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FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Jul 07, 2020

SEAN F. McAVOY, CLERK

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

13
14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 LI XIAOYU (a/k/a "Oro0lxy") and
17 DONG JIAZHI,

18 Defendants.
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4:20-CR-6019-SMJ

INDICTMENT

Vio.: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(5)(A)
Conspiracy to Access Without
Authorization and Damage
Computers (Count 1)

18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1-3),
1832(a)(5)
Conspiracy to Commit Theft of
Trade Secrets (Count 2)

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (b), (c)(2)(B)(i-iii)
Unauthorized Access to
Computers (Count 3)

18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,
Conspiracy to Commit Wire
Fraud (Count 4)

18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A, 2
Aggravated Identity Theft
(Counts 5-11)

Criminal Forfeiture Allegations
18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2)(B),
1030(i)(1)

7
8 The Grand Jury charges:

9 At all times relevant to this Indictment, unless otherwise stated:

10 INTRODUCTION

11 1. Beginning no later than September 2009 and continuing until at least
12 the date of this Indictment, together, Defendants LI XIAOYU (a/k/a “Oro0lxy”)
13 (hereinafter “LI” and/or “LI XIAOYU”) and DONG JIAZHI (hereinafter “DONG”
14 and/or “DONG JIAZHI”) and collectively the “Defendants,” each a hacker in the
15 People’s Republic of China (“China” or “PRC”), gained unauthorized access to
16 computers around the world and stole terabytes of data.

17 2. LI and DONG, former classmates at an electrical engineering college
18 in Chengdu, China, used their technical training to hack the computer networks of
19 a wide variety of victims, such as companies engaged in high tech manufacturing;
20 civil, industrial, and medical device engineering; business, educational, and
21 gaming software development; solar energy; and pharmaceuticals. More recently,
22 they researched vulnerabilities in the networks of biotech and other firms publicly
23 known for work on COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and testing technology. Their
24 victim companies were located all across the world, including among other places
25 the United States, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
26 South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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1 3. The Defendants stole hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of trade
2 secrets, intellectual property, and other valuable business information. At least
3 once, they returned to a victim from which they had stolen valuable source code to
4 attempt an extortion—threatening to publish on the internet, and thereby destroy
5 the value of, the victim's intellectual property unless a ransom was paid.

6 4. LI and DONG did not just hack for themselves. While in some
7 instances they were stealing business and other information for their own profit, in
8 others they were stealing information of obvious interest to the PRC Government's
9 Ministry of State Security ("MSS"). LI and DONG worked with, were assisted by,
10 and operated with the acquiescence of the MSS, including MSS Officer 1, known
11 to the Grand Jury, who was assigned to the Guangdong regional division of the
12 MSS (the Guangdong State Security Department, "GSSD").

13 5. When stealing information of interest to the MSS, LI and DONG in
14 most instances obtained that data through computer fraud against corporations and
15 research institutions. For example, from victims including defense contractors in
16 the U.S. and abroad, LI and DONG stole information regarding military satellite
17 programs; military wireless networks and communications systems; high powered
18 microwave and laser systems; a counter-chemical weapons system; and ship-to-
19 helicopter integration systems.
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21 6. In other instances, the Defendants provided the MSS with personal
22 data, such as the passwords for personal email accounts belonging to individual
23 Chinese dissidents. For example, they provided the MSS with email accounts and
24 passwords belonging to a Hong Kong community organizer, the pastor of a
25 Christian church in Xi'an, and a dissident and former Tiananmen Square protestor.
26 The Defendants also stole email account contents of obvious interest to the PRC
27 Government, such as emails between that same dissident and the office of the
28 Dalai Lama; emails belonging to a Chinese Christian "house" (*i.e.*, not PRC

1 Government-approved) pastor in Chengdu, who was later arrested by the PRC
2 government; and emails from a U.S. professor and organizer, and two Canadian
3 residents, who advocated for freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. In some
4 instances the Defendants reacted quickly to the PRC government’s perceived
5 desires, targeting the above-mentioned Chengdu house pastor just days after the
6 provincial government banned his church, and conducting reconnaissance on a
7 webmail service and a messaging app when those were used by Hong Kong
8 citizens protesting the PRC government’s recent steps to curtail freedoms there.

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10 7. MSS Officer 1 assisted LI and other hackers. For example, when LI
11 encountered difficulty compromising the mail server of a Burmese human rights
12 group, MSS Officer 1 provided him with malware—a computer program designed
13 to compromise a victim computer system—to exploit a popular internet browser.
14 As LI had requested, MSS Officer 1 provided him “0day” malware, *i.e.* malware
15 unknown to the software vendor and to security researchers.

16 8. MSS Officer 1 and other MSS officers known to the Grand Jury
17 purported to be researchers at the “Guangdong Province International Affairs
18 Research Center.” In fact, they were intelligence officers working for the GSSD at
19 Number 5, 6th Crossroad, Upper Nonglin Road, Yuexiu District, in Guangzhou, at
20 the facility depicted in in these images:

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1 and agencies of the United States and protected computers, and where the offense
2 did cause and would, if completed, have caused loss aggregating \$5,000 in value to
3 at least one person during a one-year period from a related course of conduct
4 affecting a protected computer, and damage affecting at least 10 protected
5 computers during a one-year period, and, did and would have affected a computer
6 used by or for an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the
7 administration of national defense and national security, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
8 §§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B).

9
10 THE DEFENDANTS

11 13. Defendant LI XIAOYU was a citizen of and resident of China. LI
12 studied Computer Application Technologies at the University of Electronic
13 Science and Technology (“UEST”) in Chengdu, China. In the conspiracy, LI
14 primarily compromised victim networks and stole information.

15 14. Defendant DONG JIAZHI was a citizen of and resident of China.
16 DONG studied Computer Application Technologies at the same time as LI at
17 UEST. DONG primarily researched victims and potential means of exploiting
18 them.

19 MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
20 TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DEFENDANTS


21 15. The manner and means by which Defendants LI and DONG sought to
22 accomplish the conspiracy included, among other things, the following:

- 23 a. Defendants researched and identified victims possessing information
24 of interest, including trade secrets, confidential business information,
25 information concerning defense products and programs, and personal
26 identifying information (“PII”) of victim employees, customers, and
27 others, using various sources of information including business news
28 websites, consulting firm websites, and a variety of search websites.

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- b. Defendants then gained unauthorized access to victims possessing the information sought by the conspiracy. Defendants typically stole the kinds of information with which their victims were most closely associated. That is, they stole source code from software companies; information about drugs under development, including chemical designs, from pharmaceutical firms; students' PII from an education company; and weapon designs and testing data from defense contractors.
- c. In some instances the Defendants targeted companies that possessed information belonging to other, partner companies—for example, the Defendants targeted a scientific research and testing company and, from it, stole information belonging to a range of that company's clients, including Victims 10 and 11.
- d. The Defendants usually gained initial access to victim networks using publicly known software vulnerabilities in popular products. Those vulnerabilities were sometimes newly announced, meaning that many users would not have installed patches to correct the vulnerability. The Defendants exploited vulnerabilities in commonly used web server software, web application development suites, and software collaboration programs. They also targeted insecure default configurations in common applications.
- e. The Defendants used their initial access to place malicious programs known as "web shells" on victim networks without authorization. Web shells are programs that allow the remote execution of commands on a computer.
- f. The Defendants frequently employed variants of the China Chopper web shell. China Chopper is publicly available and commonly

1 employed by hackers working in China. It provides an easy-to-use
2 interface through which the user can control web shells installed on
3 multiple victim computers, as shown in this publicly-available sample
4 image:



23 g. Defendants frequently disguised web shells they placed on victim
24 networks by giving the associated files innocuous names. For
25 example, they placed a China Chopper web shell employed against
26 one victim under the name “p.jsp” and hid it at URL “http://[redacted]
27 .com/builds/fragments/p.jsp.”
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- 1 h. That, combined with the large number of China Chopper variants
- 2 available, made the web shells difficult for victims to discover.
- 3 i. Defendants also sometimes secured access to their web shells with
- 4 passwords.
- 5 j. In addition to web shells, Defendants frequently uploaded credential-
- 6 stealing software programs to victim computer networks and then
- 7 used and attempted to use the resulting stolen passwords, including
- 8 passwords belonging to real, authorized network users, to gain further
- 9 access to victim network.
- 10 k. Once Defendants gained access to and surveilled victim networks,
- 11 they typically packaged victim data in compressed, encrypted Roshal
- 12 Archive Compressed files (“RAR files”).
- 13 l. The Defendants changed file names and extensions on documents and
- 14 files they stole from victims computers, to make it more difficult for
- 15 victims and law enforcement to identify the theft. For example, the
- 16 Defendants frequently changed file names associated with the RAR
- 17 files they created to extensions such as “.jpg” to make those files
- 18 appear to appear to be images.
- 19 m. The Defendants frequently operated within the “recycle bin” on
- 20 victim networks. The folder where recycle bin files are stored is
- 21 hidden by default in the Windows operating system, and system
- 22 administrators can thus be less likely to discover files saved there.
- 23 Defendants often loaded malicious programs into folders they created
- 24 within the recycle bin, saved RAR files they created there, and stole
- 25 such files, and the data contained therein, from victim computers’
- 26 recycle bins.
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- n. After stealing data and information from their victims and bringing that data and information back to China, Defendants then sold it for profit or provided it to the MSS, including MSS Officer 1.
- o. The Defendants frequently returned to re-victimize companies, government entities, and organizations from which they had previously stolen data. In some cases the Defendants returned years after a successful data theft.

INTRUSIONS

16. During the approximate time periods identified, and from the victims whose identities are known to the Grand Jury, the defendants stole the approximate quantity and type of data as described in the table below:

U.S. VICTIMS			
Victim	Approx. Time Frame of Activity	Approx. Quantity of Data Stolen	Nature of Data Stolen (Not Inclusive)
Victim 1: California technology and defense firm	Dec. 2014- Jan. 2015	200 GB	Radio, laser, and antennae technology; circuit board and related algorithm designs for advanced antennae; testing mechanisms and results.
Victim 2: Maryland technology and manufacturing firm	Jan. 2015- Apr. 2015	64 GB	Testing mechanisms and results, product composition, and manufacturing processes related to high-tech materials and composites, which would reveal to competitors what products the victim was working on and allow competitors to save on research and development costs. Information related to supply chains for raw materials, such as a global shortage of a key component.

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Victim 3: Hanford Site, Department of Energy, in the Eastern District of Washington ("Hanford")	Mar. 2015	<1GB	Reconnaissance information about Hanford's network and its personnel, such as lists of authorized user and administrator accounts.
Victim 4: Texas engineering and technology firm	Apr. 2015- June 2016	27 GB	Business proposals and other documents concerning space and satellite applications.
Victim 5: Virginia federal and defense contractor	Sept. 2015- Feb. 2016	140 GB	Presentations, project files, drawings, and other documents relating to projects for the U.S. Air Force and Federal Bureau of Investigation; PII belonging to more than 300 Victim 5 employees and contractors.
Victim 6: Massachusetts software firm	Mar. 2017	76 GB	Proprietary and sensitive data including software source code.
Victim 7: California software gaming company and subsidiary of a Japanese company	Mar. 2018	22 GB	Source code for two Victim 7's games, one of which had not yet been released to the public.

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Victim 8: Mechanical engineering company operating in the U.S. and Japan	Apr. 2018- May 2018; Mar. 2020	1.2 TB	Proprietary and sensitive data held in the U.S. and Japan, including component engineering drawings and specifications for high-efficiency gas turbines.
Victim 9: U.S. educational software company	Nov. 2018- Feb. 2019	10 GB	Proprietary and sensitive data, including, among other things, millions of students and teachers' PII.
Victim 10: Massachusetts pharmaceutical company	Feb. 2019- Mar. 2019	2 GB	Chemical structure of anti-infective agents, the chemical engineering processes needed to create those agents, and test results from Victim 10's research, all of which would enable a competitor to focus research on areas of higher potential investment return without making the same research and development expenditures as the victim.
Victim 11: California pharmaceutical company	Feb. 2019- Mar. 2019	105 GB	Chemical structure and design of a treatment for a common chronic disease, and testing, toxicity, and dosing research related to that treatment, all of which would allow a competitor to leverage the victim's research and development expenditures.
Victim 12: Massachusetts medical device engineering company	Feb. 2019- Mar. 2019; Jan. 2020	83 GB	Source code for Victim 12's medical devices, and algorithms essential to the operation of those devices. At or about this time, the victim had partnered with a Chinese firm to produce various components for similar devices, taking care not to permit access to the victim's source code or algorithms.

1 2 3 4 5 6 Victim 13: U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese medical device and supplies company	Mar. 2019- Apr. 2019	128 GB	Proprietary and sensitive data including designs, testing data, and manufacturing plans for internal medical devices, as well as designs for machinery needed to fabricate those devices.
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7 17. The Defendants targeted victims around the world. They tended to
8 target companies in countries with successful technology industries. As when
9 targeting U.S. victims, the Defendants stole data associated with the knowledge
10 areas for which those overseas victims were best known. The Defendants'
11 overseas victims included, among others:

OVERSEAS VICTIMS		
Victim	Approx. Time Frame of Activity	Defendant Conduct
16 17 18 19 20 Victim 14: Large electronics firm in the Netherlands	Feb. 2016	Compromised Victim 14's computer network.
21 22 23 24 Victim 15: Swedish online gaming company	Mar. 2017	Stole approximately 169 gigabytes of data concerning, among other things, development build code for Victim 15's products; developer keys and certificates; usernames and passwords; and code associated with in-game upgrades.
25 26 27 28 Victim 16: Lithuanian gaming company	Apr. 2017	Stole approximately 38 gigabytes of data concerning, among other things, programming data, Java files, and encoding files.

1 2 3 4 5	Victim 17: German construction software company	May 2017	Stole approximately 1 GB of, among other things, source code for Victim 17's products.
6 7 8 9	Victim 18: German software engineering firm	Apr. 2017	Stole approximately 2 gigabytes of data from company that creates products designed to manage, among other things, wireless networks and Internet of Things ("IoT") platforms.
10 11 12 13	Victim 19: Belgian engineering software company	Mar. 2018- Apr. 2018	Stole approximately 142 gigabytes of documents including, among other things, source code for Victim 19's products, imaging tools, and algorithms, associated with computational fluid dynamics.
14 15 16 17 18	Victim 20: Civil and transportation engineering firm in the Netherlands	Feb. 2019- July 2019	Compromised Victim 20's computer network.
19 20 21 22	Victim 21: Australian defense contractor	Apr. 2019-June 2019	Stole approximately 320 gigabytes of documents including, among other things, source code for Victim 21's products; engineering schematics; and technical manuals.
23 24 25 26 27 28	Victim 22: South Korean shipbuilding and engineering firm	June 2019-July 2019	Stole approximately 842 megabytes of documents concerning, including, among other things, IoT software and smart factory development.

1 2 3 4 5 Victim 23: Australian solar energy engineering concern	Jan. 2020	Compromised Victim 23's network and conducted additional network reconnaissance.
6 7 8 Victim 24: Spanish electronics and defense firm	Mar. 2020	Stole approximately 900 GB of documents from a company that engineers technology solutions in civilian and defense sectors.
9 10 11 12 13 Victim 25: U.K. artificial intelligence and cancer research firm	Apr. 2020	Compromised the network of Victim 25.

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18. These numbered victims represent only a small percentage of the Defendants' offense conduct. The Defendants and their co-conspirators compromised hundreds of victims.

OVERT ACTS

19. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to affect its unlawful objects, LI and DONG committed and caused to be committed the following overt acts, among others, in the Eastern District of Washington and elsewhere.

20. On or about December 3, 2014, LI conducted reconnaissance on a U.S. Navy contracting portal containing information about companies including Victim 5.

21. On or about December 26 and 30, 2014, DONG conducted reconnaissance on Victim 5 by a variety of means, including viewing data about the company that was available on the website of a consulting firm.

1 22. On or about December 4, 2015, LI accessed a China Chopper web
2 shell program on Victim 5's network at "[redacted].com/irj/api.jsp."

3 23. On or about December 4, 2015, LI used a Victim 5's employee's
4 credentials without authorization and obtained information that the employee was
5 authorized to access.

6 24. On or about August 10, 2019, LI attempted but failed to again access
7 Victim 5's network, using the usernames and passwords of three company
8 personnel.

9 25. In or about December 2014, LI compressed Victim 1's files into RAR
10 files, divided those RAR files into smaller sub-files, and then removed the RAR
11 files.

12 26. On or about December 29, 2014, DONG accessed Victim 1's stolen
13 RAR files.

14 27. On or about January 16, 2015, LI conducted reconnaissance on
15 Victim 2's network, including scanning IP addresses associated with the network,
16 attempting to access network administrator tools, and browsing subdomains.

17 28. During the Victim 2 intrusion, LI saved a Javascript, password-
18 protected web shell to Victim 2's network under filename chengshu_jsp.java.

19 29. On or about April 25, 2015, LI transferred files stolen from Victim 2's
20 network to China.

21 30. On or about August 5, 2019, LI attempted unsuccessfully to regain
22 unauthorized access to Victim 2's network.

23 31. In or around March 2015, LI accessed a web shell program named
24 "lm.aspx" on the Hanford computer network.

25 32. LI also hid another web shell from Hanford's network defenders,
26 naming the other "toolbars.cfm," and password protecting it.
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1 33. On or about March 16, 2015, LI used a web shell to execute command
2 “whoami” (to list the username of the account that he was using to run commands)
3 on Hanford’s network.

4 34. That same day, LI used a web shell to execute command “net
5 localgroup administrators” on Hanford’s network, to print the list of user accounts
6 possessing administrator-level privileges.

7 35. On or about November 15, 2018, LI attempted to exploit an Adobe
8 ColdFusion vulnerability that had been publicly identified and patched in
9 September 2018 (9 CVE-2018-15961) by navigating to the file manager on
10 Hanford’s network associated with text editing program CKEditor, at
11 [redacted]ckeditor/plugins/-filemanger/filemanager.cfm.
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13 36. The Defendants failed to access this CKEditor file manager. But
14 Hanford was not the only entity Defendants sought to exploit using
15 CVE-2018-15961.

- 16 a. On or about October 20, 2018, LI navigated to the network of another
17 victim—a U.S. government biomedical research agency in Maryland.
- 18 b. There, too, LI navigated to the file manager at [redacted]ckeditor/
19 plugins/filemanager/filemanager.cfm. LI successfully accessed the
20 file manager.
- 21 c. Then, he used that access to upload a ColdFusion web shell program
22 named “cfm backdoor by ufo” to the ckeditor file manager.
- 23 d. One minute later, he used that ColdFusion web shell to upload
24 another, China Chopper web shell to the victim’s network.

25 37. In or around April 2015, DONG conducted reconnaissance on U.S.
26 engineering and technology companies, including Victim 4.
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28 38. In the course of that reconnaissance, DONG employed a third-party
network research tool to analyze Victim 4’s computer network.

1 39. On or about June 15 and 16, 2016, LI compressed and encrypted
2 Victim 4's documents into RAR files falsely labeled with ".jpg" file extensions to
3 mimic image files.

4 40. On or about February 29, 2016, LI accessed a web shell on
5 Victim 14's network at [http://origin.www.\[redacted\].com/Q2O/CFIDE/-](http://origin.www.[redacted].com/Q2O/CFIDE/-)
6 [scripts/error.cfm](http://origin.www.[redacted].com/Q2O/CFIDE/-).

7 41. On or about March 16, 2017, LI used a China Chopper web shell to
8 change the last-modified time of Victim 15's files (a technique known as
9 "timestomping").

10 42. On or about April 21, 2017, LI compromised Victim 18's network by
11 exploiting a vulnerability in web application development software running on
12 Victim 18's server.

13 43. On or about April 29, 2017, LI compressed a Victim 16's network
14 directory into a "tarball," a compressed file format in the Linux operating system.

15 44. On or about May 22, 2017, LI downloaded a RAR file from
16 Victim 17's network, and transferred it to China.

17 45. LI emailed several Victim 6's personnel on or about December 6,
18 2017, with the subject line "Source Code To Be Leaked!"

19 a. LI emailed them using a compromised mail server and an email
20 account hosted on the network of another company.

21 b. In his email, LI demanded Victim 6 pay \$15,000 in cryptocurrency.

22 c. In that same email, LI threatened to "publish all [Victim 6's] source
23 code" to the internet unless he was paid.

24 d. LI also attached a file containing a folder named "demo pro e source
25 code" to his email, containing source code stolen from Victim 6 in or
26 around March 2017.
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1 46. On or about March 8, 2018, LI downloaded three RAR files with
2 “.jpg” file extensions from Victim 7’s network.

3 47. On or about March 21, 2018, LI accessed a China Chopper web shell
4 he had placed on the network of Victim 19, at [http://helpdesk.\[redacted\].be/-](http://helpdesk.[redacted].be/-)
5 [uuid/HttpServletWrapper](http://helpdesk.[redacted].be/-uuid/HttpServletWrapper).

6 48. On or about April 30, 2018, LI used stolen, valid credentials to access
7 Victim 8’s mail server in Tokyo, Japan.

8 49. On or about March 10, 2020, LI used stolen, valid system account
9 credentials to access Victim 8’s webmail server.

10 50. On or about December 1, 2018, LI transferred 649 megabytes of data
11 stolen from Victim 9 to China.

12 51. On or about December 2, 2018, LI transferred 9.5 gigabytes of data
13 stolen from Victim 9 to China.

14 52. On or about February 27, 2019, LI accessed Victim 12’s network via a
15 China Chopper web shell at URL [http://\[redacted\].com/custom/login/tst.jsp](http://[redacted].com/custom/login/tst.jsp).

16 53. On or about the same day, LI accessed Victim 12’s web server using
17 stolen, valid credentials.

18 54. On or about May 11, 2020, LI navigated to the same URL at which he
19 had placed the web shell on Victim 12’s network, but the web shell was no longer
20 present.

21 55. On or about March 17, 2019, LI logged in to a Chinese, invitation-
22 only criminal hacking forum.

23 56. On or about February 7, 2019, LI accessed a China Chopper web shell
24 he had placed on the network of Victim 20, at [http://\[redacted\].com/SQLTrace-](http://[redacted].com/SQLTrace-)
25 [/i.jsp](http://[redacted].com/SQLTrace-/i.jsp).
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1 57. On or about March 21, 2019, LI used the valid credentials of a
2 Victim 13 network user to create a subfolder within Victim 13’s network recycle
3 bin, and then created RAR files containing Victim 13’s data in the recycle bin.

4 58. On or about April 18, 2019, LI accessed a China Chopper web shell
5 on Victim 21’s network at [http://confluence.\[redacted\].com/i.jsp](http://confluence.[redacted].com/i.jsp).

6 59. On or about June 26, 2019, LI timestomped Victim 22’s files to
7 disguise his actions on Victim 22’s network.

8 60. On or about January 25 and 27, 2020, LI searched for vulnerabilities
9 at a Maryland biotech firm. That firm had announced less than a week earlier that
10 it was researching a potential COVID-19 vaccine.

11 61. On or about January 27, 2020, LI conducted reconnaissance on the
12 computer network of a Massachusetts biotech firm publicly known to be
13 researching a potential COVID-19 vaccine.

14 62. On or about January 28, 2020, LI accessed Victim 23’s network via a
15 China Chopper web shell.

16 63. LI then executed commands on Victim 23’s network that enabled him
17 to view reconnaissance information such as directory contents and user privileges.

18 64. On or about February 1, 2020, LI searched for vulnerabilities in the
19 network of a California biotech firm that had announced one day earlier that it was
20 researching antiviral drugs to treat COVID-19.

21 65. On or about March 17, 2020, LI accessed Victim 24’s network and
22 browsed 40 RAR files, named with “.jpg” image-file extensions, in folder
23 [webmail.\[redacted\].es/aspnet_client/images/](mailto:webmail.[redacted].es/aspnet_client/images/).

24 66. On or about April 1, 2020, LI accessed a China Chopper web shell on
25 Victim 25’s network at [\[redacted\].com/confluence/plugins/-servlet/URA](http://[redacted].com/confluence/plugins/-servlet/URA).

- 1 a. Knowingly and without authorization steal, appropriate, take, and by
- 2 fraud, artifice, and deception obtain trade secrets that were related to a
- 3 product or service used in and intended to be used in interstate and
- 4 foreign commerce;
- 5 b. Knowingly and without authorization copy, duplicate, alter, replicate,
- 6 transmit, deliver, send, communicate, and convey trade secrets that
- 7 were related to a product or service used in and intended to be used in
- 8 interstate and foreign commerce; and
- 9 c. Knowingly receive, buy, and possess trade secrets that were related to
- 10 a product or service used in and intended to be used in interstate and
- 11 foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen,
- 12 appropriated, obtained, and converted without authorization.
- 13

14 76. LI and DONG conspired to steal trade secret information from
15 Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 6, Victim 7, Victim 10, Victim 11, Victim 12, and
16 Victim 13. Each of the victims took reasonable measures to keep this information
17 secret, and such information derived independent economic value from not being
18 generally known, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
19 another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
20 information.

21 77. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the purpose and objects
22 thereof, Defendants LI and DONG, and others, committed various overt acts in the
23 Eastern District of Washington and elsewhere, including, but not limited to, the
24 overt acts identified in paragraphs 25 through 30, 45 through 46, 52 through 54,
25 and 57, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(1-3), all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
26 §§ 1832(a)(5).
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COUNT THREE

Computer Fraud and Abuse: Unauthorized Access

78. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 and 13 through 73 are realleged and incorporated as if set forth herein.

79. In or about November 2018, in the Eastern District of Washington and elsewhere, Defendants LI and DONG, aided and abetted by each other and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, attempted to access and accessed computers of the United States, specifically the Department of Energy, and protected computers, in the Eastern District of Washington, without authorization to obtain information, in furtherance of violations of the United States, including, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 641, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (b), and (c)(2)(B)(i-iii).

COUNT FOUR

Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud

80. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 and 13 through 73 are realleged and incorporated as if set forth herein.

81. From at least on or about September 1, 2009, until on or about July 7, 2020, in the Eastern District of Washington and elsewhere, the Defendants, LI and DONG, did knowingly and intentionally conspire with each other and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, including officers of the MSS including MSS Officer 1, to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain property from the United States and others, by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises—including among others the presentation of false identification to gain unauthorized access to computers—and did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, namely malicious code, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute

1 such scheme and artifice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, all in violation of 18
2 U.S.C. § 1349.

3 COUNTS FIVE through ELEVEN

4 *Aggravated Identity Theft*

5 82. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 and 78 through
6 81 are realleged and incorporated as if set forth herein.

7 83. On or about the dates set forth below, in the Eastern District of
8 Washington and elsewhere, the Defendants, LI and DONG, aided and abetted by
9 each other and by others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, during and in
10 relation to the crime of Unauthorized Access to Computers, in violation of 18
11 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (b), (c)(2)(B)(i-iii) and the crime of Conspiracy
12 to Commit Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, did knowingly
13 transfer, possess, and use, without lawful authority, the means of identification of
14 another person:
15

COUNT	ON OR ABOUT	IDENTIFICATION OF ANOTHER PERSON
Five	December 4, 2015	LI accessed the network of Victim 5 using username dj*** and that real user's password.
Six	March 16, 2017	LI accessed the network of Victim 6 with username rg***** and that real user's password.
Seven	March 26, 2017	LI accessed the network of Victim 6 with username kh***** and that real user's password.
Eight	February 26, 2019	LI stole and possessed two usernames and associated passwords associated with real users from Victim 12.

Nine	March 21, 2019	LI stole and possessed four usernames and associated passwords associated with real users from Victim 13.
Ten	March 21, 2019	LI accessed the network of Victim 13 with username ke***** and that real user's password.
Eleven	August 10, 2019	LI attempted to access the network of Victim 5 using three Victim 5 usernames and associated passwords all associated with real users.

All in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 2.

CRIMINAL FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS

84. As a result of committing one or more of the offenses alleged in Counts One through Eleven of this Indictment, Defendants LI and DONG, shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2)(B) and 1030(i)(1), the Defendants' interests in any personal property that was used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate the commission of such offenses, and any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of one or both of the said offenses, including but not limited to the sum of money representing the amount of proceeds obtained as a result of one or both of the said offenses.

85. If any one of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the Defendants:


- a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
- b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person;
- c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;
- d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

1 e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
2 without difficulty;
3 it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) and 21
4 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendants up to
5 the value of the above forfeitable property.

6 DATED this 7 day of July, 2020.

7 A TRUE BILL

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9
10
11 Forfeiture

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13
14 
15 William D. Hyslop
16 United States Attorney

17
18 
19 James A. Goeke
20 Assistant United States Attorney

21 
22 Scott K. McCulloch
23 Department of Justice Trial Attorney
24 National Security Division
25
26
27
28