

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CHAD F. WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*, an alien is “inadmissible” if, “in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, [the alien] is likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A). Following notice-and-comment rulemaking, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promulgated a final rule interpreting the statutory term “public charge” and establishing a framework by which DHS personnel are to assess whether an alien is likely to become a public charge. The questions presented are:

1. Whether entities that are not subject to the public-charge ground of inadmissibility contained in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A), and which seek to expand benefits usage by aliens who are potentially subject to that provision, are proper parties to challenge the final rule.
2. Whether the final rule is likely contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners (defendants-appellants below) are Chad F. Wolf, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; the United States Department of Homeland Security; the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, an agency within the United States Department of Homeland Security; and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, in his official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.*

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Cook County, Illinois; and Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc.

* The complaint named Kevin K. McAleenan, then the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, as a defendant in his official capacity. Chad F. Wolf has since assumed the role of Acting Secretary, and has thus been automatically substituted as a party in place of former Acting Secretary McAleenan. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Similarly, the complaint named Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II in his role as Acting Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Mr. Cuccinelli is now serving as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Ill.):

Cook County v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-6334 (Oct. 14, 2019) (granting preliminary injunction)

United States Court of Appeals (7th Cir.):

Cook County v. Wolf, No. 19-3169 (June 10, 2020), reh'g denied (Aug. 12, 2020) (affirming preliminary injunction)

Cook County v. Wolf, No. 19-3169 (Feb. 10, 2020) (denying renewed motion for stay pending appeal)

Cook County v. Wolf, No. 19-3169 (Dec. 23, 2019) (denying motion for stay pending appeal)

Supreme Court of the United States:

Wolf v. Cook County, No. 19A905 (Apr. 24, 2020) (granting stay pending appeal)

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad F. Wolf *et al.*, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-85a) is reported at 962 F.3d 208. The opinion of the district court (App., *infra*, 86a-123a) is reported at 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 10, 2020. A petition for rehearing was denied on August 12, 2020 (App., *infra*, 124a-125a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are reprinted in the appendix to this petition. App., *infra*, 126a-139a.

STATEMENT

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a rule interpreting the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (8 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*), that makes an alien inadmissible if, “in the opinion of” the Secretary of Homeland Security, the alien is “likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A). The district court here entered a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the DHS rule in Illinois, see App., *infra*, 86a-123a, and district courts in four other States also entered preliminary injunctions against implementation of the Rule (some nationwide and some on a more limited basis). Those preliminary injunctions were all stayed—several by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, see Order, *CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump*, No. 19-2222 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019); *City & County of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services*, 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019), and the remainder by this Court, see *Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020); 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020). The Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed the preliminary injunction entered by a district court in Maryland, see *CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump*, 971 F.3d 220 (2020), but the Second Circuit affirmed the injunctions entered by a district court in New York (while limiting their geographic scope), see *New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security*, 969 F.3d 42 (2020). In the decision here, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction entered by the district court, over a dissent by Judge Barrett. App., *infra*, 1a-85a.

A. The Public-Charge Inadmissibility Rule

1. The INA provides that “[a]ny alien who, * * * in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A).¹ That assessment “shall at a minimum consider the alien’s (I) age; (II) health; (III) family status; (IV) assets, resources, and financial status; and (V) education and skills.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). A separate INA provision provides that an alien is deportable if, within five years of entry, the alien “has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen” since entry. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(5).

Three agencies make public-charge determinations under this provision: DHS, for aliens seeking admission at the border and aliens within the country applying to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident; the Department of State, for aliens abroad applying for visas; and the Department of Justice, for aliens in removal proceedings. See 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,294 n.3 (Aug. 14, 2019). The rule at issue governs DHS’s public-charge determinations. *Ibid.* The State Department has adopted a consistent rule (which has been preliminarily enjoined in separate litigation), and the Department of Justice expects to do likewise. *Ibid.*; 84 Fed. Reg. 54,996 (Oct. 11, 2019) (State Department interim final rule); *Make the Road New York v. Pompeo*, No. 19-cv-11633, 2020 WL 4350731 (S.D.N.Y. July 29,

¹ The statute refers to the Attorney General, but in 2002 Congress transferred the Attorney General’s authority to make public-charge determinations in the relevant circumstances to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 8 U.S.C. 1103; 6 U.S.C. 557; see also 6 U.S.C. 211(c)(8).

2020) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of State Department rule).

2. The “public charge” ground of inadmissibility dates back to the first federal immigration statutes in the late nineteenth century. See, *e.g.*, Immigrant Fund Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§ 1-2, 22 Stat. 214. Through the nearly 140 years that the public-charge inadmissibility ground has been in effect, however, Congress has consistently chosen not to define the term “public charge” by statute. Indeed, in an extensive report that served as a foundation for the enactment of the INA in 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that “[d]ecisions of the courts have given varied definitions of the phrase ‘likely to become a public charge,’” and that “‘different consuls, even in close proximity with one another, have enforced [public-charge] standards highly inconsistent with one another.’” S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 347, 349 (1950). Rather than recommend adoption of a specific standard, the Committee indicated that because “the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law.” *Id.* at 349; see INA § 212(a)(15), 66 Stat. 183 (using term without definition).

In 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), recognizing that the term was “ambiguous” and had “never been defined in statute or regulation,” proposed a rule to “for the first time define ‘public charge.’” 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, 28,676-28,677 (May 26, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (May 26, 1999) (1999 Guidance). The proposed rule would have defined “public charge” to mean an alien “who is likely to become primarily dependent on the Government for subsistence as demonstrated by either: (i) [t]he receipt of public

cash assistance for income maintenance purposes, or (ii) [i]nstitutionalization for long-term care at Government expense.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,681. When it announced the proposed rule, INS also issued “field guidance” adopting the proposed rule’s definition of “public charge.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. The proposed rule was never finalized, however, leaving only the 1999 Guidance in place. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,348 n.295.

3. In October 2018, DHS announced a new approach to public-charge determinations. It did so by providing notice of a proposed rule and soliciting comments. 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). After responding to comments timely submitted, DHS promulgated a final rule in August 2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,501 (Rule).

The Rule defines “public charge” to mean “an alien who receives one or more public benefits [as defined in the Rule] * * * for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,501. The designated public benefits include cash assistance for income maintenance and certain non-cash benefits, including most Medicaid benefits, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits, and federal housing assistance. *Ibid.* As the agency explained, the Rule’s definition of “public charge” differs from the 1999 Guidance in that (1) it incorporates certain non-cash benefits and (2) it replaces the “primarily dependent” standard with the 12-month/36-month measure of dependence. *Id.* at 41,294-41,295.

The Rule also sets forth a framework immigration officials will use to evaluate whether, considering the “totality of an alien’s individual circumstances,” the alien is “likely at any time in the future to become a public charge.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,369; see *id.* at 41,501-41,504. Among other things, the framework identifies a number

of factors an adjudicator must consider in making a public-charge determination, such as the alien’s age, financial resources, employment history, education, and health. *Ibid.* The Rule was set to take effect on October 15, 2019, and was originally set to apply prospectively to applications and petitions postmarked (or, if applicable, submitted electronically) on or after that date. *Id.* at 41,292.

B. Procedural History

1. Respondents are Cook County, Illinois and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. (Coalition). In September 2019, they filed suit challenging the Rule in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. D. Ct. Doc. 1 (Sept. 23, 2019) (Compl.). They assert that the Rule’s definition of “public charge” is at odds with that term’s settled meaning; the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, see 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); the Rule violates the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), Pub. L. No. 93-122, 87 Stat. 355 (29 U.S.C. 701 *et seq.*), because disabled aliens are less likely to be admissible; the Rule violates the statute establishing the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 7 U.S.C. 2011 *et seq.*; and the Rule violates constitutional equal-protection principles. See Compl. ¶¶ 140-188.

On October 14, 2019, the district court granted respondents’ request for a preliminary injunction barring DHS from implementing the Rule in Illinois, and for a stay of the Rule under 5 U.S.C. 705. App., *infra*, 86a-123a. The court concluded that respondents had Article III standing, *id.* at 91a-98a, and that they were within the zone of interests protected by the public-charge provision because Cook County would suffer economic injury, and because an advocacy organization like the

Coalition is “precisely the type of organization that would reasonably be expected to police the interests that the statute protects.” *Id.* at 101a (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see *id.* at 99a-103a.

On the merits, the district court concluded that respondents were likely to prevail on their claim that the Rule’s definition of “public charge” is inconsistent with the INA. App., *infra*, 103a-118a. In particular, the district court read this Court’s century-old decision in *Gegiow v. Uhl*, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), to hold definitively that the term “public charge” refers only to a person who is primarily and permanently dependent on the government for support. App., *infra*, 106a-108a.

Regarding the other preliminary-injunction factors, the district court concluded that respondents’ anticipated harms—economic injuries and possible public-health risks that Cook County could face down the road, and the Coalition’s diversion of resources away from existing programs—were irreparable. App., *infra*, 119a. As to the balance of equities and hardships, the court found that it “favor[ed]” respondents “on the present record,” even though a “delay in implementing the Rule undoubtedly would impose some harm on DHS.” *Id.* at 119a-120a.

2. The government sought a stay pending appeal, which the district court and Seventh Circuit denied. This Court subsequently granted the government’s request for a stay, directing that the stay would remain in effect “pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” 140 S. Ct. 681, 681. DHS accordingly began implementing the Rule nationwide on February 24, 2020.

3. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. App., *infra*, 1a-85a.

a. The court of appeals held that respondents had Article III standing. See App., *infra*, 9a-11a. The court also concluded that Cook County fell within the public-charge provision’s zone of interests, reasoning that the provision was designed “to protect taxpayer resources,” an interest that Cook County sought to promote. *Id.* at 13a. But the court declined to address the “harder” question whether the Coalition’s injury was within the zone of interests, reasoning that Cook County’s right to sue was sufficient to resolve the case. *Id.* at 14a.

On the merits, the court of appeals unanimously rejected the district court’s conclusion that the term “public charge” has an unambiguous historical meaning that Congress implicitly ratified. App., *infra*, 26a; *id.* at 52a (Barrett, J., dissenting). The court of appeals recognized instead that “[w]hat has been consistent is the delegation from Congress to the Executive Branch of discretion” to interpret and apply the public-charge inadmissibility provision. *Id.* at 26a (majority opinion).

The panel majority nonetheless concluded that the Rule was an unreasonable interpretation of the public-charge statute. App., *infra*, 27a-33a. The majority first reasoned that the Rule likely violates the Rehabilitation Act, because it requires immigration officials to consider an alien’s disability as a negative factor in some circumstances. *Id.* at 28a-30a. The majority also concluded that the Rule is in “tension[]” with provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (42 U.S.C. 1305 note), that authorize some aliens to obtain public benefits covered

by the Rule. App., *infra*, 30a. And it was “concern[ed]” that “DHS’s interpretation of its statutory authority has no natural limitation,” fearing that DHS might adopt a “zero-tolerance rule under which the receipt of even a single benefit on one occasion would result in” an inadmissibility finding. *Id.* at 31a-32a. In addition, the majority found evidence of the Rule’s purported unreasonableness in its stacking mechanism, which treats two benefits received in one month as two months’ worth of benefits, and in its failure to account for the possibility that an alien might “repay the value of the benefits received once she is back on her feet.” *Id.* at 32a.

The majority also concluded that the Rule was likely arbitrary and capricious, in violation of Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 *et seq.* App., *infra*, 33a-41a. In the majority’s view, DHS failed to consider adequately the costs for state and local governments that might result from confusion about the Rule, adopted an impermissibly “absolutist sense of self-sufficiency,” and mandated that adjudicators consider factors (such as an alien’s English language proficiency) that are likely to result in decisions being made based on “unsupported assumptions.” *Id.* at 38a, 40a; see *id.* at 35a-37a.

Regarding the other preliminary-injunction factors, the majority acknowledged that this Court’s stay “provides an indication that the Court thinks that there is at least a fair prospect that DHS should prevail and faces a greater threat of irreparable harm than the plaintiffs.” App., *infra*, 42a. But the majority nonetheless concluded that “the dramatic shift in policy,” respondents’ likelihood of success, and the “potentially dire public health consequences of the Rule” tipped the scales in favor of injunctive relief. *Id.* at 43a.

b. Judge Barrett dissented. App., *infra*, 44a-85a. She agreed with the majority that the term “public charge” was ambiguous and that Congress has given the Executive Branch “broad discretion” to interpret the term. *Id.* at 59a. But she disagreed with the majority that the Rule’s definition was unreasonable. *Id.* at 73a. Surveying the history of the term “public charge” in detail, Judge Barrett concluded that the term “seemed to refer in an imprecise way to someone who lacked self-sufficiency and therefore burdened taxpayers,” and had sometimes referred to persons who needed temporary relief. *Id.* at 58a. Judge Barrett further determined that Congress’s 1996 amendments to the public-charge statute and Welfare Reform Act showed that “public charge” was a “much more capacious term” than the majority recognized. *Id.* at 73a.

In particular, Judge Barrett found it “obviously significant” that, in the 1996 amendments, Congress automatically classified certain aliens as likely public charges if they lack a sponsor who will provide an affidavit of support promising to reimburse the government for any means-tested public benefits that the alien uses. App., *infra*, 65a. Judge Barrett read the relevant provisions to mean that Congress viewed “public charge” broadly to include reliance on any means-tested public benefits, including supplemental benefits. See *id.* at 62a-69a.

Judge Barrett also noted several problems with the majority’s reasoning. For example, the majority’s conclusion that DHS cannot consider benefits authorized by Congress would render the public-charge provision “a dead letter,” as the provision presupposes that an alien will be eligible for public support. App., *infra*, 70a.

Judge Barrett further observed that it was “totally implausible” to read the Welfare Reform Act as evidence that Congress desired the admission of aliens who were likely to rely on means-tested public benefits, given that Congress intended to discourage aliens’ reliance on public benefits. *Id.* at 71a.

Judge Barrett stressed that the limited set of benefits covered by the Rule are all “means tested, satisfy basic necessities, and are major welfare grants.” App., *infra*, 82a. Moreover, an alien will be considered likely to become a public charge only if the alien uses some combination of those benefits for more than 12 months out of a 36-month period. In Judge Barrett’s view, DHS did not act unreasonably in describing “someone who relies on the government to satisfy a basic necessity for a year, or multiple basic necessities for a period of months, as falling within the definition of a term that denotes a lack of self-sufficiency.” *Id.* at 83a.

Judge Barrett would not have addressed respondents’ arbitrary-and-capricious claims, which were not addressed by the district court or fully developed by the parties. App., *infra*, 84a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Congress has declared it the official “immigration policy of the United States that * * * aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs,” and that “the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1601(2). This case concerns the Executive Branch’s efforts to further that policy through its longstanding authority to deny admission or lawful permanent resident status to aliens whom it determines are likely to become public charges. As multiple courts of appeals have recognized, the Rule

represents a “plainly permissible” exercise of the Executive Branch’s broad authority in this area. *CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump*, 971 F.3d 220, 244 (4th Cir. 2020); see *City & County of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services*, 944 F.3d 773, 799 (9th Cir. 2019) (granting a stay pending appeal after concluding that the Rule “easily” qualifies as “a permissible construction of the INA”). The Seventh Circuit erred in concluding otherwise, and its decision would irreparably harm the interests of the United States if allowed to take effect—as this Court’s previous entry of a stay pending appeal recognized. Because, however, the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari in *United States Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, No. 20-____, is a better vehicle for this Court to address the Rule’s validity, the appropriate course in this case is to hold the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari and then dispose of it in light of the disposition in *New York*.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED IN THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE RULE

Entry of a preliminary injunction was doubly inappropriate here. Respondents are not proper plaintiffs to challenge DHS’s construction of the INA’s public-charge inadmissibility provision, and their claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits regardless.

A. As a threshold matter, respondents cannot invoke the cause of action provided by the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, because their asserted injuries are not even “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated” by the INA’s public-charge inadmissibility provision. *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomí Indians v. Patchak*, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (quoting

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). The zone-of-interests requirement is not satisfied where the interests a plaintiff seeks to vindicate are only “marginally related to” or “inconsistent” with the purposes of the statutory provision at issue. *Patchak*, 567 U.S. at 225 (quoting *Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n*, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). When a plaintiff is not subject to an agency rule and asserts interests inconsistent with or unrelated to the ones that Congress sought to further, “it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” *Clarke*, 479 U.S. at 399.

Such is the case here. The operative effect—and evident purpose—of the public-charge inadmissibility provision is to prevent the admission or adjustment of status of aliens who are likely to rely on taxpayer-funded public benefits. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A); cf. 8 U.S.C. 1601(4) (discussing the government’s interest in “assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system”). Respondents are not themselves subject to that provision, and the interests they seek to further through their suit are inconsistent with its purpose: rather than seeking to *limit* benefits usage by aliens, respondents’ object in bringing suit is to *facilitate* benefits usage by aliens. Given that inconsistency, it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress would have intended to authorize such suits by state and local governments and non-governmental advocacy organizations. Indeed, even if DHS expanded the “public charge” definition beyond whatever limits are imposed by that ambiguous phrase, any such limits plainly are intended to protect the aliens themselves—and are not even “arguably” intended to protect state and local governments or nongovernmental advocacy organizations

from any indirect economic effects caused by aliens' avoidance of benefits that would trigger the Rule. Cf. *Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP*, 562 U.S. 170, 177 (2011) (rejecting an understanding of the zone of interests protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would allow "a shareholder * * * to sue a company for firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a consequence").

B. In any event, the Rule is lawful. Respondents' contrary claims all lack merit.

1. Although Congress has never defined the term "public charge," when it "enacted the INA in 1952 * * * [t]he ordinary meaning of 'public charge' * * * was 'one who produces a money charge upon, or an expense to, the public for support and care.'" *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 242 (quoting *Black's Law Dictionary* 295 (4th ed. 1951)); see *Black's Law Dictionary* 311 (3d ed. 1933) (explaining that "[p]ublic [c]harge," "[a]s used in" the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, means "one who produces a money charge on, or an expense to, the public for support and care") (emphasis omitted); Arthur E. Cook & John J. Hagerty, *Immigration Laws of the United States* § 285 (1929) (noting that "[p]ublic [c]harge" meant a person who required "any maintenance, or financial assistance, rendered from public funds, or funds secured by taxation"). That ordinary meaning easily encompasses the Rule's definition of the term to cover an individual who relies for a prolonged or intense period on a narrow set of means-tested public benefits to meet his or her basic needs.

Related statutory provisions confirm that the Rule represents a lawful interpretation of the INA. See

CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 243-244. Those provisions show that receipt of public benefits, including non-cash benefits, can establish that an alien qualifies as likely to become a public charge, even if the alien is not primarily dependent on public support for sustenance.

One such set of provisions requires that many aliens seeking admission or adjustment of status must submit “affidavit[s] of support” executed by sponsors, such as a family member. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C) and (D). Congress specified that the sponsor must agree “to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line,” 8 U.S.C. 1183a(a)(1)(A), and Congress granted federal and state governments the right to seek reimbursement from the sponsor for “any means-tested public benefit” the government provides to the alien during the period the support obligation remains in effect, 8 U.S.C. 1183a(b)(1)(A), including non-cash benefits. Aliens who fail to obtain the required affidavit are treated by operation of law as inadmissible on the public-charge ground, regardless of individual circumstances. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Those provisions show Congress’s recognition that the mere possibility that an alien might obtain unreimbursed, means-tested public benefits in the future could be sufficient to render that alien likely to become a public charge, regardless of whether the alien was likely to be primarily dependent on those benefits. See App., *infra*, 68a (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he affidavit provision reflects Congress’s view that the term ‘public charge’ encompasses supplemental as well as primary dependence on public assistance.”); *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 243 (“This sponsor-and-affidavit scheme * * * underscores that the public charge provision is naturally read as extending beyond only those

who may become ‘primarily dependent’ on public support.”).

Surrounding statutory provisions also show *why* Congress would have intended the Executive Branch to take such public benefits into account in making public-charge determinations. In legislation passed contemporaneously with the 1996 enactment of the current public-charge provision, Congress stressed the government’s “compelling” interest in ensuring “that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.” 8 U.S.C. 1601(5). Congress observed that “[s]elf-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes,” 8 U.S.C. 1601(1), and provided that it “continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that * * * (A) aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, * * * and (B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States,” 8 U.S.C. 1601(2). Congress equated a lack of “self-sufficiency” with the receipt of “public benefits” by aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1601(3), which it defined broadly to include any “welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing * * * or any other similar benefit,” 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B). And Congress emphasized the government’s strong interest in “assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.” 8 U.S.C. 1601(4).

Given the broad, plain meaning of the statutory phrase “public charge” as one who imposes a charge upon the public, and Congress’s statutory policy of ensuring that aliens do “not burden the public benefits system” or find the nation’s generous benefits programs to be “an incentive for immigration to the United

States,” 8 U.S.C. 1601(2)(B) and (4), the Rule “easily” qualifies as a “permissible construction of the INA.” *City & County of San Francisco*, 944 F.3d at 799; see *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 251 (holding that the Rule is “unquestionably lawful”). And that is especially true in light of the heightened deference traditionally afforded to Executive Branch determinations in the immigration context, “where Congress has expressly and specifically delegated power to the executive in an area that overlaps with the executive’s traditional constitutional function.” *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 251 n.6; see *id.* at 251 (“When Congress chooses to delegate power to the executive in the domain of immigration, the second branch operates at the apex of its constitutional authority.”) (citing *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1936)).

2. Accordingly, the panel majority erred in holding that the Rule is likely contrary to law. Indeed, the court did not dispute that the Rule is consistent with the text of the public-charge inadmissibility provision. See App., *infra*, 26a. Instead, it offered a handful of other reasons for concluding that the Rule is contrary to law. None of those reasons has merit.

a. The majority first concluded that because, under the Rule, “a person’s disability will [sometimes] be the but-for cause of her being deemed likely to become a public charge,” the Rule violates the Rehabilitation Act. App., *infra*, 30a; see *id.* at 28a-31a. That is incorrect.

The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual * * * shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,” be denied the benefits of certain federal programs. 29 U.S.C. 794(a). “[B]y its terms,” the statute “does not compel [regulated entities] to disregard the disabilities of * * * individuals * * * . Instead,

it requires only that ‘an otherwise qualified * * * individual’ not be excluded * * * ‘solely by reason of [his or her disability].’” *Southeastern Community College v. Davis*, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). The Rule complies with that requirement: it is not “solely” an alien’s disability that results in her inadmissibility under the Rule, but rather the likelihood—because of the totality of her circumstances, including but not limited to her disability—that she will use the specified amount and type of public benefits after her admission. Moreover, the INA itself explicitly directs that immigration officials “shall” consider an alien’s “health” when assessing whether she is likely to become a public charge. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(i)(II). That statutory command, made in the specific context of the public-charge inadmissibility provision, provides the governing rule in this context. *Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (“[A] specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.”) (citation omitted).

The panel majority suggested (App., *infra*, 30a) that the statutes can be reconciled by permitting officials applying the INA to consider only those health conditions that do not rise to the level of disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. That approach is not required by the Rehabilitation Act, and would turn on its head the public-charge provision’s requirement to consider an alien’s health, as it would prohibit consideration of the health conditions most relevant to one’s likely status as a public charge. Indeed, the implausibility of the majority’s approach is underscored by the fact that it would make unlawful even the 1999 Guidance, which deemed aliens to be “public charges” if they were likely to be institutionalized or otherwise primarily dependent on certain

government benefits, without any exception for aliens with disabilities. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689-28,690.

b. The panel majority next concluded that the Rule “conflicts with Congress’s affirmative authorization for designated immigrants to receive the benefits the Rule targets.” App., *infra*, 30a. Congress had decided when to make aliens eligible or ineligible for benefits, the majority reasoned, and it would be inconsistent with that “balance” for DHS to “penalize receipt” of benefits for which aliens had been made eligible. *Id.* at 31a. As Judge Barrett explained, that “logic would read the public charge provision out of the statute.” *Id.* at 69a (dissenting opinion).

If the majority’s understanding were correct, “DHS could not exclude an applicant even if it predicted that the applicant would eventually become permanently reliant on government benefits, because the future use of those benefits would, after all, be authorized.” App., *infra*, 70a (Barrett, J., dissenting). Instead, Congress’s decision to make aliens eligible for benefits in certain circumstances after they have been lawfully admitted simply shows that while Congress desired to prevent immigration by aliens whom immigration authorities can predict at the outset “are likely to need public benefits,” it “also provided a backstop for those who face setbacks that were unforeseeable on the front end.” *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 253; cf. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(5) (making an alien removable if, within five years of entry, the alien “has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen” since entry). DHS’s attempt to be more proactive about identifying likely public charges on the front end is consistent with Congress’s decision to provide a backstop for when those predictive efforts fail.

c. Finally, the majority’s “concerns [we]re heightened” by its perception that “DHS’s interpretation of its statutory authority has no natural limitation.” App., *infra*, 31a. The majority stated that it would do “violence to the English language and the statutory context” to read “‘public charge’” to cover “a person who receives only *de minimis* benefits for a *de minimis* period of time.” *Id.* at 32a. This is a red herring.

The majority’s hypothetical bears no resemblance to the Rule that DHS has actually adopted, which focuses on receipt of only a limited category of public benefits and requires a projected 12 months of benefits within a 36-month period. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,501. As Judge Barrett observed, “[i]t is consistent with the term ‘public charge’ to consider the potential receipt of cash, food, housing, and healthcare benefits—all of which fulfill fundamental needs—in evaluating whether someone is likely to depend on public assistance to get by.” App., *infra*, 78a (dissenting opinion). It is not unreasonable for DHS to conclude that “[r]el[iance] on the government to provide a year’s worth of a basic necessity * * * implicates self-sufficiency” of the sort with which the public-charge inadmissibility provision is concerned, or to conclude that reliance on means-tested governmental programs to satisfy multiple necessities could sufficiently implicate the provision’s concerns about self-sufficiency in an even shorter period. *Id.* at 82a-83a. If DHS were to adopt some hypothetical definition that was unreasonable, the solution would be to invalidate that definition for that reason; the fear of that hypothetical slippery-slope is no basis to adopt the majority’s unduly narrow interpretation, which forecloses the entirely reasonable definition that DHS actually adopted.

3. The panel majority also concluded that the Rule is likely to be found arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Here, too, the majority erred.

a. The majority first stated that DHS had failed adequately to address the effects of concerns among the “target population” that the Rule might “become more stringent at any time and operate retroactively,” as well as misunderstandings about the Rule’s current scope. App., *infra*, 35a; see *id.* at 35a-36a. The majority observed that those factors could lead to disenrollment from benefits that are not covered by the Rule or by individuals to whom the Rule does not apply, and stated that this possibility deserved a “serious” response from DHS because it could lead to greater burdens on state and local governments. *Id.* at 36a.

Contrary to the majority’s view, however, DHS did provide a reasonable response. It acknowledged the possibility that the Rule would lead individuals to disenroll from benefits in circumstances where the Rule would not actually apply, but explained that it was not willing to modify the Rule to avoid such “unwarranted choices.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,313. Instead, it indicated that it would address the concerns by providing “clear guidance” about the Rule’s actual operation. *Ibid.* That was an entirely sensible response; indeed, it would be remarkable for a government agency to abandon an otherwise valid policy merely because third parties asserted that the regulated community would overreact based on confusion or paranoia. In all events, the majority had no warrant to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

b. The majority also concluded that the “chosen durational threshold” was likely arbitrary and capricious because it amounted to a requirement of “total self-sufficiency at every moment.” App., *infra*, 37a-38a; see *id.* at 37a-39a. This characterization echoed the majority’s discussion of whether receipt of *de minimis* benefits for a *de minimis* period would render someone a public charge—and is flawed for the same reason. Whether or not adopting an “absolutist” approach to self-sufficiency in the context of the public-charge determination would be arbitrary and capricious, the line that DHS has drawn is a far cry from that, and reflects a reasonable judgment about the length or intensity of benefits usage that is sufficient to render someone a public charge. See p. 20, *supra*; see also *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 234-235 (explaining that “DHS did not simply pluck the operative time period out of thin air” but rather “relied on several empirical analyses regarding patterns of welfare use in the United States” that “indicate that a substantial portion of individuals who receive public benefits do so for fewer than 12-months, and that those who receive such benefits over a longer period are more likely to become ‘long-term recipients’ of welfare”) (citations omitted). That the panel majority might have drawn the line differently is no basis for setting aside the Rule under APA review. See *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43.

c. Finally, the majority found fault with several criteria the Rule does or does not direct agency adjudicators to consider, as part of the totality of the circumstances, in making a public-charge determination. See App., *infra*, 39a-41a. The majority stated that it was unclear how adjudicators could make non-arbitrary predictions about whether an alien is likely to become a

public charge in the future based on factors such as a person’s family size, English-language proficiency, or credit score. *Id.* at 39a. But that criticism takes issue with the forward-looking, predictive nature of the inquiry required by the statute itself; the fact that making such predictions will never be a perfect science does not make it arbitrary or capricious for the agency, just like insurers and others who must make predictive judgments, to identify particular traits that both empirical evidence and common sense suggest are probative. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,178-51,207.²

II. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED WARRANT THIS COURT’S REVIEW

Whether challengers such as respondents are likely to succeed in their challenge to the Rule presents questions that warrant this Court’s review. But the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari in *United States Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, No. 20-____, provides a better vehicle for resolving those questions.

A. The courts of appeals are divided over the lawfulness of the Rule. The Fourth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Rule based

² The majority also faulted the Rule for not asking whether an alien might repay benefits in the future, suggesting that the absence of such a feature was “new” because “the regulations governing deportation on public-charge grounds require a demand and a failure to pay.” App., *infra*, 40a. That reflects a misunderstanding of the differences between admissibility and deportation determinations. The Board of Immigration Appeals indicated as early as 1974 that it would not use the test for deportation proceedings (on which the panel majority relied here) when making admissibility determinations. See *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 233 (citing *In re Harutunian*, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 585 (B.I.A. 1974)).

on its conclusion that “[t]he DHS Rule * * * comports with the best reading of the INA.” *CASA de Maryland*, 971 F.3d at 250. Indeed, it concluded that “[t]o invalidate the Rule would * * * entail the disregard of the plain text of a duly enacted statute,” and would “visit palpable harm upon the Constitution’s structure and the circumscribed function of the federal courts that document prescribes.” *Id.* at 229. Similarly, in entering a stay pending appeal of preliminary injunctions against the Rule, the Ninth Circuit issued a lengthy published opinion concluding that “[t]he Final Rule’s definition of ‘public charge’ is consistent with the relevant statutes, and DHS’s action was not arbitrary or capricious.” *City & County of San Francisco*, 944 F.3d at 790.³

Two other courts of appeals have held that the Rule is likely unlawful, but have done so for different reasons. The Second Circuit relied primarily on its erroneous view that “public charge” has acquired a narrow, settled meaning that excludes aliens who use means-tested public benefits as supplemental rather than primary support. See *New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security*, 969 F.3d 42, 70-74 (2020); but see pp. 14-17, *supra*. The Seventh Circuit, as discussed, correctly rejected that conclusion—but then found that the Rule is likely unlawful for a scattershot of erroneous reasons, over an extended dissent by Judge Barrett. That disagreement, regarding not only the Rule’s ultimate legality but also the particular

³ A merits panel of the Ninth Circuit heard argument on the appeal in *City & County of San Francisco* on September 15, 2020. See Docket, *City & County of San Francisco*, *supra* (No. 19-17213). And the plaintiffs in *CASA de Maryland* have filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which remains pending as of this filing. See Pet. for Reh’g, *CASA de Maryland*, *supra* (No. 19-2222).

grounds on which it might be found unlawful (which would affect DHS’s flexibility to adopt alternatives in the future), warrants this Court’s review.

B. Even apart from the aforementioned conflict, the decision below warrants this Court’s review because it concerns an issue of significant importance and, if allowed to stand, would result in irreparable harm to the United States and the public.

Decisions about whether to admit aliens into the country, or to allow aliens already admitted into the country to change their status to that of a lawful permanent resident, implicate a “fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments.” *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citation omitted). With respect to the public-charge ground of inadmissibility in particular, Congress has explicitly entrusted the Executive Branch with the authority to deny admission or adjustment of status to aliens who, “in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security],” are “likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A).

Absent this Court’s review, however, the decision below would require the adjustment to lawful permanent resident status of aliens whom DHS has determined are likely to become public charges. And—as this Court implicitly recognized in granting a stay pending appeal—those effects are irreparable: once the decisions have been made, no practical means exist by which to reverse them. See *New York*, 969 F.3d at 86-87 (“Because there is no apparent means by which DHS could revisit adjustment determinations made while the Rule is enjoined, this harm is irreparable.”). Given the substantial grounds for concluding that the court of appeals’ decision was wrong, that irreparable harm concerning a

fundamental attribute of sovereignty should not be permitted to occur without this Court's review.

C. The government's contemporaneously filed petition for a writ of certiorari in *United States Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, No. 20-____, is a superior vehicle. As a threshold matter, in light of Judge Barrett's pending nomination to this Court, her participation in this case creates the possibility that the full Court would not be able to consider this case, unlike in *New York*. Moreover, *New York* is also a better vehicle for each of the questions presented.

As to the proper parties to challenge the Rule, the plaintiffs in *New York* include not only non-governmental organizations and a local government (as in this case), but also several States. Granting certiorari in that case would therefore allow the Court to address a broader range of interests of putative plaintiffs.

As to the merits, the district court did not address respondents' argument that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, and that issue is thus less fully developed in this case than in *New York*, as Judge Barrett noted in declining to reach it. See App., *infra*, 84a (dissenting opinion). And while the Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit each relied on some grounds that the other did not, the full range of arguments would be available for this Court to consider in deciding whether to affirm the Second Circuit's judgment. Given the other considerations noted above, it is unnecessary to grant plenary review in both cases.

CONCLUSION

The Court should hold the petition for a writ of certiorari pending a decision on the government's petition for a writ of certiorari in *United States Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, No. 20-____, and any further proceedings in that case, and then dispose of the petition as appropriate in light of the Court's actions in that case.

Respectfully submitted.

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OCTOBER 2020

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-3169

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

v.

CHAD F. WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Argued: Feb. 26, 2020
Decided: June 10, 2020

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19 C 6334—**Gary Feinerman**, *Judge*

Before: WOOD, *Chief Judge*, and ROVNER and BAR-
RETT, *Circuit Judges*.

WOOD, *Chief Judge*. Like most people, immigrants to the United States would like greater prosperity for themselves and their families. Nonetheless, it can take time to achieve the American Dream, and the path is not always smooth. Recognizing this, Congress has chosen to make immigrants eligible for various public benefits; state and local governments have done the same. Those benefits include subsidized health insurance, supplemental nutrition benefits, and housing assistance. Historically, with limited exceptions, temporary receipt of

these supplemental benefits did not jeopardize an immigrant’s chances of one day adjusting his status to that of a legal permanent resident or a citizen.

Recently, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new rule designed to prevent immigrants whom the Executive Branch deems likely to receive public assistance in any amount, at any point in the future, from entering the country or adjusting their immigration status. The Rule purports to implement the “public-charge” provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). States, cities, and nonprofit groups across the country have filed suits seeking to overturn the Rule.

Cook County, Illinois, and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. (ICIRR) brought one of those cases in the Northern District of Illinois. They immediately sought a preliminary injunction against the Rule pending the outcome of the litigation. Finding that the criteria for interim relief were satisfied, the district court granted their motion. We conclude that at least Cook County adequately established its right to bring its claim and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting preliminary injunctive relief. We therefore affirm.

I. The Setting

A. The Public-Charge Rule

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, or “the Act”) provides that a noncitizen may be denied admission or adjustment of status if she “is likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). The statute does not define the term “public charge,” nor has it ever done so. Instead, the Act calls for a

“totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis, though it singles out several factors to be considered “at a minimum”: age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; education and skills; and any affidavit of support under section 1183a. *Id.* § 1182(a)(4)(B). The statute does not specify how officials should weigh the listed factors and any others that appear to be relevant.

On August 14, 2019, following a notice and comment period, DHS issued a rule interpreting this provision. In it, DHS defines as a “public charge” any noncitizen (with some exceptions) who receives certain cash and noncash government benefits for more than “12 months” in the aggregate in a 36-month period. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292-508 (Aug. 14, 2019) (“Rule”). It applies to all legally admitted immigrants; we are not concerned here with those in the country unlawfully. The Rule is not limited to federal benefits; instead, it sweeps in any federal, state, local, or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits; most forms of Medicaid; Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher Program; Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance; and certain other forms of subsidized housing. *Id.* at 41295, 41501. Each benefit received, no matter how small, is counted separately and stacked, such that receipt of multiple benefits in one month is considered receipt of multiple months’ worth of benefits. *Id.* at 41295. For example, an immigrant who receives any amount of SNAP benefits, Medicaid, and housing assistance, and nothing else for four months in a three-year period, will be considered a public charge and likely denied adjustment of status. The stacking rule means that a person can use up

her “12 months” of benefits in a far shorter time than a quick reading of the Rule would indicate.

The Rule also explains what facts DHS will consider with respect to an applicant’s age, health, family status, financial status, and education and skills. *Id.* at 41502-04. “Heavily weighted negative factors” include the following: lack of current employment or reasonable prospect of future employment; previous receipt or approval for receipt of 12 months’ worth of public benefits in a three-year period; diagnosis of a medical condition that is likely to require extensive medical treatment or institutionalization or that will interfere with the ability to provide for oneself, attend school, or work, along with lack of insurance and no prospect of obtaining private health insurance, and insufficient financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs related to such medical condition; and prior determination of inadmissibility or deportability on public-charge grounds. *Id.* at 41504.

The “heavily weighted positive factors” are exclusively monetary. They include the following: a household income, assets, resources, or support amounting to at least 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for the household size; current employment with an annual income of at least 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for the household size; and private health insurance other than subsidized insurance under the Affordable Care Act. *Id.* To put this in perspective, recall that the Federal Poverty Guideline in 2020 for a family of four is \$26,200 in annual income. Poverty Guidelines, www.aspe.hhs.gov. An annual income 250 percent of that number is \$65,500, which is very close to

the *median* U.S. income of \$63,179 (the 2018 number reported by the U.S. Census on Sept. 10, 2019, see Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018, www.census.gov).

Other factors include whether an immigrant is younger than 18 or older than 61 (bad); household size (smaller is better); whether an immigrant’s household annual gross income is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines; past receipt of any amount of public benefits (bad); level of education (good); English language proficiency; and credit history and credit score. *Id.* at 41502-04.

The Rule represents a striking departure from the previous administrative guidance—one with a potentially devastating impact on those to whom it applies.¹ That guidance, issued in 1999 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the predecessor of today’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), defines as a public charge a noncitizen who is “*primarily* dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public *cash* assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for *long-term*

¹ The dissent emphasizes the fact that the Rule will not affect certain people, such as those for whom a sponsor has furnished an affidavit of support. But those are not the people who concern Cook County—it must deal with those who bear the brunt of the Rule. *Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (“Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. . . . The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”). The dissent concedes, as it must, that the affected group is not the null set.

care at government expense.” Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (May 26, 1999) (“1999 Field Guidance”) (emphasis added); see also Proposed Rule: Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28676 (May 26, 1999). Drawing on both dictionary definitions and the development of immigration law since the 1880s, the proposed rule accompanying the 1999 Field Guidance explained that “a person becomes a public charge when he or she is committed to the care, custody, management, or support of the public,” and that the term is best understood to signify “a complete, or nearly complete, dependence on the Government rather than the mere receipt of some lesser level of financial support.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28677.

B. Procedural History

DHS’s new rule was scheduled to go into effect in October 2019. Before it did so, plaintiffs filed this suit against DHS and related entities for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint presents several theories: (1) the Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, because it exceeds DHS’s statutory authority; (2) the Rule violates APA section 706 because it is not in accordance with law; (3) the Rule violates APA section 706 because it is arbitrary and capricious; and (4) the Rule violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantee because it discriminates against non-white immigrants.

Focusing on the APA theories, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted on October 14, 2019. (Following plaintiffs’ lead, we do not discuss the Equal Protection theory.) The injunction is geographically limited to Illinois. The district

court concluded that both Cook County and ICIRR have constitutional standing to sue—Cook County primarily because of the added costs its health and hospital system is absorbing and will have to absorb as a result of decreased immigrant enrollment in government-provided health care coverage, and ICIRR because it is expending and will continue to expend additional resources to educate immigrant communities about the Rule and ensure they are able to obtain necessary health services. The court also determined that both the County and ICIRR fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the INA, for largely the same reasons they have constitutional standing. On the merits, the court concluded that DHS’s reinterpretation of the term is likely impermissible. The court found the statute to be clear and to require more substantial, sustained dependence on government assistance than the Rule demands before a noncitizen may be considered a public charge. This showed, the court held, that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims. Finally, the court ruled that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of irreparable harm and that the balance of harms favored them, such that a preliminary injunction is warranted.

DHS filed an immediate appeal and moved to stay the preliminary injunction pending resolution of its appeal. We denied the stay and a renewed motion for a stay, but on February 21, 2020, the Supreme Court granted a stay. *Chad Wolf, et al. v. Cook County, et al.*, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020).

As we write, parallel cases are being litigated in New York, Maryland, California, and Washington. *New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 19-cv-7777 (S.D.N.Y.); *Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli*, No.

19-cv-7993 (S.D.N.Y.); *Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump*, No. 19-cv-2715 (D. Md.); *California v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 19-cv-4975 (N.D. Cal.); *La Clinica De La Raza v. Trump*, No. 19-cv-4980 (N.D. Cal.); *Washington v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 19-cv-5210 (E.D. Wash.). The district courts in each of those cases also issued preliminary injunctions, though with nationwide effect. DHS appealed the preliminary injunctions and requested stays pending appeal. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits granted DHS's stay requests. *City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.*, 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019); *Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump*, No. 19-2222 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019). The Second Circuit declined to issue a stay, but the Supreme Court granted one pending further proceedings. *Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., v. New York, et al.*, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).

Rather than discussing these opinions point-by-point, we think it better to spell out our own analysis of these issues.

II. Right To Sue

Plaintiffs invoked the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for their claims under the APA. DHS responds that they lack standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. The district court rejected that argument. It also concluded that plaintiffs had adequately raised a claim within the "zone of interests" of the INA. We review the legal question of standing *de novo* and the factual findings underlying the district court's determination of standing for clear error. *Arreola v. Godinez*, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008).

A. Article III Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to the adjudication of “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For there to be a justiciable case or controversy, the party invoking the power of the court must have standing to sue. *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013). To assert standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that it is under an actual or imminent threat of suffering a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; that this injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and that it is likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury. *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).

Municipalities generally have standing to challenge laws that result (or immediately threaten to result) in substantial financial burdens and other concrete harms. See, e.g., *Dep’t of Commerce v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019) (“diminishment of political representation, loss of federal funds, degradation of census data, and diversion of resources” were sufficient to give states and municipalities standing to sue over the proposed inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 census); *Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood*, 441 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1979) (municipality had standing based on the effect of racial steering in housing on the municipality’s tax base and social stability).

The district court found that Cook County has standing based on the financial harms the County will incur if and when the Rule goes into effect. The Rule is likely to cause immigrants to forgo routine treatment, immunizations, and diagnostic testing, resulting in more costly, uncompensated emergency care and an increased risk of

communicable diseases spreading to the general public. Indeed, DHS conceded this harm in its commentary on the Rule, acknowledging “that increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a method of primary healthcare due to delayed treatment is possible and there is a potential for increases in uncompensated care in which a treatment or service is not paid for by an insurer or patient.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41384. The district court determined that “[b]oth the costs of community health epidemics and of uncompensated care are likely to fall particularly hard on [the Cook County health system], which already provides approximately half of all charity care in Cook County, including to noncitizens regardless of their immigration status.” The district court found that these financial and health burdens were sufficient.

The district court also concluded that ICIRR has Article III standing based on the effect of the Rule on its ability to perform its core mission and operate its existing programs. The court found that the Rule would impair the organization’s ability to achieve its mission of increasing access to care, improving health literacy, and reducing reliance on emergency room care in immigrant communities. The Rule already has caused ICIRR to divert resources from its core programs to new efforts designed to educate immigrants and staff about the Rule’s effects and to mitigate the Rule’s chilling impact on immigrants who are not covered by the Rule but who nonetheless fear immigration consequences based on their receipt of public benefits.

Under *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) and *Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson*, 937 F.3d

944 (7th Cir. 2019), this is enough. In *Havens*, the Supreme Court found that a nonprofit organization focused on equal housing access had standing to sue an apartment owner under the Fair Housing Act for racial discrimination, based on the negative impact of the defendant’s racial steering practices on the organization’s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-income home-seekers. 455 U.S. at 379. And in *Common Cause*, we relied on *Havens* in concluding that the plaintiff voting rights organizations had standing to challenge an Indiana law designed to remove certain people from the voter rolls, because the law caused the organizations to divert their limited resources from core programs to ameliorating the effects of the law. 937 F.3d at 950-52.

We agree with the district court that Cook County and ICIRR have established cognizable injuries. Their alleged injuries are predictable, likely, and imminent. And the Rule—not independent third-party decision-making—is the but-for cause of these injuries. Plaintiffs thus have constitutional standing to challenge the Rule.

B. Statutory Coverage

The next question is whether the interests Cook County and ICIRR assert are among those protected or regulated by the INA. A statute “ordinarily provides a cause of action only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” *Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami*, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017).

The zone-of-interests test is not “especially demanding” in the APA context. *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static*

Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 130 (2014). This is because it was “Congress’s evident intent when enacting the APA to make agency action presumptively reviewable.” *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomí Indians v. Patchak*, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012). The plaintiffs’ interests must only *arguably* fall within the zone of interests of the statute. And the emphasis on the word “arguably” is not ours: the Supreme Court has “always conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” *Id.* It is not necessary to demonstrate any “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” *Id.* Suit is foreclosed “only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” *Id.*

1. *Cook County*

The district court concluded that Cook County satisfies the zone-of-interests test based on the financial burdens the County will incur as a result of the Rule. It drew an analogy to *City of Miami*, in which the Supreme Court held that Miami’s allegations of lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses placed it within the zone of interests protected by the Fair Housing Act.

DHS takes issue with these conclusions. It argues that the County does not fall within the INA’s zone of interests because its asserted interests are inconsistent with the statutory purpose. DHS sees a tension between the County’s efforts to provide services to immigrants and the supposed aim of the public-charge provision, which it understands as a command to reduce and penalize immigrants’ receipt of public benefits. DHS

also contends that the district court misread *City of Miami*, and that the INA does not give *any* third party a judicially enforceable interest in the Executive Branch's immigration decisions.

DHS has overshot the mark. Indeed, its own arguments undermine such an absolutist position. DHS admits that one purpose of the public-charge provision is to protect taxpayer resources. In large measure, that is the same interest Cook County asserts. DHS tries to distinguish itself from Cook County by saying that it is focused on reducing the burden on *federal* taxpayers, but the Rule itself covers not just federal, but also state, local, and tribal assistance. Even if the effect of the Rule is some reduction in the burden on federal taxpayers, Cook County has plausibly alleged that at the same time, the Rule will increase the burden on those same people in their capacity as state and local taxpayers, who will have to suffer the adverse effects of a substantial population with inadequate medical care, housing, and nutrition.

Furthermore, though the purpose of the public-charge provision is to screen for and promote "self-sufficiency" among immigrants, it is not obvious what self-sufficiency means. Subsidies abound in the modern world, from discounted or free transportation for seniors, to public snow removal, to school lunches, to childhood vaccinations, and much more. Cf. Danilo Trisi, *Administration's Public Charge Rules Would Close the Door to U.S. Immigrants Without Substantial Means*, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities (Nov. 11, 2019) (noting that in a single year, one in four U.S.-born citizens, and 15 percent of all residents, receives a benefit included in the Rule's public charge definition).

Ensuring that immigrants have access to affordable basic health care, for example, may promote their greater self-sufficiency in other domains, including income, housing, and nutrition. It also protects the community at large from highly contagious diseases such as COVID-19. Cook County’s interest in ensuring lawful immigrants’ access to authorized federal and state public benefits is not plainly inconsistent with the text of the statute. Its financial interests thus suffice to bring it within the zone of interests of the public-charge provision.

2. *ICIRR*

The court also found that ICIRR fits within the INA’s zone of interests, explaining that there is “ample evidence that ICIRR’s interests are not merely marginal to those of the aliens more directly impacted by the public charge provision” and that “ICIRR [is] precisely the type of organization that would reasonably be expected to ‘police the interests that the statute protects.’”

Because only one plaintiff need demonstrate that it has stated a claim within the zone of interests of the statute, we elect to pass over ICIRR without much comment. We recognize that it asserts that it has suffered a financial burden directly attributable to the Rule. And we accept that ICIRR helps immigrants navigate the INA’s various requirements, including the public-charge rule, and it has an interest in ensuring that immigrants are not improperly denied adjustment of status or removed from the country because of confusion over DHS’s Rule. But the link between these injuries and the purpose of the public-charge part of the statute is more attenuated, and thus it is harder to say that the

injury ICIRR has asserted meets the “zone-of-interests” test.

Given Cook County’s presence in the case, we need not resolve ICIRR’s status definitively, and so we limit our discussion in the remainder of the opinion to Cook County. The central question is whether the district court abused its discretion in preliminarily enjoining the Rule for the State of Illinois?

III. The Preliminary Injunction

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; and (3) legal remedies are inadequate. See *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.*, 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018). “If the moving party makes this showing, the court balances the harms to the moving party, other parties, and the public.” *Eli Lilly*, 893 F.3d at 381. The standard is the same for an application for a stay under section 705 of the APA. *Cronin v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 919 F.2d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 1990).

The district court concluded that Cook County is likely to succeed on the merits and that the other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief have been met. We review the issuance of a preliminary injunction under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, reviewing legal issues *de novo* and factual findings for clear error. *Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017).

A. Likelihood of Success

The pivotal question in this case, as in many involving preliminary relief, is likelihood of success on the merits. We therefore devote the bulk of our analysis to this issue, understanding that the litigation is still in an early stage and anything we say may change as the record develops further.

The APA provides for judicial review of final agency decisions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706. The overriding question is whether the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is one the text will permit. We approach this inquiry through the two-step framework set forth in *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The first issue is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” *Id.* at 842. If Congress has done so unambiguously, then that is the end of it: the agency and courts alike are bound by what Congress wrote. *Id.* at 842-43. If Congress has not spoken clearly, then we move on to step two, in which we consider whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a permissible construction of the statute. *Id.* at 843. We defer to the agency’s reading “unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation [of conflicting policies] is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” *Id.* at 845; see also *Indiana v. EPA*, 796 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2015).

Statutory interpretation is not the end of the matter, however. We also must assess the agency’s policymaking to ensure that it is not “arbitrary and capricious,” as the APA uses those terms. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This review, guided by *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), focuses

not on the facial validity of the agency’s interpretation, but rather on the soundness of the process by which it reached its interpretation. See *Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“[W]here a proper challenge is raised to the agency procedures, and those procedures are defective, a court should not accord *Chevron* deference to the agency interpretation.”).

1. *Chevron Step One*

We begin our analysis of DHS’s Rule with an analysis of the text of the INA. In conducting this analysis, we consider the words of the public-charge provision, its place in the over-all statutory scheme, the relation of the INA to other statutes, and “common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.” *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).

As we noted at the outset, the INA contains no formal definition of what it takes to be a “public charge.” It merely lists several broad factors that are relevant to the determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B). It does not provide weights for either the listed factors or any others that might exist in a given case. Instead, it relies on the discretion of the responsible consular official or the Attorney General. *Id.* § 1182(a)(4)(A). It also authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to promulgate rules to guide those determinations. *Id.* § 1103(a)(3).

In defense of its Rule, DHS relies heavily on the 1996 amendments to the INA. There Congress stated that “self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United

States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1). Congress also announced its intent that “aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors and private organizations”; and that “the availability of public benefits [should] not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2).

Both parties also cite various other statutory provisions that they believe shed light on the meaning of the public-charge provision, including the requirement for some immigrants to obtain affidavits of support from sponsors, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a; an exception to the public-charge provision for immigrants who are victims of domestic violence and receive benefits in that capacity, *id.* §§ 1182(a)(4)(E), 1641(c); and several other statutes that extend, with varying conditions, certain benefits to immigrants, see, *e.g.*, *id.* §§ 1611, 1621. We do not find these provisions to be particularly helpful; each is susceptible to more than one reasonable reading.

Cook County argues that long-established judicial decisions, ratified by Congress, point us to only one possible interpretation—that is, the one that it urges. But in our view, the historical record is not so clear. The parties agreed in the district court that the understanding of the term “public charge” around the time it first entered federal immigration law in 1882 is particularly relevant. See *New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“It’s a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress

enacted the statute.”). But that is where the harmony ends.

Enter the dueling dictionaries. In Cook County’s corner, we have the Century Dictionary, defining a “charge” as a person who is “*committed* to another’s custody, care, concern or management,” Century Dictionary 929 (William Dwight Whitney, ed., 1889) (emphasis added); and Webster’s Dictionary, likewise defining a “charge” as a “person or thing *committed* to the care or management of another,” Webster’s Condensed Dictionary of the English Language 84 (Dorsey Gardner, ed., 1884). These suggest primary, long-term dependence. In DHS’s corner, we have dictionaries defining a “charge” as “an obligation or liability,” as in a “pauper being chargeable to the parish or town,” Dictionary of Am. and English Law 196 (Stewart Rapalje & Robert Lawrence, eds., 1888); and as a “burden, incumbrance, or lien,” Glossary of the Common Law 56 (Frederic Jesup Stimson, ed., 1881). These definitions can be read to indicate that a lesser reliance on public benefits is enough. Finding no clarity here, we move on.

Cook County contends that from the outset Congress distinguished between, on the one hand, those who were permitted to “land” and receive short-term support from government agencies, and, on the other hand, those who were excluded as public charges. Under the 1882 Immigration Act, the set of people who could be prevented from landing included convicts, “lunatics,” “idiots,” and any other person “unable to take care of himself or herself.” An Act to Regulate Immigration, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). The 1882 Act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, who was responsible for supervising immigration, to enter into contracts with

state entities “to provide for the support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need public aid, under the rules and regulations to be prescribed by said Secretary.” *Id.* Cook County stresses this distinction between excludable *public charges* and immigrants who (less drastically) “may fall into distress or need public aid.”

This argument has some intuitive merit. DHS responds however, that the general revenues were not at risk under the 1882 Act for immigrants who were not self-sufficient upon arrival. The 1882 Act directed the Secretary of the Treasury to levy an entry tax on all noncitizens arriving by ship to cover both the cost of regulating immigration and that of temporary assistance. 1882 Act, ch. 376, § 1. It also specified that “no greater sum shall be expended for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned, at any port, than shall have been collected at such port.” *Id.* In other words, federal funding was available only to the extent the funds matched collections from the vessels. This general feature is no longer part of the law (putting to one side the special case of sponsored immigrants).

Congress tinkered with the language in 1891, 1903, and 1907. See An Act in Amendment to the Various Acts Relative to Immigration and the Importation of Aliens Under Contract or Agreement to Perform Labor, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (1891); An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1213-1214 (1903); An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 898-899, 904-905 (1907). Never, however, did it define “public charge” or explain what

degree of reliance on government aid brands someone as such a person.

Federal district court and state-court cases from this period point in different directions. For example, in *In re Feinknopf*, 47 F. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1891), a district court distinguished between the primary dependence of persons who live in almshouses and the lesser dependence of those who merely receive public support. Around the same time, a North Dakota court indicated that temporary aid is actually a means of averting public dependence, insofar as it can keep those “destitute of means and credit from becoming a public charge.” *Yeatman v. King*, 2 N.D. 421 (1892). On the other hand, the question in *Yeatman* was whether an obligation to repay the county the value of received temporary public assistance counted as a tax, and so the decision is of limited value.

The district court did not find these and other early decisions to be dispositive. Instead, it thought that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Gegiow v. Uhl*, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), resolved the issue. But there, too, the question presented was a narrow one. The Court said that it was addressing the “single question . . . whether an alien can be declared likely to become a public charge on the ground that the labor market in the city of his immediate destination is overstocked.” *Id.* at 9-10. It answered in the negative, saying that “[t]he persons enumerated, in short, are to be excluded on the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying them irrespective of local conditions. . . . ” *Id.* at 10. The district court in our case understood *Gegiow* as holding that the term “public charge” encompasses only persons who are substantially, if not entirely, dependent on government assistance on a long-term basis.

While there is language in *Gegiow* that supports that reading, we are not persuaded that the Supreme Court necessarily ruled so broadly. The Court went out of its way to say that the question presented was the one we noted above. The Acting Commissioner of Immigration, in deciding to deport the persons at issue, mentioned in addition to local labor conditions “the amount of money possessed and ignorance of our language.” But the Court brushed off these considerations as mere “makeweights.” *Id.* at 9. It thus had no need to address directly the immigrants’ financial resources and education.

In context, the Court’s reference to “permanent personal objections” might have simply reflected a distinction between the individualized characteristics of an immigrant and external factors such as a local labor market. The terse opinion is silent about any distinction between people whose need for public assistance is temporary and minimal, and those whose need is likely to be substantial or permanent. We thus agree with DHS that the case before us cannot be resolved exclusively by reference to *Gegiow*.

Circuit court decisions in the aftermath of *Gegiow* add little clarity to this picture. For example, in *Wallis v. United States ex rel. Mannara*, 273 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1921), the Second Circuit defined a person likely to become a public charge as “one whom it may be necessary to support at public expense by reason of poverty, insanity and poverty, disease and poverty, idiocy and poverty.” *Id.* at 511. It did so in a case in which the immigrant family’s primary breadwinner was “certified for senility” and thus would never be “capable of continued self-support.” *Id.* at 510. The court noted that the

family had “insufficient [means] to provide for their necessary wants any reasonable length of time” and no private sources of support. *Id.* On the other hand, in *Ex parte Hosaye Sakaguchi*, 277 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1922), the Ninth Circuit held that an immigrant woman with the skills to support herself was *not* likely to become a public charge. *Id.* at 916. It ruled that the government had to present evidence of “mental or physical disability or any fact tending to show that the burden of supporting the [immigrant] is likely to be cast upon the public.” *Id.* How much of a burden was left undefined. See also *United States ex rel. De Sousa v. Day*, 22 F.2d 472, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1927) (“In the face of [*Gegiow*] it is hard to say that a healthy adult immigrant, with no previous history of pauperism, and nothing to interfere with his chances in life but lack of savings, is likely to become a public charge within the meaning of the statute.”).

The parties and *amici* also call our attention to later actions by the Executive Branch, but we find these also to be inconclusive. See, *e.g.*, *Matter of B-*, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323, 326 (BIA & AG 1948) (stating that the longstanding test for whether an immigrant could be deemed a public charge had three components: (1) the state must charge for the service it renders; (2) it must make a demand for payment; and (3) the immigrant must fail to pay).

What we can say is that in 1952 Congress amended the Act in a way that uses the language of discretion: it deems inadmissible immigrants “who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission, are likely *at any time* to be-

come public charges.” An Act to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality; and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 183 (1952) (emphasis added). This language clarifies the temporal dimension of the public-charge determination, but it says nothing about the degree or duration of assistance. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, also lacks a clear definition of “public charge.”

In the 1996 Immigration Act, Congress for the first time provided guidance on what the Executive Branch must consider when determining whether an immigrant is likely to become a public charge. As we noted earlier, immigration officials were instructed “at a minimum” to look at age, health, family status, financial situation, and education and skills. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 531, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). They also could consider whether an immigrant had an affidavit of support from a third party. *Id.* Congress rejected a proposal to define “public charge” to cover “any alien who receives [means-tested public benefits] for an aggregate of at least 12 months.” 142 Cong. Rec. 24313, 24425 (1996).

Contemporaneously, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), commonly known as the “Welfare Reform Act.” DHS places great weight on language in that statute’s expression of Congress’s desire that immigrants be self-sufficient and not come to the United States with the purpose of benefitting from public welfare programs.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1). The INA (with that amendment) pursues that goal by restricting most noncitizens from eligibility for many federal and state public benefits. It grants lawful permanent residents access to means-tested public benefits only after they have spent five years as a lawful permanent resident. *Id.* §§ 1611, 1613, 1621. But the exclusions are not absolute. Congress specified instead that immigrants may at any time receive emergency medical assistance; immunizations and testing for communicable diseases; short-term, in-kind emergency disaster relief; various in-kind services such as short-term shelter and crisis counseling; and certain housing and community development assistance. *Id.*

The INS summarized its understanding of the 1996 legal regime in the 1999 Field Guidance, which defined as a public charge those who are “primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28689. Following an earlier 1987 interpretive rule, see Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16205, 16211-12, 16216 (May 1, 1987), the 1999 Field Guidance said that “officers should not initiate or pursue public charge deportation cases against aliens who have not received public cash benefits for income maintenance or who have not been institutionalized for long-term care.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28689. It directed officers “not [to] place any weight on the receipt of non-cash public benefits (other than institutionalization) or the receipt of cash benefits for purposes other than for income maintenance with respect to determinations of admissibility or

eligibility for adjustment on public charge grounds.”
Id.

Later enactments lightened some of the statutory restrictions, in order to allow additional categories of immigrants to qualify for certain benefits without a five-year waiting period. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4401, 116 Stat. 134 (2002); Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. 11-3, § 214, 123 Stat. 8 (2009).

This is where things stood when DHS developed the Rule. What should we make of this historical record? As the district court recognized, there is abundant evidence supporting Cook County’s interpretation of the public-charge provision as being triggered only by long-term, primary dependence. But the question before us is not whether Cook County has offered *a* reasonable interpretation of the law. It is whether the statutory language unambiguously leads us to that interpretation. We cannot say that it does. As our quick and admittedly incomplete overview of this byzantine law has shown, the meaning of “public charge” has evolved over time as immigration priorities have changed and as the nature of public assistance has shifted from institutionalization of the destitute and sick, to a wide variety of cash and in-kind welfare programs. What has been consistent is the delegation from Congress to the Executive Branch of discretion, within bounds, to make public-charge determinations.

Thus, this case cannot be resolved at *Chevron* step one. But that does not end the analysis, because we may affirm the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction on any basis in the record. See *Valencia v.*

City of Springfield, Ill., 883 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2018). We therefore proceed to step two.

2. Chevron Step Two

At step two of the *Chevron* analysis, we consider “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U.S. at 843. Our review is deferential; we accord “considerable weight . . . to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.” *Id.* at 844; see also *Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.*, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).

A court may strike down an agency’s interpretation of a law if, for example, the agency’s reading disregards the statutory context, see, *e.g.*, *Michigan v. EPA*, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015); its rule is based on an unreasonable interpretation of legislative history, see, *e.g.*, *Council for Urological Interests v. Burwell*, 790 F.3d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2015); or its new position “would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in [the agency’s] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization, *Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

Cook County offers several reasons why DHS’s interpretation founders here. First, it contends that the Rule conflicts with at least two statutes: the SNAP statute and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Second, it urges that the DHS position creates internal inconsistencies in the immigration laws themselves. We address these points in turn.

The SNAP statute prohibits the government from considering SNAP benefits as “income or resources for any purpose under any Federal, State, or local laws.” 7

U.S.C. § 2017(b). But DHS is not trying to characterize these benefits as income or resources held by the immigrant in question. The Rule merely notes that receipt of the benefits is an indicium of a lack of self-sufficiency. Whatever else one might say about that position, it is not one that the SNAP law forbids.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits the government from excluding from participation in, denying the benefits of, or subjecting to discrimination under any federally funded program or activity, a person with a disability “solely by reason of her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). An agency violates the Act if it (1) intentionally acts on the basis of the disability; (2) refuses to provide a reasonable modification; or (3) takes an action or adopts a rule that disproportionately affects disabled people. *A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n*, 881 F.3d 587, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2018). An aggrieved person must demonstrate that “but for” her disability, she would have been able to access the desired benefits. *Id.* at 593.

DHS frankly acknowledges that it takes disability into account in its public-charge analysis, and it does so in an unfavorable way. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41383 (“DHS considers any disability or other medical condition in the public charge inadmissibility determination to the extent the alien’s health makes the alien more likely than not to become a public charge at any time in the future.”). Indeed, the Rule brands as a *heavily* weighted negative factor a medical condition that is likely to require extensive medical treatment or interfere with the person’s ability to provide for herself, attend school, or work. *Id.* at 41504. DHS does not say what amounts to “extensive medical treatment” or what it means for a

condition to “interfere with [an immigrant’s] ability to provide for herself, attend school, or work.” The Rule leaves the interpretation of these terms to immigration officials. It is therefore unclear what sorts of disabilities DHS will place into this category.

As several *amici curiae* point out, the Rule ignores the fact that private insurers do not cover many home- and community-based services, and so denial of benefits is effectively denial of access to programs or activities. See *id.* at 41382. DHS responded to this criticism, as it applies to Medicaid Buy-in for those with disabilities, with the comment that “[a]lliens should be obtaining private health insurance other than Medicaid in order to establish self-sufficiency.” *Id.* But that is chimerical. Private insurance in the United States typically excludes these benefits, and so persons with disabilities are able to obtain essential services, including personal-care services, specialized therapies and treatment, habilitative and rehabilitative services, and medical equipment, *only* by participating in the Medicaid Buy-in program. With this assistance, they are *able* to work and thus can *avoid* becoming a public charge, which is DHS’s purported goal.

The conclusion is inescapable that the Rule penalizes disabled persons in contravention of the Rehabilitation Act. All else being equal—education and skills, work history and potential, health besides disability, etc.—the disabled are saddled with at least two heavily weighted negative factors directly as a result of their disability. Even while DHS purports to follow the statutorily-required totality of the circumstances test, the Rule disproportionately burdens disabled people and in many in-

stances makes it all but inevitable that a person's disability will be the but-for cause of her being deemed likely to become a public charge.

We do not mean to suggest that the Rehabilitation Act repealed the “health” criterion in the public-charge provision by implication. There is no need to do that, if the two statutes can be reconciled—and it is our duty to see if that can be accomplished. See *Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis*, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (“[T]his Court is not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments and must instead strive to give effect to both.”). And they can live together comfortably, as long as we understand the “health” criterion in the INA as referring to things such as contagious disease and conditions requiring long-term institutionalization, but *not* disability per se. That interpretation is also historically grounded.

DHS's interpretation also creates serious tensions, if not outright inconsistencies, within the statutory scheme. It conflicts with Congress's affirmative authorization for designated immigrants to receive the benefits the Rule targets. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (allowing immigrants to receive emergency medical assistance, immunizations and contagious disease testing, and some public housing assistance); Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4401, 116 Stat. 134 (authorizing supplemental nutrition benefits for certain categories of immigrants, and Medicaid and children's health insurance for noncitizen children and pregnant women). Cook County is largely correct when it accuses the Rule of “set[ting] a trap for the unwary” by penalizing people for accepting benefits Congress made available to them. Although the Rule does not punish

immigrants for using the designated benefits, in the sense of imposing a fine, its heavily negative consideration of such use is an even worse penalty for someone seeking a lawful path to staying in the United States. Furthermore, the preliminary injunction record shows that many immigrants are not sophisticated enough to know which benefits they may safely accept and which not.

Congress drew the balance between acceptance of benefits and preference for self-sufficiency in the statutes, and it is DHS's duty to respect that outer boundary. The Welfare Reform Act achieved its stated goal of reducing immigrant reliance on public assistance by barring receipt of any benefits by some classes of noncitizens and authorizing receipt by other classes only after a five-year waiting period. The statute did not create a regime that permitted self-sufficiency to trump all other goals, nor did it modify the public-charge provision to penalize receipt of non-cash as well as cash assistance. DHS is correct that its Rule is not worded as an outright prohibition against an immigrant's receipt of benefits to which Congress has entitled him. The latter would exceed DHS's authority. But the record before us indicates that it may have the same effect.

Our concerns are heightened by the fact that DHS's interpretation of its statutory authority has no natural limitation. Although it chose a rule that quantified the benefits used to 12 months' worth over a 36-month period, nothing in its interpretation requires even that limit. There is nothing in the text of the statute, as DHS sees it, that would prevent the agency from imposing a zero-tolerance rule under which the receipt of even

a single benefit on one occasion would result in denial of entry or adjustment of status.

We see no warrant in the Act for this sweeping view. Even assuming that the term “public charge” is ambiguous and thus might encompass more than institutionalization or primary, long-term dependence on cash benefits, it does violence to the English language and the statutory context to say that it covers a person who receives only *de minimis* benefits for a *de minimis* period of time. There is a floor inherent in the words “public charge,” backed up by the weight of history. The term requires a degree of dependence that goes beyond temporary receipt of supplemental in-kind benefits from any type of public agency.

DHS also runs into trouble as a result of its decision to stack benefits and disregard monetary value. Under its Rule, the receipt of multiple benefits in one month, no matter how slight, counts as multiple months of benefits. DHS acknowledges that the Rule’s 12-months-in-36 tolerance would actually run out in four months if an immigrant received non-emergency Medicaid, any SNAP benefit, and housing assistance, or even sooner if she additionally received *any* amount of cash income assistance through a federal, state, local, or tribal program. Paradoxically, the Rule provides no opportunity for an immigrant to repay the value of the benefits received once she is back on her feet. This is another way in which it unreasonably imposes substantially disproportionate consequences for immigrants, compared to the supposed drain on the public fisc they cause.

The ambiguity in the public-charge provision does not provide DHS unfettered discretion to redefine “public charge.” We find that the interpretation reflected

in the Rule falls outside the boundaries set by the statute.

3. *Arbitrary and Capricious Review*

Our conclusion that the Rule likely does not meet the standards of *Chevron* step two is enough to require us to move on to the remainder of the preliminary-injunction analysis. But even if we are wrong about step two, one more inquiry remains: whether the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, as the APA uses those terms. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). That requires an examination of DHS's policymaking process.

When conducting rulemaking, an agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43. It may not “rel[y] on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the problem, [or] offer[] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” *Id.* Furthermore, when an agency changes course, as DHS did here when it adopted a radically different understanding of the term “public charge” compared to the 1999 Field Guidance, it “must show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). In explaining a change in policy, “an agency must also be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” *Encino Motorcars*, 136 S. Ct. at 2126. This is because a “settled course of behavior embodies the

agency's informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by Congress." *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 41-42. Thus, "a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy." *Fox Television Stations*, 556 U.S. at 516.

The review called for by *State Farm* is narrow in scope and does not permit us to substitute our own policy judgment for that of the agency. We ask only whether the agency's "decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors" and was not "a clear error of judgment." 463 U.S. at 43.

In response to its notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS received a whopping 266,077 comments, the vast majority of which opposed the proposed rule. In the preamble to the final rule, DHS summarized significant issues raised by the comments and changes it made in the final rule. We assess the validity of DHS's decision-making process based on this record.

Cook County urges that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious in a number of ways: (1) DHS failed meaningfully to evaluate and address significant potential harms from the Rule, including its substantial chilling effect on immigrants not covered by the Rule; (2) DHS failed to give a logical rationale for the duration-based standard; and (3) DHS added factors to the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that are "unsupported, irrational and at odds with the Final Rule's purported purpose." Numerous *amici* underscored these points and explained how the Rule will lead to arbitrary results, cause both direct and indirect economic harms, burden states

and localities that have to manage fallout from the Rule, and disproportionately harm the disabled and children.

We look first at DHS's dismissal of concerns about the Rule's chilling effect on legal immigrants and family members who fall outside its scope. DHS acknowledged a "plausible connection" between the Rule and needless disenrollment by exempt noncitizens (including refugees, asylees, and victims of domestic violence) in covered public benefits, and by covered immigrants in non-covered benefit programs. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41313. DHS also said that it "appreciates . . . the potential nexus between public benefit enrollment reduction and food insecurity, housing scarcity, public health and vaccinations . . . and increased costs to states and localities." *Id.* Nonetheless, it brushed off these impacts as "difficult to predict" and refused to "alter this rule to account for such unwarranted choices." *Id.* Even though these consequences are foreseeable, the Rule does not literally compel them, and so DHS asserted that they could be addressed through additional public guidance.

DHS may think that these responses are unwarranted, but it does not deny that they are taking place and will continue to do so. Moreover, the record indicates that the target population is responding rationally. DHS's system of counting and stacking benefits is hardly transparent, and so a rational person might err on the side of caution and refrain from seeking medical care, or food, or housing, even from a city, state, or tribe rather than the federal government. And the risk that the Rule may become more stringent at any time and operate retroactively against the use of benefits already used is a real one. DHS trumpets its view that the Rule stops

short of its lawful authority and that it could promulgate a more restrictive rule if it so chooses. In response to comments on the proposed rule, DHS used discretionary language: “DHS believes it is a reasonable approach to only designate Medicaid *at this time*,” *id.* at 41381 (emphasis added); and “DHS will not consider [Healthy Start] benefits *at this time*,” *id.* at 41390 (emphasis added). It warned that it may “updat[e] the list of benefits through future regulatory action.” *Id.* at 41387. Immigrants thus reasonably anticipate that their receipt of benefits that are currently not covered could eventually hurt them if DHS alters the Rule in the future.

It was not enough for DHS simply to nod at this argument; it called for a serious explanation. The importance of the chilling effect is not the number of disenrollments in the abstract, but the collateral consequences of such disenrollments. DHS failed adequately to grapple with the latter. For example, commenters predicted that disenrollment and under-enrollment in Medicaid, including by immigrants not covered by the Rule, would reduce access to vaccines and other medical care, resulting in an increased risk of an outbreak of infectious disease among the general public. To recognize the truth in that prediction, one need only consider the current outbreak of COVID-19—a pandemic that does not respect the differences between citizens and noncitizens.

There is also the added burden on states and local governments, which must disentangle their purely state-funded programs from covered federal programs. The federal government has no interest in the way that states and localities choose to spend their money.

There is no reason why immigrants should not continue to benefit from the state programs without being penalized at the federal level. The Rule will force states to make their own public welfare programs more robust to compensate for a reduction in the availability of federal programs. DHS touts the savings to the federal government from the Rule, primarily through a significant reduction in transfer payments to the states (including, it should be noted, for persons who disenroll unnecessarily because of the chilling effect), but at the same time it expects the states to fill the gaps and continue to provide critical services such as preventive healthcare. See, *e.g.*, *id.* at 41385 (“In addition, local health centers and state health departments provide preventive services that include vaccines that may be offered on a sliding scale fee based on income. Therefore, DHS believes that vaccines would still be available for children and adults even if they disenroll from Medicaid.”). It assumes this while simultaneously denying that the Rule will have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.” *Id.* at 41481.

Cook County also asserts that DHS failed to give a logical rationale for its chosen durational threshold. In its notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS proposed an array of thresholds that would apply before benefits can be counted against a noncitizen in the public charge analysis. Those lines came under sharp criticism for being arbitrary, confusing, and an unacceptable proxy for undue reliance on public support. *Id.* at 41357-58.

In the final Rule, DHS opted for the single threshold for both monetizable and nonmonetizable benefits of 12 months (stacked) over a 36-month period. It touted this approach as “particularly responsive to public comments that communicated concerns about the complexity of the bifurcated standard and lack of certainty.” *Id.* at 41358. It also asserted that the 12/36 standard “is consistent with DHS’s interpretation of the term ‘public charge.’” *Id.* at 41359. DHS equates the term “public charge” with a lack of “self-sufficiency” and it regards anyone who fails its test as not self-sufficient. *Id.* It defends its stacking mandate on the theory that it “ensures that aliens who receive more than one public benefit (which may be more indicative of a lack of self-sufficiency, with respect to the fulfillment of multiple types of basic needs) reach the 12-month limit faster.” *Id.* at 41361. DHS concluded that the bright-line rule “provides meaningful guidance to aliens and adjudicators, . . . accommodates meaningful short-term and intermittent access to public benefits, and . . . does not excuse continuous or consistent public benefit receipt that denotes a lack of self-sufficiency.” *Id.*

This explains how DHS incorporated its understanding of “self-sufficiency” into the Rule. But we still have a textual problem. The INA does not call for total self-sufficiency at every moment; it uses the words “public charge.” DHS sees “lack of complete self-sufficiency” and “public charge” as synonyms: in its view, receipt of any public benefit, particularly one related to core needs such as health care, housing, and nutrition, shows that a person is not self-sufficient. See *id.* at 41356. This is an absolutist sense of self-sufficiency that no person in a modern society could satisfy; everyone relies on nonmonetary governmental programs, such as food

safety, police protection, and emergency services. DHS does not offer any justification for its extreme view, which has no basis in the text or history of the INA. As we explained earlier, since the first federal immigration law in 1882, Congress has assumed that immigrants (like others) might face economic insecurity at some point. Instead of penalizing immigrants by denying them entry or the right to adjust status, Congress built into the law accommodations for that reality. Also, as numerous commenters on the Rule pointed out, the benefits it covers are largely *supplemental* and not intended to be, or relied upon as, a primary resource for recipients. Many recipients could get by without them, though as a result they would face greater health, nutrition, and housing insecurity, which in turn would likely harm their work or educational attainment (and hence their ability to be self-sufficient).

Finally, Cook County contends that the Rule adds irrational factors into the public-charge assessment, including family size, mere application for benefits, English-language proficiency, lack of disability, and good credit history. With respect to language, we note the obvious: someone whose English is limited on the date of entry may be entirely competent five years later, when the person first becomes eligible for benefits under the Welfare Reform Act and related laws. In almost all cases, an immigration official making a determination about whether someone is likely to become a public charge will be speculating about that person's family size, linguistic abilities, credit score, and the like no fewer than five years in the future.

Even if we grant that these new factors carry some minimal probative value, it is unclear to us, and DHS nowhere explains, how immigration officials are supposed to make these predictions in a nonarbitrary way. Worse, for many people the relevant time is not five years—it is eternity, because the Rule calls for officials to guess whether an immigrant will become a public charge *at any time*. There is a great risk that officials will make their determination based on stereotype or unsupported assumptions, rather than on the type of objective facts called for by the Act (age, present health, family status, financial situation, and education or skills).

DHS also never explains why it chose not to take into account the possibility that an immigrant might, at some point in the future, be able to repay the value of public benefits received. Someone who seeks to adjust status will be penalized for having previously received public benefits without being given the opportunity to refund the government the cost of those benefits. This is new: the regulations governing deportation on public-charge grounds require a demand and a failure to pay. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 28691.

All of this convinces us that this Rule is likely to fail the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The Rule has numerous unexplained serious flaws: DHS did not adequately consider the reliance interests of state and local governments; did not acknowledge or address the significant, predictable collateral consequences of the Rule; incorporated into the term “public charge” an understanding of self-sufficiency that has no basis in the statute it supposedly interprets; and failed to address

critical issues such as the relevance of the five-year waiting period for immigrant eligibility for most federal benefits.

B. Other Criteria for Preliminary Injunction

We have spent most of our time on likelihood of success on the merits, because that is the critical factor here. We add only a few words about the other requirements for preliminary relief. Cook County had to show that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; that legal remedies are inadequate; and that the balance of equities tips in their favor. The district court found that it did so.

As we noted earlier, Cook County has shown that the Rule will cause immigrants, including those not covered by the Rule, to disenroll from, or refrain from enrolling in, federal Medicaid and state-level public health programs. This already has led to reduction in rates of preventive medicine and caused immigrants to rely on uncompensated emergency care from Cook County's hospital system; the record supports the prediction that those harms will only get worse. The result for the County will be a significant increase in costs it must bear and a higher county-wide risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable diseases for its population as a whole. The record also supports the district court's finding that Cook County will have to divert resources away from existing programs to respond to the effects of the Rule.

The district court was also on solid ground in finding that Cook County lacks adequate legal remedies for the injuries imposed by the Rule. The APA provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity

and supports a claim for a challenge to agency action, but only to the extent that the plaintiffs “seek relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. There is thus no post-hoc legal remedy available to Cook County to redress the financial harms it stands to suffer as a result of the Rule. It is injunctive relief or nothing.

With respect to the balance of harms, we must take account of the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. The Court’s stay decision was not a merits ruling. To succeed in obtaining a stay from the Supreme Court, an applicant “must demonstrate (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.” *Conkright v. Frommert*, 556 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., in chambers). Stays, the Court tells us, are “granted only in extraordinary cases.” *Id.* We do not know why the Court granted this stay, because it did so by summary order, but we assume that it abided by the normal standards. Consequently, the stay provides an indication that the Court thinks that there is at least a fair prospect that DHS should prevail and faces a greater threat of irreparable harm than the plaintiffs.

The stay thus preserves the status quo while this case and others percolate up from courts around the country. There would be no point in the merits stage if an issuance of a stay must be understood as a *sub silentio* disposition of the underlying dispute. With the benefit of

more time for consideration and the complete preliminary injunction record, we believe that it is our duty to evaluate each of the preliminary injunction factors, including the balance of equities. In so doing, we apply a “sliding scale” approach in which “the more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor.” *Valencia v. City of Springfield*, 883 F.3d at 966. We also consider effects that granting or denying the preliminary injunction would have on the public. *Id.*

In our view, Cook County has shown that it is likely to suffer (and has already begun to suffer) irreparable harm caused by the Rule. Given the dramatic shift in policy the Rule reflects and the potentially dire public health consequences of the Rule, we agree with the district court that the public interest is better served for the time being by preliminarily enjoining the Rule.

IV. Conclusion

While we disagree with the district court that this case can be resolved at step one of the *Chevron* analysis, we agree that at least Cook County has standing to sue. We make no ruling on ICIRR’s standing, and so we have based the remainder of our opinion on Cook County’s situation only. The district court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law when it concluded that Cook County is likely to succeed on the merits of its APA claims against DHS. Nor did the district court’s handling of the balance of harms and lack of alternative legal remedies represent an abuse of discretion. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order entering a preliminary injunction.

BARRETT, *Circuit Judge*, dissenting.

The plaintiffs have worked hard to show that the statutory term “public charge” is a very narrow one, excluding only those green card applicants likely to be primarily and permanently dependent on public assistance. That argument is belied by the term’s historical meaning—but even more importantly, it is belied by the text of the current statute, which was amended in 1996 to increase the bite of the public charge determination. When the use of “public charge” in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is viewed in the context of these amendments, it becomes very difficult to maintain that the definition adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is unreasonable. Recognizing this, the plaintiffs try to cast the 1996 amendments as irrelevant to the meaning of “public charge.” That argument, however, flies in the face of the statute—which means that despite their best efforts, the plaintiffs’ interpretive challenge is an uphill battle that they are unlikely to win.

I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ challenge to DHS’s definition of “public charge” is likely to succeed at *Chevron* step two. I express no view, however, on the majority’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ other challenges to the rule under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court did not reach them, and the plaintiffs barely briefed them. The preliminary injunction was based solely on the district court’s interpretation of the term “public charge.” Because its analysis was flawed, I would vacate the injunction and remand the case to the district court, where the plaintiffs would be free to develop their other arguments.

I.

There is a lot of confusion surrounding the public charge rule, so I'll start by addressing who it affects and how it works. The plaintiffs emphasize that the rule will prompt many noncitizens to drop or forgo public assistance, lest their use of benefits jeopardize their immigration status. That's happening already, and it's why Cook County has standing: noncitizens who give up government-funded healthcare are likely to rely on the county-funded emergency room. But it's important to recognize that immigrants are dropping or forgoing aid out of misunderstanding or fear because, with very rare exceptions, those entitled to receive public benefits will never be subject to the public charge rule. Contrary to popular perception, the force of the rule does *not* fall on immigrants who have received benefits in the past. Rather, it falls on nonimmigrant visa holders who, if granted a green card, would become eligible for benefits in the future.

To see why, one must be clear-eyed about the fact that federal law is not particularly generous about extending public assistance to noncitizens. That is not a function of the public charge rule; it is a function of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), commonly referred to as the "Welfare Reform Act." Under the Act, undocumented noncitizens are ineligible for benefits. So are nonimmigrant visa holders, a category that encompasses noncitizens granted permission to be in the United States for a defined period—think of tourists, students, and temporary workers. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), 1621(a), 1641(b) (excluding undocumented noncitizens and nonimmigrant

visa holders from the list of noncitizens “qualified” for government benefits).¹ Because of these restrictions, many noncitizens are altogether ineligible for the benefits relevant to a public charge determination.

Only two major groups are statutorily eligible to receive the benefits that the public charge rule addresses, and the rule has little to no effect on either. The first group is certain especially vulnerable populations—refugees and asylees, among others. Congress has entitled these vulnerable noncitizens to public assistance, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b), and exempted them from the public charge exclusion, *id.* §§ 1157(c)(3), 1159(c). That means that their need for aid is not considered when

¹ There are some narrow exceptions, but they are irrelevant to the “public charge” determination. All noncitizens, including the undocumented, are eligible to receive short-term, in-kind emergency disaster relief; certain forms of emergency medical assistance; public-health assistance for immunization, as well as treatment for the symptoms of communicable disease; other in-kind services such as soup kitchens and crisis counseling; and housing benefits to the extent that the noncitizen was receiving public housing prior to 1996. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b), 1621(b). Other than the housing benefits, none of this aid counts under the rule’s definition of a “public benefit,” so none has any effect on any future adjustment-of-status proceeding. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.21; *see also* Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,313 (Aug. 14, 2019) (noting that the rule’s “definition does not include benefits related exclusively to emergency response, immunization, education, or social services”); *id.* at 41,482 (explaining that the rule’s definition “does not include emergency aid, emergency medical assistance, or disaster relief”). And while housing benefits are covered by the public charge rule, 8 C.F.R. § 212.21, they are largely irrelevant because the number of noncitizens still within the grandfathering provision has presumably dwindled dramatically in the quarter century since the Welfare Reform Act was passed.

they are admitted to the United States, nor is their actual receipt of aid considered in any later adjustment-of-status proceeding. The public charge rule is entirely irrelevant to the most vulnerable.

The second group eligible for benefits is lawful permanent residents, often referred to as green card holders, and the rule is almost entirely irrelevant to them too. Here's why: The public charge exclusion applies to noncitizens at the admission stage or an adjustment-of-status proceeding. *Id.* § 1182(a)(4)(A). ("Admission" is a term of art referring to "the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." *Id.* § 1101(a)(13)(A).) Lawful permanent residents have already been admitted to the United States, and they already possess the most protected immigrant status. They are therefore not subject to the public charge exclusion unless they jeopardize their lawful permanent residency. *See id.* § 1101(a)(13)(C) (describing the narrow circumstances in which lawful permanent residents are considered to be "seeking an admission"). Most relevant here, a green card holder who leaves the country for more than 180 days puts her residency in question and might need to "seek[] an admission" upon returning to the United States. *Id.* § 1011(a)(13)(C)(iii). If she used benefits prior to her departure, then her use of those benefits might count against her at reentry. But this consequence is easy to avoid by keeping trips abroad shorter than six months. It's also worth noting that a lawful permanent resident is eligible to receive very few benefits until she has been here for five years—which is the point at which she is eligible for citizenship. *Id.* § 1427(a). Naturalization eliminates even the small risk that a lawful permanent resident would ever face

the admission process again. Notably, the rule doesn't apply at the naturalization stage. *See id.* § 1429.

The upshot is that the public charge rule will rarely apply to a noncitizen who has received benefits in the past.² Indeed, in the Second Circuit case challenging this same rule, both the government and the plaintiffs conceded as much. When pressed to identify who could be penalized under the public charge rule for using benefits, neither side identified any example other than the 180-day departure of a lawful permanent resident. *See* Oral Argument at 36:06-38:47, 1:03:45-1:04:40, *New York v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, Nos. 19-3591, 19-3595 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2020), <https://www.c-span.org/video/?469804-1/oral-argument-trump-administration-public-charge>.

Notwithstanding all of this, many lawful permanent residents, refugees, asylees, and even naturalized citizens have disenrolled from government-benefit programs since the public charge rule was announced. Given the complexity of immigration law, it is unsurprising that many are confused or fearful about how the rule might apply to them. Still, the pattern of disenrollment does not reflect the rule's actual scope. Focusing on the source of Cook County's injury can therefore be misleading.

That does not mean, however, that the rule has no effect. Even though it is almost entirely inapplicable to

² Hence the majority is wrong to treat the rule as unreasonable because it “set[s] a trap for the unwary.” Maj. Op. at 29. Because those eligible for the designated benefits are not subject to the rule—except in very rare circumstances—it does not “penaliz[e] people for accepting benefits Congress made available to them.” *Id.*

those currently eligible for benefits, it significantly affects a different group: nonimmigrant visa holders applying for green cards. Recall that nonimmigrant visa holders, unlike lawful permanent residents and those holding humanitarian-based visas, are ineligible for the relevant benefits in their current immigration status. If granted lawful permanent residency, though, they would become eligible for these benefits in the future. The public charge rule is concerned with what use a green card applicant would make of this future eligibility. As a leading treatise puts it, the public charge determination is a “prophetic” one. ⁵ CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 63.05[3] (2019). If DHS predicts that an applicant is likely to rely too heavily on government assistance, it will deny her lawful permanent residency on the ground that she is likely to become a public charge. This case is about whether DHS has defined “public charge” too expansively and is therefore turning too many noncitizens away.

There are four major routes to obtaining the status of lawful permanent resident: humanitarian protection (refugees and asylees), the sponsorship of a family member, employment, and winning what is known as the green card lottery.³ See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS 3-4 (2018), <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Lawful>

³ The diversity visa, commonly referred to as the green card lottery, is awarded to foreign nationals from underrepresented countries in an effort to increase diversity within the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c).

_Permanent_Residents_2017.pdf. Those seeking humanitarian protection are not subject to the statutory provision rendering inadmissible any “alien who . . . is likely at any time to become a public charge,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A), and only a subset of those in the remaining three categories will be subject to the DHS rule. That is because DHS only handles the applications of noncitizens who apply from within the United States; the State Department processes the applications of noncitizens who apply from abroad.⁴ This division of authority means that, as a practical matter, the regulation applies to those present in the United States on nonimmigrant visas who seek to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent residents. And because the green card lottery is processed almost entirely by the State Department, the DHS rule applies primarily to employment-based applicants and family-based applicants (by far the larger of these two groups).⁵

⁴ The State Department has adopted the interpretation set forth in this rule, but its implementation of the public charge exclusion is not at issue in this case. *See* Visas: Ineligibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 54,996, 55,000 (Oct. 11, 2019).

⁵ In 2019, approximately 572,000 noncitizens adjusted their status to that of lawful permanent residents. The largest group—roughly 330,000—were family based, and the majority of those (over 217,000) were spouses of U.S. citizens. About 111,000 were employment based, and only about 1,000 were lottery winners. The vast majority of the remaining 130,000 noncitizens—refugees and asylees, among others—were exempt from the public charge rule. *See Legal Immigration and Adjustment of Status Report Data Tables: FY 2019*, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY tbl.1B (Jan. 15, 2020), <https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/readingroom/special/LIASR#>.

As nonimmigrant visa holders, these applicants have not previously been eligible for the benefits designated by DHS's rule—so the determination is not a backward-looking inquiry into whether they have used such benefits in the past. Instead, it is a forward-looking inquiry into whether they are likely to use such benefits in the future. The rule guides this forward-looking inquiry. Under the 1999 Guidance, an applicant was excluded only if she was likely to be institutionalized or primarily dependent on government cash assistance for the long term. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (Mar. 26, 1999). Now, DHS considers the applicant's potential usage not only of cash assistance for income maintenance (including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and state cash assistance), but also of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, housing benefits under Section 9, and Medicaid (with some explicit exceptions). 8 C.F.R. § 212.21. And if DHS concludes that an applicant is likely to use more than 12 months' worth of these benefits—with the use of 2 benefits in 1 month counting as 2 months—it will deem her “likely to become a public charge” and deny the green card. *Id.*

This heightened standard for admissibility is a significant change—but it's not the one that the plaintiffs' emphasis on disenrollment suggests. Evaluating the rule requires a clear view of what it actually does; so, with the rule's scope in mind, I turn to the merits.

II.

While I agree with the majority's bottom-line conclusion at *Chevron* step one that "public charge" does not refer exclusively to one who is primarily and permanently dependent on government assistance, I have a little to add to the history and a lot to add to the statutory analysis. In my view, the majority takes several wrong turns in analyzing the statute that skew its thinking about *Chevron* step two. For purposes of this Part, the most significant is that the majority accepts the plaintiffs' view that the 1996 amendments to the public charge provision were irrelevant. In what follows, I'll lay out my own analysis of the plaintiffs' arguments, which will explain why I wind up in a different place than the majority does on the reasonableness of DHS's interpretation of the statute.

The plaintiffs advance three basic arguments as to why the term "public charge" refers exclusively to one who is "primarily and permanently" dependent on government assistance. First, they say that the term had that meaning when it first appeared in the 1882 federal statute. Second, they contend that even if the term was unsettled in the late nineteenth century, subsequent judicial and administrative decisions narrowed it, and later amendments to the statute ratified these interpretations. Third, they argue that interpreting the term "public charge" to encompass anything short of primary and permanent dependence conflicts with Congress's choice to make supplemental government benefits available to immigrants. I'll take these arguments in turn.

A.

The plaintiffs first argue that in the late nineteenth century, “public charge” meant primary and permanent dependence. See *New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“[I]t’s a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” (citation omitted)). Evaluating this argument requires careful consideration of a term with a long history. The term “public charge” was borrowed from state “poor laws,” which were in turn modeled on their English counterparts. HIDEAKA HIROTA, *EXPPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY* 43-47 (2017). Early poor laws used “public charge” synonymously with “public expense,” referring to any burden on the public fisc. Thus, when someone sought assistance from a city or county overseer of the poor, the cost of the relief provided was entered on the overseer’s books as a public charge—that is, an expense properly chargeable to, and therefore funded by, the public. Over time, the term “public charge” came to refer (at least in the context of poor relief and immigration laws) not only to expenditures made under the poor laws, but also to the people who depended on these expenditures.⁶

⁶ This is why nineteenth-century dictionary definitions of “charge” are unhelpful. The words “public” and “charge” comprise a unit that must be understood in the context of the laws that used the phrase. Cf. *Yates v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015) (“[A]lthough

State legislatures, worried about the burden that destitute immigrants might place on programs to aid the needy, co-opted the poor-law language into immigration legislation. In 1847, New York created an administrative apparatus for dealing with the influx of immigrants. The new “Commissioners of Emigration” were tasked with examining incoming passengers to determine if “there shall be found among such passengers, any lunatic, idiot, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm persons . . . who, from attending circumstances, are likely to become permanently a public charge”—language, incidentally, that suggests that one could be a public charge either temporarily or permanently. Act of May 5, 1847, ch. 195, § 3, 1847 N.Y. Laws 182, 184. These individuals were permitted to land in the state upon payment of a bond by the vessel’s master “to indemnify . . . each and every city, town and county within this state, from any cost or charge . . . for the maintenance or support of the person . . . within five years.” *Id.* The bonds paid for the landing of these immigrants were then used to pay for the state immigration infrastructure, including the provision of some temporary aid to new arrivals. Two years later, the state expanded the category of people for whom a bond was required. Still excluded were those “likely to become permanently a public charge” but also those “who have been paupers in any other country, or who from sickness or disease, existing at the time of departing from the foreign port, are or are likely to soon become a public charge.” Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 350, § 3, 1849 N.Y. Laws 504, 506. By 1851, the New York statute contained the language

dictionary definitions of the words ‘tangible’ and ‘object’ bear consideration, they are not dispositive of the meaning of ‘tangible object’. . . .”).

which would be included in both the 1882 and 1891 federal statutes. Gone was the reference to those “likely to become permanently a public charge,” replaced by phrases referring to someone “unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” and someone “likely to become a public charge.” Act of July 11, 1851, ch. 523, § 4, 1851 N.Y. Laws 969, 971. In the event that a bond was unpaid, New York—and Massachusetts, which enacted a substantially similar law—ordered the exclusion of those immigrants deemed “likely to soon become a public charge.” HIROTA, *supra*, at 71-72.

The bond system was held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that that the power to tax incoming foreign passengers “has been confided to Congress by the Constitution.” *Henderson v. Mayor of New York*, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1876). The decision threw the state systems into uncertainty and created demand for federal legislation, largely to reenact the defunct state policies and to replace the lost funding. Since the states could no longer fund their immigration systems using state bonds, the 1882 federal statute levied “a duty of fifty cents for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United States” arriving by sea; this was to “constitute a fund . . . to defray the expense of regulating immigration . . . and for the care of immigrants arriving in the United States, for the relief of such as are in distress.” Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat. 214, 214. The first federal statute therefore filled the space left by the now-ineffective state laws: it used funds raised from the immigrants or their carriers to provide some care for the newly arrived, while describing criteria for excluding those likely to fi-

nancially burden state and local governments. Because the term “public charge” had been pulled directly from the state statutes, it presumably had the same meaning that it had come to have under the state laws: someone who depended, or would likely depend, on poor-relief programs.

But when the term “public charge” was imported into federal law, it was unclear how much state aid qualified someone as a “public charge.” Neither state poor laws nor state immigration laws defined “public charge,” and no clear definition emerged in judicial opinions or secondary sources, either. Early efforts to enforce the 1882 statute bear out the uncertainty surrounding the term. In 1884, an association of ten steamship companies asked the Secretary of the Treasury, on whom responsibility for immigration fell at the time, to “specifically define . . . the circumstances which shall constitute ‘a person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,’ and who shall not be permitted to land under . . . the [1882] act.” SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1884, at 365 (1885). (The steamship companies had a stake because they were on the hook for the noncitizen’s return ticket if she was rejected as a likely public charge.) The Secretary demurred, answering that “the determination of the liability of arriving immigrants to become public charges is vested . . . in the commissioners of immigration appointed by the State in which such immigrants arrive,” and thus “this Department must decline to interfere in the matter.” *Id.* One year later, Treasury continued to recognize that “difficulties have arisen in regard to the construction of

so much of section 2 of [the 1882 act] . . . as refers to the landing of convicts, lunatics, idiots, or persons unable to take care of themselves without becoming a public charge,” though it still refused to offer clarification. SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF, NAVIGATION, AND OTHER LAWS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1885, at 359 (1886).

The term was not necessarily clarified in 1891, when immigration-enforcement authority was placed directly in the hands of federal officials. (From 1882 until Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891, states had continued to administer immigration enforcement, albeit under authority conferred by the federal statute.) With the change in administration, the steamship companies continued to express confusion, informing Treasury officials that the phrase “was somewhat indefinite and [that they] desired to have a more specific explanation of its meaning.” 1 LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION UPON THE CAUSES WHICH INCITE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 109 (1892). At this point, Treasury offered an answer, but it was hardly clarifying. Pressed by Congress to describe the standards used by officials to determine whether an immigrant was “likely to become a public charge,” the Assistant Secretary in 1892 responded that “written instructions and an inflexible standard would be inapplicable and impracticable . . . and the sound discretion of the inspection officer, subject to appeal as prescribed by law, must be the chief reliance.” H.R. REP. NO. 52-2090, at 4 (1892).

Rather than conveying something narrow and definite, the term “public charge” seemed to refer in an imprecise way to someone who lacked self-sufficiency and therefore burdened taxpayers. Explanations of the term offered in a congressional hearing by John Weber, the first commissioner of immigration at Ellis Island, illustrate the point. He explained that “[t]he appearance of the man, his vocation, his willingness to work, his apparent industry, and the demand for the kind of work that he is ready to give, is what governs” whether an individual was likely to become a public charge. *Id.* at 359. When asked whether an immigrant would be considered likely to become a public charge if “it is necessary that a private charity shall furnish food and lodging . . . for a period long or short after landing,” Weber responded that such a person would likely be considered a public charge, but that it would not violate the statute to allow him to land so long as it was obvious that he would be “supported on private charity only up to the time when [he got] employment, which may only be until the next day.” *Id.* at 425.

The repeated requests for clarification from steamship operators and Congress, coupled with Treasury’s reluctance to provide a concrete answer, indicate that the term did not have a definite and fixed meaning. That is unsurprising in the context of the time: it would have been difficult to have a one-size-fits-all definition of how much aid was too much, because there was not a one-size-fits-all system of welfare. Poor relief was largely handled by towns and counties, which made their own choices about how to deliver aid. Most localities deployed “outdoor relief”—in-kind and cash support without institutionalization. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, *IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL*

HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 37 (1986) (“[P]oor-houses did not end public outdoor relief. With a few exceptions, most towns, cities, and counties helped more people outside of poorhouses than within them.”). Other areas were more reliant on “indoor” relief in the form of poorhouses. *Id.* at 16-18. Some used a mixed system, adjusting the provision of indoor and outdoor relief as poorhouse populations ebbed and flowed. *Id.* at 39. And while the plaintiffs treat residence in a poorhouse as a proxy for primary and permanent dependence, that’s not how poor-houses worked—they housed a mix of the permanently and temporarily dependent, serving as “both a short-term refuge for people in trouble and a home for the helpless and elderly.” *Id.* at 90.

The bottom line is that in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, several different forms of public relief existed contiguously. And when nineteenth-century immigration officials determined whether someone was “likely to become a public charge,” dependence on a particular kind or amount of relief does not appear to have been dispositive. Rather than serving as shorthand for a certain type or duration of aid, the term “public charge” referred to a lack of self-sufficiency that officials had broad discretion to estimate. Neither state legislatures nor Congress pinned down the term any more than that.

B.

The plaintiffs have a backup argument: even if the term was unsettled in the late nineteenth century, they claim that it became settled in the twentieth. According to the plaintiffs, courts and administrative agencies repeatedly held that “public charge” meant one who is “primarily and permanently dependent” on the government, and Congress ratified this settled meaning in its

many reenactments of the public charge provision. *See* WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION app. at 421 (2016) (“When Congress reenacts a statute, it incorporates settled interpretations of the reenacted statute.”). Thus, the plaintiffs say, whatever uncertainty may have surrounded the term in 1882, there was no uncertainty when Congress reenacted the provision. And because Congress reenacted the provision many times—in 1891, 1907, 1917, 1952, 1990, and 1996—the plaintiffs canvass a century’s worth of judicial and administrative precedent in an effort to show that a consensus existed before at least one of these reenactments.

The bar for establishing a settled interpretation is high: at the time of reenactment, the judicial consensus must have been “so broad and unquestioned that we must presume Congress knew of and endorsed it.” *Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t*, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005). The plaintiffs rely heavily on *Gegiow v. Uhl*, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), to establish this consensus, but I share the majority’s view that *Gegiow* doesn’t do the work that the plaintiffs want it to. In that case, the Court did not define “public charge” other than to say that it cannot be defined with reference to labor conditions in the city in which an immigrant intends to settle. The Court concluded that immigrant arrivals “are to be excluded on the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying them irrespective of local conditions unless the one phrase before us [public charge] is directed to different considerations than any other of those with which it is associated.” *Id.* at 10. In other words, classifying someone as a likely “public charge” does not depend on whether he is bound for Portland or St. Paul. The

Court did not define the degree of reliance that renders someone a “public charge,” because that was not the question before it. Thus, *Gegiow* neither binds us nor offers a definition that Congress could have ratified.⁷

Without *Gegiow*, the plaintiffs face an uphill battle because satisfying the requirements of the reenactment canon typically requires at least one Supreme Court decision. See, e.g., *Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.*, 557 U.S. 230, 244 n.11 (2009); *Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.*, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979). And for the reasons that the majority gives, this is not the rare case in which lower court and administrative decisions are enough to demonstrate a consensus. See Maj. Op. at 21-22; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., *Interpreting Legislative Inaction*, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 83 (1988) (“[T]he Court often will not incorporate lower court decisions into a statute through the reenactment rule.”); cf. *Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2015) (applying the reenactment canon in light of “the *unanimous* holdings of the Courts of Appeals”) (emphasis added).

⁷ It is worth noting that even after *Gegiow*, state and local governments took varied positions on what it meant for an immigrant to be a public charge. For instance, in the 1920s, Los Angeles worked closely with charitable institutions to report as public charges immigrants who were receiving outdoor relief. Cybelle Fox, *The Boundaries of Social Citizenship: Race, Immigration and the American Welfare State, 1900-1950*, at 266-67 (May 7, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). But other jurisdictions rarely reported immigrants who were receiving only outdoor relief—for example, as early as the 1920s, Cook County developed its own local policy to not “deport when the necessity for public care [was] only temporary.” *Id.* at 278.

In any event, the reenactment canon requires more than a judicial consensus—it applies only if Congress reenacted the provision without making material changes. *Jama*, 543 U.S. at 349; *see also Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez*, 566 U.S. 583, 593 (2012) (“[T]he doctrine of congressional ratification applies only when Congress reenacts a statute without relevant change.”). Whatever one thinks of earlier changes to the public charge provision, there can be no doubt that the 1996 amendments were material.

The INA is notoriously complex, and these amendments are no exception. Making matters worse, the amendments came from two separate acts, themselves incredibly complex, that were passed a month apart: the Welfare Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (IIRIRA). But because the plaintiffs challenge the materiality of these amendments to the meaning of the term “public charge,” it is necessary to step through them at a level of detail that is, unfortunately, excruciating.

Congress enacted IIRIRA, which made sweeping changes to the INA, in September of 1996. Among its changes were several material amendments to the public charge provision. For the first time in the provision’s 114-year history, Congress required the Executive to consider an itemized list of factors in making the public charge determination, thereby ensuring that the inquiry was searching rather than superficial. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B)(i) (providing that “the consular officer or the Attorney General shall at a minimum consider” the noncitizen’s age; health; family status; assets,

resources, and financial status; and education and skills). Even more significantly, it added a subsection to the public charge provision rendering most family-sponsored applicants automatically inadmissible on public charge grounds unless they obtained an enforceable affidavit of support from a sponsor (usually the family member petitioning for their admission). *Id.* § 1182(a)(4)(C) (rendering a family-sponsored non-citizen “in-admissible under this paragraph” unless the sponsor executes an “affidavit of support described in [8 U.S.C. § 1183a] with respect to such alien”).⁸ The affidavit provision had been inserted into the INA weeks earlier by the Welfare Reform Act. *See* Welfare Reform Act § 423. In addition to making the affidavit of support mandatory under the public charge provision, IIRIRA significantly expanded 8 U.S.C. § 1183a by spelling out what the affidavit of support requires.

The affidavit provision is meant to establish that the applicant “is not excludable as a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1). To that end, it empowers the federal government, as well as state and local governments, to demand reimbursement from the sponsor for any means-tested public benefit received by the sponsored noncitizen.⁹ *Id.* § 1183a(b)(1)(A). A “means-tested public benefit” is one available to those whose in-

⁸ IIRIRA originally provided that a family-based applicant was “excludable” without the affidavit. IIRIRA § 531(a). A subsequent amendment to the INA changed the terminology from “excludable” to “inadmissible.”

⁹ It also requires the sponsor “to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line.” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A).

come falls below a certain level. The provision explicitly excludes certain benefits, regardless of whether they are means tested, from the sponsor's reimbursement obligation; by implication, receipt of every other means-tested benefit is included. *See id.* § 1183a note.¹⁰ If the sponsor doesn't pay upon request, the government can sue the sponsor. *Id.* § 1183a(b)(2). If the sponsor doesn't keep "the Attorney General and the State in which the sponsored alien is currently a resident" apprised of any change in the sponsor's address, she is subject to a civil penalty—and that penalty is higher if she fails to update her address "with knowledge that the sponsored alien has received any means-tested public benefits" other than those described in three cross-referenced provisions of the Welfare Reform Act. *Id.* § 1183a(d).¹¹ The affidavit is generally enforceable for ten years or until the sponsored noncitizen is naturalized. *Id.* § 1183a(a)(2).¹²

¹⁰ I discuss these exemptions, which are narrow, in my analysis at *Chevron* step two.

¹¹ This list of exempted benefits in the change-of-address penalty section largely track those in the "benefits subject to reimbursement" section.

¹² IIRIRA contained another provision relevant to the "public charge" ground of inadmissibility: section 564 of the Act directed the Attorney General to establish a pilot program "to require aliens to post a bond in addition to the affidavit requirements under [8 U.S.C. § 1183a]." IIRIRA § 564(a)(1). The bond covered the cost of benefits described in the affidavit provision—that is, any means-tested benefit other than those described in three cross-referenced provisions of the Welfare Reform Act. *Id.* Congress instructed the Attorney General to set the bond at "an amount that is not less than the cost of providing [the relevant benefits] for the alien and the alien's dependents for 6 months." *Id.* § 564(b)(2).

Notwithstanding IIRIRA's obvious—and obviously significant—amendments to the public charge provision, the plaintiffs insist, and the majority agrees, that its amendments reveal nothing about the scope of the term “public charge.” Yet as I will explain below, the 1996 amendments were not only material, but they also increased the bite of the public charge exclusion.

The plaintiffs characterize the affidavit provision as having nothing to do with admissibility; as they see it, the provision merely reinforces restrictions on government benefits for lawful permanent residents. They offer two basic arguments in support of that position: first, that the supporting-affidavit requirement appears in a different provision than does the public charge exclusion (8 U.S.C. § 1183a, as opposed to § 1182(a)(4)), and second, that the supporting-affidavit requirement doesn't apply to everyone who is subject to the public charge exclusion.

The first argument is totally unpersuasive. The public charge provision explicitly cross-references the affidavit provision, thereby tying the two together, and it makes obtaining an affidavit of support *a condition of admissibility*. *Id.* § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii). What's more, the affidavit provision expressly states that the point of the affidavit is “to establish that an alien is not excludable as a public charge under section 1182(a)(4).” *Id.* § 1183a(a)(1). Because a family-sponsored applicant is inadmissible as a public charge without the affidavit, the coverage of the affidavit is very strong evidence of the

If an admitted noncitizen used a covered benefit, the government could bring suit either on the bond or against the sponsor pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. IIRIRA § 564(a)(2). Congress allowed this pilot program to sunset after three years. *Id.* § 564(e).

nature of the burden with which the public charge exclusion is concerned.¹³

The plaintiffs’ second argument fails too. As an initial matter, the affidavit provision—which, it bears repeating, is tied by cross-reference to the public charge exclusion—uses the term “public charge,” and we “do[] not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same or related statutes.” *Azar v. Allina Health Servs.*, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019); see also *Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa*, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (explaining that as a general rule, “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning” (citation omitted)). The plaintiffs don’t specify what different meaning the term “public charge” might have in the affidavit provision; they just vaguely assert that the provision is getting at something else. They presumably don’t want to embrace the logical implication of their position: that the term “public charge” means something more stringent for family-based immigrants, who need to produce an affidavit, than it does for the others, who don’t.

In any event, this argument assumes that if the affidavit were tied to the standard of admissibility, Congress would have required one from everyone subject to the exclusion. Its choice to require an affidavit only from family-based immigrants, the logic goes, means that the

¹³ The same is true of IIRIRA’s pilot bond program. The required bond protected the government against the risk that the noncitizen would become a public charge, so the scope of its coverage is a window into the meaning of the term at the time of the 1996 amendments.

affidavit provision can't shed any light on the admissibility provision, which is more generally applicable.

This argument is misguided. There is an obvious explanation for why Congress required supporting affidavits from family-based immigrants and not from employment-based immigrants or green card lottery winners: that is the only context in which it makes sense to demand this assurance. A connection to a citizen or lawful permanent resident is the basis for a family-based green card. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2), 1153(a). The same is not true for immigrants who obtain diversity or employment-based green cards, neither of which is based on a personal relationship—much less a relationship close enough that someone would be willing to take on ten years' worth of potentially significant liability. Moreover, in the context of an employment-based green card, a supporting affidavit would add little. The affidavit is a means of providing the Executive with assurance that the green card applicant will not become a public charge if admitted. The stringent criteria for an employment-based green card provide similar assurance. Employment-based green cards are reserved largely for those with “extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim”; “outstanding professors and researchers” who are “recognized internationally”; “multinational executives and managers”; those who hold advanced degrees and have job offers; and entrepreneurs prepared to invest a minimum of \$1,000,000 in a venture that will benefit the United States economy and employ “not fewer than 10 United States citizens or [lawful permanent residents].” *Id.* § 1153(b)(1)-(5). Someone who

meets these criteria is unlikely to have trouble supporting herself in the future. That said, if an employment-based applicant will be working for a relative, and therefore has a family connection, the statute still requires her to obtain a supporting affidavit—demonstrating that the affidavit is not uniquely applicable to those applying for family-based green cards. *See id.* § 1182(a)(4)(D).

Despite the plaintiffs' effort to show otherwise, it doesn't make sense to treat the affidavit provision as an anomalous carve-out rather than compelling evidence of the scope of the public charge inquiry. In fact, trying to categorize the supporting affidavit as limited by virtue of its application to family-based immigrants is a sleight of hand, because, as the plaintiffs surely know, the family-based category is not simply one among several to which the public charge exclusion applies. As a practical matter, it is the category for which the exclusion matters most. The number of lottery winners is considerably smaller than the number of family-based immigrants, and employment-based immigrants—also a smaller category than the family based—have other means of demonstrating self-sufficiency.

In short, the 1996 amendments to the public charge provision—most notably, the addition of factors to guide the public charge determination and the insertion of the affidavit requirement—were material. What's more, the affidavit provision reflects Congress's view that the term "public charge" encompasses supplemental as well as primary dependence on public assistance. To establish that a family-based applicant is not excludable as a public charge, a sponsor must promise to pay for the noncitizen's use of any means-tested benefit outside the

itemized exclusions. Without such an affidavit, the noncitizen is inadmissible. Congress's attempt to aggressively protect the public fisc through the supporting-affidavit requirement is at odds with the view that it used the term "public charge" to refer exclusively to primary and permanent dependence.

C.

Switching gears, the plaintiffs—with the support of the House of Representatives, appearing as *amicus curiae*—advance a creative structural argument for why the term "public charge" must be interpreted narrowly: they say that interpreting the term to include the receipt of supplemental benefits is inconsistent with Congress's choice in the Welfare Reform Act to make such benefits available to lawful permanent residents. According to the plaintiffs, Congress would not have authorized lawful permanent residents to receive supplemental benefits if it did not expect them to use those benefits. And it is inconsistent with Congress's generosity to deny someone a green card because she is likely to take advantage of benefits for which Congress has made her eligible. The statutory scheme therefore forecloses the possibility of interpreting "public charge" to mean anything other than primary and permanent dependence.

There are several problems with this argument. To begin with, its logic would read the public charge provision out of the statute. The premise of the public charge inquiry has always been that immigrants in need of assistance would have access to it after their arrival—initially through state poor laws and later through modern state and federal welfare systems. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how someone could become a public

charge under any conception of the term if it were impossible to receive public aid. For example, on the plaintiffs' logic, DHS could not exclude an applicant even if it predicted that the applicant would eventually become permanently reliant on government benefits, because the future use of those benefits would, after all, be authorized. Barring the Executive from considering a green card applicant's potential use of authorized benefits would render the statutory public charge exclusion a dead letter.

Moreover, the plaintiffs' position assumes that tension exists between the public charge exclusion and the availability of benefits to lawful permanent residents—and that this tension can be resolved only by limiting the scope of the exclusion. In fact, the public charge exclusion and the availability of benefits are easily reconcilable. Immigration law has long distinguished between one who becomes a public charge because of a condition preexisting her arrival and one who becomes a public charge because of something that has happened since. *See, e.g., id.* § 1227(a)(5) ("Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable."); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 ("[A]ny alien who becomes a public charge within one year after his arrival in the United States from causes existing prior to his landing therein shall be deemed to have come in violation of law and shall be returned as aforesaid."). Providing benefits to immigrants who have been here for a designated period of time—generally five years under current law—takes care of immigrants in the latter situation. Life contains the unexpected: for instance, a pandemic may strike, leaving illness, death, and job loss in its wake. A

lawful permanent resident who falls on hard times can rely on public assistance to get back on her feet. Congress's willingness to authorize funds to help immigrants who encounter unexpected trouble is perfectly consistent with its reluctance to admit immigrants whose need for help is predictable upon arrival.

In any event, the plaintiffs' argument is inconsistent not only with the statutory exclusion, but also with the Welfare Reform Act. As the plaintiffs tell it, Congress has generously supported noncitizens, thereby implicitly instructing the Executive to ignore a green card applicant's potential usage of supplemental benefits in the admissibility determination. But that is a totally implausible description of the Welfare Reform Act. The stated purpose of the Act is to ensure that noncitizens "within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations," and that "the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2). To this end, the Act renders lawful permanent residents ineligible for most benefits until they have lived in the United States for at least five years. *Id.* § 1613(a). The Act's dramatic rollback of benefits for noncitizens sparked vociferous criticism. *See* Isabel Sawhill et al., *Problems and Issues for Reauthorization*, in *WELFARE REFORM AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE SAFETY NET* 20, 27 (Isabel Sawhill et al. eds., 2002) (referring to the five-year aid eligibility restriction as one of the Act's "most contentious features"). It blinks reality to describe the Welfare Reform Act as a "grant" of benefits,

as the plaintiffs do, or to say that the Act took an immigrant’s potential use of supplemental benefits off the table for purposes of the admissibility determination.¹⁴

* * *

Given the length and complexity of my analysis of the plaintiffs’ arguments at *Chevron* step one, a summary may be helpful. In my view, the plaintiffs can’t show that the term “public charge” refers narrowly to someone who is primarily and permanently dependent on government assistance. The term “public charge” was broad when it entered federal immigration law in 1882, and it has not been pinned down since. IIRIRA, Congress’s latest word on the public charge provision, cuts in the opposite direction of the plaintiffs’ argument, as does the Welfare Reform Act, which, contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, hardly reflects a congressional desire that immigrants take advantage of available public assistance. In fact, the amendments that IIRIRA and the Welfare Reform Act together made to the INA reflect more than Congress’s view that the term “public

¹⁴ As the plaintiffs point out, Congress softened some of these restrictions in subsequent legislation. Perhaps most notably, in 2002 Congress passed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, which made adults eligible for SNAP after 5 years of residency (it had previously been 10) and children eligible for SNAP immediately after becoming lawful permanent residents. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4401, 116 Stat. 134, 333 (2002) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)). Yet these minor adjustments, even if slightly more generous than the original restrictions, did not overhaul immigration policy—nor, as I have already explained, is it unreasonable in any event for the Executive to consider whether a green card applicant is likely to use benefits if she is permitted to stay. That’s the point of the public charge determination.

charge” is capacious enough to include supplemental dependence on public assistance. They reflect its preference that the Executive consider even supplemental dependence in enforcing the public charge exclusion.

III.

While the term “public charge” is indeterminate enough to leave room for interpretation, DHS can prevail only if its definition is reasonable. The majority holds that DHS is likely to lose on the merits of that argument; I disagree. My dissent from the majority on this score is inevitable, given how differently we analyze the statute at *Chevron* step one. The majority seems to understand “public charge” to mean something only slightly broader than “primarily and permanently dependent,” but I understand it to be a much more capacious term—not only as a matter of history, but also by virtue of the 1996 amendments to the public charge provision. On my reading, in contrast to the majority’s, the statute gives DHS relatively wide discretion to specify the degree of benefit usage that renders someone a “public charge.” Thus, the majority and I approach *Chevron* step two from different starting points.

The plaintiffs challenge the reasonableness of the rule’s definition in two respects. First, they object to the particular benefits that DHS has chosen to designate in its definition of “public charge.” According to the plaintiffs, DHS has unreasonably interpreted the statute insofar as the rule counts in-kind aid. Second, they argue that DHS has set the relevant benefit usage so low that the definition captures people who cannot reasonably be characterized as “public charges.” I will address these arguments in turn.

A.

The plaintiffs don't contest DHS's authority to account for the receipt of state and federal cash assistance (like SSI and TANF) in the definition of "public charge." But they insist that in-kind benefits (like SNAP, public housing, and Medicaid) are off-limits. Their argument in support of that position is difficult to grasp. In their brief, the plaintiffs vaguely assert that in-kind benefits shouldn't be counted because they are categorically different from cash payments; they imply that the term "public charge" does not encompass someone who relies on in-kind public assistance. At oral argument, the plaintiffs wisely abandoned that position. For one thing, they could not articulate why it mattered whether the government chose to give someone \$500 for groceries or \$500 worth of food. For another, that argument is inconsistent with history: everyone agrees that someone living permanently in a late nineteenth-century poor-house qualified as a public charge, and shelter in a poor-house is in-kind relief.

At least rhetorically, a great deal of the plaintiffs' argument involves their repeated emphasis on the fact that the 1999 Guidance directed officers "not [to] place any weight on the receipt of non-cash public benefits (other than institutionalization) or the receipt of cash benefits for purposes other than for income maintenance." 1999 Guidance, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. The implication is that the 1999 Guidance reflects the only reasonable interpretation of the statute.

Of course, the fact that a prior administration interpreted a statute differently does not establish that the new interpretation is unreasonable—the premise of *Chev-*

ron step two is that more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute exists. See *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). Moreover, the focus on cash benefits in the 1999 Guidance flowed from the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s decision to interpret “public charge” to mean “primarily dependent on the government for subsistence.” 1999 Guidance, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,692. As the Guidance explained, INS had decided “that the best evidence of whether an alien is primarily dependent on the government for subsistence is either (i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance, or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.” *Id.* DHS has now taken a different approach — it has decided that projected reliance on government benefits need not be primary to trigger the public charge exclusion. And once DHS made that baseline choice, a broader range of benefits became relevant. Thus, the plaintiffs’ fundamental objection to the counting of benefits like Medicaid, housing, and SNAP—that they are supplemental—is really just a repackaging of their argument under *Chevron* step one.

The plaintiffs also advance a legislative-inaction argument: in 2013—twenty years after Congress enacted IIRIRA—the Senate Judiciary Committee, while debating the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, voted down a proposal to require applicants for lawful permanent resident status “to show they were not likely to qualify even for non-cash employment supports such as Medicaid, the SNAP

program, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).” S. REP. NO. 113-40, at 42 (2013). But the failure of this proposal is neither here nor there. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, “Congressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because ‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, ‘including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’” *Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.*, 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (citation omitted). This rejected proposal—which would have overridden the 1999 Guidance—is a case in point: the rejection is as consistent with the choice to leave the matter within the Executive’s discretion as it is with the choice to force the Executive’s hand. The plaintiffs’ argument has other problems too. Why should the views of the 2013 Senate Judiciary Committee be attributed to Congress as a whole? *See Thompson v. Thompson*, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen, are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President.” (citation omitted)). And how could the unenacted views of the 2013 Congress settle the meaning of language chosen by a different Congress at a different time? *See United States v. Price*, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”).

Thus, the plaintiffs are wrong to insist that DHS is barred from considering the receipt of a particular benefit simply because the benefit is in-kind rather than cash. There is no such bar. Rather, the list of desig-

nated benefits is reasonable if receiving them is consistent with the lack of self-sufficiency conveyed by the term “public charge.”

Answering this question requires fleshing out what it means to lack self-sufficiency for purposes of the public charge exclusion. As the majority observes, no one is self-sufficient in an “absolutist” sense because everyone relies on some nonmonetary government services—for example, public snow removal and emergency services. Maj. Op. at 13, 37. Importantly, the term “public charge” does not implicate self-sufficiency in this absolutist sense. Throughout its centuries-long history, “public charge” has always been associated with dependence on a particular category of government programs: those available based on financial need. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these were “poor relief” programs; now, they are the need-based programs of the modern welfare system. And what has always been implicit in the term “public charge” was made explicit by the 1996 amendments. The statutory exclusion requires the Executive to consider the noncitizen’s age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills—factors plainly designed to determine whether a noncitizen will be able to support herself, not whether she will use generally available services like snow removal. In the same vein, the sponsor’s reimbursement obligation covers only those benefits that are “means tested”—that is, available to those whose income falls below a certain threshold. As a matter of both history and text, a “public charge” lacks self-sufficiency in the sense that she lacks the financial resources to provide for herself.

The benefits designated in DHS's definition are all consistent with this concept of self-sufficiency. Recall that DHS has designated the following benefits: cash assistance for income maintenance (including SSI, TANF, and state cash assistance), SNAP, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, housing benefits under Section 9, and Medicaid (with some explicit exceptions). 8 C.F.R. § 212.21. These benefits are all means tested; they are also squarely within the Welfare Reform Act's definition of "public benefit." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(c), 1621(c) (defining "public benefit" to include welfare, food, health, and public-housing benefits funded by the federal, state, or local governments). It is consistent with the term "public charge" to consider the potential receipt of cash, food, housing, and healthcare benefits—all of which fulfill fundamental needs—in evaluating whether someone is likely to depend on public assistance to get by.

It is also worth noting some of the benefits that the rule does *not* include: significantly, the rule's definition accommodates the reimbursement limitations in the affidavit provision. Under the affidavit provision, the following benefits, even if means tested, are not subject to reimbursement: certain forms of emergency medical assistance; short-term, in-kind emergency disaster relief; school-lunch benefits; benefits under the Child Nutrition Act of 1966; public-health assistance for immunization, as well as treatment for the symptoms of communicable disease; certain foster-care and adoption payments; certain in-kind services such as soup kitchens and crisis counseling; student assistance for higher education; benefits under the Head Start Act; means-tested programs under the Elementary and Secondary

Education Act of 1965; and certain job-training benefits. *Id.* § 1183a note.¹⁵

These exemptions under the affidavit provision are excluded from the rule too. The rule's definition provides "an exhaustive list of public benefits," Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,296, so any benefit not mentioned in the list is by implication excluded from the definition. And the list does not mention any of the benefits exempted in the affidavit provision of the statute. 8 C.F.R. § 212.21; *see also* Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,312 (noting that the rule's "definition does not include benefits related exclusively to emergency response, immunization, education, or social services"); *id.* at 41,482 (explaining that the rule's definition "does not include emergency aid, emergency medical assistance, or disaster relief"); *id.* at 41,389 (excluding benefits under the National School Lunch Act, the Child Nutrition Act, and the Head Start Act). Indeed, to highlight just how carefully the rule tracks the statutory exemptions to the affidavit of support, consider the rule's exclusion of Medicaid for those under the age of 21 and pregnant women. *Id.* at 41,367. These benefits do not appear in the list of exemptions to the affidavit of support, but they are exempted from the sponsor's reimbursement obligations under a different statutory provision.

¹⁵ By virtue of a notice issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, housing benefits are excluded from the reimbursement obligation. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 213a.1; Eligibility Restrictions on Noncitizens, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,994 (Aug. 16, 2000). But that exemption is not statutory, and here, I'm concerned only with DHS's interpretation of the statute.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(4)(B). The rule captures that exclusion even though it appears elsewhere; in other words, DHS did not simply copy and paste the statutory note.

In sum, the designated benefits are not only consistent with the term “public charge,” but they also fit neatly within the statutory structure. Considering the potential receipt of these benefits to gauge the likelihood that a noncitizen will become a public charge is therefore not an unreasonable interpretation of the statute.

B.

The closer question is whether DHS’s benefit-usage threshold stretches the meaning of “public charge” beyond the breaking point. The rule defines “public charge” to mean a noncitizen who receives one or more of the designated benefits “for more than twelve months in the aggregate within any 36-month period.” One month of one benefit counts toward the twelve. As a result, an applicant expected to live in Section 8 housing for a year would be denied admission as someone who is likely to become a public charge, as would an applicant who is expected to receive three months’ worth of housing, TANF, Medicaid, and SNAP.

The plaintiffs have a legislative-inaction argument for this feature of the rule too. They point out that during the enactment of IIRIRA, the Senate Judiciary Committee, while negotiating the House-passed version of the bill, dropped language that “would have clarified the definition of ‘public charge’” in the deportation provision to provide for deportation if a noncitizen “received Federal public benefits for an aggregate of 12

months over a period of 7 years.” 142 Cong. Rec. S11,872, S11,882 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Thus, they say, Congress has foreclosed the possibility that 12 months’ worth of benefit usage renders someone a public charge. Whatever the statutory floor is, it must be higher than that.

I’ve already identified some of the problems with legislative-inaction arguments, so I won’t belabor them here. It’s worth noting, though, that this legislative-inaction argument is even worse than the plaintiffs’ other. So far as the plaintiffs’ citation reveals, the proposal dropped out of the statute in the course of committee negotiations, not by a vote, and there is no explanation for why it did. *See Thompson*, 484 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“An enactment by implication cannot realistically be regarded as the product of the difficult lawmaking process our Constitution has prescribed.”). Moreover, the dropped proposal involved the public charge *deportation* provision, not the public charge *admissibility* provision. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5). Drawing general conclusions from a committee’s decision to drop this language in a context with much higher stakes is a particularly dubious proposition. Despite the plaintiffs’ effort to demonstrate otherwise, the statute doesn’t draw a bright line requiring something more than 12 months of benefit usage to meet the definition of “public charge.”

At oral argument, DHS declined to identify any limit to its discretion, implying that it could define public charge to include someone who took any amount of benefits, no matter how small. It may have been grounding its theory in the affidavit provision, which triggers the sponsor’s liability once the noncitizen receives “*any*

means-tested public benefit” that falls within the sponsor’s reimbursement obligation. *Id.* § 1183a(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

That may well overread the affidavit provision, which does not purport to define “public charge.” Enforcement of the public charge exclusion has waxed and waned over time in response to economic conditions, immigration policy, and changes in the programs available to support the poor. The amendments made by IIRIRA and the Welfare Reform Act, including the affidavit provision, reflect Congress’s interest in vigorous enforcement. Yet Congress left the centuries-old term in the statute, and that term has always been associated with a lack of self-sufficiency. So that’s the principle that governs here: if it’s reasonable to describe someone who takes one or more of the designated benefits “for more than twelve months in the aggregate within any 36-month period” as lacking in self-sufficiency, then DHS’s definition falls within the permissible range.

In deciding this question, it is wrong to focus exclusively on the durational requirement—duration must be viewed in the context of the benefits measured. Three features are particularly important in this regard: the designated benefits are means tested, satisfy basic necessities, and are major welfare grants. To see the importance of these features, consider how different the durational threshold would look without them—for example, if the rule measured the usage of benefits that are not means tested (e.g., public education), that are means tested but don’t satisfy a basic necessity (e.g., Pell grants), or that satisfy a basic necessity but are not major welfare grants (e.g., need-based emergency food assistance). Relying on the government to provide a

year's worth of a basic necessity (food, shelter, medicine, or cash assistance for income maintenance) implicates self-sufficiency in a way that funding a year of college with the help of a Pell grant does not.

The plaintiffs particularly object to the rule's stacking mechanism, which can reduce the durational requirement from 12 months to as little as 3 months. But here, too, the context matters: all of the designated benefits supply basic necessities, and the reduction is triggered in proportion to the degree of reliance on the government. The more supplemental the reliance, the longer it can go on before crossing the "public charge" threshold. The briefest durational threshold—three months of benefit usage—meets the definition only when the recipient relies on the government for *all* basic necessities (food, shelter, medicine, and cash assistance for income maintenance). In other words, such short-term reliance only counts if it's virtually total. The rule measures self-sufficiency along a sliding scale rather than by time alone.

It is not unreasonable to describe someone who relies on the government to satisfy a basic necessity for a year, or multiple basic necessities for a period of months, as falling within the definition of a term that denotes a lack of self-sufficiency. To be sure, the rule reaches dependence that is supplemental and temporary rather than primary and permanent. But the definition of "public charge" is elastic enough to permit that. The rule's definition is exacting, and DHS could have exercised its discretion differently. The line that DHS chose to draw, however, does not exceed what the statutory term will bear.

IV.

This case involves more than the definition of “public charge.” The plaintiffs raised a host of objections to the rule in their complaint, and the majority addresses some of them. It concludes that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their challenge to the factors that DHS uses to implement its definition (the list of factors includes health, family size, and English proficiency), as well as in their argument that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining that the agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (citation omitted)).

I wouldn’t reach these issues. The district court didn’t address them, and on appeal, the parties devoted their briefs almost entirely to the definition of “public charge.” *Singleton v. Wulff*, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”); see also *Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen*, 694 F.3d 108, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (remanding to the district court for arbitrary-and-capricious review when the district court resolved a case at *Chevron* step one without reaching the issue and when the agency’s position was not well developed). And while it’s generally prudent to refrain from deciding difficult issues without the benefit of arguments from the parties, the procedural posture of this case offers a particularly good reason to stop where the parties did. We are reviewing the issuance of the “extraordinary remedy” of a prelim-

inary injunction. *Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017). Based on the record developed thus far, the plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to this extraordinary remedy. I would remand so that the district court can assess whether the plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the rule are likely to succeed.

* * *

The many critics of the “public charge” definition characterize it as too harsh. But the same can be said—and has been said—of IIRIRA and the Welfare Reform Act. The latter dramatically rolled back the availability of aid to noncitizens, and both statutes linked those cuts to the public charge provision by making the affidavit of support a condition of admissibility. The definition in the 1999 Guidance tried to blunt the force of these changes; now, DHS has chosen to exercise the leeway that Congress gave it. At bottom, the plaintiffs' objections reflect disagreement with this policy choice and even the statutory exclusion itself. Litigation is not the vehicle for resolving policy disputes. Because I think that DHS's definition is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory term “public charge,” I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

No. 19 C 6334

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, AN ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, AND ILLINOIS COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, INC.,
PLAINTIFFS

v.

KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, A FEDERAL AGENCY, KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI II, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATIONS SERVICES, A FEDERAL AGENCY,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: Oct. 14, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Judge GARY FEINERMAN

In this suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 *et seq.*, Cook County and Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. (“ICIRR”) challenge the legality of the Department

of Homeland Security's ("DHS") final rule, Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212-14, 245, 248). Doc. 1. The Final Rule has an effective date of October 15, 2019. Cook County and ICIRR move for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Civil Rule 65, or a stay under § 705 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705, to bar DHS (the other defendants are ignored for simplicity's sake) from implementing and enforcing the Rule in the State of Illinois. Doc. 24. At the parties' request, briefing closed on October 10, 2019, and oral argument was held on October 11, 2019. Docs. 29, 81. The motion is granted, and DHS is enjoined from implementing the Rule in the State of Illinois absent further order of court.

Background

Section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") states: "Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). The public charge provision has a long pedigree, dating back to the Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, §§ 1-2, 22 Stat. 214, 214, which directed immigration officers to refuse entry to "any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge." The provision has been part of our immigration laws, in various but nearly identical guises, ever since. *See* Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 899; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29 § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876; INA of

1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 183; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 531(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-674-75 (1996).

Prior to the rulemaking resulting in the Final Rule, the federal agency charged with immigration enforcement last articulated its interpretation of “public charge” in a 1999 field guidance document. *Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds*, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999). The field guidance defined a “public charge” as a person “primarily dependent on the government for subsistence,” and instructed immigration officers to ignore non-cash public benefits in assessing whether an individual was “likely at any time to become a public charge.” *Ibid.* That definition and instruction never made their way into a regulation.

On October 10, 2018, DHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018), which was followed by a sixty-day public comment period. Some ten months later, DHS published the Final Rule, which addressed the comments, revised the proposed rule, and provided analysis to support the Rule. *See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, supra.* As DHS described it, the Rule “redefines the term ‘public charge’ to mean an alien who receives one or more designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295.

By adopting a duration-based standard, the Rule covers aliens who receive only minimal benefits so long as

they receive them for the requisite time period. As the Rule explains: “DHS may find an alien inadmissible under the standard, even though the alien who exceeds the duration threshold may receive only hundreds of dollars, or less, in public benefits annually.” *Id.* at 41,360-61. The Rule “defines the term ‘public benefit’ to include cash benefits for income maintenance, SNAP, most forms of Medicaid, Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program, Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, and certain other forms of subsidized housing.” *Ibid.* The Rule sets forth several nonexclusive factors DHS must consider in determining whether an alien is likely to become a public charge, including “the alien’s health,” any “diagnosed . . . medical condition” that “will interfere with the alien’s ability to provide and care for himself or herself,” and past applications for the enumerated public benefits. *Id.* at 41,502-04. The Rule provides that persons found likely to become public charges are ineligible “for a visa to come the United States temporarily or permanently, for admission, or for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident.” *Id.* at 41,303. The Rule also “potentially affect[s] individuals applying for an extension of stay or change of status because these individuals would have to demonstrate that they have not received, since obtaining the nonimmigrant status they are seeking to extend or change, public benefits for” more than the allowed duration. *Id.* at 41,493.

Cook County and ICIRR challenge the Rule’s legality and seek to enjoin its implementation. Cook County operates the Cook County Health and Hospitals System (“CCH”), one of the largest public hospital systems in the Nation. Doc. 27-1 at p. 326, ¶ 5. ICIRR

is a membership-based organization that represents nonprofit organizations and social and health service providers throughout Illinois that deliver and seek to protect access to health care, nutrition, housing, and other services for immigrants regardless of immigration status. *Id.* at pp. 341-342, ¶¶ 3-10. Cook County and ICIRR maintain that the Rule will cause immigrants to disenroll from public benefits—or to not seek benefits in the first place—which will in turn generate increased costs and cause them to divert resources from their existing programs meant to aid immigrants and safeguard public health. Doc. 27-1 at pp. 330-338, ¶¶ 25-52; *id.* at pp. 342-350, ¶¶ 11-42. Cook County and ICIRR argue that the Rule exceeds the authority granted to DHS under the INA and that DHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the Rule.

Discussion

“To win a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish that (1) without preliminary relief, it will suffer irreparable harm before final resolution of its claims; (2) legal remedies are inadequate; and (3) its claim has some likelihood of success on the merits.” *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.*, 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018). “If the moving party makes this showing, the court balances the harms to the moving party, other parties, and the public.” *Ibid.* “In so doing, the court employs a sliding scale approach: the more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in [its] favor; the less likely [it] is to win, the more need [the balance] weigh in [its] favor.” *Valencia v. City of Springfield*, 883 F.3d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 2018) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The sliding scale approach is not mathematical in nature, rather it is more properly characterized as subjective and intuitive, one which permits district courts to weigh the competing considerations and mold appropriate relief.” *Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters.*, 695 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Stated another way, the district court sits as would a chancellor in equity and weighs all the factors, seeking at all times to minimize the costs of being mistaken.” *Ibid.* (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). A request for a temporary restraining order is analyzed under the same rubric, *see Carlson Grp., Inc. v. Davenport*, 2016 WL 7212522, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2016), as is a request for a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, *see Cronin v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 919 F.2d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The standard is the same whether a preliminary injunction against agency action is being sought in the district court or a stay of that action [under 5 U.S.C. § 705] is being sought in [the appeals] court.”).

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A. Standing

DHS argues at the outset that Cook County and ICIRR lack Article III standing. Doc. 73 at 20-23. “To assert [Article III] standing for injunctive relief, [a plaintiff] must show that [it is] under an actual or imminent threat of suffering a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’; that this injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and that it is likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” *Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson*, 937 F.3d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).

On the present record, Cook County has established its standing. In *Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood*, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), where a municipality alleged under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 *et seq.*, that real estate brokers had engaged in racial steering, the Supreme Court held for Article III purposes that “[a] significant reduction in property values directly injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear the costs of local government and to provide services.” *Id.* at 110-11. That was so even though the causal chain resulting in the municipality’s injury involved independent decisions made by non-parties; as the Court explained, “racial steering effectively manipulates the housing market” by altering homebuyers’ decisions, which “reduce[s] the total number of buyers in the . . . housing market,” particularly where “perceptible increases in the minority population . . . precipitate an exodus of white residents.” *Id.* at 109-10. That reduction in buyers, in turn, meant that “prices may be deflected downward[,] . . . directly injur[ing] a municipality by diminishing its tax base.” *Id.* at 110-11.

Applying *Gladstone*, the Seventh Circuit in *City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc.*, 982 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1992), held that Chicago had standing in a similar FHA case, reasoning that “racial steering leads to resegregation” and to “[p]eople . . . becom[ing] panicked and los[ing] interest in the community,” generating “destabilization of the community and a corresponding increased burden on the City in the form of increased crime and an erosion of the tax base.” *Id.* at 1095. The Seventh Circuit added that Chicago’s standing also rested on the fact that its “fair housing

agency ha[d] to use its scarce resources to ensure compliance with the fair housing laws” rather than to “perform its routine services.” *Ibid.*

The Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year in *Department of Commerce v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019), is of a piece with *Gladstone* and *Matchmaker*. In a challenge to the Department of Commerce’s addition of a citizenship question to the census, the Court held that the plaintiff States had shown standing by “establish[ing] a sufficient likelihood that the reinstatement of a citizenship question would result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates than other groups, which in turn would cause them to be undercounted and lead to” injuries to the States such as “diminishment of political representation, loss of federal funds, degradation of census data, and diversion of resources.” *Id.* at 2565. In so holding, the Court explained that the fact that a “harm depends on the independent action of third parties,” even when such actions stem from the third parties’ “unfounded fears,” does not make an injury too “speculative” to confer standing. *Id.* at 2565-66.

Cook County asserts injuries at least as concrete, imminent, and traceable as did the government plaintiffs in *Gladstone*, *New York*, and *Matchmaker*. As the parties agree, the Final Rule will cause immigrants to disenroll from, or refrain from enrolling in, critical public benefits out of fear of being deemed a public charge. Doc. 27-1 at pp. 330-332, ¶¶ 25, 30; *id.* at pp. 344-345, ¶¶ 19-20, 23; 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,300 (“The final rule will . . . result in a reduction in transfer payments from the Federal Government to individuals who may choose

to disenroll from or forego enrollment in a public benefits program.”); *id.* at 41,485 (same). Cook County adduces evidence showing, consistent with common sense, that where individuals lack access to health coverage and do not avail themselves of government-provided healthcare, they are likely to forgo routine treatment—resulting in more costly, uncompensated emergency care down the line. Doc. 27-1 at pp. 331-333, 335-337, ¶¶ 30-32, 41-50. Additionally, because uninsured persons who do not seek public medical benefits are less likely to receive immunizations or to seek diagnostic testing, the Rule increases the risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable diseases spreading throughout the County. *Id.* at pp. 329-330, 333, ¶¶ 20-21, 33; *id.* at pp. 358-359, ¶¶ 29, 32. Both the costs of community health epidemics and of uncompensated care are likely to fall particularly hard on CCH, which already provides approximately half of all charity care in Cook County, *id.* at pp. 335-336, ¶¶ 42-43, including to non-citizens regardless of their immigration status, *id.* at p. 327, ¶ 11. Indeed, DHS itself recognizes that the Rule will cause “[s]tate and local governments . . . [to] incur costs” stemming from “changes in behavior caused by” the Rule. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,389; *see also id.* at 41,300-01 (“DHS estimates that the total reduction in transfer payments from the Federal and State governments will be approximately \$2.47 billion annually due to disenrollment or foregone enrollment in public benefits programs by foreign-born non-citizens who may be receiving public benefits.”); *id.* at 41,469 (“DHS agrees that some entities, such as State and local governments or other businesses and organizations, would incur costs related to the changes.”). DHS specifically noted that

“hospital systems, state agencies, and other organizations that provide public assistance to aliens and their households” will suffer financial harm from the Rule’s implementation. *Id.* at 41,469-70.

Given its operation of and financial responsibility for CCH, that is more than enough to establish Cook County’s standing under the principles set forth in *Gladstone*, *New York*, and *Matchmaker*. DHS’s contrary arguments fail to persuade.

First, DHS suggests that it is “inconsistent” for Cook County to maintain both that immigrants will forgo treatment and that they will come to rely more on uncompensated care from CCH. Doc. 73 at 21. But as Cook County observes, Doc. 80 at 14, there is no inconsistency: immigrants will “avoid seeking treatment for cases other than emergencies,” Doc. 1 at ¶ 109, and the emergency treatment they seek will involve additional reliance on uncompensated care from CCH, Doc. 27-1 at p. 330, ¶ 21 (“When individuals are uninsured, they avoid seeking routine care and instead risk worse health outcomes and use costly emergency services.”). The Rule itself acknowledges as much. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,384 (“DHS acknowledges that increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a method of primary healthcare due to delayed treatment is possible and there is a potential for increases in uncompensated care.”).

Second, DHS argues that because some non-citizen residents of Cook County have already disenrolled from benefits and are unlikely to re-enroll, the County cannot rely on their disenrollment as showing that others will follow suit. Doc. 73 at 21. That argument ignores the plain logic of Cook County’s position—if the mere pro-

spect of the Rule’s promulgation after the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2018 prompted some immigrants to disenroll, it is likely that the Rule’s going into effect will prompt others to do so as well. Again, the Rule itself acknowledges that disenrollment is a likely result of the Rule’s implementation. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,300-01.

Third, DHS argues that Cook County’s invocation of its need to divert resources is a “novel” and unsupported extension of organizational “standing from the private organizations to whom it has always been applied to a local government entity.” Doc. 73 at 22. Even if this argument were correct, it would not speak to the injuries to the County arising from CCH’s provision of uncompensated care. But the argument is wrong, as municipal entities and private organizations alike may rely on the need to divert resources to establish standing. *See Matchmaker*, 982 F.2d at 1095 (holding that Chicago had Article III standing because its “fair housing agency has to use its scarce resources to ensure compliance with the fair housing laws . . . [and] cannot perform its routine services . . . because it has to commit resources against those engaged in racial steering”); *see also City of Milwaukee v. Saxby*, 546 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1976) (“In any case where a municipal corporation seeks to vindicate the rights of its residents, there is no reason why the general rule on organizational standing should not be followed.”).

As for ICIRR, the Supreme Court held in *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), that if a private organization shows that a defendant’s “practices have perceptibly impaired” its ability to undertake its existing programs, “there can be no question that the

organization has suffered injury in fact.” *Id.* at 379; *see also Common Cause Ind.*, 937 F.3d at 954 (“Impairment of [an organization’s] ability to do work within its core mission [is] enough to support standing.”). ICIRR adduces evidence that its existing programs include efforts within immigrant communities to increase access to care, improve health literacy, and reduce reliance on emergency room care. Doc. 27-1 at pp. 341-342, ¶ 4-10. ICIRR further shows that the Rule is likely to decrease immigrants’ access to health services, food, and other programs. *Id.* at p. 344-345, ¶¶ 19-20, 23. Indeed, ICIRR already has expended resources to prevent frustration of its programs’ missions, to educate immigrants and staff about the Rule’s effects, and to encourage immigrants not covered by but nonetheless deterred by the Rule to continue enrolling in benefit programs. *Id.* at pp. 343-345, ¶¶ 14-15, 22. If the Rule goes into effect, those consequences are likely to intensify and ICIRR’s diversion of resources likely to increase. *Id.* at pp. 343-347, ¶¶ 16, 18, 23-31. ICIRR’s standing is secure. *See Common Cause Ind.*, 937 F.3d at 964 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]f a defendant’s actions compromise an organization’s day-to-day operations, or force it to divert resources to address new issues caused by the defendant’s actions, an Article III injury exists.”).

In pressing the contrary result, DHS contends that ICIRR “does not allege that the Rule will disrupt any of its current programs,” and therefore that ICIRR is not “required” to alter its activities but instead “simply elected to do so.” Doc. 73 at 22-23. But the evidence adduced by ICIRR suggests a “concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities,” not “simply a setback to [its] abstract social interests.” *Havens*, 455 U.S. at 379. That is enough to establish standing, for

“[w]hat matters is whether the organization[’s] activities were undertaken because of the challenged law, not whether they were voluntarily incurred or not.” *Common Cause Ind.*, 937 F.3d at 956 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Ripeness

DHS next contends that this case is not ripe. Doc. 73 at 23-25. Suits directed at agency action “are appropriate for judicial resolution” where the challenged action is final and the issues involved are legal ones, provided that the plaintiff shows that the action’s impact on it “is sufficiently direct and immediate.” *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52 (1967). The challenged agency action here is the Final Rule’s promulgation, the issues involved (as discussed below) are purely legal challenges to DHS’s implementation of the public charge provision enacted by Congress, and—as shown above and addressed below in the discussion of irreparable harm—Cook County and ICIRR allege a direct and immediate impact of the Rule on them. Under these circumstances, the suit is ripe. *See OOIDA v. FMCSA*, 656 F.3d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a federal agency’s ripeness challenge, which posited that the “petitioners [we]re not currently under a remedial directive,” because “the threat of enforcement is sufficient” to show hardship under *Abbott Laboratories*); *id.* at 586 (“Where . . . a petition involves purely legal claims in the context of a facial challenge to a final rule, a petition is presumptively reviewable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DHS retorts that this suit will not be ripe until the Rule is applied to actual admissibility or adjustment de-

terminations. Doc. 73 at 23-24. At most, DHS’s argument pertains to any individual non-citizen’s challenge to the Rule. It is far from clear that ripeness would pose an impediment even to claims by affected individuals. See *OOIDA*, 656 F.3d at 586 (“[T]he threat of enforcement is sufficient” to make a suit ripe “because the law is in force the moment it becomes effective and a person made to live in the shadow of a law that she believes to be invalid should not be compelled to wait and see if a remedial action is coming.”). In any event, certain of Cook County’s and ICIRR’s injuries—like their need to respond to the Rule’s chilling effect on benefits enrollment, or to divert resources to educate immigrants about the Rule—result from the Rule’s promulgation. It follows that their claims are ripe.

C. Zone of Interests

DHS next argues that Cook County and ICIRR fall outside the “zone of interests” protected by the INA. Doc. 73 at 25-26. “[A] person suing under the APA must satisfy not only Article III’s standing requirements, but an additional test: The interest . . . assert[ed] must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’” that the agency action allegedly violated. *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak*, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (quoting *Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). “Whether a plaintiff comes within the ‘zone of interests’ is an issue that requires [the court] to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The question here is whether Cook County and ICIRR “fall[] within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue under” the relevant statutes. *Ibid.*

“[I]n the APA context, . . . the [zone of interests] test is not ‘especially demanding.’” *Lexmark*, 572 U.S. at 130 (quoting *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band*, 567 U.S. at 225). As the Supreme Court explained, it has “always conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff” and the test does not require any “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band*, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Lexmark*, 572 U.S. at 130 (reaffirming *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band* and distinguishing non-APA cases). Accordingly, the zone of interests test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band*, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). The appropriate frame of reference here is not only the public charge provision, but the immigration laws as a whole. *See Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n*, 479 U.S. 388, 401 (1987) (holding that the court should “consider any provision that helps [it] to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the” relevant statutes); *Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA*, 693 F.3d 169, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Importantly, in determining whether a petitioner falls within the zone of interests to be protected by a statute, we do not look at the specific provision said to have been violated in complete isolation, but rather in combination with other provisions to which it

bears an integral relationship.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even if an APA plaintiff is not among “those who Congress intended to benefit,” the plaintiff nonetheless falls within the zone of interests if it is among “those who in practice can be expected to police the interests that the [relevant] statute protects.” *Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala*, 140 F.3d 1060, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *see also Amgen, Inc. v. Smith*, 357 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he salient consideration under the APA is whether the challenger’s interests are such that they in practice can be expected to police the interests that the statute protects.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *ALPA Int’l v. Trans States Airlines, LLC*, 638 F.3d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).

Cook County and ICIRR both satisfy the zone of interests test. As DHS observes, the principal interests protected by the INA’s “public charge” provision are those of “aliens improperly determined inadmissible.” Doc. 73 at 25. ICIRR’s interests in ensuring that health and social services remain available to immigrants and in helping them navigate the immigration process are consistent with the statutory purpose, as DHS describes it, to “ensure[] that only certain aliens could be determined inadmissible on the public charge ground.” *Ibid.* There is ample evidence that ICIRR’s interests are not merely marginal to those of the aliens more directly impacted by the public charge provision. Not only is ICIRR precisely the type of organization that would reasonably be expected to “police the interests that the statute protects,” *Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 109, but the INA elsewhere gives organizations like ICIRR a role in helping immigrants navigate immigration procedures generally, *see, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(i)(1) (requiring that potential T visa applicants be referred to

nongovernmental organizations for legal advice); *id.* § 1184(p)(3)(A) (same for U visa applicants); *id.* § 1228(a)(2), (b)(4)(B) (recognizing a right to counsel for aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings); *id.* § 1229(a)(1), (b)(2) (requiring that aliens subject to deportation proceedings be provided a list of pro bono attorneys and advised of their right to counsel); *id.* § 1443(h) (requiring the Attorney General to work with “relevant organizations” to “broadly distribute information concerning” the immigration process). Especially given the APA’s “generous review provisions,” *Clarke*, 479 U.S. at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted), these considerations place ICIRR’s claims “at the least[] ‘arguably within the zone of interests’” protected by the INA, *Bank of Am. v. City of Miami*, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017) (quoting *Data Processing*, 397 U.S. at 153).

In pressing the contrary result, DHS relies principally on Justice O’Connor’s in-chambers opinion in *INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County*, 510 U.S. 1301 (1993). Doc. 73 at 25-26. That reliance is misplaced. As an initial matter, Justice O’Connor’s opinion is both non-precedential and concededly “speculative.” *Legalization Assistance Project*, 510 U.S. at 1304. In any event, the opinion predates the Court’s articulation in *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band* and *Lexmark* of the current, more flexible understanding of the zone of interests test in APA cases.

Cook County satisfies the zone of interests test as well. In *City of Miami*, the Supreme Court held that Miami’s allegations of “lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses” placed it within the zone of interests protected by the FHA, which allows “any person who . . . claims to have been injured by a discriminatory

housing practice” to file a civil action for damages. 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cook County asserts comparable financial harms from the Final Rule. True enough, Cook County is not itself threatened with an improper admissibility or status adjustment determination, but neither did Miami itself suffer discrimination under the FHA. In both *City of Miami* and here, the consequences of the challenged action generate additional costs for the municipal plaintiff. If such injuries place a municipality within the FHA’s zone of interests in a non-APA case like *City of Miami*, they certainly do so in this APA case.

D. *Chevron* Analysis

The APA provides for judicial review of final agency decisions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706; *Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion*, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985) (“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”). The question here is whether DHS exceeded its authority in promulgating the Final Rule. Under current precedent, which this court must follow, resolution of that question is governed by the framework set forth in *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

“At *Chevron*’s first step, [the court] determine[s]—using ordinary principles of statutory interpretation—whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” *Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder*, 758 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2014). If “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue . . . the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” *Indiana v. EPA*, 796 F.3d 803, 811

(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842-43) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), and end the inquiry there, see *Coyomani-Cielo*, 758 F.3d at 912. “If, however, ‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,’” *Chevron*’s second step, at which “a reviewing court must defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable,” comes into play. *Indiana*, 796 F.3d at 811 (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843-44). As shown below, because the pertinent statute is clear, there is no need to go beyond *Chevron*’s first step.

“When interpreting a statute, [the court] begin[s] with the text.” *Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp.*, 906 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2018). “Statutory words and phrases are given their ordinary meaning.” *Singh v. Sessions*, 898 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2018); see also *United States v. Titan Int’l, Inc.*, 811 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2016). “It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *Brumfield v. City of Chicago*, 735 F.3d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 2013); see also *LaPlant v. N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 701 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We try to give the statutory language a natural meaning in light of its context.”).

Congress has expressed in general terms that “[s]elf-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes,” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), that “[t]he immigration policy of the United States” provides that “aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs,” *id.* § 1601(2)(A), and that “the availability of public benefits [is] not [to] constitute

an incentive for immigration to the United States,” *id.* § 1601(2)(B). But those provisions express only general policy goals without specifying what it means for non-citizens to be “[s]elf-sufficient” or to “not depend on public resources to meet their needs.” *Cf. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.*, 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (“You cannot discover how far a statute goes by observing the direction in which it points. Finding the meaning of a statute is more like calculating a vector (with direction and length) than it is like identifying which way the underlying ‘values’ or ‘purposes’ point (which has direction alone).”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The public charge provision is intended to implement those general policy goals—yet in none of its iterations since its original enactment in 1882 did Congress define the term “public charge.”

This lack of a statutory definition gives rise to the interpretative dispute that divides the parties. Cook County and ICIRR submit that the term “public charge” includes only “those who are likely to become *primarily and permanently dependent* on the government for *subsistence*.” Doc. 27 at 15 (emphasis in original). DHS submits that the term is broad enough to include any non-citizen “who receives” a wide range of “designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within a 36-month period,” Doc. 73 at 18-19—including, as the Final Rule acknowledges, those who “receive only hundreds of dollars, or less, in public benefits annually” for any twelve months in a thirty-six month period, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,360-61. As Cook County and ICIRR contend, and as DHS implicitly concedes through its silence, if Cook County and ICIRR are correct about what “public charge” means, the Final Rule fails at *Chevron* step one, as there would be “no

ambiguity for the agency to fill.” *Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018).

Settled precedent governs how to ascertain the meaning of a statutorily undefined term like “public charge.” “[I]t’s a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.” *New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, the term “public charge” entered the statutory lexicon in 1882 and has been included in nearly identical inadmissibility provisions ever since.

For this reason, the court agrees with DHS’s foundational point that, given the “unbroken line of predecessor statutes going back to at least 1882 [that] have contained a similar inadmissibility ground for public charges,” Doc. 73 at 16, “the late 19th century [is] the key time to consider” for determining the meaning of the term “public charge,” *id.* at 27.

Fortunately, the Supreme Court told us just over a century ago what “public charge” meant in the relevant era, and thus what it means today. In *Gegiow v. Uhl*, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), several Russian nationals brought suit after they were denied admission to the United States on public charge grounds because, the immigration authorities reasoned, they were bound for Portland, Oregon, where the labor market would have made it impossible for them to obtain employment. *Id.* at 8-9. In holding that the aliens could not be excluded on that ground, the Court observed that in the statute identifying “who shall be excluded, ‘Persons likely to become a public charge’ [we]re mentioned between paupers and

professional beggars, and along with idiots, persons dangerously diseased, persons certified by the examining surgeon to have a mental or physical defect of a nature to affect their ability to earn a living, convicted felons, prostitutes, and so forth.” *Id.* at 10. In light of the statutory text, the Court held that “[t]he persons enumerated . . . are to be excluded on the ground of *permanent personal objections accompanying them* irrespective of local conditions unless the . . . phrase [‘public charge’] . . . is directed to different considerations than any other of those with which it is associated. Presumably [the phrase ‘public charge’] is to be read as generically similar to the other[phrase]s mentioned before and after.” *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

Gegiow teaches that “public charge” does not, as DHS maintains, encompass persons who receive benefits, whether modest or substantial, due to being temporarily unable to support themselves entirely on their own. Rather, as Cook County and ICIRR maintain, *Gegiow* holds that “public charge” encompasses only persons who—like “idiots” or persons with “a mental or physical defect of a nature to affect their ability to make a living”—would be substantially, if not entirely, dependent on government assistance on a long-term basis. That is what *Gegiow* plainly conveys—DHS does not contend otherwise—and that is how courts of that era read the decision. See *United States ex rel. De Sousa v. Day*, 22 F.2d 472, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1927) (“In the face of [*Gegiow*] it is hard to say that a healthy adult immigrant, with no previous history of pauperism, and nothing to interfere with his chances in life but lack of savings, is likely to become a public charge within the meaning of the statute.”); *United States ex rel. La Reddola v. Tod*, 299 F. 592, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding that an

alien who “suffer[ed] from an insanity” from which “recovery [was] impossible . . . was a public charge” while institutionalized, “for he was supported by public moneys of the state of New York and nothing was paid for his maintenance by him or his relatives”); *Ng Fung Ho v. White*, 266 F. 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1920) (holding that “the words ‘likely to become a public charge’ are meant to exclude only those persons who are likely to become occupants of almshouses for want of means with which to support themselves in the future”), *rev’d on other grounds* 259 U.S. 276 (1922); *Howe v. United States ex rel. Savitsky*, 247 F. 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that “Congress meant the act to exclude persons who were likely to become occupants of almshouses for want of means with which to support themselves in the future”); *Ex parte Horn*, 292 F. 455, 457 (W.D. Wash. 1923) (“The record is conclusive that the petitioner was not likely to become a public charge, in the sense that he would be a ‘pauper’ or an occupant of an almshouse for want of means of support, or likely to be sent to an almshouse for support at public expense.”) (citations omitted).

In an attempt to evade *Gegiow*’s interpretation of “public charge,” DHS argues that Congress, through amendments enacted in the Immigration Act of 1917, “negated the Court’s interpretation in *Gegiow*.” Doc. 73 at 30-31. That argument fails on two separate grounds. The first is that DHS maintained (correctly) that “the late 19th century [is] the key time to consider” in ascertaining the meaning of the term “public charge,” *id.* at 27, and therefore cannot be heard to contend that the pertinent timeframe is, on second thought, 1917. The second is that, even putting aside DHS’s arguable waiver, the 1917 Act did not change the meaning of “public charge” in the manner urged by DHS.

As relevant here, the 1917 Act moved the phrase “persons likely to become a public charge” from between the terms “paupers” and “professional beggars” to much later in the (very long) list of excludable aliens. 1917 Act, 39 Stat. at 875-76. The Senate Report states that this change was meant “to overcome recent decisions of the courts limiting the meaning of the description of the excluded class because of its position between other descriptions conceived to be of the same general and generical nature. (See especially *Gegiov v. Uhl*, 239 U.S., 3.)” S. Rep. No. 64-352, at 5 (1916). The value of any committee report in ascertaining a statute’s meaning is questionable. See *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[J]udicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports . . . may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.”); *Covalt v. Carey Can. Inc.*, 860 F.2d 1434, 1438 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Even the contemporaneous committee reports may be the work of those who could not get their thoughts into the text of the bill.”). And the value of this particular Senate Report is further undermined by its opacity, as it does not say in which way its author(s) believed that court decisions had incorrectly limited the statute’s breadth. See *Azar v. Allina Health Servs.*, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1815 (2019) (holding that “murky legislative history . . . can’t overcome a statute’s clear text and structure”).

Later commentary on the 1917 Act—which DHS cites as authoritative, but the origin of which DHS fails to identify, Doc. 73 at 30—explained that the public

charge provision “has been shifted from its position in sec. 2 of the Immigration Act of 1907 to its present position in sec. 3 of this act in order to indicate the intention of Congress that aliens shall be excluded upon said ground *for economic as well as other reasons* and with a view to overcoming the decision of the Supreme Court in *Gegiow v. Uhl*, 239 U.S. 3 (S. Rept. 352, 64th Cong., 1st sess.).” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Immigration Laws and Rules of January 1, 1930 with Amendments from January 1, 1930 to May 24, 1934 (1935), at 25 n.5. This explanation suggests that Congress understood *Gegiow*, given its exclusive focus on an alien’s economic circumstances, to have held that aliens may be deemed public charges only if there were *economic* reasons for their dependence on government support, and further that Congress wanted aliens dependent on government support for *noneconomic* reasons, like imprisonment, to be included as well.

That is precisely how many cases of the era understood the 1917 Act. See *United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster*, 24 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1928) (“The fact that the appellant confessed to a crime punishable by imprisonment in the federal prison, and the very fact that he was actually incarcerated for a period of 18 months was sufficient to support the allegation in the warrant of deportation that he was likely ‘to become a public charge.’”); *Ex parte Horn*, 292 F. at 457 (holding that although “the petitioner was not likely to become a public charge, in the sense that he would be a ‘pauper’ or an occupant of an almshouse for want of means of support, or likely to be sent to an almshouse for support at public expense,” he was, as a convicted felon, a public charge because he was “a person committed to the custody of a department

of the government by due course of law”) (citations omitted); *Ex parte Tsunetaro Machida*, 277 F. 239, 241 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (“[A] public charge [is] a person committed to the custody of a department of the government by due course of law.”). Other cases disagreed, holding that noneconomic dependence on the government for basic subsistence did not make one a public charge. See *Browne v. Zurbrick*, 45 F.2d 931, 932-33 (6th Cir. 1930) (rejecting the proposition “that one who is guilty of crime, and therefore likely to be convicted for it and to be imprisoned at the public expense, is ipso facto likely to become a public charge”); *Coykendall v. Skrmetta*, 22 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1927) (holding that “it cannot well be supposed that the words in question were intended to refer to anything other than a condition of dependence on the public for support,” and therefore that the public charge provision did not include the public expense imposed by imprisonment); *Ex Parte Mitchell*, 256 F. 229, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1919) (“The court holds expressly that the words ‘likely to become a public charge’ are meant to exclude only those ‘persons who were likely to become occupants of almshouses for want of means with which to support themselves in the future.’”). The divergence between those two lines of precedent is immaterial here, for DHS cites no case holding that the 1917 Act upended *Gegiow*’s holding that an alien could be deemed a public charge on economic grounds only if that person’s dependence on public support was of a “permanent” nature. *Gegiow*, 239 U.S. at 10. Nor does DHS cite any case holding that an alien could be deemed a public charge based on the receipt, or anticipated receipt, of a modest quantum of public benefits for short periods of time.

DHS's contrary view rests upon an obvious misreading of *Ex parte Horn*. DHS cites *Ex parte Horn* for the proposition that post-1917 cases "recognized that" the 1917 Act's transfer of the public charge provision to later in the list of excludable persons "negated the Court's interpretation of *Gegiow* by underscoring that the term 'public charge' is 'not associated with paupers or professional beggars.'" Doc. 73 at 30 (quoting *Ex parte Horn*, 292 F. at 457). But *Ex parte Horn* involved not an alien whose economic circumstances were less dire than a pauper's or professional beggar's and thus who might have needed only modest government benefits for a short period of time; rather, the case involved a person who had committed crimes and was likely to be imprisoned. 292 F. at 458. Thus, in saying that "[t]he term 'likely to become a public charge' is not associated with paupers or professional beggars, idiots, and certified physical and mental defectives," *id.* at 457, *Ex parte Horn* held not that the 1917 Act ousted *Gegiow*'s view regarding the severity and duration of the economic circumstances that could result in an alien being deemed a public charge; rather, it held that the 1917 Act expanded the meaning of "public charge" to include persons who would be totally dependent on the government for noneconomic reasons like imprisonment. *See id.* at 458 ("When he was convicted he became a public charge, and a tax, duty, and trust was imposed upon the government by his conduct; and at the time of his entry he was likely to become a public charge by reason of the crime which he had committed.") (internal quotation marks omitted). *Ex parte Horn* thus faithfully implements the change that, as shown above, DHS's own historical authority suggests the amendment was intended to effect.

DHS has three other arrows in its quiver, but none hits its mark. The first is a 1929 treatise stating that “public charge” means “any maintenance, or financial assistance, rendered from public funds, or funds secured by taxation.” Arthur Cook et al., *Immigration Laws of the United States* § 285 (1929). The treatise is wrong. It does not address *Gegiow* in expressing its understanding of “public charge.” And the sole authority it cites, *Ex parte Kichmiriantz*, 283 F. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1922), does not support its view. *Ex parte Kichmiriantz* concerned an alien “committed to the Stockton State Hospital for the insane” for dementia, who, without care, “would starve to death within a short time.” *Id.* at 697-98. Thus, although *Ex parte Kichmiriantz* observes that “the words ‘public charge,’ as used in the Immigration Act, mean just what they mean ordinarily; . . . a money charge upon, or an expense to, the public for support and care,” *id.* at 698 (citation omitted), the context in which the court made that observation shows that it had in mind a person who was totally and likely permanently dependent on the government for subsistence. The case therefore aligns with Cook County and ICIRR’s understanding of the term, not DHS’s.

DHS’s second arrow consists of a mélange of nineteenth century dictionaries and state court cases addressing whether one municipality or another was responsible for providing public assistance to a particular person under state poor laws. Doc. 73 at 29, 32-33. Those authorities, which address the meaning of the words “public,” “charge,” and “chargeable” and the term “public charge,” would be material to the court’s interpretative enterprise but for one thing: The Supreme Court told us in *Gegiow* what the statutory term “public

charge” meant in that era. The federal judiciary is hierarchical, so in deciding here whether the Final Rule faithfully implements the statutory “public charge” provision, this court must adhere to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the term regardless of what nineteenth century dictionaries and state court cases might have said. *See Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs.*, 746 F.3d 782, 792 (7th Cir. 2014); *Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp.*, 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004); *Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin.*, 603 F.3d 365, 393 (7th Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

As it happens, the dictionaries and state court cases do not advance DHS’s cause. An 1888 dictionary cited by DHS defines “charge” as “an obligation or liability,” but the only *human* example it offers of a “charge” is “a *pauper* being chargeable to the parish or town.” Dictionary of Am. and English Law 196 (1888) (emphasis added). An 1889 dictionary defines “charge” in the context of a person as one who is “committed to another’s custody, care, concern, or management,” Century Dictionary of the English Language 929 (1889), and an 1887 dictionary likewise defines “charge” as “[t]he person or thing committed to the care or management of another,” Webster’s Condensed Dictionary of the English Language 85 (3d ed. 1887). Those definitions are consistent with *Gegiow*’s understanding of “public charge” and do nothing to support DHS’s view that the term is broad enough to include those who temporarily receive modest public benefits. The same holds for state court cases from the era. *See Cicero Twp. v. Falconberry*, 42 N.E. 42, 44 (Ind. App. 1895) (“The mere fact that a person may occasionally obtain assistance from the county does not necessarily make such person

a pauper or a public charge.”); *City of Boston v. Capen*, 61 Mass. 116, 121-22 (Mass. 1851) (holding that “public charge” refers “not [to] merely destitute persons, who . . . have no visible means of support,” but rather to those who “by reason of some permanent disability, are unable to maintain themselves” and “might become a heavy and long continued charge to the city, town or state”); *Overseers of Princeton Twp. v. Overseers of S. Brunswick Twp.*, 23 N.J.L. 169 (N.J. 1851) (repeatedly equating “paupers” with being “chargeable, or likely to become chargeable”).

As it did with *Ex parte Horn*, DHS misreads the state court cases upon which it relies. According to DHS, *Poor District of Edenburg v. Poor District of Strattanville*, 5 Pa. Super. 516 (1897), held that a person who temporarily received “some assistance” while ill was not “chargeable to” the public solely because she was “without notice or knowledge” that her receiving the assistance would “place[] [her] on the poor book,” and not because the public assistance was temporary. Doc. 73 at 32 (quoting *Edenburg*, 5 Pa. Super. at 520-24, 527-28). But it is plain that the court’s holding rested in large part on the fact that the person had economic means and was only temporarily on the poor rolls. See *Edenburg*, 5 Pa. Super. at 526 (noting that the person “had for sixteen years been an inhabitant of the borough and for twelve years the undisputed owner by fee simple title of unincumbered real estate, and household goods of the value of \$300 in the district,” and that she “had fully perfected her settlement by the payment of taxes for two successive years”). DHS characterizes *Inhabitants of Guilford v. Inhabitants of Abbott*, 17 Me. 335 (Me. 1840), as holding that a person was “likely to become chargea-

ble” based on his receipt of “‘a small amount’ of assistance” and “‘his age and infirmity.’” Doc. 73 at 33 (quoting *Guilford*, 17 Me. at 335-36). To be sure, DHS’s brief quotes words that appear in the decision, but as DHS fails to acknowledge, the court observed that the person “for many years had no regular or stated business, . . . was at one time so furiously mad, that the public security required him to be confined,” had “occasionally since that time, . . . been deranged in mind,” and at a later time “was insane, roving in great destitution.” *Guilford*, 17 Me. at 335. DHS describes *Town of Hartford v. Town of Hartland*, 19 Vt. 392, 398 (Vt. 1847), as holding that a “widow and children with a house, furniture, and a likely future income of \$12/year from the lease of a cow were nonetheless public charges.” Doc. 73 at 32. But DHS fails to mention the court’s explanation that the widow’s “mother claimed to own some part of the furniture, . . . that her brother . . . claimed a lien upon the cow,” and that the \$12 annual lease income—which, incidentally, was for the house, not the cow—was past due for the preceding year with no reason to expect payment in the future. *Hartford*, 19 Vt. at 394. Accordingly, contrary to DHS’s treatment of those state court cases, they align with *Gegiow’s*—and Cook County and ICIRR’s—conception of what it means to be a public charge.

DHS’s third arrow is an 1894 floor speech in which Representative Warner, objecting to a bill to support “industrial paupers” or “deadbeat industries”—what today might be called corporate welfare—drew a rhetorical comparison with his constituents’ view that, because the immigration laws would bar admission of an alien who “earn[s] half his living or three-quarters of it,” they had “no sympathy . . . with the capitalist who offers

to condescend to do business in this country provided this country will tax itself in order to enable him to make profits.” 26 Cong. Rec. 657 (1894) (statement of Rep. Warner) (cited at Doc. 73 at 29). Representative Warner’s remarks have no value. They only obliquely reference the immigration laws, and he had every incentive to exaggerate the harshness of immigration law to support his opposition to the industrial assistance under consideration.

To sum up: As DHS argues, interpretation of the statutory term “public charge” turns on its meaning in the late nineteenth century. The Supreme Court in *Gegiow* interpreted the term in a manner consistent with Cook County and ICIRR’s position and contrary to DHS’s position in the Final Rule. The Immigration Act of 1917 did not undermine *Gegiow*’s understanding of the severity of the economic circumstances that would lead an alien to be deemed a public charge. Contemporaneous dictionaries and state court cases are immaterial and, even if they were material, are consistent with *Gegiow*. DHS cites no case from any era holding that the public charge provision covers noncitizens who receive public benefits—let alone modest public benefits—on a temporary basis. And against that statutory and case law backdrop, Congress retained the “public charge” language in the INA of 1952 and the IIRIRA of 1996. See *Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling*, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1762 (2018) (holding that Congress “presumptively was aware of the longstanding judicial interpretation of the phrase [included in a newly enacted statute] and intended for it to retain its established meaning”). It follows, based on the arguments and authorities before the court at this juncture, that Cook County and

ICIRR are likely to prevail on the merits of their challenge to the Final Rule.

II. Adequacy of Legal Remedies and Irreparable Harm

Although a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show “more than a mere possibility of harm,” the harm need not “actually occur before injunctive relief is warranted” or “be certain to occur before a court may grant relief on the merits.” *Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 2017). “Rather, harm is considered irreparable if it cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial.” *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

The final relief potentially available to Cook County and ICIRR is circumscribed by the APA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity: it waives the sovereign immunity of the United States only to the extent that the suit “seek[s] relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Thus, if Cook County and ICIRR show that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, they will suffer injury that would ordinarily be redressed by money damages, that will suffice to show irreparable harm, as “there is no adequate remedy at law” to rectify that injury. *Turnell v. CentiMark Corp.*, 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).

Cook County and ICIRR have made the required showing. As set forth in the discussion of standing, Cook County has shown that the Rule will cause immigrants to disenroll from, or refrain from enrolling in, medical benefits, in turn leading them to forgo routine treatment and rely on more costly, uncompensated emergency care from CCH. Doc. 27-1 at pp. 330-333, 335-337,

¶¶ 25, 30-32, 41-50; *id.* at pp. 344-345, ¶¶ 19-20, 23. In addition, because uninsured persons who forgo public medical benefits are less likely to receive immunizations or to seek diagnostic testing, the Rule increases the entire County’s risk of vaccine-preventable and other communicable diseases. *Id.* at pp. 329-330, 333, ¶¶ 20-21, 33; *id.* at pp. 358-359, ¶¶ 29, 32. And as also shown above, ICIRR will have to divert resources away from its existing programs to respond to the effects of the Final Rule. *Id.* at pp. 343-347, ¶¶ 16, 18, 23-31. Given the unavailability of money damages, those injuries are irreparable, satisfying the adequacy of legal remedies and irreparable harm requirements of the preliminary injunction standard.

III. Balance of Harms and Public Interest

In balancing the harms, “the court weighs the irreparable harm that the moving party would endure without the protection of the preliminary injunction against any irreparable harm the nonmoving party would suffer if the court were to grant the requested relief.” *Valencia v. City of Springfield*, 883 F.3d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, Cook County and ICIRR have shown that the Final Rule is likely to impose on them both financial and programmatic consequences for which there is no effective remedy at law. On the other side of the balance, DHS asserts that it has “a substantial interest in administering the national immigration system, a *solely federal* prerogative, according to the expert guidance of the responsible agencies as contained in their regulations, and that the Defendants will be harmed by an impediment to doing so.” Doc. 73 at 54. A temporary

delay in implementing the Rule undoubtedly would impose some harm on DHS. But absent any explanation of the practical consequences of the delay and whether those consequences are irreparable, it is clear—at least on the present record—that the balance of harms favors Cook County and ICIRR.

As for the public interest, DHS makes no argument beyond the public interest in its unimpeded administration of national immigration policy. *Id.* at 54-55. But at the same time, “[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” *League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby*, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Given the court’s holding that Cook County and ICIRR are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the Final Rule, given that the balance of harms otherwise favors preliminary relief, and bearing in mind the public health risks to Cook County if the Final Rule were allowed to take effect, entry of a preliminary injunction satisfies the public interest.

DHS raises two other equitable points. First, it argues that an ongoing challenge to the Final Rule in the Eastern District of Washington in which the State of Illinois is a party, and in which the court last Friday granted a preliminary injunction, *see Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 19-5210 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 162, renders this case duplicative. Doc. 73 at 52-53. Relatedly, DHS contends that the Eastern District of Washington’s injunction, as well as a nationwide preliminary injunction issued last Friday by the Southern District of New York, *see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, __ F. Supp. __, 2019 WL 5100372, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), renders moot this court’s consideration of the present motion. Doc.

82. While recognizing the federal courts' general aversion to duplicative litigation, *see Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 3 F.3d 221, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1993), the court concludes that the pendency of those other cases and the preliminary injunction orders entered therein do not moot the present motion or otherwise counsel against its consideration.

Neither the parties nor this court have any power over or knowledge of whether and, if so, when those two preliminary injunctions will be lifted or modified. Even a temporary lag between the lifting of both injunctions and the entry of a preliminary injunction by this court would entail some irreparable harm to Cook County and ICIRR. Indeed, the federal government in other litigation earlier this year maintained, correctly, that "[t]he possibility that [a nationwide] injunction may not persist is sufficient reason to conclude that . . . appeal" of an injunction entered elsewhere was "not moot." Supplemental Brief for the Federal Appellants at 152, *California v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.*, No. 19-15072 (9th Cir. May 20, 2019), ECF No. 152.

Second, DHS argues that Cook County and ICIRR's "[l]ack of diligence, standing alone," is sufficient to "preclude the granting of preliminary injunctive relief." Doc. 73 at 53 (quoting *Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy*, 762 F.2d 7, 8 (7th Cir. 1982)). Cook County and ICIRR's delay in bringing this suit relative to when the New York and Washington suits were brought, while not trivial, is not sufficiently severe to justify denying them equitable relief, particularly because any delay "goes primarily to the issue of irreparable harm," which they have otherwise amply established. *See Majorica*, 762 F.2d at 8.

In any event, because DHS was already preparing substantially similar briefs in the other cases challenging the Final Rule, the effect of the delay on its ability to contest the present motion was minimal.

Finally, DHS asks that any preliminary injunction be limited “to Cook County and specific individual members of ICIRR.” Doc. 73 at 55. But because the record shows that ICIRR “represent[s] nearly 100 non-profit organizations and social and health service providers *throughout Illinois*,” Doc. 27-1 at p. 341, ¶ 5 (emphasis added), it is appropriate for the preliminary injunction to cover the entire State.

Conclusion

The parties (to a lesser extent) and their *amici* (to a greater extent) appeal to various public policy concerns in urging the court to rule their way. To be sure, this case has important policy implications, and the competing policy views held by parties and their *amici* are entitled to great respect. But let there be no mistake: The court’s decision today rests not one bit on policy. The decision reflects no view whatsoever of whether the Final Rule is consistent or inconsistent with the American Dream, or whether it distorts or remains faithful to the Emma Lazarus poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty. *Compare New York*, 2019 WL 5100372, at *8 (asserting that the Final Rule “is repugnant to the American Dream of the opportunity for prosperity and success through hard work and upward mobility”), *with* Jason Silverstein, “Trump’s top immigration official reworks the words on the Statue of Liberty,” CBS News (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:25 AM), <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/statue-of-liberty-poem-emma-lazarus-quote-changed-trump-immigration-official-ken-cuccinelli-after-public->

charge-law (quoting the acting director of the Citizenship and Immigration Services suggesting in defense of the Final Rule that the Lazarus poem conveys this message: “Give me your tired and your poor who can stand on their own two feet, and who will not become a public charge.”). The court certainly takes no position on whether, as DHS suggests, the Old Testament sheds light on the historical backdrop of Congress’s enactment of the 1882 Act. Doc. 73 at 28 (citing *Deuteronomy* 15:7-15:8).

Today’s decision, rather, rests exclusively on a dry and arguably bloodless examination of the authorities that precedent requires courts to examine—and the deployment of the legal tools that precedent requires courts to use—when deciding whether executive action complies with a federal statute. *See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu*, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1357-58 (2018) (“Each side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the more efficient policy. But who should win that debate isn’t our call to make. Policy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court. It is Congress’s job to enact policy and it is this Court’s job to follow the policy Congress has prescribed.”). And having undertaken that examination with the appropriate legal tools, the court holds that Cook County and ICIRR are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the Final Rule, that the other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief are met, and that the Final Rule shall not be implemented or enforced in the State of Illinois absent further order of court.

Oct. 14, 2019

/s/
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Chicago, Illinois 60604

No. 19-3169

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

v.

CHAD F. WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Aug. 12, 2020

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Gary Feinerman, *Judge*

ORDER

ILANA D. ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and AMY C. BARRETT, *Circuit Judges*.

Defendants-Appellants filed a petition for rehearing *en banc* on July 27, 2020. No judge¹ in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing *en banc*, and all members of the original panel have

¹ Judge Joel M. Flaum and Judge Amy J. St. Eve did not participate in the consideration of this matter.

voted to deny panel rehearing. The petition for rehearing *en banc* is therefore DENIED.

APPENDIX D

1. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4) provides:

Inadmissible aliens**(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission**

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(4) Public charge**(A) In general**

Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.

(B) Factors to be taken into account

(i) In determining whether an alien is inadmissible under this paragraph, the consular officer or the Attorney General shall at a minimum consider the alien's—

(I) age;

(II) health;

(III) family status;

(IV) assets, resources, and financial status;

and

(V) education and skills.

(ii) In addition to the factors under clause (i), the consular officer or the Attorney General may also consider any affidavit of support under section 1183a of this title for purposes of exclusion under this paragraph.

(C) Family-sponsored immigrants

Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status under a visa number issued under section 1151(b)(2) or 1153(a) of this title is inadmissible under this paragraph unless—

(i) the alien has obtained—

(I) status as a spouse or a child of a United States citizen pursuant to clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of section 1154(a)(1)(A) of this title;

(II) classification pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of section 1154(a)(1)(B) of this title; or

(III) classification or status as a VAWA self-petitioner; or

(ii) the person petitioning for the alien's admission (and any additional sponsor required under section 1183a(f) of this title or any alternative sponsor permitted under paragraph (5)(B) of such section) has executed an affidavit of support described in section 1183a of this title with respect to such alien.

(D) Certain employment-based immigrants

Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status under a visa number issued under section

1153(b) of this title by virtue of a classification petition filed by a relative of the alien (or by an entity in which such relative has a significant ownership interest) is inadmissible under this paragraph unless such relative has executed an affidavit of support described in section 1183a of this title with respect to such alien.

(E) Special rule for qualified alien victims

Subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) shall not apply to an alien who—

- (i) is a VAWA self-petitioner;
- (ii) is an applicant for, or is granted, nonimmigrant status under section 1101(a)(15)(U) of this title; or
- (iii) is a qualified alien described in section 1641(c) of this title.

2. 8 U.S.C. 1183a provides in pertinent part:

Requirements for sponsor's affidavit of support

(a) Enforceability

(1) Terms of affidavit

No affidavit of support may be accepted by the Attorney General or by any consular officer to establish that an alien is not excludable as a public charge under section 1182(a)(4) of this title unless such affidavit is executed by a sponsor of the alien as a contract—

(A) in which the sponsor agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable;

(B) that is legally enforceable against the sponsor by the sponsored alien, the Federal Government, any State (or any political subdivision of such State), or by any other entity that provides any means-tested public benefit (as defined in subsection (e)¹), consistent with the provisions of this section; and

(C) in which the sponsor agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of any Federal or State court for the purpose of actions brought under subsection (b)(2).

(2) Period of enforceability

An affidavit of support shall be enforceable with respect to benefits provided for an alien before the date the alien is naturalized as a citizen of the United States, or, if earlier, the termination date provided under paragraph (3).

* * * * *

(b) Reimbursement of government expenses

(1) Request for reimbursement

(A) Requirement

¹ See Reference in Text note below.

Upon notification that a sponsored alien has received any means-tested public benefit, the appropriate nongovernmental entity which provided such benefit or the appropriate entity of the Federal Government, a State, or any political subdivision of a State shall request reimbursement by the sponsor in an amount which is equal to the unreimbursed costs of such benefit.

(B) Regulations

The Attorney General, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out subparagraph (A).

(2) Actions to compel reimbursement

(A) In case of nonresponse

If within 45 days after a request for reimbursement under paragraph (1)(A), the appropriate entity has not received a response from the sponsor indicating a willingness to commence payment an action may be brought against the sponsor pursuant to the affidavit of support.

(B) In case of failure to pay

If the sponsor fails to abide by the repayment terms established by the appropriate entity, the entity may bring an action against the sponsor pursuant to the affidavit of support.

(C) Limitation on actions

No cause of action may be brought under this paragraph later than 10 years after the date on which the sponsored alien last received any means-

tested public benefit to which the affidavit of support applies.

* * * * *

3. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(5) provides:

Deportable aliens

(a) Classes of deportable aliens

Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens:

(5) Public charge

Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable.

4. 8 U.S.C. 1601 provides:

Statements of national policy concerning welfare and immigration

The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy with respect to welfare and immigration:

(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country's earliest immigration statutes.

(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that—

(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and

(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.

(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for and receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at increasing rates.

(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.

(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.

(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.

(7) With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a State that chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be

self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.

5. 8 U.S.C. 1611 provides:

Aliens who are not qualified aliens ineligible for Federal public benefits

(a) In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsection (b), an alien who is not a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title) is not eligible for any Federal public benefit (as defined in subsection (c)).

(b) Exceptions

(1) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the following Federal public benefits:

(A) Medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.] (or any successor program to such title) for care and services that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition (as defined in section 1903(v)(3) of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1396b(v)(3)]) of the alien involved and are not related to an organ transplant procedure, if the alien involved otherwise meets the eligibility requirements for medical assistance under the State plan approved under such title (other than the requirement of the receipt of aid or assistance under title IV of such Act [42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.], supplemental security income benefits under title XVI of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.], or a State supplementary payment).

(B) Short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief.

(C) Public health assistance (not including any assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.]) for immunizations with respect to immunizable diseases and for testing and treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases whether or not such symptoms are caused by a communicable disease.

(D) Programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter) specified by the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's sole and unreviewable discretion after consultation with appropriate Federal agencies and departments, which (i) deliver in-kind services at the community level, including through public or private nonprofit agencies; (ii) do not condition the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance provided on the individual recipient's income or resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of life or safety.

(E) Programs for housing or community development assistance or financial assistance administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, any program under title V of the Housing Act of 1949 [42 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.], or any assistance under section 1926c of title 7, to the extent that the alien is receiving such a benefit on August 22, 1996.

(2) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any benefit payable under title II of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.] to an alien who is lawfully present in the

United States as determined by the Attorney General, to any benefit if nonpayment of such benefit would contravene an international agreement described in section 233 of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 433], to any benefit if nonpayment would be contrary to section 202(t) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 402(t)], or to any benefit payable under title II of the Social Security Act to which entitlement is based on an application filed in or before August 1996.

(3) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any benefit payable under title XVIII of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.] (relating to the medicare program) to an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as determined by the Attorney General and, with respect to benefits payable under part A of such title [42 U.S.C. 1395c et seq.], who was authorized to be employed with respect to any wages attributable to employment which are counted for purposes of eligibility for such benefits.

(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any benefit payable under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 [45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.] or the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act [45 U.S.C. 351 et seq.] to an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as determined by the Attorney General or to an alien residing outside the United States.

(5) Subsection (a) shall not apply to eligibility for benefits for the program defined in section 1612(a)(3)(A) of this title (relating to the supplemental security income program), or to eligibility for benefits under any other program that is based on eligibility for benefits under the program so defined, for an alien who was receiving such benefits on August 22, 1996.

(c) **“Federal public benefit” defined**

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), for purposes of this chapter the term “Federal public benefit” means—

(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and

(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.

(2) Such term shall not apply—

(A) to any contract, professional license, or commercial license for a nonimmigrant whose visa for entry is related to such employment in the United States, or to a citizen of a freely associated state, if section 141 of the applicable compact of free association approved in Public Law 99-239 or 99-658 (or a successor provision) is in effect;

(B) with respect to benefits for an alien who as a work authorized nonimmigrant or as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.] qualified for such benefits and for whom the United States under reciprocal treaty agreements is required to pay benefits, as determined by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State; or

(C) to the issuance of a professional license to, or the renewal of a professional license by, a foreign national not physically present in the United States.

6. 29 U.S.C. 794 provides:

Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs

(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such committees.

(b) “Program or activity” defined

For the purposes of this section, the term “program or activity” means all of the operations of—

(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or

(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;

(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or

(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 7801 of title 20), system of career and technical education, or other school system;

(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship—

(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or

(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or

(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or

(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);

any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.

(c) Significant structural alterations by small providers

Small providers are not required by subsection (a) to make significant structural alterations to their existing facilities for the purpose of assuring program accessibility, if alternative means of providing the services are available. The terms used in this subsection shall be construed with reference to the regulations existing on March 22, 1988.

(d) Standards used in determining violation of section

The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510,¹ of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201-12204 and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.

¹ See References in Text note below.