JOHN H. MACKEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS V. LANIER COLLECTION AGENCY & SERVICE, INC. No. 86-1387 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court Of Georgia Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae This brief is submitted in response to the Court's invitation to the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question presented Statement Discussion Conclusion QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), preempts state laws insofar as they permit judgment creditors to garnish employee welfare benefit plans covered by ERISA to satisfy debts of some of the plans's participants. STATEMENT 1. Petitioners are the trustees of the South Atlanta ILA/Employers Vacation and Holiday Fund ("the Fund"), which provides vacation and holiday benefits to longshore workers and other employees of several southeastern stevedoring companies (Pet. App. A6, A19). The Fund is an employee welfare benefit plan as defined in Section 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1002(1). /1/ Employees' qualifications for participation in the Fund and their entitlement to benefits are determined annually (Pet. App. A21). Respondent, Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., obtained money judgments against 23 employee-beneficiaries of the Fund. Thereafter, respondent instituted garnishment proceedings in the State Court of Chatham County pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. Section 18-4-60 (1982), seeking to garnish their Fund entitlements. /2/ Petitioners maintained that the Fund was exempt from garnishment by Ga. Code. Ann. Section 18-4-22.1 (1982), which prohibits garnishment of ERISA plans except to enforce alimoney or child support obligations. /3/ It is undisputed that the judgments respondent seeks to enforce do not arise from such family obligations (Pet. App. A6). 2. The trial court held that the Fund is subject to garnishment (Pet. App. A11-A21). It concluded that the Georgia legislature intended the exemption in Section 18-4-22.1 "to make the Georgia law identical to the federal law" (Pet. App. A20). While the court acknowledged that "(t)he federal decisions are in conflict," it considered that "the trend of the law seems to be that only pension funds and not vacation funds are exempt from garnishment" under ERISA (id. at A19). Accordingly, the trial court held that the Georgia statute does not exempt the Fund from garnishment, and ordered petitioners to pay into the court amounts owed to respondent by the Fund's beneficiaries (id. at A21). The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed (Pet. App. A6-A10). Although the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that ERISA does not protect the Fund from garnishment (id. at A7-A8), it concluded that the Georgia legislature intended Section 18-4-22.1 "to protect vacation plans like the Fund from garnishment even though ERISA does not provide such protection" (Pet. App. A8). The court of appeals therefore concluded that state law exempts the Fund from garnishment (id. at A9). The court of appeals rejected respondent's argument that the express preemption provision of ERISA, Section 514(a), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), prevented the state from exempting welfare benefit plans from state garnishment procedures. Section 514(a) provides that ERISA "supersede(s) any and all State laws insofar as they * * * relate to any employee benefit plan." Relying on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983), the court concluded that the exemption from garnishment in Section 18-4-22.1 is not preempted because it does not "'relate to' ERISA" within the meaning of Section 514(a), since "its regulatory effect is too minimal and therefore insufficient to invoke ERISA's preemption provision" (Pet. App. A9). The court observed in that regard that "'(t)he enforcement of state court money judgments by creditors is a valid area of state concern, and is one which is totally unregulated by ERISA with respect to welfare plans.'" Ibid. (quoting Electrical Workers Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Mo. 1979)). The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed (Pet. App. A1-A5). It first agreed with the court of appeals that Section 18-4-22.1 "exempts all ERISA funds and benefits from garnishment except for alimony or child support judgments" (Pet. App. A1-A2). The court then noted that Section 206(d) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d), expressly prohibits alienation of pension benefits but does not apply to welfare plans (Pet. App. A2). /4/ It concluded, therefore, that the statutory exemption from garnishment in Section 18-4-22.1 "'relates to' ERISA since it purports to regulate garnishment of ERISA funds and benefits, a matter specifically provided for under ERISA" (Pet. App. A3-A4 (footnote omitted)). The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that the Georgia statute, by protecting welfare funds from garnishment, "prohibits that which the federal statute permits and is therefore in conflict with it." Pet. App. A4, citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). It thus held that Georgia's statutory exemption to garnishment "insofar as it conflicts with ERISA is preempted by federal law," and accordingly ruled that the Fund is subject to garnishment (Pet. App. A5). DISCUSSION The Georgia Supreme Court erred near the beginning of its analysis by holding that ERISA permits garnishment of welfare benefit plans such as the vacation benefit plan at issue here. In fact, ERISA's express preemption provision, Section 514(a), prempts any state law provisions insofar as they allow creditors to garnish welfare benefit plans, since such garnishment actions "relate to" ERISA plans within the meaning of Section 514(a). State garnishment proceedings affect employee benefit plans because plan trustees must participate in those proceedings, incurring potentially substantial costs, and disburse plan assets as required by state courts rather than according to the documents governing the plan. ERISA therefore generally precludes the application of state garnishment laws to ERISA plans. Because of the practical importance of the issue and disagreement among the lower courts addressing it, review is warranted by this Court to decide whether ERISA preempts state garnishment laws insofar as they apply to welfare plans. /5/ 1. a. As previously chronicled by this Court, Congress enacted ERISA following nearly a decade of studying the operation of private employee pension and welfare benefit plans. Central States v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 & n.9 (1985); Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980). Congress found that there had been enormous growth in employee benefit plans in recent years and that "the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans." 29 U.S.C. 1001(a). Due to the inadequacy of existing minimum standards under state law, however, Congress found that "the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered" (ibid.). Congress therefore established in ERISA a comprehensive regulatory framework to "assur(e) the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness" (ibid.), and thereby to "protect * * * participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. 1001(b). At the same time that it created ERISA's scheme of regulation of employee benefit plans, Congress expressly preempted "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," and broadly defined "State law" to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." Section 514(a) and (c), 29 U.S.C. 1114(a) and (c). As this Court has repeatedly instructed, Section 514(a) is "deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.'" Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, No. 85-1043 (Apr. 6, 1987), slip op. 4 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 415 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). "The preemption provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). Nor, as this Court has emphasized, is preemption "limited to 'state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.'" Pilot Life, slip op. 6 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983)). Rather, the phrase "relate to" must be "given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law 'relate(s) to' a benefit plan 'in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.'" Pilot Life, slip op. 6 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97). As this Court explained in Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-100, the legislative history of ERISA confirms that Congress intended to occupy the field of employee benefit plans by superseding any and all state laws affecting such plans, and not just those state laws governing subjects covered by the federal statute. The Conference Committee deliberately rejected the approach employed in earlier House and Senate versions of the bill, which preempted only matters actually regulated by ERISA, in favor of the broad preemption of all state laws relating to plans covered by the statute. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974). Describing the conferees' intent to the House of Representatives, Congressman Dent explained that "the provisions of Section 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice, or decision of any State * * * which would affect any employee benefit plan covered by ERISA." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974) (emphasis added). b. Like the employment discrimination law involved in Shaw, the Georgia garnishment statute, although also governing other matters, "relate(s) to" ERSA-covered plans insofar as it affects such plans. Most obviously, the state law authorizes judgment creditors to appropriate plan assets before they are disbursed as benefits to plan participants or beneficiaries. The Georgia garnishment procedures also affect employee benefit plans by imposing added duties on fund trustees. Here, to comply with the garnishment order, the trustees of the Fund would be required to confirm the identity of each of the 23 individual participants, calculate his or her maximum entitlement from the Fund for the period between the service date and the reply date of the summons of garnishment, determine the amount that each individual owes to respondent, and make payment into state court of the lesser of the amount owed to respondent or the amount of the individual's entitlement. See Pet. App. A21. Moreover, because garnishment is essentially an adversary proceeding between the plaintiff and the garnishee (see generally 38 C.J.S. Garnishment Section 2 (1943)), plans subject to garnishment necessarily bear costs in answering the summons of garnishment as well as costs incurred in any contest over, for example, the validity of the garnishment, the liability of the garnishee, or priorities between garnishments and other levies. And, as trustees of a multiemployer plan covering participants in several states, petitioners are potentially subject to multiple garnishment orders under varying or conflicting state laws. These effects of the state garnishment procedures fall squarely within the preemptive sweep of Section 514(a). In Shaw, this Court acknowledged that "(s)ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates' to the plan" (463 U.S. at 100 n.21). This case, however, like Shaw, "plainly does not present a borderline question" (ibid.) because garnishment of welfare benefit plan assets directly interferes with plan administration and threatens the imposition of substantial costs on plans. Rather, this case involves precisely the "sort of interference with the administration of employee benefit plans" that "ERISA's comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize" (id. at 105 n.25). Accordingly, state garnishment laws are preempted by Section 514(a) insofar as they apply to such plans. Moreover, garnishment of trust assets would directly conflict with Sections 403(c)(1) and 404(a)(1)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1103(c)(1) and 1104(a)(1)(A), which require trustees to hold and expend trust funds "for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits" and "defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Payment of plan monies to a creditor of a beneficiary violates these ERISA restrictions and could subject the trustees to personal liability for breach of fiduciary responsibility. See 29 U.S.C. 1109 and 1132. Congress preempted state laws under Section 514(a) precisely to free plans and their trustees from such conflicting legal duties. The application of Georgia's garnishment procedures to welfare benefit plans also "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of ERISA. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Congress sought in ERISA to assure that employees and their beneficiaries actually receive promised fringe benefits. See 29 U.S.C. 1001(a); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 510 & n.5, citing Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. at 375. /6/ To permit general creditors to reach plan assets would frustrate congressional intent to ensure the financial soundness of plans and the payment of benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. In contrast, preemption of the Georgia garnishment procedures does not, in most instances, defeat the ability of creditors to collect judgment debts owed by the plan participants. It merely requires creditors to pursue debtors' other assets or to await the established and easily ascertainable periodic distribution by the plan of monies to the participants. c. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that, although ERISA preempts garnishment of pension plans, it permits garnishment of welfare plans. See Pet. App. A2. It based that conclusion on the fact that Section 206(d)(1)of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1), requires that "(e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated," /7/ but contains no similar provision pertaining to welfare plans. See note 4, supra. The court erred in its negative implication that welfare plan benefits may be garnished. It is true that Section 206(d)(1), which prohibits any assignment, whether voluntary or involuntary, deals only with pension plan assets. But Section 514 preempts state laws relating to both pension and welfare plans. That provision effectively prohibits involuntary assignments of plan assets because such assignments would necessarily be effected by application of state laws which are preempted. /8/ Thus, while garnishment of welfare plans is not prohibited by Section 206(d)(1), Section 514(a) bars garnishment of any employee benefit plan pursuant to state law. While there is some overlap between Section 206(d)(1) and Section 514(a) -- both prohibit involuntary assignment of pension benefits -- the Georgia Supreme Court read too much into Section 206(d)(1) in holding that it implicitly demonstrates that Congress intended to permit garnishment of welfare plan assets. A subsequent congressional enactment conclusively shows that Congress understands Section 514(a) to preempt state garnishment laws. In 1984, Congress adopted Section 514(b)(7), which provides that Section 514(a) "shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders (within the meaning of (29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)))." Pub. L. No. 98-397, Section 104(b) 98 Stat. 1426, 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 1144(b)(7). The 1984 amendment codified a line of cases in which the courts had found an implied exception to ERISA's preemption and pension anti-alienation provisions to permit garnishment of employee benefits to satisfy family support and community property obligations contained in state court orders. /9/ The creation of a limited exemption for domestic relations orders reaffirms Congress's intent to otherwise bar garnishment of employee benefit plans. The exemption "preserves and clarifies the original broad preemption of State law under ERISA section 514 while carrying out an appropriate and well-defined exception for domestic relations orders meeting specific standards" (130 Cong. Rec. H8756 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 2984) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn)). /10/ 2. Further review of this case is warranted because of the confusion in the lower courts as to whether ERISA generally preempts state garnishment laws. In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), the court of appeals held in a split decision that ERISA preempted a California tax collection law insofar as it permitted state authorities to levy on funds held in trust for the taxpayers under a vacation benefit plan. The court of appeals reasoned -- correctly, in our view -- that while pension plans, but not welfare plans, are expressly protected from creditors' claims, ERISA's preemption clause governs both pension and welfare plans, and there is "(no) legal basis to warrant a retreat from preemption" (679 F.2d at 1309). Although this Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the case had been improperly removed from state to federal court, it noted that "the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the State's levy in the circumstances of this case" (463 U.S. at 26). /11/ See also National Carriers' Conference Committee v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978) (Section 514(a) preempts a state statute requiring welfare plans to pay an annual tax); General Motors Corp. v. California State Board of Equalization, 600 F.Supp. 76 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (insurance franchise tax on uninsured welfare benefits preempted by ERISA). Other courts have held to the contrary. The Sixth Circuit adopted the decision of a district court holding that absent "some express or implied provision of ERISA which addresses the matter," or some "'regulatory' effect" other than administrative expense, Section 514(a) does not preempt state garnishment proceedings against funds held in a vacation trust. Local Union 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW Credit Union, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), aff'g 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). To the same effect is a Missouri Supreme Court decision, Electrical Workers Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holding Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 159 (1979) (en banc), declining to interpret Section 514(a) of ERISA to require preemption of that state's garnishment law since "(t)he enforcement of state court money judgments by creditors is a valid area of state concern, and is one which is totally unregulated by ERISA with respect to welfare plans." Accord First National Bank of Commerce v. Latiker, 432 So.2d 293, 296 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The decisions allowing garnishment of welfare plans are inconsistent with this Court's decisions in Shaw, Metropolitan Life, and Pilot Life regarding the breadth of Section 514. Moreover, as this Court recognized in Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 4, the issue is an important one and "must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution." Indeed, whether welfare plan assets are subject to garnishment has practical implications for thousands of welfare plans covering millions of participants. Focusing only on multiemployer welfare plans (other than health and life insurance plans), the Department of Labor estimated in 1981, the last year for which statistics were tabulated, that there were over 2,000 such plans covering in excess of six million participants. /12/ This case well illustrates the confusion and disagreement among the lower courts on the issue of whether ERISA preempts the garnishment of welfare plan assets. Indeed, the strongest argument for denying review of this case is the profound confusion evident in the opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court. Its conclusion that ERISA requires states to subject welfare plan assets to existing state garnishment laws is the framework within which the question is presented by petitioner. As we have noted (see note 5, supra), however, implicit within the court's holding is the important issue on which the courts have disagreed -- whether ERISA preempts the application of state garnishment laws to welfare plan assets. This Court should grant certiorari because uncertainty on this latter issue will interfere with the orderly administration of employee benefit plans, which is what ERISA's broad preemption provision sought to minimize. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105 n.25. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General DONALD B. AYER Deputy Solicitor General CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT Assistant to the Solicitor General GEORGE R. SALEM Solicitor of Labor ALLEN H. FELDMAN Associate Solicitor CAROL A. DE DEO Deputy Associate Solicitor BETTE J. BRIGGS Attorney Department Of Labor MAY 1987 /1/ ERISA governs welfare benefit plans as well as pension benefit plans. Section 3(1) (emphasis added) defines "employee welfare benefit plan" to mean "any plan, fund, or promgram * * * established or maintained * * * for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries * * * medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits * * *." /2/ Section 18-4-60 provides that "(i)n all cases where a money judgment shall have been obtained in a court of this state or in a federal court sitting in this state, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the process of garnishment." Under Georgia law garnishment proceedings are governed exclusively by state statute. See Ga. Code Ann. Section 18-4-60 (1982); Grande Carpet Co. v. Bedco Associates No. 1, 171 Ga. App. 33, 318 S.E.2d 767 (1984); Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Georgia-Carolina Industrial Park Venture, 463 F. Supp. 538, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1978). /3/ Section 18-4-22.1 provides in pertinent part that "(f)unds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program subject to (ERISA) shall not be subject to the process of garnishment * * * (2) unless such garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support * * *." /4/ Section 206(d)(1) requires that "(e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Welfare plans are expressly excluded from coverage of the Anti-alienation clause and other participation and vesting requirements by Section 201(1), 29 U.S.C. 1051(1). /5/ The Petition -- following Georgia Supreme Court's erroneous conclusion that ERISA permits (indeed, mandates) garnishment of welfare benefits plans -- presents the question whether ERISA preempts the states from exempting employee welfare funds or benefits from the state's own garnishment procedures and does not explicitly ask whether the state's garnishment procedures are themselves preempted insofar as they apply to ERISA plans. Because the determination of the validity of the state garnishment procedures as applied to a welfare plan is a threshold issue which is essential to the analysis of the decision below and is a predicate to an intelligent resolution of the question presented, it is "fairly included" within the question set forth in the petition and, under Rule 21.1(a) of the Rules of this Court, may be considered by this Court. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 n.6 (1980). /6/ Congress, in enacting ERISA, was particularly concerned with "the great personal tragedy' suffered by employees whose vested benefits are not paid when pension plans are terminated," Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at 374 (footnote omitted) (quoting from a statement by Senator Bentsen), and accordingly imposed greater requirements on pension plans than on welfare plans. See 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 1051-1086 (participation, vesting, and funding provisions). But evidence before Congress also reflected abuse involving misuse and mismanagement of welfare benefit funds -- see, e.g., Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 464, 470-472 (1970) (statement of George Shultz, Secretary of Labor) -- and ERISA's fiduciary responsibilities and trust requirements apply equally to pension and welfare plans. See 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 1101-1113. /7/ The identical provision in Section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) has been interpreted in a Treasury regulation to prohibit both voluntary assignments and garnishment by operation of law. 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1954 Code). This interpretation is supported by the legislative history, and most courts have held that private creditors may not garnish pension benefits under Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA. See, e.g., Tenneco., Inc. v. First Virginia Bank, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Helmsley-Spear Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981). /8/ Section 514(a) does not, however, bar voluntary assignments by plan participants since voluntary assignments do not rely on provisions of state law. See, e.g., Misic v. Building Service Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986) (permitting assignment by a beneficiary of his right to reimbursement under a health care plan to the health care provider); see also 29 C.F.R. 2509.78-1 (interpreting ERISA to permit voluntary assignment of vacation plan benefits, provided the plan documents expressly permit a participant to make such an assignment and certain other conditions are met). /9/ AT&T Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Operating Engineers' Local #428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases); Tenneco Inc. v. First Virginia Bank, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983); Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Stone v. Stone, 450 F.Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re the Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). In enacting Section 514(b)(7), Congress sought "to ensure that only those orders that are excepted from the spendthrift provisions are preempted by ERISA." S. Rep. 98-575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984). /10/ There is no basis for implying an exception from Section 514(a) to permit the garnishment of plan assets by a participant's general creditor. The courts that had recognized the implied exception codified by Section 514(b)(7) based that exception on the fact that "(m)embers of the families of employees are included in the class which ERISA protects," a factor which distinguishes the claims of dependents from those of business or other creditors. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 926. While Congress expressly declared in enacting ERISA that "the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by (the) plans" (Section 2(a), 29 U.S.C. 1001(a) (emphasis added)), it expressed no similar concern for creditors such as respondent. /11/ The case is currently pending on remand to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (No. C-326040). /12/ These figures were tabulated from annual reports filed with the Department of Labor as required by 29 U.S.C. 1023-1024.