JAMEEL-ISMAIL HASSAN SAAHIR, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 90-7144 In The Supreme Court Of The United States October Term, 1990 On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit Brief For The United States In Opposition OPINION BELOW The court of appeals opinion (Pet. App. 1A-4A) is not reported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on November 14, 1990. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 6, 1991. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). QUESTION PRESENTED Whether petitioner was properly sentenced to terms of special parole under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(4) (1982, Supp. IV 1986) for offenses committed in June and August 1987. STATEMENT After a bench trial in the District of Colorado, petitioner was convicted on one count of conspiracy to import marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963, and on two counts of importing and aiding the importation of less than 50 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952, 960, based on offenses committed between April 1987 and September 1987. Pet. 6; Pet. App. 2A-3A. He was sentenced on the latter two counts under the applicable penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(4) (1982, Supp. IV 1986), as modified by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Tit. I, Section 1302, 100 Stat. 3207-15 (Oct. 27, 1986), to two consecutive terms of three years' imprisonment, to be followed by two consecutive two-year terms of special parole. He was also sentenced to a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment on the conspiracy count. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. Pet. App. 2A. 2. Petitioner filed a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) to correct his sentence by striking the four year term of special parole, arguing that at the time he committed his offense there was no authority for the court to impose a term of special parole. The district court denied that motion on April 11, 1990, without discussion. Pet. App. 2A. 3. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of petitioner's Rule 35 motion. Apparently following the approach of petitioner's brief on appeal, the court of appeals analyzed the sentencing question under 21 U.S.C. 841(b), which contains sentencing provisions for domestic drug offenses that are parallel to those in 21 U.S.C. 960. The court noted that the pertinent sentencing provision was 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D) (1982, Supp. IV 1986), which applied to offenses involving less than 50 kilograms of marijuana and prescribed a mandatory minimum term of two years' special parole. Pet. App. 3A. The court recognized that "(s)tatutory authority for the imposition of special parole under Section 842(b)(1)(D) persisted until the 'supervised release' provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act became effective on November 1, 1987, under Section 1004(a) and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984." Ibid. The court concluded that the challenged sentence was therefore within statutory limits. Id. at 4A. ARGUMENT Petitioner argues (Pet. 8) that there was no statutory authority for imposing a sentence of post-confinement monitoring during the period in which he committed his offenses -- that is, between the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), on October 27, 1986, and November 1, 1987, the date on which petitioner claims that the ADAA became effective. In Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 840 (1991), this Court held that all of the penalty provisions of the ADAA, including its provisions for post-confinement monitoring in the form of special parole or supervised release, became effective upon enactment on October 27, 1986. In that case, this Court rejected the premise of petitioner's argument -- that the effective date of the post-confinement monitoring provisions of the ADAA was delayed until November 1, 1987. Gozlon-Peretz dealt specifically with offenses for which the ADAA prescribed terms of post-confinement monitoring in the form of supervised release. The ADAA left unaltered certain other penalty provisions -- including Sections 841(b)(1)(D) and 960(b)(4) -- that prescribed a term of post-confinement monitoring in the form of special parole. See also 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(2), 845(a), 845a(a) (1982, Supp. IV 1986) & 962(a) (1982). The version of the penalty provision that applies to petitioner -- 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(4) -- that was in effect at the time of petitioner's June and August 1987 offenses authorized a sentence of at least two years' special parole. (That penalty provision parallels the penalties prescribed in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D) (1982, Supp. IV 1986) for offenses involving domestic possession with intent to distribute.) Accordingly, petitioner was correctly sentenced to four years of special parole on the two importation counts of conviction and his petition does not raise any question warranting further review by this Court. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. KENNETH W. STARR Solicitor General ROBERT S. MUELLER, III Assistant Attorney General RICHARD A. FRIEDMAN Attorney APRIL 1991