47TH STREET PHOTO, INC., PETITIONER V. COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, ET AL. No. 86-624 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Memorandum for the Federal Respondents The federal respondents in No. 86-624 submit this memorandum to set forth the government's position on the jurisdictional issue raised in 47th Street Photo, Inc.'s brief. /1/ 47th Street Photo contends that the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. 1581, vests the Court of International Trade with exclusive jurisdiction over the present challenge to the Customs Service regulation, 19 C.F.R. 133.21, which implements Section 526 of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1526. We disagree. The district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, empowering the district courts to hear "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," and under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), empowering the district courts to hear civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating to * * * trademarks." The Customs Courts Act did not divest the district court of jurisdiction under those provisions in the present case. 1. 47th Street Photo contends, first, that the present action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade because it arises out of a law of the United States providing for "embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety" (28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(3)). It is true that Section 526, which restricts the importation of foreign merchandise bearing a mark identical to a U.S. trademark, could be literally construed as an "embargo" in the sense that it results in a "prohibition imposed by law upon commerce" (47th Street Photo Br. 11 n.3, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1971)). We agree with the court of appeals, however, that the term is better understood as limited to traditional prohibitions on imports "arising out of trade policy, the sort of measures that have traditionally limited the importation of shoes, textiles, automobiles, and the like" (86-625 Pet. App. 8a). 2. 47th Street Photo also contends that the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over a determination of the Customs Service regulation's validity "'as a corollary to protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1581(a)'" (47th St. Photo Br. 17, quoting Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, No. 85-411 (Jan. 13, 1986)). /2/ Section 1581(a) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of International Trade over "any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930" (18 U.S.C. 1581(a)). And Section 1581(i)(4) further confers jurisdiction over any action against the United States that arises out of a law "providing for * * * administration and enforcement with respect to matters referred to in" 28 U.S.C. 1581(a). 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(4). We agree with the court of appeals (86-625 Pet. App. 6a-7a) that 28 U.S.C. 1581(a) deals strictly with judicial review of a limited class of statutorily defined protests. It does not grant the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction over a civil action, as here, that contests the admission of imported goods. And the civil action here does not fall within 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(4). That subsection provides jurisdiction over cases challenging the procedures governing protests; it does not provide exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to a statute and regulation that, in other circumstances, might provide the basis for a protest. See 86-625 Pet. App. 7a. Thus, we submit that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1338(a) over the present dispute and that the Customs Courts Act did not divest the court of that jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General MAY 1987 /1/ We discuss the issue of the validity of the Customs Service regulation -- an issue that is presented in this case as well as two companion cases, Nos. 86-495 and 86-625 -- in our brief for the federal petitioners. See 86-625 Fed. Pet. Br. /2/ Protests are administrative complaints challenging certain Customs Service actions, including "the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery * * * under any provision of the Customs laws" (19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(4)). See also 19 U.S.C. 1515.