a form to be provided by the USAO.

h. At the time of sentencing, recommend that pursuant to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence of no less than 120 months' (10 years') imprisonment is warranted for defendant in this matter.

### THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

3. The USAO agrees to:

- a. Dismiss, upon defendant's guilty plea to Counts One,
  Three, Four, and Five of the Indictment, the remaining counts of the
  Indictment.
- b. Not contest the Factual Basis agreed to in this agreement.
- c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- d. At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.
- e. At the time of sentencing, recommend that pursuant to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence of no more than 180 months' (15 years') imprisonment is warranted for defendant in this matter.

#### NATURE OF THE OFFENSES

4. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count One, that is, Conspiring to Violate Civil Rights, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 241, the following must be true: (1) a conspiracy existed which defendant

- joined; (2) the object of the conspiracy was to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate a person or persons in the free exercise or enjoyment of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, in this case, that is, the right to occupy a dwelling free from injury, intimidation, and interference based on race or color; and (3) the planned interference with a protected right was willful.
- 5. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count Three, that is, Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959(a)(6), the following must be true: (1) an enterprise affecting interstate commerce existed during the time period set forth in Count Three; (2) the enterprise engaged in racketeering activity; (3) defendant attempted to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon; (4) defendant's purpose in attempting to commit assault with a dangerous weapon was to gain entrance to, or to maintain, or to increase his position in the enterprise; and (5) defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime.
- 6. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count Four, that is, Interference With the Fair Housing Act, in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 3631, the following must be true: (1) defendant used force or threats of force to intimidate or interfere with, or to attempt to intimidate or interfere with, a person; (2) defendant did so because of that person's race or color; and (3) because that person was enjoying a housing right, namely renting or occupying a dwelling.
- 7. Defendant understands that for defendant to be subject to the statutory maximum sentence set forth below with respect to Count

- Four, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire in the commission of the offense. Defendant admits that defendant, in fact, used a dangerous weapon, explosives, and fire in the commission of the interference with the Fair Housing Act offense charged in Count Four.
- 8. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count Five, that is, Attempted Arson of Federal Property, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(f), the following must be true: (1) defendant maliciously attempted to damage or destroy; (2) a building; (3) owned or leased by an organization receiving federal assistance; by (4) means of fire.
- 9. Defendant understands that for defendant to be subject to the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum sentence set forth below with respect to Count Five, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's attempted use of fire created a substantial risk of injury to any person. Defendant admits that the attempted use of fire to damage federal property, as charged in Count Five, created a substantial risk of injury to a person.

## PENALTIES

10. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 241, is: 10 years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.

- 11. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959(a)(6), as charged in Count Three of the Indictment, is: three years' imprisonment; a one-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 12. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 3631, as charged in Count Four of the Indictment, is: 10 years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 13. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(f)(2), as charged in Count Five of the Indictment, is 40 years' imprisonment; a five-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 14. Defendant understands that the statutory mandatory minimum sentence that the Court must impose for a violation of Title 18,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Defendant understands that there is case law suggesting that the term of supervised release on Count Five could be imposed to run consecutively to the terms of supervised release on the other counts. While the USAO does not intend to seek a consecutive term of supervised release, defendant understands that if the court were to impose a consecutive term of supervised release, the maximum term of supervised release for all of the counts of conviction would be eight years, rather than five years as stated in the text above.

United States Code, Section 844(f)(2), as charged in Count Five of the Indictment, is 7 years' imprisonment.

- 15. Defendant understands, therefore, that the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is: 63 years' imprisonment; a five-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$1,000,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$400. Defendant further understands that the total mandatory minimum sentence that the Court must impose is 7 years' imprisonment.
- 16. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release.
- 17. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.

  Defendant understands that once the court accepts defendant's guilty plea, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that

unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

18. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony conviction in this case may subject defendant to: removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory; denial of citizenship; and denial of admission to the United States in the future. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony conviction in this case. Defendant understands that unexpected immigration consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

#### FACTUAL BASIS

19. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offenses to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant and the USAO agree to the statement of facts provided in Attachment A and agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to establish the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth below but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

### SENTENCING FACTORS

20. Defendant understands that in determining defendant's sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Defendant understands that the

Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot have any expectation of receiving a sentence within the calculated Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court will be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it finds appropriate between the mandatory minimum and up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.

21. Defendant and the USAO agree to the following applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors:

Base Offense Level:	24	[U.S.S.G. §§ 2H1.1., 2K1.4]
Hate Crime Motivation:	+3	[U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1]

Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments, and departures under the Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate. Defendant understands that, absent a finding from the Court that defendant provided substantial assistance, the Court must sentence defendant to a term of 7 years' imprisonment on Count Five.

- 22. Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- 23. Consistent with their Obligations above, including paragraphs 2(h) and 3(e), defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), and (a)(7).

### WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

24. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:

- a. The right to persist in a plea of not quilty.
- b. The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c. The right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be represented by counsel and if necessary have the court appoint counsel at every other stage of the proceeding.
- d. The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- e. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f. The right to testify and to present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify.
- g. The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.
- h. Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

# WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

25. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty pleas were involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to

appeal defendant's convictions on the offenses to which defendant is pleading quilty.

## LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE

- 26. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of 180 months or less, defendant gives up the right to appeal all of the following: (a) the procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion of the sentence, with the exception of defendant's criminal history category (b) the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court; (c) the fine imposed by the court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; (d) the term of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; and (e) any of the following conditions of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court: the conditions set forth in General Orders 318, 01-05, and/or 05-02 of this Court; the drug testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C.
- 27. The USAO agrees that, provided the Court imposes a term of imprisonment no less than 120 months, the USAO gives up its right to appeal any portion of the sentence.

### RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

28. Defendant agrees that if, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty pleas on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was involuntary, then (a) the USAO will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement; (b) should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations

will be tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and (ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

### EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

29. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

## BREACH OF AGREEMENT

30. Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. For example, if defendant knowingly, in an interview, before a grand jury, or at trial, falsely accuses another person of criminal conduct or falsely minimizes defendant's own role, or the role of another, in criminal conduct, defendant will have breached this agreement. All of defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the USAO in writing. If the USAO declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then:

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a. If defendant has previously entered guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty pleas.

- b. The USAO will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement; in particular, the USAO will no longer be bound by any agreements concerning sentencing and will be free to seek any sentence up to the statutory maximum for the crimes to which defendant has pleaded guilty.
- c. The USAO will be free to criminally prosecute defendant for false statement, obstruction of justice, and perjury based on any knowingly false or misleading statement by defendant.

### COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

- 31. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors.
- 32. Defendant understands that both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and the sentence it chooses to impose are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 21 are consistent with the facts of this case. This paragraph permits both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed

as inconsistent with the Factual Basis or Sentencing Factors agreed to in this agreement.

33. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all of defendant's obligations under this agreement.

Defendant understands that no one - not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court - can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

# NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

34. Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

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1 PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING 35. The parties agree that this agreement will be considered 2 part of the record of defendant's quilty plea hearing as if the 3 entire agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding. 4 5 AGREED AND ACCEPTED 6 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 NICOLA T. HANNA United States Attorney 9 Mack C. enkins 3/19/2018 10 MACK E. JENZINS JULIA GEGENHEIMER Date 11 Assistant United States Attorneys 12 13 14 15 Defendant 16 17 18 Attorney for Defendant 19 Jose Saucedo 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

### CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I have had this agreement read to me in its entirety. I have had enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading guilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason.

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## CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

I am the defendant's attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement.

Attorney for Defendant Jose Saucedo

3/19/18 Date

ATTACHMENT A: FACTUAL BASIS

The parties agree to the following facts and that, if this case were to proceed to trial, the government would be prepared to prove at least the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:

- 1. Throughout the period described in the above-captioned Indictment, defendant JOSE SAUCEDO, aka "Lil' Moe" ("defendant"), along with codefendants 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (collectively, the "codefendants"), were all members of the Big Hazard street gang ("Hazard").
- Indictment, Hazard is and was a multi-generational gang that claims as part of its territory the Ramona Garden Housing Development ("RGHD"), a public housing development located in the Boyle Heights section of Los Angeles, within the Central District of California. The RGHD was built using federal funds provided by the United States Housing Authority and continues to receive financial assistance from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The RGHD is occupied primarily by Hispanic residents and also includes, among others, a tiny fraction of African-American residents.
- 3. Hazard, including its leaders, members, and associates, constitutes a criminal "enterprise," as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(4). That is, Hazard constitutes a group of individuals associated together in an organization whose members and associates function as a continuing unit for a common purpose of achieving the objectives of the enterprise. These objectives include dominating the RGHD and monopolizing its criminal activity, including

drug trafficking. As a result of its drug trafficking conduct, throughout the period described in the above-captioned Indictment, Hazard members and associates engaged in, and their activities in some way affected, interstate commerce.

- 4. Between no later than early May 2014, defendant SAUCEDO and the codefendants knowingly and willfully entered into an agreement to firebomb several of the apartments in the RGHD that were occupied by African-American families, including women and children ("the African-American victims"). The co-conspirators planned to use Molotov cocktails to attack residences in order to (1) threaten and intimidate the African-American victims for exercising and enjoying their federally protected right to live in the RGHD free from injury, intimidation, and interference based on race and (2) maliciously damage the residences occupied by the African-American victims. Additionally, defendant SAUCEDO knew that the firebombing could result in serious bodily injury to the African-American victims. Defendant SAUCEDO entered into this agreement in order to maintain his position within Hazard.
- 5. Codefendant 1 divided defendant SAUCEDO and the other codefendants into two groups of four. Codefendant 1 told the two groups they would split up when they arrived at the RGHD, with one group going to target the African-American victims who resided in one area of the RGHD and the other group going to target the African-American victims who resided in a different area of the RGHD. The codefendants then discussed the locations of each victim's residence.
- 6. Codefendants 1, 3, 6, and another coconspirator were in one group; codefendant 1 was the leader of that group. Defendant SAUCEDO

was part of the second group that included codefendants 4, 5, and 7. Codefendant 1 assigned everyone in his group a role in the firebombing. Codefendant 1 stated that the group would throw the Molotov cocktails into the African-American victims' apartments after the windows were broken and the Molotov cocktails were ignited. Codefendant 1 provided the codefendants with several Molotov cocktails, tools to break the windows, including a wrench and a hammer, and materials to conceal their identities from the surveillance cameras in and around the RGHD and any witnesses. Codefendants 3 and 5 put the gasoline-filled bottles with torn rags in a crate.

- 7. Defendant SAUCEDO and the other codefendants who were present were told by codefendant 1 that the African-American victims were being targeted for firebombing because of their race and that such order had come down from a senior Hazard gang leader and ultimately from a Hispanic prison gang. Codefendant 1, defendant SAUCEDO and the other codefendants who were present discussed that the targeted units would be occupied by residents, including children, at the time of the proposed firebombing attack.
- 8. Codefendant 1 obtained a van to transport the codefendants. Codefendants 1 and 4 were each armed with a semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of the firebombing and to protect the Hazard members from any rivals they might encounter while preparing to travel to the firebombing.
- 9. Codefendant 1 drove the codefendants in the van outside of the Projects and Hazard territory and parked the van. After leaving the van, the codefendants walked to the RGHD using the pedestrian

Defendant's Initials 1.5

overpass that runs over the I-10 freeway. The codefendants chose this route to the RGHD in order to avoid detection by surveillance cameras. Shortly after midnight on or about May 12, 2014, the codefendants entered the RGHD. Once inside the RGHD, the codefendants split up into their respective groups and proceeded to their targets.

- 10. When defendant SAUCEDO's group arrived at their victims' residences, he and his codefendants fulfilled the roles provided them by codefendant 1. Using his hammer, codefendant 7 broke the window of one victim's residence in order to allow a firebomb to enter the unit, codefendant 5 lit the ripped up towel in the firebomb, and defendant SAUCEDO then threw a firebomb into that unit. A codefendant in defendant SAUCEDO's group threw a second firebomb at their targeted unit.
- 11. Defendant SAUCEDO and the codefendants moved to a second victim's residence. Defendant SAUCEDO knew the location of second victim's unit and directed his codefendants to which window to break. Codefendant 7 hit a window with a hammer. A codefendant threw a firebomb at the second victim's unit.
- 12. Immediately after the firebombing attack, codefendant 3, driving the van obtained by codefendant 1, transported codefendant 1 to White Memorial Hospital due to injuries that codefendant 1 incurred during the firebombing. Codefendant 3 then drove the other codefendants to a location outside of Hazard territory. While at that location, codefendants 4 and 7 both possessed firearms.
- 13. In total, the codefendants maliciously struck and damaged four different residences in the RGHD with Molotov cocktails on May

12, 2014. The units were: (a) Unit 124, occupied by Victim "1", Victim "1"'s minor children, and Victim "2"; (b) Unit 119, occupied by Victim "3", Victim "3"'s minor children, and Victim "4"; (c) Unit 61, occupied by Victim "5", and Victim "5"'s children and three grandchildren; (d) Unit 123, occupied by Victim "6", directly adjacent to Victim "1"'s Unit 124.

14. Three of the four residences they struck and damaged were occupied by the African-American victims, who were the intended targets of the codefendants' firebombing. Defendant SAUCEDO and the codefendants targeted the victims because they are African-American and in order to force the African-American victims to move from the RGHD. Defendant SAUCEDO also committed the firebombing, in substantial part, to maintain his status in Hazard.

15. Defendant SAUCEDO and the codefendants knew that throwing firebombs into residences occupied by children, among others, after midnight created a substantial likelihood of causing serious bodily injury to at least one of the residents. Such bodily injury could have included injuries sustained from broken glass, being hit by an ignited bottle, smoke inhalation, the explosion resulting from the firebomb, and any resulting fire. Defendant SAUCEDO also knew that such bodily injury was intended by at least one of the codefendants.