

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CASE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

BILFINGER SE,

Defendant.

UNITED STATES COURTS  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
FILED

DEC - 9 2013

David J. Bradley, Clerk of Court

**DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT**

Defendant BILFINGER SE (the "Company"), by its undersigned representatives, pursuant to authority granted by the Company's Executive Board, and the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section (the "Department"), enter into this deferred prosecution agreement (the "Agreement"). The terms and conditions of this Agreement are as follows:

**Criminal Information and Acceptance of Responsibility**

1. The Company acknowledges and agrees that the Department will file the attached three-count criminal Information in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas charging the Company with (a) conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, that is, to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), as amended, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 (Count One); (b) violating, and aiding and abetting a violation of, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and

78dd-2 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 (Counts Two and Three). In so doing, the Company: (a) knowingly waives its right to indictment on this charge, as well as all rights to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b); and (b) knowingly waives for purposes of this Agreement and any charges by the United States arising out of the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts any objection with respect to venue and consents to the filing of the Information, as provided under the terms of this Agreement, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

2. The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible under United States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as charged in the Information, and as set forth in the Statement of Facts attached hereto as Attachment A and incorporated by reference into this Agreement, and that the allegations described in the Information and the facts described in Attachment A are true and accurate. Should the Department pursue the prosecution that is deferred by this Agreement, the Company stipulates to the admissibility of the Statement of Facts in any proceeding, including any trial, guilty plea, or sentencing proceeding, and will not contradict anything in the Statement of Facts at any such proceeding. Neither this Agreement nor the criminal Information is a final adjudication of the matters addressed in such documents.

#### **Term of the Agreement**

3. This Agreement is effective for a period beginning on the date on which the Information is filed and ending three (3) years and seven (7) calendar days from that date (the "Term"). The Company agrees, however, that, in the event that the Department determines, in

its sole discretion, that the Company has knowingly violated any provision of this Agreement, an extension or extensions of the term of the Agreement may be imposed by the Department, in its sole discretion, for up to a total additional time period of one year, without prejudice to the Department's right to proceed as provided in Paragraphs 16-20 below. Any extension of the Agreement extends all terms of this Agreement, including the terms of the monitorship in Attachment D, for an equivalent period. Conversely, in the event the Department finds, in its sole discretion, that there exists a change in circumstances sufficient to eliminate the need for the corporate compliance monitor in Attachment D, or self-reporting, whichever is in effect at the time, and that the other provisions of this Agreement have been satisfied, the Term of the Agreement may be terminated early.

#### **Relevant Considerations**

4. The Department enters into this Agreement based on the individual facts and circumstances presented by this case and the Company. Among the facts considered were the following: (a) the Company's cooperation with the Department, albeit at a late date, including interviewing relevant employees and disclosing the facts learned during those interviews to the Department, and facilitating the Department's interviews of foreign employees; (b) the Company's remediation efforts, including terminating the employment of certain employees responsible for the corrupt payments and disciplining others, and enhancing its compliance program and internal accounting controls; (c) the Company's commitment to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal accounting controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C to this Agreement; and (d) the Company's agreement to continue to cooperate with the Department in

any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA as provided in Paragraph 5 below.

5. The Company shall continue to cooperate fully with the Department in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments, subject to applicable law and regulations, including German and European Union law, until the date upon which all investigations and prosecutions arising out of the conduct described in this Agreement are concluded, including the investigations of the matters listed in Attachment A, whether or not those investigations are concluded within the term specified in paragraph 3. At the request of the Department, and subject to applicable law and regulations, the Company shall also cooperate fully with other domestic or foreign law enforcement authorities and agencies, as well as the Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”), in any investigation of the Company, its affiliates, or any of its present and former officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants, or any other party, in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments. The Company agrees that its cooperation pursuant to this paragraph shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

a. The Company shall truthfully disclose all factual information not protected by a valid claim of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine with respect to its activities, those of its present or former subsidiaries and affiliates, and those of its present and former directors, officers, employees, agents, and consultants concerning all matters relating to corrupt payments about which the Company has any knowledge or about which the Department may inquire. This obligation of truthful disclosure includes the obligation of the Company to provide to the Department, upon request, any document, record or other tangible evidence relating to such corrupt payments about which the Department may inquire of the Company.

b. Upon request of the Department, with respect to any issue relevant to its investigation of corrupt payments in connection with the operations of the Company, or any of its present or former subsidiaries or affiliates, the Company shall designate knowledgeable employees, agents or attorneys to provide to the Department the information and materials described in Paragraph 5(a) above on behalf of the Company. It is further understood that the Company must at all times provide complete, truthful, and accurate information.

c. With respect to any issue relevant to the Department's investigation of corrupt payments in connection with the operations of the Company or any of its present or former subsidiaries or affiliates, the Company shall use its best efforts to make available for interviews or testimony, as requested by the Department, present or former officers, directors, employees, agents and consultants of the Company. This obligation includes, but is not limited to, sworn testimony before a federal grand jury or in federal trials, as well as interviews with federal law enforcement and regulatory authorities. Cooperation under this Paragraph shall include identification of witnesses who, to the knowledge of the Company, may have material information regarding the matters under investigation.

d. With respect to any information, testimony, documents, records or other tangible evidence provided to the Department pursuant to this Agreement, the Company consents to any and all disclosures, subject to applicable law and regulations, to other governmental authorities, including United States authorities and those of a foreign government, and the MDBs, of such materials as the Department, in its sole discretion, shall deem appropriate.

**Payment of Monetary Penalty**

6. The Department and the Company agree that application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) to determine the applicable fine range yields the following analysis:

- a. The 2012 USSG are applicable to this matter.
- b. Offense Level. Based upon USSG § 2C1.1, the total offense level is 32, calculated as follows:
  - (a)(2) Base Offense Level 12
  - (b)(1) Multiple Bribes +2
  - (b)(2) Value of improper payments  
approximately \$6,000,000 +18
  - TOTAL** 32
- c. Base Fine. Based upon USSG § 8C2.4(a)(1), the base fine is \$17,500,000.
- d. Culpability Score. Based upon USSG § 8C2.5, the culpability score is 8, calculated as follows:

(a)	Base Culpability Score	5
(b)(5)	The organization had 200 or more employees and an individual within high-level personnel of the organization participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense	+5
(g)(1)	The organization fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct	- 2
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>8</u>

Calculation of Fine Range:

Base Fine	\$17,500,000
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Multipliers	1.6 (min)/3.2 (max)
Fine Range	\$28,000,000 / \$56,000,000

The Company agrees to pay a monetary penalty in the amount of \$32,000,000 to the United States Treasury within ten (10) business days of the filing of the Information. The Company and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given the facts and circumstances of this case, including the Company's cooperation and remediation in this matter. The \$32,000,000 penalty is final and shall not be refunded. Furthermore, nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed an agreement by the Department that \$32,000,000 is the maximum penalty that may be imposed in any future prosecution, and the Department is not precluded from arguing in any future prosecution that the Court should impose a higher fine, although the Department agrees that under those circumstances, it will recommend to the Court that any amount paid under this Agreement should be offset against any fine the Court imposes as part of a future judgment. The Company acknowledges that no United States tax deduction may be sought in connection with the payment of any part of this \$32,000,000 penalty.

**Conditional Release from Liability**

7. Subject to Paragraphs 16-19, the Department agrees, except as provided herein, that it will not bring any criminal or civil case against the Company related to the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts or relating to information that the Company disclosed to the Department prior to the date on which this Agreement was signed. The Department, however, may use any information related to the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts against the Company: (a) in a prosecution for perjury or obstruction of justice; (b) in a prosecution for making a false statement; (c) in a prosecution or other proceeding

relating to any crime of violence; or (d) in a prosecution or other proceeding relating to a violation of any provision of Title 26 of the United States Code.

a. This Paragraph does not provide any protection against prosecution for any future conduct by the Company.

b. In addition, this Paragraph does not provide any protection against prosecution of any present or former officer, director, employee, shareholder, agent, consultant, contractor, or subcontractor of the Company for any violations committed by them.

#### **Corporate Compliance Program**

8. The Company represents that it has implemented and will continue to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws throughout its operations, including those of its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures, and those of its contractors and subcontractors whose responsibilities include interacting with foreign officials or carrying a high risk of corruption. Implementation of these policies and procedures shall not be construed in any future enforcement proceeding as providing immunity or amnesty for any crimes not disclosed to the Department as of the date of signing of this Agreement for which the Company would otherwise be responsible.

9. In order to address any deficiencies in its internal accounting controls, policies, and procedures, the Company represents that it has undertaken, and will continue to undertake in the future, in a manner consistent with all of its obligations under this Agreement, a review of its existing internal accounting controls, policies, and procedures regarding compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. If necessary and appropriate, and consistent with German law, regulations and accounting standards, the Company will adopt new or modify

existing internal accounting controls, policies, and procedures in order to ensure that the Company maintains: (a) a system of internal accounting controls designed to ensure the making and keeping of fair and accurate books, records, and accounts and (b) a rigorous anti-corruption compliance code, standards, and procedures designed to detect and deter violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. The internal accounting controls system and compliance code, standards, and procedures will include, but not be limited to, the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C, which is incorporated by reference into this Agreement.

### **Corporate Compliance Monitor**

10. Promptly after the Department's selection pursuant to Paragraph 11 below, the Company agrees to retain an independent compliance monitor (the "Monitor"). Within thirty (30) calendar days of the filing of the Agreement and the accompanying Information, and after consultation with the Department, the Company will propose to the Department a pool of three (3) qualified candidates to serve as the Monitor. If the Department determines, in its sole discretion, that any of the candidates are not, in fact, qualified to serve as the Monitor, or if the Department, in its sole discretion, is not satisfied with the candidates proposed, the Department reserves the right to seek additional nominations from the Company. The Monitor candidates shall have, at a minimum, the following qualifications:

- a. demonstrated expertise with respect to the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws, including experience counseling on FCPA issues;
- b. experience designing and/or reviewing corporate compliance policies, procedures and internal accounting controls, including FCPA and anti-corruption policies, procedures and internal accounting controls;

c. the ability to access and deploy resources as necessary to discharge the Monitor's duties as described in the Agreement; and

d. sufficient independence from the Company to ensure effective and impartial performance of the Monitor's duties as described in the Agreement.

11. The Department retains the right, in its sole discretion, to accept or reject any Monitor candidate proposed by the Company, though the Company may express its preference(s) among the candidates. In the event the Department rejects all proposed Monitors, the Company shall propose an additional three candidates within ten (10) calendar days after receiving notice of the rejection. This process shall continue until a Monitor acceptable to both parties is chosen. The Department and the Company will use their best efforts to complete the selection process within sixty (60) calendar days of the filing of the Agreement and the accompanying Information. If the Monitor resigns or is otherwise unable to fulfill his or her obligations as set out herein and in Attachment D, the Company shall within sixty (60) calendar days recommend a pool of three (3) qualified Monitor candidates from which the Department will choose a replacement. The Company may again express its preference(s) among the candidates.

12. The Monitor will be retained by the Company for a period of not less than eighteen (18) months from the date the Monitor is selected, unless the term of the Monitor is terminated early pursuant to Paragraph 4. The term of the monitorship, including the circumstances that may support an extension of the term, as well as the Monitor's powers, duties, and responsibilities will be as set forth in Attachment D. The Company agrees that it will not employ or be affiliated with the Monitor for a period of not less than one (1) year from the date

on which the Monitor's term expires. Nor will the Company discuss with the Monitor the possibility of employment or affiliation during the Monitor's term.

13. At the end of the monitorship, provided all requirements set forth in Paragraph 8 of Attachment D are met, the Company will report on its compliance to the Department periodically, at no less than six-month intervals, for the remainder of this Agreement, regarding remediation and implementation of the enhanced compliance measures set forth by the Monitor as described in Paragraph 8 of Attachment D. The Company shall designate a senior company officer as the person responsible for overseeing the Company's corporate compliance reporting obligations. Should the Company discover credible evidence that potentially corrupt payments or potentially corrupt transfers of property or interests may have been offered, promised, paid, or authorized by any Company entity or person, or any entity or person working directly for the Company, or that false books and records related to such corrupt activities have been maintained, the Company shall promptly report such conduct to the Department. During this period, the Company shall conduct and prepare at least three follow-up reviews and reports, as described below:

a. The Company shall undertake follow-up reviews at six-month intervals, each incorporating the Department's views and comments on the Company's prior reviews and reports, to determine whether the policies and procedures of the Company are reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anticorruption laws. Reports shall be transmitted to Deputy Chief - FCPA Unit, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1400 New York Avenue, NW, Bond Building, Eleventh Floor, Washington, DC 20530.

b. The first follow-up review and report shall be completed by no later than one-hundred- eighty (180) calendar days after the approval by the Department of the enhanced compliance measures described in Paragraph 19 of Attachment D. Subsequent follow-up reviews and reports shall be completed by no later than one-hundred-eighty (180) calendar days after the completion of the preceding follow-up review.

c. The Company may extend the time period for submission of any of the follow-up reports with prior written approval of the Department.

### **Deferred Prosecution**

14. In consideration of: (a) the past and future cooperation of the Company described in Paragraphs 4 and 5 above; (b) the Company's payment of a criminal penalty of \$32,000,000; and (c) the Company's implementation and maintenance of remedial measures as described in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above, the Department agrees that any prosecution of the Company for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of Facts, and for the conduct that the Company disclosed to the Department prior to the signing of this Agreement, be and hereby is deferred for the Term of this Agreement.

15. The Department further agrees that if the Company fully complies with all of its obligations under this Agreement, the Department will not continue the criminal prosecution against the Company described in Paragraph 1 and, at the conclusion of the Term, this Agreement shall expire. Within thirty (30) days of the Agreement's expiration, the Department shall seek dismissal with prejudice of the criminal Information filed against the Company described in Paragraph 1.

### **Breach of the Agreement**

16. If, during the Term of this Agreement, the Department determines, in its sole discretion, that the Company has breached the agreement by (a) committing any felony under U.S. federal law subsequent to the signing of this Agreement, (b) providing in connection with this Agreement deliberately false, incomplete, or misleading information, (c) failing to cooperate as set forth in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement; (d) failing to implement an enhanced compliance program as set forth in Paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Agreement and Attachment C; or (e) otherwise failing specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of the Company's obligations under the Agreement, the Company shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the Department has knowledge, including but not limited to for the charges in the Information described in Paragraph 1, which may be pursued by the Department in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas or any other appropriate venue. Any such prosecution may be premised on information provided by the Company. Any such prosecution relating to the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts or relating to conduct known to the Department prior to the date on which this Agreement was signed that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement may be commenced against the Company notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the expiration of the Term plus one year. Thus, by signing this Agreement, the Company agrees that the statute of limitations with respect to any such prosecution that is not time-barred on the date of the signing of this Agreement shall be tolled for the Term plus one year.

17. In the event that the Department determines that the Company has breached this Agreement, the Department agrees to provide the Company with written notice of such breach prior to instituting any prosecution resulting from such breach. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, the Company shall have the opportunity to respond to the Department in writing to explain the nature and circumstances of such breach, as well as the actions the Company has taken to address and remediate the situation, which explanation the Department shall consider in determining whether to institute a prosecution.

18. In the event that the Department determines that the Company has breached this Agreement: (a) all statements made by or on behalf of the Company to the Department or to the Court, including the attached Statement of Facts, and any testimony given by the Company before a grand jury, a court, or any tribunal, or at any legislative hearings, whether prior or subsequent to this Agreement, and any leads derived from such statements or testimony, shall be admissible in evidence in any and all criminal proceedings brought by the Department against the Company; and (b) the Company shall not assert any claim under the United States Constitution, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or any other federal rule that statements made by or on behalf of the Company prior or subsequent to this Agreement, or any leads derived therefrom, should be suppressed or are otherwise inadmissible. The decision whether conduct or statements of any current director or employee, or any person acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the Company will be imputed to the Company for the purpose of determining whether the Company has violated any provision of this Agreement shall be in the sole discretion of the Department.

19. The Company acknowledges that the Department has made no representations, assurances, or promises concerning what sentence may be imposed by the Court if the Company breaches this Agreement and this matter proceeds to judgment. The Company further acknowledges that any such sentence is solely within the discretion of the Court and that nothing in this Agreement binds or restricts the Court in the exercise of such discretion.

#### **Sale or Merger of Company**

20. The Company agrees that in the event it sells, merges, or transfers all or substantially all of its business operations as they exist as of the date of this Agreement, whether such sale is structured as a sale, asset sale, merger, or transfer, it shall include in any contract for sale, merger, or transfer a provision binding the purchaser, or any successor in interest thereto, to the obligations described in this Agreement.

#### **Public Statements by Company**

21. The Company expressly agrees that it shall not, through present or future attorneys, officers, directors, employees, agents or any other person authorized to speak for the Company make any public statement, in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by the Company set forth above or the facts described in the attached Statement of Facts. Any such contradictory statement shall, subject to cure rights of the Company described below, constitute a breach of this Agreement, and the Company thereafter shall be subject to prosecution as set forth in Paragraphs 16-19 of this Agreement. The decision whether any public statement by any such person contradicting a fact contained in the Statement of Facts will be imputed to the Company for the purpose of determining whether it has breached this Agreement shall be at the sole discretion of the Department. If the Department determines that a public

statement by any such person contradicts in whole or in part a statement contained in the Statement of Facts, the Department shall so notify the Company, and the Company may avoid a breach of this Agreement by publicly repudiating such statement(s) within five (5) business days after notification. The Company shall be permitted to contest liability, raise defenses, assert affirmative claims, and otherwise take legal positions in other proceedings, including civil proceedings with private litigants, relating to the matters set forth in the Statement of Facts provided that such legal positions do not contradict, in whole or in part, a statement contained in the Statement of Facts. This Paragraph does not apply to any statement made by any present or former officer, director, employee, or agent of the Company in the course of any criminal, regulatory, or civil case initiated against such individual, unless such individual is speaking on behalf of the Company.

22. The Company agrees that if it, or any of its direct or indirect subsidiaries or affiliates issues a press release or holds any press conference in connection with this Agreement, the Company shall first consult the Department to determine (a) whether the text of the release or proposed statements at the press conference are true and accurate with respect to matters between the Department and the Company; and (b) whether the Department has any objection to the release.

23. The Department agrees, if requested to do so, to bring to the attention of governmental and other debarment authorities the facts and circumstances relating to the nature of the conduct underlying this Agreement, including the nature and quality of the Company's cooperation and remediation. By agreeing to provide this information to debarment authorities,

the Department is not agreeing to advocate on behalf of the Company, but rather is agreeing to provide facts to be evaluated independently by the debarment authorities.

**Limitations on Binding Effect of Agreement**

24. This Agreement is binding on the Company and the Department but specifically does not bind any other federal agencies, or any state, local or foreign law enforcement or regulatory agencies, or any other authorities, although the Department will bring the cooperation of the Company and its compliance with its other obligations under this Agreement to the attention of such agencies and authorities if requested to do so by the Company.

**Notice**

25. Any notice to the Department under this Agreement shall be given by personal delivery, overnight delivery by a recognized delivery service, or registered or certified mail, addressed to Deputy Chief - FCPA Unit, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1400 New York Avenue, NW, Bond Building, Eleventh Floor, Washington, DC 20530. Any notice to the Company under this Agreement shall be given by personal delivery, overnight delivery by a recognized delivery service, or registered or certified mail, addressed to Dr. Nils Anderson, Bilfinger SE, Carl-Reiß-Platz 1-5, 68165 Mannheim, Germany. Notice shall be effective upon actual receipt by the Department or the Company.


Complete Agreement

26. This Agreement sets forth all the terms of the agreement between the Company and the Department. No amendments, modifications or additions to this Agreement shall be valid unless they are in writing and signed by the Department, the attorneys for the Company and a duly authorized representative of the Company.


AGREED:

FOR BILFINGER SE:

Date: November 27, 2013

By:   
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dr. Nils Anderson  
Bilfinger SE

Date: December 6, 2013

By:   
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas C. Green  
Jeffrey T. Green  
Sidley Austin LLP

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:

JEFFREY H. KNOX  
Chief, Fraud Section  
Criminal Division  
United States Department of Justice

Date: 12/9/13

BY:   
\_\_\_\_\_  
Laura N. Perkins  
Senior Trial Attorney

### COMPANY OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

I have read this Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with outside counsel for Bilfinger SE (the "Company"). I understand the terms of this Agreement and voluntarily agree, on behalf of the Company, to each of its terms. Before signing this Agreement, I consulted outside counsel for the Company. Counsel fully advised me of the rights of the Company, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this Agreement.


I have carefully reviewed the terms of this Agreement with the Executive Board of the Company. I have advised and caused outside counsel for the Company to advise the Executive Board fully of the rights of the Company, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into the Agreement.

No promises or inducements have been made other than those contained in this Agreement. Furthermore, no one has threatened or forced me, or to my knowledge any person authorizing this Agreement on behalf of the Company, in any way to enter into this Agreement. I am also satisfied with outside counsel's representation in this matter. I certify that I am the General Counsel for the Company and that I have been duly authorized by the Company to execute this Agreement on behalf of the Company.

Date: November 27, 2013

BILFINGER SE


By:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dr. Nils Anderson  
General Counsel  
Bilfinger SE

## CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

We are counsel for Bilfinger SE (the "Company") in the matter covered by this Agreement. In connection with such representation, we have examined relevant Company documents and have discussed the terms of this Agreement with the Executive Board of the Company. Based on our review of the foregoing materials and discussions, we are of the opinion that the representative of the Company has been duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the Company and that this Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed, and delivered on behalf of the Company and is a valid and binding obligation of the Company. Further, we have carefully reviewed the terms of this Agreement with the Executive Board and the General Counsel of the Company. We have fully advised them of the rights of the Company, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions and of the consequences of entering into this Agreement. To our knowledge, the decision of the Company to enter into this Agreement, based on the authorization of the Executive Board, is an informed and voluntary one.

Date: December 6, 2013

By: 

Thomas C. Green  
Jeffrey T. Green  
Sidley Austin LLP  
Counsel for Bilfinger SE

## ATTACHMENT A

### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

The following Statement of Facts is incorporated by reference as part of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (the “Agreement”) between the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section (the “Department”) and Bilfinger SE (“Bilfinger”). Bilfinger hereby agrees and stipulates that the following information is true and accurate. Bilfinger admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as set forth below. Should the Department pursue the prosecution that is deferred by this Agreement, Bilfinger agrees that it will neither contest the admissibility of, nor contradict, this Statement of Facts in any such proceeding.

If this matter were to proceed to trial, the Department would prove beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged below and set forth in the criminal Information attached to this Agreement. This evidence would establish the following:

#### ***The Defendant and Relevant Subsidiaries***

1. Defendant BILFINGER SE, formerly Bilfinger Berger AG and Bilfinger Berger SE, (“BILFINGER”) was an international engineering and services company involved in the industrial services, power services, building and facility services, construction, and concessions business segments. BILFINGER was a German company with its headquarters in Mannheim, Germany.

2. Bilfinger Berger Gas and Oil Services Nigeria Ltd. (“BBGOS”) was a German company based in Nigeria that provided engineering, construction, and other services in the oil and gas industry. At the relevant time, BILFINGER owned 80% of BBGOS. In 2006,

BILFINGER transferred its ownership interests in BBGOS to its wholly owned subsidiary, Bilfinger Berger Nigeria GmbH (“BBN”).

3. Julius Berger Nigeria (“JBN”) was a Nigerian company that provided construction services in Nigeria. BILFINGER owned 49% of JBN and the remaining 51% was owned by Nigerian nationals. Although BILFINGER did not own a controlling share of JBN, BILFINGER controlled JBN’s daily operations and its finances.

***The EGGS Project and the EGGS Consortium***

4. The Eastern Gas Gathering System (“EGGS”) was a natural gas pipeline system in the Niger Delta designed to relieve existing pipeline capacity constraints. The EGGS project, which was divided into two phases, consisted of the construction of a major natural gas pipeline system through remote, swampy and otherwise difficult terrain in the Niger Delta. EGGS Phase 1 involved engineering, procurement and construction of a pipeline from the Soku Gas Plant to the Bonny Island Liquefied Natural Gas Plant. EGGS Phase 1 included an optional scope of work (known as “EGGS Coating”) for the application of a Polyethylene-concrete coating to the EGGS Phase 1 pipeline to give it sufficient weight and protection. EGGS Phase 2 was another optional scope of work within the EGGS Phase 1 proposal, and contemplated the construction of a second pipeline from an area known as the Gbaran/Ubie node to the Soku Gas Plant. The EGGS Phase 1 contract price for “base scope” was approximately \$216,500,000; the EGGS Coating optional scope price was approximately \$30,000,000; and the EGGS Phase 2 price was approximately \$141,000,000; for a combined total scope of work price of approximately \$387,500,000.

5. BBGOS entered into a consortium agreement with Willbros West Africa, Inc. (“WWA”) and Willbros Nigeria Ltd. (“WNL”) to bid on and perform the EGGS project (the “EGGS Consortium”). WWA and WNL were subsidiaries of Willbros International Inc. (“WII”), a Panamanian corporation, through which Willbros Group, Inc. (“WGI”) conducted its international work (collectively referred to herein as “Willbros”). Willbros provided construction, engineering and other services in the oil and gas industry. WGI and WII maintained their principal places of business in Tulsa, Oklahoma (until 2000), and in Houston, Texas (from 2000 to the present). WGI’s shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange and registered pursuant to Title 15, United States Code, Section 78l, and WGI was required to file periodic reports pursuant to Title 15, United States Code, Section 78o(d). As such, WGI was an “issuer,” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15 United States Code, Section 78dd-1(a). WII was a “domestic concern” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B), because its principal place of business was in the United States.

#### *The Nigerian Government Entities*

6. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”) was a sovereign African nation with substantial deposits of oil and gas within its territory. A particular political party (referred to herein as the “Political Party”) was the dominant political party in Nigeria.

7. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) was a government-owned company charged with the development of Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth and the regulation of the country’s oil and gas industry, and was the majority shareholder in certain joint ventures with various multinational oil companies. National Petroleum Investment Management Services (“NAPIMS”) was a subsidiary of NNPC that, among other things, oversaw Nigeria’s investments

in the joint ventures and other development projects. NNPC and NAPIMS were agencies and instrumentalities of the Government of Nigeria, within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) and 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). NNPC owned 55% of a joint venture that was established by the Nigerian government in connection with the EGGS project (the “Joint Venture”). The other owners of the Joint Venture were multinational oil companies, including Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria, Ltd. (“SPDC”), which served as the operator of the Joint Venture. As the majority owner of the Joint Venture, the Nigerian government exercised control over the Joint Venture, including but not limited to having the ability to block the award of contracts related to the EGGS project.

#### *Bilfinger Employees*

8. An unnamed coconspirator, hereinafter referred to as Bilfinger Employee 1, was a German citizen who held a variety of positions at BILFINGER or its subsidiaries from in or around 1982 to in or around March 2011. Specifically, from in or around 1999 to in or around 2001, Bilfinger Employee 1 was the Managing Director of BBGOS. In or around May 2001, Bilfinger Employee 1 became the Commercial Director of JBN and served in that role until he stepped down in or around August 2010. As the Commercial Director of JBN, Bilfinger Employee 1 reported to Bilfinger Employee 2, the then Managing Director of JBN, as well as to Bilfinger Employee 3, a BILFINGER employee in Germany.

9. An unnamed coconspirator, hereinafter referred to as Bilfinger Employee 2, was a German citizen who held a variety of positions at BILFINGER or its subsidiaries beginning in or around 1976. Specifically, from in or around May 2001 to in or around November 2007, Bilfinger Employee 2 was the Managing Director of JBN and a member of JBN’s Board of

Directors. As Managing Director of JBN, Bilfinger Employee 2 reported to JBN's Board of Directors and to Bilfinger Employee 3.

10. An unnamed coconspirator, hereinafter referred to as Bilfinger Employee 3, was a German citizen who, beginning in or around 1983, held a variety of positions in or related to BILFINGER's work in Nigeria, including Managing Director of JBN and, from in or around 2001 to in or around 2006, Technical Director for Nigerian Operations at BILFINGER. In or around 2006, Bilfinger Employee 3 became the head of BBN.

#### *Willbros Employees and Agents*

11. James Kenneth Tillery was a United States citizen and an officer of WII. In or around 2003, Tillery became the Executive Vice President of WII and he later became the President of WII, with responsibility for its global operations outside of North America until he was removed from that position in late 2004 and resigned in 2005.

12. Jason Edward Steph was a United States citizen and employee of WII. WII employed Steph from in or around 1998 to April 2005, when he resigned. Steph held the position of General Manager – Onshore in Nigeria from 2002 to April 2005.

13. Jim Bob Brown was a United States citizen and an employee of WII from at least 1990 through April 2005. From in or around November 2004 to in or around April 2005, Brown was the Managing Director of WII in Nigeria.

14. Paul Grayson Novak was a citizen of the United States who performed purported consulting services in Nigeria for WII on the EGGS project and, in doing so, offered and made corrupt payments to Nigerian officials on behalf of the EGGS Consortium.

15. Tillery, Steph, Brown, and Novak were each a “domestic concern” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).

16. An unnamed coconspirator, hereinafter referred to as Nigerian Consultant 1, was a Nigerian national who also performed purported consulting services in Nigeria for WII on the EGGGS project and, in doing so, offered and made corrupt payments to Nigerian officials on behalf of the EGGGS Consortium.

### *The Bribery Scheme*

17. From at least in or around late 2003, through in and around late June 2005, in the Southern District of Texas, and elsewhere, the defendant, BILFINGER SE, did unlawfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree with Bilfinger Employee 1, Bilfinger Employee 2, Bilfinger Employee 3, Willbros, Tillery, Steph, Brown, Novak, Nigerian Consultant 1, and others, known and unknown, to commit offenses against the United States, that is, to make use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value to any foreign official, to any foreign political party and official thereof, and to any person while knowing that all or a portion of such money and thing of value would be offered, given, and promised, directly and indirectly to any foreign official and foreign political party and official thereof, for purposes of: (i) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official and foreign political party and official thereof in his and its official capacity; (ii) inducing such foreign official and foreign political party and official thereof to do and omit to do an act in violation of his or its lawful duty; (iii) securing an improper advantage; and (iv) inducing such foreign official and foreign political

party and official thereof to use his or its influence with a foreign government and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and instrumentalities, in order to assist BILFINGER and others, in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business to, BILFINGER and others, all in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2.

18. The purpose and object of the conspiracy was to obtain and retain contracts related to the EGGS project through the promise and payment of over \$6 million in bribes to officials of NNPC, NAPIMS, the Political Party, an official in the executive branch of the Government of Nigeria, and others (collectively referred to herein as “Nigerian officials”).

19. BILFINGER, BBGOS, and Willbros agreed that BBGOS and WWA/WNL would form a joint venture consortium to bid on the EGGS project and its optional scopes of work.

20. BILFINGER and its coconspirators agreed that the EGGS Consortium would inflate the price of its bid for the EGGS project by 3% so it could cover the cost of paying bribes to Nigerian officials (which BILFINGER, BBGOS, and JBN employees commonly referred to as “landscaping” payments and Willbros employees and agents commonly referred to as “commitments”) for their assistance in obtaining and retaining the EGGS project and its optional scopes of work. BILFINGER and its coconspirators further agreed that BILFINGER and BBGOS would pay the bribes to the officials from NNPC and NAPIMS and Willbros would pay the bribes to the officials from SPDC.

21. BILFINGER, BBGOS, and JBN employees agreed to make and made payments to Nigerian officials in cash using money obtained from a safe at JBN. The safe contained, in

part, money that was mailed or flown to Nigeria from Germany for BBGOS's and JBN's local expenses, including "landscaping" payments.

22. Pursuant to the Consortium Agreement, BBGOS submitted invoices to WWA for its work on the EGGS project. WWA combined BBGOS's invoices with its own invoices and, on behalf of the EGGS Consortium, submitted the invoices to SPDC for payment. The invoices requested payment of the inflated amount that the EGGS Consortium had included in its bid to cover the cost of paying bribes to Nigerian officials for their assistance in obtaining and retaining the EGGS project and its optional scopes of work.

23. When Willbros employees encountered difficulty obtaining money to make Willbros's share of the promised bribe payments to Nigerian officials due to WGI's internal investigation, BILFINGER agreed to loan, and caused BBGOS to loan, WWA/WNL \$1 million, with the understanding that the \$1 million would be used to pay some of the promised bribe payments to Nigerian officials, and with the understanding that Willbros employees would find other ways to obtain money to pay Willbros's remaining share of the promised bribe payments.

#### *Details of the Bribery Scheme*

24. In or around mid 2003, BILFINGER agreed to create a joint venture with WWA/WNL to bid on the EGGS contract and its optional scopes of work.

25. In or around December 2003, BBGOS and WWA/WNL executed a "Consortium Agreement," which formalized BILFINGER's agreement to create a joint venture in connection with the EGGS project.

26. In or around late 2003, BILFINGER, Willbros, and others, known and unknown, agreed to make a series of corrupt payments totaling in excess of \$6,000,000 to Nigerian

government officials to assist the EGGS Consortium in obtaining and retaining the EGGS contract and its optional scopes of work.

27. In or around December 2003, the EGGS Consortium submitted a commercial proposal to the Joint Venture, through the Joint Venture's operator, SPDC, for pipeline work on EGGS Phase 1 and, among other optional scopes of work, EGGS Coating and EGGS Phase 2.

28. In or around May 2004, after receiving NNPC and NAPIMS approval, the Joint Venture awarded EGGS Phase 1 to the EGGS Consortium.

29. In or around July 2004, representatives of the EGGS Consortium and of SPDC (the latter, as operator of, and thus on behalf of, the Joint Venture) executed the EGGS Phase 1 contract, which included the EGGS Consortium's offer to perform the optional scopes of work for EGGS Coating and EGGS Phase 2.

30. On or about July 19, 2004, WWA opened a bank account in the United States on behalf of the EGGS Consortium, into which payments for work conducted by the EGGS Consortium would be deposited and out of which payments would be made to BBGOS or WWA when authorized by both BBGOS and WWA.

31. In or around August 2004, after NNPC and NAPIMS approval, the Joint Venture awarded the optional EGGS Coating work to the EGGS Consortium.

32. In or around September or October 2004, Tillery told Bilfinger Employee 1 that he had promised an NNPC official ("Nigerian Official 1") \$150,000 for helping the EGGS Consortium obtain and retain the EGGS contract.

33. In or around September or October 2004, Tillery asked Bilfinger Employee 1 to give the \$150,000 referred to in Paragraph 21(h) to Nigerian Official 1, in accordance with the

agreement among and between Tillery, Bilfinger Employee 1, and others that BILFINGER (or BBGOS or JBN with BILFINGER's knowledge) would make the corrupt payments to officials from NNPC and NAPIMS on behalf of the EGGS Consortium.

34. In or around September or October 2004, Bilfinger Employee 1 and Bilfinger Employee 2 agreed to make the corrupt payment requested by Tillery, as referenced in Paragraphs 21(i) and (j), using \$150,000 in cash from a safe in Bilfinger Employee 2's office at JBN.

35. In or around October 2004, on two separate occasions, Bilfinger Employee 1 gave Nigerian Official 1 cash totaling the promised amount of \$150,000.

36. In or around late October 2004, Nigerian Individual 1, a business colleague and former NNPC official who had given Bilfinger Employee 1 advice regarding "landscaping payments" on previous projects, gave Bilfinger Employee 1 a list containing the names of seven to nine officials from NNPC and NAPIMS and amounts totaling approximately \$1,000,000 that Nigerian Individual 1 "advised" BILFINGER pay the officials for helping the EGGS Consortium obtain and retain the EGGS contract.

37. In or around late October 2004, two of the Nigerian officials on the list referred to in Paragraph 21(m) told Bilfinger Employee 1 that they had been promised money for their assistance and that they would like to be paid, after which Bilfinger Employee 1 and Bilfinger Employee 2 agreed to pay the officials the amounts contained on the list (\$50,000 for one official and \$30,000-\$50,000 for the other official).

38. In or around January 2005, WGI announced Tillery's resignation and the commencement of an internal investigation.

39. In or around January 2005, as a result of WGI's internal investigation, WGI ceased paying WII's purported consultants.

40. In or around January 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1, Bilfinger Employee 2, and others learned of demands by Nigerian officials for payment of the promised corrupt payments and, because they were concerned that failure to make the promised payment would result in interference with Phase 1 and the potential loss of the Phase 2 contract, they scheduled a meeting with Brown to discuss the promised corrupt payments and the status of the EGGS project.

41. On or about January 24, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1 met with Brown, who had just arrived in Nigeria to replace Tillery, and discussed, among other things, the EGGS project generally, the fact that payments had been promised to Nigerian officials but had not yet been made, and the need to find out the particular promises that had been made so they could be fulfilled.

42. On or about January 25, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1 telephoned Bilfinger Employee 3, who was in the United States, and asked Bilfinger Employee 3 to meet with Tillery in Boston, Massachusetts, to find out what payments had been promised to officials and whether the Phase 2 contract was at risk because those payments had not yet been made.

43. On or about January 27, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 3 flew from Houston, Texas, to Boston, Massachusetts, to meet with Tillery and inquire about the outstanding corrupt payments and the Phase 2 contract.

44. On or about February 12, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1, Bilfinger Employee 2, Steph, Brown, and Nigerian Consultant 1 discussed the outstanding bribe payments, which totaled several million dollars.

45. On or about February 12, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1, Bilfinger Employee 2, and others agreed, on behalf of BILFINGER, to make the outstanding payments to the officials from NNPC and NAPIMS and to loan Willbros money to help Willbros pay its share of the promised corrupt payments.

46. On or about February 19 and 21, 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1, Bilfinger Employee 2, and others caused BBGOS to loan WWA/WNL \$1,000,000, pursuant to a written loan agreement between the companies and to have the cash delivered to Brown in a suitcase in Lagos, Nigeria.

47. On or about May 16, 2005, BILFINGER caused WGI to wire transfer \$2,804,496 from the EGGS Consortium's bank account in Houston, Texas, to BILFINGER in Frankfurt, Germany, in connection with the EGGS contract.

48. In or around May 2005, Bilfinger Employee 1 contacted WWA/WNL to establish a repayment schedule for the \$1,000,000 loan BBGOS had made to WWA/WNL on or about February 19, 2005.

49. In or around late June 2005, a senior executive in WGI's legal department sent a letter to BILFINGER refusing to establish a repayment schedule for the \$1,000,000 loan given the corrupt purposes for which the loan was made.

ATTACHMENT B

**CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE RESOLUTIONS**

WHEREAS, Bilfinger SE (the “Company”) has been engaged in discussions with the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section (the “Department”) regarding issues arising in relation to certain improper payments to foreign officials to facilitate the award of contracts and assist in obtaining business for the Company; and

WHEREAS, in order to resolve such discussions, it is proposed that the Company enter into a certain agreement with the Department; and

WHEREAS, the Company’s General Counsel, Dr. Nils Anderson, together with outside counsel for the Company, have advised the Executive Board of the Company of its rights, possible defenses, the Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions, and the consequences of entering into such agreement with the Department;

Therefore, the Executive Board has RESOLVED that:

1. The Company (a) acknowledges the filing of the three-count Information charging the Company with (a) conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, that is, to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), as amended, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 (Count One); (b) violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 (Count Two); and aiding and abetting a violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2, and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 (Count Three); (b) waives indictment on such charges and enters into a deferred prosecution agreement with the

Department; and (c) agrees to accept monetary criminal penalties against Company totaling \$32,000,000, and to pay a total of \$32,000,000 to the United States Treasury with respect to the conduct described in the Information;

2. The Company accepts the terms and conditions of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, (a) a knowing waiver of its rights to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title 18, United States Code, Section 3161, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b); and (b) a knowing waiver for purposes of this Agreement and any charges by the United States arising out of the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts any objection with respect to venue and consents to the filing of the Information, as provided under the terms of this Agreement, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas; and (c) a knowing waiver of any defenses based on the statute of limitations for any prosecution relating to the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts or relating to conduct known to the Department prior to the date on which this Agreement was signed that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement.

3. The General Counsel of Company, Dr. Nils Anderson, is hereby authorized, empowered and directed, on behalf of the Company, to execute the Deferred Prosecution Agreement substantially in such form as reviewed by this Executive Board at this meeting with such changes as Dr. Anderson may approve;


4. Dr. Anderson, is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to take any and all actions as may be necessary or appropriate and to approve the forms, terms or provisions of any

agreement or other documents as may be necessary or appropriate, to carry out and effectuate the purpose and intent of the foregoing resolutions; and

5. All of the actions of Dr. Anderson, which actions would have been authorized by the foregoing resolutions except that such actions were taken prior to the adoption of such resolutions, are hereby severally ratified, confirmed, approved, and adopted as actions on behalf of the Company.

Date: November 27, 2013

By:



Roland Koch  
Chief Executive Officer and  
Executive Board Member  
Bilfinger SE

## ATTACHMENT C

### CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

In order to address any deficiencies in its internal accounting controls, compliance code, policies, and procedures regarding compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, *et seq.*, and other applicable anti-corruption laws, BILFINGER SE (the “Company”) agrees to continue to conduct, in a manner consistent with all of its obligations under this Agreement, appropriate reviews of its existing internal accounting controls, policies, and procedures.

Where necessary and appropriate, the Company agrees to adopt new or to modify existing internal accounting controls, compliance code, policies, and procedures in order to ensure that it maintains: (a) a system of internal accounting controls designed to ensure that the Company makes and keeps fair and accurate books, records, and accounts; and (b) a rigorous anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures designed to detect and deter violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. At a minimum, this should include, but not be limited to, the following elements to the extent they are not already part of the Company’s existing internal accounting controls, compliance code, policies, and procedures:

#### *High-Level Commitment*

1. The Company will ensure that its directors and senior management provide strong, explicit, and visible support and commitment to its corporate policy against violations of the anti-corruption laws and its compliance code. The Company will further ensure that the members of the Board of Directors and senior management are committed to and, to the extent appropriate to their positions, effectively implement the corporate compliance program described

herein, and the Company shall take appropriate measures if they fail to fulfill these responsibilities.

*Policies and Procedures*

2. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, a clearly articulated and visible corporate policy against violations of the FCPA and other applicable foreign law counterparts (collectively, the “anti-corruption laws,”), which policy shall be memorialized in a written compliance code.

3. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, compliance policies and procedures designed to reduce the prospect of violations of the anti-corruption laws and the Company’s compliance code, and the Company will take appropriate measures to encourage and support the observance of ethics and compliance policies and procedures against violation of the anti-corruption laws by personnel at all levels of the Company. These anti-corruption policies and procedures shall apply to all directors, officers, and employees and, where necessary and appropriate, outside parties acting on behalf of the Company in a foreign jurisdiction, including but not limited to, agents and intermediaries, consultants, representatives, distributors, teaming partners, contractors and suppliers, consortia, and joint venture partners (collectively, “agents and business partners”). The Company shall notify all employees that compliance with the policies and procedures is the duty of individuals at all levels of the company. Such policies and procedures shall address:

- a. gifts;
- b. hospitality, entertainment, and expenses;
- c. customer travel;

- d. political contributions;
- e. charitable donations and sponsorships;
- f. facilitation payments; and
- g. solicitation and extortion.

4. The Company will ensure that it has a system of financial and accounting procedures, including a system of internal controls, reasonably designed to ensure the maintenance of fair and accurate books, records, and accounts to ensure that they cannot be used for the purpose of foreign bribery or concealing such bribery.

*Periodic Risk-Based Review*

5. The Company will develop these compliance policies and procedures on the basis of a risk assessment addressing the individual circumstances of the Company, in particular the foreign bribery risks facing the Company, including, but not limited to, its geographical organization, interactions with various types and levels of government officials, industrial sectors of operation, involvement in joint venture arrangements, importance of licenses and permits in the Company's operations, degree of governmental oversight and inspection, and volume and importance of goods and personnel clearing through customs and immigration.

6. The Company shall review its anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures no less than annually and update them as appropriate to ensure their continued effectiveness, taking into account relevant developments in the field and evolving international and industry standards.

*Proper Oversight and Independence*

7. The Company will assign responsibility to one or more senior corporate executives of the Company for the implementation and oversight of the Company's anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures. Such corporate official(s) shall have the authority to report directly to independent monitoring bodies, including the Company's Supervisory Board, or any appropriate committee of the Supervisory Board, and shall have an adequate level of autonomy from management as well as sufficient resources and authority to maintain such autonomy.

#### *Training and Guidance*

8. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, mechanisms designed to ensure that its anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures are effectively communicated to all directors, officers, employees, and, where necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners. These mechanisms shall include: (a) periodic training for all directors and officers, all employees in positions of leadership or trust, and positions that otherwise pose a corruption risk to the Company, including internal audit, accounting, finance, sales, marketing, procurement, legal, compliance, government relations, travel, licensing, permitting, and customs, and, where necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners; and (b) corresponding certifications all such directors, officers, employees, agents, and business partners, certifying compliance with the training requirements.

9. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, an effective system for providing guidance and advice to directors, officers, employees, and, where necessary and appropriate, agents and business partners, on complying with the Company's anti-corruption

compliance code, policies, and procedures, including when they need advice on an urgent basis or in any foreign jurisdiction in which the Company operates.

*Internal Reporting and Investigation*

10. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, an effective system for internal and, where possible, confidential reporting by, and protection of, directors, officers, employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners concerning violations of the anti-corruption laws or the Company's anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures.

11. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, an effective and reliable process with sufficient resources for responding to, investigating, and documenting allegations of violations of the anti-corruption laws or the Company's anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures.

*Enforcement and Discipline*

12. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, mechanisms designed to effectively enforce its compliance code, policies, and procedures, including appropriately incentivizing compliance and disciplining violations.

13. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, appropriate disciplinary procedures to address, among other things, violations of the anti-corruption laws and the Company's anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures by the Company's directors, officers, and employees. Such procedures should be applied consistently and fairly, regardless of the position held by, or perceived importance of, the director, officer, or employee. The Company shall maintain, or where necessary establish, procedures to ensure that where

misconduct is discovered, reasonable steps are taken to remedy the harm resulting from such misconduct, and to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to prevent further similar misconduct, including assessing the internal accounting controls, compliance code, policies, and procedures and making modifications necessary to ensure the overall anti-corruption compliance program is effective.

#### *Third-Party Relationships*

14. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, risk-based appropriate due diligence and compliance requirements pertaining to the retention and oversight of all agents and business partners, including:

- a. properly documented due diligence pertaining to the hiring and appropriate and regular oversight of agents and business partners;
- b. informing agents and business partners of the Company's commitment to abiding by anti-corruption laws, and of the Company's anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures; and
- c. seeking a reciprocal commitment from agents and business partners.

15. Where necessary and appropriate, the Company will include standard provisions in agreements, contracts, and renewals thereof with all agents and business partners that are reasonably calculated to prevent violations of the anti-corruption laws, which may, depending upon the circumstances, include: (a) anti-corruption representations and undertakings relating to compliance with the anti-corruption laws; (b) rights to conduct audits of the books and records of the agent or business partner to ensure compliance with the foregoing; and (c) rights to terminate an agent or business partner as a result of any breach of the anti-corruption laws, the Company's

compliance code, policies, or procedures, or the representations and undertakings related to such matters.

#### *Mergers and Acquisitions*

16. The Company will maintain, or where necessary establish, policies and procedures for mergers and acquisitions requiring that the Company conduct appropriate risk-based due diligence on potential new business entities, including appropriate FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence by legal, accounting, and compliance personnel. If the Company discovers any corrupt payments or inadequate internal accounting controls as part of its due diligence of newly acquired entities or entities merged with the Company, it shall report such conduct to the Department.

17. The Company will ensure that the Company's compliance code, policies, and procedures regarding the anti-corruption laws apply as quickly as is practicable to newly acquired businesses or entities merged with the Company and will promptly:

a. train the directors, officers, employees, agents, and business partners consistent with Paragraph 8 above on the anti-corruption laws and the Company's compliance code, policies, and procedures regarding anti-corruption laws; and

b. conduct a risk assessment and, where appropriate, an FCPA-specific audit of all newly acquired or merged businesses as quickly as practicable.

#### *Monitoring and Testing*

18. The Company will conduct periodic reviews and testing of its anti-corruption compliance code, policies, and procedures designed to evaluate and improve their effectiveness in preventing and detecting violations of anti-corruption laws and the Company's anti-corruption

code, policies, and procedures, taking into account relevant developments in the field and evolving international and industry standards.

## ATTACHMENT D

### **INDEPENDENT COMPLIANCE MONITOR**

The duties and authority of the Independent Compliance Monitor (the “Monitor”), and the obligations of BILFINGER SE (the “Company”), on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries and affiliates, with respect to the Monitor and the Department of Justice (the “Department”), are as described below:

1. The Company will retain the Monitor for a period of not less than eighteen (18) months (the “Term of the Monitorship”), unless the early termination provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (the “Agreement”) is triggered. Subject to certain conditions specified below that would, in the sole discretion of the Department, allow for an extension of the Term of the Monitorship, the Monitor shall be retained until the criteria in Paragraphs 19-20 below are satisfied or the Agreement expires, whichever occurs first.

#### *Monitor’s Mandate*

2. The Monitor’s primary responsibility is to assess and monitor the Company’s compliance with the terms of the Agreement, including the Corporate Compliance Program in Attachment C, so as to specifically address and reduce the risk of any recurrence of the Company’s misconduct. During the Term of the Monitorship, the Monitor will evaluate, in the manner set forth below, the effectiveness of the internal accounting controls, record-keeping, and financial reporting policies and procedures of the Company as they relate to the Company’s current and ongoing compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws (collectively, the “anti-corruption laws”) and take such reasonable steps as, in his or her view, may be necessary to fulfill the foregoing mandate (the “Mandate”). This Mandate shall include

an assessment of the Executive Board's and senior management's commitment to, and effective implementation of, the corporate compliance program described in Attachment C of the Agreement.

*Company's Obligations*

3. The Company shall cooperate fully with the Monitor, and the Monitor shall have the authority to take such reasonable steps as, in his or her view, may be necessary to be fully informed about the Company's compliance program in accordance with the principles set forth herein and applicable law, including applicable data protection and labor laws and regulations. To that end, the Company shall: facilitate the Monitor's access to the Company's documents and resources; not limit such access, except as provided in Paragraphs 5-6; and provide guidance on applicable local law (such as relevant data protection and labor laws). The Company shall provide the Monitor with access to all information, documents, records, facilities, and employees, as reasonably requested by the Monitor, that fall within the scope of the Mandate of the Monitor under the Agreement. The Company shall use its best efforts to provide the Monitor with access to the Company's former employees and its third-party vendors, agents, and consultants.

4. Any disclosure by the Company to the Monitor concerning corrupt payments, false books and records, and internal accounting control failures shall not relieve the Company of any otherwise applicable obligation to truthfully disclose such matters to the Department, pursuant to the Agreement.

*Withholding Access*

5. The parties agree that no attorney-client relationship shall be formed between the Company and the Monitor. In the event that the Company seeks to withhold from the Monitor access to information, documents, records, facilities, or current or former employees of the Company that may be subject to a claim of attorney-client privilege or to the attorney work-product doctrine, or where the Company reasonably believes production would otherwise be inconsistent with applicable law, the Company shall work cooperatively with the Monitor to resolve the matter to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

6. If the matter cannot be resolved, at the request of the Monitor, the Company shall promptly provide written notice to the Monitor and the Department. Such notice shall include a general description of the nature of the information, documents, records, facilities or current or former employees that are being withheld, as well as the legal basis for withholding access. The Department may then consider whether to make a further request for access to such information, documents, records, facilities, or employees.

*Monitor's Coordination with the  
Company and Review Methodology*

7. In carrying out the Mandate, to the extent appropriate under the circumstances, the Monitor should coordinate with Company personnel, including in-house counsel, compliance personnel, and internal auditors, on an ongoing basis. The Monitor may rely on the product of the Company's processes, such as the results of studies, reviews, sampling and testing methodologies, audits, and analyses conducted by or on behalf of the Company, as well as the Company's internal resources (e.g., legal, compliance, and internal audit), which can assist the

Monitor in carrying out the Mandate through increased efficiency and Company-specific expertise, provided that the Monitor has confidence in the quality of those resources.

8. The Monitor's reviews should use a risk-based approach, and thus, the Monitor is not expected to conduct a comprehensive review of all business lines, all business activities, or all markets. In carrying out the Mandate, the Monitor should consider, for instance, risks presented by: (a) the countries and industries in which the Company operates; (b) current and announced business opportunities and transactions; (c) current and announced business partners, including third parties and joint ventures, and the business rationale for such relationships; (d) the Company's gifts, travel, and entertainment interactions with foreign officials; and (e) the Company's involvement with foreign officials, including the amount of foreign government regulation and oversight of the Company, such as licensing and permitting, and the Company's exposure to customs and immigration issues in conducting its business affairs.

9. In undertaking the reviews to carry out the Mandate, the Monitor shall formulate conclusions based on, among other things: (a) inspection of relevant documents, including the Company's current anti-corruption policies and procedures; (b) on-site observation of selected systems and procedures of the Company at sample sites, including internal accounting controls, record-keeping, and internal audit procedures; (c) meetings with, and interviews of, relevant current and, where appropriate, former directors, officers, employees, business partners, agents, and other persons at mutually convenient times and places; and (d) analyses, studies, and testing of the Company's compliance program.

*Monitor's Written Work Plans*

10. To carry out the Mandate, during the Term of the Monitorship, the Monitor shall conduct an initial review and prepare an initial report, followed by at least one follow-up review and report as described in Paragraphs 16-18 below. With respect to the initial report, after consultation with the Company and the Department, the Monitor shall prepare the first written work plan within thirty (30) calendar days of being retained, and the Company and the Department shall provide comments within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of the written work plan. With respect to each follow-up report, after consultation with the Company and the Department, the Monitor shall prepare a written work plan at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to commencing a review, and the Company and the Department shall provide comments within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of the written work plan. Any disputes between the Company and the Monitor with respect to any written work plan shall be decided by the Department in its sole discretion.

11. All written work plans shall identify with reasonable specificity the activities the Monitor plans to undertake in execution of the Mandate, including a written request for documents. The Monitor's work plan for the initial review shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to conduct an effective initial review in accordance with the Mandate, including by developing an understanding, to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate, of the facts and circumstances surrounding any violations that may have occurred before the date of the Agreement. In developing such understanding the Monitor is to rely to the extent possible on available information and documents provided by the Company. It is not intended that the

Monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry into the historical events that gave rise to the Agreement.

*Initial Review*

12. The initial review shall commence no later than sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the engagement of the Monitor (unless otherwise agreed by the Company, the Monitor, and the Department). The Monitor shall issue a written report within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of commencing the initial review, setting forth the Monitor's assessment and, if necessary, making recommendations reasonably designed to improve the effectiveness of the Company's program for ensuring compliance with the anti-corruption laws. The Monitor should consult with the Company concerning his or her findings and recommendations on an ongoing basis and should consider the Company's comments and input to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate. The Monitor may also choose to share a draft of his or her reports with the Company and the Department prior to finalizing them. The Monitor's reports need not recite or describe comprehensively the Company's history or compliance policies, procedures and practices, but rather may focus on those areas with respect to which the Monitor wishes to make recommendations, if any, for improvement or which the Monitor otherwise concludes merit particular attention. The Monitor shall provide the report to the Supervisory Board of the Company and contemporaneously transmit copies to the Deputy Chief – FCPA Unit, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, at 1400 New York Avenue N.W., Bond Building, Eleventh Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005. After consultation with the Company, the Monitor may extend the time period for issuance of the initial report for a brief period of time with prior written approval of the Department.

13. Within ninety (90) calendar days after receiving the Monitor's initial report, the Company shall adopt and implement all recommendations in the report, unless, within fifteen (15) calendar days of receiving the report, the Company notifies in writing the Monitor and the Department of any recommendations that the Company considers unduly burdensome, inconsistent with applicable law or regulation, impractical, excessively expensive, or otherwise inadvisable. With respect to any such recommendation, the Company need not adopt that recommendation within the ninety (90) calendar days of receiving the report but shall propose in writing to the Monitor and the Department an alternative policy, procedure, or system designed to achieve the same objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on which the Company and the Monitor do not agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement within fifteen (15) calendar days after the Company serves the written notice.

14. In the event the Company and the Monitor are unable to agree on an acceptable alternative proposal, the Company shall promptly consult with the Department. The Department may consider the Monitor's recommendation and the Company's reasons for not adopting the recommendation in determining whether the Company has fully complied with its obligations under the Agreement. Pending such determination, the Company shall not be required to implement any contested recommendation(s).

15. With respect to any recommendation that the Monitor determines cannot reasonably be implemented within ninety (90) calendar days after receiving the report, the Monitor may extend the time period for implementation with prior written approval of the Department.

### *Follow-Up Review*

16. The follow-up review shall commence no later than ninety (90) calendar days after the issuance of the initial report (unless otherwise agreed by the Company, the Monitor and the Department). The Monitor shall issue a written follow-up report within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of commencing the follow-up review, setting forth the Monitor's assessment and, if necessary, making recommendations in the same fashion as set forth in Paragraph 12 with respect to the initial review. The Monitor shall also certify whether the Company's compliance program, including its policies and procedures, is reasonably designed and implemented to prevent and detect violations of the anti-corruption laws. After consultation with the Company, the Monitor may extend the time period for issuance of the follow-up report for a brief period of time with prior written approval of the Department.

17. Within ninety (90) calendar days after receiving the Monitor's follow-up report, the Company shall adopt and implement all recommendations in the report, unless, within fifteen (15) calendar days after receiving the report, the Company notifies in writing the Monitor and the Department concerning any recommendations that the Company considers unduly burdensome, inconsistent with applicable law or regulation, impractical, excessively expensive, or otherwise inadvisable. With respect to any such recommendation, the Company need not adopt that recommendation within the ninety (90) calendar days of receiving the report but shall propose in writing to the Monitor and the Department an alternative policy, procedure, or system designed to achieve the same objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on which the Company and the Monitor do not agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement within fifteen (15) calendar days after the Company serves the written notice.

18. In the event the Company and the Monitor are unable to agree on an acceptable alternative proposal, the Company shall promptly consult with the Department. The Department may consider the Monitor's recommendation and the Company's reasons for not adopting the recommendation in determining whether the Company has fully complied with its obligations under the Agreement. Pending such determination, the Company shall not be required to implement any contested recommendation(s).

*Certification of Compliance  
and Termination of the Monitorship*

19. At the conclusion of the ninety (90) calendar day period following the issuance of the follow-up report, if the Monitor believes that the Company's compliance program is reasonably designed and implemented to detect and prevent violations of the anti-corruption laws and is functioning effectively, the Monitor shall certify the Company's compliance with its compliance obligations under the Agreement. The Monitor shall then submit to the Department a written report ("Certification Report") within sixty (60) calendar days. The Certification Report shall set forth an overview of the Company's remediation efforts to date, including the implementation status of the Monitor's recommendations and an assessment of the sustainability of the Company's remediation efforts. The Certification Report should also recommend the scope of the Company's future self-reporting. Also at the conclusion of the ninety (90) calendar day period following the issuance of the follow-up report, the Company shall certify in writing to the Department, with a copy to the Monitor, that the Company has adopted and has implemented, or is implementing on an agreed-to schedule, all of the Monitor's recommendations in the initial and follow-up report(s), or the agreed-upon alternatives. The Monitor or the Company may

extend the time period for issuance of the Certification Report or the Company's certification, respectively, with prior written approval of the Department.

20. At such time as the Department approves the Certification Report and the Company's certification, the monitorship shall be terminated, and the Company will be permitted to self-report to the Department on its enhanced compliance obligations for the remainder of the term of the Agreement. The Department, however, reserves the right to terminate the monitorship absent certification by the Monitor, upon a showing by the Company that termination is, nevertheless, in the interests of justice.

21. If permitted to self-report to the Department, the Company shall thereafter submit to the Department a written report every six (6) months setting forth a complete description of its remediation efforts to date, its proposals to improve the Company's internal accounting controls, policies, and procedures for ensuring compliance with the anti-corruption laws, and the proposed scope of the subsequent reviews. The report shall be transmitted to the Deputy Chief – FCPA Unit, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1400 New York Avenue, N.W., Bond Building, Eleventh Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005. The Company may extend the time period for issuance of the self-report with prior written approval of the Department.

*Extension of the Term of the Monitorship*

22. If, however, at the conclusion of the ninety (90) calendar-day period following the issuance of the follow-up report, the Department concludes that the Company has not by that time successfully satisfied its compliance obligations under the Agreement, the Term of the Monitorship shall be extended for one year.

23. Under such circumstances, the Monitor shall commence the second follow-up review no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the Department concludes that the Company has not successfully satisfied its compliance obligations under the Agreement (unless otherwise agreed by the Company, the Monitor, and the Department). The Monitor shall issue a written follow-up report within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of commencing the second follow-up review in the same fashion as set forth in Paragraph 12 with respect to the initial review and in accordance with the procedures for follow-up reports set forth in Paragraphs 16-18. A determination to terminate the monitorship shall then be made in accordance with Paragraphs 19-20.

24. If, after completing the second follow-up review, the Department again concludes that the Company has not successfully satisfied its obligations under the Agreement with respect to the Monitor's Mandate, the Term of the Monitorship shall be extended until expiration of the Agreement, and the Monitor shall commence a third follow-up review within sixty (60) calendar days after the Department concludes that the Company has not successfully satisfied its compliance obligations under the Agreement (unless otherwise agreed by the Company, the Monitor, and the Department). The Monitor shall issue a written follow-up report within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of commencing the third follow-up review in the same fashion as set forth in Paragraph 12 with respect to the initial review and in accordance with the procedures for follow-up reports set forth in Paragraphs 16-18.

*Monitor's Discovery of Misconduct*

25. Should the Monitor, during the course of his or her engagement, discover that:

- corrupt or otherwise suspicious payments (or transfers of property or interests) may have been offered, promised, made, or authorized by any entity or person within the Company or any entity or person working, directly or indirectly, for or on behalf of the Company; or
- false books and records may have been maintained by the Company

either (a) after the date on which this Agreement was signed or (b) that have not been adequately dealt with by the Company (collectively "improper activities"), the Monitor shall promptly report such improper activities to the Company's General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officer, and/or Audit Committee for further action. If the Monitor believes that any improper activities may constitute a violation of law, the Monitor also shall report such improper activities to the Department. The Monitor should disclose improper activities in his or her discretion directly to the Department, and not to the Company, only if the Monitor believes that disclosure to the Company would be inappropriate under the circumstances, and in such case should disclose the improper activities to the General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officer, and/or the Audit Committee of the Company as promptly and completely as the Monitor deems appropriate under the circumstances. The Monitor shall address in his or her reports the appropriateness of the Company's response to all improper activities, whether previously disclosed to the Department or not. Further, in the event that the Company, or any entity or person working directly or indirectly for or on behalf of the Company, withholds information necessary for the performance of the Monitor's responsibilities, if the Monitor believes that such withholding is without just

cause, the Monitor shall disclose that fact to the Department. The Company shall not take any action to retaliate against the Monitor for any such disclosures or for any other reason. The Monitor may report any criminal or regulatory violations by the Company or any other entity discovered in the course of performing his or her duties, in the same manner as described above.

*Meetings During Pendency of Monitorship*

26. The Monitor shall meet with the Department within thirty (30) calendar days after providing each report to the Department to discuss the report, to be followed by a meeting between the Department, the Monitor, and the Company.

27. At least annually, and more frequently if appropriate, representatives from the Company and the Department will meet together to discuss the monitorship and any suggestions, comments, or improvements the Company may wish to discuss with or propose to the Department, including with respect to the scope or costs of the monitorship.

*Contemplated Confidentiality of Monitor's Reports*

28. The reports will likely include proprietary, financial, confidential, and competitive business information. Moreover, public disclosure of the reports could discourage cooperation, or impede pending or potential government investigations and thus undermine the objectives of the monitorship. For these reasons, among others, the reports and the contents thereof are intended to remain and shall remain non-public, except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, or except to the extent that the Department determines in its sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the Department's discharge of its duties and responsibilities or is otherwise required by law.