Department of Justice

STATEMENT

OF

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ATTORNEY GENERAL

BEFORE

THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE INDIVIDUALS
REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee today to spell out my role in the Department of Justice's investigation of Billy Carter under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a) ("the Act"). I think that after listening to my colleagues at the Justice Department and to me today you will agree that the investigation of Billy Carter under the Foreign Agents Registration Act was handled both fairly and well.

The questions that have been raised concern the procedures the Justice Department followed, and it is those procedures -- including my own limited involvement with them -- that I am going to talk about.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act, as you know, is a rather esoteric statute -- it requires registration, but it does not prohibit anyone from being a foreign agent. Indeed, there are hundreds, even thousands, of law firms, public relations firms, organizations, institutions or individuals who are foreign agents and the statute in no way condemns them or prohibits their acting for their principals.

Nonetheless, we must recognize that the public may associate the term "foreign agent" with nefarious and covert conduct. Thus when citizens hear of an FBI investigation, conducted

for the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, into the payment of $220,000 by the Libyans to Billy Carter, they tend to conclude that there should be some criminal prosecution. This is no doubt fueled by the feeling that since Libya is a country of disrepute, Billy's dealings with it are reprehensible and therefore, something is wrong when he is not criminally prosecuted. While I share the condemnation of dealings with a country like Libya which espouses hatred and terrorism, that alone does not, cannot, and should not provide a basis for criminal prosecution.

However, I realize that one question which arises when there is no indictment is: "Was favoritism shown to Billy Carter because he is the President's brother?" I can answer that question unequivocally. Billy Carter was shown no favoritism by the Department of Justice; he was treated fairly and equally, and the Department achieved its goal and that of the Act in obtaining Billy Carter's registration as a foreign agent.

BACKGROUND

Before turning to the specifics of the Billy Carter investigation, I would like to explain my familiarity with the Foreign Agents Registration Act as of the time I became Attorney General.

The Criminal Division, which I headed from 1977 to mid-1978, has a Registration Unit in the Internal Security Section, that enforces the Act. It does so by means of civil suits, almost never by criminal prosecutions. This has been true at least since 1966, when the Act was amended to provide an alternative to bringing criminal prosecutions by authorizing the Justice Department to use civil procedures. Congress did not adopt these changes to make it easier to be an unregistered foreign agent. Congress did this, at least in part, because criminal proceedings take time and are difficult to prosecute and prove. As Senator Fulbright, who sponsored the amendments to the Act, said in June 1966:

> "[The provision of the civil injunctive remedy to the Justice Department] will permit the Attorney General to bring about compliance with the letter and the spirit of the act without resorting to long, cumbersome criminal proceedings . . . The act was not intended to bring about wholesale convictions for violations. It was -- and is -- intended to bring about disclosure. Injunctive proceedings, as authorized in this bill, will be far more effective in achieving that objective than would ever be possible through criminal sanctions."

When I was in private practice, I was not familiar with the Foreign Agents Registration Act; I don't remember representing any private clients in connection with the Act. In the Criminal Division, I spent most of my time on subjects ranging from organized crime to mass distribution of narcotics, from white-collar crime to racketeering on a national scale. The Registration Unit was not something that occupied a good

deal of my attention, but I did become generally familiar with its operation.

This general familiarity led me to understand that the Department, since the 1966 amendments, usually pursues civil remedies under the Act. I don't mean to say that the Department would never bring a criminal prosecution; that would not be the regular practice or normal procedure, though. Generally speaking, the policy of the Registration Unit over the last dozen years has been to consider a criminal prosecution only where the foreign agent has actively concealed his or her relationship with a foreign government or where the foreign agent has engaged in other, separate illegal activities like espionage or bribery.

One of the factors making criminal actions difficult to pursue -- quite apart from the 1966 congressional intent that the Department use the civil route -- is that the proof must involve evidence of a "willful" failure to register. This means, in a non-technical way, that the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of twelve jurors that the defendant knows and believes that he is an agent of a foreign government who has the duty to register and, despite that, has deliberately chosen not to do so.

When there is insufficient evidence to support a criminal claim, but persuasion and demands to register are insufficient to achieve compliance, the Department will file a civil suit to compel registration.

THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION

Although I have no precise recollection of when or how I first learned that the Criminal Division was investigating whether Billy Carter should register as a foreign agent, I believe that sometime in mid to late 1979 I became aware that the Division was making inquiries to determine whether Billy Carter had an obligation to register. At that time, I either was Deputy Attorney General or I had only recently become Attorney General and I do not recall any conversation or communication concerning either the conduct or the details of the investigation.

I cannot recall, and my files have failed to reveal, any communication to me concerning the Billy Carter investigation until January, 1980. At that time, and again in February of 1980, I was advised, as part of a daily reporting system I had instituted, that certain interviews were being conducted, or had been conducted, regarding the Billy Carter investigation. However, I was not advised either before the interviews or after, as to their substance or any details concerning them.

As you know, by the end of 1979 Billy Carter, his visits to Libya and his meetings with the Libyans, as well as the fact that we were investigating his activities, had received a great deal of public attention. Sometime, in late February I believe, I asked Phil Heymann, in passing, how the investigation was proceeding. He indicated generally that we did not have much evidence and that he expected the investigation would be closed before long.

Thereafter, in late March or early April, I became aware of a story which appeared in an Atlanta newspaper reporting that the Department was on the verge of making a decision on the Billy Carter investigation. I was surprised and dismayed that there had been an apparent leak of such information, and I recall mentioning it to Phil Heymann, who was also upset by the story.

THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

After that conversation with Phil, I don't remember any connection with the Billy Carter investigation until April. Then I was shown -- but not given -- two documents containing intelligence information from a highly sensitive source which indicated that an American citizen (Billy Carter) might be about to receive certain sums of money from the

Libyan Government. I debated within my own mind what action, if any, should be taken. I thought about it for a few days but I did not discuss the matter with anyone. I decided that I would not request the documents at that time and I would not reveal the information to anyone, for the time being. Instead, I determined to allow matters to proceed to see if we would, as I thought likely, gather similar information from other sources.

My two most basic concerns were that, in the absence of other sources, any disclosure of the information or exploration of leads from it could compromise the intelligence source; and second, I did not want to abort the transaction, which might constitute substantial evidence of a duty to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

I followed the fundamental principle that as the number of people with access to information increases -- even though limited to those with a top secret security clearance -- the likelihood of compromising the source and method of the intelligence grows correspondingly. Although I am aware that some people have questioned the need for such secrecy, the plain fact is that I was told, I believed, and I still believe, that it is vital to the interests of the United States that nothing be done which would compromise our

intelligence efforts and particularly the sources and methods in this case.

The intelligence information I received obviously could not be used as evidence in any proceeding, since that would directly compromise it. Further, in my view the information could not be used in the investigation in any way consistent with principles of security, so long as there was no other source for the information. Any investigation based upon such a single source might indicate the source or method that provided the intelligence information and thus lead to its compromise. While I have every reason to trust the people within the Department who have appropriate security clearances, that was not by itself sufficient reason in my mind to disclose such sensitive information. The law is quite clear that access to classified information must be limited to that ". . . necessary for the performance of official duties." (Executive Order 12065). Since this information could not safely be used in the investigation, the requisite "need to know" immediately on the part of the Criminal Division employees was, in my view, weak and disclosure would merely increase the risk of compromise.

In addition, I was concerned that by conducting any investigation predicated on this information, the Libyans or Billy might be alerted and the transaction aborted. I debated in my own mind whether my obligation was to seek to stop the transaction or rather to permit it to go forward with the expectation that the continuing investigation would uncover usable evidence. I believed that if we waited, the transaction might be completed and the Department would learn independently of evidence of the actual transfer of funds which would enable the Criminal Division to proceed without the risk of identifying the single important, highly sensitive intelligence source.

In making my choice to allow the transaction to go forward, I should tell the Subcommittee that I clearly distinguished in my mind between a situation where the Attorney General receives information of the imminent commission of a crime -- for example, where the information is that a kidnapping is about to take place -- and this situation, where the transaction involved no violence, no physical threat and indeed, by itself, no crime.

In short, I balanced three considerations against the possible benefit of immediately communicating the information to the Criminal Division attorneys: the importance of maintaining the security of the intelligence; the possibility of inadvertent disruption of the transaction; and the probability that similar information would be obtained from other sources.

After weighing these factors, I made my judgment to await developments temporarily.

I was concerned, however, because I had been told that the investigation might close shortly due to a lack of evidence. This troubled me since I believed that if the transaction took place it might constitute important evidence in our investigation. With all this in mind, I made a decision, which I considered, and still consider, to be the correct way to handle the situation.

A few days after I saw the information, I told Phil Heymann that I had been informed of highly sensitive intelligence information regarding the Billy Carter matter and that he should not close the investigation until he had received that information. I did not give Heymann the information, nor did I reveal its source, or when he would be receiving it. I only wanted to be certain that the investigation was not closed. Thus, I promptly put the Criminal Division on notice that the investigation should be kept open, and I did so in a way that I believed -- and subsequent events have proven me correct -- was likely to result both in successful law enforcement and successful protection of intelligence sources and methods.

THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

From the time I advised Phil Heymann not to close the investigation until the end of May, I had no further association, to the best of my recollection, with anyone concerning the Billy Carter investigation. On May 29, 1980, as I was preparing for a press conference to be held that same day, I called Phil Heymann to ask where the Billy Carter investigation stood. He told me that they were still working on the matter, that he recognized that it had taken longer than it should, and that I should refer reporters to him. He volunteered that it was appropriate for me to state that the investigation was taking too long. Although I was, of course, aware of the intelligence information and the fact that I had told Heymann not to close the investigation, I decided that I would follow Heymann's suggestion because, in fact, the investigation had been going on for more than a year and that was a long time in my view.

At my press conference, I was asked about the Billy Carter case, and I stated that I believed the investigation had taken longer than it should and referred all inquiries to Heymann.

I now know that, as a result of my comment, Heymann prodded the staff to move ahead on the investigation.

The very next day, May 30, the Deputy Attorney General, Judge Renfrew, told me that Phil Heymann had advised him that information had been obtained from other sources that Billy Carter had received or was receiving funds from the Libyan Government. I believe I then told Judge Renfrew that I had earlier received secret intelligence information indicating possible payments of some kind to Billy Carter and this information, while different, generally confirmed that there might have been a transfer of funds. With that information in hand, that same day I requested that the information from the initial source be made available to the Department for the Criminal Division. Now that we had multiple sources indicating the transfer of funds to Billy Carter, I felt the initial intelligence information could be given -- under controlled circumstances -- to the Criminal Division. We still could not use the information in court, or directly as part of our investigation since that would reveal sources and methods, but it could help in the confirmation and evaluation of other facts.

I was out of town until the afternoon of June 3, but on the morning of June 4, after I returned, I met with Phil

Heymann. At that time I opened the envelope in which the sensitive intelligence documents had been delivered, and together we looked at the documents I had seen in April.

Heymann suggested that we carefully mark the envelope to indicate the date and that it was reviewed by the two of us. He also suggested that I indicate on the envelope who should be permitted to see this highly sensitive information. Accordingly, I wrote on the envelope that it was reviewed by the two of us on June 4, 1980, and I asked Heymann who else should see the information. He responded that, in addition to the two of us, I should add the initials of Mark Richard, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division. This I did. Heymann also went on to say that if Mark Richard felt that John Martin, Chief of the Internal Security Section, and Joel Lisker, head of the Registration Unit, had to see it, he would authorize that. I told Heymann that was all right with me. I gave the envelope and the documents to Phil Heymann to give to Eric Richard, my Special Assistant, to hold under the tightest security. I understand that, with the approval of Mark Richard and Phil Heymann, John Martin and Joel Lisker both reviewed the intelligence information on or shortly after June 4.

On June 4 after reviewing the information with Phil Heymann, I was concerned that while we had multiple sources we still did

not have evidence usable in court. In other words, we had several sources but none could be directly used or compromised. Thus, we had to develop facts which could be used in court to establish the payments. One possibility, which Phil Heymann and I discussed briefly on June 4, was for the Criminal Division to call in Billy Carter and confront him to see if he would admit the payments. Although no decision was made on June 4 as to whether to do that, I understood that this was one avenue, among others, which the Criminal Division was going to consider.

Later that same day, I asked Victor Kramer, Counselor to the Attorney General, his reaction to the possibility of my speaking to Billy Carter if the Criminal Division called him in. My thought was that perhaps if the Attorney General came in and suggested strongly that he should tell the truth this might have an effect upon Billy Carter. Kramer advised me that, based upon his understanding of Billy Carter's personality as it had been depicted in the press, he did not see anything to be gained or lost by doing that at that time. I decided then simply to have the Criminal Division go ahead with the investigation and not to volunteer to join any interview they might have. Accordingly, I did not ask Kramer to take any action.

I heard nothing further about the Billy Carter matter until sometime on the afternoon of June 11, when I received a call from Judge Renfrew saying that Mark Richard and Joel Lisker were with him and asking if they could come see me. As best I can recall, the three of them met with me in my office for about ten or fifteen minutes. At the outset, either Judge Renfrew or Mark Richard, I cannot recall which, explained to me that Billy Carter had been in to be interviewed that day. That was the first information I had that Billy Carter was coming to the Department of Justice or had been in.

Richard and Lisker told me that Billy Carter had confirmed that he had received a check for $200,000 from Libya, which he characterized as a loan. They also told me, I believe, that Billy Carter had said that he received another $20,000 as reimbursement of expenses. They said that they were relaying this information to me because Billy Carter had left to go to the White House after his meeting and had said that he was going to meet with Dr. Brzezinski. Judge Renfrew seemed concerned that since I was going to the White House later that day for a social event, I should be informed of the interview so that I would not be surprised if anyone mentioned it. In addition, Richard and Lisker

seemed worried that Billy Carter might complain to someone at the White House about our conduct of the investigation and our treatment of him. I said that I was not concerned, that I doubted that anyone would even mention the matter to me, but that if anyone did, I would simply respond that we were investigating the matter, that our investigation was being conducted properly and I would not discuss it further. In fact, no one mentioned the matter at all to me while I was at the White House that evening.

In the course of the conversation with Judge Renfrew, Richard and Lisker, I was also told that physical surveillance had been placed upon Billy Carter while he was in Washington. I was surprised. I asked why they had felt surveillance was desirable and I was told by Mark Richard, I believe, that they did not know why Billy Carter intended to come to Washington that day and it was possible that he might have scheduled a meeting with Libyans in Washington and might be receiving money at that time. Accordingly, they had arranged for the surveillance. I did not ask, and they did not say, how long the surveillance would continue. The discussion of surveillance, however, took a good part of the conversation as I remember it.

I recall generally that someone, I believe Mark Richard, indicated he was concerned because Billy Carter had said that Dr. Brzezinski had told him that he knew of a business transaction between Billy Carter and Charter Oil Company. Richard's concern seemed to be that this information had come from the same intelligence source or document we had. I think I said it might have, but it also might have come from many other sources from which Brzezinski regularly receives information.

At some point in the conversation, I asked Joel Lisker whether he felt prepared to bring a case right then to compel Billy Carter to register. The substance of his response was that he wanted to do further investigation. This led to a general discussion of leads and further avenues for investigation. Mark Richard briefly mentioned the possibility of using a grand jury subpoena to secure documents or testimony, if necessary. I understood Billy Carter was coming back later that day to continue his interview and we discussed others who might be interviewed. One person mentioned was Randy Coleman, Billy Carter's associate. I remember suggesting that we should definitely interview him and follow up on other avenues as well.

As best I can recall, the conversation ended with Joel Lisker saying that he had advised Billy Carter that he should

register and would do so again. I think I said that I agreed and we would see what happened. I was not asked to make any decisions at that meeting and I did not; I was not asked for any guidance or advice on what to investigate or how and, other than suggesting that they might want to interview Randy Coleman, I did not give any guidance or advice. The meeting as far as I was concerned was for one purpose and one purpose only, to alert me to the interview because I was going to be at the White House and Judge Renfrew did not want me "blindsided," not even knowing that Billy Carter had been interviewed that day.

I am aware that it has been suggested that I may have indicated a desire that the staff should wait to see what would happen over the next ten days. I cannot state precisely what I said, but I can state that I never directed or suggested that the investigation in any way be delayed or deferred and it was not. I do not even recall saying "Let's see what happens over the next ten days," but if I did, it was clearly in the context of Lisker's comment that he had advised Billy to register. I never delayed or attempted to delay or interfere in any way with the investigation or any proceeding. I knew Billy Carter was to be reinterviewed. I recommended that Randy Coleman be approached and I intended for the staff to

push ahead -- which they did. In fact, the investigation went forward from that time on, without any delay.

Between June 11 and June 17, the Billy Carter investigation may have been mentioned once or twice during discussions with Phil Heymann on other matters, but I cannot pinpoint the dates. I do recall one brief conversation in which Phil Heymann told me that he personally viewed the Billy Carter matter as civil, rather than criminal.

JUNE 17 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER

On June 17, I had a meeting with the President, also attended by White House counsel, Lloyd Cutler, to discuss judicial nominations.

There have been some questions raised about the brief conversation I had with the President regarding Billy Carter and I would like to address them directly. I should tell the Committee that neither then nor now have I had any doubts that my comments to the President about Billy Carter's obligation to register and the Department's general policy were completely proper and consistent with my duties as Attorney General.

As you know, when Attorney General Bell took office, he and President Carter made it explicitly clear that the Department of Justice would be free from political influence from the White House. When I first spoke with President Carter about becoming Attorney General in August of 1979, the President reiterated his commitment to the principle of an independent Department of Justice, and I told him that it was an essential element of the duties of the Attorney General. Soon after taking office, I issued a memorandum to all the units in the Department expressing my position with regard to the independence of the Department of Justice and specifying procedures to be followed in the event of communications from people in the White House to persons in the Department about investigations or litigation.

It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the wall which we have carefully and solidly constructed between the Department of Justice and the White House is to insulate the Department from improper intrusions. In particular, it is intended to preserve the right of professional line attorneys and the heads of divisions to make decisions within the areas of their expertise independently and without political interference or its appearance.

In this context I am tempted to discuss in an almost academic way the role of the Attorney General. It is a role that is divided in some countries, such as Great Britain. The Attorney General is both the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General in the United States. He has a policy role, and he is in charge of the investigation and prosecution of crime. Certainly, no one would argue that the President does not have a role in setting policy with regard to law enforcement, criminal justice and the other activities of the Justice Department, ranging from such areas as drug enforcement to immigration and civil rights enforcement. On the other hand, past history shows that there can be difficulty when the chief executive becomes involved in specific decisions to prosecute those with whom the Administration may have links. Yet the President is charged by the Constitution with resonsibility for faithful execution of the laws. I do not plan to address these issues today because they do not bear directly on your inquiry. Nevertheless, they form the wider backdrop for the kind of specific inquiry you have undertaken.

On June 17, I went to the Oval Office, as I had on other occasions, to discuss with the President a number of judicial appointments. Normally I meet with the President alone on these matters, but, as I indicated, on this day for

the first time Mr. Cutler was also present. The meeting concerning judgeships lasted about twenty-five minutes and when it was concluded I asked to speak with President Carter alone. I did this because I wanted to speak to the President about a number of matters relating to the Department, not involving Mr. Cutler, including my upcoming trips to the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Judicial Conferences, my planned three-week absence from the office and other matters concerning the Department of Justice.

One of several matters I mentioned to the President was his brother, Billy, and his failure to register as a foreign agent. Prior to this conversation I had thought about whether I should mention the Billy Carter matter to the President at all. I decided that it would be proper, advisable and entirely consistent with my duties as Attorney General to tell the President that the Billy Carter matter was an investigation which I would not discuss with him. I wanted to do this, if time permitted, because I wanted to be certain that the President was aware of my view since, as I earlier testified, I had reason to believe that Billy Carter had spoken to Dr. Brzezinski and possibly others on the White House staff after his interview on June 11, perhaps complaining about our inquiry. I felt that, if the President heard anything in that regard, he

should be prepared to respond immediately to anyone that the Department should not be consulted about the investigation. I wanted the President to understand that I considered Billy Carter's case different from those about which I do from time to time advise him and that this was one which we should not discuss.

I also told the President, that in my view, his brother was foolish and should have registered long ago. The President asked what was likely to happen if Billy registered under the Act, and I replied, in substance, that if he told the truth and registered under the Act, then it was my understanding that the general practice in the Department was not to prosecute.

My statement in this regard was based upon my knowledge of the Act and its purpose, as well as general Department practice. I did not consider, and the President I am confident did not consider, this to be a "deal" or a "commitment" of any kind and any suggestions to the contrary are unfair and baseless.

The whole conversation concerning Billy Carter took no more than a minute. My exchange with the President was not intended to have, nor did it have, any effect or impact on the Department's investigation. I did not advise anyone of my conversation; the Criminal Division staff continued its investigation unabated; and the decision as to whether

and how to proceed, was made within the Division based upon an assessment of the facts and the purposes of the Act. I had absolutely nothing to do with the Billy Carter matter from June 17 until after the case was filed. I did not discuss the investigation with anyone and I did not even know that a suit was to be filed until after it was actually commenced.

As I have stated, the wall between the Justice Department and the White House was designed to prevent interference by the White House into law enforcement. Neither Judge Bell nor I have ever erected an absolute barrier to prevent the Attorney General from discussing any cases, investigations or policies with the President that the Attorney General or the President deem necessary; that, in my view, would be improper. The President has a proper, indeed necessary, role and interest in many of the decisions and activities of the Department. The purpose of my comment to the President was to distinguish those situations from the investigation of his brother, and to establish that, in this instance, there would be no discussions regarding the investigation. To my knowledge, no inquiry was, in fact, made to the Department by anyone at the White House regarding the Billy Carter case either before or after my conversation with the President.

EVENTS AFTER THE JUNE 17th CONVERSATION

On July 21, I was called by Mr. Cutler and told that the White House was going to release a statement which said that there had been no discussions between the Department and the White House concerning the conduct of the investigation. I confirmed the accuracy of that statement. When I did that, I focused upon the fact that there had been no interference, and there had been no discussion about the substance of the investigation with anyone at the White House, including the President. I felt that the brief exchange I had with the President was not a significant or substantive discussion concerning the investigation, and hence, I did not mention it to Mr. Cutler.

On July 24, at a regularly scheduled press conference, I was asked a question aimed, I thought, at whether there had been any interference in the investigation by anyone at the White House. I drew the distinction between a substantive discussion about the conduct of an investigation and the brief conversation I had with the President and replied "no." That answer was wrong in two respects. First, the question did not ask about interference by the White House, but rather asked whether there had been any communications at all. Secondly, I was wrong in attempting to draw such a close, lawyer-like distinction in responding to a general, public inquiry.

The suggestion has been made that I revealed my conversation with the President because I was informed by Mr. Cutler on the night of the 24th that the President had recalled our conversation when he ran across a note he had made. This may be true but I don't believe so. Although I cannot say with certainty whether I would have, upon further reflection, decided that my answer to the press inquiry should be corrected, I can tell you that I was troubled during the day of July 24 as I thought about the questions asked at the press conference. I was concerned that they might have been broader and more literal than I had construed them and that the fine distinction I had made would not be understood commonly. In fact, I requested the transcript of the conference as soon as it was available because I wanted to review it to see whether I had given an incorrect answer. But, while I like to think I would have corrected my press statement even if I had not spoken to Mr. Cutler, I cannot assuredly state that, since on the night of the 24th Mr. Cutler and I did talk.

I regret that I drew the kind of distinction I did during my press conference. I have had, and I believe I still have, a reputation for being both a good lawyer and a person of candor and integrity. My conversation with the President was in my mind absolutely proper. My statement to the press on July 24 was wrong. I rectified that mistake the very next day, but I must and do accept the responsibility for the

error. I hope, however, that a relationship built over years based upon mutual respect can endure a single error.

In conclusion, I must advise this Committee that I am both comfortable with and proud of the conduct of the Department in this matter. The handling of secret intelligence information was, I am convinced, both proper and wise; the conduct of the investigation and the decisions made concerning the handling of the case were thoughtful and appropriate in every way and made by experienced, career attorneys. Similarly, my conversation with President Carter needs no apology. It is important, I respectfully suggest, to record the fact that neither I nor any other official in the Department took any action which in any way interfered with, deterred or diverted the course of this investigation; the final result of our efforts was, I believe, a fair and correct disposition.

Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.